

SERVING AT THE PLEASURE OF THE MAYOR:
AN EXPLORATION OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IN NEW
YORK POLICE COMMISSIONER DEPARTURES 1901-2001

by

BRIAN JOSEPH RIZZO

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Criminal Justice in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
The City University of New York

2010

© 2010

BRIAN JOSEPH RIZZO

All Rights Reserved

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the
Graduate Faculty in Criminal Justice in satisfaction of the
dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Date

Todd R. Clear
Chair of Examining Committee

Date

Karen Terry
Executive Officer,
Doctoral Program in Criminal Justice

Hans Toch

Richard Culp

Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Abstract

Serving at the Pleasure of the Mayor: An Exploration of Political Involvement in New York Police Commissioner Departures 1901-2001

by

Brian Joseph Rizzo

Adviser: Todd R. Clear

In 1901 New York City abolished the bi-partisan Board of Police Commissioners and replaced it with a single headed police commissioner. This legislation was intended to remove politics from policing and affixed a police commissioner's term at five years absent removal for the public interest by the mayor. Through a historical, political and institutional context, the present study explored mayoral involvement in the departure of all former New York Police Commissioners (N=40) between 1901 and 2001. Variations of the following areas found in the literature were included in the analysis; Wilson's police executive selection, Enter's police executive career path, Bynander and Hart's executive succession and Mastrofski's police governance. Two new areas were added to the extant policing literature; "Police Independence" (Professional, Autonomist, Antagonist) which measured the police commissioner's criticism of the mayor at the time of his departure, and "Civilian Control" (Political, Latent Political, Non-Political) which measured the mayor's level of involvement in police commissioner departures. Tepid support for Wilson's (1968) link between local political culture and police style was found using qualitative and quantitative measures. Historically, the study found that despite a mayor being actively

engaged in police affairs, political involvement was not the leading cause of police commissioner departures. Multiple manifest rationales were cited for police commissioner departures and numerous latent reasons were identified which revealed underlying political involvement. The average police commissioner tenure was half the City Charter's stipulated five year term and 63% of successions were mid-term. During the period of the study the relationship between the police commissioner and the mayor progressed from servitude to estrangement to, ultimately, accountability and oversight. An informal tradition was identified which was exhibited by police commissioner's decision to resign rather than invoke the City Charter to complete an unexpired term. This tradition which allowed a new mayor the pleasure of selecting his own man not only disregarded the letter of the 1901 legislation intended to protect and insulate incumbent police commissioners from induced political departures, but also violated its spirit to separate politics from policing. These findings are generalizable only to New York City. Future research should focus on municipalities with different political/police structures.

“If one advances confidently in the direction of one's dreams, and endeavors to live the life which one has imagined, one will meet with a success unexpected in common hours.”

– Henry David Thoreau

To Gretchen,

You made it possible for me to live the life I imagined.

In memory of:

Sergeant Ralph Barbato
Police Officer John Perry

Acknowledgements

“Education is hanging round till you catch on.”

- Robert Frost

To my committee, friends all, you made this work immeasurably better with your wisdom and only my obstinacy kept this work from being better and allowing us to wrap it up much earlier. To my Chair Todd R. Clear thanks for everything. I especially want to thank you for stepping into the breach when duty called. Keep “chooglin!” To my other “distinguished” committee member, Hans Toch, SUNY Albany, who represented upstate New York, I’m honored you accepted the invitation to serve on my committee. You went above and beyond what was expected and I’m forever grateful. To Rick Culp, I’m glad you were there in the end. You’re a gentleman and I really appreciate your willingness to skype from the Serengeti to get me out. Thanks!

To Edwin P. Hollander, who taught about leadership, thank-you. To James B. Isenberg, who granted permission to reproduce excerpts, thank-you. To the gang at Westfield State College who put up with the insanity, thanks.

To my parents, Mary and Mike, I know I took my own path through life. I hope this makes up for some of the headaches I may have caused along the way.

To Peeps, Reno, and Nezzzy, thanks for jumping on the keyboard and desk, blocking the screen, sitting on books and drafts, and just keeping me company in the wee hours.

Finally, to my wife Dr. Gretchen Bickerstaff, thank-you doesn’t even come close to expressing how fortunate I am to have you in my life. I know you

wanted this self-indulgent ordeal to end even more than I did. I love you so very much. THANKS, Sweet Pea!

I've waited almost fifty years to say this for the last time, "School's out for Summer, School's out FOREVER!" Thanks, Alice Cooper!

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction.....	1
Statement of the Problem.....	6
Chapter 2: Review of the Literature.....	9
Civilian Control Versus Professional Autonomy.....	12
Police Governance.....	16
Politics/Administration Dichotomy.....	19
Chief Political Executive.....	24
Municipal Legislation.....	32
Police Evolution.....	37
Political Era.....	39
Reform Era.....	40
Professional Era.....	42
Community Era.....	43
Professional Police Model.....	48
Progressives, Reformers and the Police.....	50
Chief Police Executive.....	55
Chief Police Executive Selection	56
Chief Police Executive Departure	63
New York Police Commissionership.....	65
Research Questions	74
Chapter 3: Data and Methodology.....	76
Thesis.....	76

Methods.....	77
Coding.....	83
Selection of Cases.....	86
Reliability and Validity.....	86
Weaknesses and Limitations.....	90
Chapter 4: Analysis.....	93
Departure.....	97
Police Independence.....	101
Civilian Control.....	102
Selection	105
Local Political Culture.....	108
Policy.....	109
James Q. Wilson's Theory	111
Civilian Control Versus Professional Autonomy	117
Chapter 5: Discussion.....	120
Chapter 6: Police Commissioner Term Summaries	150
From 300 Mulberry to One Police Plaza	150
Political Period: The Single Headed Police Commissioner 1901-2001..	151
Reform Period: Removal of Politics Post Wickersham 1926-1950....	180
Professional Period: The Fall of Tammany Hall 1951-1975	214
Community Period: Practical Experience Preferred 1976-2001.....	256
Chapter 7: Conclusion	305
Contribution to the Literature	309

Future Directions for Research.....	310
End Notes to Police Commissioner Term Summaries	312
Appendices:	
Appendix A: Police Commissioner Profiles.....	345
Appendix B: New York City Mayors 1901-2001.....	385
Appendix C: New York City Police Commissioners Terms 1901-2001.....	386
Appendix D: Progression of Mayoral Involvement	389
Appendix E: Coterminous New York City Mayor and Police Commissioner Dyads	391
Appendix F: Coding Definitions.....	393
Appendix G: James Isenberg Police Chief Interviews.....	401
Bibliography.....	405

List of Tables

4.1.	Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables.....	93
4.2.	Latent Departure by Manifest Departure.....	99
4.3.	Civilian Control by Period.....	101
4.4.	Police Independence By Period.....	102
4.5.	Civilian Control by Police Governance	103
4.6.	Police Governance by Period.....	104
4.7.	Police Governance by Police Commissioner Selection Type.....	106
4.8.	Selection Type by Period.....	108
4.9.	Police Governance by Police Independence.....	109
4.10.	Police Policy by Period.....	109
4.11.	Civilian Control by Police Independence.....	110
4.12.	Political Culture and Police Independence.....	113
4.13.	Political Culture and Selection Type.....	114
4.14.	Political Culture and Civilian Control	115
4.15.	Political Culture and Policy.....	116
4.16.	Mean Scores for Selected Variables: Professional Autonomy Versus Civilian Control	118

Chapter One

Introduction

In a democracy, the police are accountable to the public first and foremost. The public holds the police accountable through their elected officials. In turn, elected officials hold the police accountable through the chief police executive. When elected officials are remiss in their duty to hold the police accountable it can be deleterious to the public weal and manifests itself in various acts upon the citizenry, including: disrespect and discourtesy, abuse of authority, excessive force, civil rights violations, unequal enforcement of the law, official misconduct, brutality, corruption, and deadly physical force. To ensure the police are applying one uniform and consistent policy for all citizens, it is essential that the elected official appoint as head of the police department an individual who will not succumb to the wiles of politicians; an individual who is apolitical, professional, and autonomous.

In the history of American policing, this ideal has not always been the case as political interference by crooked politicians and criminals has played too prominent a role. At the turn of the twentieth century the police were especially corrupt and controlled by the local political machines. Police reform efforts at this time were intended to eliminate all forms of politics exemplified by graft, extortion, blackmail, patronage, election fraud, etc. from policing. When Theodore Roosevelt was appointed to the New York Police Board of Commissioners in 1895 he believed he could eliminate political interference in policing and run an efficient and honest police department which serves all

citizens equally (1914, 172). In New York City, for Roosevelt and others, the aspired ideal was a non-partisan police force established and maintained through civil service procedures. In an attempt to bring non-partisanship to policing, in 1901 New York City abolished the four-member bi-partisan Police Board of Commissioners and placed the ultimate responsibility for running the police department in a single head accountable to the mayor for his selection, retention and removal.

Since the inception of this legislative change in 1901, how has this arrangement between the mayor, who represents civilian control of the police, and the police commissioner, who represents professional autonomy, worked? Has politics been eliminated from policing in New York? In what circumstances would a mayor decide to exercise his power of dismissal? When would a police commissioner choose not to be complicit in implementing policy he deemed as the result of the machinations of “political interference?” Would a police commissioner stand on principle and opt to exercise his prerogative to resign from office if he believed his ethics and morals were challenged by the administration’s policies? Can a chief police executive hold a chief political executive accountable by exposing undue involvement in police affairs?

The present study explores this line of inquiry which is as pertinent today as it was in 1901. Ruchelman examined police governance and shed some light on the problem politicians, particularly mayors, face between their desire to be involved in police affairs and the perception of political interference (Big, 39).

In 1929 President Herbert Hoover convened the first national review of

the police situation. The National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on the Police (1931) placed the blame for police corruption and inefficiency squarely on political interference by mayors and corrupt politicians. More popularly known as the Wickersham Commission after its chairman George Wickersham the commission proclaimed, “The chief evil...lies in the short term of a service of the chief or executive head of the police force and in his being subject while in office to the control by politicians in the discharge of his duties” (1).

James Q. Wilson was the first scholar to link local political culture to policing style. Wilson observed that the selection of a police chief most reflects the political culture of a community (Varieties). By implication, wouldn't the local political culture also manifest itself in the departure of the police chief? What circumstances, warranted or not, have precipitated the departure of the chief police executive? What role does politics play in driving out the chief police executive?

Historically, how have politics and police mixed in the United States? We know that at the beginning of the twentieth century, the relationship of the police and the politician was one of servitude. As the century progressed, this relationship became one of estrangement, and today the relationship of the police to the politician is one of accountability. Each specific relationship corresponds, with some overlap, to the three widely accepted eras of policing which Kelling and Moore described: Political, Professional, and Community. These different eras were the result of external forces that affected change in the police function,

representing a national, or macro-policing trend and on a micro level, the type of policing practiced in each local jurisdiction.

The U.S. Department of Justice counts nearly 13,000 local police departments (Sourcebook, 37). In American policing there is no national police force, nor a formal, centralized system for coordinating or regulating all the different agencies and leaves primary responsibility for the police function with local governments. How is the police executive's departure affected by political involvement, or interference? What accounted for the departure of New York Police Commissioner Bugher (1918) twenty-three days after he was appointed, or Commissioner Valentine to remain eleven years (1934-1945)?

The Wickersham Commission's Report on Police recognized the deleterious effect politics had on the tenure of the chief police executive and included ten recommendations to "professionalize," and reform policing. Carte and Carte (67) indicate the top two recommendations focused on the removal of politics from policing and the independence of the police function:

1. The corrupting influence of politics should be removed from the police organization.
2. The head of the department should be selected at large for competence, a leader, preferably a man of considerable experience, and removable from office only after preferment of charges and a public hearing (140).

Perhaps more telling is what the report did not say. It did not say that

“politics” should be removed from the police organization, but only its “corrupting influence.” Was August Vollmer, who authored the police executive section of the report, implying police governance is very much a political activity? If so, the need to explore the relationship between the police and the politician is necessary in order to understand when “politics” is more akin to political direction and guidance than political interference. The former is simply good police governance, but the latter often results in the departure of the chief police executive. Vollmer was explicit in his recommendation to increase police executive tenure by not removing police executives without due process. However, despite Vollmer’s concerns, political pressure remained the leading cause of police executive departures (Tunnell and Gaines; Rainguet and Dodge).

The police have always answered to a higher authority in the form of civilian boards, commissions, elected official(s), public safety directors, and city managers. The politician, oftentimes the mayor at whose pleasure the police executive serves, views his involvement in police affairs as exercising civilian control, providing direction, and holding the police executive accountable. But, when does any political pressure and interference actually result in forcing a police executive to resign? Some police executives will claim professional autonomy and resist all political pressure, resulting in a showdown with their political boss. Oftentimes resignations due to political pressure are publicly attributed to other causes i.e. family, other employment, or health. A resignation of this sort that is not played out in the media benefits both parties; the political executive benefits by inducing the police executive to resign without

a public trial, and the police executive benefits by “voluntarily” resigning and avoiding the humiliation of being “fired.”

Statement of the Problem

This study explored the relationship between political involvement and the police on a micro level by focusing on two primary actors: the chief political executive, and the chief police executive. The elected official sets policy. The police chief implements policy. When the two are in sync, and assuming the policy is good policy, the relationship between the two men should be strong. When the two are at odds over a given policy this relationship will suffer.

In this study, attention was focused on the chief political executive’s role in a chief police executive departure. How a difference of opinion is resolved often determined how the police chief vacated his office. In these instances of politically “induced” resignations, the manifest reason (i.e. new employment) masked a more convoluted latent reason (i.e. political interference). The departure of a police chief was a watershed moment that encapsulated the tone of the relationship with his political superior.

When chief police executives choose to resign rather than carry out an administration policy that challenges his principles, and publicly declares his displeasure, perhaps only then will police chiefs begin to hold politicians accountable and make it a two-way relationship.

The removal of corrupt politics from policing is a recurrent theme in the police reform literature (Smith; Fosdick; Fogelson; Walker, Critical). Although

overt corrupt and partisan politics in the area of police executive selection and removal are clearly defined, the less obvious distinction between political direction and political interference (O'Brien) which often results in a police executive's departure, remains ambiguous. According to the police historian Samuel Walker "the tension between professional expertise and public control over the police forms one of the dominant themes of recent police history" (Critical, 68).

In 1967, almost forty years after the Wickersham Commission presented its report, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (Katzenbach Commission) warned regarding police governance that "we are now in a period of uncertainty as to the best relationship between police and the city government" (15). The President's Commission acknowledged a "strong formal commitment to local control of law enforcement in this country," but professed, "the actual means for exerting control [have] become quite obscure" (30). In addition, researchers (Mastrofski; Tunnel and Gaines) suggested that the role of the chief political executive and chief police executive in the area of police governance has not been completely resolved.

In 2001, police scholar David H. Bayley headed a team of researchers to identify and report to the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) how the United States should proceed in "[reforming] police forces abroad so as to support the development of democracy" (3). Bayley reminded us that the paramount duty of the police is to adhere to the rule of law and not to "serve the interests of government," or by "directions given arbitrarily by particular regimes and their

members” (13-14). But, throughout the history of American policing, municipal governments have tried various formulations in an attempt to control the police.

Fosdick listed some of these iterations:

partisan boards, bi-partisan boards, and non-partisan boards; they have lodged the appointment of their heads of police in the hands of governors, legislatures, mayors, common councils, boards of public works, attorney generals, judges of the circuit court, probate judges, state auditors, state commissioners of public buildings, and the people themselves....(110)

Many of these variations still exist in police governance in different jurisdictions. Apparently, one model does not fit all. The following sections explore the literature regarding the development of the relationship between the police and politics, and more specifically, the relationship between the chief police executive and the chief political executive.

Chapter Two

Review of the Literature

Stephen D. Mastrofski examined the role of level of involvement by external political agents in developing and overseeing police policy. Mastrofski identified three models of the proper role of these political agents vis-à-vis the police and explored the applicability of these models labeled “political activist,” “professional autonomy,” and “team,” to existing 1977 Police Services Study (PSS) data (police departments in the Rochester, St. Louis, and Tampa-St. Petersburg metropolitan areas (N=24)). Mastrofski interviewed police administrators, government officials and political leaders, heads of citizen and neighborhood groups active in police issues, and monitored newspaper stories and noted that many factors can affect the relationship between the politician and the police including the “personalities and capabilities of the individuals involved” (16). In the study, police governance was operationalized by function: policy formulation and oversight of daily operations. Policy formulation was defined as “decisions about organizational goals and strategies to achieve them,” and oversight as “monitoring operations to assess the quality of conformance to expectations” (17). Although Mastrofski characterized his analysis as “descriptive,” he concluded that simply finding of variation in governing style increases the probability that local officials are important in shaping police service (28).

Kenneth D. Tunnell and Larry K. Gaines examined the degree of political interference or pressure exerted by public officials on two groups of Kentucky

police chiefs, predecessor chiefs (N=113) and incumbent chiefs (N=115). The authors looked at the location or areas of political interference and its impact on police executives. They found that political pressure resulted in the departure of over fifty percent (53 %) of the predecessor chiefs. This figure included the categories “political pressure” (44%) and “demoted” (9%). This information was gained by querying the incumbent chiefs about their recollections and assertions of what they believed to be the reason for their predecessor’s departure. The reasons given for the predecessor chiefs’ departure included: retired due to political pressure (9.7%); resigned due to political pressure (16.8%); terminated by the government (17.7 %); and, demoted within the department (8.8%).

Further, incumbent police chiefs reported that they experienced mayoral pressure in 21% of personnel decisions, 15.8 % in promotion decisions, and 23% of personnel assignments. The figures were slightly higher for arrest and enforcement (28%), and perform special services (27%) respectively. The most striking and relevant finding of this study, and most relevant to the present study, is that incumbent police chiefs reported encountering political pressure 23% of the time. Incumbent police chiefs may be reluctant to claim political pressure as evidenced by the 77% of respondents who reported no political pressure.

Fred W. Rainguet and Mary Dodge found that police executives cited political pressure as being one reason among others for their departures. In fact, “political difficulties” were cited in 70% of the cases. Other reasons for police chief departures included health (40%), family concerns (30%), stress (50%), personnel issues (40%), and, new position (40%). Although the small sample

(N=10) may limit the generalizability of these findings, they indicate a trend regarding political pressure and that its link to police executive departures still exists.

In 1967, a second national blue ribbon commission was convened by President Johnson, like the Wickersham Commission forty years earlier, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (Katzenbach Commission) issued a General Report. Included was one volume, the Task Force Report: The Police, which was devoted entirely to the police function. The Commission recognized that not only is there a need for external oversight and accountability of the police, but that there must be a "rethinking of the relationship between the police and...local government officials" (32).

Regarding the specific involvement of the Mayor or City Council in policymaking, the Task Force report stated:

It may be helpful, in the long-range interest of law enforcement, to involve local officials in the process of developing enforcement policies...

Although this involvement of city government may give rise to concern over "political influence," the risk of improper influence is minimized by the fact that the involvement is open to view. The vice of political influence of an earlier day was that it tended to be...secretive. (33)

Walker recognized the political process as a means of police accountability. However, regarding politics and the police, Walker was less

confident that the process worked all the time and cited mayors as being especially vulnerable to external politics due to a lack of understanding regarding the police function (New World, 8).

If, as Walker contended, mayors are disengaged in the business of policing, whether desired or not, then the police executive is left to his own devices to administer the police affairs. The next section examines the tug-of-war between civilian control of the police as represented by the elected official, and professional autonomy as represented by the police executive.

Civilian Control Versus Professional Autonomy

The issue of civilian control versus professional autonomy lies at the crux of the tone and tenor of the relationship between an elected politician and a police chief. Walker described police governance as “the tension between professional expertise and public control over the police” (Critical, 68). According to Wilson, the relationship between the appointer and the appointee “ranges somewhere between benign neglect and active hostility” and “the costs of having the agency appear to be under his [the mayor] control exceed the benefits of that control (Bureaucracy, 199).

The Katzenbach Commission (1968) was concerned that the police had now gone too far in the direction of professional autonomy to counteract the politics of an earlier time and included in its final report the following about the relationship between the government and the police:

The record of involvement by elected officials in police operations, to the detriment of both the efficiency and effectiveness of the police establishment, has had a lasting and somewhat negative impact on the lines of control between the citizenry and the police...(30).

However, despite the earlier abuses of political interference the Commission advocated political involvement as good police governance and accountability “the operations of the police, like the operations of any other administrative agency that exercises governmental authority, must be subject to effective legislative, executive, and judicial review and control” (30). As Manning pointed out, “in theory, the American police are apolitical.... In practice, however, police organizations function in a public political arena, and their mandate is politically defined” (115).

Thirty-five years after the Wickersham Commission called “political control by politicians in the discharge of the police executives’ duties” the “chief evil,” the area of police governance remains unsettled. The type and magnitude of political involvement in police department affairs remains the most contentious issue facing a political executive, particularly in the areas of personnel, discipline, operations, and tactics which are traditionally considered the purview of the police executive.

John T. O’Brien attempted to delineate where political direction ends and interference begins and blamed the problem of “interacting and sometimes conflicting roles of the elected executive and the chief of police” on the

“haphazard growth of American local government” (394). Regarding the political executive’s reluctance to even give the appearance of interference, O’Brien stated, “that the better, or at least the safer, policy is one of non-involvement, and [the political executive] adopts a Jeffersonian ideal, and thus avoids any charges of political interference (396). Potts added, “imbroglios over police policy will often be politically impudent even for the truly concerned mayor. The costs of appearing partisan are too high” (14).

There is an ongoing debate among politicians, police chiefs, academics, and others concerning the degree to which the power to direct local police affairs should be ceded by mayors and the political establishment in favor of independent boards, monitors, inspectors general, commissions, or quasi-judicial bodies like some citizen review boards (Stone and Bobb). This debate, in fact, has taken place for over one hundred years and this conflict between the police chief and the political executive has centered in many different areas of police administration, including recruitment, selection, training, promotion, conditions of service, unions, discipline, and employee relations (O’Brien, 394).

In an attempt to reconcile this conflict about political involvement and find a solution, William Geller assembled politicians, police chiefs, and academics and posed the following two questions, “Who runs the police, and Who should” (3). Almost twenty years earlier, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police posed a similar question, “To whom is a police agency responsible?” and perhaps in a somewhat defeated tone concluded, “While there is a very strong formal

commitment to local control of law enforcement in this country, the actual means for exerting control has become quite obscure” (30). One highly regarded police executive acknowledged the difficulty and the blurring of lines between the professional and personal relationship between a chief political executive and a police chief (Murphy, 32). Richard Brzeczek, former Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department observed that no clear set of rules exist to define the relationship between the mayor and the police chief because of the uniqueness of the individuals involved and the situations which emerge during the administration (50).

Tunnell and Gaines examined “political pressures and influences on police executives,” and concluded, “What is becoming increasingly clear...is that we know very little about this political process” (14). This is quite a dramatic statement to be made in the last decade of the twentieth century, since as early as the beginning of twentieth century police reformers wrangled with the problem of how to rid the police of the politics of corruption, partisanship, and patronage.

In 1931, the matter was clearly still unresolved when the Wickersham Commission released its report that recommended the elimination of partisan politics from policing. Although the recommendation was both sound and necessary, the Wickersham Commission provided no guidelines for future police governance. Thus, the police executive and the politician were left to their own devices to come up with a workable arrangement to govern police. The next section explores the evolution of police governance in American policing.

Police Governance

Not until the 1950's, twenty years after the Wickersham Commission, were police executives successful in gaining a modicum of autonomy and independence. In fact, the police were so successful at distancing themselves from the politicians that in 1967 the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (President's Crime Commission) warned, "in many cities the elected officials no longer accepted responsibility for the conduct of the police force" (cited in Fogelson, 223). According to William H. Hudnut III, "the art of governing a local community requires a commitment to take bad politics out of the police department while putting the right kind back in" (20). Politics would remain despite what Kelling and Moore in their examination of police history stated that "axioms in the field of policing are not timeless truths, but rather choices made by former police leaders" and cited as an example the axiom that guided police administration post-Wickersham, "effectiveness in policing depends on distancing police departments from politics" (2). This notion has been and still is in some locales the accepted practice or rule regarding the police function. Banfield and Wilson explained that many jurisdictions attempted to remove politics from policing through legislation, but an unintended effect was a mayor's reluctance to give direction and provide leadership (217) out of fear of being accused of political interference.

Despite what is an accepted truism regarding politics and police, that the two remain completely divergent, William Ker Muir took an opposing view and argued that the police should not be removed from politics and instead should

“engage vigorously in elective politics,” by “join[ing] political parties, enter[ing] into coalitions, becom[ing] a part of political clubs, writ[ing] to newspapers, work[ing] for candidates and run[ning] for office....” (Police and Politics, 3) Muir continued “politics...takes the police out of their stations...In politics police touch base with persons of every walk of life” (7). To avoid the possibility that the return of the police into politics would resurrect the political abuses of the past, Muir offered three suggestions: diligence on the part of journalists, external police review, and professional training (9).

Historically, a loose framework existed which described those areas which were the purview of the chief political executive, and those areas which were the responsibility of the chief police executive. Where a problem has sometimes arisen was when the chief political executive did not even engage in those practices which were clearly his responsibility for fear of being charged with political interference. On the other hand, police officials so intent on not being a party to the appearance of partisan influence, literally shunned “all political and non-professional influence” (Potts, 13).

The President’s Crime Commission (1967) who addressed this area of police governance and civilian control of the police at the time observed “Fear of being accused of political interference...have often resulted in the mayor abdicating all responsibility for police operations by granting complete autonomy to his police department” (30). According to Walker an elected official could “disclaim responsibility for police problems, when expedient, and a police chief could resist reform proposals advanced by dissident groups on the grounds of

political pressure” (Critical, 170). Despite an apparent estrangement between the police and the politician throughout the forties and fifties this arrangement fostered an era of supposed professional autonomy and political independence for policing. This supposition came under heightened scrutiny in the next decade.

During the 1960’s, as crime increased nationally, criminologists began questioning traditional policing practices. These academics, representing the fields of political science, sociology and psychology dared ask, “What do the police do?” and “Are the police doing what they say they do?” It became apparent that the police, who marketed themselves as professional “crime fighters,” were not doing what they claimed. External stakeholders (i.e. elected officials, clergy, community activists, academics, etc.) became more vocal and began expressing what “they want the police to do.” The police function would be transformed in the 1980’s and the police “officially” assumed responsibility for more than just crime fighting. Community relations would become the new “politics.” Now, the police in partnership with the community it is sworn to serve, would become “problem solvers” (Goldstein; Toch and Grant). This latest evolution into community relations ushered the police out of the Professional Period and into the Community Period; the former based on separation/divorce, while the latter, on domestic partnership/marriage with the public.

According to Bass, limiting avenues for external influence from political leaders and the public was the linchpin of the professional model. This “linchpin” eventually slipped out of place, and the locking mechanism of the new professional model was now increased police accountability to and oversight from

elected officials, external organizations, and the entire electorate. Hence, elected officials mindful of not only their constituencies' "fear of crime," but also their "votes" became more involved in the daily affairs of policing. The police grudgingly emerged from the privacy and safety of their "professional" cocoon, and began operating in a public "open environment, or system" (see Hudzik and Cordner, 88).

After twenty years of resisting political intervention by evoking the professional label the police began willy-nilly relinquishing some of their coveted autonomy and independence. Leonard Ruchelman asked, "What avenue of control should be developed - should the mayor, city council, state or federal government, or a civilian review board insure that the police become responsive once again to societal or parochial concerns?" Ruchelman continued somewhat forebodingly, "How, once the independence of police departments has been breached, can communities prevent a return to the days of bossism and political corruption?" (Who Rules, 243). The next section examines Ruchelman's lament that it was an all or nothing proposition.

Politics/Administration Dichotomy

Woodrow Wilson's politics/administration dichotomy addressed the separation of those who make policy and those who carry out policy. O'Brien while acknowledging the denunciation of the dichotomy since its inception, attempted to explain the balancing act which mayors encounter more with the police than any other municipal department and offered some solutions, "the

administrative dichotomy of executive direction without political interference is an increasing problem” (397) and “there must be a decision as to the respective realms of each and those areas of joint responsibility” (400). O’Brien ultimately warned that “we can no longer permit the mayor and police chief to hammer out policies between them without rules or parameters to guide them” (401).

Another observer stated that the police may not be bound by traditional public administration tenets, “As a result of political and cultural factors, police administration has been cut off from the mainstream of general public administration” (Potts, 12).

What form should the governance of the police take? Should the relationship between the chief political executive and the chief police executive be formalized? Mastrofski posited that the themes of the writings of the police scholar Herman Goldstein which stated that “the police are poorly governed to the extent that they are governed at all” may apply intimating that this area is ripe for review. Potts, using survey data collected by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), found that “chief’s opinions on what factors influence their superiors’ evaluations of them differed from what the superiors themselves indicated” (18). Potts referred to the discrepancies as “misunderstandings,” and pondered how much better their professional relations would be if “both knew what the other was thinking” (18).

In order to limit these misunderstandings and the problems they contribute to the police/politician relationship, Allen H. Andrews, Jr. is in favor of formal legislation which clearly delineates the roles of both parties (7). Cyril D.

Robinson agrees that if such a plan was in place it would be the politician's responsibility for its enactment, "A strong mayor would both direct the police chief in the pursuance of these goals and accept responsibility for the failure of the department to achieve the defined objectives" (308).

If the police executive truly enjoyed professional autonomy and independence, these commentators' vision for a formal structuring of the political/police relationship might be possible. Other commentators, however, are not so optimistic that a formalized relationship between the political and police executive is possible. There is a popular misconception that police chiefs have a free hand in running their departments (Geller).

Erving Goffman coined the term "impression management" to label what he believed was the continuous playing of various roles by individuals in order to present themselves favorably. Police executives may employ this technique to create the illusion of maintaining "the appearance of being apolitical" (Manning, Sykes). Price concluded that police chiefs used the "rhetoric of professionalism" as one of the strategies of appearing to be apolitical. This technique was employed in a defensive manner to protect the police institution from outside forces. According to Price, politicians satisfied by the rhetoric of professionalism offered by police leaders were able to legitimize their lack of involvement in police affairs (4). The professional moniker when applied to the police may be misleading in terms of whether the police truly have gained professional autonomy and independence (Sykes, 138).

Perhaps the strongest criticism regarding the relationship between the

chief political executive and chief police executive comes from Robinson who examined events over a forty year span to support his thesis that the political role of the police is to “shield the mayor from responsibility for problems,” (277) and “accept the punishment” (278) that might otherwise be directed at the mayor. Is Robinson implying the police leader is employing an impression management? Robinson asserted that the independence of the police is a public image designed to protect the mayor. The most extreme case of protection and punishment experienced by a police executive would be his public dismissal. Less political would be a behind the scenes “negotiated” resignation induced by mayoral pressure, whether manifest or latent, which is exerted on the police executive.

A resignation which resulted from this indirect political interference from city hall is, in effect, a de facto dismissal. Banfield and Wilson (1963) illustrated how this can occur in the relationship between a city manager and the city council:

it is normally “good politics” for councilmen to maneuver the manager into taking, or seeming to take, responsibility for risky or controversial measures...their strategy, consequently, is to avoid “rocking the boat.” If the boat must be rocked, they want the public to think that the city manager’s hand is on the tiller. If all goes well, they can take credit later with the electorate. If not, they can blame him and perhaps even make “political capital” by firing him. (175)

Renford Reese in his study of leadership in the LAPD believed few public sector leaders can effectively lead without successfully fusing politics and administration (xiii). Reese believes public sector leaders need to possess “political savvy” (59) to walk the tightrope between internal administration and external politics. Goodsell coined the term “political professionalism” to acknowledge that politicians and public managers should be politically involved and embrace a politics that serves the public interest.

Reese examined how Los Angeles police chiefs balanced the interests and concerns of various constituencies in what he metaphorically referred to as “walking the tightrope.” Reese examined how well the police chief handled both the internal and external forces which can affect or influence a police chief’s tenure. For example, Chief Parker, as well as his successor, Chief Davis mastered the balancing act between the public and the rank and file. Chief Gates, who succeeded Davis was beloved by the LAPD, but lost the public’s adoration. Conversely, Gates’ successors, Chiefs Williams, and Parks, gained the public’s acceptance, but lost the department’s confidence. Ultimately, Chief Bratton, the last chief in the study was described as “gifted with the ability to make ‘the connection’ with the public and the rank and file; he is perfectly suited to walk the public leadership tightrope” (154).

The one constituent that the police executive must never ignore and must always placate is the individual who appointed him. Today, lifetime tenures for police chiefs are rare, particularly in the major US cities. Los Angeles abolished lifetime tenure for its police chiefs in 1992. As police chiefs are subordinate to

the elected official, the onus is on the elected official to set the tone and tenor of the relationship. The next section examines the chief political executive.

Chief Political Executive

Former Police Board President Theodore Roosevelt (1895-1897) believed that successful executives pick good men on the merits and then are able to leave them alone to get the job done. But, this is easier said than done. In most large cities the mayor is the chief political executive. Since its incorporation in 1898, Greater New York City has had a strong mayor/council system of government. In their classic study of New York City politics, Sayre and Kaufman (as cited in Ruchelman, *Big City*, 182) vividly described the selection process of department heads by the mayor:

The Mayor may move quickly, making the appointment before the pressures have had an opportunity to form. He may delay, hoping that undesirable nominees will lose support. He may test the strength of candidates and their sponsors by encouraging rumors that this or that prospect is being considered. He may resort to ‘high prestige’ candidates, selected on his own initiative, to avoid appointing candidates of lesser public standing urged upon him by influential public participants. Or he may change the traditional qualifications for a particular post, specifying new standards of selection which throw the customary participants off balance, forcing them to seek new types of candidates more to the Mayor’s liking.

This description accurately captures the dance mayors engage in when selecting a police commissioner. The Mayor has the sole authority to select the chief police executive, often cited as the most important political appointment (Wilson; Guyot). Wilson understood that politics trump policy when deciding who to select for an executive leadership position (Bureaucracy, 199). This relationship between the chief political executive and the police executive must recognize each other’s role in police governance. Although both roles must maintain their independence, they must also be interdependent. The mayor, for example, should be part of the “police management team” and the police chief must be part of the “municipal management team” (15). At times, this accommodation may cause conflict. One study, found that Atlanta Mayor

Maynard Jackson's (1974-1981) goal of political control of the police at times conflicted with his goal of police professionalism (James, 78).

Mastrofski (1988) identified three models of police governance in the reform literature: professional autonomy, political activist, and team. Professional autonomy advocated minimal intrusion by outside officials in police affairs. Political activist emphasized the need for external political control of the police, and team exemplified an active partnership with frequent communication and collaboration between the politician and the professional in an active partnership. Mastrofski applied these models to the Police Services Study (1977) data collected on twenty-four police departments, and included a sample (n=62) of mayors, council members, managers, police boards, and commissions in order to "explore the applicability of these models," and the "variation in governing styles...by examining patterns in the political and demographic structure..." (12)

Mastrofski found that "a diversity of approaches in local police governance exists, simple characterizations of governing style are inadequate, and simple political and demographic structural styles are inadequate for explaining variation in style of police governance." He concluded that "simply finding variation in governing style increased the probability that local officials are important in shaping police service--not just through the selection of their chief but by their involvement in the department's policies and daily practices" (28).

In the council/manager form of government, an appointed city manager is responsible for the day to day municipal operations including the police department. Krimmel and Lindenmuth surveyed Pennsylvania municipal

managers' perceptions of the performance of police chiefs they directly supervised on 45 different leadership attributes and performance indicators. Police chiefs who possessed professional training (i.e. FBI National Academy), and/or higher education levels, received significantly higher ratings as did those police chiefs who were promoted from within the police department (480).

The relationship between New York Mayor Edward I. Koch and Police Commissioner Robert McGuire serves as a model for what a strong relationship between a chief political and chief police executive. In the five years that Koch and McGuire were responsible for police governance there was nary a single public incident which indicated any friction, discontent, or other strain between these two men. New York Mayor Koch was ever mindful to keep politics out of police decisions. In his autobiography Koch recounted a story which clearly illustrated this point:

At the...meeting, it was mentioned...people in Crown Heights were...getting inadequate police protection while the Lubavitcher Rebbe...was ...getting special protection....I said...I would have it checked out. I asked Bob McGuire if what they allege is true, and he said it was....I asked him to find out whether that police car was required on the basis of a police decision or was it there as a result of a political decision....McGuire came in with a written report....the first car had been put in front of the synagogue in 1966 by Mayor Lindsay....a second car had been placed in front of the Rebbe's home by Mayor Beame in 1977...The police report...said...on the basis of manpower formulas, neither car should be there....McGuire said, 'If you want them there, they will stay. But our study shows they should not be there. I told McGuire to get rid of them right away (78-79).

In another instance which involved sit-in demonstrators at a Harlem Hospital, Koch again exhibited his governing style that politics should not be the basis of sound police policy:

During our meeting, Bob McGuire told us the Intelligence Division...has advised him...agitators were looking for a confrontation with the police...McGuire said he thought the sit-ins should be removed at 3 A.M. that night....I said to McGuire...‘If you think the demonstrators should be removed, that is a police judgment and I will concur. This cannot be a political decision. It must be based on security grounds.’...McGuire said, ‘It is a police decision.’ (216-217)

Ruchelman conducted a comparative study of police and politics in three US cities: New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia. He examined the influence of different political actors on police policy. The chief political executive, and the chief police executive are two such actors. Another actor included the police department rank and file, who Ruchelman identified as a “power bloc.” Ruchelman recognized the police associations and unions as a separate political force of influence, “As a power bloc in its own right, the police have a stake in the political process...police politics affect community politics” (Police Politics, 3). In assessing the impact of police on the political environment Ruchelman focused on three areas: civil review and accountability of the police, law and order, and police-community relations. After identifying key participants and assessing their behavior in the police jurisdictions of New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia from 1966-1969. Ruchelman posited three models of police politics:

Model 1. New York City: Mayor-Police War:

Through legal suits, referendum battles and lobbying, the organized police bureaucracy shows considerable success in opposing the Mayor. Overall, the Mayor and the Police Commissioner remain in control though at any time their authority in police affairs could evaporate. Where the Police Commissioner is unwilling or unable to fulfill the role of the “mayor’s cop,” he is expected to leave. No one of the contending forces...is able to overawe the other.

Model 2. Philadelphia: Police Cooptation of the Mayor:

The Mayor supports the Police Commissioner and the police in virtually every issue, irrespective of the opposition. The Mayor himself has limited power resources: he is a lame duck with disintegrating party organization. The initiative on police matters has shifted to the Police Commissioner in his role as a “cop’s cop.” With the close support of the local policemen’s association, and with the acquiescence of the Mayor, the Commissioner has been able to assert influence beyond the police policy area.

Model 3. Chicago: the Mayor Ascendant:

Because of the strength of the...party organization as headed by the Mayor, the police are effectively limited in what they can do. The Mayor has the initiative and sets the tone on matters of police policy. At the same time, the police rely on him for support and protection. The Police Superintendent is only as successful as he has support from the Mayor which structures his role as the ‘mayor’s cop’ (Police Politics, 99).

Ruchelman's study recognized that key players in police politics, i.e. the mayor, the chief police executive, and the police unions all influence policy formulation. In the top model, Ruchelman placed the mayor and chief police executive as one faction against the police union or association. The success or failure of the police union in influencing police policy was dependent on the relationship between the mayor and chief police executive. Where the two are in sync, they pose a formidable foe. When the two are in opposition, it increases the flexing of the police apparatus. It is easier to be in sync if set guidelines defining the parameters of the relationship are established.

All police chiefs must deal with a political superior. James B. Isenberg interviewed 26 of America's top police leaders, including two former New York Police Commissioners and in the chief's own words we learn how these police leaders describe the relationship. Isenberg's sample was diverse ethnically, racially, and by gender, and represented a variety of police departments. The respondents fit three selection criteria: "interest in discussing the role of a police chief in our society, [Isenberg's] knowledge of the chiefs and issues that they had confronted or suggestions from other chiefs about who might offer interesting perspectives" (245). It is possible that a sample of police chiefs who did not fit the above criteria and not interviewed reflect a certain reluctance to "tell it like it is" regarding their political boss.

One section of the study, "Lessons Learned about the Relationship with Mayors," provided a first hand account and offers insight into how these

successful police leaders navigated the political waters. Each police leader responded to the following three questions; 1) When working with the Mayor, what is the Mayor's involvement with the police department? 2) How would you describe your working relationship with the Mayor? and 3) What works well and what are impediments to getting the job done right?" (252). In the excerpts the recurring theme postulated by the police chiefs was that the mayor is the boss, and the police chief's role is to implement the mayor's vision, and keep the mayor informed. If a police chief is successful with these three the relationship will be stronger. Verbatim excerpts have been reprinted with permission in Appendix F.

The next section examines the formal legislation lays the ground rules regarding the relationship between the chief political executive and the chief police executive.

Municipal Legislation:

Bruce Smith in his treatise *Police Systems in the United States* found no rhyme nor reason regarding the manner of selection of American police chiefs. Each locality had there own policy. Regardless of the form of government, elected officials produce legislation. One area of legislation involves the relationship between the government and its police, between civilian control and professional autonomy. The politics of a given municipality regarding the selection and termination of a chief police executive is clearly delineated in a city charter, municipal code or other ordinance, regulation or statute. The relationship between the chief political executive and the chief police executive is dependent

upon the formal structure of the city government. For example, as previously indicated, New York City has a strong mayor council form of government in which both the mayor and city council members are elected, with the power concentrated in the office of the mayor. In a municipality, the chief political executive is a part of the executive branch of government. The legislative branch of government is represented by the city council which has budget and agency oversight responsibilities, as well as law making authority.

Legislation regarding the administration of municipal government in regard to police governance has been excerpted from the Los Angeles and New York City Charter and/or administrative code to illustrate the language that defines the relationship.

In Los Angeles, the City Charter and Administrative Code grants a Board of Police Commissioners police oversight authority and power to “issue instructions to the Chief of Police concerning the exercise of the authority conferred on the Chief of Police by the Charter.” The sections of the Los Angeles Charter and Administrative Code which deal specifically with the relationship between the political and police entities provide the language defining the police chief’s role, and the selection and removal process. Section 574 “Powers and Duties of the Chief of Police” places the police chief in a subordinate position to the Police Board, “The chief administrative officer of the Police Department shall be known as the Chief of Police. Subject to the provisions of the Charter, the rules of the Police Department, and the instruction of the Board of Police Commissioners.”

The language is quite explicit about the selection and removal process of a police chief in Section 575 Regarding the selection and removal of the Chief of Police:

The recruitment and selection of qualified candidates for the position of Chief of Police shall be administered by the general manager of the Personnel Department, in cooperation with the Board of Police Commissioners, through a system of open competition based on professionally accepted recruitment and selection standards. The general manager of the Personnel Department shall refer a group of at least six highly qualified candidates to the Board of Police Commissioners, which shall then provide a list of three recommended candidates, in ranked order, to the Mayor for review and for appointment of one of them to the Office of Chief of Police. The Mayor's appointee shall be subject to confirmation by the Council. The Chief of Police shall serve a five-year term and may be appointed, in the manner described below, to a second five-year term. No person shall serve as Chief of Police for more than ten years altogether.

Although the mayor of Los Angeles appoints the police chief, his removal can be by the Police Board or the City Council as follows:

Removal by Board. The Chief of Police shall serve at the pleasure of the City, as set forth herein, and shall not attain any property interest in the position of Chief of Police. The Board of Police Commissioners may remove the Chief of Police from office at any time prior to the expiration of a first or second five-year term. Should the Board of Police Commissioners so act to remove the Chief of Police, it shall promptly notify the Mayor of its action.

Removal by Council. The Council may remove the Chief of Police from office in accordance with the following procedures. The Council, by two-thirds vote, may initiate removal proceedings by giving ten days written notice of a public hearing on the proposed removal to the Mayor, the Board of Police Commissioners and the Chief of Police.

In 1992, in the wake of the Rodney King police brutality incident, the Los Angeles City Council passed legislation which limited the police chief to two five year terms. Prior to this change in the law the LAPD chief enjoyed civil service protection and lifetime tenure. This legislation was introduced to force the resignation of the incumbent Police Chief Darryl Gates.

In comparison, In New York City does not have civilian Police Board overseeing the Police Department. An argument can be made that the Police Commissioner is, in fact, a board of one. However, since the police commissioner is the administrative head of the department, any oversight authority a police commissioner possesses would be self-directed. The sections of

the New York City Charter which pertain to the police commissioner are excerpted here. In New York City the mayor has the selection and removal power of the police commissioner according to the New York City Charter, Section 431 which states:

a. There shall be a police department the head of which shall be the police commissioner who shall be appointed by the mayor and shall, unless sooner removed, hold office for a term of five years. b. Whenever in the judgment of the mayor or the governor the public interests shall so require, the commissioner may be removed from office by either, and shall be ineligible for reappointment thereto. c. Whenever a vacancy shall occur in the office of police commissioner, a police commissioner shall be appointed by the mayor within ten days thereafter.

The role of the police commissioner is defined in Section 434 which enumerates the powers of the police commissioner:

a. The commissioner shall have cognizance and control of the government, administration, disposition and discipline of the department, and of the police force of the department. b. The commissioner shall be the chief executive officer of the police force. He shall be chargeable with and responsible for the execution of all laws and the rules and regulations of the department.

In 1901, legislation introduced in the New York State Senate created the single head of the police department which was re-printed in the New York Times (Police Bill Introduced, 1):

The terms of office of the Police Commissioners of the City of New York, heretofore constituting the Police Board, shall cease and determine within ten days after the passage of this act, and the powers, duties and functions now by law exercised by and imposed on them are hereby granted to and concentrated upon and vested in a single Police Commissioner....The office of Chief of Police in the City of New York is hereby abolished, and the powers, duties, and functions now by law exercised and imposed on said Chief of police are hereby granted to, concentrated upon, and vested in the said Police Commissioner.

The bill that abolished the four member bi-partisan Board of Police Commissioners, and the civil service position of Chief of Police and combined the powers and authority of these entities into a single police commissioner. The present study's exploration of progression political involvement in police commissioner departures began in 1901 with the selection of Michael C. Murphy as the first police commissioner of the New York Police Department.

Police Evolution

The manner in which cities have embraced police reform has not only

varied, but in some instances has been slow in coming (Fosdick; Walker, Critical). It has been dependent on a city's political, social, and cultural ethos. For example, police reform in New York, Chicago and Los Angeles took different paths. Thomas Reppetto described how the police in each of these cities struggled with different external forces to become not only independent and autonomous, but professional. Also, these early struggles affected the development of each cities police style:

In New York, the police were constantly caught in the struggle between regulars and reformers...they gradually developed a means of remaining aloof from both by turning inward and institutionalizing bureaucracy....In California, where the political struggle was generally between Progressives and business elites, the police opted for a model of [a] technically efficient, professionalized police...In Chicago, where the business and social elite abdicated civic responsibility...the real struggle was usually between the political machine and organized crime (312).

It is widely acknowledged that modern policing began in London in 1829. At that time, Sir Robert Peel is credited with forming the first municipal police force. In America, the Boston Police Department in 1838, followed by the New York Police Department in 1845 were both modeled after the Metropolitan Police Department and Peel's "Bobbies." Fosdick and Walker (Critical) found that American policing developed differently from its European counterparts. Walker

observed, “Ostensibly, the first American police departments were modeled after the London Metropolitan Police. In reality, the Americans borrowed selectively” (Critical, 7).

Since the advent of modern policing in America, there has been at least three recognizable periods, or eras of which reflect the police function: Political or Spoils Era, Reform or Professional Era, and Community (see Kelling and Moore). The first wave of police reform had as its goal the removal of corrupt and partisan politics from policing. The second wave wanted to “professionalize” policing and the latest chapter in police reform moved toward establishing better community relations, with an emphasis on restoring police community awareness, accountability and responsiveness.

The Political Era, which had its genesis almost from the outset of modern policing in America, was beset by political corruption in the form of patronage, graft, blackmail and extortion. Here, police reform attempted to “get politics out of policing.” The Reform or Professional Era, beginning in the early 1900’s, and lasting until the late 1960’s, attempted to upgrade standards and efficiency and bring “professionalism” to policing. The most recent era, Community, had its genesis in the 1970’s and called on the police not only be “crime-fighters,” but to be “problem-solvers” as well (Toch and Grant; Goldstein) and to help quell the violence and address the underlying causes of crime and establish better community relations with the minority community.

Political Era:

During the Political Era of policing the local political machines were

responsible for the revolving door of police chiefs. Selection of the police chief was tied to the political party in office. This game of political musical chairs represented the classic manifestation of the maxim “to the victor go the spoils.” Police jobs were dispensed through nepotism and patronage. The members of the police force who were recipients of these jobs were indebted to the politicians and did their bidding. The real power lay in the political leaders of these wards or precincts. Deakin described the process “the real political powers were the councilmen or aldermen who controlled the wards...the captains in each ward or precinct, who were appointed by ward bosses, had the real power” (12).

Reform Era:

Those individuals who wanted to reform the police, also referred to as “Progressives” had as their primary mission the removal of corrupt partisan politics from municipal services. According to Hunt and Magenau, “progressive reform...of the police...had as a consistent primary objective the depoliticization of the police and their conversion to rational, professional norms of conduct” (23). Since the most visible form of egregious political corruption was found in police departments, that is where the reformers began their crusade. When the Progressive former President and New York Governor Theodore Roosevelt was appointed to the New York Police Commission in 1895 he administered the police department with a deliberate disregard of partisan politics. The Progressives targeted the local politicians who used the police to commit many unlawful and unethical acts including harassing enemies of the administration, actively

campaigning for candidates, intimidating people at the polls and selectively enforcing the law. The reform movement sought the replacement of corrupt politics by the political machines authority and accountability vested in centralized chief executives who would be responsible to the electorate for police governance (Brown, 41).

After the turn of the twentieth century “reformers rejected politics as the basis of police legitimacy...and law, especially criminal law, and police professionalism were established as the principal bases of police legitimacy” (Kelling and Moore). The Political Era spoils system represented by patronage and nepotism would gradually be replaced by a merit based civil service system where trained professionals with expertise in their respective field would head departments. With regards to the police function, Sparrow, et al observed that “The reformers had argued that policing should be independent, competent, and correct...so long as independence and competence were rooted in police authority and judgment, and correctness was rooted in law” (37-38). In reaction to the direct political control of the spoils system, reformers of the early twentieth century focused on providing a semi-military atmosphere in police departments, increasing tenure for police supervisors through civil service appointments, and insulating police leadership from the body politic (Wilson and McLaren, 244). The overt political presence of the party machines provided the impetus for the Reform, or Professional Era (1900’s - 1970’s) which attempted to separate politics and policing.

The Progressives inspired the first wave of police reform, and the

professional law enforcement community ushered in the second wave of police reform (Fogelson, 145). It was police administrators who were the catalyst for change and they attempted to bring professionalism to policing. Although removing corrupt political influence from policing was still desired, the goal of creating a professional police force through training, education and the use of science and technology gained momentum (Richardson, 134).

Professional Era:

In 1950's Los Angeles, and 1960's Chicago, chief police executives William Parker and O.W. Wilson began upgrading their respective police forces using the professional model. These men and others like them, "embodied the model of professional impartial law enforcement, and...would brook no political involvement in their professional decisions" (Richardson, 125). In 1970, Patrick V. Murphy was appointed police commissioner and given a mandate to combat corruption and reform the New York Police Department.

One hallmark of professional policing was the enforcement of the law in an impersonal, impartial and non-partisan manner as epitomized by the Los Angeles Police Department under Chief William Parker. However, many critics contended that this type of policing led to the construction of a "blue wall," and an "us versus them" mentality in the minds of the police who viewed segments of the public as enemy number one. In addition, the dominant "professional" style of policing practiced by the police not only was unsuccessful in reducing crime, but the public's fear of crime was found by researchers to be even more of an

indicator of law enforcement ineffectiveness. In essence, it was the police who were “busted.” As violence erupted and crime increased in our urban centers, the police were forced to alter their long held belief that more cops were the answer to the crime problem. In the Community Era the police admitted that they could not alone be as effective as when they formed partnerships with the community and worked together in a symbiotic relationship.

Community Era:

Kelling and Moore acknowledged that police reform and the style of policing it maintained did not account for the social changes in America during 1960's and 1970's" (9). During the often violent civil rights and anti-war protests which symbolized the frustration some sectors of the community had with the government and the police, who represented the local manifestation of what was wrong with the government, various commissions were formed to explore the law enforcement function. One such commission, “The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice” (1967) included in its study of the criminal justice system a volume dedicated to ways in which the police can increase their effectiveness.

The Bureau of Justice Assistance produced a monograph entitled *Understanding Community Policing: A Framework of Action* which clearly indicated that the police did not “understand” and were therefore ineffective in handling the problems which arose. As a result, a re-examination of the police function was called for by civic leaders and politicians (7). The police were

ultimately forced to confront this reality in the third wave of police reform as represented by the community policing model. This model no longer defined success by the number of arrests or radio calls handled, but assumed a broader mandate which measured success according to the “quality of life in neighborhoods, problem solution, reduction of fear, increased order, citizen satisfaction with police services as well as crime control” (Kelling and Moore, 13).

The police bore some of the responsibility for the deteriorating community relations because of the style of policing practiced. Toch and Grant observed, “The reformers’ response was to turn police departments into feudal fiefdoms. The chiefs who governed these fiefdoms became impervious to modulating sentiments of public opinion that could have taken the edge off their inflexible enforcement policies. Interestingly, as Kelling and Moore pointed out the reforms implemented to remedy the ills of the Political Era were supplanted by a community focus which included politics of a different sort. The authors raise the possibility that “community authorization exists in a different political context” and “that the civil service movement, the political centralization that grew out of the Progressive era, and the bureaucratization, professionalization, and unionization of police stand as counterbalances to the possible recurrence of the corrupting influences of ward politics that existed prior to the reform movement” (11)

The Community Policing Era began with an interest in police/community relations propelled by the increasing crime rate and violence in many American

cities. As a result of research into police operations and the national commissions formed to examine the state of law enforcement at this time, addressing community relations and working in partnership with the community would become the dominant style of policing in the 1980's and beyond. The Task Force Report: The Police, published by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967), emphasized the need for better community relations between the police and the minority community and warned "...no lasting improvement in law enforcement is likely in this country unless police-community relations are substantially improved..." (144).

The problem-oriented policing and community policing models of the 1970's and 80' were by products of this move toward improved community relations. These new styles of policing were met with organizational resistance as the police now viewed their newly defined roles as "problem solvers" more akin to social work than crime fighting. Egon Bittner concisely captured this sentiment in "Florence Nightingale In Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the Police." Although, many of the rank and file preferred the authoritative and masculine appellation "crime fighter" to the conciliatory and effeminate "social worker," a shift in policing was underway and community policing was grudgingly endorsed. The Bureau of Justice Assistance cautioned that restoring good relations cannot be rushed and requires a sustained long-term strategy stating that police executives "should not allow political leaders and the public to develop unrealistic expectations for community policing in terms of crime deterrence or speed of implementation" (53).

Community policing and its progeny, supplanted police singleness with police partnership, and police independence with police accountability. This partnership with the community would define the latest policing era. According to O'Brien, "the public [became] evermore cognizant of the influence of the police in their daily lives, and demand[ed] that its' voices be heard" (396). As per the Task Force Report: The Police, the police had, at times, contributed to the poor relations as a result of "improper or at least unwise police conduct" (145).

Given this heightened scrutiny of the police by the entire electorate the chief political executive was remiss if he was not knowledgeable of, and involved in, policing matters. The Task Force Report also stressed that the police, "As a responsible and organized public service agency, must take the initiative in making good police-community relations a reality" (150).

In a study which explored the relationship between stress and police reform, particularly the implementation of the community policing model, politics was found by Toch to covet the "Red-Flag Stressor Award" among the rank and file in the two departments (city and suburban) surveyed. Toch asked respondents to indicate the stress level now and in the past on various variables. Fifty-eight percent of the officers in the city police department believed external political influence was "stressful" or "very stressful" now, compared to 55.1% in the past. Officers in the suburban police department believed external political influence to be "stressful" or "very stressful" 44.3 % now and 50% in the past. When respondents were asked "How much of a role do you think external forces play in influencing department policy" 81.5% of city officers answered "some" or "great

deal” compared to 90.4% of suburban officers. These figures suggest certain recognition on the part of the rank and file that the days of driving around with the windows up and being perceived as an occupying army were over and they were now expected to park their patrol cars and mingle with the public.

As mentioned above, the earlier police reform movement was intended to eliminate political influence from policing. However, despite its success in achieving its goal, it did not come without a cost. Toch blamed the professional model’s “rigid, heavy-handed managerial practices and command-and-control administrations” for the level of stress exhibited by the rank and file post Wickersham (199). Toch surmised that the professional model resulted in “inflexible, impersonal policing.” This style was ultimately rejected by the public in many locales and “a new set of reforms was instituted, culminating in currently prevailing philosophies of community-oriented and problem-oriented policing” which Toch observed “offended a new set of targets of reform -- those employees most strongly wedded to preceding orientations and practices” (199).

The next section explores police reform which embodied the “orientations and practices” of the police to which Toch alluded. This issue was addressed in this study by examining the political executive’s involvement and ultimately the effect this involvement has on the chief police executive’s departure. As Toch found, external political pressure also affects those at the bottom of the police hierarchy who have no choice but to deal with the political pressure until such time that they can retire.

Professional Police Model

The professional police model sought autonomy and independence from the politics (Richardson; Walker, Critical). Autonomy in the form of an impartial, fair, and just police who are accountable to the citizenry should be the goal of every local government in the delivery of the police function. The police should be apolitical; however, in America each local government acts independently regarding the style of policing it advocates. In the United States there is no national police force due to the fragmentation of American police departments. Also, there is no national standard of mandated compliance.

The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) propounds standards that are merely recommendations. CALEA has no authority over the more than 12,000 local law enforcement agencies (Sourcebook, 2003) to mandate submission to any of its recommendations. Each department is free to choose to follow or ignore CALEA's recommendations. Local governments are free to act according to the will of their particular communities' local political and social culture. Hence, different styles of law enforcement practiced in urban, suburban, and rural locales are more the norm than the exception. Some police departments dubbed "progressive," or "professional," have chosen to follow the CALEA standards to gain accreditation, while others simply have not. The CALEA website states that the "accreditation program provides law enforcement agencies the opportunity to voluntarily demonstrate that they meet an established set of professional standards."

Despite attempts to "professionalize" the police for over one hundred

years the vision of the reformers has not been fulfilled (Wilson, Varieties; Bittner; Fogelson; Walker, Critical; Goldstein; Sparrow, et al). The police may even be guilty of bastardizing professionalism and it has become a “catchall” for any idea or attempt at improving the police function (Carte and Carte, 108). Police leaders have instituted an updated version of the professional model originated by the early reformers but as Price observed police leaders still “use the rhetoric of professionalism...in defense of their occupation when...under attack from critics” (vii).

Samuel Walker believed an occupation should meet three criteria to be considered a profession; 1. professional knowledge, 2. professional autonomy, and 3. a service ideal (Critical, ix). Walker noted that there have been other very different ideas of police professionalism which included; “reform of internal administration of policing, acquisition of scientific techniques of crime detection, and alternative view of the police as social workers,” adding “throughout the history of police reform...there would be a continuing tension between these alternatives and often conflicting definitions of exactly what police professionalism consisted of” (Critical, 33). It is an amorphous term with different meanings to different people who view the police from different perspectives.

One police observer examined police professionalism as becoming an occupation commensurate with other “professions” like law or teaching, for example. Price listed three aspects of the police occupation stood in the way of and prevented professionalism of the police and unless these three factors were

addressed the police could never become true professionals like lawyers and teachers. For Price, the police needed to develop their own body of knowledge, streamline its bureaucratic structure, and find leaders who foster rather than subvert the professional ideal (11).

Progressives, Reformers and the Police

The police reform movement began seriously in the late nineteenth century in an effort to separate the spoils system of government from policing (Walker, Critical, 33). These early “reformers,” or “Progressives” were intent on removing corruption and patronage from government and, in its place, instilling proper moral and ethical values and organizational rules and constraints. At the local level, overt corrupt and partisan activity of the political machines utilized the police to “man the polls” in an effort to intimidate the electorate and maintain local political influence and control.

This local political control was then applied to the police to selectively enforce the law. It was these acts and others which became the target of the Progressive’s crusade. However, whether politics were corrupt, or benevolent, politics nonetheless remained pervasive. Walker observed that even the Progressive agenda to bring professionalism to the police was itself political, “Despite its claims to non-partisanship...the idea of professionalization was itself a movement that served political ends” (Critical, 31). In order to have a greater impact, the reformers needed to back candidates for office who shared their vision. Otherwise, any gains would be nullified by a succeeding administration

which endorsed the status quo (Skolnick and Fyfe, 173).

Theodore Roosevelt biographer Jay Stuart Berman chronicled that Roosevelt, while serving as United States Civil Service Commissioner in the 1890's, was instrumental in putting forth the Progressive agenda. Roosevelt stressed the "gospel of efficiency" and the "gospel of morality" and this credo would serve "as the philosophical basis for much of the progressive program of municipal reform" (5-6). Berman further stated, "the reformers held that the police should be seen as a disinterested, non-partisan agency of government, responsible for the most efficient delivery of services by the most qualified personnel available" (6). Roosevelt was given a chance to apply his vision to the New York Police Department when he served as President of the Police Board from 1895-1897. Walker noted Roosevelt's term as a New York Police Commissioner was noteworthy because "it illustrates the intellectual links between police professionalization, and the broader progressive movement that flourished during the first two decades of the twentieth century" (Critical, 43). This broader movement included civil service reform. According to historian James F. Richardson "patrician reformers...believed municipal governments should be rated as to how effectively they provided [services]...they wanted...appointments on the basis of competitive examinations" (62).

In 1883, Congress passed the Pendleton Act of Civil Service Reform. This legislation was intended to replace the spoils system of patronage with merit based appointments at the Federal level. Similarly, reform would eventually be enacted at the state and local levels where the introduction of examinations and

“merit and fitness” standards were instituted. Civil service protection afforded the police job security. No longer would police employment be contingent on which political party was in power. No longer would individuals pay to be hired, promoted and transferred. No longer would the police be beholden to the politician’s “benevolence.” The policeman’s loyalty would now be to the locality and not the politician, governed by the rule of law and not of man.

The Progressives provided the blueprints and foundation of governmental reform, but the second group of reformers which consisted of police leaders began the actual building of the professional model. The professional model fostered by the police leadership was based organizationally on the military, replete with a strict chain of command, rank structure, obedience to authority and a centralized command structure. An internal disciplinary system designed to give administrators more control over the “rank and file,” the identification of a more qualified recruit through civil service examinations, and police academy training consisting of police science, law, social science, and other specialized curricula was also implemented.

Two of the most influential police leaders of this second group of reformers were August Vollmer, and O.W. Wilson. Both men brought professionalism to the entire law enforcement institution. Two others, J. Edgar Hoover, head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and William Parker, Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) brought “professional law enforcement” to their respective organizations at the Federal and local levels. Parker’s LAPD was an agency transformed into the epitome of the professional

model of policing, while Hoover cultivated the FBI “new image of police professionalism...that of a skilled, highly trained, and extremely efficient law enforcement agent” (Walker, Critical, 159). When Attorney General Harlan Stone selected Hoover to reorganize the FBI, Hoover simply stated, “I accept under one condition...no politics” (Floherly).

August Vollmer, considered by police scholars as the principal author of the professional model of policing (Carte and Carte; Walker, Critical) was the first police leader to advocate a police science curriculum. Vollmer believed that if policing was truly to achieve professional status, it was necessary to have its own body of knowledge which could be taught at the college level and supplemented with professional training throughout a police officers career. August Vollmer had been one of the leading proponents of the social work aspects of policing in the first quarter of the twentieth century.

O.W. Wilson, a protégé of Vollmer, also advocated a professional model of policing. William J. Bopp described Wilson’s version of the professional model as including “narrow spans of control, a rigid chain of command, the sanctity of written policy pronouncements...specialization of tasks, carefully controlled delegations of authority and responsibility, and...close supervision” (5). O.W. Wilson produced the seminal textbook “Police Administration” which laid out explicitly how officers should comport themselves both on and off-duty.

Two unintended effects of the professional model would, ultimately, result in its demise. First, police chiefs insulated themselves from political accountability by hiding behind the professional autonomy facade, and using the

“rhetoric of professionalism in defense of their occupation” (Price, vii). Second, the professional model with its focus on crime control resulted in an impersonal aggressive style of policing which alienated some sectors of the community and resulted in the 1960’s of a new professional model, which emphasized police-community relations, and problem-oriented policing models (Goldstein).

However, this new style of policing which called for the police to be “problem-solvers,” and not “crime-fighters” alone does not a professional make. The police would still have to provide more than lip-service to the public. Those who believed that the police were not truly professional but rather “command bureaucrats preoccupied with order and efficiency,” proposed steps be taken to make the police “conform to the standards and practices of other professions...and based on scientific knowledge” (Brown, 295). Sparrow, et al offered a possible summation regarding the attempts of the police to achieve professional police autonomy, “autonomy, if it was not a reality, never ceased to be an inspiration” (77).

To this day, the police continue to strive for professional recognition. But, if the police are more a craft than a profession (Wilson, Varieties) all the inspiration in the world cannot make them professional in the true sense of the word. However, as the twentieth century progressed, the men and women chosen to lead large municipal police departments have achieved a modicum of professional status by possessing the knowledge, skill and ability gained from prior law enforcement experience and higher education. The next section examines the chief police executive.

Chief Police Executive

Walker cited the 1930's as "a decade in which finally policing as an occupation began to develop its own sense of professional autonomy" (Critical, 169). From the 1930's on, the exemplar of a police leader was defined in neutral terms as an efficient, honest, apolitical manager who is equipped to implement the professional model of policing (Goldstein). However, given that the police executive has not received the scholarly attention commensurate with that given the "street cop," it caused some commentators to remark that "not much is known about police chiefs" (Hunt and Magenau, 3). In fact, only two empirical studies were located which specifically dealt with the area of police governance.

Mastrofski examined the political relationship from the perspective of the political entity, and Tunnel and Gaines from the perspective of the police executive. Case studies, which allow for an in-depth exploration of a single police executive, are limited to a few high profile reform chiefs including Carte and Carte's "Police Reform in the United States: The Era of August Vollmer 1905-1932," William Bopp's "O.W. Wilson and the Search for a Police Profession," and Jay Stuart Berman's "Police Administration and Progressive Reform." Bopp's work recounted the tenure of Theodore Roosevelt as president of the New York Police Commission. Carte and Carte, and Bopp report that both Vollmer, in Los Angeles, and Roosevelt, in New York, vacated their positions disenchanted at not being able to accomplish all that they had envisioned, lending credence to Guyot's observation that affecting change in police organizations is

akin to “bending granite.”

Empirical police executive research has included the following areas: career path and selection (Enter; Penegor and Peak); departure (Rainguet and Dodge; Tunnel and Gaines); leadership and performance (Mayo; Witham; Krimmel and Lindenmuth; Reese; Isenberg); organization and management (Roberg and Kuykendall); and organizational change (Guyot). Works which deal with the political/police relationship but are less empirically sound include Robinson’s foray into Chicago political/police relations which addressed the relationship between a Mayor and his police executive, and examined the professional relationship between Chicago’s Mayor and Police Superintendent. Reese examined the effectiveness of the Los Angeles police chief to placate the community, politicians, media, Los Angeles Police Commission and the rank and file members of the LAPD. A collection of essays of various commentators’ descriptive, prescriptive and anecdotal views and opinions (see Geller’s *Police Leadership in America: Crisis and Opportunity*) were also identified which dealt the police executive.

Who are the men and women selected to head police agencies? Do they possess any particular qualities, or attributes not found in the literature? Are they politically connected? Have they moved up through the ranks? The next section examines what criteria are considered in the selection of a chief police executive.

Chief Police Executive Selection

The first act of a new police commissioner was usually to maintain the

status quo until such time that new policy and procedures were implemented. An order resembling the following would be signed and administered:

BY ORDER OF THE POLICE COMMISSIONER

The undersigned, having been duly appointed Police Commissioner of the City of New York, has taken the oath and assumed the duties of the office. The rules, regulations and orders now in force will remain so until further notice.

X_____

New York Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia (1934-1945) once remarked, in opposition to an old New York axiom that a Police Department could break any commissioner, “Strangely, it never occurred to anyone that a Police Commissioner could make a Department.” LaGuardia must have known what he was talking about because his second police commissioner Lewis J. Valentine served the longest of any of the men who held the office.

Guyot stated that “the moment when a city selects a new head for its police department is the time when the city has the most choice about future directions for the department” (32). In the selection process for a new police chief Guyot advocated a national search, and the appointee be given a fixed term, renewable contract which Guyot describes as a “moderate alternative to the...dichotomy between life tenure and service at the pleasure of the city executive.” (31). The selection of a police executive, whether called a chief,

commissioner, superintendent, or public safety director is considered the most important appointment an elected official can make in municipal government. This is due to the enormous potential of the individual to impact a community's quality of life through policy and enforcement.

In those cities where the mayor has both the power of appointment and removal of the police executive the kind of individual he selects is a good indication of his political beliefs and associations (Richardson). The political culture of a city is not only reflected in its elected officials, but according to Wilson also reflected the style of policing exhibited by the police force (Varieties, 233).

Given the importance of the police function, it is critical that whoever assumes this public post be someone with impeccable credentials; however, some researchers have found this not to be the case. Witham found that the qualifications of police chief executives remain generally unimpressive. Further, he found that many police administrators fail to realize that their positions entail political/public responsibilities as well as administrative duties. Similarly, Mayo found that the recommended standards of performance for the position found in the literature frequently are not met.

Wilson observed three types of candidates chosen as police administrators within the context of his thesis that the politics of the locality affect the type of candidate chosen, and the police style practiced (Varieties, 233). The individual selected reflects both the political and social culture. For example, a reform city intent on having a professional non-partisan police department may seek the

individual with the best qualifications to administer the police function without political interference, namely the “Best Man Available” who is willing to take the place. The other two types “Deserving Local Fellow,” and “Man Closest to the Party” may fit different political culture.

The “best man available” is the individual who is deemed the most qualified for the position. This individual may have headed another department, or risen through the ranks of a single agency. Either way, this individual has demonstrated his prowess and bona fides for the position. In the early twentieth century, this individual was most likely ex-military, an attorney, or a business executive. Today, this label most likely refers to an individual who has served as a police chief in another jurisdiction or risen through the ranks in an agency larger than the one he is chosen to lead. This individual is dubbed the “outsider” candidate.

The “deserving local fellow” is most likely the candidate that has risen through the ranks of a single department, is familiar with the community’s problems, enjoys a good professional reputation and is well-respected within the police department. This individual is usually dubbed the insider candidate.

The last type, the “man closest to the party,” traditionally is considered the patronage appointment; an individual who has been pre-approved by the local political machine. This type was quite prevalent during the early twentieth century. As political machines lost power and control as the century advanced and selecting a “professional” police executive became *de rigueur*, this type was eliminated in its’ classic form. This type may still, however, be found in a

modified hybrid form where a qualified candidate is chosen precisely because they are close to the appointing official personally or professionally.

In New York City, the Mayor appoints the Police Commissioner. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani (1993-2000) chose two individuals who fit this proposed hybrid model of the candidate dubbed “man closest to the party.” Howard Safir and Bernard Kerik both had personal ties to Mayor Giuliani and were chosen due to this kinship which provided Mayor Giuliani with a modicum of loyalty and trust in his police commissioners. The departure of Giuliani’s first Police Commissioner William Bratton considered the “best man available” and had no prior connection with Giuliani, was ultimately due to a breakdown in their professional relationship. The two men, who may have been more alike than not, never developed a close bond. Although their working professional relationship was satisfactory, Commissioner Bratton’s resignation came amidst much media speculation that Mayor Giuliani forced him out. Conversely, the media reported that both Safir and Kerik were selected precisely because of their close ties to the Mayor and perhaps influenced by the non-relationship with Commissioner Bratton. Commissioners Safir and Kerik can be labeled “closest to the party,” or more accurately, closest to the “chief political executive”, or mayor.

When O.W. Wilson was selected as Chicago’s Superintendent of Police in 1960, he was not only an outsider, but was considered the “best man available.” Darryl Gates became police chief in Los Angeles and he was not only an insider but considered the “local deserving fellow.” Former Police Commissioner Patrick Murphy (1973), who after a successful career in the NYPD left to head other

agencies before returning to New York in the 1970's, offered his notion of what makes for a successful internal police chief candidate, "They enter the department of their hometown, work their way up the ranks by being unobtrusive, cooperative, and perhaps even competent, and reap the reward of their department's top job" (65). Interestingly, Murphy lists "unobtrusive," and "cooperative" before "competent." This makes one wonder whether in many local political cultures the "deserving local fellow" and "man closest to the party" may be the preferred choice.

New York Mayor Edward I. Koch (1984) provided a behind-the-scenes peek at the selection process. As Mayor-elect, Koch set up a search panel to find a police commissioner. He recalled the panel took on a life of its own and "wasn't too cooperative" (48). The panel wanted to limit the search to candidates who were "in the Police Department, or had come out of the Department." Koch insisted, "No, anyone in law enforcement can be considered" and informed them, "I got this name from Bob Morgenthau and would you please interview Robert McGuire" (49). Koch also forwarded to the search panel the name of another former prosecutor, John Keenan. The search panel submitted a list to Koch which included people who were either in the police department or had come out of the police department. Koch recalled the panel's preference, "Now, these are the people we prefer... We don't believe these others should be considered in the same way, but if you do, then the one we think is best is Bob McGuire" (49). Koch stated, "I think we should take McGuire; he's the best" (49). Koch described his relationship with McGuire, "We have a very good relationship. In

the six years he was Police Commissioner I never told him what to do except to do it on the merits. And he appreciated that...Everybody says it was a very unusual relationship. Mutual respect” (50). By all accounts Koch’s recollection was supported by the media.

Penegor and Peak (1992) in a survey of police chiefs from thirteen Pacific states found that there may not be “any compelling advantage” to selecting an insider or outsider, but that the selections should be situationally based (30). What about a chief police executive’s departure? Every police executive at some point will vacate his office. Arthur Woods, New York City’s tenth Police Commissioner lectured at Yale University five years after leaving office. The following is an excerpt of one of his lectures which recounted how the turnover of police commissioners is viewed by the rank and file:

In some cities the heads of the police force are apt to change with a shift of the party in power, and even more often, according to the exigencies and urgencies of the political situation. This matter of changing leadership is another of the evils our political system foists on police forces....When commissioners are mere birds of passage, as they fly so fast and remain on the perilous perch for so short a time that their species can hardly be determined....(147).

Woods description of chief police executives as “mere birds of passage” makes one wonder as to the circumstances which surround a police executive’s

departure, the topic examined in the next section.

Chief Police Executive Departure

In 1931, in response to the anecdotal evidence that police chiefs were subject to the whims of politicians, the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, the Wickersham Commission, blamed the short duration of America's police chiefs on corrupt civilian control. Police executives displayed no independence or autonomy in the administration of the police function if they wanted to keep their job. Seventy years later, Ranguet and Dodge (2001) made a similar observation, "There is an alarmingly high rate of police chief turnover" (1). Bruce Frankel reported in USA Today that during 1982-1992, the average tenure of big-city chiefs dropped from 5.5 years to 3.5 years. Average tenures for police executives have also been reported as 2.5 years (IACP, 1997), 2.8 years (Geller), and in 1997 the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) estimated 4.93 years.

What accounts for the widely accepted notion that tenures of police chiefs are too short? Fosdick (1969) observed that "the impermanent character of the chief's tenure is ascribable...largely to politics" (256). Ranguet and Dodge and Tunnell and Gaines suggested that political interference is responsible for police executive resignations. Both studies found that political pressure was the cause of police executive departures over fifty percent of the time. In July 2009 the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) published a survey of thirty-four active Michigan police chiefs. When asked to cite the most negative aspect

of the job, the respondents listed “the frustration of working in the political environment and dealing with politicians” as the most discouraging and dissatisfying aspect of their job.

In 1931, the Wickersham Commission recognized that police chiefs needed job security and a longer term to efficiently carry out their duties and responsibilities. The Wickersham Commission found that average police chief tenure in nine cities with a population between 300,000 and 500,000 was 3.62 years, while in ten cities with a population over 500,000, the average was 2.41 years. According to Frankel, the average tenure for police executives in the ten largest American cities for the 25 year period (1967-1992) is as follows: New York (2.8 years); Los Angeles (5.5 years); Chicago (2.5 years); Houston (2.3 years); Philadelphia (3.6 years); San Diego (8.3 years); Detroit (3.6 years); Dallas (3.6 years); Phoenix (6.3 years); and San Antonio (6.0 years).

Sayre and Kaufman (as cited in Ruchelman, *Police Politics*, 13) in their study of New York City governance intimated that the Police Commissioner’s task is overwhelming regardless of the background of the individual selected. Due to the complexity of the position the learning curve is greater than necessary to master the “basic conditions of his leadership and initiatives in the position” observing that both insiders and outsiders alike have “expended great energies and varied strategies upon this dilemma without triumphant results.”

Does a police executive need more than just professional competence to succeed? Is political savvy a necessary component? If so, the chief police executive of the largest police force, and arguably the top police post in the

country, should certainly be mindful of the political landscape and adept at navigating the different constituencies found in America's historically largest city. In fact, the New York Police Commissioner may even have to possess a modicum of moxie.

The next section introduces the historical context which the single-headed New York Police Commissionership was created.

New York Police Commissionership

In New York City, the selection of a police commissioner is national, if not international news. As head of the largest American police department the New York Police Commissioner is confronted with a formidable task. That person must fight crime, placate the community, maintain internal department homeostasis and navigate the external political climate.

New York City has a rich history of corrupt political involvement in police affairs. One such committee was convened in 1894 in the New York State Senate and was known as the Lexow Committee after its chairman Clarence Lexow. In its final report, the Lexow Committee made nine recommendations. Two dealt specifically with the elimination of political interference in police affairs; one expanded the powers of the uniform chief of police and the other created a four member bi-partisan board of police. Two Lexow Committee members disagreed with the creation of the bi-partisan police board, instead opting for a single head of the department. One of the committeemen, billed himself as the "sole representative of the City of New York on the special committee," and wrote a

minority opinion which spoke of his disagreement, “I would provide first for a single-headed commission of the police department ...appointed by the mayor...I believe he can be safely trusted with the appointment of a competent commissioner” (71-73). Mr. Cantor concluded his remarks with an appeal proclaiming that the police serve and protect all citizens regardless of their station in life, “The welfare of the...city should be the first concern of all...the police power...should be free from political influences or considerations” (75-76).

According to Astor “the Lexow siege breached the police fortress, and through the hole in the political structure reform poured into the New York government” (83). Reform brought a bi-partisan Police Board consisting of four members, two Democrats and two Republicans. The president of the board Theodore Roosevelt understood the dire need for reform in municipal government, but was particularly put off by the police situation. Roosevelt would write about his undertaking to bring reform to the police department, “I know well how hard the task ahead of me is. Yet, in spite of the nervous strain and worry, I am glad I undertook it; for it is man’s work (Astor, 83).

At 9:00, the morning of May 5, 1897 Governor Black of New York signed the Greater New York Charter Bill (“Charter Bill Signed”) creating a consolidated municipality. The law took effect on January 1, 1898 and consolidated all the separate police forces into a single police department controlled by a Police Board consisting of four commissioners appointed by the Mayor (“The New York of Today”).

On February 22, 1901, New York Governor O’Dell signed the “police

bill” which abolished the bi-partisan Police Board of Commissioners and provided for the appointment of a single Police Commissioner by the Mayor (“Col. Murphy New Head of Police”). Hence, the relationship between the single head of the police force and City Hall was born. This legislation was not, however, favorably received by the incumbent Tammany Mayor Robert Van Wyck, who had vetoed the bill six days earlier on February 16, 1901 and sent it back to Albany. The New York Times (“Mayor Vetoes Single Head Police Bill” published the text of Mayor Van Wyck’s challenge to the constitutionality of the proposed bill:

I return herewith as not accepted by the City of New York a bill...entitled: 'An act relating to the Police Department of the City of New York'...This bill abolishes the present Board of four Police Commissioners...and transfers all their powers to a single commissioner, to be named by the Mayor, subject at all times to a power of removal vested not only in the Mayor, but also in the Governor. The power of removal which is given to the Governor is not limited in any way. It is not a power of removal for cause and it does not require that the Commissioner shall have any opportunity of being heard before his removal....it is a...power vested in a state officer to remove a local officer arbitrarily....Notwithstanding all that the bill says about a five year term, the fact remains that the Commissioner holds his office at pleasure, and the further fact remains that it is not at the pleasure of the Mayor, 'the authority making the appointment' as required by the Constitution, but at the pleasure of the Governor, a state officer, a tenure which the Constitution was designed to protect. (1)

The bill was resubmitted to the legislature, passed, and signed into law by Governor O'Dell. Fifty years later the Corporation Council released a legal decision which interpreted the City Charter regarding a mid-term (Unscheduled/Ad Hoc) appointment. It read that if a Police Commissioner is appointed mid-term, other than an appointment related to February 21 in a year ending in 1, or, 6 (i.e. 1906, 1931) he is appointed only for the unfilled portion of his predecessor's term. Although this formalized the process, the police

commissioner adhered to an informal tradition of departing the office when a new administration entered City Hall unless expressly requested to remain by the Mayor-elect. Barbara Gelb was granted unfettered access to the New York Police Department by Mayors Lindsay, Beame and Koch and described how a mayor had no right to fire a police commissioner prior to the expiration of their term but for the public interest. This was supposed to take politics out of policing as the police commissioner's term was one year more than the mayor's four. Gelb recounts the sentiment of Mayor-elect Edward Koch toward the incumbent, "Immediately after the election, [Mayor] Koch announced that one of the first things he would do was fire Police Commissioner Michael J. Codd. Koch could not, in fact, legally do any such thing" (15). But as Gelb further observed, "it was the rare commissioner who had the bad grace to hang on knowing that his boss, the mayor, wanted him out. Every mayor appointed his own commissioner, and put the politics right back in" (15).

Lardner and Reppetto compiled a vivid account of the history of the New York Police Department and also described how the new law which created the single police commissioner didn't fulfill all that the reformers had hoped, "Statutorily, the commissioner had vast authority, and his deputies were often selected by "the Hall" (City or Tammany)...when told to leave, he did so" (155). According to the authors, if a police commissioner didn't depart quickly enough, the mayor "could slash their budgets, publicly embarrass them, and even put them on trial for offenses real or imagined (115).

In fact, in the early days the uniform police brass believed that police

commissioners should behave like children “seen, but not heard.” When Frank Moss, a prosecutor in the New York State Mazet Commission hearings (1899-1900), asked a police captain to describe the kind of commissioner who was acceptable to the brass, the captain replied, “A nice, honest gentleman who does not know he is alive. He makes a good front...while the insiders do the business behind his back” (Lardner and Reppetto, 155).

The Citizens Union of the City of New York is an independent, nonpartisan, civic organization of members who promote good government and advance political reform in the city and state of New York. For more than a century, Citizens Union has served as a watchdog for the public interest and advocated for the common good. Founded in 1897 to fight the corruption of Tammany Hall, Citizens Union helped elect Seth Low, the first reform Mayor in 1901. On November 21, 1906, an article in the New York Times entitled “Citizens’ Union Plan to Better the Police” which provided a roadmap to solving the “police problem” by improving the efficiency of the police department and removing the “political influences and personal factors which play so great a part in determining what kind of service will be rendered...” The article continued, “The kernel of the problem...is the need of a system by which the individual patrolman shall feel that his promotion really depends upon merit...”

The Citizen’s Union made three recommendations, two of which pertained specifically to the Police Commissioner and one which addressed the short duration of his term, “That the Police Commissioner be kept in office for a longer time; as a means thereto that the Mayor be required to brave public opinion in

removing him by publishing the reasons for his action.”

From the advent of the single police commissioner in January 1901 until November 1906 when this article appeared, there had been four different Police Commissioners in six years, lending credence to the notion that the term of the Police Commissioner ought to be longer and his removal by the Mayor less casual. But this was not the case, “while a single-commissioner plan was expected to produce strong central control over the police department, it did not work out that way. No New York City Police Commissioner ever survived a change of administration” (Reppetto, 71).

And as Gelb reminded us, when each Mayor appointed his own Police Commissioner the politics were brought right back into policing. Reppetto similarly observed this political-police connection, “The twentieth century saw the centralization of power, but with such rapid rotation of administrators it could hardly be exercised. Contrary to expectation it became more difficult to determine who ran the...Department” (71).

Politics also affected the departure of the Police Commissioner. The first uniform member of the New York Police Department to assume the commissionership was Lieutenant Richard Enright. Enright was summoned to City Hall and offered the post by then Mayor Hylan. Today, the thought of an active police Lieutenant being appointed police commissioner would seem out of place, but this is precisely what happened to Lieutenant Enright in 1918. Commissioner Enright was no ordinary Lieutenant; he was the head of the Lieutenant’s organization and all of the higher ranking members of the service

knew Enright. In this position Enright was in position to play a role in many of their promotions, assignments and transfers. Enright may have honored “contracts” made by ward leaders and other politicians on behalf of many of the brass. Commissioner Enright was the longest serving police commissioner until 1945 when he was surpassed by Lewis Valentine.

Lewis J. Valentine, was no friend of Tammany Hall. Throughout Valentine’s career, he was intermittently promoted and demoted according to the political party in power. Tammany Hall Mayors would demote Valentine and banish him to a precinct where he could not engage in any actions which would hinder the interests of those associated with Tammany Hall i.e. saloons, gambling parlors and other illicit activities. Valentine had been a protégé of “Honest Dan” Costigan and as a Sergeant Valentine had been a member of the police commissioner’s confidential squad which had as its sole mission to break up the graft associated with excise and gambling enforcement. Through what was a seesaw career, Valentine maintained a steady head and did not get discouraged. In the end, reform Mayor LaGuardia, who hated crooked politicians gave Valentine his reward for all the years his career suffered because of machine politics.

LaGuardia was instrumental in Valentine’s selection as the chief inspector under Commissioner O’Ryan. The chief inspector was the highest uniform rank in the police department. Upon Commissioner O’Ryan’s resignation, Chief Inspector Valentine became the police commissioner--a post he would not relinquish for almost twelve years. Despite Mayor LaGuardia’s heavy

involvement in police affairs, Valentine endured. Whether this was due to Valentine's indifference to, ignorance or approval of LaGuardia's involvement, twelve years are a testament to his endurance.

Interestingly, Enright and Valentine had a history. In 1918, when Enright vacated his post as head of the Lieutenant's association, he named a successor. Lieutenant Valentine fought Enright's choice and nominated another Lieutenant. In 1921, then Lieutenant Valentine was transferred by Commissioner Enright from a special vice enforcement squad to desk duty. In 1924, Commissioner Enright passed over Valentine for promotion to captain despite Valentine scoring eighth on the promotion list (years earlier, Enright had been passed over for promotion to captain and believed Valentine's vice enforcement made him look bad and may have influenced Commissioner Woods' decision at the time).

As these two examples show, politics and the police were intertwined. How political involvement manifests itself in the police commissioner's departure deserves special attention. In his autobiography, Commissioner Valentine, explained the reality of the position:

I have never seen it fail. The moment a newly appointed Police Commissioner sinks into his swivel chair...speculation runs high. Who is behind him? How long is he going to last?...That has been the time-honored rule-he's simply a king on sufferance. The ink on his first order is not yet dry, when he gets a ...call from...City Hall to hand in his resignation. (287)

Valentine's quote is remarkably similar to William McAdoo's penned forty years earlier in his autobiography:

A Commissioner has no sooner entered on the performance of his duty than the department begins speculating as to how long he will remain, who are behind him, how does he stand with the political government of the day, who will be his successor. His official life is a plaything of the moment. He is a king on sufferance-a temporary head over a permanent body....(50)

The present study explored political involvement in the New York Police Commissioner departure between 1901 and 2001. The study began with the inception of the first single-headed Police Commissioner Michael C. Murphy in 1901, and ended with the last completed term of Bernard B. Kerik in 2001.

Research Questions

The present study chronicled the extent to which political involvement affected the departure of the New York City Police Commissioner. Specifically, when did Mayoral involvement become political interference, and what effect did it have on a Police Commissioners departure? This study was guided by five research questions; 1) Was political (mayoral) involvement the leading cause of police commissioner departures? 2) In general, what accounted for police commissioner departures? 3) Did the manner and extent of political involvement

change over time? 4) Was political culture linked to police commissioner selection, departure, independence, and policy? 5) How was civilian control of the police linked to professional autonomy?

Chapter Three

Data and Methodology

Thesis

It is accepted that overt corrupt politics in policing found in the early twentieth century and manifested by patronage in hiring, intimidation at polling sites, and the graft system has been eliminated. What form of politics has replaced this earlier rendition which was so detrimental to good government? Tunnell and Gaines suggest that a more covert, and acceptable “subtle form of politics” (3) is now present in police governance. Regardless of whether the style of politics are overt or subtle, the overriding concern is that politics nonetheless remain in policing. It is only when political involvement becomes political interference does it become a problem? Some believe that because politics and policing are inextricably linked that reform was destined to fail (Fogelson, 111).

One area which has been linked to political pressure is a police executive departure (Tunnel and Gaines; Rainguet and Dodge). If Wilson’s thesis is correct, and the political culture manifests itself mostly in the selection of the police chief, it stands to reason that the police executive’s departure is equally important. Perhaps even more, as the circumstances of a police commissioner’s departure often dictate the selection of the successor. If it is a futile act to try to remove politics from policing then some form of political involvement should be evident in every administration. The question then becomes, “What form does this political involvement take? Is it more guidance and direction, oversight and accountability, or, intrusion and interference?”

In order to understand how the role of politics in policing has been transformed, and how the variation in politics has affected police commissioner departures, the present study traced the progression of the relationship between the chief police executive (Police Commissioner) and City Hall (Mayor); specifically, the effect of political involvement in New York City police commissioner departures between 1901- 2001. New York City was chosen for this study because it is the largest American police department, one of the most scrutinized police departments in the world, and is a bellwether in police professionalization. Toward this end, it was necessary to find a rich evidentiary source which not only provided a historical context of the political and social culture, but also situated and reported the actions and words of all the past New York City police commissioners and mayors. It was determined that the best and sole primary source which met this historical component (1901-2001), was rich in information, and provided consistent and uninterrupted coverage of the police and politics was the newspaper. By examining newspaper accounts of the terms of all former police commissioners, this study was able to identify and analyze the interactions, exchanges, and overall dynamics of the progression of police governance with respect to police commissioner departures in a single police department, in a single city, over a one hundred year period.

Methods

This study consisted of establishing political involvement in police commissioner departures in New York City between 1901-2001. Given the

longitudinal nature of this study (1901-2001), paucity of information was not a problem; however, the main problem was devising a method that would enable the collection of enough relevant information of all forty police commissioners to be able to make inferences and draw conclusions. Initially, numerous New York newspapers were to be searched, but it was determined that this resulted in redundancy. Ultimately, the New York Times archival database was selected as the sole primary source of data collection for two reasons. First, it was the only daily published for the entire period of the study; secondly, it was entirely on-line through ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2005).

A tremendous advantage of the Pro Quest database was its accessibility. It could be accessed anytime from a remote location which made the search and data collection manageable, and convenient. The primary source had to cover the period of the study (1901-2001), had to provide sufficient historical record of events from which to draw conclusions, and had to address all the subjects uniformly and consistently. Full text newspaper articles then, contained a breadth of information on each subject in the study.

The present study addressed political involvement in police commissioner departures. This differs from conventional case studies and surveys of police executives in the following way: a case study examines a single police chief in depth, affording a thorough retrospective of an individual's life. Surveys/questionnaires query a large sample, but usually capture only a single moment in time. Perhaps, of the different methods, the interview technique is best because it allows for follow-up questions and can collect the most accurate

and relevant information from respondents. Unfortunately, in an historical study such as the present study, the interview technique was not possible. It was decided that the best way to collect data for this study was through the use of an archival newspaper database which allowed for the placement of the information within a historical context which helped to understand how each successive police commissioner's term fit.

Newspapers are unique in that they provide a first hand account of an event, essentially recording it for posterity. A much recognized limitation of newspapers as a source of data collection is the problem of media bias in the coverage. Editorial decisions of what constitutes news, human interest, etc., and decisions regarding the length and placement of coverage contribute to the weakness of newspapers as a source; however, media bias is more likely a problem in a conventional content analysis. Given the nature of this study, media bias is not considered a serious problem. Traditionally, newspapers have dedicated staffs to cover government and crime. In fact, oftentimes the staff reporter begins on the police beat and graduates to the City Hall post.

There were two options available in employing newspapers as the primary data collection source: a manual microfiche search, and an on-line electronic search. As mention above, this study employed the latter. The primary data source was ProQuest Historical Newspapers, an on-line service. ProQuest contains an archival database of full-text articles of the New York Times (1851-2005). The New York Times is the only major New York daily published without interruption during the entire period of the study. This on-line service allowed for

a comprehensive electronic search and retrieval of nearly 10,000 articles.

ProQuest allowed for basic and advanced Boolean searches, a single search term, i.e. “Bratton,” and/or the linking of two, or, more terms; e.g. “Bratton” AND “Police.”

ProQuest allowed for the search of the terms by its placement in the article. For example is the term(s) located in the “title” or “text.” Narrowing the search, the database allowed for a specific date range to be queried e.g. 01/01/1901 - 12/31/1902. The most important advantage of utilizing the ProQuest database is its ease of replication. The search process of each police commissioner included the police commissioner’s “last name” (i.e. Safir, Monaghan, etc.) and located in the article “Title,” or headline, coupled with the term “police” located in the article’s “Text.” This procedure ensured the retrieval of articles in which the individual subject was included. Although extraneous articles sometimes were retrieved using this method it was not problematic.

In order to limit the number of articles found, it was necessary to enter a date range. The date range for every search began with the date the police commissioner assumed office and ended one day after the police commissioner left office. This allowed for the police commissioner’s last day to be included in the search. This exact data collection procedure was utilized in every case as an initial foray into the articles. For each successive police commissioner only the police commissioner’s “Last Name” and “Date Range” were altered to fit each respective case. The following instructions illustrate search process:

- 1) Select: ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 -

2005).

2) Select ADVANCED search option

3) Enter search terms, location where those terms are located and the date range of the search.

For example, the data collection entries for Frederick Bugher, who was appointed Police Commissioner on January 1, 1918, and left office on January 23, 1918 are as follows:

1) Enter “Bugher” in first search field

2) From the drop down menu select “Document title.”

3) Enter “police” in second search field

4) From the drop down menu select “Document text.”

5) Database: “News - The Historical New York Times” should be entered

6) Date Range: Select “From” and enter 01/01/1918 as the beginning point of the search in the first box, then tab to the second box and enter 1/24/1918 as the ending point of the search.

7) Hit search.

The number of articles retrieved within the prescribed search parameters will be shown. Bugher’s search revealed 6 documents found for:

TITLE(bugher) AND TEXT(police) AND PDN(>1/1/1918) AND PDN(<1/24/1918)

ProQuest displays every article found in the search in the following manner:

1. BUGHER SAYS 'LID' WILL NOT BE LIFTED; New Police Head

Adds There Will Be No Politics in Department. SUGGESTED BY
UNTERMYER He Has Twice Been a Deputy Commissioner and Served
Under Bingham and Baker.

New York Times (1857-Current file). Jan 2, 1918. p. 2 (1 page)

[Abstract](#) [Page map](#) [Article image - PDF](#) (147 K)

8) Next click on the article image for a complete full-text version of the article as it appeared on the original date of publication.

9) Each article is then read, and all relevant data extracted and placed into separate files containing the article citation and any personal notes.

The notes provided a quick reference of the article's content to allow location of pertinent information and from this information case summaries and profiles were prepared.

Any additional research conducted outside the specific data range was solely intended to clarify, or, expound on information initially located. Countless other newspaper articles were also retrieved and read for content, although no direct information was extracted from these articles. This additional information provided perspective and context. This background knowledge and contextual richness made it easier to decipher the original data, form hypotheses, and draw conclusions.

In the event a police commissioner or mayor produced information which directly impacted the present study subsequent to their term of office, that information was not included in the analysis but served as a check on both the

data collected and conclusions drawn. This was an important decision made to keep the data collection uniform, consistent, and derived from a single source. The individuals who occupied the offices of New York City Mayor and Police Commissioner have received differential attention after they have left office; some more, some less, and some not at all. The most fruitful extraneous sources include autobiographies, biographies, or other works about New York City illuminating its politics and/or its police department. Studying a purposive sample of police commissioners (N=40) over a one hundred year period allowed the linking of each subject's case with his specific data within the situational context of his predecessors. The cataloguing of the entire sample of New York City Police Commissioners and related political involvement in their departures in a single source allows a starting point for future research into any one of the forty individuals examined.

Coding

Qualitative research lends itself to many interpretations of data; especially that which research involves archival data. In archival research, one does not have the luxury of asking respondents' to choose among categories in a survey instrument, or sit for an interview with a follow-up to clarify responses. The combination of using archival data and isolating categories of a variable which spanned days, weeks, months and years made the operationalization of some variables more difficult, in particular "police governance," and "police independence."

To address this matter and find mutually exclusive categories to place these two variables, a decision was made to focus on a single event which is most reflective of the relationship between the police commissioner and mayor. The event chosen was the police commissioner's departure from office. The circumstances surrounding the departure, the behavior of the individuals, and remarks made at this juncture appeared indicative of the strength of the relationship between a police commissioner and mayor.

It was found that as the research progressed, the data were viewed differently. The primary researcher was able to identify and interpret nuances, and meanings in the data which were not initially found. Subsequent readings of the same article directed focus on a sentence or paragraph which turned out to be relevant, but initially had been missed entirely, misinterpreted, or overlooked. An individual researcher's interpretation and analysis of data collected from newspaper articles may differ based on criteria as straightforward as a researcher's knowledge of the subject, attentiveness to detail, and organization of the voluminous data, or as convoluted as an individual's fatigue factor at the time of the initial observation, any distractions that interrupted collection, or any other factor which can affect one's concentration. It was found that early in the research every piece of information seemed important for two reasons: political interference was rampant in the early twentieth century in policing, and lack of sophistication in distinguishing the relevance of information.

As the data collection progressed, the level of expertise in locating important information not only increased, but was continually modified to fit the

final product. As the level of sophistication increased, so did the interpretation of the data. In order to clarify some of the data, articles outside the date range were reviewed.

A second coder was used to increase reliability and any discrepancies were discussed. As a result, changes to the terms and definitions were made. One example illustrated this process. Initially, the variable, “career path” was borrowed from Enter *in toto*. Enter’s original six typologies used the terms “police,” “non-police,” “law enforcement,” and “non-law enforcement” interchangeably. Since the use of these terms were confusing and as a result a disagreement emerged between the primary and secondary coders. The primary coder labeled a case “Ultimate Outsider “B,” while the second coder labeled “Multiple Agency.” Enter’s original description for Ultimate Outsider “B,” included “an individual with no prior law enforcement, but has other criminal justice experience.” The primary coder interpreted “law enforcement” experience as having served as a sworn uniform police officer. The second coder interpreted “law enforcement” as working for a law enforcement agency, regardless of whether the individual was a sworn uniform police officer, or civilian employee. In the case in question the individual previously served as a civilian deputy police commissioner. It was decided to use only the terms “law enforcement,” and “non-law enforcement” and clarify the position as being a sworn officer and not simply employed by a police agency. All the categories were modified to reflect this change. Other discrepancies raised by the secondary coder were handled in a similar fashion. Coding definitions are located in Appendix F.

Selection of Cases

This study selected a purposive sample of all former New York City Mayors (16), Acting Mayors (3), and Police Commissioners (40) between 1901-2001. New York City abolished the four member bi-partisan Board of Police Commissioners and replaced it with a single police head in 1901. The last year of a completed term of a New York City Police Commissioner was 2001, and was a natural endpoint for the study.

Reliability and Validity

Maxfield and Babbie discussed the conflict between coding the manifest and latent content in printed material. The choice is between reliability and validity in data collection; this study attempted to achieve a balance. Determination of various types was made based on the manifest statements of the principals, sacrificing validity. To address this, the statements were viewed through the prism of the entire term of incumbency, as well as the historical context of all the previous terms to determine the latent content, this increasing validity but decreasing reliability. The more data were collected, the greater the chance a second coder could reach different conclusions simply due to lack of knowledge gained from reading all the cases which affects one's level of proficiency.

The use of newspapers as a primary source of data collection presents three types of validity; descriptive, interpretative, and theoretical (Johnson). Descriptive refers to the factual accuracy of the account as reported, interpretative

refers to how accurate the principal's viewpoints, intentions, and experiences are understood and reported; and theoretical refers to the theoretical explanations developed from the research and how they fit the data and is, therefore, credible and defensible.

The New York Times satisfied the first, descriptive validity. The second type, interpretative, was satisfied by the use of direct quotations and reported actions of the principal actors, although intentions are difficult to decipher in a historical analysis as one has to take at face value what is stated. Finally, theoretical validity was least satisfied in the present study due to the collection, analysis, and conclusions being contingent upon the researcher. Historical events are subject to varying interpretations.

Another threat to internal validity is instrumentation. Media coverage may change over time. The reporters assigned to the "City Hall," or "Police Headquarters" will change. The access to information may become stricter as the culture changes, ultimately affecting the reporting. Even so, newspapers provide a rich source of the principal actors own words. New York is arguably the largest US media market. The New York City Mayor and Police Commissioner are national public figures, and as such their actions and statements are subject to heightened scrutiny. In New York, the competition represented by other daily newspapers to get the story accurately is keen. This makes fabrications of a mayor and police commissioner's own words and actions less likely.

Journalists and reporters can obtain information for an article by interviewing subjects or sources, through direct observation, or by independent

research. In the production of an article, journalists are subject to ethical guidelines in their use of sources and the use of quotations. These guidelines are similar to those placed on academic research regarding source documentation and plagiarism.

In the media, direct quotations are attributed to a named, unnamed, or anonymous source. Information reported from a named source is deemed to be more reliable than that obtained from an unnamed source, and information from an unnamed source is considered more reliable than that obtained from an anonymous source. Often, information comes from a source whose identity remains confidential and only a veiled reference to the individual's position is mentioned. For example, a quote is attributed to a "senior police official," or "city hall staff member."

Journalists are not only expected to accurately check and double check facts, they are bound to abide by a professional code of ethics which stipulate what is acceptable practice regarding the use of sources and quotations. Therefore, it is expected that the information reported should achieve an acceptable degree of reliability. Further, since daily events which comprise the "hard news" are covered by more than one media outlet, each one provides a built-in check against the others, increasing the likelihood that the information reported in any given article is deemed reliable.

Originally, other New York newspapers (Herald, Tribune, Daily News, Post, Wall Street Journal, etc.) were to serve as primary data sources; however, a decision was made to abandon other newspapers because a preliminary

comparison revealed they did not differ in any substantive way from the news reported in the New York Times. The New York Times was rich enough in material from which to draw inferences and make conclusions in this study.

As stated previously, material other than newspaper articles outside the date range parameters was examined. For example each Mayor was researched separately to understand his motivation for selecting a police commissioner. Campaign rhetoric was explored, as well as any other comments about the police, or law enforcement issues in general, and the type of police commissionership desired in particular. A file was created in a similar fashion to that for each police commissioner. This secondary step was used to validate and serve as a check against the information contained in the original sample. In addition, many works pertaining to New York City, New York City Mayors, New York City Police Commissioners, the New York City Police Department, and other relevant works in the policing literature were scoured for background and contextual information. However, in only extremely rare cases instances was information not directly attributable to the principal, and not from the primary data collection source used to refute, or validate information already collected and analyzed. For example, if a police commissioner published an autobiography and discussed the circumstances of his departure, this information would be used as a check against the variables “police independence” and “civilian control.” When a discrepancy presented itself, it would be noted. This process was not only a check on the measurement of certain variables, but also on the accuracy of using newspapers as a source, and more importantly, the forthrightness of police commissioners about

the reason they left office.

Weaknesses or Limitations

The major weakness of the study, discussed above, was the possibility that relevant information was missed by not expanding the search into other publications (e.g. Wall Street Journal, Daily News, Herald Tribune, Post, etc.). Perhaps, the single greatest factor which mitigated this concern was the use of direct quotations. The principals' own words revealed their intentions most clearly without the filter of second and third party sources. All forty Police Commissioners were researched in the format described above.

Another potential limitation which affected data collection involved the variation in the tenure of the police commissioner, and the variation in the interaction between the principal actors. For example, a very short tenure often precluded enough data from which to provide a situational perspective to conduct analyses, make inferences, and draw definitive conclusions. This was potentially an issue with the variables; "police independence," "police governance," and "civilian control." Ordinarily, these variables required a modicum of interaction between the parties to permit a proper assessment, immersion in the data and increased knowledge about the dynamics of the relationship between the mayor and police commissioner made it easier to understand what had transpired even in the event of reduced media coverage.

Another potential weakness was the accuracy of the data. The New York Times is the only newspaper which published uninterruptedly during the entire

period of this study (1901-2001). Information found in this national publication is deemed reliable due to its reputable professional and journalistic bona fides in almost one hundred and fifty years of publication. The media competition precluded the fabrication of public events involving these high profile public figures. The Mayor and Police Commissioner responded to any inconsistency in their meaning of a given statement. These attempts to correct the public record were often made directly to the press corps.

At times, when an “off the record” remark was printed the principal to whom the remark was attributed would react. Third party quotations were kept to a minimum and only included to illuminate an event when neither the mayor nor the police commissioner was directly quoted. Journalistic integrity demands that actual depictions of events be as accurate as possible. Of course, it is recognized that editorial bias can affect the coverage of an event’s meaning or interpretation. The occurrence of an actual public event (i.e. mayoral election, police commissioner appointment, etc.), however, is impossible to fabricate.

Statements made by the principal actors were sometimes not forthright. In the case of Commissioner Bratton, for example, he cited other employment as the reason for his departure. Only later, in his autobiography, did he state his differences with Mayor Giuliani as precipitating his departure. This example reveals a weakness in the sole reliance of newspapers for data collection and conclusions can be made which are not entirely accurate. So, although the New York Times provided a consistent and uniform approach to each case, it is evident that when the reporting may be accurate, candidness is sometimes an issue. As

this study relied on statements made by the principals themselves, it is impossible to have accurate information if the police commissioner or mayor is not totally forthright in their remarks. If as Robinson asserted that the police commissioner's role is to protect the mayor, this may say something very important about the relationship dynamic and why police commissioners may offer a less than accurate manifest reason for their departure.

Finally, a primary weakness of the present study is one which is common to all research on the New York Police Department; the matter of generalizability. The New York Police Department is unique in that it is the largest American police department, without equal to any of the over 13,000 local police departments nationwide (Sourcebook, 1999). The Sourcebook defined a "local police department" as a general purpose police department operated by a municipal or county government. It can be argued that no other police department (i.e. Chicago Police Department, Los Angeles Police Department) are similar to the New York Police Department (NYPD) given the NYPD's uniquely situated position in a city with the social, cultural, and financial dynamics of New York, as well as the heightened media, academic, and external scrutiny it has historically received. There may be however, findings which have inferential allure to other police departments: for example, the variables "police independence," "civilian control," and "police governance" may offer insight regarding the political and professional relationship between a chief political and chief police executive.

Chapter Four

Analysis

The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to organize the data, tabulate frequencies, and perform cross tabulations. The analysis is focused on understanding the historical context, and the situational and circumstantial characteristics regarding the relationship between a police commissioner and mayor. The analysis section is broken down in the following manner: a master frequency table is presented of all Independent Variables (IV's). Next, each research question is examined using selected independent variables. Lastly, a link between political culture and police style is tested. A relationship between professional autonomy and civilian control is examined by converting specific categorical variables into ordinal variables based on the level of political (mayoral) involvement.

Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables

Succession	(n)	(%)
Scheduled/Institutional	21	36.8
Unscheduled/Ad Hoc	<u>36</u>	<u>63.2</u>
Total	57*	100.0
Selection	(n)	(%)
Best Man Available	17	42.5
Local Deserving Fellow	15	37.5
Man Closest to the Party	<u>8</u>	<u>20.0</u>
Total	40	100.0

Last Official Post	(n)	(%)	
Uniform Member NYPD	9	22.5	
Civilian Member NYPD	6	15.0	
Law Enforcement-Other	4	10.0	
Public Official-Local	8	20.0	
Public Official-State	2	5.0	
Public Official-Federal	4	10.0	
Private	<u>7</u>	<u>17.5</u>	
Total	40	100.0	
Career Path	(n)	(%)	
Insider Law Enforcement	12	30.0	
Insider Criminal Justice	10	25.0	
Outsider	8	20.0	
Law Enforcement Executive	6	15.0	
Multiple Agency	<u>4</u>	<u>10.0</u>	
Total	40	100.0	
Hierarchical Ranking of All Prior Employment	(n)	(%)	
Sworn Member- NYPD	16	40	
Sworn Member - Other	4	10	
Civilian Member NYPD	6	15	
Criminal Justice	6	15	
Non-Law Enforcement/Criminal Justice	<u>8</u>	<u>20</u>	
Total	40	100	
Type of Departure	(n)	(%)	
Resignation	37	92.5	
Dismissal	1	2.5	
Resignation/Dismissal	<u>2</u>	<u>5.0</u>	
Total	40	100.0	
Tenure	(n)	(%)	Cumulative (%)
Less than 6 months	4	10.0	10.0
Between 6 months and 1 year	9	22.5	32.5
Between 1 and 2 years	9	22.5	55.0
Between 2 and 4 years	10	25.0	80.0
Greater than 4 years	<u>8</u>	<u>20.0</u>	100.0
Total	40	100.0	

Manifest Departure	(n)	(%)
Employment	14	35.0
New Administration	10	25.0
Dismissed	3	7.5
Health	3	7.5
Policy Difference	3	7.5
Alleged Misconduct	2	5.0
Family	2	5.0
Position Untenable	1	2.5
Term expired - Not re-appointed	1	2.5
Not given	<u>1</u>	<u>2.5</u>
Total	40	100.0

Latent Departure	(n)	(%)
Avoid Removal	11	27.5
Mayor Induced	9	22.5
Politics-Enforcement	6	15.0
Police/Minority Relations	3	7.5
Mayor not seeking re-election	2	7.5
Health	2	2.5
Politics-Pull	2	5.0
External Investigation	2	5.0
Media Scrutiny	1	2.5
Mayor Management Team Survey	1	2.5
Advise Mayoral Candidate	<u>1</u>	<u>2.5</u>
Total	40	100.0

Police Independence	(n)	(%)
Professional	26	65.0
Autonomist	10	25.0
Antagonist	<u>4</u>	<u>10.0</u>
Total	40	100.0

Police Governance	(n)	(n)**	(%)
Professional Autonomy	8	(6)	20.8
Team	13	(12)	20.8
Political Activist	22	(22)	35.8
Insufficient Data	<u>8</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>22.6</u>
Total	51***	40	100.0

Civilian Control	(n)	(%)	
Political	9	22.5	
Non-Political	20	50.0	
Latent Political	<u>11</u>	<u>27.5</u>	
Total	40	100.0	
Priority	(n)	(%)	
Enforcement	2	5.0	
Community	11	27.5	
Corruption	10	25.0	
Department	<u>17</u>	<u>42.5</u>	
Total	40	100.0	
Age at Appointment	(n)	(%)	Cumulative (%)
Under 40	4	10.0	10.0
41 - 45	11	27.5	37.5
46 - 50	8	20.0	57.5
51 -55	10	25.0	82.5
Over 55	<u>7</u>	<u>17.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>
Total	40	100.0	
Race	(n)	(%)	
White	38	95.	
Black	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	
Total	40	100	
Gender	(n)	(%)	
Male	40	100	
Female	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	
Total	40	100	
Education	(n)	(%)	
Yes	31	77.5	
No/Undetermined	<u>9</u>	<u>22.5</u>	
Total	40	100.0	

*There were 57 separate successions. The first Scheduled/Institutional succession was February 22, 1901. A scheduled succession occurred every five years between 1901 and 2001. ** Only 40 of the 51 dyads were used in the analysis. These 40 dyads include the incumbent mayor or mayor-elect at the time of a police commissioner's departure. ***There were 40 police commissioners, and nineteen mayors/acting mayors which comprised 51 separate dyads.

Departure

The variable “Succession” in Table 4.1 reveals that 57 successions occurred in the period of the study. The first appointment of a single police commissioner occurred in 1901, and counting every successive five year term between 1901 and 2001 reveals a total of 21 scheduled/institutionalized successions. If every police commissioner was appointed to a new five year term and served out its entirety, then only 21 individuals would have been police commissioner. However, 40 men were selected. In 36 instances, police commissioners departed before the expiration of a Scheduled/Institutional term which Bynander and Hart (2005) labeled an Unscheduled/Ad Hoc succession (See Table 2).

The variable “Civilian Control” in Table 4.1 reveals that political (Mayoral) involvement is not the leading cause of departures. Statistically, 50% of the departures are categorized as “Non-Political,” or “not publicly induced by the Mayor.” The remaining cases are divided between “Political,” (22.5%) and “Latent Political” (27.5%). The variable “Type of Departure” in Table 4.1 measured the manner in which a police commissioner vacated the Office of the Police Commissioner and shows that forced, or “involuntary” departures (i.e. dismissal, resignation/dismissal) accounted for only 7.5 % of the total. The remaining 92.5% were comprised of 37 resignations. Of these 37 resignations, it was found that 17 were categorized as either “Political” (6), or “Latent Political” (11). The 11 “Latent Political” cases reflect a Mayor’s more subtle, or implicit

involvement in a Police Commissioner departure. Combining these 17 “Political” and “Latent Political” cases with the 3 forced dismissals (7.5%) the total cases would account for 50% of the total police commissioner departures.

If the resignations labeled “Non-Political” but attributed to a new administration are added the resulting percentage increases to 70%. There were 10 new administration cases where a Police Commissioner vacated his office either before a successor was named to allow the new administration unfettered freedom to select its own man, or after a successor was named. Ordinarily, the incumbent mayor who was leaving office did not force the police commissioner’s departure. These resignations were, in essence, de facto dismissals since a police commissioner departed prematurely, or faced removal from office.

In three instances the police commissioner’s departure at the time of a new administration is labeled “Political.” In one case the incumbent police commissioner challenged the authority of the mayor-elect to remove him. In the other two instances, the police commissioner overlapped briefly into the next administration’s term before a successor was named. In addition, in these two cases the police commissioners were each considered viable candidates for the post by the new mayor. A finding that 50% of the cases are either “Political,” or “Latent Political” is comparable to Tunnel and Gaines’ (1992) finding that 53% of predecessor police chief departures were due to political pressure, but significantly lower than the 70% cited by Rainguet and Dodge (2001).

Table 4.2 provides the manifest and latent rationale for police commissioner departures. The manifest rationale is defined as that reason given

by the police commissioner and reported in the media for his departure from office. The accompanying latent rationale is defined as the underlying cause, or subtext of the police commissioner’s departure reported in the media and as interpreted by the totality of the circumstances. The most common latent reason found for a police commissioner’s departure is “Avoid Removal.” The most prevalent manifest reason for a police commissioner’s departure is “Other Employment” (See Table 4.1 for complete “Manifest” and “Latent” Rationale frequencies).

Table 4.2 Latent Departure by Manifest Departure

Latent	Manifest	Total
Avoid Removal	New Administration (10); Dismissal (1)	11
Mayor Induced	Employment (5); Alleged Misconduct (1);	9
Politics (Enforcement)	Term Expired (1); Policy Differences (1); Health (1)	
Police/Minority	Employment (2); Policy Differences (2); Alleged	6
Relations	Misconduct (1); Dismissed (1)	
Mayor not seeking re-election	Employment (3)	3
Politics (Pull)	Employment (2); Family (1)	3
External Investigation	Employment (1); Dismissed (1)	2
Media	Position Untenable (1); No Reason Offered (1)	2
External Report	Family (1)	1
Health	Employment (1)	1
Advise Mayoral Candidate	Health (1)	1
Total		<u>40</u>

The manifest category “Other Employment” was found in approximately 56% of latent cases labeled “Mayor Induced” which may be indicative of a reluctance of a police commissioner to not “rock the boat” as he exits.

Table 4.2 shows there are multiple manifest reasons cited for a police commissioner’s departure and there are numerous latent reasons which reveal an underlying political involvement.

Table 4.3 reveals that political involvement in police commissioner departures waned after Period 1 and remained steady throughout Period 2, 3, and 4. Table 3 also reveals that political involvement in departures was heaviest at 42% within Period 1 (Political), and between periods accounted for 56% of all political departures. Political departures within Periods 2 (Reform), 3 (Professional), and 4 (Community Relations) were found in 10%, 11%, and 22% of the cases respectively. The political departures in Period 4 were not due to any rift, or strained relationship between the police commissioner and the mayor; they reflect the two incumbents who overlapped into a new administration and resigned once a new police commissioner was named.

In Period 2, latent political involvement by mayors in police commissioner departures accounted for the majority (60%) of the cases. This may indicate that a more subtle type of political involvement replaced the corrupt politics found in Period 1. “Non-political” cases accounted for the majority of cases in Periods 3 and 4, totally 67% of the cases in each period.

In Periods 3 and 4, which represent post 1950, there were only 5 cases categorized as “Political” (3), or “Latent Political” (2) departures, while there

were 15 such cases “Political” (6); “Latent Political” (9) found in the first half of the century which encompassed the Political and Reform Periods. Interestingly, there was just a single case of a political departure in Period 2, the period which included the Wickersham Commission report. This single case was not a typical “forced” political departure due to any rift between the mayor and police commissioner, but was due to an external investigation into police affairs which rendered the police commissioner’s position “untenable.”

Table 4.3 Civilian Control by Period

Civilian Control	Period				Total	%
	1 Political 1901-1925	2 Reform 1926-1950	3 Professional 1951-1975	4 Community 1976-2001		
Political	5	1	1	2	9	22.5
Latent Political	3	6	2	0	11	27.5
Non-Political	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>50.0</u>
Total	12	10	9	9	40	100.0

Police Independence

Table 4.4 examined the progression of the variable “Political Independence” Table 5 revealing that “Professional” accounted for 100% of the cases I Period 4 (Community), and 80% of cases in Period 2 (Reform). In Period 3 (Professional) the “Autonomist” accounted for the largest percentage within the

category at 56%. This is indicative that police commissioners during this period expressed their independence and autonomy regarding any undue political involvement in police commissioner departures. Interestingly, Period 1 (Political) contained 6 police commissioners labeled “Professional” out of the 12 and accounted for 50%.

Table 4.4 Police Independence by Period

Independence	Period				Total	%
	1 Political 1901-1925	2 Reform 1926-1950	3 Professional 1951-1975	4 Community 1976-2001		
Professional	6	8	3	9	26	65.0
Autonomist	4	1	5	0	10	25.0
Antagonist	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>10.0</u>
Total	12	10	9	9	40	100.0

Civilian Control

Table 4.5 reveals that “Political Activist” (mayors who are heavily involved in police affairs) is the only category to induce “political” departures. Further, when we examine the “Political Activist” category more closely, we find that in almost 73% of the departures labeled “Latent Political” a corresponding “Political Activist” mayor was identified. This may be indicative of a different style of political involvement in police affairs, a different understanding by police

commissioners of when involvement becomes “interference” or reflective of a police commissioner’s reticence in contesting any undue involvement in police affairs. A “Team” mayor accounted for 55% of the “Non-Political” departures. This lends support to the emergence of another type of political involvement in police commissioner departures.

Table 4.5 Civilian Control by Police Governance

Civilian Control	Professional Autonomy	Governance		Total	%
		Team	Political Activist		
Political	0	0	9	9	22.5
Latent Political	2	1	8	11	27.5
Non-Political	<u>4</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>50.0</u>
Total	6	12	22	40	100.0

Table 4.6 shows the variable “police governance” which measured mayoral (political) involvement in police affairs during the entire period of the study 1901-2001. There were 17 elected Mayors and 2 Acting Mayors typed according to their daily interaction and level of involvement in police affairs with each of the 40 police commissioners. Although accounting for a total of 51 dyads, as some police commissioners served multiple mayors, and some mayors appointed multiple police commissioners, only those dyads in which a police commissioner’s departure occurred were included which resulted in 40 cases for

analysis.

“Police governance” provides a glimpse into the Mayor’s professional and/or personal relationship with the police commissioner. For example, a “Political Activist” mayor is “actively engaged, takes a personal interest...” in police affairs (see Coding section for complete definition of the 3 categories). The data shows in the Political Period mayors were, expectedly, very involved in police affairs (75%). Period 2 (Reform) ushered in a era of political silence regarding a mayor’s public persona vis-a-vis police affairs. Although the “Political Activist” mayor decreased slightly in the Reform Period, it still accounted for 70% of the cases between 1926-1950. This may indicate that some mayors found it difficult to relinquish control.

Table 4.6 Police Governance by Period

Governance	Period				Total	%
	Political 1901-1925	Reform 1926-1950	Professional 1951-1975	Community 1976-2001		
Professional Autonomy	1	3	2	0	6	15.0
Team	2	0	5	5	12	30.0
Political Activist	<u>9</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>55.0</u>
Total	12	10	9	9	40	100.0

However, after 1950 in both the Professional and Community Periods the

“Political Activist” mayor waned dramatically, with its lowest representation at 22% in the “Professional Period” between 1951 and 1975. The political activist increased to 44% in the Community Period (1976-2001), however, because of the strict coding of the categories, the act which labeled the mayor “political activists” in two of the cases was the non-retention/non-selection of the incumbent police commissioner who had been considered a viable candidate for the post.

The “Team” style of police governance emerged as the dominant style in both Period 3 (Professional) and Period 4 (Community) accounting for 56% of the cases within each period. Perhaps, this was a result of the public’s outcry for greater political and police accountability. The “Team” style would come to define the modern relationship between the police commissioner and mayor and may account for the absence of the category “Professional Autonomy” and why it was not found in Period 4 (Community).

Selection

Table 4.7 shows the joint distribution of the variable “Police Governance,” used to represent the local political culture, and “Selection,” a measure which captures the background of the individual chosen to be the police commissioner. The local political culture encompasses three components: type of government, type of election, and professional manager. In the present study, the first two are fixed. The third, professional manager is dynamic and represented by the mayor. Although 51 dyads were found, only the police governance style of the mayor

who selected the police commissioner is analyzed (N = 40).

Mayors who follow the police governance style “Professional Autonomy” selected the “Best Man” in 83% of the cases in that category. These mayors choose someone they believe is competent in law enforcement, and allow them to exercise a modicum of professional autonomy in police affairs. In addition, it is interesting to note that the “Best Man”, as defined in the present study, was selected in almost 60% of the time by “Political Activist” mayors. This finding may be indicative that regardless of the extent of the mayor’s involvement in police affairs, the “Best Man” is the preferred choice.

Table 4.7 Police Governance by Police Commissioner Selection Type

Governance	Best Man	Selection Local Deserving	Closest to Party	Total	%
Professional Autonomy	5	1	0	6	15.0
Team	2	5	5	12	30.0
Political Activist	<u>10</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>55.0</u>
Total	17	15	8	40	100.0

Table 4.7 also shows that New York City Mayors, regardless of their style, selected the “Man Closest to the Party” least. The “Political Activist” and “Professional Autonomy” mayors overwhelmingly selected the “Best Man.”

Table 4.8 shows the selection type by period. The “Best Man” (42.5%)

was the most represented, followed by “Local Deserving Fellow” (37.5%), and “Man Closest to the Party” (20%). Traditionally, these three types of individuals selected as the chief police executive were defined as the local cop (Local Deserving Fellow), political party hack (Man Closest to the Party), or the most qualified individual willing to take the job (Best Man Available). These terms were modified to better fit the uniqueness of the New York Police Department (see Coding section for complete operationalization of the variable “Selection”). This adaptation is most evident in the type “Man Closest to the Party” found equally with the other two types in Period 4 (Community). In fact, in Period 4, “Man Closest to the Party” was found in greater percentage of cases within the period than the same category in Period 1 (33.3% to 25%), when it would be expected to be much higher than any of the three other periods.

As Table 4.8 reveals, all three types are represented in each of the four periods. This may be indicative that the selection of police commissioner is situationally, or contextually determined and not beholden to any prescribed plan, but more of a structured randomness. It may also point to the lack of parochialism in the selection process.

Table 4.8 Selection by Period

Selection	1901-1925	1926-1950	1951-1975	1976-2001	Total	%
Best Man Available	6	4	4	3	17	42.5
Deserving Local Fellow	3	5	4	3	15	37.5
Man Closest to The Party	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>20.0</u>
Total	12	10	9	9	40	100.0

Local Political Culture

Table 4.9 again uses the variable “Police Governance” to represent the local political culture, and joins it with the variable “Police Independence” which represents the police style. Table 10 shows that 65% of the police commissioners are labeled “Professional.” Of these, 46% served under a “Political Activist” mayor and departed without any hint of public criticism of the Mayor. This may be indicative that the police commissioner acted in a professional manner by remaining silent when political involvement was responsible for his departure. It may also be indicative of what Robinson (1975) asserted was the role of the chief police executive to take “a hit” for his political boss; however the finding that 60% of “Autonomist” police commissioners served a “Political Activist” mayor reveals that a majority of some police commissioner’s were less reluctant to bow out gracefully.

Table 4.9 Police Governance by Police Independence

Governance	Autonomy			Total	%
	Professional	Autonomist	Antagonist		
Professional Autonomy	5	1	0	6	15
Team	9	3	0	12	30
Political Activist	<u>12</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>55</u>
Total	26	10	4	40	100

Table 4.10 Police Policy by Period

Policy	Period				Total	%
	Political 1901-1925	Reform 1926-1950	Professional 1951-1975	Community 1976-2001		
Corruption	8	1	0	1	10	25.0
Department	2	7	6	2	17	42.5
Community	1	2	2	6	11	27.5
Enforcement	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>5.0</u>
Total	12	10	9	9	40	100.0

Policy

Table 4.10 shows the breakdown of administration policy by period.

Historically, external forces (i.e. politicians, press, civil rights organization, etc.) have influenced police policy. The administration's policy was grouped into 1 of 4 categories; corruption, department, community, and enforcement (see Coding section). In Period 1 (Political) we find that fighting corruption was paramount and accounted for 67% of the total cases. Period 2 (Reform) and Period 3 (Professional) focused on police reform and the establishment of a professional police department. Priorities to strengthen the overall administration and efficiency of the police department accounted for 70% and 67% of the cases in these two periods. In Period 4 (Community) which represented the last quarter of the twentieth century, priorities focused on strengthening community relations which represented 67% of all cases within the period, and 56% of cases between periods.

Table 4.11 Civilian Control by Police Independence

Control	Independence			Total	%
	Professional	Autonomist	Antagonist		
Political	3	3	3	9	22.5
Latent Political	6	4	1	11	27.5
Non-Political	<u>17</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>50.0</u>
Total	26	10	4	40	100.0

Table 4.11 places the variables “Civilian Control” and “Police Independence” in a contingency table. These are competing forces (civilian control versus professional autonomy) are the crux of the main focus of the present study. Table 4.11 reveals how these competing forces manifested themselves in police commissioner departures. As expected, a departure labeled “Political” which was publicly induced by the mayor was met with an equally opposing force. Here, the police commissioner is publicly critical of the mayor in almost 67% of “political” departures. When the pressure to depart was tacit, as evidenced by the “Latent Political” labeled departures, a police commissioner is split (55% to 45%) in favor of “Professional” and resigned without being openly critical. Interestingly, in 15% of the “Non-Political” departures, a Police Commissioner was somewhat critical of his political boss. This gives a slight hint that some New York Police Commissioners were willing to speak their mind regarding political interference and professional autonomy even in the absence of overt political or mayoral involvement.

James Q. Wilson’s Theory

In Wilson’s seminal study on the link between local political culture and police style, political culture was measured using “form of local government,” “professionalism of the manager,” and “type of local election.” In the present study, the strong mayor-council form of local government and the partisan election process remained constant throughout the entire period of the study (1901-2001).

Tables 4.12, 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15 show new dichotomous collapsed variables placed into a 2 x 2 table and using Yule's Q to measure the association of each pair. Yule's Q is a measure of association for two categorical variables with two categories, or levels. It is an appropriate measure of association in a 2 x 2 contingency table (Bachman and Paternoster, 1997, p. 683).

Table 4.12 shows the distribution of the revised collapsed variables "Police Governance" and "Police Independence." These two variables represent Wilson's (1968) "political culture" and "police style." The three categories which comprised the original variable police governance which measured the level of involvement of the mayor in police affairs was collapsed in the following manner: Professional Autonomy became "not involved," while Team, and Political Activist were collapsed into the category labeled "involved." The original "Professional Independence" is comprised of three categories "Professional," "Autonomist," and "Antagonist" which reflect the level of criticism directed at the mayor by the police commissioner at the time of his departure. The category "Professional" became "Not Critical," while "Autonomist" and "Antagonist" were collapsed and labeled "Critical." The resulting Yule's Q of .5116 indicates a moderate association between police governance (culture) and professional autonomy (style).

Table 4.12 Political Culture and Police Independence

		Style	
		Non Critical	Critical
Culture	Not Involved	5	1
	Involved	21	13

Yule's Q = .5116

Table 4.13 measured the collapsed variables "Police Governance" and "Selection." The three categories which comprised the original variable police governance which measured the level of involvement of the mayor in police affairs were collapsed in the following manner; "Professional Autonomy" became "Not Involved," while "Team," and "Political Activist" were collapsed into the category labeled "Involved." The original variable "Selection" was comprised of "Best Man Available," Local Deserving Fellow," and "Man Closest to the Party." Historically, the best man was associated with the outsider candidate, the local deserving fellow, the insider candidate, and the man closest to the party, the patronage candidate. For the purposes of this study, the "Local Deserving Fellow," and "Man Closest to the Party" were collapsed into one category labeled "Insider." The resulting Yule's Q of .8032 indicates a very strong association between police governance (culture) and the type of individual selected as police commissioner.

Table 4.13 Political Culture and Selection Type

		Selection	
		Outsider	Insider
Culture	Not Involved	5	1
	Involved	12	22

Yule's Q = .8032

Table 4.14 measured the revised variables “Police Governance” (culture) and “Civilian Control.” The three categories which comprise the original “Police Governance” were collapsed as follows: “Professional Autonomy” became “Not Involved,” and “Team,” and “Political Activist” were collapsed into a single category labeled “Involved.” The original “Political Involvement” consisted of three categories: “Political,” “Latent Political,” and “Non-Political.” “Non-political” remained “Non-Political,” while “Latent Political” and “Political” were collapsed into a new variable “Political.” The resulting Yule’s Q of .6177 indicates a moderately strong association between the police governance and civilian control. Although statistically associated, the direction cannot be determined as evidence by an almost even split between involved mayors and non-political (17) and political (18) departures. It is expected that undue political involvement in police affairs would lead to political departures; it is counterintuitive to think otherwise. This finding supports the notion that political

involvement does not ipso facto constitute negative interference. It appears the determinant factor in whether or not involvement rises to the level of interference is based on the police commissioner’s perception, or acknowledgement.

Table 4.14 Political Culture and Civilian Control

		Control	
		Non Political	Political
Culture	Not Involved	4	1
	Involved	17	18

Yule’s Q = .6179

Table 4.15 measured the revised variables “Police Governance” and “Policy.” The three categories which comprised the original “Police Governance” were collapsed in the following manner: “Professional Autonomy” became “not involved,” and “Team,” and “Political Activist” were collapsed into the category labeled “involved.” The original “Policy” consisted of four categories: “corruption,” “department,” “community,” and “enforcement.” The categories corruption and enforcement were combined and labeled “Crime,” and the remaining categories “Department,” and “Community” were labeled “Non-Crime.” The resulting Yule’s Q of .7873 indicates a moderate association

between police policy and police governance.

Table 4.15 Political Culture and Policy

		Policy	
		Non Crime	Crime
Culture	Not Involved	12	1
	Involved	16	11

Yule's Q = .7873

“Police Governance,” as a measure of Wilson’s local political culture in the present study was most strongly associated with “Selection” (.80) and “Policy” (.78). The individual selected and the administration’s priority were directly affected by the local political culture. The association between “Police Governance” and “Civilian Control” (Departure) (.62) and “Professional Autonomy” (.51), although moderate, was less clear. Given the human element, a “Political Activist” may be as likely to induce a political departure as not. A police commissioner may be as likely to be critical as not regardless of the mayor’s role in the departure.

Civilian Control Versus Professional Autonomy

The on-going debate regarding the apolitical nature of the police is civilian control versus professional autonomy. In order to measure the manner and extent of political involvement in police affairs in the police commissioner selection through departure, the four variables which directly pertained to each issue were analyzed. The variables included “Selection,” “Civilian Control,” “Police Independence,” and “Police Governance.” “Civilian Control” represented the level of political involvement in the police commissioner’s “Departure.” “Police Independence,” which is a measure of police style represented the level of professional autonomy in the departure, and “Police Governance” which represented the daily involvement in police affairs.

Each variable category was rank ordered and assigned a score ranging from 1 to 3 according to the manner and extent of political involvement. A score of 1 inferred a less “political” decision, while a 3 inferred a more “political” decision. For example, the category “Best Man Available” in variable “Selection” would more likely represent a non-political decision than the category “Man Closest to the Party.” (see Coding section for operationalization of all terms).

Selection

Best Man Available = 1

Deserving Local Fellow = 2

Man Closest to the Party = 3.

Departure (Civilian Control)

Non-Political = 1

Latent Political = 2,

Political = 3.

Police Style (Police Independence)

Antagonist = 1

Autonomist = 2

Professional = 3.

Political Culture (Police Governance)

Professional Autonomist = 1

Team = 2

Political Activist = 3

The mean was calculated for each variable. In a longitudinal study extremes are cancelled. The results are contained in Table 4.16.

Selection

A mean of 1.77 is just slightly more toward professional autonomy than civilian control. This is indicative that no single typology dominated the selection process.

Table 4.16 Mean Scores for Selected Variables: Professional Autonomy Versus Civilian Control

Variable	Mean
Selection	1.77
Civilian Control (Departure)	1.75
Police Independence (Police Style)	2.55
Police Governance	2.40

* Scores ranged between 1 (Professional Autonomy) through 3 (Civilian Control). Means were calculated based on 40 cases (see Table 4.1).

Civilian Control (Departure):

A mean of 1.725 is indicative that New York City Mayors have not historically been publicly involved in forcing the Police Commissioner's

departure.

Police Independence (Style):

A mean of 2.55 is situated very much toward the Civilian Control end of the continuum. This may be indicative that police commissioners, despite the rhetoric of professional autonomy and independence, understand that they serve at the pleasure of the mayor.

Police Governance

A mean of 2.40 is indicative that mayors were actively engaged in police affairs, but their involvement was not always perceived as interference.

Chapter Five

Discussion

The present study has attempted, through a compilation of police commissioner /mayor dyads to identify patterns or trends which can be referenced as a baseline for future similar examinations of different cities. A natural starting point for this archival research was found in the New York Police Department in 1901, when the Police Bill was enacted in the New York State legislature which created the single head of the New York City Police Department. This change was intended to remove politics from policing, make the police more professional, and affix accountability to a single individual. In addition, the police commissioner's term was set at five years, so as to prevent his being ousted by a new administration absent for cause only. Of the forty men appointed police commissioner only four (Enright, Valentine, Kennedy, and McGuire) lasted five years, or more in office. Four others had terms between four and five years. Despite the City Charter, and the rhetoric about the elimination of politics, most police commissioners vacated the office when the incumbent Mayor's term expired, or soon thereafter. This is the first clue that politics existed in policing in some form.

As previously covered in the literature review the Wickersham Commission made two recommendations to wrest control of the police from politicians. The New York Police Department was thirty years ahead of the Wickersham Commission with its 1901 legislation intended to insulate the police commissioner from political interference. Interestingly, not one of the five police

commissioners was given a public hearing before he was dismissed or asked to resign. All five cases occurred between 1901 and 1925 in Period I (Political).

August Vollmer, author of the Wickersham Commission's Report on Police, blamed the "corrupting influence of politics" for the problems facing the police at that time. Was Vollmer acknowledging the existence and inevitability of politics in policing? Whatever Vollmer's intention, the present study found that a police commissioner's departure historically was as likely to be the result of politics as defined here, as not. This finding could be due to the operationalization of the terms, or as Wilson observed, the "political culture." If each dyad was treated as a separate political culture, the one dynamic variable would be the mayor. The form of government and type of election was constant throughout the period of the study (1901-200).

The findings and implications of the present study will be addressed in the order of the five research questions.

Research Question 1: "Is political (Mayoral) involvement the leading cause of Police Commissioner departures?"

The first question is quite simply answered, "it depends." It depends on how political involvement is perceived by the Police Commissioner. Whether mayoral involvement is considered political interference is "in the eye of the beholder." One Commissioner may view mayoral involvement as interference, and another as assistance or proper direction, and yet another may ignore it altogether. According to the data, a Police Commissioner's departure was not likely to be the result of mayoral pressure. The category "Latent Political"

captured those police commissioner departures which were not clearly political as defined here, but were deemed so by the media. It is a strong possibility that the police commissioner in question resigned due to some type of political pressure, however slight. A police commissioner departure categorized as “Political,” and defined as a departure which is “publicly induced by the Mayor,” is clearly due to political involvement. Finding political involvement in those cases labeled “Latent Political” is not as clear.

If a more in-depth exploration into the circumstances surrounding the departure of each case labeled “latent political” was conducted, and if ultimately every case was re-categorized as “political,” the resulting combined percentage of the two variables “Political,” and “Latent Political” would still not exceed 50%. Thus, political involvement by even the most liberal interpretation would reveal that the likelihood that a police commissioner’s departure is due to mayoral involvement, or “publicly induced by the mayor” is 1 in 2, or 50%. This figure is similar to the 53% found by Tunnel and Gaines, but significantly less than the 70% designated by Rainguet and Dodge regarding police chief departures due to political pressure. The latter study had a small sample (N=10).

Based on these findings, political involvement is not a major cause of police commissioner departures. It must be remembered that these findings are historical, and do not capture multiple police chiefs at a single point in time. This finding includes a period (1901-1925) in which political involvement in policing was rampant, causing the Wickersham Commission in 1931 to pronounce “political control by politicians in the discharge of the police executives’

duties...[as] the chief evil.” Thus, it is even more remarkable that the proportion is less than both the Tunnel and Gaines and Rainguet and Dodge studies.

The present study differs from these prior studies in the following ways. First, this study included the incumbent’s own words to determine the manner of the departure. Tunnel and Gaines used the observations and opinions of active chiefs to conclude whether political interference was believed to be the reason for their predecessor’s departure. Second, the Dodge and Rainguet study which surveyed a much smaller sample allowed the police chief to select multiple reasons for their departure. This study provides a more narrow and accurate depiction of the circumstances surrounding a chief police executive’s departure.

If the present study included the “Manifest Rationale” category “New Administration” as an induced departure, then this figure would increase to 70% equaling the findings of Ranguet and Dodge. The respondents in the Rainguet and Dodge were asked to select from a list of reasons including “political pressure.” Respondents could cite multiple reasons for their departure of which “political pressure” was only one. The present study captured a manifest reason based on the police commissioner’s own statements, resignation letter, or actions, and a latent reason based on media coverage, and a totality of the available data.

Whether the police commissioner departed due to political pressure, and if so, whether he chose to publicly disclose that fact appeared to be an entirely personal decision. It was found that sometimes a mundane yet acceptable public reason for a police commissioner departure disguised a more controversial and accurate latent reason(s). The existence of latent rationale for a police

commissioner departure highlights a problem with archival research: the inability to follow-up, or gain clarification. The researcher must piece together and make inferences based on the available data.

Research Question 2: "In general what accounted for police commissioner departures?"

It may be easier to understand the nature of political involvement in police commissioner departures if we examine the reasons why police commissioners leave office. Primarily, we are interested in those resignations which occur mid-term, and not at the expiration of a scheduled/institutionalized term, or due to a new administration, although cases at this juncture can still be susceptible to political involvement.

The latent reason is offered by the press, politicians, or other interested third parties as being the "true" reason for the Police Commissioner's resignation. We are particularly interested in those departures which took place mid-term because they are the result of a police commissioner's conscious and deliberate choice at that particular moment. Whether this choice is truly voluntary or not is sometimes easier to ascertain at a later date. Resignations due to a new administration, although induced by a Mayor-elect, are a function of tradition and custom among Police Commissioners to allow a new Mayor the opportunity to select his own man unencumbered.

In the event a police commissioner chooses not to leave office in an orderly manner, as in the case of Police Commissioner Waldo, he runs the risk of

being dismissed if his not “getting out of the way” is considered to be detrimental to the good order and efficiency of the police department or the public interest. In this case, Mayor-elect Mitchel and Acting Mayor Kline acted in concert by removing Waldo and replacing him with First Deputy Commissioner McKay. This case is an atypical departure regarding a new administration, and is counted as a forced dismissal because of the incumbent acting mayor’s role in the police commissioner’s departure.

Not a single police commissioner, after the election of a new mayor, invoked the City Charter to remain in office. Some made a passing reference, but not a single man challenged his claim to the position. In all other cases of a police commissioner departure due to a new administration there was no indication that an incumbent mayor played an active role in the police commissioner’s departure other than to accept the resignation.

As indicated, in some cases, latent reasons may be a more accurate representation of the reason why police commissioners vacate the office. This is not always the case, though, as with the resignation of Commissioner McGuire who left to take an executive position with a highly respected private security firm, proving that sometimes a resignation due to a new employment opportunity is just that and not a “red flag” that something is amiss. There is no doubt that police commissioners can experience burnout due to the stress of the office and decide to leave for reasons which have nothing to do with blatant politics in the pejorative sense, yet are indicative of political acts of omission or commission which lead the police commissioner to conclude that resigning is his best option.

The following three examples illustrate the contrast between the manifest and latent rationale.

In the first case, Police Commissioner Partridge was subjected to criticism by external agents including the Governor and party leaders, while his political boss Mayor Low remained silent. Ultimately, Police Commissioner Partridge, who tired of the constant barrage and the absence of any public Mayoral support, resigned citing “poor health.” A second example is the resignation of Police Commissioner Cropsey who similarly withstood the mayor’s criticism and lack of support. The difference between Cropsey and Partridge was that the criticism did not come from external agents, but from his political boss Mayor Gaynor. When Cropsey resigned, he initially cited “mayoral criticism,” and “lack of support;” however, for the record Commissioner Cropsey amended his reason for resigning to “not to embarrass the Mayor.” A third case involved Police Commissioner Warren who reportedly sent two different letters of resignation to Mayor Walker. The first letter, which was returned by City Hall, cited political interference in police department personnel matters. The second letter, which simply stated that the Police Commissioner desired to return to the practice of law, was accepted.

In the entire period of the study, only three police commissioners left office at the expiration of a scheduled/institutionalized five year term; Commissioner Kennedy resigned after declining re-appointment, Commissioner Broderick resigned after not being re-appointed, and Commissioner Bratton resigned because of a delay in deciding his re-appointment. Again, all three were fraught with lesser political acts of omission or commission which led the police

commissioner's resignation.

The second most prevalent latent reason found for a police commissioner's departure was "Mayor Induced." Of the 9 cases in this category, almost 90% were asserted to have left for other employment. The only case of the nine was Police Commissioner Broderick who was not re-appointed after the completion of his term. Had Broderick's departure occurred at other than a fixed scheduled/institutionalized point, absent the tension over the implementation of the Civilian Complaint Review Board, and Broderick's allegations of political interference, his case would have been labeled a "political" departure. However, because Mayor Lindsay was able to select anyone he desired for a new five year term, Police Commissioner Broderick was just another potential candidate considered, but not selected.

Sometimes a single event can trigger a departure. The event may not always immediately precede the resignation, but it will be of such gravity that it changes the dynamic of the relationship between the police commissioner and mayor. Mayor James J. Walker appointed four Police Commissioners during his three terms. Walker resigned from office before the end of his third term. Each of the first three police commissioners cited new employment as the reason for their departure, but it was evident that Mayor Walker was instrumental in each one's departure.

In the case of police commissioner McLaughlin, the triggering event may have been the Mayor's intervention in brokering a truce between the Commissioner and Tammany Hall, the Democratic machine. The Commissioner

had taken a hard line against gambling and the police raided some Democratic clubs which reportedly caused the local district leaders to begin clamoring for the Commissioner's removal. Whether the Commissioner viewed the Mayor's action as political interference is undetermined. What is known is the Commissioner's public stance denouncing any political intrusion in police affairs. When the Commissioner submitted his resignation one week later there was much speculation that it was due to the Mayor's involvement in the matter.

The case of the second Police Commissioner is chronicled above. To reiterate, it was alleged by Commissioner Warren that Mayor Walker had intervened in matters of personnel. This was referenced in the Commissioner's first letter of resignation. When the letter was promptly returned by City Hall, the Police Commissioner submitted a second resignation letter which cited a return to the practice of law. Mayor Walker's third Police Commissioner, Grover Whalen, also left office and returned to his former employment. In the end there were policy disagreements between Commissioner Whalen and the Mayor. These disagreements may have contributed to Mayor Walker's reversal of a policy for no apparent substantive reason. Mayor Walker had previously been in accord with his Police Commissioner regarding the proposed policy. Rumors circulated which intimated that Commissioner Whalen was too high profile, and that Mayor Walker did not want to share the spotlight with his Police Commissioner. Further, it was leaked that the Mayor would be receptive to the Police Commissioner's resignation. Commissioner Whalen was succeeded by Edward Mulrooney, the second man to come from the ranks, and whose low key

demeanor was in sharp contrast to Whalen's publicity seeking and must have surely met with Mayor Walker's approval.

Another mayor who appointed multiple police commissioners was Mayor Koch. He appointed four police commissioners during his three terms. Unlike Mayor Walker Koch's police commissioners had nothing to do with his political maneuverings. One Commissioner, William Devine, Koch appointed as a full commissioner in a pre-arranged agreement where Devine would serve only two days then resign to combat an illness, while another, Commissioner Condon, served a few months at the end of Koch's administration. The other two Commissioners epitomized a strong relationship between a police commissioner and a Mayor. Personally, Police Commissioner McGuire and Ward could not have been more opposite. Professionally, their styles differed as well. The fact that each one's relationship with Mayor Koch was strong may suggest that the Mayor plays a more significant role in the relationship than the Police Commissioner. It is the Mayor who sets the tone of the relationship. Both Police Commissioners served more than five years. McGuire left to assume a security position with Pinkerton's, while Ward departed citing health issues.

It has already been mentioned that McGuire's resignation was deemed void of political pressure. For a departure to be categorized as "political," it must have been "publicly induced by the Mayor." Police/minority relations were found to be the latent reason for Commissioner McGuire's resignation. Even if McGuire decided it was time to bow out as a result of the friction between the police and the minority community, it does not qualify as either "political," or

“latent political” as defined in the present study, but may have been a prime factor in the selection of his successor Commissioner Ward, the first Black Police Commissioner.

Where McGuire epitomized the steady low key Police Commissioner, and maybe went unnoticed in the street, there was no mistaking Commissioner Ward, who would have a tumultuous, but never contentious relationship with Mayor Koch. It was rumored that Commissioner Ward resigned to advise the Black Democratic Mayoral nominee, David Dinkins. Mayor Koch decided that he would not seek re-election. Again, as with Commissioner McGuire, even if Commissioner Ward left to advise another politician, this departure did not qualify as “political.” In both cases there was no indication that either man left because of any personal animus toward the Mayor. On the contrary, both relationships are testimony to the strong bond which can be forged between a Police Commissioner and a Mayor. Mayor Koch never wavered in defending and supporting his police commissioners through thick and thin.

There were five departures which were found to have unique circumstances. In the first instance, Mayor Impelliteri and Commissioner O’Brien agreed that the Police Commissioner should step down in the interest of restoring public confidence due to an ongoing external investigation into police corruption. Both Impelliteri and O’Brien believed the position had become “untenable.” This case comes closest to Robinson’s assertion that the political role of the police executive is to protect the mayor and take responsibility for problems even if that means resigning.

Only one other case can be potentially considered in the same vein. Commissioner Safir enjoyed both a good professional and personal relationship with Mayor Giuliani. After a series of embarrassing incidents involving possible abuses of power by Safir, an incident of alleged excessive force by the police in the shooting of an emotionally disturbed man raised the ire of the minority community. Commissioner Safir announced his resignation shortly thereafter. It is very conceivable that Commissioner Safir took the hit for his old friend so that the Mayor could begin to mend fences and establish better relations with a police commissioner more attuned to the minority community.

In another case of an irregular departure, Commissioner Cawley refused to comply with a request by the new administration to submit a resignation with an accompanying resume. The Police Commissioner cited the City Charter section which set the police commissioner's term at five years as the reason for his non-compliance. Before Mayor Beame selected Michael Codd for the police commissionership, many believed that Cawley had a legitimate shot at being retained in office, and that it was his own behavior which kept him from being retained.

The final two cases include one police commissioner who declined the position after it was announced that he had been re-appointed, and another who resigned without stating the reason. Commissioner Kennedy refused his re-appointment when offered by Mayor Wagner due to what Kennedy believed was insincerity on the part of Mayor Wagner. Lastly, Commissioner Leary resigned without stating a reason. Commissioner Leary was the only police commissioner

to depart in this fashion. Leary had spoken about politics and the police in an interview months earlier, but he never attributed his resignation to political involvement, or any other reason.

One commissioner who would not remain silent as to the circumstances surrounding his departure was Police Commissioner Bingham. Bingham wrote an article entitled, "Why I Was Removed" which squarely laid the blame on political involvement. In the article which appeared in the October issue of Van Norden's magazine and was reported in the New York Times on September 20, 1909 ("Bingham Yearned to Spank the Mayor") Bingham believed Mayor McClellan's decision to remove him was influenced by individuals whose interests were negatively affected by Bingham's policies.

Research Question 3 "Did the manner and extent of political involvement change over time?"

After the Bi-Partisan Police Board was abolished in 1901 politics was supposed to have been eliminated from policing. At this time, precinct captains and ward leaders had the real power over appointments, assignments, transfers, and promotions. Patronage and nepotism, which epitomized the maxim "To the victor belong the spoils," was prevalent. As Tammany Mayor Van Wyck was in office when the single-headed police commissioner edict was enacted, he allowed the political organization to carry on as usual. Mayors backed by Tammany Hall would split City Hall with fusion, reform, independent democrat, and republican candidates well into the 1960's when Tammany Hall finally lost all semblance of

its former glory.

Regarding the extent of mayoral involvement, the Political Period was dominated by political activist mayors. Political activists were also prevalent in the Reform Period. One political activist mayor was three-term Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia. LaGuardia, who appointed the longest serving police commissioner Lewis Valentine, was very much involved in police affairs. His police governance style was not welcomed by his first Police Commissioner, John O’Ryan, however after O’Ryan’s resignation, Valentine was appointed police commissioner and he would remain in place for over eleven years, resigning only after LaGuardia announced he would not seek a fourth term. Thus, providing evidence that police commissioners can serve political activist mayors and supporting the finding that political interference is in the “eye of the beholder.” LaGuardia may represent Goodsell’s “political professionalism” discussed earlier.

The Professional Period (1951-1975) ushered in the “Team” style of police governance which would become the dominant style of the second half of the twentieth century. Three-term Mayor Robert Wagner, who was the last Tammany Hall mayor, appointed four police commissioners, and publicly epitomized the team concept. At each swearing in ceremony he would clearly state that he would not interfere, and would give his police commissioner a “free hand” in the administration of the department. Despite his claims of not interfering and his team style of police governance, his first two police commissioners, Francis Adams and Stephen Kennedy, both resigned mid-term. The true reason for Commissioner Adams’ resignation was clouded by the fact

that he returned to his law practice; a convenient exit strategy which gave the appearance that he had done his service, and was now moving on. There wasn't any public condemnation or criticism of Mayor Wagner from Adams, but behind the scenes, there was some speculation that Mayor Wagner was receptive to the idea of his police commissioner departing in the same vein as Mayor Walker had intimated about Commissioner Whalen years earlier. It was rumored that Commissioner Adams may have been a bit outspoken for his political boss. There was no misunderstanding Commissioner Kennedy's reason for departing which has been recounted above: he refused the re-appointment because he believed Mayor Wagner did not favor a pay differential between the Police and Fire Department.

Research Question 4 "Was political culture linked to police commissioner selection, police commissioner departure, police independence, and police policy?"

Selection:

If we re-phrase this question and ask, "In what way is the Mayor linked to the Police Commissioner?" we can begin to understand the relationship between a chief political and chief police executive. The most obvious link between the two principal actors is the criterion for selection of the police commissioner. It was found that the "best man" and "local deserving fellow" were each selected twice as often as the "man closest to the party." The disappearance of the Democratic

political machine Tammany Hall was one reason why “Man Closest to the Party” was the least frequent type selected. The reason for Tammany Hall’s decline may have been most likely due to the great amount of media and other scrutiny placed on New York politics and police, and the fact that both the New York Mayor and Police Commissioner were (and are) national public figures, and in some instances international public figures. The candidate appointed police commissioner must be seen as qualified to assume the “top cop” position in American law enforcement. It can be argued that many of those labeled “local deserving fellow” can also be the “best man available.” Over the years, members of the NYPD have become chief police executives of other police departments due to the fact that New York inculcates a cadre of professionals who possess the requisite knowledge, skill, and ability to be a chief police executive. The operationalization of the categories for the variable “Selection” account for the uniqueness of the police situation in New York (see Coding Section for “selection” categories).

The variable “Selection” is comprised of the categories “Best Man,” “Deserving Local Fellow”, and “Man Closest to the Party.” The best man is traditionally associated with the outsider candidate. However, this distinction was not found to apply to New York. The “best” candidate oftentimes was contextual, or situational as the cases of Commissioner Grover Whalen (1928-1930) and Commissioner Bratton (1994-1996) attest. Both men grabbed much of the spotlight from a mayor who truly enjoyed being in the spotlight himself. When Mayor Walker replaced Whalen, he chose the very reserved Edward P.

Mulrooney, a former Assistant Chief Inspector and thirty-four year veteran of the police department, who as the antithesis of his predecessor maintained a policy of silence and kept the press at arms length informing them only with “all the news consistent with police work.”

Similarly, Mayor Giuliani shut out Bratton in an attempt to regain the media spotlight on City Hall and not Police Headquarters. Ultimately, Commissioner Bratton submitted his resignation. Mayor Giuliani chose Howard Safir, a loyal and trusted friend, to succeed Bratton. Commissioner Safir declared, “I’m going to do my job despite the media, not because of the media.” Safir actually banned a Daily News reporter from his office, prompting the newspaper to state, “It is not the part of a city official to dictate who covers the news.” This incident is consistent with the administration’s attempts to “punish” the press for their favorable treatment of Safir’s predecessor Bratton.

There was not found to be a single typology which would be considered the “Best,” regardless of the situation. Oftentimes, there were many individuals who possessed the requisite professional knowledge, skill, and ability to be police commissioner; however, it was found that the political culture at the time played a role and influenced who was ultimately selected. Although the New York Police Department cultivated a deep cadre of qualified candidates after 1950, any one of whom could have been chosen, often the determining factor was based on the political climate, not the sordid “politics” of an earlier time of which the Wickersham Commission warned, but the more “subtle” politics which has been found to have supplanted it.

Post 1950, the “Best Man,” “Deserving Local Fellow,” and “Man Closest to the Party” were represented. In fact, both the insider and outsider candidates were selected equally. In addition, all three types were represented between 1901- 1950. The selection of the New York Police Commissioner is not a “cookie cutter” affair. In 55% of the cases, Police Commissioners were once either a uniform member of the NYPD, or served as one of the civilian Deputy Police Commissioners. In comparison, only 17.5% had no criminal justice, or law enforcement experience. Yule’s Q, a measure of association, revealed a moderately strong relationship (.51) between political culture and selection type (See Table 4.14).

Civilian Control (Departure):

The cases where a police commissioner departed under speculation that “politics” was responsible, those cases labeled “latent political,” provide the best estimate of the type and extent of political involvement deemed by media whose assessment of the contextual circumstances surrounding the departure were reported. “Political” cases are clearly due to mayoral involvement as defined by, “publicly induced by the Mayor.” “Non-political” departures are equally evident, mostly due to a strong professional and/or personal relationship between the police commissioner and the mayor. Of the nine cases found which are labeled “political,” five occurred in Political Period (1901-1925) and two in the Community Period (1976-2001). The former finding was not surprising. However, the latter finding did appear out of place. But as has been reported, these two cases involved incumbent Police Commissioners whose service

overlapped in a new administration, and were retained, or selected by the new mayor. The five cases in the Political Period were representative of the political influence and were responsible for the short term of police executives.

The Wickersham Commission admonished that politics was the “chief evil” responsible for the short tenures of police executives. When each of the terms of the six police commissioner’s who began on day one with a new mayor were calculated it shows that the average term was 22 months. If Robert McGuire’s term is excluded (72 months) that figure is reduced to only 13 months (6/80). Interestingly, when there was a holdover police commissioner prior to the selection of a new mayor’s own man, the average term was almost 36 months. This may suggest of a mayor’s need to be in office awhile before he knows what he wants in a police commissioner, or if he was tardy in making a selection close to the time he assumed office, the circumstances may have dictated it best to stick with the incumbent.

In New York, the 1901 Police Bill legislation was intended to remove politics from the police. The primary means to accomplish this was the fixing of a Police Commissioner’s term at five years. If a police commissioner left office before the end of his term, his successor was appointed to fulfill the remainder of the unexpired term. At the time, the imposition of the five year term was intended to keep a police commissioner from being subjected to an early departure through party politics when a new mayor assumed office. The mayor’s term is four years and absent an incumbent mayor’s re-election, a police commissioner’s term was intended to overlap; however, few police commissioners invoked the City Charter

in an attempt to remain in office. It may be that those individuals who did wanted to annoy the mayor-elect rather than finish out the term. Not a single police commissioner pressed the issue when faced with removal from office.

The closest example of this is the departure of Commissioner Broderick who was not re-appointed when the existing term expired on February 21, 1966. At the time, Mayor Lindsay and Commissioner Broderick had been exchanging barbs. After Mayor Lindsay assumed office he could have removed Broderick, but he waited until the term expired and appointed Commissioner Leary from Philadelphia. In another case, Police Commissioner Kennedy also departed under rather unique circumstances when he refused his re-appointment citing Mayor Wagner's "indecision, inertia and drift" (See Case # 25 below for detailed account of departure).

These two examples aside, the transfer of command from one police commissioner to another was found to be quite smooth. A quarter of the police commissioner resignations were labeled Unscheduled/Ad Hoc successions and occurred during a transition of a mayoral administration. These cases are indicative of a tradition and custom among New York Police Commissioners to allow a new mayor the opportunity to select his own man. In the event a police commissioner chose not to leave office in an orderly fashion, as in the case of Police Commissioner Waldo, he ran the risk of being dismissed if his "getting out of the way" was considered to be detrimental to the good order and efficiency of the police department.

In reality, the police commissioner's term is more a mandatory maximum

sentence than a shield against mayoral interference which begs the question, “Can the police truly be removed from politics?” It only took Police Commissioner Frederick Bugher twenty-three days to realize he had been duped into believing there would be no political interference in police affairs. Bugher’s term represented the shortest stint, excluding Commissioner Devine’s two day pre-arranged ascension. The second longest term belonged to the first Police Commissioner to come from the ranks, Lieutenant Richard Enright, who succeeded Bugher, and served faithfully for seven years, eleven months, and eight days. Commissioner Enright was the President of the Lieutenants Association, and in that position possessed much informal political and reward power within the police department. As such, his selection most certainly was sanctioned by the Democratic political machine Tammany Hall.

The years 1901 through 1925 were the most politically active. During that time-span five of the twelve police commissioners were either dismissed by the Mayor or given an opportunity to resign under contrived or dubious circumstances. Interestingly, two of the men incurred the wrath of an “acting” mayor. In the first case, while Mayor Gaynor was recuperating from an assassination attempt, acting Mayor John Puroy Mitchel alleged that Commissioner Baker was insubordinate and sought permission to summarily dismiss him. Mayor Gaynor handled the matter himself upon his return and offered Baker an opportunity to resign. The second case involved Commissioner Rhinelandter Waldo and acting Mayor Ardolph Kline. Kline, who became acting Mayor upon Gaynor’s death, cited Waldo for failure to follow orders after Waldo

had submitted his intended resignation. Three other Commissioners (Partridge, Cropsey, and McKay) resigned citing lack of Mayoral support.

There were four cases labeled “Non-Political” departures during this period (see Table 4.3). When we examine the four cases in Period I labeled “non-political” more closely, we find political involvement but not as defined in the present study. The first case involved the first single headed police commissioner Michael C. Murphy. The mayor at the time, Robert Van Wyck was not heavily involved with Commissioner Murphy in police affairs. In fact, there was speculation that Commissioner Murphy was a figurehead and his number two man, First Deputy Police Commissioner and former chief, William Devery (a Tammany man) was actually running the department. In this case, political involvement was very evident, but it did not fall into one of the categories as defined in the present study.

The second case involved the second police commissioner John Partridge and the excise enforcement policy of Mayor Low. Commissioner Partridge dutifully implemented the mayor’s wishes--however the mayor kept altering the policy, which made Commissioner Partridge appear indecisive and not up to the task. Sometimes, the political involvement came from someone other than the mayor.

Commissioner Partridge was succeeded by Francis V. Greene, a military man, and friend of the Governor. Commissioner Greene sought and received assurances that he would have a free hand in the administration of the department. The Governor may have been instrumental in Greene’s selection, and Mayor Low

may have chosen not to get publicly involved in police affairs because Greene was the Governor's guy. Thus, another variant of politics seemed to be involved, but again not as defined in the present study.

The third case involved Mayor Mitchell's personal Secretary Arthur Woods who, unlike Commissioner McKay, needed no assurances as to his permanency in office. Mayor Mitchell tapped the man who was part of his inner circle and needed no assurances as to where he stood with the Mayor. The two men enjoyed a personal and professional relationship. Mitchell and Woods left office together.

The last case involved Commissioner Enright. As mentioned above, for Commissioner Enright to be elevated from Lieutenant to Police Commissioner, Mayor Hylan must have received the endorsement from Tammany Hall. Particularly, after it appeared that Tammany Hall pressured Hylan to remove Enright's predecessor Commissioner Bugher. In order for Enright to last as long as he did, he was able to keep his political superior, Mayor Hylan, happy. So, although there were four "non-political" cases in the years between 1901 and 1925, a closer analysis reveals political involvement, but not the kind as defined in the present study. In other words, despite reformers best efforts, politics remained in policing throughout the first quarter of the twentieth century.

Although 50% of police commissioner departures were labeled "Non-political," we must understand that that is a measure of a blatant overt act of commission or omission by the mayor to induce the police commissioner's departure. As illustrated by the four "Non-political" departures in Period 1 above,

and the distinct possibility that some variant of politics can be found in the “Latent Political” cases, indicates the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of removing politics from policing in police commissioner departures. Yule’s Q measure of association of .61 indicates a moderately strong relationship between the mayor’s general involvement in police affairs and his specific involvement in the police commissioner’s departure. .

Police Independence (Style):

Overall, police commissioners chose to depart quietly. With regards to mayoral involvement, some cases were obvious that the mayor induced the police commissioner’s departure, however, in other cases a mayor’s seemingly heavy involvement in police affairs was not cited by the police commissioner as precipitating his departure. Perhaps, due to the magnitude of events in New York City, a strain is placed on the relationship between the Mayor and the Police Commissioner. This strain is reflected in the police commissioner tenures. Most police commissioners acknowledged that the New York Police Commissioner is demanding job and this may be cause for the short durations in office where 55 % served less than two years and only 10% served a term of beyond five years (see Table 1 “Tenure”). The mean police commissioner service in number of months was 30.05 including Commissioner Devine, who served for two days in a prearranged departure, and 30.82 excluding Devine. The median is 19.5 months with Devine, and 20 months without Devine.

The multitude of police related events in New York City, which can instantly alter the political landscape, are great. Given this potentially rich trove

of events the Mayor's governance style can be different from one police commissioner to another. Three Mayoral dyads illustrate how historical events can affect the relationship.

The first case involved Mayor Giuliani and his relationship with Commissioners Bratton and Safir, which have been well chronicled here (See Case #'s 38 and 39 below). Essentially, Mayor Giuliani, who had a criminal justice background, made crime a priority. He secured one of the top police administrators (William Bratton) to put his plan into action. Previously, Commissioner Bratton had turned around crime in the New York City subway system and Mayor Giuliani wanted the same success above ground. To summarize, Commissioner Bratton received accolades from the press for the precipitous drop in crime which Mayor Giuliani believed should be his. Since it was Bratton's much heralded COMPSTAT program that contributed to the successful diminishment of crime, pressure was placed on him to resign. Mayor Giuliani never publicly slighted Bratton, but used the opportunity to re-appoint another when Bratton's term expired; Mayor Giuliani chose Howard Safir, the antithesis of Bratton, to be his new police commissioner. Safir made sure that the Mayor would receive all the credit due him. Mayor Giuliani was a "political activist" Mayor with Commissioner Bratton, but became a "team" Mayor with Commissioner Safir. Of the forty police commissioners, only two spoke negatively of a predecessor. Howard Safir was one. He publicly commented that Commissioner Bratton's law enforcement experience paled in comparison to his own resume.

The second example involved Mayor Lindsay and Police Commissioners Howard Leary and Patrick V. Murphy. Although Mayor Lindsay had a tumultuous two month relationship with Police Commissioner Broderick at the beginning of his administration where he was labeled a “Political Activist”, this analysis begins with Broderick’s replacement Howard Leary. Mayor Lindsay, who would ultimately become a “Team” Mayor during Leary’s term, at the beginning he forced his commissioner to select Sanford Garelik for Chief Inspector. Most police commissioners believed that public meddling by the Mayor in police department personnel matters, such as this, was taboo. In fact, just two months earlier Leary’s predecessor had accused Mayor Lindsay of political interference for meddling with detective promotions.

When Commissioner Leary resigned, he did so without publicly stating a reason. On the surface, it appeared that Lindsay and Leary had a typical chief political executive and chief police executive relationship, typical of a “Team” mayor. Commissioner Leary had remarked how he was surprised about how involved and attentive Lindsay was in police matters. Mayoral aides painted a different picture and it was intimated that Leary was so uneasy being seen at City Hall that he used a back door. Mayoral aides also indicated that Commissioner Leary was so jumpy that Mayor Lindsay was reluctant to discuss matters with him toward the end of Leary’s commissionership.

Commissioner Leary was replaced by Patrick V. Murphy. Commissioner Murphy was tapped to bring reform to the New York Police Department in the midst of the Knapp Commission hearings involving systemic corruption in the

NYPD. Murphy, who was once a uniform member of the New York Police Department, was considered one of the top police officials in the country. Mayor Lindsay, who had a very contentious two months with Commissioner Broderick, a strange, but traditional relationship with Commissioner Leary, gave Commissioner Murphy a free hand in police affairs. Actually, Murphy dictated the terms. If at any time his terms were not met, he would resign. Regarding his predecessor, Murphy, the only other commissioner to bad mouth a predecessor besides Safir, commented that it was enough for Leary to just hang on because this was the best job he ever had. Murphy was not interested in just hanging on. During Commissioner's Murphy's term, Mayor Lindsay was a "Professional Autonomist," thus Mayor Lindsay's governance was different with each of the three police commissioners who served under him.

The last case to be discussed is Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia. LaGuardia was notorious for being a "hand-on" mayor in all municipal affairs. The indefatigable LaGuardia selected John O'Ryan, a military man, as his first police commissioner. This appointment appeared to reward O'Ryan for dropping out of the mayoral race and throwing his support behind LaGuardia. For Chief Inspector, the highest uniform position in the police department, LaGuardia wanted Lewis Valentine, and like Mayor Lindsay years later ensured his police commissioner selected his personal choice for the chief position, LaGuardia wanted his personal choice. When a series of incidents convinced Commissioner O'Ryan that he and the Mayor viewed things differently, he departed. Mayor LaGuardia then appointed Chief Inspector Valentine police commissioner.

Commissioner Valentine became the longest serving police commissioner serving and resigned only after LaGuardia announced he would not seek a fourth term. Mayor LaGuardia was a “Political Activist” with Commissioner O’Ryan, and remained a “Political Activist” with Commissioner Valentine. However, one man resented the involvement, while the other handled it.

Policy:

Each successive administration’s policy reflected the dominant issue surrounding the police at the time (see Table 4.10). For example, the Political Period (1901-1925) was dominated by fighting the corruption involved in the enforcement of the excise and gambling laws. This finding was expected. The imposition of civil service reform and other means to remove politics from policing were designed to bring an end to the rampant corruption which existed at that time. During the Reform and professional periods (1926-1975) police commissioners focused on improving the image of the New York Police Department and transforming it into a professional and efficient force. Successive police commissioners focused on re-organizing the department, eliminating political involvement in personnel matters, and increasing morale, etc. In the Community Period (1976-2001), police commissioners were forced to pay attention to external forces, the same external forces that previous police commissioners ignored, which resulted in seemingly non-existent relations with the minority community. In the Community Period police commissioner focused on building community relations, implementing crime prevention strategies, and addressing quality of life issues.

As Table 4.10 reveals, there is a variation in policy throughout the period of the study. Statistically, it was found that this variation was strongly associated with local political culture. Table 4.15 reveals shows “Policy” and “Police Governance”) yielding a Yule’s Q of .7837. The strength of the local political culture on determining policy is strong. As a democratic nation, the citizenry must always be alert that the political culture does not abuse its power and implement policy which is contrary to democratic values.

5) How was civilian control of the police linked to professional autonomy?

Historically, the selection of a New York Police Commissioner was contextual, or situationally dependent based on the political culture. Different times and circumstances dictated the type of police commissioner candidate selected by the Mayor. The degree to which the police commissioner may have been subtly or privately influenced by external agents, specifically the Mayor, was not always able to be determined by the method of data collection employed in the present study. Although, it appeared the police commissioner made the decision when to depart of his own volition, the design of the present study captured the media reporting of the incident. In some cases this media reporting offered a behind the scenes expose of the nature of the relationship between the police commissioner and the mayor and the circumstances surrounding the police commissioner’s departure. Police commissioners were more likely to resign without being critical, or causing a public spectacle, regardless of the type and extent of mayoral involvement in their departure. Thus, the status quo would be a

high level of involvement. It appeared that although mayors were very much involved in police affairs, this involvement did not translate into a significant number of politically induced departures (see Tables 4.1, 4.3, 4.9, 4.11, 4.12, and 4.14).

Chapter Six

Police Commissioner Term Summaries

From 300 Mulberry to One Police Plaza:

The Police Commissioner has been referred to as a “mere bird of passage” due to his short term in office. Most police commissioners knew the political demands of the job, and were willing to meet the challenge head on. Many of the early police commissioners (Political and Reform Periods) were prominent citizens, who in many cases were even more prominent than the mayor they served, and viewed the police commissionership as a public service, or duty.

Interestingly, whether or not the police commissioner’s departure was voluntary, and despite any political problems which they may have encountered, all praised the rank and file. Their pride in being “top cop” far exceeded any problems they had along the way.

In 1901, Michael C. Murphy walked into police headquarters located at 300 Mulberry Street as the first single headed police commissioner. In 1909, police headquarters would move to 240 Centre Street, and in 1973, the police department would be headquartered at One Police Plaza. Today, Raymond W. Kelly occupies the “Top Cop” position. Commissioner Kelly is the first police commissioner to serve non-consecutive terms. The present study examined only past police commissioners. Excluding Mr. Kelly, who was still active in his second stint as police commissioner, forty men have the privilege, and the honor to head the largest police department in the country, and one of the most studied

and respected police departments in the world.

The police commissioners, in their own words, reveal the confluence of civilian control and professional autonomy, and how political involvement in policing manifests itself prior to, during, and after a police commissioner's term. In order to make the present study's data come alive, and to understand the personal and professional dynamics between a police commissioner and a mayor, a summary of each police commissioner's administration follows.

Political Period: The Single-Headed Police Commissioner (1901-1925)

The Political Period had twelve police commissioners. This was the beginning of the single-headed police commissioner. There were military men, lawyers, former NYPD deputy police commissioners, an academic, an ex-Congressman, a bureaucrat, a Mayor's Secretary, and the first uniform member to become Police Commissioner. This last individual Richard Enright remained in office almost seven years. This period saw the greatest struggle between civilian control and professional autonomy.

1. Michael C. Murphy February 22, 1901-January 1, 1902

Michael C. Murphy, a stalwart member of the Tammany Hall political machine, became the first single headed Police Commissioner of the City of New York. Commissioner Murphy had been a district leader and served on various Tammany Hall committees. He also held other patronage posts (Excise and Health Boards) before becoming police commissioner. Murphy declared, "I am

going to enforce the laws as I find them and do not care who may interfere.”¹ It was rumored that Mayor Van Wyck’s first choice for police commissioner was former Police Board member John B. Sexton and when Mayor Van Wyck refused to publicly comment on the appointment of Police Commissioner Murphy it gave the appearance this was in fact the case and he had been pressured in selecting Murphy. It was reported that Governor O’Dell would remove Sexton if he was appointed. The Governor was against Sexton’s selection because of speculation that Sexton would have appointed William Devery, the former police chief, as First Deputy Commissioner. The new legislation, by eliminating the position of chief, was intended to oust Devery from the force.

Commissioner Murphy was a less controversial choice than Sexton. However, it was unclear how he ended up choosing Devery for First Deputy Commissioner. It was alleged that he did not know at the time of his appointment that he was to receive direction from Tammany Hall as to Devery’s placement. As the ex Chief of Police, Devery was influential. When the question of Devery’s influence or “pull” was raised in a disciplinary matter involving a policeman who was considered one of “Devery’s boys,” the best Commissioner Murphy could muster was, “I didn’t notice that, but they’ve said that all along. I heard that before I came into the department. Mr. Devery had nothing to do with this.”²

The fact that Mayor Van Wyck and Commissioner Murphy did not publicly interact often encouraged speculation that Tammany Hall was actually running the police department thru the First Deputy Commissioner. The Second Deputy Police Commissioner slot, which oversaw police matters in Brooklyn,

went to former Police Board Commissioner, Bernard York. This appointment was the result of political horse trading between the Manhattan and Brooklyn political machines and not the personal choice of Commissioner Murphy. When Mayor Van Wyck was asked to comment about the various scenarios regarding the new police administration, he gave his stereotypical response, “I have nothing to say for publication.”³

The Police Board and the position of Chief of Police were incorporated into the single position of Police Commissioner. The appointments of William Devery, the former police chief, and Bernard York, a former police board member, may not have accomplished what was envisioned when the legislation was enacted in the Republican controlled legislature in Albany, the capital of New York. Through the appointments of the First and Second Deputy Commissioners, it can be argued that nothing had changed regarding police governance, and that a de facto police board was now comprised of three partisan members, not four bi-partisan members.

When Mayor Van Wyck lost his re-election bid to Seth Low in the 1901, Commissioner Murphy resigned rather than give the new mayor an opportunity to dismiss him. If a police commissioner is dismissed for any reason, he forfeits his chance to ever serve again as police commissioner. Mr. Murphy summed up his tenure:

What is there to say? My administration must speak for me. I am not going away from this city. ...I have had a little uphill work here. I came now and then in contact with my First Deputy...his views and mine clashed at times and resulted in vigorous talks. That's about all. In the end I was Commissioner all through.⁴

Interestingly, Commissioner Murphy did not mention Mayor VanWyck, but alluded to First Deputy Devery. Regarding Mayor Van Wyck's relative disassociation from police affairs it may have been due less to his belief in professional autonomy, and more to his deference to the Democratic political machine Tammany Hall.

2. John N. Partridge January 1, 1902 - January 1, 1903

Republican Mayor Seth Low, who ran on a fusion ticket, chose John N. Partridge to succeed Commissioner Michael C. Murphy. Partridge was selected for his skill as an administrator and he was tasked by Mayor Low to make the police department more accountable. Partridge and Low had a prior relationship. Eighteen years earlier, when Low was mayor of the city of Brooklyn he selected Partridge to be his chief of police. Partridge was clear in enunciating that "politics and improper outside influences should be eliminated from municipal matters."⁵

What caused Partridge the most grief during his term was the excise enforcement policy. Mayor Low never articulated a clear strategy and left Partridge to his own devices in enforcing the law. Commissioner Partridge

described the relationship, “The Mayor is my superior officer and he...makes suggestions, but the final decision is always left to me.”⁶ Whether it was true or not that Partridge made the final decision, it was apparent that Mayor Low was involved in police matters. One example of this involvement was when Low developed a re-organization plan for the police department without Commissioner Partridge’s knowledge. It prompted Commissioner Partridge to state, “[I have] not been officially informed of the matter...I will say now in a general way that I in full agree with what the mayor has said on the matter and endorse his ideas.”⁷

Commissioner Partridge began to be criticized about his performance from members of his own party. For example, the Republican Governor stated, “he [Commissioner Partridge] has not...acted wisely at all times.”⁸ A former member of the Police Board said that “the police situation would have to be taken by the throat by a strong executive.”⁹ Within two weeks, Partridge had heard enough and resigned. Partridge cited poor health and recovery from an illness, “I am advised that a prompt and complete recovery calls for more rest than I could get while performing the onerous duties of this office.”¹⁰

Another and perhaps a more accurate reason Partridge had given for his resignation was his desire to not “embarrass [the] administration or any future administration which may rise or fall on the success or ashes of this one.”¹¹

According to Commissioner Partridge:

There are a great many people who I think are Mayor Low's supporters who think there are better men for Commissioner than I...I am going to give Mr. Low a chance to put one of them in....I think I have had the hardest task in the city administration--I know that I have."¹²

After it was a given that the commissioner was to resign, Mayor Low defended Commissioner Partridge's record as police commissioner stating, "No one on the outside has the slightest conception of the difficulties with which you have had to deal, and no one understands as well as I how much you have accomplished,"¹³ As if to soften the blow Mayor Low added, "You can well afford to await general recognition of the actual value of your services that time will certainly bring."¹⁴

At a speaking engagement one week after his resignation Commissioner Partridge told the audience, "When I took charge of the department a year ago, I was badly handicapped in two or three ways, and maybe more. I was a stranger and there was no one to whom I could turn."¹⁵ Early in the term Mayor Low defended the Police Commissioner against criticism by the City Club, a political organization. However, in the end Mayor Low was especially quiet and allowed as opposition to Partridge's administration to build and ultimately force Partridge's resignation. This act of omission was as forceful as any act of commission in affecting his police commissioner's departure.

John N. Partridge was succeeded by Francis V. Greene. Commissioner Greene, a West Point graduate. Greene, like Partridge was brought on board to shape up the police department. Before accepting the position, Commissioner Greene sought assurances that he would be in charge. Knowing the plight of his predecessor, Commissioner Greene wanted the City Charter amended to take politics out of policing. Perhaps, by taking this strong stand early on, or due to his strength of character, Commissioner Greene enjoyed more autonomy in police affairs than did Commissioner Partridge. Regarding the excise policy which appeared to sink Partridge, Mayor Low commented that the current excise policy was “entirely Greene’s idea and the best to date.”¹⁶

Early in 1903 during the mayoral campaign Democratic candidate George McClellan announced in no uncertain terms that he would not appoint Greene or anyone like Greene to the police commissionership. Commissioner Greene had intimated that neither Mayor Low, nor McClellan could remove him except “for the public interest.”¹⁷ Police Commissioner Greene was the first police commissioner to invoke the language of the City Charter. Despite this declaration Greene resigned at the end of the year, “I shall surrender the administration of affairs of this department on the first of January next to my successor with a certain amount of pleasure. It has not been a very easy burden.”¹⁸

Mayor Low, who began his administration as a fusion candidate, returned to the Republican Party during Greene’s term.

4. William McAdoo January 1, 1904 - January 1, 1905

Francis V. Greene was succeeded by Congressman William McAdoo.

After two years of a Republican administration, the Democratic machine Tammany Hall was successful in electing George McClellan. Tammany Hall believed a man of Commissioner McAdoo's reputation would be "untrammelled in every sense as commissioner, and that his rule...would be supreme, subject only to review and suggestion by the mayor-elect."¹⁹ Subject only to review and suggestion by the mayor-elect, and perhaps, Tammany Hall?

Mayor McClellan publicly stated that McAdoo was responsible for implementing policy. Commissioner McAdoo remarked on more than one occasion that he had no debt to repay in being offered the police commissionership, and thus, would not be influenced by "Tammany Hall nor any other society or club...in running the police department."²⁰ Even though McAdoo was a Tammany man he met with opposition from the political machine from the outset due to his strict enforcement policies. McAdoo "kept the lid down" on gambling and when it was alleged that a variety of abuses were committed by the police during a raid of the Bon Ton, a political club, Mayor McClellan "ordered" his commissioner to investigate the matter at once.

In a clear defense of the rank and file, and at considerable peril to his own tenure, McAdoo stated, "If the evidence showed that the police acted within their rights in the zealous performance of their duties for the enforcement of the law, I will sustain them at all costs to myself."²¹ Shortly thereafter, Mayor McClellan sought and received McAdoo's resignation, "I take great pleasure in complying with your request, which would have been unnecessary had you acquainted me with your wishes...I would not continue in this office even if you had requested

me to do so.”²² One year later McAdoo commented on the police commissionership and politics, “A Commissioner is requested...to be independent of the power that created him. And the moment he does so he will fall with a dull, sickening thud, as witness a painful incident in my own career.”²³

The raid of the Democratic Bon Ton club was a turning point in the administration. Whether Mayor McClellan was outraged by possible police abuses, or by McAdoo’s overzealousness, he publicly ordered McAdoo to not attend a hearing stating, “The Police Commissioner has something far more important to attend...and has gone to his office.”²⁴ Mayor McClellan was getting pressure from Tammany Hall to replace McAdoo. Perhaps the publicly allegations of police misconduct raised by McClellan were part of an effort to force McAdoo’s departure. Commissioner McAdoo took the allegations of his subordinates in enforcing the law as an affront to his character.

Ultimately, Mayor McClellan requested Police Commissioner McAdoo step down, a request which the Police Commissioner was all too happy which to comply. McAdoo left with his reputation in tact.

5. Theodore A. Bingham January 1, 1906 - July 1, 1909

William McAdoo was replaced by Theodore A. Bingham. Upon announcement of his selection, Bingham pondered his new position:

This Police Commissionership is the biggest job I have ever been up against. The difficulties are almost superhuman, but I cannot back down now after putting my shoulder to the wheel. As yet I don't even know on what floor of the building at 300 Mulberry Street my office will be....I have no great personal acquaintances with New York, but that will be all the better, because I shall have no axes to grind. The Police Department must be an executive department, and when I take the reins I shall try merely to carry out the laws as they are on the statute books. I have good health, nothing else to do, and I have a reasonable hope of succeeding.²⁵

When reporters asked General Bingham about his policy toward poolrooms he replied:

I don't know anything about poolrooms as yet, but probably shall find out much. Of course I suppose they exist, but if they are flourishing I shall do my best to suppress them....I am going to enforce the laws to the best of my ability, and shall regulate things without regard to anyone. I am absolutely independent and I know if I do good work it will help the McClellan administration.²⁶

On February 22, 1906, Bingham began a new five year term representing the second scheduled/institutional succession. A military man was selected to

replace a politician. Bingham had some reservations about political interference and sought assurances from Mayor McClellan before accepting the position.

Bingham recounted the moment he was offered the police commissionership:

When Mayor McClellan asked me to take this job...I said: 'Goodness, Mr. Mayor, Police Commissioner? No, not that.' Then the Mayor explained to me there would be no politics in the department, 'Go ahead and do your best and I shall do all I can to help you.'²⁷

Commissioner Bingham advocated a longer term of office for the Police Commissioner as a means of taking politics out of the police, "[I]n order that scheming politicians may be deprived of any possibility of summarily getting rid of an honest Commissioner...The men...are not quite sure who is their real boss - the 'machine' or the Police Commissioner."²⁸ Bingham's frank remarks about the police commissioner's term coupled with legislation that increased the power of the police commissioner to make discretionary promotions (i.e. Inspectors, Detectives) were not well received in Tammany Hall and prompted the political machine to seek Bingham's ouster and maintain the dispensing of patronage.

When Governor Hughes requested Mayor McClellan and Commissioner Bingham answer accusations levied by reformer Dr. Charles Parkhurst that the administration, among other things, was lax in its enforcement of the excise law Mayor McClellan in customary fashion avoided responsibility and squarely placed any blame on his police commissioner (as he had done with former

Commissioner McAdoo) that:

The gist of these charges...I have been guilty of retaining in office as Police Commissioner an official who I have reason to know is guilty of misconduct or unfit for his position...as Commissioner Bingham's commanding officer I am responsible for all his actions of commission and omission in so far as I may be charged with knowledge of his actions. Should you...believe...that I had knowledge of that failure. Then I have no disposition to shirk my share of the responsibility.²⁹

State Supreme Court Justice William J. Gaynor of Brooklyn, a future New York mayor, also called for Bingham's ouster. Justice Gaynor contended that Bingham was too independent and recounted a case which supported his assertion. It involved a teenager George Duffy who despite not being convicted of any crime was photographed and his picture hung in the "Rogues Gallery" alongside convicted felons. In the matter of George Duffy Mayor McClellan replied, "I shall give the matter my personal attention and advise you of my findings."³⁰ Commissioner Bingham was not be affected and declared, "I have no intention of resigning, whatever action the Mayor takes in the Duffy case."³¹ Rumors circulated that the Mayor's investigation into the Duffy affair might broaden into a fuller investigation of Commissioner Bingham's administration and result in a new police commissioner.

When Mayor McClellan disagreed with Bingham's decision to put a

uniform member of the police department in charge of Brooklyn instead of a civilian deputy commissioner it so frustrated him that he overruled Bingham. McClellan decided it was necessary to exercise his role as chief executive and ordered Bingham to carry out eleven directives. In one fell swoop, Mayor McClellan had taken control of all future appointments, promotions, transfers, discipline, and procedures affecting, not only the borough of Brooklyn, but the entire police department.

Bingham carried out all but two of the Mayor's orders causing McClellan to declare, "For your refusal...to obey my orders...I remove you from the office of Police Commissioner of the City of New York."³² Upon receipt of the letter announcing his dismissal, Bingham remarked, "Tell the Mayor that I shall be out of here in twenty minutes."³³ At the time Commissioner Bingham stated:

The Mayor himself told me I had made good. There has been no change in me, but with the approaching election I think the City of New York would agree with me in general that it will never do to have me as Police Commissioner if a square deal is what is wanted....Apparently the Mayor could no longer resist the pressure put upon him, and I hope he gets the reward he probably expects for removing me from office.³⁴

Later, Commissioner Bingham penned an article entitled "Why I Was Removed" in which he explained:

When I took the job of Police Commissioner Mayor McClellan told me politics and politicians would not be allowed to interfere with my work....I believed him at the time....But I was wrong....George B. McClellan did not possess the strength of character enough to keep his promise and to keep politics out of my end of the administration....That McClellan saw a chance to get rid of me was clearly evident to me and my aides. Almost a month before he acted I had made preparations to leave in a hurry.³⁵

6. William Baker

July 1, 1909 - October 20, 1910

Commissioner Bingham was succeeded by William Baker. Baker had served as the First Deputy Commissioner under Bingham and was the first police commissioner to have a prior affiliation with the Police Department. Mayor McClellan would not seek re-election in 1909 and after six uneventful months under McClellan, Commissioner Baker would have a new political boss. .

On January 1, 1910 Mayor-Elect William Jay Gaynor was sworn into City Hall. Although he initially stated that he would replace the police commissioner once he found his own man, Mayor Gaynor informed Baker he would fill the remainder of Bingham's term which ended in February 1911. Mayor Gaynor would be very involved in police matters. One example, was Gaynor's decision to have the Commissioner of Accounts, and not the Police Commissioner, handle investigations involving police misconduct. Baker's protest led Gaynor to "recommend" a vacation for his police commissioner "Baker is in need of a rest,

the Police Commissioner will begin a ten day vacation.”³⁶

Mayor Gaynor denied he ever said he was “his own Police Commissioner,” and regarded himself as “executive head of the city.”³⁷ However, on more than one occasion, Gaynor chose not to utilize his police commissioner to investigate police matters and when an investigation was launched in Harlem Gaynor tapped Baker’s First Deputy Commissioner Frederick Bugher.

While Baker was on holiday in the Summer 1910, Mayor Gaynor was shot. Baker returned to the city and after being assured the Mayor would recover, returned to the mountains. Acting Mayor Mitchel decided that he wanted the police commissioner to attend to police matters and interrupted Baker’s vacation a second time. According to Mitchel, “I acted as I have because I did not intend to let the city get away from me while Mayor Gaynor is away.”³⁸ Baker voiced his displeasure at the way Mitchel treated him. Mitchel, on the other hand, believed Baker was insubordinate and sought Gaynor’s approval to summarily dismiss Baker. Gaynor told Mitchel he would handle it upon his return. Mayor Gaynor gave Baker an opportunity to submit his resignation, or be removed. Commissioner Baker resigned stating, “I am glad to get out, I am relieved of a burden.”³⁹

7. James C. Cropsey October 10, 1910 - May 23, 1911

William F. Baker was succeeded by James C. Cropsey. Mayor Gaynor told Commissioner Cropsey that he was prepared to make changes in the police department administration after his first six months in office, but decided to wait

to implement changes.

Regarding his new police commissioner, Gaynor offered to “confer...about the policies and general management of the department, but for the enforcement of outward order and decency...[he] will hold [Cropsey] responsible.”⁴⁰ Commissioner Cropsey was quite reticent and quietly went about the business of being the police commissioner offering, “My conception of the police job is that I ought not to talk.”⁴¹ Mayor Gaynor told Cropsey:

In intrusting the department to you, let me say that, although I can devote a little time to it now and then, I shall always be glad to confer with you about the policies and general management of the department, but for the enforcement of outward order and decency first, and next for the detection of secret illegal places I will hold you responsible.⁴²

Mayor Gaynor took an active role in police affairs and was involved in the selection of the Deputy Police Commissioners. One selection for Second Deputy Police Commissioner was a former Secret Service agent. Supposedly Gaynor promised him a free hand in running the Detective Bureau. Interestingly, this free hand extended all the way to Police Commissioner Cropsey.

When the Municipal Civil Service Commissioner alleged that Commissioner Cropsey violated civil service rules in hiring the allegations were supported by the city’s Corporation Council. Mayor Gaynor now had a bona fide reason to pressure Commissioner Cropsey into submitting his resignation.

Cropsey, in fact, resigned and released a statement citing Mayor Gaynor's "criticism and lack of confidence" as the reason.⁴³ Cropsey later amended his earlier statement by adding he had resigned rather than risk becoming an embarrassment to Mayor Gaynor (like Commissioner Partridge earlier). Finally regarding political interference, Cropsey stated, "I leave the department without a regret...no influence, either personal or political, has ever controlled or even colored a single act of mine."⁴⁴

Although Mayor Gaynor appeared to give his police commissioner a free hand in the administration of the department, the single act which defined his police governance was the reduction of Commissioner Cropsey's authority over the police department. Gaynor told Cropsey not to interfere with his Second Deputy Commissioner Flynn in his handling of the Detective Bureau. In essence, Cropsey was police commissioner of only half the department, despite being its titular head and responsible for the entire department. Gaynor replaced Cropsey with his Fire Commissioner Rhineland Waldo.

8. Rhineland Waldo May 23, 1911 - December 31, 1913

Fire Commissioner Rhineland Waldo, a former Deputy Police Commissioner, was chosen to succeed James C. Cropsey. Mayor Gaynor charged Waldo with removing even the appearance of "favoritism or purchase" in appointment and promotion.⁴⁵

Over a year into Waldo's term the city Board of Aldermen investigated the police department in the wake of a high profile murder of known gambler Herman

Rosenthal. Rosenthal was gunned down after linking police lieutenant Charles Becker to his operation. Commissioner Waldo had requested direction from Mayor Gaynor as to how to proceed administratively against Becker's alleged link to the gambler. Gaynor responded that Becker should not be put on trial unless he could be convicted and dismissed.

At the Alderman hearing Commissioner Waldo distanced Gaynor from any involvement in police matters. Waldo explained to the hearing known as the Curran Committee:

The Mayor has given me an absolutely free rein in the conduct of this office. I am responsible and welcome an investigation....If there is a 'system' that is more corrupt than in previous years...I am here to accept whole responsibility.⁴⁶

Contrary to Waldo's depiction of police governance, Mayor Gaynor became very much involved in police matters and also appeared before the Curran Committee where he told the members, "I am the Mayor of the City and I run the department through a Commissioner...If the city is run badly I am to blame."⁴⁷ When asked directly whether he was willing to have the Police Commissioner run the department, Gaynor answered, "Sure, he does run it...and run it well, too."⁴⁸

Despite Gaynor's outward support of Commissioner Waldo's independence, the Mayor continued to be heavily involved in police affairs. For example, Mayor Gaynor issued a directive about the excise enforcement policy to

his police commissioner which read, "I have revoked all these licenses...It will...be your duty to see to it that everyone is out of these places by one o'clock...I therefore put this matter in your hands, and you will delegate it to nobody."⁴⁹

When in its final report the Curran Committee called for Waldo's ouster citing "incompetence and unfitness to perform the duties of his office," as well as, "inefficiency and administrative blunders,"⁵⁰ Mayor Gaynor publicly supported his police commissioner. Mayor Gaynor supported Commissioner Waldo to the end, "They thought they were powerful enough to stampede me and make me dismiss him, but I defy them."⁵¹ In September 1913 mayor gaynor died.

Acting Mayor Kline:

The President of the Board of Alderman, Ardolph L. Kline, became Acting Mayor upon Gaynor's death. That November, John Puroy Mitchel became the Mayor-elect. As late as the third week of December, 1913 Mitchel indicated he would retain Waldo until such time as he found a suitable successor. When asked if he was satisfied with Waldo, Kline stated, "I have been and I am at present."⁵² Outwardly, it appeared Waldo would serve until such time a successor was found. So, when Commissioner Waldo submitted a four line resignation to Mayor Kline stipulating his resignation take effect no later than midnight December 31, 1913 Mayor Kline was somewhat surprised. Regarding his decision to resign Waldo commented, "The prospect of getting out makes me feel ten years younger."⁵³

Prior to his resignation Commissioner Waldo had accepted the resignation

of all four deputy police commissioners. If Mayor Kline accepted Waldo's resignation, the department would be without a head from midnight until noon the following day when Mayor-elect Mitchel assumed office. To prevent this from happening Kline asked Waldo to reinstate First Deputy Commissioner McKay. According to Mayor Kline:

Mr. Waldo said he could not reappoint Mr. McKay...he sent to my office...an impudent and insubordinate letter...and demanding his resignation be accepted at once...no other course was left to me...except the summary removal of Commissioner Waldo from office.⁵⁴

Commissioner Waldo could have remained Police Commissioner into Mayor Mitchel's term. Instead he evoked the ire of Kline by not only accepting the resignation of his top deputies, and not re-instating the First Deputy McKay. As if that was not enough, Waldo transferred all seasoned headquarters personnel to other commands. According to Waldo he wanted the new head of the department to "trim his own ship."⁵⁵

Although the relationship between Acting Mayor Kline and Police Commissioner Waldo was brief, it showed the exercise of civilian control exercised by the political boss. When Waldo failed to comply with Kline's order he was summarily dismissed him for insubordination.

9. Douglas I. McKay

December 31, 1913 - April 8, 1914

Acting Mayor Kline:

Rhineland Waldo was replaced by his First Deputy Commissioner Douglas I. McKay. Commissioner McKay had resigned but was called back by Mayor Kline. Commissioner McKay served one day under Kline.

Mayor Mitchel:

Mayor Mitchel intended to retain McKay until such time as he found a suitable replacement. Regarding McKay's future, Mayor Mitchel stated, "Mr. McKay stepped into the breach when it was necessary for someone to do it. That is all I care to say just now."⁵⁶ Mayor Mitchel did care to tell reporters that he would announce the general policies of the administration.

Mayor Mitchel and Commissioner McKay appeared to enjoy a professional relationship. Mitchel giving direction and establishing policy and McKay dutifully acknowledging the Mayor's input and implementing policy. Together the pair attacked gang violence and began a re-organization of the police department. The first difference of opinion between Mitchel and McKay developed over the saloon closing time enforcement policy. McKay favored the 1:00 AM policy enforced under Mayor Gaynor. Mayor Mitchel simply did not. The New York Times reported:

Mayor Mitchel and Police Commissioner McKay appeared to be in official conflict...over the order issued by the head of the Police Department....While the Commissioner assumed full responsibility for his action, the Mayor made it clear the order did not have his sanction.⁵⁷

Mitchel stated, “No order came from this office, but we had asked Commissioner McKay to look into this matter some days ago, and someone, probably misunderstood the orders. I have no intention of carrying out the stringent measures...of the former administration.”⁵⁸

Commissioner McKay decided to seek reassurance about the security of his tenure as police commissioner from the mayor. After two weeks of not getting a firm answer regarding his future, he submitted his resignation citing a “desire to seek other employment.”⁵⁹ Perhaps more telling was a comment he made which goes to the very essence of the relationship between the police commissioner and the mayor, “I feel very strongly that the discipline of the department requires you to appoint a Commissioner who you expect to retain and support during the rest of your administration...”⁶⁰

According to those close to McKay, he would have accepted the place had it been offered to him, but Mayor Mitchel never allowed himself to be pinned down as to whether McKay would be made permanent. Mitchel responded to McKay’s resignation letter:

Your appointment relieved me of the embarrassment of a disorganized department. You have remained in office under conditions which must have been most trying. The discussion of the possible appointment of Col. Goethals as Police Commissioner, a selection which as you know, was made by me long prior to your own appointment by Mayor Kline, tended to render embarrassing and difficult your own position. Despite this fact, your administration of police affairs has been effective, and has, I believe, commanded the approval of the people of the city.⁶¹

There is no evidence to indicate Mayor Mitchel forced out McKay other than the understanding Mitchel was seeking his own man. The pivotal moment in this relationship was the disagreement over the enforcement of the closing time for saloons. It caused Mitchel to comment that he “had no intention of carrying out the strict policies of the former administration”⁶² Mitchel’s act of omission in ignoring McKay’s request may be construed as political involvement and responsible for McKay’s departure.

10. Arthur Woods

April 8, 1914 - December 31, 1918

Mayor Mitchel selected his Secretary Arthur Woods to succeed Commissioner McKay. Woods, a former deputy police commissioner, was close to Mitchel and understood his thinking on police matters. Mayor Mitchel stated:

Mr. Woods is appointed for the full term of this administration, and will have the full and constant backing and co-operation of the Mayor. Police policies will be settled by Commissioner Woods and myself in conference. The administration of the department will be left entirely in his hands....We shall proceed slowly and deliberately in adopting constructive changes.⁶³

In January 1916, Woods turned down a gubernatorial appointment to head the State Prison Department which prompted Governor Whitman to remark, "I think it is likely that Commissioner Woods will remain at the head of the Police Department in New York City for some time to come."⁶⁴ One month later, in February 1916, the term of former Commissioner Cropsey ended. Woods began the fourth scheduled five year police commissioner term. Mitchel and Woods received kudos from Dr. Charles Parkhurst of the Society for the Prevention of Crime. Parkhurst, an early advocate of police reform and constant critic of the police remarked, "We laid the foundation for what we have today. We have got in New York today a Mayor who is not afraid. We have got a Police Commissioner ...who is the finest we have had in my knowledge."⁶⁵ Woods would not accept personal accolades and credited the police force and the Mayor for any success:

If the police are rendering greater service than ever before there are two principal reasons. The first is the character of the personnel of the force. The second reason...has been the unfailing support of my chief, the Mayor. He was always ready with it whenever it was asked for, and never at any other time.⁶⁶

Mayor Mitchel lost his bid for re-election to John Hylan, a Tammany Hall backed candidate. Commissioner Woods resigned on December 31 and left office with Mayor Mitchel. Commissioner Woods thanked Mitchel for allowing him a free hand in running the department. The Mayor had set the tone of his administration early on asserting "Police policies will be settled by Woods and myself in conference. The administration of the department will be left entirely in his hands."⁶⁷

Mitchel even defended the police commissioner in an incident involving the death of a young lady name Ruth Cruger. In a letter responding to allegations by her father that the police had bungled the investigation into finding his daughter's killer Mitchel wrote, "sound judgement cannot be predicated upon an isolated act or omission...when one considers...the success of a police administration, one must consider its whole history and record."⁶⁸

11. Frederick Bugher January 1, 1918 - January 23, 1918

Mayor Hylan selected a former Deputy Police Commissioner, Frederick

Bugher, to be his Police Commissioner. Despite Commissioner Bugher being well-versed in police affairs he was not eager to assume the police commissionership and stated, “When [Hylan] first made the proposal, I flatly refused on the ground that I feared there might be politics injected into the department.”⁶⁹ Bugher clearly enunciated his philosophy regarding politics and the police, “If there comes a day when politics interferes with this department and I am not given a free hand to do what I think is best for the interests of the people, I’ll simply put on my hat and coat and walk out.”⁷⁰

All seemed well in public, but without notice Police Commissioner Bugher suddenly submitted his resignation citing mayoral interference regarding appointments. Commissioner Bugher believed he was being pressured by the Mayor to “take guidance and advice from a subordinate on the force.”⁷¹ The subordinate in question was a policeman serving as Hylan’s bodyguard, who also happened to be the Mayor’s brother-in-law. The Mayor ignored Bugher’s accusation. In fact, Hylan countered with own accusation that Bugher was being swayed by “outside influences” for not suspending policemen who were involved in alleged wrongdoing⁷²

Mayor Hylan used this incident to force Bugher’s resignation. Hylan promptly initiated proceedings to dismiss the Police Commissioner for failure to obey orders. Bugher responded, “I regard your notice of today of covering a mere pretext and as proving to a demonstration that I could not have continued to serve as Police Commissioner without the abandonment of my principles and the loss of all self-respect.”⁷³

Mayor Hylan was heavily influenced by Tammany Hall in police matters, particularly patronage in the form of personnel matters i.e. transfers, and promotions. Tammany Hall believed that Commissioner Bugher “put his foot down hard on every suggestion” of patronage appointments resulting in the Tammany leadership “serving notice upon Mayor Hylan that Mr. Bugher would not do.”⁷⁴ The resignation/dismissal of Police Commissioner Bugher highlighted the influence of the political machine Tammany Hall on both the mayor and the police in the first quarter of the twentieth century.

12. Richard E. Enright. January 23, 1918 -December 31, 1925

When Commissioner Bugher abruptly departed, Mayor Hylan reached into the department and named Lieutenant Richard E. Enright “Acting” Police Commissioner and the first uniform member of the police department to be selected Police Commissioner. The scuttlebutt in police circles was that the department would be “run by the Mayor himself and by his trusted advisors in and out of the department.”⁷⁵ Just as Tammany Hall played a role in Bugher’s departure, it must have sanctioned Enright’s elevation. When Enright was asked, “Do you feel sure that you have a free hand in running the department?” he stated, “I do.”⁷⁶ Enright carefully qualified his response when asked “Do you have that understanding with the Mayor?” stating, “I have. On the other hand, I am a part of this administration and I intend to co-operate in carrying its policies like any other department head.”⁷⁷

Commissioner Enright made similar remarks throughout his term, for

example, “The Police Department will be an administrative unit directly responsible to the Mayor, operated by the Police Commissioner, as the Mayor’s deputy in active charge.”⁷⁸ FMulrooney continued, “For, it is my life training to obey the orders of my immediate superior....I would certainly have an ill-trained idea of duty if I thought I could oppose [the mayor] in this office.”⁷⁹ Enright viewed Mayor Hylan as his superior officer, and not a politician. Hylan would periodically gave Enright directions. For example, he once directed Enright’s attention to a list of conditions and possible remedies “I hope you will give the foregoing suggestions every possible consideration.”⁸⁰ When Enright was asked about Mayor Hylan’s handling of police affairs, Enright was emphatic:

Mayor Hylan has not asked me to do anything for anybody. The Mayor takes his hands off and leaves the direction to me. I confer with the Mayor regarding policy, but that does not mean that he directs what it shall be. Every important move affecting the department and all the details of administration are made on my initiative or are my work.⁸¹

In 1921 the Meyer Committee began public hearings into the city’s finances. Its first witness was Commissioner Enright and instead of examining the Police Department’s budget requests, much of the questioning focused on the influence of politics in police personnel matters. Letters were produced which intimated that City Hall was processing outside requests and forwarding them to the Police Commissioner for action in transfers, promotions, etc. Each and every

time Enright reiterated that he was solely responsible for personnel matters in the police department.

At a testimonial dinner given to mark Enright's twenty-five years of service, Mayor Hylan praised his Police Commissioner, "I believe that in the present Police Commissioner the city has the best equipped man for the job."⁸² Further, commenting on the department's latest organizational changes the Mayor remarked, "I have placed a Commissioner in charge of the Police Department, and he is responsible for its administration.... Whatever changes he makes are of his own volition."⁸³

When calls for Enright's ouster were made by outside agents Mayor Hylan would not be swayed, "Enright still has one fan, and it is the opinion of that one fan which is the only one that counts."⁸⁴ Although the Mayor was careful to distance himself from the affairs of the department after the Meyer Commission's inquiry, it was not enough. Neither the Meyer Legislative Investigating Committee to the Legislature, nor the Charter Revision Committee were convinced an dcluded charges of "political interference" in the police department in their final reports. Mayor Hylan understood that Enright's term began January 23, 1918, and re-appointed him on January 25, 1923 to a second consecutive five year term (technically, Commissioner Enright was appointed to complete the unexpired term of Commissioner Woods which ended February 22, 1921). On this occasion Hylan took the opportunity to commend Enright, "Police Commissioner Enright has served five years faithfully and well and therefore is entitled to reappointment, if he continues his good work in the next five years it

will be appreciated by the public.”⁸⁵ Enright ultimately served eight years and became the longest serving police commissioner since the advent of the single head of the police to date.

Despite the Meyer and Charter Revision Committee findings of political interference, Commissioner Enright never made a similar claim in his eight years in office. Enright understood his role as a department head and carried out the policies set forth by his political boss Mayor Hylan.

Reform Period: Removal of Politics Post Wickersham (1926-1950)

The first quarter of the twentieth century had seven Mayors and twelve Police Commissioners. The second quarter had six Mayors and ten Police Commissioners. Three mayors dominated this period, serving over twenty-three of the twenty-five years. Interestingly, two Mayors (Walker, O’Dwyer) would leave office under a cloud before the completion of their second terms, while the third (LaGuardia) would be elected to three terms and appoint the longest serving police commissioner in history (Lewis Valentine). Mayor Walker appointed four different police commissioners during his six years in office.

13. George V. McLaughlin January 1, 1926 - April 12, 1927

George V. McLaughlin was the first of four police commissioners selected by Mayor James J. Walker. Commissioner McLaughlin was adamant to carry out his promise to the citizenry that “no interference with [policemen] in the

performance of their duties will be tolerated.”⁸⁶ McLaughlin was determined to be “the only boss as a Police Department should have but one man in supreme command.”⁸⁷ Although McLaughlin was appointed in January, he was technically appointed to a new five year term in February 1926. After his first two months in office McLaughlin reflected:

I thought when I took this job...it was like any business organization, but...police work is no easy task. I did not seek this job, I was warned...that I should not take it, for no Police Commissioner had ever made good. Now I would not give it up.⁸⁸

McLaughlin was cognizant of the many attempts to remove politics from the police department, “The men in the department have heard many times that there would be no political interference and almost as many times they have been disappointed.”⁸⁹ Like some of his predecessors, McLaughlin took a hard line against gambling, and conducted police raids of Democratic clubs. Reportedly these raids upset the local district leaders who began clamoring for McLaughlin’s removal.

One of the few times Mayor Walker involved himself in police matters was to broker a détente between the Police Commissioner and the Democratic political machine Tammany Hall. Walker, who admittedly kept his distance in police matters did the best he could with his “limited responsibility for the Police Commissioner’s actions”⁹⁰ and stated, “I am for law and order and certainly have

no patience with professional or commercialized gambling inside the clubs or outside the clubs, whether they be Democratic or Republican or otherwise.”⁹¹

Whether Commissioner McLaughlin viewed Walker’s action as political interference is undetermined. What is known is that McLaughlin was on record as denouncing any political intrusion in police affairs. So, when Commissioner McLaughlin submitted his resignation one week later there was much speculation that Walker’s involvement in the matter of the police raids was responsible. The Mayor, Governor, and head of the Brooklyn Democratic club all denied the raids had anything to do with McLaughlin’s departure.

McLaughlin cited new employment as the reason for his resignation, “I am tendering my resignation...to become Executive Vice-President of MacKay Companies...it was our understanding when I accepted the position...that I was not to remain for any definite period of time...”⁹² There was much speculation that Tammany Hall pressured Mayor Walker to remove McLaughlin. Perhaps, McLaughlin would have favored Mayor Walker publicly expressing support for his Police Commissioner rather than brokering a peace deal with Tammany Hall. Nonetheless, Mayor Walker praised Commissioner McLaughlin as he departed, “when you accepted the Commissionership, I assured you the department would be solely and completely under your control, and your conduct in the department has justified...the confidence thus reposed in you.”⁹³

Mayor Walker continued his governing philosophy with his second Police Commissioner, “I will appoint a competent man, and when you have a competent man it is best to let him run his department and leave him alone.”⁹⁴ He selected

his Commissioner of Accounts Joseph Warren.

14. Joseph A. Warren

April 4, 1927-December 18, 1928

Mayor Walker selected his Commissioner of Accounts Joseph A. Warren to replace Commissioner McLaughlin. Warren enunciated his management style:

Perhaps the greatest policy produced by Commissioner McLaughlin was the forcing upon the citizens and the police force the realization that he and he alone was the Commissioner of Police and that no outside influences were running the department. This policy will be continued during my administration. If mistakes are made, they will be my own mistakes. Every member of the force need only consider my wishes and those of no one else. In turn, of course, I shall only be responsible to my superior officer, the Mayor of the City of New York.⁹⁵

In May 1928, the New York Times ran the following headline “WARREN TO QUIT AS HEAD OF POLICE IN RIFT WITH MAYOR.”⁹⁶ Reportedly, the Mayor had been dissatisfied with Warren’s handling of the department, and was to make a change because of a first quarter report of an increase in crime in the city. Further, it was reported that according to sources the Mayor was happy that the breach was now made public. These sources, who reportedly were close to Mayor Walker, revealed that Walker was considering Warren’s replacement. Whether this was true is not known. However, sometimes a replacement is not

easy to find and the mayor and police commissioner are stuck with one another. If this is what happened in Warren's case, then Walker would have to make due for awhile and dispel any rumors of a rift in order not to make matters worse. Regarding Warren, Walker stated, "I have no criticism to make of Commissioner Warren's administration of the Police Department....I intend to let him run the Police Department, I have complete faith in him."⁹⁷

As Warren's term progressed, his management style was such as to defer to Walker and seek his approval in police matters. Walker's management style was to push whatever the matter back in Warren's lap to handle as he saw fit. Walker's impatience with Warren grew. Warren began an investigation into a shortfall of funds with the Police Glee Club, a private organization. The organization was linked to the police department through uniform patrolmen who sold tickets to police events in strong arm fashion. Walker was asked by reporters if he would become involved in this investigation if Warren brought the matter to his attention. Walker was not pleased that Warren could not make a decision and replied:

In my pre-election campaign I promised that promiscuous ticket selling by uniform men would be stopped if I was elected, and it was stopped.

Commissioner Warren is in charge of the department without interference of any kind from City Hall, I assume he can handle a matter such as has arisen. If I did not think so I would not have appointed him head of the department. If [Warren] wants to talk to me about it, I'll be glad to see him about it. It is after all a matter of policy. If Commissioner Warren wants to decide whether the glee club should be continued, that will be satisfactory to me.⁹⁸

If Warren's apparent indecisiveness tested Walker's pledge of non-interference, the murder investigation of Arnold Rothstein, a known gambler, propelled Walker into the middle of police matters. When Walker was asked if he was satisfied with the ongoing investigation he stated:

I cannot say I am satisfied. I can say I regret that no one has been apprehended....Commissioner Warren is doing the best he can. I can see no reason why he should not desire to carry the Rothstein case through to a successful conclusion."⁹⁹

Mayor Walker focused on the police investigation and was not satisfied with the results and remarked, "I must consider the consequences that might

follow from any drastic or wholesale changes in the Police Department in the very midst of an important investigation”¹⁰⁰ He sensed Warren would not do and needed to find a way to replace him. Mayor Walker wanted Commissioner Warren to make some personnel changes in the upper echelon of the department. Warren refused to blame or embarrass any of his staff and intimated he would resign if made to do so. Walker agreed that Warren should go. The only question that remained was whether Warren’s departure would be voluntary?

Reportedly, Commissioner Warren submitted two resignation letters. The first was returned by Walker because it made reference to mayoral interference. The second letter read simply, “As you very well know, I have for a long time been desirous to return to the practice of law. I therefore hereby present my resignation as Police Commissioner.”¹⁰¹ With Warren gone, Walker convinced Grover Whalen to accept the police commissionership.

15. Grover A Whalen

December 18, 1928 - May 21, 1930

Commissioner Warren was succeeded by Grover A. Whalen. Ten years earlier, Whalen had been Mayor Hylan’s Secretary. He was intimately familiar with the workings of the Police Department and the city. Confident, charismatic and possessing a penchant for the spotlight, Whalen was everything Warren was not. Mayor Walker introduced his new police commissioner, “He will be in charge of the police department. I have never interfered with any Police Commissioner in the handling of his office and I certainly will not interfere with Mr. Whalen.”¹⁰² Whalen acknowledged Mayor Walker:

I shall always look to you for wise counsel and advice, remembering always that you are at the head of our...municipal government and that I am but one of your lieutenants in carrying out the mandate of the people which was given to you three years ago.¹⁰³

One of Commissioner Whalen's first moves was to elevate Inspector Edward Mulrooney to Deputy Chief Inspector and place him in charge of detectives. This move evidenced the importance of restoring efficiency to the police department, in general, and solving the Rothstein murder in particular. Two other personnel moves of note was the transfer and promotion of James S. Bolan from the district where the Rothstein murder occurred to head all Manhattan uniform personnel, and the demotion of Deputy Chief Lewis Valentine to Captain. Incidentally all three men; Mulrooney, Bolan, and Valentine would one day be police commissioner.

Whalen explained his management style, "When I took office it was with the distinct understanding that I was to have an absolutely free hand and I was not to be hampered by politics or political pledges."¹⁰⁴ The first indication that Whalen may have doubted his own ability in office, or his policies, was included in a statement to the press, "We want no shirkers in the department. If I myself cannot produce, the public will demand my removal, and I cannot produce if the men under me fall down on their jobs."¹⁰⁵ Whalen placed blame on the rank and file for his shortcomings.

In January 1929, Mayor Walker was on record as stating, “I am not one of those who believe running the police department is the most difficult job in the world and Grover knows how I feel about it.”¹⁰⁶ Apparently Commissioner Whalen disagreed, as he referred to the position of police commissioner as “the toughest job I ever had.”¹⁰⁷ Whalen stated further, “I don’t know whether a man should stay much longer than a year in a job like this. It means twenty hours of work each day if the job is to be done well, and a man can only stand that for a short time.”¹⁰⁸ Five months after this comment, Commissioner Whalen resigned to return to his old job at Wannamaker’s Department store from which Mayor Walker had coaxed him to become police commissioner.

On March 6, 1930 Whalen promoted Deputy Chief Inspector Mulrooney to the newly created position of Assistant Chief Inspector. On March 21, Mayor Walker and Whalen met for two hours fueling speculation of a rift. It was rumored that Whalen would resign after the Police Parade on May 2. On March 23 it was reported that Mayor Walker would be “receptive to a Whalen resignation as he did not fancy Whalen’s fondness for the limelight, nor approve of some of the Police Commissioner’s methods.”¹⁰⁹

In April, Mayor Walker failed to sign a taxi bill introduced by the Police Commissioner, and passed by the Board of Aldermen. Mayor Walker vetoed the bill stating, “I appreciate and sympathize with these motives, but I cannot agree that this is the best method of accomplishing those results”¹¹⁰ and appointed a committee to look into the matter. Commissioner Whalen appealed the Mayor’s decision, but to no avail and ultimately relented and offered the Department’s

assistance to the Mayor's Commission.

After this public embarrassment for Whalen, his resignation was more imminent. Leaks from City Hall intimated that Mayor Walker was receptive to Whalen's resignation. Commissioner Whalen did not publicly criticize the mayor for his sudden reversal regarding the taxi bill. Instead Whalen praised Walker and the police department, "The department is clicking 100 per cent...Through the fine cooperation of the Mayor, no outside influence is molesting the department."¹¹¹

In early May Commissioner Whalen submitted the Police Department's annual report in which he continued heaping praise on Mayor Walker:

In conclusion, I desire to assure you of my deep appreciation of your hearty cooperation and support in the difficult task of reconstructing both the foundation and the superstructure of the Police Department, without which the unprecedented expansion, progress and achievements during the year would have been impossible.¹¹²

Mayor Walker anticipated Whalen's resignation. When the moment came he was ready to name a successor. On May 16th, Mayor Walker was asked by reporters about Police Commissioner Whalen's resignation. As with Warren, Walker had reached his threshold of patience with this police commissioner and announced, "Anytime Mr. Whalen wants to step down I have someone in line. I will announce his successor concurrently with Mr. Whalen's resignation."¹¹³

Sources close to the Mayor indicated that although the Mayor had “expressed public satisfaction with Whalen’s performance, his high profile was somewhat distasteful. The next police commissioner [would] be reminded that the Mayor would prefer a more subdued public persona.”¹¹⁴ When Commissioner Whalen finally submitted his resignation his “adulation” of Mayor Walker was evident:

The success of the plan adopted when the present administration was inaugurated could not have been carried out were it not for the enthusiastic support of the Mayor of the city. It has happened that Police Commissioners have forgotten the source of their power. If the Mayor is held responsible for the failure of a police administration, he should also receive the credit for a successful administration. Any measure of success which I have obtained as Police Commissioner has been due to your encouragement and cooperation....I have the honor, Sir, to present you herewith my resignation as Police Commissioner, to take effect on Wednesday, May 21, 1930, at noon.¹¹⁵

Allowing Tammany Hall the courtesy of approving his selection, Mayor Walker appointed Edward P. Mulrooney the next Police Commissioner.

In his autobiography, Grover Whalen wrote:

I had been Commissioner for a year and a half. Though there was no open break, I felt Mayor Walker had ceased to approve of some of my policies in the Department. In fact, I was told he had said: ‘Well we won the election. Now Grover can go.’ Whether or not this was true...I decided to return to Wanamaker’s.¹¹⁶

Former Police Commissioner turned mayoral candidate Richard Enright alleged that Mayor Walker took “his orders from Tammany Hall”¹¹⁷ Was Tammany Hall behind Walker’s decision to overrule and veto Whalen’s proposal regarding the taxi situation? Did Tammany Hall pressure Walker to veto this legislation to force out Commissioner Whalen?

16. Edward P. Mulrooney May 21, 1930 - April 12, 1933

Assistant Chief Inspector Edward P. Mulrooney was appointed to replace Commissioner Whalen. Commissioner Mulrooney was a thirty-four year veteran of the police department, and the second police commissioner to come from the ranks. Mulrooney was the antithesis of Whalen and adopted a policy of silence toward the press. Keeping them at arms length, he only informed the press regarding “all the news consistent with police work.”¹¹⁸ Mayor Walker, certainly more at ease with Whalen gone, commented on Mulrooney’s penchant for obscurity, “your devotion to duty has led you away from spectacle and sensation, yet there is a deal of romance in it.”¹¹⁹

Police Commissioner Mulrooney was quite humbled by being chosen the “administrative and executive head” of the department and exclaimed, “I have

worked in this department for many years, but I assure you never once with a thought of such a day as this in mind. It was unsought, unexpected, and sudden.”¹²⁰ Mulrooney’s first test was dealing with allegations of police corruption which resulted in the formation of the Seabury Commission. Mayor Walker and Commissioner Mulrooney were quick to “lend whatever cooperation or assistance [was] needed.”¹²¹

One area which Walker and Mulrooney differed was the closing time for the licensing of cabarets, dance halls, etc. However, they were able to reach a compromise which met with both men’s approval. As the term progressed there was no evidence of any public rift between the two men.

When a patrolman was slain in the line of duty, Mayor Walker voiced his opinion about police policy. Walker wanted the force to dispense with crime prevention, or what Mulrooney called “the new police idea” and return to the days of “brass buttons, and nightsticks...It seems to me that the Crime Prevention Bureau had better begin to prevent crime.”¹²² Mulrooney may or may not have been offended by Walker’s observation that the officer was killed because he was “not prepared, not outgunned, or outmanned.”¹²³ However, one month later while addressing a police academy class, Mulrooney echoed Walker’s sentiment “you will often encounter characters whom you must beat to the draw, or to the punch as the case may be.”¹²⁴

The Seabury Investigation recommended a plan to address the graft and corruption found in the police department. Mayor Walker was briefed on the new plan adopted by the police department to tackle vice enforcement in the city.

According to Mulrooney, “The Mayor is anxious to have any abuses that may exist under the old methods removed and he was consulted about the new plan in detail.”¹²⁵

In 1931, the Federal Wickersham Commission’s Report of Police was released. It observed that “political control of the police system in New York is deplorable,” which caused Commissioner Mulrooney to declare that, “there was no politics in the Police Department, and...civil service rules prevail.”¹²⁶

Mulrooney’s understanding of political interference involved patronage by external agents in appointments, transfers, and promotions. Mayor Walker had a broader view of political interference which included any undue involvement in police affairs by anyone including the mayor. Walker was always very mindful of not intruding in police matters personally. When Mayor Walker embarked on a vacation to Europe he maintained, “I have every confidence in Commissioner Mulrooney as head of the Police Department and his ability, integrity and devotion to public service which will...enable him to handle the situation. Even if I were here I would not interfere.”¹²⁷ A group called New York American understood the connection between politicians and organized crime and called for “a complete banishment of political interference with or attempted control of the Police Department of the City of New York and called on both the Mayor and Police Commissioner to drive out the gangsters.”¹²⁸

While Walker was on holiday, Acting Mayor McKee decided to initiate an all out assault on crime. McKee and Mulrooney traveled to Albany to seek legislation to strengthen law enforcement’s ability to combat the gangsters and

racketeers. Commissioner Mulrooney remarked, “Do not be afraid to trust us with this power. We will not abuse it. If we do, you can take it away.”¹²⁹

Mayor James J. Walker resigned under a cloud on September 1, 1932. By all public accounts it appeared Walker exercised restraint in police governance. Any private involvement could not be ascertained. Even before the Wickersham Commission report was released, Walker had maintained a policy of non-interference in the police department. Perhaps, the Seabury and Wickersham reports which revealed police misconduct shed light on his own nefarious activities and precipitated his departure.

Acting Mayor McKee:

Alderman President Joseph V. McKee became acting Mayor until the end of the year. McKee had nothing but praise for Commissioner Mulrooney at a Police Academy training exercise remarking, “I welcome the opportunity of expressing the confidence of the people of the city of New York in one of its most efficient, most trusted and finest officials...[Mulrooney] is administering the affairs of the department in a way that is a credit to the men and the city.”¹³⁰ A special election was held in November 1932 to fill Walker’s unexpired term (January 1, 1933-December 31, 1933). Surrogate Judge and Tammany Hall candidate John O’Brien was elected.

Mayor O’Brien:

Upon assuming office, Mayor O’Brien retained Commissioner Mulrooney. Mulrooney spent most of his time denying rumors that he would resign for other employment i.e. head of the Secret Service. Finally, in April he

was offered a gubernatorial appointment to head the newly created State Alcoholic Beverages Control Board. Governor Lehman acknowledged Mayor O'Brien when announcing his selection, "I must say that in calling Mr. Mulrooney to the service of the State I had the assistance of Mayor O'Brien, who was willing to waive his prior claim to the commissioner's services in order that he might undertake this important work in the service of the State."¹³¹

When O'Brien was asked if Mulrooney was leaving because he could not get any assurance regarding his retention from either himself, or Tammany Hall leader Curry, O'Brien retorted:

That statement is entirely false. I have stated on several occasions what I think of Mr. Mulrooney's record. I have expressed myself on that point fully. The Governor put his new appointment on plane where it would be very difficult not to comply with the Governor's wishes.¹³²

It is possible that Commissioner Mulrooney's assault on "gangsters and racketeers" with Acting Mayor McKee was not received well in Tammany Hall. Perhaps, as speculated in prior administrations, the Democratic political machine may have pressed for his removal. As Mr. Mulrooney left for Albany, he remarked that the only thing any of the three Mayors under whom he served asked of him was efficiency. Mayor O'Brien stated, "The choice of a successor presents a very serious problem. The first factor is whether the new commissioner should be a member of the police department or a layman, but whoever he is the

successor must have the confidence of the people.”¹³³ Deputy Chief Inspector James S. Bolan was chosen to succeed Commissioner Mulrooney.

17. James S. Bolan April 15, 1933 - December 31, 1933

Mayor O’Brien appointed James S. Bolan to replace Commissioner Mulrooney. Mayor O’Brien was completing Mayor Walker’s unexpired term and would be out of office in eight months. He advised his new Police Commissioner, “Bar politics...from the department and its activities...you will have a positively free hand in making this department a means of great service to the people. In all your endeavors you will have my constant support.”¹³⁴

Commissioner Bolan thanked the Mayor and assured him that “no act of [his] will ever cause [the Mayor] to regret the confidence that [he] have placed in [him].” In October 1933 a Senate Investigating Committee focused on the extent of racketeering in big cities including New York. Bolan was called as a witness and responded to charges that the influence of corrupt politicians was present in the New York Police Department. The charges were reminiscent of the Wickersham allegations. Bolan stated:

I don't think so. I have performed my duty in the Police Department for thirty-seven years and I have never had a politician, big or little, come to me and make any demand or interfere with my work. I have always found them to be fine men and most sociable....Sometimes, of course, they would call on me to be lenient and intercede for a policeman who found himself in difficulty; but they would only make a request, not a demand....In one or two cases since I was a captain-since 1913-a local politician would call on me ostensibly for social reasons, but rarely to get a patrolman transferred from one post to another. It never worked out. I never considered the politician. As long as I knew I was right, and did my work, I felt I didn't have to consider him.¹³⁵

As with previous commissions and police commissioners, "political interference" to Bolan focused solely on politicians other than the mayor. After the election of Fiorello LaGuardia in November 1933, Commissioner Bolan arranged for his pension. He believed his term ended on December 31, 1933. Shortly thereafter, however, Bolan told reporters that he did not intend to resign until asked by the Mayor-elect. Whether Bolan was informed that his term ended five years from appointment in April 1938, or in February 1936, either way he figured he did not have to resign. The issue was rendered moot when LaGuardia informed him that he would in fact be gone by announcing that he would appoint John F. O'Ryan the next Police Commissioner. Commissioner Bolan submitted his resignation to Mayor O'Brien effective midnight December 31, 1933.

John F. O’Ryan, a military man, was chosen by Mayor LaGuardia to succeed Commissioner Bolan. Interestingly this was not the first time O’Ryan’s name was connected with the police commissionership. It was reported that Mayor Walker had considered him to succeed Commissioner Enright in 1925. The choice of O’Ryan may have been a reward for dropping out of the mayoral race and supporting LaGuardia.

From the outset, Mayor LaGuardia was heavily involved in police affairs. Mayor LaGuardia wanted Commissioner O’Ryan to promote Captain Lewis Valentine to Chief Inspector, the highest uniform position in the police department. After complying with the mayor’s directive, O’Ryan set to work instilling much needed discipline into the department and trimming the budget. O’Ryan was clear that Mayor LaGuardia was his superior officer “My boss has made promises and is sincere. I am going to help him make good on his promises. I intend to cut the budget of the department...and submit it to the Mayor.”¹³⁶

Like Mayor Walker’s earlier criticism of crime prevention, the Crime Prevention Bureau under LaGuardia received much scrutiny. LaGuardia didn’t think it was measuring up. O’Ryan decided to wait and reach his own conclusions regarding its effectiveness. As a former military officer who understood the chain of command, O’Ryan sought approval from LaGuardia for different policies and procedures he was considering for the department. Commissioner O’Ryan believed that Mayor LaGuardia had finally taken politics

out of the police department. LaGuardia was on record as stating to a group of police recruits:

a great opportunity...is presented to us by the advent of the Fusion administration. It is true now that we can do this without the interference, direct or indirect, of outside influence...In the present situation we are not handicapped in the performance of our duty by obligation to any political party, whether worthy or corrupt, or to any political leader, whether worthy or corrupt.¹³⁷

O’Ryan was pleased that political interference of the type castigated by the Wickersham Commission four years earlier was absent. But, how would Commissioner O’Ryan view Mayor LaGuardia’s personal attention to police matters; as direction and guidance, or interference and intrusion? Mayor LaGuardia who still had not warmed up to the department’s Crime Prevention Bureau asked his police commissioner if he would, “be good enough to order the twenty-five crime prevention investigators to report to me three each day at 4 o’clock.”¹³⁸ Why LaGuardia chose to personally and publicly address the crime prevention issue is not known. Commissioner O’Ryan was in agreement with LaGuardia that if properly organized and administered the crime prevention function could serve a real purpose. However, O’Ryan disagreed with the Mayor as to whether crime prevention work should take place in the station houses.

Mayor LaGuardia again became involved in police affairs when reports of

official corruption in the department surfaced. In March 1934 LaGuardia went on record stating he intended to give the matter “his personal attention for the time being”¹³⁹ LaGuardia even joined Chief Inspector Valentine on a raid of a rooming house allegedly used for prostitution. If O’Ryan was perturbed by LaGuardia engaging in police raids he didn’t let on, instead, O’Ryan defended the Mayor’s actions:

For two months I have not been conservative in the performance of my duty as Police Commissioner and I have been butting in on what normally are the immediate concerns of subordinates. However, I believe it necessary to see and hear first-hand how such matters are being handled. I gather that the Mayor is operating under such similar policy.¹⁴⁰

This was an explanation of the Mayor’s conduct, but it doesn’t answer whether O’Ryan welcomed it. Was it just part of the mayor checking on his subordinates as O’Ryan checked on his patrolmen, or a military commander checked on his soldiers? When O’Ryan did have difficulty in policy with LaGuardia he voiced them. In one instance he differed over policy regarding the enforcement of a taxi strike. Mayor LaGuardia endorsed a more liberal interpretation of free speech and right to assemble. Commissioner O’Ryan narrowly defined the law and wanted to quell even the most minor disturbance. When reporters asked O’Ryan if they had a difference of opinion about policy, he straightforwardly responded, “My background has been military, and my training

hasn't much to do with liberalism" and he further added, "at no time did he think about the power of the Mayor to remove him from office, nor did he know that when he was appointed there would be a check on his authority."¹⁴¹

It appeared that the Police Commissioner's patience was wearing thin. When asked, "in the event of a disagreement between you and the Mayor, how would you act? O'Ryan was quite explicit, "If it were a matter of importance, I would act in accordance with my own judgment or I would resign."¹⁴²

A public spat between Mayor LaGuardia and Commissioner O'Ryan continued into August and played out in the press over a disagreement about the issuance of identification cards to union leaders. The result was a public back and forth between the two men. The Mayor remarked that O'Ryan's statement about resigning over a disagreement was "unbecoming, and that the commissioner was so informed by the Mayor."¹⁴³ When LaGuardia was asked to comment about his relationship with the police commissioner and the presence of any rift he added, "in my administration, as long as a Commissioner is at his post there is no break" and considered any criticism of Commissioner O'Ryan due not to ineptitude, but rather the Commissioner's zeal to deliver to the city the best possible police administration.¹⁴⁴ O'Ryan had his idea of how maintain law and order. In that charge he would not let anyone take advantage of him. Whether or not this included the Mayor is left open to speculation.

After being berated over the phone by Mayor LaGuardia, and after learning that the mayor had circumvented the chain of command and issued orders to his chief of staff, Police Commissioner O'Ryan submitted his

eliminating politics from the police, “When the policeman on the beat sees that his promotion is not dependent on a district leader, and when an ordinary citizen can no longer go to a district leader to get favors from the department, politics will be a dead issue.”¹⁴⁹

Mayor LaGuardia continued to be involved in police matters. He would from time to time issue directives to Commissioner Valentine. For example, when the Mayor learned of a policy toward minors which resulted in a frivolous charge of vagrancy he directed Valentine’s attention to correcting the matter, “Will you be good enough to issue strict orders that under no circumstances is a technical charge to be filed against any minor.”¹⁵⁰ LaGuardia did not perceive his involvement as interference. He believed he would be remiss if he did not pay such close attention.

Regarding politics in policing both LaGuardia and Valentine believed that the police department was cleaner than at any other time. Mayor LaGuardia publicly stated, “This is the first time in the city that there has been no political interference in the Police Department.”¹⁵¹ Commissioner Valentine echoed the Mayor, “[The] department is operated on the proposition that interference - political or otherwise - is tantamount to a heinous crime; that what you know, not whom you know, counts; that merit, not privilege, is all important.”¹⁵² Valentine was comfortable with LaGuardia and had no problem giving credit to him on the anniversary of his first year as police commissioner.

Commissioner Valentine technically began a new scheduled five year term as Police Commissioner in February 1936. Valentine understood that Mayor

LaGuardia dictated policy and that he implemented policy. For example, when LaGuardia wanted to address noise in the city, he wrote the Police Commissioner, “If you recall the noise abatement ordinance was hailed as one which would put teeth into the law respecting noise nuisances....I should like to see the law enforced with reasonableness and discretion...”¹⁵³

Although there were rumors of the Police Commissioner resigning from time to time, Valentine remained longer than all previous commissioners except Richard Enright. On September 25, 1939, Mayor LaGuardia appointed Lewis J. Valentine to another five year term. The matter of when an official term begins and whether a police commissioner is serving an unexpired term would eventually be decided in a future court ruling. Technically Valentine began a new term on February 22, 1936. With this latest appointment, Valentine’s term would expire in September 1944, while Mayor LaGuardia’s term expired in December 1941 absent re-election. LaGuardia stated, “I am keeping Valentine on his original job....That his service is satisfactory to the Mayor is evidenced by the fact of the re-appointment.”¹⁵⁴

Commissioner Valentine would unwittingly be drawn into the 1941 mayoral campaign by Brooklyn District Attorney and candidate William O’Dwyer. O’Dwyer remarked that he was responsible for “orderly and controlled street meetings.”¹⁵⁵ Valentine took exception and clarified how policy is made, “I am the police Commissioner. I, as Commissioner am in full command of the Police Department and am entirely responsible for its conduct.”¹⁵⁶ Valentine added, “The Mayor of the city and the Police Department will continue to protect

both the safety and the persons of all the people in New York City.¹⁵⁷ Mayor LaGuardia was re-elected in 1941. In the Fall 1942, Lewis J. Valentine became the longest serving Police Commissioner.

Mayor LaGuardia was still very much involved in police matters even after Commissioner Valentine entered his tenth year even calling Valentine back from his vacation to address a Brooklyn Grand Jury report alleging “lawlessness” in a Brooklyn neighborhood. LaGuardia stated, “I am greatly dissatisfied with the police conditions in Brooklyn. We have discussed this matter several times. You will be good enough to take appropriate action at the earliest possible time.”¹⁵⁸ LaGuardia specified in a letter to Valentine:

I have just asked Acting District Attorney Hughes of Kings County to send you a copy of the grand jury presentment concerning conditions in Bedford-Stuyvesant... You will please study every single charge or insinuation made in that presentment and investigate each one of them thoroughly and completely.... I have full and complete confidence in you and expect a thorough survey and complete report to me on the subject. This confidence, of course, is coupled with full and complete responsibility which vests in you as head of the Police Department.¹⁵⁹

Mayor LaGuardia appointed Commissioner Valentine to another five year term in September 1944. When Valentine learned that LaGuardia would not seek re-election he resigned to take other employment, “I sincerely regret leaving you

was not satisfied with the Police Department's efforts and charged the Department of Investigation to provide external oversight of the graft investigation. According to O'Dwyer, "The Commissioner of Investigation, no matter who it is, will conduct a check-up for the balance of my administration."¹⁶³ Clearly embarrassed and upset, Police Commissioner Wallander assembled his executive corps and let them know where he stood:

I warned you repeatedly to remedy conditions in your divisions, and you have failed me....as of today and now the Commissioner of Investigation has assumed charge of supervising the organized fight against gambling and vice...My reputation is at stake and I'm not going to have it ruined by you men...I warned you and you failed to heed my warning, and as a result you will suffer the consequences....You have plenty of opportunity to put things right. You are not kidding me anymore. This administration came in with clean hands, and will go out with clean hands.¹⁶⁴

Regarding gambling, Wallander wanted the entire force to understand that they were to enforce the Mayor's policy or risk the consequences, "The administration's views on gambling should be well enough known by now...work or get out. That's the policy. I want to repeat that the policy of Mayor O'Dwyer...since taking office still stands."¹⁶⁵

Before becoming the mayor, O'Dwyer, was a former police officer and District Attorney. He was quite familiar with the criminal justice system. When

asked what he intended to do with the current situation, he responded, “I am going to enforce the laws as best I can and keep the Police Department as clean as I can. That is why I am so happy to have the aid of grand juries - to do both, enforce the law and prevent corruption.”¹⁶⁶ When O’Dwyer was asked if the Police Commissioner was “fighting for his job” he responded, “The city could stand one hundred Wallanders. That’s based not only on his record...but on the thirty-one years I have known him intimately. He can be Commissioner as long as I am Mayor if he wants it.”¹⁶⁷ Mayor O’Dwyer also made a point of declaring Wallander’s autonomy:

There can be only one boss of the police department, Commissioner Arthur Wallander, and that when it comes to operations I don’t butt in. I thought it was well understood by every member of the force that when one exerts any political pressure, he is in trouble.¹⁶⁸

In February 1949, Commissioner Wallander announced his resignation to take an executive position with Con Edison. Wallander also cited his health as a factor in his making his decision. Questions arose as to whether Wallander resigned due to political involvement in the appointment of high-level police officials. It was speculated that the individuals appointed were not Commissioner Wallander’s selections. Both Wallander and O’Dwyer denied the rumors. According to Wallander, “I just want to set the record straight, there’s no politics in this set-up....These fellows are my selections. They were submitted to the

Mayor and he reported my selections were approved.”¹⁶⁹ As for his departure, Commissioner Wallander stated, “No man ever left any employer with a better taste than I’m leaving with. I definitely say that there is definitely no politics in my retirement...”¹⁷⁰

Whether Mayor O’Dwyer was more engaged in police affairs because of his prior criminal justice experience could not be determined. O’Dwyer had been a police recruit when Commissioner Wallander was a police academy instructor, and had great respect for Wallander. However, the reason why O’Dwyer tasked his Commissioner of Investigation and not Commissioner Wallander to investigate the graft issue for the duration of his term Was not ascertained. Certainly, this must have been a blow to Wallander’s management of the department. To not be able to investigate his own department gave the appearance that Wallander did not have the mayor’s confidence. Perhaps, O’Dwyer wanted to keep an eye on the investigation for personal reasons. Mayor O’Dwyer selected Deputy Police commissioner William P. O’Brien to succeed Wallander.

21. William P. O’Brien March 1, 1949 - September 25, 1950

A week after Third Deputy Police Commissioner and former policeman William P. O’Brien succeeded Commissioner Wallander he remarked, “I am beholden to no man, I wouldn’t stay in the department for twenty-four hours if I thought I had to sacrifice my integrity.”¹⁷¹ Typically, when a new appointment is made the mayor would make reference to allowing the police commissioner a

“free hand” in running the police department. There was no report of this taking place. Perhaps, due to his previous criminal justice experience, O’Dwyer believed he could run police affairs through Commissioner O’Brien.

Mayor O’Dwyer was re-elected in November 1949. In December 1949, rumors circulated that Commissioner O’Brien would not join O’Dwyer in his second term and resign on January 1, 1950. The rumors were denounced by Mayor O’Dwyer, “It is regretted that such an unfounded report should be published...it is eminently unfair to Commissioner O’Brien, who has no intention of leaving....there is nothing to it.”¹⁷² In January 1950 Commissioner O’Brien began a new campaign against gambling. Interestingly, reporters were inquisitive as to whether Mayor O’Dwyer ordered the operation. Commissioner O’Brien responded, “I have received no instructions from the Mayor regarding gambling.”¹⁷³ O’Dwyer responded with “no comment.”¹⁷⁴ In September 1950, an external investigation was launched to probe the graft issue in the Police Department. Simultaneously, Commissioner O’Brien began an internal probe to determine the veracity of allegations that policemen were “on the take.”¹⁷⁵

Amidst this probe into lax gambling enforcement, Mayor O’Dwyer resigned to assume a Presidential appointment as envoy to Mexico. Whether the investigation had anything to do with Mayor O’Dwyer’s resignation could not definitively be ascertained. There was limited interaction between O’Dwyer and O’Brien throughout the term. The biggest event during this term was the graft investigation which was not launched by the Mayor.

Mayor Impelliteri:

President of the Board of Alderman Vincent Impelliteri became acting mayor after O'Dwyer's resignation. Impelliteri stated, "I told the Police Commissioner that I would confer with him at City Hall...to get a full report of the entire picture and the course of the investigation he has ordered."¹⁷⁶ After the meeting, Impelliteri was satisfied that the Police Commissioner "is pursuing his investigation with great vigor"¹⁷⁷ and asked Commissioner O'Brien to remain in his administration. When asked whether the police department should investigate itself, Mayor Impelliteri replied that "it was up to the Police Commissioner to investigate any corruption in the Police Department."¹⁷⁸

Just three days later on September 22, 1951 it was reported that Mayor Impelliteri would not rule out replacing his Police Commissioner. Impelliteri attempted to gain control of the police situation:

I want to talk to District Attorney McDonald about all aspects of his investigation, I am going to the conference alone and my purpose is to find out everything he has in connection with the investigation and then determine what action to take, if any, as Mayor of the City of New York."¹⁷⁹

Eventually it was reported that the Mayor believed he had no choice but to remove O'Brien as Police Commissioner and seek a civilian successor as "the situation required more than a 'tough cop'".¹⁸⁰ Rather than face certain removal by the Mayor, Commissioner O'Brien resigned. Mayor Impelliteri stated:

I honestly believe [Commissioner O'Brien's] personal integrity is not involved in the present situation. I also feel his position has become untenable....it was mutually agreed that his resignation at this time would go far toward restoring the public confidence and strengthening any morale of the police force that have been weakened.”¹⁸¹

As for O'Brien's successor, Impelliteri selected Federal Prosecutor Thomas Murphy, “I shall swear [Thomas F. Murphy] in as Police Commissioner....like me, he is independent of thought and action.”¹⁸² Mayor Impelliteri decided that Commissioner O'Brien could not remain in office. It was hoped that this decision would restore public confidence, and department morale.

22. Thomas F. Murphy September 26, 1950 - July 5, 1951

Acting Mayor Impelliteri:

Former United States Attorney Thomas F. Murphy succeeded Commissioner O'Brien. In introducing Murphy, Mayor Impelliteri commented, “Mr. Murphy is an independent. He owes his job to no one...he goes into the job with no strings attached whatsoever.”¹⁸³

Governor Dewey summoned Mayor Impelliteri and Commissioner Murphy to Albany to discuss the corruption investigation. Impelliteri was receptive to the Governor's interest in the matter, “Both the Commissioner and I will, of course, accept the cooperation of any official agency sincerely interested in eliminating any bad situation which may exist.”¹⁸⁴

In a gesture of transparency, Commissioner Murphy invited the press to cover his address to the police department executive corps, “The circumstances attending my entrance to the department are so extraordinary and of such grave import to the people of the city that I believe the people are entitled to know just what I am doing and what I propose doing.”¹⁸⁵ Rumors circulated that Commissioner Murphy had been offered other positions while police commissioner. One such offer was as chief enforcement officer, Department of Price Stabilization which Murphy refused “I told [Mr. Disalle] I was flattered by the offer but I had a job to do as Police Commissioner in New York City. I told him I had an obligation to fulfill and that I would stick with it.”¹⁸⁶

Commissioner Murphy, who had prosecuted the spy Alger Hiss, was selected because of his reputation as a crime-fighter. He was retained after Impelliteri won a special election.

Mayor Impelliteri:

Mayor Impelliteri was victorious in the 1950 special election. On February 21, 1951, Mayor Impelliteri swore in Commissioner Murphy to a new five year term stating, “Commissioner Murphy will remain in his place as long as he desires”¹⁸⁷ the Mayor added, “Mr. Murphy has discharged his duties to my complete satisfaction, he has done so with free hand, and he will continue to do so.”¹⁸⁸

As the corruption investigation continued in the city, the Mayor and Police Commissioner restated their goal, “We are continuing to cooperate with the end in view of giving the City of New York a clean Police Department and a clean city.

This is the ambition of all of us. It is our objective and that is what we all want to effect.”¹⁸⁹ The Mayor and Police Commissioner also were together on the issue of unionization of the police. After the Police Commissioner stated his opposition, the president of the union remarked in a letter to the Commissioner, “I am certain you did not speak for your boss, Mayor Impellitteri.”¹⁹⁰ Mayor Impellitteri defended Murphy’s stance and that “he shared Commissioner Murphy’s view and that participation in a union-sponsored strike would cost them their jobs.”¹⁹¹

Sometimes, the Mayor and Police Commissioner did differ on an issue. For example, when both the Mayor’s Management Team and Commissioner Murphy were conducting parallel studies of the police department, Murphy wanted the Mayor’s review delayed until his was completed. Murphy relented after members of the Mayor’s team threatened to leave the administration if the Police Department continued to thwart the survey. Two months later President Truman nominated Commissioner Murphy to a Federal judgeship. When the Mayor’s Management Team report was released it accused the Police Commissioner of “blocking” their efforts to begin their review of the department.”¹⁹² Interestingly, Mayor Impellitteri did not publicly involve himself in this matter.

Commissioner Murphy spoke at a luncheon shortly after his resignation was announced and thanked Mayor Impellitteri “for keeping a promise that he would be free to operate without hint or hindrance. Nobody has even telephoned me, suggesting a promotion, or a transfer.”¹⁹³

Regarding the Mayor’s Management Team survey of the police,

Impelliteri did not intervene when Commissioner Murphy expressed his views. Impelliteri simply could have ordered Commissioner Murphy to cooperate, but chose to not get involved --- whether this was due to Murphy's celebrity as the person who prosecuted the spy Alger Hiss, or a sincere desire not to interfere in police affairs is cause for speculation.

Professional Period: The Fall of Tammany Hall (1951-1975)

This period was dominated by law enforcement and criminal justice professionals. Professional autonomy was quite evident and demonstrated by many of the police commissioners. The single act which most reflects this sentiment was Police Commissioner Kennedy's refusal to accept his re-appointment.

23. George P. Monaghan

July 9, 1951 - December 31, 1953

Unlike his predecessor Thomas Murphy, Commissioner George Monaghan promised "full cooperation without restriction"¹⁹⁴ with the Mayor's Committee on Management survey. As Fire Commissioner, Monaghan worked closely with the group when it studied the Fire Department, "I am in complete sympathy with the idea of Dr. Gulick's men conducting their studies in this department...I found his representatives extremely helpful with suggestions for improvements in the Fire Department."¹⁹⁵ However, in November 1952 when the final report was released Commissioner Monaghan was not receptive to its conclusions. The Mayor's Management Team report on the police department

negatively commented about the quality of police candidates, low department morale, and lax discipline.”¹⁹⁶ After sixteen months as Police Commissioner Monaghan’s views changed about the survey and he stated he, “ would take plenty of time to study the report, as we also have murder, rape, and robbery to deal with.”¹⁹⁷

Commissioner Monaghan also had to deal with another matter begun in the previous administration; the unionization of the police. After meeting with Mayor Impelliteri, Monaghan issued an order forbidding membership in the union, “now in existence or hereafter to be formed.”¹⁹⁸ Mayor Impelliteri supported his Police Commissioner’s directive, “I had gone over the order with the Commissioner before it was issued and that the directive and the reasons for it had my approval.”¹⁹⁹

One incident in which it appeared Impelliteri had no knowledge of Monaghan’s actions involved the Police Commissioner and the Attorney General of the United States. Reportedly, the FBI had agreed not to interview every policeman involved in allegations of police brutality until after the Police Department and local District Attorney’s completed its own investigations and reported its findings to the FBI. When the Attorney General abrogated this agreement, in February 1953, the Police Commissioner Monaghan and the Chief Inspector traveled to Washington, DC. When the ACLU asked the Mayor if the agreement violated any Federal law, he replied, “I know nothing about it.”²⁰⁰ Further, when Mayor Impelliteri was asked if he had any comment regarding Monaghan and the Chief Inspector going to Washington in an effort to restore the

agreement, Mayor Impelliteri responded, “No, I didn’t even know they were down there.”²⁰¹ Mayor Impelliteri, perhaps embarrassed by this exchange, offered the city’s cooperation to a House Judiciary Sub-Committee investigating the alleged agreement between the Police Department and the Department of Justice. Commissioner Monaghan had denied there had ever been such an agreement with the Department of Justice, and the Police Department would cooperate in any investigation involving the police. In a show of support for the department Monaghan remarked, “However, it must be remembered that a policeman, because of the nature of his duties, has a special responsibility. He must often use force to protect citizens from criminals.”²⁰²

When calls for Commissioner Monaghan’s ouster were made by various organizations and politicians, Mayor Impelliteri supported his Police Commissioner, “I heard un-American demands to remove the Police Commissioner, nothing doing, I’ll take my oath on the facts in the case. I have broad shoulders. I have taken it before and I can take it again.”²⁰³

In November 1953, Mayor Impelliteri lost his bid for re-election to Robert Wagner. Mayor-elect Wagner indicated he was likely to replace Commissioner Monaghan. Not allowing anyone to dictate his future, Commissioner Monaghan resigned at the end of the year and accepted a gubernatorial appointment to sit on a commission investigating the harness racing industry.

Regarding the matter of the Federal civil rights violation investigation, Impelliteri defended his Police Commissioner to the end and offered to cooperate with a “fair and impartial investigation.”²⁰⁴ Mayor Impelliteri seemed reluctant to

unduly become involved in police affairs and his involvement in police matters appeared to come as a necessary function of his duties as Mayor.

24. Francis W.H. Adams

January 1, 1954 - August 1, 1955

Mayor Robert Wagner selected former US Attorney Francis W.H. Adams to succeed Commissioner Monaghan. According to Adams, Mayor Wagner promised to let him “run the department without let or hindrance.”²⁰⁵ Adams continued, “were that not so, I would not be here.” Finally stating, “I’m not a politician, I regard this job as a privilege and a responsibility. I am my own boss.”²⁰⁶

The first test of whether Mayor Wagner would come to his police commissioner’s support involved the restoration of the so-called “shoo-fly” system which was intended to be a supervision tool. The police union viewed the objective as penalizing policemen for minor infractions which affected morale. Adams denied there was such a system, but remarked, “There is now and there will continue to be a rigid supervision of all units and activities of the department.”²⁰⁷ Mayor Wagner added, “Commissioner Adams is the kind of public servant I want to keep with me. I am glad to take this opportunity...to state publicly that I am backing him 100 per cent; and maybe we’ll make it 1000 per cent.”²⁰⁸

In another incident Commissioner Adams was criticized for levying a severe penalty of transfer and demotion to an off-duty detective who was photographed holding an umbrella for the heavyweight boxing champion Rocky Marciano. Commissioner Adams thought the incident would be perceived as a

special favor for a celebrity. That the department supplied a bodyguard at a time when he was propounding that the department was undermanned. A spokesman for the Mayor's office referred to Adam's decision, "The Commissioner has the right to take action for reasons that seem good and sufficient and that make sense to him."²⁰⁹ Publicly, Mayor Wagner did not intervene. Ultimately, Commissioner Adams admitted he was "wrong" in his understanding of the facts.²¹⁰

Commissioner Adams believed very strongly in keeping politics out of the police department and credited Mayor Wagner, and the Tammany Hall and Bronx political leaders for "politics not playing a role in the operations of the department."²¹¹ Adams understood that a patrolman's loyalty is divided and the seeds of corruption are sown if requests by external parties for transfers, or promotions are granted. Mayor Wagner, on record as allowing his Commissioner a "free hand," continued to make public statements backing Commissioner Adams, "you will continue to have my support as long as you continue to do the good job that you have been doing."²¹²

Commissioner Adams was very vocal regarding the police commissioner's term of office. He advocated a fixed term, removal only after a show of cause and a proper hearing. As it was, the Commissioner served at the pleasure of the Mayor, and according to Adams, "this power can permit political control of the Police Department."²¹³ However, Commissioner Adams believed his sentiment did not apply to his current boss Mayor Wagner:

Mayor Wagner has seen to it that there has been no interference with the activities of the Police Department from any source whatever. As long as he is Mayor, we have no fear the Police Department will be tampered with. But the time will come when he will no longer be with us. Therefore I think that consideration should be given to the appointment of the Police Commissioner by the Mayor for a specified term, during which the commissioner could not be removed except upon a showing of malfeasance in office.²¹⁴

Mayor Wagner reportedly did not think the recommendation was necessary. He believed that the present system where “department heads were appointed by the Mayor and removable at his pleasure was sound.”²¹⁵ In a brusque manner, Mayor Wagner tersely addressed his Police Commissioner’s opinion regarding the relationship between City Hall and the Police Department, “The Police Department has been free of politics. Mr. Adams was told it would be when he took office, and it will be while I’m Mayor.”²¹⁶

The first official announcement that Commissioner Adams was to resign came from the Mayor’s Executive Secretary who stated, “In recent months [Adams] has indicated his desire to return to the firm....when Mr. Adams accepted this appointment he told the Mayor that he might quit before the end of Mr. Wagner’s four years in office. The Mayor was reluctant to lose his services.”²¹⁷ In a televised speech, Commissioner Adams confirmed his pending resignation:

When I first came into office, it was my understanding with the Mayor that I was to have a completely free hand in running the department.... And the Mayor has fully supported that policy in every way. It was also necessarily our understanding that whenever my private affairs required it, I would be allowed to surrender my post. That time has now come.²¹⁸

Interestingly, as both statements were quite similar, and the first announcement came from other than the Police Commissioner himself, it gave the appearance that mayoral politics precipitated the Police Commissioner's departure. Yet, this resignation was not subjected to heightened speculation by the press. Commissioner Adams was returning to his law practice which provided him with a convenient out. Chief Inspector Stephen Kennedy was selected to succeed Adams. On the surface, Mayor Wagner used his office to support the Police Commissioner, and he did not appear to unduly inject himself into police affairs.

25. Stephen P. Kennedy August 2, 1955 - February 22, 1961

Commissioner Adams was succeeded by Chief Inspector Stephen P. Kennedy. Commissioner Kennedy expressed his conception of being Police Commissioner:

The Police Commissionership is a twenty-four hour job. It is not a 9 to 5 affair, and I don't intend to make it so. I have the complete assurance, and it was a condition of taking the job, that in all matters relating to the operation and administration of the Police Department, I shall in no way, by any person, be influenced except according to the provisions set forth by law.²¹⁹

Of course, this exempted Mayor Wagner who stated, "I am confident Steve Kennedy will do an outstanding job as Police Commissioner. He is in full accord with the principles I feel must be followed in our department."²²⁰ When Commissioner Kennedy refused to comply with a Mayoral Executive Order, Mayor Wagner supported his decision. Mayor Wagner recognized the right of the Police Commissioner to refuse an instruction if it was "contrary to department policy or if it might interfere with operations."²²¹

Mayor Wagner continued his policy of non-interference with Commissioner Kennedy stating:

When I came into office, I told the predecessor of Commissioner Kennedy...that he would have a free hand in running the department and I would not countenance any political influence to permeate the department. Commissioners Adams and Kennedy have followed that policy and followed it well, and I want again to reiterate that my stand is still the same and always will be.²²²

The Mayor's policy was evident when he offered assistance to the Police Commissioner regarding a traffic enforcement crackdown, "I have no intention of interfering in any way with the program. Today's conference is to determine what assistance I can provide to help make the traffic crackdown work more smoothly."²²³

Mayor Wagner announced his intention to re-appoint Commissioner Kennedy to a new five year term. Kennedy had been serving the unexpired term of Commissioner Murphy which began on February 21, 1951. Wagner stated:

[Kennedy] is a good Commissioner. There has never been any question about it. He will remain in my administration as long as he is a good Commissioner. There was never any question of resignation, when I appointed him last August, I never gave any thought to having to reswear him at any time; I didn't have in mind that the term in which he was serving would expire next February.²²⁴

Commissioner Kennedy maintained an independent streak throughout his career. He refused the Mayor's Executive Order early in his term, and was the sole law enforcement head in the state to refuse a state legislative committee's request to turn over wiretapping data. He told a hearing of the Board of Estimate that "Mayor Wagner's proposed budget made totally insufficient provision for adequate police protection,"²²⁵ and differed with City Hall on what was responsible for increased juvenile crime arrests (City Hall argued better

enforcement, while Kennedy argued more crime).

According to Kennedy, “a Police Commissioner must not only meet the practical problems from day to day, he must be a strong moral force. He must not bow to expediency or political considerations.”²²⁶ When Adam Clayton Powell was elected District leader he requested that three police officials be transferred. Commissioner Kennedy sent Powell the following telegram:

You have just recently established yourself as a political district leader and, therefore you are perhaps under some misapprehension. Under my administration, district leaders do not, under any circumstances, make transfers, promotions or either directly or indirectly to the Police Department of the City of New York.²²⁷

Commissioner Kennedy did not limit political interference to persons other than the Mayor. He instead included all politicians, including the Mayor. Commissioner Kennedy was steadfast in his belief that politics must be removed from policing, “I want to keep politics out of the police and the police out of politics.”²²⁸ Given this, he believed that a truly professional police commissioner can serve in any administration. Commissioner Kennedy let it be known that the Police Department served all the people, and that he was willing to serve as Police Commissioner under any Mayor “provided he followed Mayor Wagner’s principle of no political interference in the Police Department”²²⁹

Commissioner Kennedy did not believe in unionization of the police. He would not be bullied by anyone including police officers:

This Police Commissioner does not intend to have any pressure groups-no matter how well intentioned they claim to be - second guessing his decisions. In 1901 the Police Board was abolished and sole responsibility for the conduct of the department was vested in one Police Commissioner. When command decisions have to be made, they shall and will be made by the Police Commissioner-they cannot and will not be made by a debating society.²³⁰

Police Commissioner Kennedy believed in a professional police department which “represented law enforcement at all times. [Where] its members must be impartial in their operation and not be subservient to any labor boss or other outside influence.”²³¹ Kennedy further stated, “the rules of the department are firm. Legal precedent has established the right of the Commissioner to run the department.”²³² Mayor Wagner concurred, “the Police Commissioner runs the department, I back my Police Commissioner to the hilt.”²³³

When asked if he would resign if the Mayor appointed a committee to study a grievance matter, in essence, making the Police Commissioner’s decisions subject to appeal, Commissioner Kennedy responded, “No committee has been set up, and I don’t think he intends to. He is aware of my position.”²³⁴ One month

later, Wagner went on record as giving the Police Commissioner “a blank check” in all matters of police discipline. Mayoral aides stressed that no committee would be appointed and that the entire matter was “closed” as far as City Hall was concerned.”²³⁵

Kennedy’s targeted Jewish policemen next. Commissioner Kennedy offended this group by canceling all days off due to the UN General Assembly. When these officers argued they could not work due to religious observance, Commissioner Kennedy remarked, “When are these men religious? The other fifty-one weeks of the year we don’t hear anything about it.”²³⁶ Commissioner Kennedy elaborated:

This is an emergency. We live in a country believing in separation of church and state. It is regrettable the order interferes with a religious observance, but this is the Police Department and orders must be obeyed. My order stands, and I am not backing away from it, let that be understood. I thought it was pretty well understood by now that I do not succumb to pressure from political, racial, or religious groups. A policeman is a policeman at all times.²³⁷

Mayor Wagner apologized to the Board of Rabbis on behalf of his administration for Commissioner Kennedy’s remarks. The Mayor also believed that Kennedy would apologize himself within forty eight hours. Commissioner Kennedy said he had “no intention to insult the Jewish community...but, this is no

matter for an apology.”²³⁸ Once again, Mayor Wagner defended his Police Commissioner:

I would like to affirm my full confidence in Commissioner Kennedy’s administration of the Police Department. I would also like to affirm my confidence in dedication to the true American spirit of tolerance. I have known him and his record for many years and can affirm that he is without any trace of bigotry or prejudice.²³⁹

On February 21, 1961, Mayor Wagner believed he had re-appointed Commissioner Kennedy to a second five year term. Commissioner Kennedy stated, “he would accept reappointment on [only] one condition, that the police be given a \$600 raise more than the Fire Department.”²⁴⁰ When this condition was not met Commissioner Kennedy resigned. Kennedy exercised his professional autonomy and publicly explained his decision:

I will not accept another term as Police Commissioner. Prior to the Mayor's offer of reappointment...I informed him that the problems confronting the Police Department must be faced up to and that this was the time of decision. I insisted that the solution of the problems facing the office of Police Commissioner were more important than who filled that office. In announcing his offer of reappointment of me, the Mayor publicly stated...that the ban on 'moonlighting' would continue. I would not serve on any other basis. He also recognized the resulting inequity and stated that a meeting would be held with me at some vague, future date to reach a solution....I indicated that the meeting should be held prior to my acceptance of reappointment....A meeting was held...and it became perfectly clear the Mayor wanted things to continue just as they are....I have stated that this inertia, indecision, and drift must end.²⁴¹

Mayor Wagner, when notified that Kennedy had resigned, issued the following statement, "I announce the appointment of Michael J. Murphy...as Police Commissioner. As in the case of Commissioners Kennedy and Adams, I have ordered that he run the department free from any pressure of any kind."²⁴²

Mayor Wagner was careful not to be branded as interfering with the police. He was a politician and as Mayor found it necessary to comment on the activities of his police commissioner from time to time, even defending Commissioner Kennedy for some apparent gaffes. In cases where City Hall and Police Headquarters disagreed on a matter, Mayor Wagner recognized each others

domain. On the surface, he did not appear to take any of Kennedy's criticism personally.

26. Michael J. Murphy

February 23, 1961 - June 6, 1965

Mayor Wagner promised Michael J. Murphy a free hand in running the Police Department. Commissioner Murphy addressed two contentious issues of the previous administration; the salary increase, and grievance procedures. Mr. Murphy accepted a pledge from Mayor Wagner to sit down and discuss the salary issue with the Budget Director. Wagner and Murphy together announced that new grievance procedures would be implemented.

After six months of routine police activities, Commissioner Murphy affirmed Mayor Wagner's promise of a free hand in running the department, "I have absolutely no problem whatever from Mayor Wagner's office. He has never given me any order or suggestion regarding the administration of the Police Department. That was our original understanding and it still stands."²⁴³

An issue arose which made it appear the Mayor had authorized police patrols for a private housing project. The Commissioner reminded the Mayor that deployment of personnel is the domain of the Police Commissioner. In a letter to the Mayor, the Commissioner cleared up any misunderstandings the public might have had by stating that police patrol the perimeter of various housing projects when there is a need. The need is evaluated by the Police Department. Commissioner Murphy explained:

I, as Police Commissioner, having sole responsibility under the law, for the disposition of the police force, will go on making my determinations according to professional police judgment and with reference to the best interests of the citizens as a whole. This position is, of course, in accordance with your consistent policy of not interfering directly or indirectly with the operation of this department.²⁴⁴

Commissioner Murphy was the lone department head to go against the Mayor's decision to not invoke the Condon-Wadlin Act in the walkout of municipal drivers. When Commissioner Murphy fired five civilian Police Department employees he was asked if his action had the Mayor's approval, Murphy exclaimed, "This is my responsibility as Police Commissioner."²⁴⁵ In a prepared statement by Mayor Wagner:

Commissioner Murphy has advised me that he considered the walkout of drivers of municipal vehicles in his department a special emergency requiring special action...I have always supported Commissioner Murphy; I support him now. I do not believe a similar emergency exists at this time in the other departments affected by this walkout.²⁴⁶

Commissioner Murphy was open to studying the idea of a civilian review board to hear brutality complaints, although he believed the current policy in which brutality complaints were heard by a panel of three Deputy Commissioners

was satisfactory.

Nonetheless, a bill to establish a civilian review board was introduced in the City Council by a reform Democratic councilman. Mayor Wagner stood by his Police Commissioner, “This is a police matter in which I take Commissioner Murphy’s advice, and he has my complete confidence.”²⁴⁷ Commissioner Murphy eventually rejected outright any such plan stating that there was “no valid, logical or practical reason for adding civilians to the department’s own Civilian Complaint Review Board exists.”²⁴⁸ One month later, Commissioner Murphy announced he would resign to become head of the National Automobile Theft Bureau. He denied that his resignation had anything to do with the announcement that the City Council sub-committee had recommended the creation of a Civilian Review Board which he had opposed.

In his resignation letter, Murphy expressed his gratitude to his boss, Mayor Wagner, “Your support of the Police Commissioner and the police department is without parallel.”²⁴⁹ Mayor Wagner named Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney, and former Deputy Police Commissioner Vincent L. Broderick to replace Commissioner Murphy. Once again, Mayor Wagner allowed his police commissioner a free hand in the running of the police department. But when necessary, Mayor Wagner got involved and publicly supported Commissioner Monaghan.

27. Vincent L. Broderick

June 7, 1965 - February 21, 1966

Mayor Robert Wagner upon swearing in his fourth Police Commissioner

Vincent L. Broderick restated his policy of giving his police commissioners a free hand, “He is in charge of the department, free of politics and other influences. He is the sole person responsible for the department, no outside interference of any kind.”²⁵⁰ Three days later, Mayor Wagner announced he would not seek another term.

Wagner kept his pledge and allowed Broderick a free hand in police affairs. By all accounts, Commissioner Broderick did just that for the first six months of his term. There was no public interference from City Hall. Broderick administered police affairs without political or other interference of any kind, and would brook no outside intervention in management and operations, from any source or at any level.

In November 1965, John V. Lindsay was elected mayor. As 1965 drew to a close Commissioner Broderick said that, “My future plans are to administer the Police Department at least till February 21 [1966].”²⁵¹ One member of the Harlem clergy called on Mayor-elect Lindsay to retain Commissioner Broderick, “We love him and respect him and want to thank him for what he has done to improve the conditions of the city in such a short time. He’s the type of man New York City needs to head its Police Department.”²⁵² As of December 24, 1965, Broderick still had not discussed retention with Mayor-elect Lindsay.²⁵³

There was limited interaction between Mayor Wagner and Commissioner Broderick during the last six months of Wagner’s administration. Every indication is that Mayor Wagner was as accommodating as he had been with his previous three Police Commissioners.

Mayor Lindsay

John V. Lindsay became Mayor on January 1, 1966. From the outset claims of political interference were aimed at his administration, “there have been half dozen incidents where critics, openly, or in private have charged interference by City Hall in the department’s business.”²⁵⁴ One incident exemplified these allegations. It involved discretionary promotions to the highest and most coveted investigative rank in the police department of Detective First Grade. The allegation was that City Hall attempted to interject itself into the internal operations of the department by suggesting the Police Commissioner not fill all first grade detective vacancies. This “suggestion” came from the Mayor’s Secretary and was perceived by Broderick as reminiscent of patronage. Commissioner Broderick remarked, “I didn’t attach any importance to it because I was busy at the time. I’m sure that if the Mayor wanted something, he would communicate with this Police Commissioner directly and not through a secretary. I did not read anything into the request except an element of naivete.”²⁵⁵

Former Commissioner Adams, who maintained a close advisory capacity to Mayor Wagner on police matters stated, “To the extent that this indicates a policy of interference with the Police Department with the new administration, I would regard it as the worst thing that’s happened to the Police Department in many years.”²⁵⁶ Deputy Mayor Price denied knowing if any calls were made from his office regarding this matter. The Mayor called Mr. Broderick’s statements “nonsense.” The incident prompted the City Council President to remark “it is difficult to imagine a more retrogressive step in municipal government than the

restoration of political influence in police appointments and promotions. I think, however, that the Mayor upon reflection will sustain...the practice of non-interference.”²⁵⁷

A second incident, which occurred less than a week after Commissioner Broderick’s claims of political interference, reflected the administration’s awkwardness in police governance. It involved the demotion of two deputy inspectors to Captain, and the transfer of a Captain and Lieutenant. A mayoral spokesman went on record that the moves were carried out without giving City Hall any advance notice and that this was entirely within the Police Commissioner’s jurisdiction. This incident was reported less than a week after the alleged patronage incident. According to the reporter, “the mayor and his deputy have been at pains lately to emphasize Mr. Broderick’s independence from City Hall.”²⁵⁸

These two incidents aside, the issue which defined the tumultuous two month relationship between Mayor Lindsay and Commissioner Broderick was the creation of an independent civilian complaint review board. Mayor Lindsay was in favor of the move, while Commissioner Broderick believed an independent civilian complaint review board would “lessen the effectiveness of the police officer on the street, because he could be second guessed by someone who is not informed.”²⁵⁹ Regarding Commissioner Broderick’s testimony before the City Council, then Mayor-elect Lindsay remarked “were [Police Commissioner Broderick] to say to me flat out, I cannot agree and I won’t go along with it, it would be his privilege and probably responsibility I’m sure to tender his

resignation.”²⁶⁰ Broderick argued against an independent civilian board because the police were already under civilian control and he expressed this at a City Council hearing:

Gentlemen, the surest and most effective and most objective civilian control of the Police Department and its disciplinary processes, is through a civilian Commissioner. I have assumed responsibility for discipline, and I intend to exercise that responsibility, aggressively and fairly. Another layer of civilian control should not, I submit be superimposed.²⁶¹

Less than two weeks before the expiration of former Commissioner Murphy’s term February 21, 1966, the Mayor’s eight-man Law Enforcement Task Force recommended, among other things, adding four civilians to the Civilian Complaint Review Board. To no one’s surprise, Commissioner Broderick did not agree with the Task Force recommendation and voiced his concern. Broderick called on the Mayor “to renounce political expediency,” that the report, “contained erroneous ideas,” and was “an invitation to the Mayor to take over the department.”²⁶² At a news conference, Commissioner Broderick stated, “I am not asking the Mayor to replace me, and I am certainly not asking to be reappointed. I am asking him to select a man...who has the capacity to run this Department. This man should have a free hand in running the Police Department.”²⁶³ Commissioner Broderick sent a letter to Mayor Lindsay which pointed out that the task force report was silent on the proper relations between the Mayor and

Police Commissioner:

The remarkable feature of this task force report is what it does not say. It says nothing of the continuing successful effort which has been made in the last twelve years to divorce the Police Department from political interference and political control....I noted one other very significant omission in the task force report. Nowhere did I see any discussion of a strong, dedicated and independent police commissioner in the administration of the Police Department. Yet in my judgment the police commissioner, his attitudes and his policies, are the core of the effectiveness of this department.²⁶⁴

Commissioner Broderick ended with this discourse, “Assure yourself Mr. Mayor, that your police commissioner shares your dedication to basic human liberty and basic human dignity, or replace him with one who does. Then mandate him to administer and discipline the Police Department without interference from anyone.”²⁶⁵

In an unusual show of support, former police commissioners agreed with Commissioner Broderick. A statement was released that the real issue, “is not this thing of a review board, but who’s going to run the Police Department in New York - the Mayor or the Police Commissioner.”²⁶⁶ Former Commissioner Adams accused Mayor Lindsay of being, “totally unsophisticated in the problems of running a great metropolitan police force,” while former Commissioner Mike

Murphy added, “The independence of the police force is being threatened at this time. I didn’t spend thirty years on the force to see this happen.”²⁶⁷

Lindsay and Broderick tried one last time to come to an agreement acceptable to both parties on the matter of the Civilian Review Board. It was their first meeting in...two weeks, and reportedly Broderick would accept reappointment only if he was assured of certain conditions. Specifically, that “there be no political interference, that ground rules be laid down that would permit him to supervise and discipline the department without interference and enable him to be the Police Commissioner and not a straw man.”²⁶⁸

By now, Mayor Lindsay had tired of Broderick’s impertinence, and regarding the volatile issue of the independent civilian complaint review board declared, “I, as Mayor, as chief executive have a right and should resolve this question. And, I propose to resolve it along the lines of the proposal that I had made.”²⁶⁹ Four days later, Mayor Lindsay announced he was appointing Howard Leary, the Philadelphia Police Commissioner, to succeed Commissioner Broderick.

Mayor Lindsay cited Broderick’s opposition to civilian representation on the police board as the reason he did not reappoint him. Broderick looked at the broader issue, which involved the entire question of independence of the police department from City Hall. In fact, after leaving office, Broderick continued decrying politics in policing. At Commissioner Leary’s swearing in, Mayor Lindsay took the opportunity to answer the charge of political interference:

The Mayor's responsibilities in law enforcement matters are clear-cut. These desperate voices which have spoken in past weeks about the relationship between the Police Department and the Mayor have come perilously close to missing the basic principle of a democratically elected government. They have suggested - no they have stated - that the Police Department is a law unto itself. They have stated that the duly elected civilian government of New York is not responsible for the Police Department as it is for the other departments of the city...the ultimate responsibility lies with the Mayor, and I intend to exercise that responsibility.²⁷⁰

Commissioner Broderick had the last word, "the Police Commissioner's responsibility for the Police Department comes from the [City] Charter, while the Mayor's comes from the people."²⁷¹ Mayor Lindsay acted within his powers as the chief executive officer and relieved Commissioner Broderick at the end of a scheduled/institutionalized term. As the Mayor-elect, and as Mayor, Lindsay allowed Commissioner Broderick to make allegations of political interference and the civilian complaint review board major issues.

At any point after January 1, 1966 when Mayor Lindsay was sworn in he could have summarily dismissed Commissioner Broderick. However, as Broderick was completing the unexpired term of Commissioner Michael Murphy, Lindsay waited until the expiration of the term. At this point Broderick was not so much dismissed, or not retained by Lindsay, but was just another candidate for

the position who was not selected. Whether in the end Lindsay would have selected Broderick had his views on the civilian review board been different we cannot know.

28. Howard R. Leary

February 22, 1966 - October 8, 1970

Mayor John V. Lindsay appointed Philadelphia Police Commissioner Howard R. Leary to a new five year term. Commissioner Leary addressed the political interference charges of his predecessor Commissioner Broderick, “My Mayor in Philadelphia gave me an absolute free hand. Mayor Lindsay has assured me of this, that I will have the same support and the same autonomy within the [New York] department.”²⁷²

On his first day in office Commissioner Leary clarified his view of the separation of politics and administration, “I don’t think City Hall should play any role in the specific operations of the Police Department, but setting policy is something else again.”²⁷³ Commissioner Leary said that he could support a civilian review board even though, as a cop, he was opposed. Another matter which Leary had to deal was whether to allow police officers to join the John Birch Society, an anti-communist organization. Lindsay initially declined to discuss what Leary would do. However, the next day, City Hall released the following statement, “Mayor Lindsay has called upon the Police Commissioner Howard R. Leary for a report on the activities, if any, on the part of police personnel in the Birch Society.”²⁷⁴

The first hint of political interference by the Lindsay administration

involved the selection of the Chief Inspector, the highest uniform rank in the Police Department. Former Chief Inspector Shanley claimed that Commissioner Leary told him the shift was a matter of politics. Leary denied ever saying this to Shanley. However, former Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy (1970-1973), who would succeed Leary, recounted in his autobiography that Leary phoned him to inquire about Sanford Garelik and there was “an urgency about the call that seemed difficult to understand, since Leary had been Commissioner for but a few days.”²⁷⁵ Murphy understood what had transpired when Garelik’s promotion was announced. The naming of Garelik was a foregone conclusion when Leary arrived from Philadelphia. Garelik was not Leary’s choice for the top uniform position in the department, but instead was the choice of the political circle. Essentially, Leary had been issued a fiat from City Hall. This is reminiscent of Mayor LaGuardia’s elevation to Chief Inspector of Lewis Valentine under Commissioner O’Ryan. Since Garelik was not Leary’s man would it compromise Leary’s ability to manage the police department?

A former Chief of Staff to the Police Commissioner stated that he was asked to submit his retirement papers by Garelik. When asked if the resignation of his Chief of Staff was made “over his head,” Leary replied, “I would not put it in those terms.”²⁷⁶ Commissioner Leary told his former Chief of Staff, “if he wanted to come back the job was still available to him.”²⁷⁷ Did the order come from Garelik, or, City Hall? The Deputy Commissioner in charge of the department’s press and community relations commented about the mudslinging in the department, “I don’t know who the hell is running the department. I don’t know

whether it's Garelik-Leary, Ltd., or Leary-Lindsay, Ltd., or, Garelik-Lindsay.”²⁷⁸

The furor over political interference eventually subsided, but by this time Mayor Lindsay had limited his appearances with the Police Commissioner both publicly and privately. The Mayor was giving his Commissioner a free hand in running the department, though this would not last long. The city was facing a 10 per cent increase in crime. In 1967, Mayor Lindsay became more involved in police affairs as he and his Police Commissioner were giving the “War on Crime” top priority. Lindsay stated, “I’m going to spend my personal attention on this ahead of everything else in the weeks and months to come.”²⁷⁹ According to Commissioner Leary, Mayor Lindsay began having regular meetings with top police brass to understand their problems, “He’s an unusual man, I never knew of a mayor making a sincere effort to support the police. He was in this office for a two and a half hour session on narcotics.”²⁸⁰

An alleged feud between Leary and Chief Inspector Garelik had been kept under the radar. When it hit the papers, both men were forced to publicly deny it. Mayor Lindsay intervened and stated that he had to “get the two of them together in the same room.”²⁸¹ Despite reported record crime in New York, Mayor Lindsay called Commissioner Leary “the best there is in the business,” Lindsay added, “I hope he remains police commissioner of our town as long as I am mayor.”²⁸²

Almost two and a half years into his term, Commissioner Leary had found his stride in running the Department. When Leary was asked his secret for his administrative mastery he replied, “When you have no ambition for higher political office, when you are convinced you have the toughest job in your field,

your enemies have a much tougher time getting their hooks into you.”²⁸³

The latest cry of political interference came, ironically not from the Police Commissioner, but from the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association. The PBA charged that in civil demonstrations police were reluctant to make arrests for fear of reprisal, and the force was guided by an unwritten policy emanating out of City Hall of “turning the other cheek and not getting involved.”²⁸⁴ In a prepared statement, Commissioner Leary responded to the allegations:

According to law the Police Commissioner is given the power and the authority and the duty to run the Police Department. This includes the making of policy, the practices and the administration of the department. While this authority can be delegated...the responsibility always remains with the Police Commissioner....I categorically deny that there is any political interference with the operation of this department and no one has presented any evidence of it. The Police Commissioner reports to the city’s chief executive - the Mayor. Neither the Mayor, nor any elected or appointed officials have, in any way, interfered with the operation of the Police Department. If there are any criticism of the department’s policies, administration or operations, it should be directed toward the Police Commissioner, because he is the commander.²⁸⁵

Mayor Lindsay briefly commented on the controversy at a news conference, “the only issue now is who runs the Police Department. It can only

be the Commissioner through the established chain of command. Commissioner Leary has my full support and backing.”²⁸⁶ Commissioner Leary gained independence from City Hall regarding operational decisions. He conferred with Mayor Lindsay on a daily basis to discuss the kind of policy decision that might affect other areas of city government, or perhaps the Mayor’s political image during his re-election campaign.

In 1970, anti-war demonstrators were attacked by a roving band of construction workers. It was reported the police may have been lax in their enforcement of their peacekeeping role. Mayor Lindsay needed to address this incident, and ordered Commissioner Leary to conduct a “thorough investigation to fix responsibility at the command level, and administer “prompt disciplinary action.”²⁸⁷

In uncharacteristic fashion, Commissioner Leary allowed himself to be interviewed. When he was asked, “if he could be his own man,” Leary went into a diatribe about his view of politics and police:

Absolutely!...I can't be any other way. I have no friendly base. I have no John Jones, Bill Smith, that's going to go anywhere on a friendship basis for me. Nobody. I have no political base. I'm here totally and completely by myself. The longer I'm here, the sooner I'll go. I've been around too long to get caught in any type of a jam. I'd rather stand up and fight for what I believe and get knocked down. Now what can I do? I can play patsy and maybe stay six more months, or nine months or one year - but in the end I go....When I go, you won't even know it.²⁸⁸

Leary continued in a reflective and almost cathartic manner when asked if most police commissioners had a base of support:

Oh yes, the professional is expendable. Everybody is expendable to a politician. The professional even more so because the professional doesn't have ties to the politicians....You spend a great deal of time being nonpolitical in your whole police career - and politics is going to break your back. So often in life--not only in myself--I see how contrary things work out.²⁸⁹

Finally, when asked, "What is your relationship now with the Mayor?" Leary answered tersely, "I have a very good relationship with the Mayor."²⁹⁰ Leary explained that although he maintained his independence, the police commissioner is still "subservient" to the Mayor whose requests are carried out

“as long as what he demands doesn’t violate my principles or ethics.”²⁹¹ Within three months of the interview, Leary announced he was quitting. Although Commissioner Leary’s resignation was verbal and he did not offer a reason, Mayor Lindsay penned his response:

I will miss your companionship, in hours of tension, laughter and turmoil; your strength and integrity as the pressure mounts; your calm common sense that has always helped make things work out. [Our] shared experiences have built the strongest personal and professional bond between us. We have had our problems, our frustrations, our heartaches, and our hours of frustration and tension. But you have begun a progressive revolution in police management. Regretfully, I accept your resignation effective Oct. 1. On behalf of a grateful city I wish you well.²⁹²

Mayor Lindsay chose the Detroit Police Commissioner, and former New York Police Deputy Chief Inspector Patrick V. Murphy to succeed Commissioner Leary. Mr. Leary took a holiday to Europe where he maintained his silence regarding his resignation.

In 1994, Leary’s obituary in the New York Times reported, “Mr. Leary never gave any reasons for his resignation at the time or later. He refused to provide City Hall with a formal letter of resignation. His wife said yesterday that he had never discussed the matter with her or alluded to it.”²⁹³ Commissioner Leary’s comments about politics breaking his back would raise questions of

political involvement, but Leary never implicated Lindsay directly, or indirectly, and never criticized the Mayor publicly.

Although there were cries of political interference by Brooklyn police officers regarding policy, or speculation that Chief Garelik was Lindsay's choice and not Leary's, Mayor Lindsay genuinely appeared to want to assist Commissioner Leary in his capacity as the chief executive, and not interfere in police affairs.

29. Patrick V. Murphy

October 9, 1970 - May 12, 1973

Mayor Lindsay picked a New Yorker and professional police officer Patrick V. Murphy to succeed Commissioner Leary. Murphy was considered a reformer and exactly what Lindsay needed to rid the systemic corruption in the police department unearthed by the allegations of corruption raised by Frank Serpico and the subsequent Knapp Commission investigation.

According to Lindsay Murphy is “a take charge commander who gives his men and the public strong and decisive leadership and it is the key factor that has led me to conclude he is the best possible man for the job.”²⁹⁴ Mayor Lindsay assured Commissioner Murphy that he would have complete control over “matters of internal personnel and on all high-ranking decisions.”²⁹⁵ Murphy would have it no other way, “If it becomes impossible for me to function this way, I will leave.”²⁹⁶

Commissioner Murphy faced a “job action” by the police union three months into his term. Mayor Lindsay invoked the State Taylor Law which forbade municipal employees from striking. Commissioner Murphy defined the

administration's policy:

I am putting the department on notice as to what the policy will be concerning any future refusal to perform assigned duties. And that policy will be immediate suspension, I want to make that perfectly clear, that the policy that was established yesterday continues today and tomorrow and everyday that I am Commissioner.²⁹⁷

Commissioner Murphy publicly declared that he personally supported a raise for policemen, but that his statement was “solely that of the Police Commissioner and not in any way as the Mayor.”²⁹⁸ Mayor Lindsay was satisfied with his Police Commissioner's “extraordinary, almost revolutionary management reforms.”²⁹⁹ In February 1971, Lindsay appointed Murphy to a new five year term. Murphy continued working on increasing the professionalism of the police and fighting corruption. Commissioner Murphy, after briefing Mayor Lindsay in a closed door session, made major personnel changes in the department. Mayor Lindsay was asked to comment on the “shake-up” and stated, “I am backing him up 100 per cent. I schedule more time with the Police Commissioner than any other member of my cabinet...he is making his own decisions and as far as I can tell they are the right decisions.”³⁰⁰

On the role played by Mayor Lindsay in matters of police affairs, sources close to both the Mayor and Police Commissioner thought it extremely unlikely that the Mayor was dictating to the Commissioner on what to do, rather, the

Commissioner kept the Mayor fully informed of his plans. Murphy had said it was “preposterous” that anyone who knew him believed he could be controlled like a puppet, but regarding his predecessor offered, “For Leary it was enough to survive. This was the best job he ever had and he didn’t want to lose it. I don’t feel that way. I’m going to stay only while I can believe I can accomplish the things I want to do.”³⁰¹ Commissioner Murphy explained his mission:

The job I’m trying to do in my five year term is a challenge, a challenge I came here to do. It is to establish a satisfactory level of integrity and dedication by means of a department wide policy of command accountability. I want the commanders to get this message: You must get on my team. You must help me to change the job....I came into the department determined to change it. I’m going to change the job and exert every ounce of my energy doing that. I don’t regard myself as a failure, but I’m not satisfied with my performance. The ultimate responsibility is mine. If I can’t do this the Mayor should do his job - find a more effective police commissioner.³⁰²

The people who knew the dynamics of the relationship between Mayor Lindsay and Commissioner Murphy best were the members of their respective staffs. One such member of Mayor Lindsay’s staff provided this glimpse of the relationship between Commissioner Murphy and Mayor Lindsay:

Mr. Murphy is a very secure man. Commissioner Leary would actually come into City Hall through a back door to make sure it didn't get around the precinct houses that he had spoken to the Mayor. It got so bad that the Mayor actually felt jumpy about asking Leary a question. Murphy couldn't care less who knows he's talking to the Mayor. If we make a suggestion he doesn't like, he tells us, and that's the end of it. The Mayor, in fact, uses the Commissioner as an example to his other Commissioners. He's always telling them he wants them to administer their departments the way Murphy runs his. The relationship is very strong. The Mayor is delighted to have a Commissioner who knows what he's doing.³⁰³

Members of both staffs recognized the level of trust Mayor Lindsay had in Commissioner Murphy was reflected in the "amount of autonomy Murphy has in running the department."³⁰⁴ One instance in which Mayor Lindsay stepped in and "directed" Commissioner Murphy was in a high-level personnel matter. As previously mentioned, the area of personnel is one which has been traditionally the domain of the police commissioner. However, when the police department's Deputy Commissioner for Public Affairs Robert Daley accused the Lindsay administration of interfering in his job, he no longer had a job. Murphy stated that the decision to ask Daley for his resignation "was his, and his alone."³⁰⁵ Murphy added, "I have it as a hallmark of my administration to open up the department...I am firmly opposed to unnecessary secrecy about our operations....contrary to Mr. Daley's implications, the Mayor has continuously

supported and encouraged me in this policy.”³⁰⁶

In July 1972, Commissioner Murphy denied resignation rumors. He stated that he intended to remain in office for at least another year. When Mayor Lindsay announced he would not seek re-election to a third term it was determined that a new mayor would occupy City Hall the following January. Citing precedent and tradition, Murphy explained that new Mayors select their own commissioner.

Ever mindful that the police remain apolitical, Murphy was uneasy when his name was bandied about by the candidates during the mayoral campaign, “I am not a politician, and I feel uncomfortable having my name used politically in any way.”³⁰⁷ Three weeks later Commissioner Murphy announced his resignation to become head of the Police Foundation, a Washington D.C. based think-tank. His resignation was to be effective May 7th.

Mayor Lindsay passed over Chief Inspector and future Police Commissioner Michael Codd (1974-1977) and announced that Donald F. Cawley, the Chief of Patrol, would succeed Commissioner Murphy. In leaving, Commissioner Murphy stated, “Mayor Lindsay promised me I would have complete independence and he has lived up to that word.”³⁰⁷

30. Donald F. Cawley May 13, 1973 - January 11, 1974

Mayor Lindsay selected former Chief of Patrol Donald F. Cawley to succeed Commissioner Murphy and promised him a “free hand” in running the police department.³⁰⁸ Cawley was Commissioner Murphy’s personal choice to

best carry out the program and policies Murphy had initiated. In less than seven months a new mayor would occupy City Hall. When asked if he would like to remain Commissioner when a new Mayor took office, Cawley defiantly replied, “I’ll make that decision when the time comes. I intend to do the very best possible job. My term expires in 1976, February.”³⁰⁹ The Commissioner elaborated on the process of the mayor-elect selecting a successor:

The new Mayor could legally take anyone from the ranks of Captain and above and name him Commissioner...into that layer that I think we’ve built and in those ranks are men that I would like to think are tuned in to what I consider the right way to run a Police Department.³¹⁰

Cawley fixated on members of the service above the rank of Captain, not even considering the possibility of someone outside the department being chosen. Of the next ten police commissioners, three would be elevated from the civilian First Deputy Commissioner position. The other seven would be outsiders. Less than one month before Mayor-elect Beame was to be sworn in, Cawley still did not know whether he would remain in office in the new year. When asked by officers in the 81 precinct if he will be around when Beame became Mayor, Cawley said, “I like being the Commissioner, I hope so.”³¹¹ But Cawley appeared to act contradictory to his expressed desire to remain.

As previously recounted, Commissioner Cawley came closest to staking his claim to the Office of Police Commissioner as per the City Charter when he

stated, “the Police Commissioner ‘shall be appointed by the Mayor and shall, unless sooner removed, hold office for a term of five years.’ No other city commissioner is appointed for a specific term.”³¹² Mayor-elect Beame was understandably miffed and not only called, but raised Cawley’s impertinence stating, “I will make the decisions as to who holds public office, based on what I believe to be the best interest, nobody will make these decisions for me, including Mr. Cawley.”³¹³

But Commissioner Cawley was not done. He further exerted his authority by refusing to secure resignation letters of the seven civilian Deputy Police Commissioners, “They can’t submit their resignations to the Mayor-elect because they were appointed by me.”³¹⁴ As if Cawley had not done enough to sabotage any chance he had of being retained, when asked again whether he expected to remain as Police Commissioner, Cawley replied, “I have not submitted my resignation.”³¹⁵ When asked whether Mayor-elect Beame had asked him to stay on, he said, “I’d prefer not to comment on a private discussion.”³¹⁶

Not surprisingly, Mayor-elect Beame announced he would not retain Commissioner Cawley. Instead, Beame reached out to retired Chief Inspector Michael J. Codd. Sources familiar with the selection process stated that Commissioner Cawley damaged his chances when he refused to honor the Mayor-elect’s request to submit a resignation and ask for re-appointment in a separate letter with an attached resume.³¹⁷ With his removal certain, Commissioner Cawley submitted his resignation to Mayor Lindsay effective December 31, 1977.

Mayor Beame coaxed former Chief Inspector Michael Codd out of retirement to replace Commissioner Cawley, “I was impressed with his knowledge of all facets of police work, the respect he has earned from the rank and file, and the dedication he has shown to his duties.”³¹⁸ Reportedly, Beame had considered six other candidates before choosing Codd.³¹⁹ It cannot be determined whether Beame had planned to keep Cawley all along and only after being rebuffed decided to make a change.

The first six months passed quite uneventful for Mssrs. Beame and Codd. Mayor Beame was not very publicly engaged in police matters. In July 1974, as a result of subway crime and a recent murder, Mayor Beame asked his Police Commissioner to come up with new crime initiatives. At a press conference, the Mayor and Police Commissioner together announced the new programs. According to the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA) head, “City Hall’s influence on Codd had been minimal.”³²⁰ The PBA had been quite vocal in past years when it believed the Mayor, or one of his aides were engaging in political control of the police department, in effect, trying to run the department from City Hall.

With one full year completed, it was reported that Commissioner Codd was free from the pressures of City Hall. There was no indication that Mayor Beame’s administration had dictated any major decision to Commissioner Codd. New York City was facing a fiscal crisis. Mayor Beame wanted city agencies to cut 16% of their “controllable” expenditures. Commissioner Codd complied with

the directive, but changed where the recommended cuts would come, adding, “These cuts, regardless where they come, will seriously impair the ability of the police department to function.”³²¹ The freedom to reshuffle the Mayor’s suggested cuts intimated that Commissioner Codd had Mayor Beame’s confidence in the administration of the police department. Commissioner Codd would also let City Hall know of his concern that funds had not been requested under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) to rehire policemen, as was done with firemen and sanitation workers, “We are heading for trouble and I’ve so informed City Hall....You can call it a complaint, you can call it a discussion. But, I made it clear that we were not being treated equally.”³²² Codd also mentioned that he did not speak to Mayor Beame personally, but had dealt with aides.

On February 26, 1976, Police Commissioner Codd met personally with Mayor Beame to be sworn to a new five year term. Due to the city’s fiscal woes, the previous year Commissioner Codd was the first Police Commissioner to lay-off policemen. In 1976, Codd dealt with protests by off-duty policemen at his home and Gracie Mansion. A protest at Yankee Stadium before a championship boxing match got so out of control that on-duty officers were accused of not taking action, or even of joining in the ruckus. It was reported that roving bands of youths were allowed to rob and attack patrons while the police stood by indifferently, and at times even alleged to have encouraged them.”³²³

Mayor Beame stated, “I have received a preliminary report from Commissioner Codd which indicates to me an appalling police indifference to

acts of vandalism and terror. We cannot and are not going to condone lawlessness either by anyone in the department or anyone not in it.”³²⁴ Commissioner Codd explained, “Over the last five days there have been a number of situations in which commanding officers did not command, in which commanding officers and supervisors did not supervise, in which sworn members of this department did not fulfill the duties they were sworn to fulfill...”³²⁵

Mayor Beame was asked if his confidence in Commissioner Codd had been shaken as a result of the events of the previous few days, to which he replied, “No, the Commissioner is doing everything he can to handle the situation.”³²⁶ Codd said that the Mayor expressed, “No dissatisfaction or impatience with his performance”³²⁷ during the week of off-duty police protests. At one such protest on the steps of City Hall, the crowd was quite vocal in expressing their desire to see Commissioner Codd removed: Chants of “Codd must go,” “Beame is a shrimp, Codd is a fish,” and “Good-bye, Coddie, we’re glad to see you go”³²⁸ were repeated as the protesters marched. Both Mayor Beame and Police Commissioner Codd became the PBA’s villains.

With the police department still reeling after the Knapp Commission investigation, the re-organization of the department under Commissioner Pat Murphy, coupled with unprecedented lay-offs of fellow officers, Commissioner Codd had inherited a frustrated police department. In September 1977, Commissioner Codd was admitted to the hospital for exhaustion. Even while he was convalescing, the Commissioner could not escape the criticism of mayoral candidate Ed Koch, who said he would remove Codd if he became Mayor.

Commissioner Codd did not consider himself a “lame duck” until he was personally told by the Mayor-elect that he would not be retained.³²⁹ On December 1 Codd got what he wished for, and was told he’d be replaced. He submitted his resignation effective on December 31, 1977.

Community Period: Practical Experience Preferred (1976-2001)

Except for one police commissioner during this period who did not have prior sworn law enforcement experience, and another whose law enforcement experience was on the Federal level, all the other police commissioners had previous sworn law enforcement experience. Incidentally, two had experience with agencies other than the NYPD and were considered outsiders when selected.

32. Robert J. McGuire January 1, 1978 - December 29, 1983

Robert J. McGuire, former US Attorney and son of a New York policeman, was appointed by Mayor Koch to succeed Commissioner Codd. Wanting a “fresh approach” Mayor Koch chose McGuire because, “Bob McGuire will not be bound by the way things always have been done.”³³⁰ Both of the two largest line organizations, the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, PBA, and the Detectives Endowment Association, DEA, praised the selection and pledged their support. Both groups had been highly critical of Commissioner Codd and advocated for Mayor-elect Koch to select an outsider as Police Commissioner.

During the campaign, Mayor Koch voiced his displeasure with the police administration, and he brought in McGuire to change it. If Koch didn’t like

McGuire's administration of the department, he could remove him.

Commissioner McGuire drew that analogy with Koch when he transferred a Captain for actions of those assigned to his command, "The responsibility falls on his shoulders, sometimes it's not fair, but that's what he's getting paid for....and it's the same with me. If the Mayor doesn't like what's happening in the Police Department, then I'm responsible."³³¹

As a result of dissatisfaction with a six month drive to curb crime in the subways, Mayor Koch made a policy decision to place the Transit and Housing Authority police forces under the Police Commissioner with respect to "operational and policy"³³²direction. McGuire commented on his added responsibilities, "I probably needed this like a hole in the head, but I think the move to a unified police command is a good one - a modest first step that should lead to improved coordination of policy and planning."³³³ Mayor Koch favored co-terminality, the allocation of municipal services based on geographic boundaries in order to increase efficiency. However, Commissioner McGuire convinced him to exempt the Police Department because he believed it would impede service delivery.³³⁴ Koch endorsed the plan and exempted the Police Department.

The Police Department's rank and file took to calling Commissioner McGuire "Koch's guy" because they believed he sided with management on the strike issue. McGuire understood their frustration, "The men are right and the men are wrong when they say he is the Mayor's guy, what else can I be? Strikes by municipal employees are illegal. Of course, that doesn't mean they're not

understandable.”³³⁵ PBA President Phil Caruso called McGuire “one of the most able Police Commissioners we’ve had. He’s sensitive to the needs of police officers although he’s in an ambivalent situation now.”³³⁶ But McGuire is Koch’s guy. It was Koch who selected him. Mayor Koch went against the recommendation of his own search committee to select a member of the Police Department, “an insider,” and instead chose McGuire, who was recommended by Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau.³³⁷ Mayor Koch called McGuire “the best Commissioner ever” every chance he got, but McGuire stated simply “No” when asked if he would follow the Mayor to Albany if Koch was successful in his gubernatorial bid. McGuire jokingly referred to the State Police as the size of a precinct.³³⁸ McGuire had no real or rumored rift with the Mayor. In fact, there had not been any mention of even the slightest problem between Koch and McGuire.

Commissioner McGuire gave a glimpse of how he approached his job in an interview:

I don’t come in here in the morning and sit back and structure what’s going to happen. It’s not like I’m the chief executive officer of IBM. I come in and say what’s going to happen, what’s happening, this is what it is...People ask why I don’t stand up and demand more cops, why I don’t break with the Mayor? Because he’s my boss. I’ve not been elected by anybody. Day comes I don’t like the game, I’ll pick up my basketball and go home.³³⁹

Throughout 1983, allegations of abuse and brutality by Black and Hispanic youths rose. Both Koch and McGuire defended the police department. In August, 1983, Commissioner McGuire said “I will not contemplate leaving while the police brutality issue is a hot topic. It’s not fair to the Mayor, the city, or the Police Department.”³⁴⁰ I have not talked to the Mayor and will not until the brutality issue is over and put to bed.”³⁴¹ Koch said he would not even think about a successor “until Bob McGuire actually tenders his resignation, which I hope will not occur.”³⁴² The brutality allegations against Black and Hispanics prompted a Congressional hearing.³⁴³ Mayor Koch prevented Commissioner McGuire from appearing at the hearing citing the venue...as inappropriate.³⁴⁴

On October 6, 1983, Commissioner McGuire submitted his resignation effective December 31, 1983 to take a job with the security firm Pinkerton’s.

33. William Devine December 30, 1983 - December 31, 1983

When William Devine found out he would be the Police Commissioner for the last two days of 1983, he remarked to friends, “I’ll take it.”³⁴⁵ Mayor Koch said that Devine was his first choice to replace Commissioner McGuire, but Devine’s health prevented this appointment. In a pre-arranged deal, Commissioner McGuire left office on December 29th.

34. Benjamin Ward January 1, 1984 - October 22, 1989

Mayor Koch selected his Corrections Commissioner and former NYPD Lieutenant and Deputy Police Commissioner for Community Affairs Benjamin

Ward to succeed Commissioner Devine. Regarding the selection of Commissioner Ward, Mayor Koch stated, On paper, Ward is far and away the best and as it related to my personal experience with him, he was equal to or better than the others... That Mr. Ward was black was an extra added plus after the decision was made.”³⁴⁶ Mayor Koch listed four criteria which guided his selection, “I decided it would be someone I knew, it could be someone in or out of government, but it had to be someone who worked in law enforcement, and the Commissioner would have to be a New Yorker.”³⁴⁷

A Department of Investigation report was released and alleged that Commissioner Ward had “exercised poor judgment and lack of discretion” regarding the use of his office for “late night and weekend meetings with a female guest, and for storing his private boat in a city owned garage on Rikers Island. In addition Ward was accused of using Corrections personnel to make repairs on the boat.”³⁴⁸ Mayor Koch stated that “he was aware of the report when he appointed Mr. Ward as the police commissioner...but...believed that Mr. Ward was nonetheless the best candidate for the job at the time.”³⁴⁹ Mr. Ward had no intention of resigning after he was appointed and Mayor Koch had no intention of asking for Ward’s resignation.³⁵⁰

A subsequent story alleged that the Police Commissioner was intoxicated in public at a police convention. Mayor Koch asked Commissioner Ward about the incident and accepted his denial. However, Koch was quoted as saying, “maybe he ought to be more prudent about [drinking in public].”³⁵¹

Another incident in which Mayor Koch supported his Police

Commissioner involved Ward being out of touch for three days while on vacation. Coincidentally, a mass murder had taken place in the city and department officials needed to reach him. Regarding this incident, Mayor Koch reiterated that he had no intention of asking for Commissioner Ward's resignation. When Koch was asked if he hoped there would be no more damaging reports about Commissioner Ward, the Mayor said simply, "You bet."³⁵² Once again, Koch accepted Commissioner Ward's explanation, but remarked, "...whatever the case is, you should always be in touch, especially if you're a police commissioner with your office."³⁵³

Commissioner Ward spoke out against the "self-defense" argument postured by Bernhard Goetz in the shooting of two unarmed teenagers who he thought were trying to rob him on the subway. Goetz was not indicted during Grand Jury proceedings. Ward's opinion differed from that of Mayor Koch who believed Mr. Goetz should have been charged only for the possession of an unregistered handgun and not for attempted manslaughter.³⁵⁴ The Goetz incident polarized New York City along racial lines. Goetz was white and the teenagers black. When Ward was asked how his view contrasted with the Mayor's, he said "I don't know that it differs, I didn't discuss it with him."³⁵⁵

Police brutality, still a hot topic in Ward's term, caused the commissioner to state that the Department took a "bum rap" on brutality charges. However, after a series of incidents including an allegation of the use of a stun gun on prisoners in the 106th precinct, Ward confronted the matter head on and ordered top management to Police Headquarters for a closed door meeting.³⁵⁶ Ward felt

“personal shame and disgrace” over this incident.³⁵⁷ He stated he would not be forced out and that despite the recent spate of police brutality complaints, “I’m not going to stay here until the pressure builds to where I have to consider resigning or the Mayor has to consider replacing me.”³⁵⁸

Mayor Koch appointed Commissioner Ward to a full five year term on February 21, 1986. Ward had been completing the unexpired term of Robert McGuire. In June, Commissioner Ward admitted that the job of police commissioner “tired” him, and that although he would not leave the job in 1986, he stated, “I really don’t know what 1987 will hold.”³⁵⁹

Commissioner Ward selected Richard Condon to replace Patrick Murphy as the First Deputy Commissioner. At the news conference announcing the appointment Mayor Koch explained that Condon was “the commissioner’s choice” in an effort to distance himself from allegations of political interference.³⁶⁰ If Commissioner Ward had been contemplating resigning the selection of Condon met Koch’s criteria of what he wanted in a police commissioner. Koch knew him, he was a former police officer and he was a New Yorker. It is very likely that Koch had approved of Condon and would be an acceptable replacement in the event Koch needed to appoint a new Police Commissioner.

In October 1986, a corruption scandal was exposed in the 77th Precinct in Brooklyn. Police officers were charged with stealing money and narcotics from drug dealers. Ward announced a city-wide transfer plan which sparked a work slowdown and caused the PBA President to call for the Commissioner’s removal.

Ward stated, “At some point in time people have to come to an understanding that it’s not the aim of the Police Commissioner, or the Mayor to paint everyone with the same brush, and make it appear...that by transferring police officers we are saying everyone is corrupt.”³⁶¹

Commissioner Ward did not resign and added, “I am always willing to compromise. I’m not looking for a fight. But I believe the Mayor is right that this is our prerogative.”³⁶² A planned PBA demonstration was called off only after Mayor Koch directly intervened. Koch called the PBA President and diffused what was becoming an increasingly tense situation between the Police Commissioner and the union, with potentially harmful consequences for the city and the department.³⁶³ As a result, Ward and Caruso met to try to reach an acceptable compromise regarding the transfer plan.

Commissioner Ward assailed the PBA head four months later for attempting to expel officers who were in favor of the transfer plan. Most of those officers belonged to the Black and Hispanic fraternal organizations. Ward commented on the Mayor’s weekly radio broadcast, “Do I think Phil Caruso is exerting too much power in this city today? I think he is. He should be brought up short to let him know that he is not running the Police Department.”³⁶⁴ Mayor Koch, in support of Commissioner Ward’s leadership, said, “There isn’t a single instance where there has been a confrontation between the Police Commissioner and the PBA where I haven’t supported the Commissioner.”³⁶⁵

During an event at which Mayor Koch and Police Commissioner Ward were speaking, the Mayor turned to Commissioner Ward and asked when he had

appointed him commissioner. When he learned it was January 1984, Koch said, “It seems like a lifetime, Ben.”³⁶⁶ This brief exchange sums up the relationship between Koch and Ward. Koch believed he picked the best, and stuck with him through thick and thin. Koch had been Ward’s biggest supporter despite many of Ward’s gaffes which caused consternation among members of the department and some sectors of the public. This sentiment was expressed by both friends, and critics of the Commissioner. Mayor Koch continued his staunch support of Commissioner Ward:

When you consider how many comments he has to make in the course of a day, day in and day out, year in and year out, he makes remarkably few gaffes, I think, fewer than I do. While obviously every error in judgment and comment is to be regretted, I don’t think we should dwell on it.³⁶⁷

As to the question of whether Koch hired Ward because of his race, and now was reluctant to dismiss him for the same reason, we only have Mayor Koch’s word, “If Ben Ward did anything that would cause me to fire some other commissioner, the same rules would apply to him. But he has not done that and I don’t expect him to.”³⁶⁸ Eight months later, the roles were reversed. Commissioner Ward chastised his boss for comments made about the black presidential candidate Jesse Jackson. In similar situations, Koch supported the police commissioner, but Mr. Ward chose to call the Mayor to task:

Whatever the Mayor thought he was doing about what he did, I'm here to tell him, and I think the whole city community - black and white - are saying it didn't come out right, Ed, and it has a divisive tone to it. This is a troubled time in this country, this is a troubled time in this state and a troubled time in this city. If what you are doing or saying leads to divisiveness, then you must recognize that. It's not a sign of weakness to admit when something goes wrong, however well-intentioned, that sometimes you have to admit that. I've had to do it. I don't want to hide behind this and do a lot of double-talk, I don't agree with what the Mayor said. He has not asked me. I have not had an opportunity to talk to him. When he wants to see me I'm always in the same place 1 Police Plaza.³⁶⁹

Mayor Koch, in a letter to the New York Times explained his intentions in a conciliatory and remorseful tone:

I regret it if racial or religious friction resulted from my comments...I hope that those who are angry with me will understand and forgive my transgressions as they perceive them and help me to be a better Mayor. Show me when I am wrong, support me when I am right, and understand that I am just another human being seeking the truth.³⁷⁰

In October 1987, Commissioner Ward suffered an asthma and allergy attack serious enough to be hospitalized. Even though the Commissioner's attack

took place in the early morning hours, Mayor Koch arrived shortly after Mr. Ward, to check on his condition. A police spokeswoman said that Commissioner Ward had been hospitalized once before in the Spring 1984.³⁷¹

The issues which created turmoil for Commissioner Ward's boss dealt predominantly with comments made about this or that, never about the Commissioner's handling of the Police Department. Commissioner Ward implemented many new strategies, policies, and procedures to combat crime and improve the quality of policing. So, in the aftermath of a police-community melee in Tompkins Square Park Koch was quick to defend his Police Commissioner, "I believe that Ben Ward is a very special cop, He knows what he's doing and he's not afraid of anybody."³⁷² Mayor Koch reiterated what he had said all along, that Commissioner Ward could stay as long as he remained Mayor:

The day I think a commissioner, including a police commissioner, isn't as good as he should be to run whatever he is running, that's the day I will ask him to submit his resignation. I think Ben Ward will go down as one of the greatest police commissioners this city ever had. Bob McGuire is the other, and I appointed both of them.³⁷³

On September 26, 1989, Commissioner Ward submitted his resignation to Mayor Koch effective October 22, citing poor health-- specifically his continuing problems with asthma.³⁷⁴ Commissioner Ward said he had wanted to leave earlier, but Mayor Koch had asked him to stay on thru the Democratic primary on

September 12.³⁷⁵ Mayor Koch lost the Democratic primary to David Dinkins. Mayor Koch called Commissioner Ward, “one of the greatest police commissioners who ever served the city.”³⁷⁶

Commissioner Ward returned the favor in his resignation letter:

Throughout my six years, Ed, you have never interfered and never given me anything but your wholehearted support, I appreciate this deeply; I only regret that the people of New York may not understand as keenly as I do the extraordinary contribution you have made to upholding the law in this city.³⁷⁷

There was some speculation that Ward resigned in order to advise the Democratic mayoral candidate, David Dinkins, during the last few weeks of the campaign. Ward stated, “I will work as closely with David as he will allow me to work.”³⁷⁸ When asked what advice he would give Dinkins regarding the direction the department should take, Ward said, “Getting police out on the street, on foot, in scooters, where the people can see the police officer and where we can engage in fear reduction.”³⁷⁹

The First Deputy Commissioner and former uniform member of the NYPD, Richard Condon, succeeded Commissioner Ward.

35. Richard J. Condon October 23, 1989 - January 21, 1990

Mayor Koch officially swore in Richard Condon as the thirty-fifth Police

Commissioner of the City of New York on October 23, 1989. Mayor Koch said Condon would be a “full commissioner, not acting, and he technically had a five year term.”³⁸⁰ Condon remarked about the length of his term, “I don’t have any plans past December 31st. The new mayor will do whatever the new mayor wishes to do, and I’ll abide by what the new mayor wishes to do.”³⁸¹ Condon quipped that after quoting G.K. Chesterton, he would finish his speech in true cop fashion, “Whatever the future brings, Teddy’s desk will still be in the PC’s office, and the star spangled banner will be played at the next swearing in.”³⁸²

Mayor-elect Dinkins convened a search committee to identify potential candidates for Police Commissioner. Commissioner Condon was one of 11 individuals to be interviewed for the post. The head of the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services sent a letter to the search committee which mentioned that the Governor thought highly of Condon and advocated he be retained.³⁸³ When the letter was made public it caused a firestorm of speculation as to its meaning. According to Governor Cuomo, “...Am I saying to the Mayor, ‘you ought to appoint him?’ No. I would not presume to tell him who he should appoint.”³⁸⁴

Mayor-elect Dinkins selected an outsider, Houston Police Chief Dr. Lee P. Brown to succeed Condon. Commissioner Condon agreed to remain during the transition period until the new commissioner was sworn in on January 22, 1990.

36. Lee P. Brown January 22, 1990 - August 4, 1992

Commissioner Brown, like former Commissioner Leary was a former

municipal chief police executive and an outsider. Mayor-elect Dinkins downplayed Brown's race as a factor in the selection, despite reports that members of his transition team suggested that the job be filled by an outsider and a black.³⁸⁵ The single issue which was said to have tipped the scales in Brown's favor was community policing, "The relationship of the community and the police. I suppose that's the single biggest thing. He's just excellent at it."³⁸⁶ Dinkins read a statement from a letter by former Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy calling Lee Brown "the best police chief in the country."³⁸⁷ Ironically, like Mr. Leary, Brown opposed civilian review of the police, one issue in which he disagreed with his new boss.³⁸⁸

Commissioner Brown's first policy statement changed the way the department responded to 911 emergency calls so officers could spend more time learning about their communities. Approximately 100 days into his term, Commissioner Brown cancelled a scheduled appearance before the City Council's Transportation and Public Safety committee regarding the merger of the transit police force. Commissioner Brown indicated he wanted to first report on the matter to Mayor Dinkins.³⁹⁰ Commissioner Brown again deferred to the Mayor at a three day management conference of top police brass where the attendees planned to finalize the department's recommendation to the Mayor on expanding the department and its transition to community policing.

There had been much speculation whether Commissioner Brown would seek 5,000 new officers, but when asked to give a number, he said that he would not reveal any figures until he reported to the Mayor, and added that whatever

figure was recommended, he would not deal with the question of how to pay for the extra officers, calling that a City Hall decision.³⁹¹

During an interview with the New York Times, Commissioner Brown opened up and expressed his frustration with the media's presentation of the crime problem:

If anything is frustrating, if not outraging, it's the presumption that the cops are not doing their job, that they are not doing what they should be doing in addressing crime, when they are out there breaking their butts. Am I doing my job? Of course I'm doing my job. We're not sitting down waiting for anything....Almost every couple of weeks there is a new initiative that we come up with. Now does that get publicized like it should? No.³⁹²

One incident which could have been construed as "political interference" involved two detectives dispatched out of the city to provide advice and assistance to a personal friend of Mayor Dinkins. Commissioner Brown intimated that the department did similar acts everyday and he saw nothing which was ethically wrong. Brown recounted the series of events:

Mr. Lewis called the Mayor; the Mayor had called the Commissioner; Mr. Lewis and the Commissioner spoke by phone; the Mayor never told the Commissioner to send two police officers to see Mr. Lewis; Mr. Lewis was concerned about the house; Mr. Lewis asked if we have people who were knowledgeable about fires and potential arson cases; Mr. Lewis asked if they could advise me, and I said, “Yes, they could.”³⁹³

When the Commissioner was asked if this courtesy would be extended to the average New Yorker, he replied, “If it happened to someone who wasn’t a friend of the Mayor, would it be any different?”³⁹⁴ When told that it was inconceivable, Mr. Brown stated, “I don’t think it is inconceivable. It’s quite conceivable. The difference between him and someone else is his accessibility to the Mayor. I see it as a New York City businessman who asked for some services from the New York City Police Department and we complied with that request.”³⁹⁵

Cultural mores define what is, and is not, corruption. Sometimes a free cup of coffee is simply a gesture of politeness. But the unequal distribution of police services has historically been associated with politics in policing. What is conceivable is that Commissioner Brown may have sincerely believed that there was nothing wrong. However, the appearance of impropriety is just as bad sometimes, and what occurred in the 75 precinct was more than an appearance of impropriety.

In 1992, an investigation begun by the Suffolk County police department

unearthed a corruption scandal in Brooklyn's 75 Precinct. Officers robbed drug dealers of money and drugs, which they sold in Long Island. Despite this latest blemish to befall the Police Department, Commissioner Brown remained optimistic, "Of course I am an optimist, you can't do what I do without being optimistic."³⁹⁶ He added, "Whenever I leave here I plan to teach and write. I'll stay until they run me away. I'm happy doing what I'm doing. I still look forward to coming to work everyday."³⁹⁷

The first public disagreement between Commissioner Brown and Mayor Dinkins involved the Civilian Complaint Review Board. Commissioner Brown did not believe it should be composed of all civilians:

Discipline is a function of management. If the management of an organization is required to be responsible for maintaining the integrity of the department, you cannot logically remove that tool and expect management to be held accountable. The Mayor has had this position since the 1960's, His position hasn't changed."³⁹⁸

Reportedly the Commissioner did not consider resigning even if the all-civilian review board was implemented. When Commissioner Brown was asked if he could remain as Commissioner under a civilian review system and if it was a deal breaker between him and the Mayor, Commissioner Brown replied, "I knew [Mayor Dinkins] position when I got here. I think my obligation as a public administrator is to share what I know. In some 30 years in the business, 17 years

running police agencies, I can't point to one [CCRB] in any place in America that works.”³⁹⁹

In July 1992, a Dominican immigrant was shot by police in Washington Heights. The incident touched off three days of rioting. Commissioner Brown, who was out of town at the time of the shooting, returned once he learned that the situation was turning violent. As the tension subsided, Commissioner Brown accompanied Mayor Dinkins on a walk through the neighborhood. What was interesting was that Mayor Dinkins walked not with his Police Commissioner, but with a Puerto Rican entertainer, while the Police Commissioner walked a few steps behind.⁴⁰⁰ In an uncharacteristic show of emotion in response to a reporter's question as to why he didn't return sooner Brown snapped, “I've already answered that!”⁴⁰¹ One month later, Police Commissioner Brown resigned. Brown dismissed speculation that he had been pressured to leave as a result of the corruption scandal, the racial unrest in Washington Heights, or the civilian review board.⁴⁰² Commissioner Brown noted, “My priorities are clear, my family come first,”⁴⁰³ and cited his wife's illness as grounds for his departure.

Mayor Dinkins acknowledged that Brown's decision was final, “I did not try to talk him out of it. It was not negotiable. It would challenge our relationship if I tried to talk him out of it.”⁴⁰⁴ In an interview granted four days after leaving office, Commissioner Brown acknowledged battles with City Hall over the budget, and with the press, and reiterated that his resignation had nothing to do with dissatisfaction with the job, but rather that the primary issue was the time he could spend with his wife. Commissioner Brown may have considered his police

career finished stating, “When you leave as the Police Commissioner of New York, where else do you go?”⁴⁰⁵

Mayor Dinkin’s convened a search committee to identify the “most qualified person for Police Commissioner,”⁴⁰⁶ and appointed First Deputy Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly as Acting Police Commissioner.

37. Raymond W. Kelly, Acting Police Commissioner (August 4, 1992 -October 16, 1992); Police Commissioner (October 16, 1992 - January 9, 1994)

Mayor Dinkins selected Raymond W. Kelly to be Acting Police Commissioner on August 4th 1992 upon the departure of Commissioner Lee Brown. On October 16th Mayor Dinkins informed Mr. Kelly that the “acting” would be dropped and he would be permanently appointed Police Commissioner. Afterward, Mr. Kelly described his emotion at that moment, “It was awe-inspiring. I literally grew up in this organization. I started as a teen-ager and to reach this level is mind-boggling.”⁴⁰⁷ Mayor Dinkins commented on his selection of Kelly:

Among the reasons I selected him is that he’s a cop, he’s a cop’s cop. He’s intelligent, well-educated, organized.....It’s not a difficult judgment to make. Frankly, it was a pretty easy judgment to make. I’m satisfied that Ray Kelly is going to be outstanding.⁴⁰⁸

Commissioner Kelly acknowledged the department had been through

difficult times in the previous year, “I want to rekindle pride in this great organization, both internally and with the community we serve. We have bridges to build. We have trust to earn. It will be my honor to do both.”⁴⁰⁹ During his first week in office, Kelly appeared on a 9 AM black radio show to launch an initiative to recruit more minorities. Kelly was asked why he had not done more to recruit blacks previously:

This is the first day, the first official day I am Police Commissioner, It’s 9 o’clock in the morning. I think it shows my level of commitment and my level of concern....as of today I’ve made a commitment to go forward and significantly increase the level of minorities.⁴¹⁰

Commissioner Kelly prepared a 170 page report on the reorganization of the Internal Affairs Division and delivered it to his boss Mayor Dinkins. This report examined the 75th precinct corruption scandal which resulted in the Mollen Commission. Mayor Dinkins was not consulted about the details of the Internal Affairs Division reorganization, although he was aware the Commissioner knew such steps were necessary, “He has told me personally that his findings were such as to indicate a need for organization.”⁴¹¹

Mayor Dinkins gave the Kelly wide latitude in the management of the department.⁴¹² Commissioner Kelly continued to define his anti-corruption plan and wanted to create an auditor type position in the department, and convened focus groups to better understand how the culture of police work caused officers

to turn bad, as well as, why other officers were reluctant to turn in an officer for corrupt acts.⁴¹³ It appeared Commissioner Kelly was competing with Mayor Dinkin's Mollen Commission regarding who could combat corruption better. Kelly already had instituted major changes in the way the department handled the issue, even before the Mollen Commission had called its first witness. Kelly said, "I can't be concerned with the Mollen Commission because I don't know what they're doing."⁴¹⁴

In another display of independence, Commissioner Kelly separated politics from his personal opinions with regards to participation in the annual St. Patrick's Day parade. Commissioner Kelly called his decision to participate in the St. Patrick's Day parade personal and not political despite personally disagreeing with the courts' ruling to uphold the exclusion of gay and lesbian marchers.⁴¹⁵ His boss, Mayor Dinkins declined to march.

Publicly, Dinkins had no objection to Kelly's participation in the parade. "It's fine, I think the Police Commissioner and anyone else can do as they please in that regard"⁴¹⁶ Dinkins acted as an elected official in declining to march. Did Kelly act in his official capacity as Police Commissioner in electing to march? According to Kelly his was a "personal" decision. However, if Kelly marched up Fifth Avenue leading the Police Department contingent, could this send mixed signals as to the separation of politics and policing? Does the Police Commissioner represent the Police Department at all times?

Although Mayor Dinkins gave Commissioner Kelly wide latitude in running the department, in some instances the Police Department was treated no

different than any other city agency in competing for resources as the following example shows. When the Police Department submitted a budget request to City Hall asking for funding to purchase mobile digital computers for all radio cars to enable officers to conduct license checks, a spokesman for the Mayor's office said there were about 150 million dollars for improved police communications and police officials would have to meet with the Mayor's office to set priorities.⁴¹⁷ From the police perspective the computers were a personnel safety issue which allowed police officers the ability to conduct on the spot checks during car stops. From the perspective of City Hall, this was just another line on a budget request which the agency would have to justify before funds would be released. When this exchange became public, the possibility was raised that relations between City Hall and the Police Department had soured for unknown reasons and City Hall staffers were protecting the Mayor.

Sometimes City Hall can react in a retaliatory manner because they feel upstaged by a Police Commissioner (as they might because of Commissioner Kelly's dogged pursuit and implementation of anti-corruption initiatives independent and ahead of the Mayor's own Mollen Commission), or because of an article which suggested the possibility of the Police Commissioners departing for greener pasture (i.e. Commissioner Kelly being considered to head the FBI). Regarding the latter, Commissioner Kelly stated, "In respect to reports that I am being considered for the position of director of the FBI, I want to make it clear that I don't intend to leave the New York Police Department."⁴¹⁸

In September, over a year after the Mollen Commission was first

convened, it began its hearings. Commissioner Kelly believed the committee's agenda was to have an outside agency monitor the police and staged a mock hearing to reach that conclusion, "I think it is fair to say this is a one-sided presentation, a trial. We have prosecutors ...questioning witnesses that they've spoken to before, and there's no defense side if you will."⁴¹⁹ Clearly, the Commissioner did not place much stock in the proceedings.

In July, 1993, an election year, Commissioner Kelly spoke out against comments made by the head of the PBA which were critical of Mayor Dinkins:

I would like to keep the Police Department as much as possible out of the political arena, and Caruso...through some of his statements is dragging us in. He has some sort of frenzy to attack the Mayor, and it appears to be something that's personal because it's gone on beyond the bounds of normal political discourse.⁴²⁰

Kelly added, "I don't need to defend the Mayor, he can defend himself, but when [Caruso] is doing it, he besmirches the reputation of the department."⁴²¹ Was Caruso speaking as police officer, or union official? If the former, Commissioner Kelly had every right to speak out against Caruso's actions and even take disciplinary action if warranted. If as Commissioner Kelly observed, "it appears to be something that's personal," then the Commissioner and the Police Department should not become involved.⁴²² Mayor Dinkins was unsuccessful in his bid for re-election.

In November 1993 Rudolph Giuliani became the Mayor-elect and convened a nine member panel to screen candidates for Police Commissioner.⁴²³ When Giuliani was asked if Commissioner Kelly was out of consideration, he stated “I want the very best person for the job, my mind is open....I have some names in mind that if they don’t come up, I might ask the committee to consider them.”⁴¹⁴ Regarding his chances of being retained as Police Commissioner, Kelly would say, “I’ll go with the flow. Whatever happens, I’m not campaigning.”⁴²⁵

Like former Mayor Koch, Giuliani wanted a fresh perspective and praised Commissioner Kelly’s service:

This is a tough choice because I have great respect for Commissioner Kelly, great respect for what he’s done with the police department throughout his career. But, I felt it was important for this new administration to have a police commissioner that gives us a chance to take a new look at the New York City Police Department and to redefine it.⁴²⁶

Giuliani chose Boston Police Commissioner William J. Bratton to succeed Commissioner Kelly.

38. William J. Bratton January 10, 1994 - April 14, 1996

On November 15, the headline read, “Former Transit Chief Shuns Giuliani Post,” nine days later, on November 24th, the headline read, “Bratton of Boston

Indicates He Is Interested in New York Police Job,” and on December 1, the candidate stated, “We’re all getting tired of this, I know I am and we’d like to get it resolved quickly. If the call comes in and it’s not my turn up to bat, life will go on and I will have a good time for myself.”⁴²⁷ The very next day William J. Bratton, the Boston Police Commissioner was named to head the New York Police Department by Mayor-elect Rudolph Giuliani.

As this exchange indicates, candidate Bratton was willing to speak his mind, without regard as to whether it hurt his chances of being selected. Mr. Giuliani, an ex-United States attorney who prosecuted organized crime cases, campaigned as a crime fighter and made crime the number one issue. Giuliani pledged to crack down on “quality of life” crimes and eliminate the public’s fear of crime.

It is interesting to note that Mayor Dinkins had three crime advisers; former Judge Milton Mollen, Police Commissioner Kelly, and Deputy Mayor for Public Safety Fritz Alexander. Mr. Giuliani had one adviser, himself. Although Mr. Giuliani stated he had spoken with many law enforcement officials about crime, he was the chief architect of his policies.⁴²⁸

Where Commissioner Kelly reported to a Deputy Mayor, Bratton reported directly to the Mayor.⁴²⁹ Echoing Mr. Giuliani’s “zero tolerance” crime campaign promises, Bratton said he intended to bring the strategies he had implemented in the subways above ground to the city.⁴³⁰ His message to the rank and file, “You have a badge, now go out there and be a cop.”⁴³¹

On January 9, 1994 Mr. Bratton was sworn in and became the thirty-

eighth Police Commissioner of the City of New York. His first order of business was a memo to the upper echelon of the police department requesting an undated signed letter of resignation.⁴³² This memo included the nine civilian deputy police commissioners, and the six bureau chiefs, more commonly referred to as the “super chiefs.” The memo read:

After consideration of your presentations and records in light of emergent new directions for the department, I may consolidate some units and make personnel changes. This will constitute the first stage in a restructuring of the organization that will unfold during the next several months.⁴³³

Bratton extended his plan nine months out; by April, have new strategies in place for running the department, by July, markedly improved departmental morale, and by September, restore the public’s confidence in the police and reduce fear of crime in the streets.”⁴³⁴ Commissioner Bratton was tested right away with one of the two ubiquitous issues confronting every administration; race relations and police corruption.

Commissioner Bratton’s first test involved a 911 call that stated that a man with a gun was robbing the Nation of Islam Mosque in Harlem. The police department had categorized the Mosque as a sensitive location that could only be entered by officers with a supervisor’s approval. However, in this instance the police rushed in, and a violent physical confrontation ensued between the police and Nation of Islam members. To quell any chance this incident had inciting

racial unrest, Commissioner Bratton called on Nation of Islam contacts in Boston to assist him in diffusing this potential racial powder keg.⁴³⁵ Mayor Giuliani received poor marks from the minority community, but Bratton was hailed as someone who understood and was willing to do what was necessary to restore strong community relations. According to Congressman Charles Rangel, “[Bratton’s] a professional, it’s the Mayor who is not a politician.”⁴³⁶

Bratton began his third week in office on a Sunday morning news program, “I intend to put together very quickly a team that can deliver on the commitment to the citizens of New York to deal with the issues of fear.”⁴³⁷ Two days later, Commissioner Bratton held a joint news conference with Mayor Giuliani and announced top level appointments, “These [personnel] changes are intended to do one thing, get this department, shake it up, shake off the lethargy...that I sense in this organization.”⁴³⁸ Traditionally, the Mayor picks his Police Commissioner, and the commissioner selects his top management. Reportedly, Mayor Giuliani still approved some of the changes, but had so far given Commissioner Bratton wide latitude in running the department.⁴³⁹

It was clear that Mayor Giuliani set policy. He discussed his crime policy much during the campaign. Commissioner Bratton was tasked with implementing the administration’s policy. It’s ironic that Mayor Giuliani’s credentials were more tailored to be police commissioner than mayor. There have been a few former commissioners who were prosecutors; Francis Adams, Thomas Murphy, George Monaghan and Vincent Broderick. One other mayor, Edward O’Dwyer, was a former District Attorney and police officer prior to his election, and Mayor

Gaynor was a judge. In some of these early news conferences, it appeared that each man assumed the next lowest rung the Mayor was the Police Commissioner, and the Commissioner, the Police Chief.

For example, after a news conference at the New York DEA office announcing the capture of a Columbian drug trafficker, Commissioner Bratton discussed the “Giuliani administration’s drug strategy.”⁴⁴⁰ The mayor’s deputy press secretary said “Giuliani’s latest drug strategy represents a rethinking by the mayor, It’s a more thorough approach. It was as thorough as it could have been before. But now [Mayor Giuliani] has more information available to him than he did as a candidate or even mayor-elect.”⁴⁴¹

Mayor Giuliani and Commissioner Bratton announced new policies to deal with drugs and youth crime. They expected dramatic results and expected to be judged by the results. Commissioner Bratton stated, “If I don’t deliver, get rid of me.”⁴⁴² In July, the Police Department press secretary John Miller announced a precipitous drop in murder, shootings, and robberies in the 75 precinct, “We proved we can send in the Marines and get significant results.”⁴⁴³ What is interesting about this announcement is that Mayor Giuliani was not present. Also, the headline of the article which described the operation read, “Bratton Policing Experiment Gets Results.”⁴⁴⁴ Heretofore, every program or strategy implemented was advertised as being a Giuliani, City Hall, or administration policy.

Mayor Giuliani directed Commissioner Bratton to study how the police department worked, and how it could be improved, “The way I see the police department of the future...the department should be largely driven and managed

by the precinct commanders.”⁴⁴⁵ The department used management techniques, including focus groups with the rank and file, to glean information about the department’s culture. According to Bratton’s Deputy Police Commissioner for Public information, Bratton said, “Wipe the page clean and tell us what you need. It doesn’t mean we’ll adopt everything, but we are looking for the freshest ideas.”⁴⁴⁶

Commissioner Bratton forced out the civilian head of the Internal Affairs Bureau for making excessive demands for resources at a time the city was facing huge budget problems.⁴⁴⁷ The position had been created by Commissioner Kelly while the city was under pressure from the Mollen Commission and other external forces to create an independent civilian monitor. Bratton also cited the individual’s inability to inspire internal affairs investigators. Bratton replaced him with a veteran member of the department with much investigative experience who was well respected by the rank and file, Assistant Chief Patrick Kelleher.⁴⁴⁸ Bratton said he considered an outsider, but decided that a person without intimate knowledge of the department would take months to become effective, “By putting someone close to me in Internal Affairs, I’m sending a message of my commitment,”⁴⁴⁹ that “With the right kind of leadership and inspiration the Internal Affairs will bust out this year.”⁴⁵⁰

Ironically, the individual who Bratton dismissed was no stranger to the Mayor. Mr. Mack and Mayor Giuliani had a contentious history. Mr. Mack worked under Mayor Giuliani when he was the United States Attorney for the Southern District. In 1989, Mr. Mack was critical of Mr. Giuliani for what he

believed was a penchant for posturing for the cameras and choosing cases that would advance his career.⁴⁵¹ Whether the Mayor had any influence in ousting Mack is undetermined.

As Bratton entered his second year, he began to feel pressure from City Hall in his administration of the police department. In February 1995, Bratton's Deputy Commissioner for public information, John Miller, resigned. Miller accused Giuliani of politicizing the police function.⁴⁵² Miller added, "The information we put out there is not information you're supposed to control, it's not the Mayor's information, it's the public's information."⁴⁵³ This resignation came at a time when Mayor Giuliani was releasing many mid-level managers who he believed were not serving his agenda.

The incident that provoked Mr. Miller's resignation involved an order from City Hall, without consulting Commissioner Bratton, to reduce his staff. Mr. Miller refused to obey City Hall's "order."⁴⁵⁴ Mr. Miller, according to City Hall aides, had not been prominently recognizing the Mayor in stories coming out of Police Headquarters. Despite attempts to mention the Mayor and acknowledge his contributions, reporters had focused on Commissioner Bratton, contributing to his popularity. In fact, it was reported that opinion polls showed Bratton was more popular than Mayor Giuliani. Bratton's popularity eventually proved to be a problem. Reporters, on occasion, were told by City Hall when requesting an interview with Commissioner Bratton, that they interview Mayor Giuliani, or no one.⁴⁵⁵

Commissioner Bratton accepted Miller's resignation with "deep regret," as

he and Miller were close friends. In a released statement, Commissioner Bratton stated he shared the Mayor's "vision" for the department "focusing on maximizing the department's effectiveness in continuing to make dramatic reductions in crime and disorder."⁴⁵⁶ The media focused on how Miller's resignation affected the growing tenuous relationship between the Police Commissioner and Mayor brought on by what City Hall viewed as the Commissioner's high profile.⁴⁵⁷

Would Bratton view this as the last straw of political interference in his police administration? If so, he was not saying. Except for Bratton's prepared statement which was approved by City Hall, he made no other comment regarding Miller's departure. Was Commissioner Bratton next? The police commissioner serves at the pleasure of the Mayor. Giuliani stated, "I just spoke with Commissioner Bratton and the rumors are unfounded, I'm not asking for his resignation."⁴⁵⁸ Another rumor which circulated that the Mayor was ready to move Fire Commissioner Safir into Bratton's place was also denied, "There is no plan to do anything like that."⁴⁵⁹

After this incident Commissioner Bratton maintained a lower public profile and shunned interviews. Grover Whalen, the police commissioner under Mayor Walker, was also criticized by City Hall for being too high profile for his political boss. According to the Commissioner's aides, he wanted to stay on as long as possible, or at least go out on his own terms with a lucrative job offer.⁴⁶⁰ According to Giuliani he wanted Commissioner Bratton to stay because they shared the same philosophy and goals for the police department.⁴⁶¹ At a police

graduation ceremony, Mayor Giuliani was booed and attempted to put this latest episode behind him, “The Police Commissioner has done an exceptional job, we’ve never had such a substantial reduction in crime.”⁴⁶²

Did the Mayor realize he needed someone with Bratton’s style to motivate the force and successfully implement his policy initiatives? Or, was he embarking on a new marketing campaign which portrayed him as someone willing to share the spotlight? What Giuliani viewed as Bratton’s publicity seeking was actually Bratton’s attempts to “re-engineer the department’s corporate culture” using the media, internal memorandum, and videos to energize and motivate the force.⁴⁶³

However, Commissioner Bratton maintained a lower public profile, but a corruption scandal put in front of the Sunday morning news cameras where he discussed a new integrity strategy which he intended to present to the Mayor first before any official announcement.⁴⁶⁴

In mid November, Bratton attended a meeting of the American Society of Criminology (ASC) where he credited Mayor Giuliani for setting a zero-tolerance policy which he believed was responsible for reducing crime, reducing fear, and improving the quality of life, “We’re changing behavior in New York City.”⁴⁶⁵

In December, Mayor Giuliani and Commissioner Bratton held a joint news conference at Police Headquarters to discuss how demonstrations and a boycott led to an arson/murder at a Harlem sporting goods store. The police department was involved in trying to mediate a landlord/tenant dispute. The landlord was a black owned church, and the tenant, a white Jewish record store owner. “It was

dealt with as a police matter,” stated the Mayor.⁴⁶⁶ This incident demonstrated how the relationship between the Mayor and the Police Commissioner had evolved. Since John Miller’s resignation which publicly exposed a rift between the two men, each had been trying to restore a professional working relationship. Perhaps to ensure that Commissioner Bratton maintained his low profile, Miller’s replacement as Deputy Commissioner of Public Information was handpicked by Mayor Giuliani. In times of crisis, news conferences were held at Police Headquarters where both men shared the spotlight. But when good news was announced, or, new policing strategies were unveiled, the news conference was held at City Hall.

Commissioner Bratton consistently gave the Mayor credit for the crime reduction. And at times when Mr. Bratton was touted as the architect of the police strategies, for example by the foreign press, City Hall appeared conciliatory, “Any time New York City gets publicity for the good things, including the historic reduction in crime, it’s a good thing,” declared Deputy Mayor LaPorte.⁴⁶⁷ When Commissioner Bratton appeared on the cover of Time magazine with the headline, “Finally, We’re winning the War on Crime,” the Mayor’s press secretary said that City Hall was delighted that Commissioner Bratton was getting such rave reviews. Regarding the article in Time, Ms. Roche stated, “It’s a terrific story and it reflects the beautiful job this Commissioner and this Mayor are doing bringing crime down by record numbers.”⁴⁶⁸

Bratton tested City Hall’s graciousness when the media reported the Commissioner was negotiating a book deal for his autobiography. The editorial-

director said she would press Bratton to give a behind-the-scenes look at policing and city government, “I don’t think [Bratton’s] going to skirt some of the tough things that happened,” but she said Bratton would also stress that his success fighting crime “is a team effort and he could not have done it without the Mayor.”⁴⁶⁹ Mayor Giuliani commented, “What I’m concerned about is that it follow the ethical and legal guidelines that are set for this.”⁴⁷⁰

In February 1996, at the expiration former Commissioner Brown’s term, Mayor Giuliani delayed the appointment of Commissioner Bratton to a new five year term until city lawyers reviewed the book deal. Commissioner Bratton viewed the reappointment as a formality since the Mayor’s power of removal was clear, “If the administration is using that as a sword over my head then that is entirely inappropriate.”⁴⁷¹ Bratton added, “It had no practical value, other than a symbolic one.”⁴⁷² Former Mayor Koch told Mayor Giuliani in 1995 that his style was threatening to drive out Mr. Bratton. Koch recalled Giuliani saying, “I don’t care if he quits...I run the police department.”⁴⁷³

In March 1996, the Mayor chose to reject proposed top-level personnel changes in the police department. Mayor Giuliani stressed that he routinely reviewed high level shifts, “I go over promotions all the time.”⁴⁷⁴ Traditionally, the Police Commissioner selected his top echelon, and any mayoral involvement in personnel issues (i.e. hiring, transfers, promotions, discipline) was construed as political interference.

This City Hall administration believed oversight was not political interference, and not only proper, but warranted. According to the Mayor’s

counsel, “These happen to be positions of sensitivity that are totally appropriate for the Mayor to review, that’s consistent with exactly what the City Charter requires by way of Mayoral supervisory responsibility of the police department,”⁴⁷⁵ It was interesting to see the City Charter invoked to support City Hall’s involvement in police affairs.

On March 24th, Mayor Giuliani publicly stated that “The Commissioner is, in fact, looking for an opportunity in private enterprise....I support him. I wish him well.”⁴⁷⁶ A police spokesman said Bratton was “seeking a job in the private sector when he leaves office. He has no immediate plans to leave.”⁴⁷⁷ Former Mayor Koch weighed in, “Let’s see how Giuliani does on his own.”⁴⁷⁸

On March 26, and no longer willing to wait for the Mayor to determine his future, Commissioner Bratton announced he was quitting effective April 15 to take a job in the private sector. The resignation was announced at a City Hall news conference. Commissioner Bratton stated:

There’s enough credit to go around. But let’s be clear about one thing, This could not have occurred without the election of a mayor who was willing to take this city in a very different political direction, to take it in the direction where the quality of life became a paramount concern.⁴⁷⁹

The Mayor, not to be upstaged, returned the compliment, “The fact is the commissioner deserves great credit for the reduction in crime in this city, and for all the other things I mentioned, and I left out probably 10 other things that he’s

accomplished, that will be part of what the New York Police Department is now like.⁴⁸⁰ But, even as Commissioner Bratton's departure was now a given, City Hall investigated whether some of his trips violated any city government ethics rules.

In a parting interview, Commissioner Bratton somewhat pensively discussed his relationship with Mayor Giuliani explaining that he and the Mayor should have worked out the parameters of their partnership at the beginning, "In hindsight, I don't know what happened. I have to reflect on that. Some things you don't control and they take on a life of their own."⁴⁸¹ Bratton added, "There is a natural tension because these are very powerful positions."⁴⁸²

Mayor Giuliani reflected on the relationship in a somewhat similar vein, "Many of the so-called disputes were things we agreed about. So, I don't know how all that happened. Sometimes it happens at the staff level and even below that."⁴⁸³

Mayor Giuliani complimented his Police Commissioner at a City Hall ceremony, "Commissioner Bratton has lived up to every single promise he has made and many, many more. He's made lasting change in the Police Department. It's now an example for police departments all over the country and all over the world."⁴⁸⁴

Commissioner Bratton alluded to his promise made at the beginning of his term in his resignation letter:

I made a promise to you and the city that we would work together to take back this city from crime, fear and disorder: neighborhood by neighborhood, block by block, house by house. It was not an empty promise in spirit or result...Overall, New York's serious crime is lower than it was when you became the city's 107th Mayor. You have truly delivered on your promise to and commitment to reduce crime and improve the quality of life for all New Yorkers.⁴⁸⁵

Although both men were amicable and deferred to protocol, this rivalry did not end. Two years later, after Mayor Giuliani had been re-elected and crime continued its drop, he accused Bratton of a penchant for impression management, "Bratton was good at public relations...and glossy presentations, but I had to supply the substance.... The roles were reversed. I was the substantive person, and the Police Commissioner was the politician."⁴⁸⁶

In Bratton's autobiography, he in turn acknowledged that Giuliani and much of his inner circle came from a background in law enforcement, "they had incredible intimacy with cases and investigations, and while their business was now politics, law enforcement was what they knew...Our work...made news, and for the backroom boys at City Hall, it had the added benefit of being politically valuable."⁴⁸⁷

Bratton acknowledged that he explored the idea of running for Mayor in 1996. He believed that not only was he more personable than Giuliani, but more importantly, he was "someone who had produced results."⁴⁸⁸ His book's title,

“Turnaround.” The sub-title, “How America’s top cop reversed the crime epidemic,” suggested that Bratton didn’t agree with his former boss’ assessment that he was not the “substantive person” in the relationship.

As anticipated, Mayor Giuliani chose his Fire Commissioner and long time friend Howard Safir to succeed Commissioner Bratton.

39. Howard Safir

April 15, 1996 - August 20, 2000

According to Mayor Giuliani, “Most, if not all the candidates we’re considering are people that we’ve had a lot of experience with, so there isn’t really a need for the kind of interviews that would normally be the case if you were interviewing outsiders.”⁴⁸⁹ It was rumored that Safir was considered earlier to replace Commissioner Bratton when Giuliani dismissed the Police Department’s Public Information head. At that time, Deputy Mayor Powers intimated that City Hall had back-up plans for every contingency and the back-up plan in the instance of a replacement for the Police Commissioner was Howard Safir.

City Hall welcomed its new Police Commissioner with a ceremony that belied the fact that Mr. Safir was essentially laterally transferred. Beyond the pageantry, in a gesture reserved for intimate friends Mayor Giuliani handed Mr. Safir the police commissioner’s shield worn by Teddy Roosevelt when he was President of the Board of Police Commissioners, not the shield worn by his predecessor Commissioner Bratton.⁴⁹⁰

A spokeswoman for the Mayor said, “It’s no secret that public safety is on

the very top of the Mayor's agenda. This ceremony today is a reflection of that, and the esteem in which the Mayor holds Commissioner Safir and the New York Police Department.”⁴⁹¹

Commissioner Safir declared, “I’m going to do my job despite the media, not because of the media.”⁴⁹² Barely one month into his term, Safir barred a Daily News reporter from his office. This action came after the reporter recounted former First Deputy Commissioner Timoney’s evaluation of Commissioner Safir as a “lightweight.” The Daily News stated “It is not the part of a city official to dictate who covers the news. We will not be dictated to over who covers the police.”⁴⁹³ The Mayor’s press secretary said the Mayor in a conversation with the owner of the Daily News “on at least three occasions reiterated his support for the way Howard Safir conducted private briefings in his private office.”⁴⁹⁴ Perhaps, the Daily News viewed public service as just that and not “private” service. Regardless, this episode reflected the incessant, and almost paranoid, focus on the media coverage Messrs. Giuliani and Safir.

Safir did not appear before a City Council hearing out of loyalty to his boss Mayor Giuliani. The hearing involved the Mayor’s proposal to give the Police Commissioner more power to discipline police officers. Former Mayor David Dinkins, who did testify, had been critical of Mayor Giuliani and supported his opponent in the upcoming mayoral election.⁴⁹⁵ Deputy Mayor Mastro, speaking on behalf of Commissioner Safir called the council hearing a “political rally for Ruth Messenger,” one of Giuliani’s opponents in the election.⁴⁹⁶

In August 1998, Commissioner Safir surpassed his predecessor’s tenure in

office. Upon this occasion, Mayor Giuliani provided some insight into the biggest difference regarding his relationship with both Safir and Bratton. Bratton was good at public relations and...coming up with glossy presentations, but I had to supply the substance....The roles were reversed. I was the substantive person and the police Commissioner was the politician. With Howard, substance comes first. He's involved in the issues much more, so I am free to be Mayor.”⁴⁹⁷

Mayor Giuliani was asked why he didn't appoint Mr. Safir first, and Giuliani replied “I've asked myself that question a few times.”⁴⁹⁸ It may be that the very things Giuliani disliked about Bratton and which he and Safir mocked were critical components responsible for motivating the force and resulting in the historic crime reductions. Bratton implemented initiatives that were continued under Commissioner Safir, notably, the weekly Compstat meetings. Compstat is a management tool that holds precinct commanders accountable for addressing and solving crime and other quality of life conditions. It is harder to implement an organizational change than to continue its policies. However, Safir echoed the Mayor's sentiment regarding his predecessor: “Bratton didn't know what the hell was going on in [police headquarters], I'm not here for press relations, I'm here to reduce crime,”⁴⁹⁹ Although Commissioner Safir claimed no resentment toward Bratton, his public comments regarding the former Commissioner appeared to indicate, at the very least, some strong ambivalence, “No offense to Bill Bratton, but I wasn't some airport cop in Boston. I did things Bill Bratton couldn't dream of.”⁵⁰⁰ Oddly, Howard Safir didn't list William Bratton in the index to his autobiography “Security: An inside look at the tactics of the NYPD,” which was

published in 2003. Whether tongue-in-cheek, in April 1999 Commissioner Safir summed up his relationship with the Mayor this way, “I’ve told Rudy that as long as he returns my phone calls, I’m here to stay. The day he doesn’t I’m gone.”⁵⁰¹

At one juncture Public Advocate Mark Green, the man who would be Mayor if Mayor Giuliani was unable to serve, or vacated the office prior to the expiration of his term, called for Commissioner Safir’s resignation for failure to deal with police misconduct in the aftermath of a police shooting of an unarmed West African man.⁵⁰² Mr. Safir called Green’s request, “a transparent political move by an ineffective and whining politician.”⁵⁰³ Commissioner Safir later added, “The only way Mark Green could guarantee my resignation is if the city were to find itself in the unfortunate position of having him as its Mayor, then I would resign immediately.”⁵⁰⁴ Again, Mayor Giuliani backed his Commissioner completely, “If Mark Green has achieved in public life what Howard Safir had achieved in public life...then Mark Green would have a right to speak about this.”⁵⁰⁵

Another incident that reflected the strength of the relationship between Giuliani and Safir, involved Safir’s notification to the Public Safety Committee investigating police brutality that he could not attend a hearing due to a scheduling conflict. When the Commissioner was photographed attending the Oscar Awards in Los Angeles the night before the hearing, critics of the Commissioner and the administration wondered why the Police Commissioner was attending a Hollywood function given the seriousness of the allegations of police brutality. Mayor Giuliani’s spokeswoman said the Mayor had no problem

with the trip, “Their relationship is as solid as a rock.”⁵⁰⁶ Mr. Giuliani stated, “[Safir] has every right to some degree of relaxation, like every other human being.”⁵⁰⁷ Nevertheless, perhaps anticipating some political fallout thru negative press attention, Commissioner Safir flew back in time to attend the committee hearing. His opening remarks sought reconciliation, “There’s been a lot of rhetoric around the city, and I think the kind of dialogue we are having here today is the kind of dialogue that’s really needed to bring the kind of healing to the city that reasonable people need to talk about.”⁵⁰⁸ After already having gone on record defending Mr. Safir’s Oscar excursion as relaxation, Mayor Giuliani decided to reserve judgment until after the Corporation Counsel’s investigation into possible ethics violations connected with the Commissioner’s trip.⁵⁰⁹

Another incident that critics contended violated conflict of interest rules involved the dispatching of two on-duty detectives to the home of a woman who had been in a traffic accident with Mr. Safir’s wife. The incident made news when it was reported that the Safir’s had filed a \$1.25 million lawsuit against the other party. Mayor Giuliani first learned of the incident, which had occurred two years before, in news accounts, and in a briefing from the First Deputy Commissioner. The Mayor’s spokeswoman said, “The Mayor is looking into it,”⁵¹⁰ and his communication’s director stated, “I think that [the Mayor] understands it’s a private matter between the Police Commissioner’s wife and the woman who struck her car.”⁵¹¹ Commissioner Safir told the Mayor that the other party had given a false name and the detectives were involved only to ascertain the correct identity to determine if this was a security concern. Mayor Giuliani,

satisfied that nothing inappropriate had transpired, told reporters “it absolutely baffles me that you can’t figure that out, or how you try to make that into something inappropriate. It’s really, really strange.”⁵¹²

Commissioner Safir defended the use of detectives for another supposed security concern, or, what others had referred to as a personal matter. News reports alleged that on-duty detectives had provided security and chauffeur service to members of the Commissioner’s extended family at his daughter’s wedding. Again, using the security defense, Commissioner Safir stated, “I get threats everyday.”⁵¹³ Regarding the shuttling of family members by detectives, according to the Police Department spokeswoman, “The detectives may have given some people lifts, but it was all for security reasons.”⁵¹⁴ Mayor Giuliani called the use of detectives “entirely appropriate.”⁵¹⁵ He then unsolicitedly added, “The Police Commissioner is not leaving. He is not going anywhere. The more unfair stories that you write about him, the more I am convinced he is doing a really good job and people are threatened by it.”⁵¹⁶

At a meeting of the PBA, the police union, the delegates cast a unanimous vote of “No confidence” in Commissioner Safir and cited as evidence his recent personal acts. The PBA called on the Mayor to suspend the Commissioner until he could be investigated for possible ethical violations. Mayor Giuliani responded, “I get to appoint the Commissioner, not the PBA, so it’s my vote of confidence that counts.”⁵¹⁷ Mayor Giuliani, in public at least, supported his Police Commissioner at all times. The maxim “disagree in private, agree in public” may apply to Commissioner Safir as well. In public he was the loyal

soldier, willing to walk in the Mayor's shadow, but in private he might have expressed disagreement with the Mayor over different police affairs. As Mayor Giuliani attested regarding his relationship with the Police Commissioner, "It's a professional relationship, but it's also a personal relationship, Howard disagrees with me fairly often enough, and has, at times been able to talk me out of things that he thought were the wrong approach."⁵¹⁸

An incident which demonstrated the professional relationship between the two men, involved the shooting by police of a hammer wielding man. The man's family thought the shooting represented excessive use of force, while the police believed the man was emotionally disturbed and represented an imminent deadly threat to himself, or others. The Mayor and Police Commissioner in a series of news conferences over several days never veered from defending the actions of the officers on the scene. Mr. Safir stated:

Who did what in that nanosecond, that is what the grand jury process does. And that is exactly what the grand jury will report on when it is finished with deliberations. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on that now, and inappropriate for the New York Times to comment on that.⁵¹⁹

Mayor Giuliani, in a separate news conference supported Mr. Safir stating, "The Police Commissioner will turn out to be right, so let's talk about this in a week."⁵²⁰

On August 8, 2000, Commissioner Safir formally announced his

resignation to take a position with a private investigations firm, “I have had the privilege, thanks to Mayor Giuliani, of leading the best men and women in law enforcement in the world.”⁵²¹ Former Police Commissioner Richard J. Condon commented that Mr. Safir had been good for the police department, “I think it was better for the department that you had a good working relation between the Police Department and the mayor, and I always thought he had a very dignified air about him that the department benefited from.”⁵²²

Regarding the selection of a successor, Mayor Giuliani stated, “This is not a situation in which I am worried about finding a talented person. My major concern is making the right choice as among the people that are very, very talented and are good friends of mine.”⁵²³ But Mayor Giuliani delayed the announcement of Mr. Safir’s successor, “the attention should really go to Howard today, and then tomorrow we could announce the new commissioner. The city is going to miss him as a Police Commissioner, and I am going to miss him as a friend.”⁵²⁴

The next day Mayor Giuliani named the Corrections Commissioner and former Detective Bernard B. Kerik to succeed Commissioner Safir.

40. Bernard B. Kerik August 8, 2000 - December 31, 2001

Mayor Giuliani selected Corrections Commissioner and former detective Bernard B. Kerik to succeed Commissioner Safir and gave him a mandate to restore police-community relations. Commissioner Kerik spent his first day as Police Commissioner visiting a black church in an effort to reach out and repair

any strained relations between the administration and minority communities. He asked those present to tell others he needed their help, “I want you to tell them one thing, give him a chance.”⁵²⁵ Mayor Giuliani stated that the leadership “would provide a chance to try and improve on things, to do things differently. We have to improve with the way the police deal with the community, and the community has to deal with the way they deal with the police.”⁵²⁶ Surprisingly, a constant critic of the police department, civil rights leader and activist Reverend Al Sharpton was almost complimentary of Kerik’s administration, “My fears were that he would be a puppet of the mayor, I’m not saying he’s not, but the strings are a lot looser than we’d thought they would be.”⁵²⁷

In contrast to Commissioner Safir’s frequent use of “we” when he referred to new initiatives being contemplated, Commissioner Kerik employed the pronoun “I.” For example, when commenting on a planned shake-up within the department, “Is there one big...organized plan right now? No, right now I’m focusing on the areas where I think need immediate attention.”⁵²⁸ Despite the style difference, the relationship between the Commissioner and Mayor appeared strong. Mayor Giuliani chose Mr. Kerik because of the job Kerik had done at managing the Corrections Department. As Commissioner, he had reduced jail violence and slashed overtime. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, Mr. Kerik’s was selected for his loyalty to Mayor Giuliani. Mr. Kerik had been Giuliani’s bodyguard during the mayoral campaign, and Mayor Giuliani was godfather to Mr. Kerik’s child.⁵²⁹

Mayor Giuliani attempted to wrest the law enforcement duties at the

airports from the Port Authority. Commissioner Kerik supported the Mayor's plan and held a news conference citing crime statistics which favored the Mayor's cause and differed from those released by the Port Authority. According to Kerik, "I'm not accepting crime has gone down since 1993, the numbers that we reported today, and that we traditionally report, we don't divine them out of the sky. They are the numbers that we are given by the Port Authority. If they're bad numbers, they are their bad numbers."⁵³⁰ When asked to explain Commissioner Kerik's actions, the Port Authority Police Superintendent stated, "I've been in law enforcement 37 years. This is my career and I consider myself a professional law enforcement administrator. I am not a politician. The Mayor is a politician. I think you should talk to him about what's behind this."⁵³¹

Two incidents show the delicateness of having a professional and personal relationship. The first incident exhibited Commissioner Kerik's independence when he persuaded Mayor Giuliani to begin transferring the responsibility for some cases of police misconduct from the police department to the Civilian Complaint Review Board.⁵³² Michael P. Jacobson, a former top level Giuliani appointee commented, "Bernie was able to get it done partly because he made an argument on the merits and partly because the mayor has a tremendous amount of trust in him."⁵³³ The other incident, mentioned above involved the support of Commissioner Kerik for the Mayor's plan to take over police operations from the Port Authority. Commissioner Kerik appeared to put his allegiance to the administration first, backing the Mayor's political strategy, over a policing strategy when he held a news conference calling attention to a disputed rise in

crime at the airports.

Mayor Giuliani returned the favor when he backed Commissioner Kerik's decision not to discipline the officers involved in the shooting of Amadou Diallo, who was unarmed when shot by the police. According to the Mayor, the case had been "investigated by everybody" and "the police officers have been found innocent."⁵³⁴ Further, he said the department's decision "should not be surprising if people are guided by the facts and the truth rather than by their predetermined prejudices."⁵³⁵ At the time, the incident was widely reported and sparked complaints of racial profiling and police brutality. The officers, who were white, shot Mr. Diallo when they mistook his wallet for a weapon. Mr. Diallo was black.

Mayor-elect Michael Bloomberg asked Police Commissioner Kerik to stay on as Police Commissioner, but Mr. Kerik told Mr. Bloomberg he wanted to spend more time with his family and doubted he would stay."⁵³⁶ Commissioner Kerik, like former Commissioner Bratton, published an autobiography. In it he included photos of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. Critics of the Commissioner commented that he included a final chapter covering the attacks and in doing so, exploited the tragedy for personal gain. In defending his inclusion of 911 in his book, Commissioner Kerik stated, "the biggest thing that happened on my watch, and I wanted to tell people what we went through."⁵³⁷ The final chapter recounted how the Commissioner and the Mayor had to flee debris from the collapsing towers. Regarding the work of the police department that day, Kerik said, "The most successful rescue mission in the history of this country was done on September 11, and I was in charge of the N.Y.P.D."⁵³⁸

As a parting gesture, Mayor Giuliani approved the recommendation of his Corrections Commissioner to change the name of the Manhattan House of Detention, commonly known as the “tombs,” to honor of Kerik’s prior service to the Corrections Department.⁵³⁹ Kerik departed with Giuliani on December 31, 2001.

Chapter Seven

Conclusion

The National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (1931) stated that “Fear of political oppression is the reason given for introducing and maintaining the system, which gives the mayor power to remove the police executive. Every other system...would have a tendency to build up police autocrats.” The debate between civilian control of the police and professional autonomy was not intended to be settled by the present research. What this research accomplished was the identification of the progression of political involvement in police commissioner departures in a department which has historically received more media scrutiny than any other law enforcement agency.

New York Times police reporter Sidney E. Zion once asked “What is the proper relationship between the head of a city government and its police force?” Originally, the present study reworked Zion’s query and posed the question, “When is a mayor’s involvement in police affairs considered political interference?” This was done for two reasons. The first was the inability to operationalize “proper,” and secondly, the fact that this research was intended to be empirical, and not an editorial. Although in New York City the “system” put in place worked it was not the “system” enumerated in the original 1901 legislation. Interestingly, only two police commissioners Lewis J. Valentine (1936-1941), and Stephen P. Kennedy (1956-1961) were appointed to their own five year term as per the City Charter and served its entirety.

Some final thoughts are offered on the relationship between the head of a

city government and its police force. When a police commissioner and a mayor have agreeable personalities they tend to work out any difficulties. If not, little things escalate and force the police commissioner's departure. Whether political involvement is more direction and guidance than interference and intrusion appeared to be "in the eye of the beholder." Simply, if a police commissioner believes mayoral involvement is interference then it is to him. Most police commissioners left office without being overly critical of the mayor, regardless of the circumstances which precipitated their departure. These police commissioners did not want to "rock the boat" and adhered to a level of professional decorum in their departures.

In New York the mayor and the police commissioner are both civilians. This fact may somewhat cloud the debate between civilian control and professional autonomy. The mayor is the CEO of municipal services, while the police commissioner is one of many senior VP's running a division. New York City Mayors acknowledged that the police commissioner is their most important appointment due to the greater potential political ramifications with the Police Department than with any other municipal department.

The New York Police Commissioner and Mayor have always been national figures. The dynamics involved in this dyad are alone worthy of study. Would the dynamics of the relationship between a mayor and a police chief in a small town be different? Small town police departments comprise the bulk of law enforcement agencies in the United States. In fact, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Local Police Departments, 2003 approximately 89% of police

departments have less than 50 sworn personnel. The populations of small towns are more homogenous than large cities, and the potential for police abuse of those who do not “fit” is potentially greater. In small town police departments the chief would most likely know everyone in his department. Unlike New York City, a small town chief can have a direct effect on the rank and file in the manner in which the police carry out their function.

Most police commissioners took the appointment knowing that the job would be difficult and understood the police commissionership to be a short term prospect. This may be in part due to political and social cultures, but “burnout” may also be a contributing factor.

Some precepts were identified and these basic tenets which emerged and inform future chief police executives included:

1. A police commissioner must understand that he serves at the pleasure of his political boss;
2. he must be allowed to exercise professional autonomy and independence in police affairs;
3. he must have the unconditional public support of his political boss;
4. he must avoid the public eye in other than strict law enforcement matters.

Political involvement in police affairs cannot be entirely eliminated from policing, nor should it. But what constitutes “good” politics from “bad” must continue to be explored.

Today, most chief police executives would publicly assert that politics is no longer an issue in policing. They would, of course, be referring to overt old

style machine politics. However, these very same individuals would probably admit privately that politics of some sort is very much present in policing. What accounts for this apparent dichotomy? True, the politics addressed by the national Wickersham Commission (1931), New York State's Lexow (1895) and Seabury Commissions (1931), and manifested by the corrupt practices found during the first half of the twentieth century have been eliminated. But, as Tunnel and Gaines suggest, a more subtle style of politics remains which require that the chief police executive to be constantly attuned to the prevailing and ever shifting political winds.

As the present study found, a chief police executive can either accept, or resist the dictates of his political superior. The most visible act of resistance is a resignation and public airing of the circumstances which precipitated the departure. This was a comparatively rare occurrence for New York Police Commissioners. It was found that the stated or manifest rationale for a police commissioner's departure was often camouflage for a more accurate and often "political" reason.

The establishment of a professional college for American police executives, similar to the former Police Staff College in Bramshill, England, now part of CEPOL the European Police College, would greatly help to professionalize the American police executive. One could envision graduates of such an institution serving as chief police executives in the fifty largest American cities which according to the 2007 census have a population of over 375,000. Further, these graduates could serve in multiple jurisdictions akin to a Major

League Baseball (MLB) manager, or National Football League (NFL) coach where a limited pool of qualified individuals exists and despite being released from one team unceremoniously is hired by another team. Perhaps, when political executives select professionals to run American police departments they can allow those professionals to complete their full terms, and give them autonomy and independence commensurate with their position.

Contribution to the Literature

The bulk of the literature regarding the relationship between the chief political and chief police executive has been either prescriptive or anecdotal. Empirical historical research of the relationship between the chief executive head of a city government and the chief executive head of a police department, to my knowledge, has never been conducted.

This study provides the framework for future research. It chronicled the historical progression of political involvement in a single police department and its effect on police commissioner departures which remain a major concern in policing. It identified which variables are important, the relationship between them, and how they can be operationalized in future police governance research. Further, the findings and conclusions of this study transcend time and can be referenced by incumbent or prospective chief police executives, mayors, city managers, council members, etc. in order to gain a better understanding of the dynamics involved in police governance.

This study may also have relevance to other disciplines: Public

Administration, Political Science, Urban Affairs, and Organizational Psychology.

Future Directions for Research

Replications of the present study should first be conducted in other large cities to determine whether the measures used here are unique to New York, or are applicable to other major urban centers in the South, Midwest, and Western United States. Replication studies could be most useful in Chicago and Los Angeles; two major municipalities with different political cultures than New York. Eventually, replications should be conducted in smaller cities and suburban and rural locales.

It has been over four decades since Wilson linked local political culture and police style. In 2008, Liederbach and Travis re-visited Wilson's thesis and argued that his model “retains an intuitive appeal...despite acknowledging that little empirical research “provides even partial support” for Wilson’s theory. This may be due to the use of quantitative measures to describe qualitative behavior (Liederbach and Travis; Hassel and Zhao). Tepid support was found for one of the most cited, but least empirically supported thesis in the policing literature, Wilson’s link between local political culture and police style. Future attempts to replicate Wilson’s findings should employ qualitative measures. Wilson’s thesis that local political culture is linked to police style is valid.

Intuitively, Wilson’s thesis has much appeal, and we should pursue the testing of his thesis with qualitative measures such as those employed in the present study. It is hoped that this study and future studies revive debate on one

of the most cited, but least supported observations in policing; the link between the police, and the local political culture.

Endnotes to Police Commissioner Summaries

*All newspaper articles, unless otherwise noted, were retrieved from ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2006) database accessed online through the Lloyd Sealy Library, John Jay College, City University of New York website between June 1, 2007 and December 31, 2009.

Political Period: The Single-Headed Police Commissioner 1901 - 1925

Case One

1. "Col. Murphy New Head of Police Force," *New York Times* 23 Feb. 1901, 1.
2. "All to Remain on Duty," *New York Times* 24 Aug. 1901, 2.
3. "Tammany in Bitter Fight Over Devery," *New York Times* 24 Feb. 1901, 1.
4. "Col. Partridge Now Head of the Police," *New York Times* 2 Jan. 1902, 2.

Case Two

5. "Col. Partridge Now Head of the Police," *New York Times* 2 Jan. 1902, 2
6. "Capt. O'Reilly to Clean His Precinct," *New York Times* 12 June 1902, 1.
7. "Col. Partridge's View," *New York Times* 8 Aug. 1902, 2.
8. "O'Dell Pleads for Republican Harmony," *New York Times* 30 Nov. 1902, 1.
9. "O'Dell."
10. "Police Commissioner Partridge Resigns," *New York Times* 13 Dec. 1902, 1.
11. "Police Commissioner."
12. "Police Commissioner."
13. "Mayor Low Praises Col. Partridge," *New York Times* 14 Dec. 1902, 3.
14. "Mayor Low."

15. "Partridge's Police Talk," *New York Times* 6 Jan. 1903, 2.

Case Three

16. "Fusion Leaders' Views," *New York Times* 4 Nov. 1903, 5.

17. "Fewer Election Bets," *New York Times* 30 Oct. 1903, 3.

18. "Greene Praises Police," *New York Times* 5 Nov. 1903, 5

Case Four

19. "M'Adoo Police Head," *New York Times* 24 Dec. 1903, 1.

20. William Griffith., "Commissioner McAdoo assails his critics." *New York Times* 12 Feb. 1905, SM3.

21. "M'Adoo Will Hear Raid Victims To-Day," *New York Times* 6 Oct. 1905, 18.

22. "M'aduo Upbraids Mayor and Dismisses Eggers," *New York Times* 31 Dec. 1905, 3.

23. "New Committee Forming to Better the Police," *New York Times* 23 Nov. 1906, 7.

24. "Schmittberger Raids Stir up the Mayor," *New York Times* 3 Oct. 1905, 16.

Case Five

25. "To Enforce the Laws My Policy---Bingham," *New York Times* 31 Dec. 1905, 3.

26. "Hunt Poolrooms, Says Bingham; Raid Follows," *New York Times* 4 Jan. 1906, 18.

27. "Says Mayor Halted Crusade on Vice," *New York Times* 8 Feb. 1907, 6.

28. "Bingham Police Bill In," *New York Times* 16 Jan. 1907, 3.

29. "Mayor and Bingham Answer Parkhurst," *New York Times* 24 Mar. 1908, 5.

30. "Oust Bingham, Gaynor Urges," *New York Times* 2 June 1909, 1.
31. "Ousts Bingham, Puts Baker In," *New York Times* 2 July 1909, 1.
32. "Ousts Bingham."
33. "Ousts Bingham."
34. "Ousts Bingham."
35. "Bingham Attacks Mayor McClellan," *New York Times* 18 Aug. 1909, 1.

Case Six

36. "Sends Baker Away, Orders Police Tried," *New York Times* 11 Feb. 1910, 1.
37. "Baker and Bugher on Mayor's Carpet," *New York Times* 7 Apr. 1910, 6.
38. "Mitchel Stirs Up Baker," *New York Times* 17 Sep. 1910, 2.
39. "Mayor Drops Police Heads, New Men In," *New York Times* 21 Oct. 1910, 1.

Case Seven

40. "Mayor Drops Police Heads; New Men In," *New York Times*, 21 Oct. 1910, 1
41. "Mitchel and Baker Break Over Raids," *New York Times*, 29 Sep. 1910, 1.
42. "Mayor Drops Police Heads; New Men In," *New York Times* 21 Oct. 1910, 1
43. "Gaynor Puts Waldo in Cropsey's Place," *New York Times* 24 May 1911, 1.
44. "Gaynor Puts."

Case Eight

45. "Gaynor Puts Waldo in Cropsey's Place," *New York Times* 24 May 1911, 1.

46. "Let Inquiry Come, Waldo Welcomes It," *New York Times* 1 Aug. 1912, 2.

47. "Gaynor on Stand Defends Waldo, Assails Becker," *New York Times* 11 Sep. 1912, 1.

48. "Gaynor on Stand."

49. "Gaynor Orders Lid for City April 1," *New York Times* 26 Mar. 1913, 1.

50. "Call on Mayor to Oust Waldo," *New York Times* 3 June 1913, 1.

51. "Gaynor With Waldo to the End," *New York Times* 17 May 1913, 4.

52. "Riley in Chinatown to Stop Gambling," *New York Times* 27 Sep. 1913, 9.

53. "Waldo Resigns; Will Go Wednesday," *New York Times* 30 Dec. 1913, 1.

54. "Kline Ousts Waldo; Calls Him Childish," *New York Times* 1 Jan. 1914, 1.

55. "Hare Gets Mullan Off Mitchel Slate," *New York Times* 27 Dec. 1913, 1.

Case Nine

56. "Kline Ousts Waldo; Calls Him Childish," *New York Times* 1 Jan. 1914, 1.

57. "Orders Club Used on the Gangsters," *New York Times* 13 Jan. 1914, 18.

58. "Orders Club."

59. "M'Kay Resigns as Police Head," *New York Times* 2 Apr. 1914, 1.

60. "M'Kay Resigns."

61. "M'Kay Resigns."

62. "Orders Club"

Case Ten

63. "Woods to Become Police Head To-Day," *New York Times* 8 Apr. 1914, 9.
64. "Offered Woods Riley's Job," *New York Times* 26 Jan. 1916, 1.
65. "Clergy Pay Honor to Dr. Parkhurst," *New York Times* 22 Dec. 1916, 6.
66. "Town Meeting Finds Police are Ready," *New York Times* 11 Jan. 1917, 10.
67. "Woods to Become Police Head To-Day," *New York Times* 8 Apr. 1914, 9.
68. "Mayor Defends Woods to Cruger," *New York Times* 22 June 1917, 3.

Case Eleven

69. "Bugher Says 'Lid' Will Not be Lifted," *New York Times* 2 Jan. 1918, 2.
70. "Bugher Warns Police to Shun All Politics," *New York Times* 3 Jan. 1918, 3.
71. "Hylan Forces Bugher Out, Names Enright," *New York Times* 24 Jan. 1918, 2.
72. "Hylan Forces."
73. "Hylan Forces."
74. "Tammany Men Deny Forcing Bugher," *New York Times* 25 Jan. 1918, 6.

Case Twelve

75. "Whitman Watches Hylan; He Could Remove Enright," *New York Times* 25 Jan. 1918, 1.
76. "Whitman Watches."
77. "Whitman Watches."

78. Richard Barry. "Enright Tells How He Will Run the Police," *New York Times*, 10 Feb. 1918, 66.

79. Barry, "Enright."

80. "Hylan Writes New Police Catechism," *New York Times* 20 June 1919, 8.

81. "Enright Rid Police of Politics, He Says," *New York Times*, 15 Feb. 1920, E1.

82. "Hylan Says Enright is Best Police Head," *New York Times*, 23 Nov. 1921, 5.

83. "Enright Explains Reorganization of Police Department," *New York Times* 17 Jan. 1922, 6.

84. "Enright Was Out as Police Commissioner, For Two Days So His Pay Could be Raised," *New York Times* 26 Jan. 1923, 1

85. "Enright Begins New 5-Year Today," *New York Times* 25 Jan. 1923, 4.

Reform Period: Removal of Politics Post Wickersham 1926 - 1950

Case Thirteen

86. "Police Cheer New Chief," *New York Times* 2 Jan. 1926, 1.

87. "M'Laughlin to Give Police Square Deal," *New York Times* 15 Jan. 1926, 4.

88. "M'Laughlin Finds Task is a Hard One," *New York Times*, 12 Feb. 1926, 7.

89. "M'Laughlin Won't Run For Governor," *New York Times* 11 May 1926, 8.

90. "Walker Endorses War on Gambling," *New York Times* 19 March 1927, 1.

91. "Walker Endorses."

92. "M'Laughlin Quits Police for \$75,000 Mackay Post; Warren to Succeed Him; Resignation is Sudden," *New York Times*, 30 Mar. 1927, 1.

93. "M'Laughlin Quits"

94. "M'Laughlin Quits."

Case Fourteen

95. "Warren Becomes Police Head Today," *New York Times* 12 Apr. 1927, 29.

96. "Warren to Quit as Head of police in Rift With Mayor," *New York Times* 15 May 1928, 1.

97. "Mayor Won't Upset Ban on Klan Parade," *New York Times* 22 May 1928, 29.

98. "Mayor Back on Job, Has Long, Busy Day," *New York Times* 7 Aug. 1928, 1.

99. "Mayor Spurs Quest of Rothstein Killer," *New York Times* 13 Nov. 1928, 28.

100. "Walker Gives 4 Days to Get Facts in Rothstein Case," *New York Times* 16 Nov. 1928, 1.

101. "Warren Resigns; Shake-up is Likely Among Aides," *New York Times* 14 Dec. 1928, 1.

Case Fifteen

102. "Whalen Takes Over Post Today; Shake-up Expected," *New York Times* 18 Dec. 1928, 1.

103. "Whalen Takes Police Post; All Deputies Will Resign to Make Way for Shake-up; Demand Made for Loyalty," *New York Times* 1 Dec. 1928, 1.

104. S.J. Woolf. "A New Hand Guides the Police Force," *New York Times* 27 Jan. 1929, SM2.

105. "Whalen to Enforce Curfew Act 'Rigidly'," *New York Times* 17 July 1929, 18.

106. "Business Men Pat Tribute to Whalen," *New York Times* 23 Jan. 1929, 3.

107. "Whalen 'Very Happy' After Year in Office," *New York Times*, 19 Dec. 1929, 3.

108. "Puts in 20-Hour Day, Whalen Declares," *New York Times*, 22 Dec. 1929, 3.

109. "Whalen Resignation Believed Imminent, Despite His Denials," *New York Times* 23 Mar. 1930, 1.

110. "Walker Vetoes Bill Raising Taxi Fare; Orders New Study," *New York Times* 22 Apr. 1930, 1.

111. "Whalen Says Force is 100% Efficient," *New York Times* 5 May 1930, 20.

112. "Violent Crime Rate Cut by 11%, Says Whalen, but Killings Rose 5 %," *New York Times* 12 May 1930, 14.

113. "Whalen Successor Chosen, Walker Says on His Return; Shift expected on Tuesday; Mayor Withholds Name," *New York Times* 17 May 1930, 1.

114. "Whalen Successor."

115. "Mulrooney Heads Police; 34 Years on the Force; Whalen Farewell Today; Choice is Surprise," *New York Times* 21 May 1930, 1.

116. Whalen, G. (1955). *Mr. New York: The autobiography of Grover Whalen*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.

117. "Walker Vetoes Bill Raising Taxi Fine," *New York Times* 22 Apr. 1930, 1.

Case Sixteen

118. "Mulrooney Sworn; Policy is Restraint," *New York Times* 22 May 1930, 1.

119. "Mulrooney Sworn," 4.

120. "Mulrooney Sworn," 4.

121. "Promises Thorough Inquiry," *New York Times* 27 Nov. 1930, 1.

123. "End Crime by Force, Mayor Tells police," *New York Times* 21 Feb. 1931, 1.

123. "End Crime," 2.

124. "259 Police Rookies Graduate Tonight," *New York Times* 25 Mar. 1931, 30.
125. "Mulrooney Replaces Entire Vice Squad," *New York Times* 12 Apr. 1931, 1.
126. "Mulrooney Denies Politics Rules Police," *New York Times* 2 Aug. 1931, 1.
127. "Walker, Off to Europe to Rest and Study," *New York Times* 4 Aug. 1931, 1.
128. "Walker, Off," 6.
129. "Crime-Curb Bills Urged at Albany," *New York Times* 17 Sep. 1931, 3.
130. "Record Round-Up is Started in City," *New York Times*, 25 Aug. 1931, 12.
131. "De Martino Sails, Returning as Envoy," *New York Times* 13 Nov. 1932, 28.
132. "New Police Fees to Bring in \$791,404," *New York Times* 31 Jan. 1933, 1.
133. "Mulrooney to Quit Police Post Today," *New York Times* 11 Apr. 1933, 2..

Case Seventeen

134. "Bolan Heads Police as Choice of Curry; Plans No Shake-Up," *New York Times* 16 Apr. 1933, 1.
135. "Medlie Will Back His Racket Charges," *New York Times* 17 Aug. 1933, 1.

Case Eighteen

136. "O'Ryan Puts Force on Military Basis," *New York Times* 3 Jan. 1934, 1.
137. "Fair Merit System Pledged to police," *New York Times* 28 Jan. 1934, 27.

138. "Anti-Crime Bureau Put on Probation," *New York Times* 28 Feb. 1934, 9.

139. "Anti-Crime"

140. "Mayor Defended by O'Ryan on Raid," *New York Times* 8 Mar. 1934, 8.

141. "O'Ryan and Mayor Differed on Strike," *New York Times* 10 Apr. 1934, 8.

142. "O'Ryan"

143. "Mayor Denies Break With O'Ryan," *New York Times* 4 Aug. 1934,. 1.

144. "Mayor Denies," 4.

145. "General O'Ryan's Statement on Differences With Mayor," *New York Times* 25 Sep. 1934, 16.

Case Nineteen

146. "LaGuardia Calls O'Ryan's Charges False, Malicious," *New York Times* 26 Sep. 1934, 1.

147. "Mayor and Valentine Deny They Clashed," *New York Times* 27 Sep. 1934, 3.

148. "Mayor and Valentine."

149. S. J. Woolf. "City's New Police Head Hits at Politics," *New York Times* 7 Oct. 1934, SM7.

150. "Vagrancy Stigma on Minors Banned," *New York Times* 13 Jan. 1935, N1.

151. "Valentine Orders Trial of Captain in Police Racket," *New York Times* 2 Mar. 1935, 1.

152. "Graft Era is Over, Police are Warned," *New York Times* 29 Apr. 1935, 7.

153. "New War on Noise Ordered by Mayor," *New York Times* 3 Aug. 1936, 17.

154. "Valentine Sworn For a New Term," *New York Times* 29 Sep. 1939,
20.

155. "Police Head Takes Issue With O'Dwyer," *New York Times* 23 Oct.
1941, 15.

156. "Police Head."

157. "Police Head."

158. "Amen Says Inquiry May Reach Higher in the Police Force," *New
York Times* 19 Dec. 1939, 1.

159. "420 Police are Sent to Brooklyn Area for Crime Survey," *New York
Times* 17 Nov. 1943, 1.

160. Irving Spiegel. "Valentine Ends 42 Years on Force to Begin Career in
Radio, Movies," *New York Times* 7 Sep. 1945, 1.

161. Spiegel, 2.

162. "Valentine Cries 'Lie' in Council at Hint of a Rift With the Mayor,"
New York Times 18 Jan. 1939, 1.

Case Twenty

163. Frank S. Adams. "Check-up of Police in Gambling Drive Ordered by
Mayor," *New York Times* 28 Aug. 1946, 1.

164. Adams, 48.

165. "Wallander Shifts 22 Division Chiefs," *New York Times* 5 Aug. 1947,
3.

166. Meyer Berger. "Laws on gambling Breed Corruption; O'Dwyer
Declares," *New York Times* 15 Aug. 1947, 1.

167. "Swedes Decorate Wallander Here," *New York Times* 17 Sep. 1947,
27.

168. "Wallander is Boss; Mayor Warns Police," *New York Times* 18 Sep.
1947, 17.

169. "O'Brien is Named City Police Head," *New York Times* 2 Feb. 1949,
30.

170. "Wallander Off on Vacation," *New York Times* 3 Feb. 1949, 26.

Case Twenty-One

171. "No Pledges, O'Brien Says," *New York Times* 11 Mar. 1949, 18.

172. "Mayor Denies Rumor O'Brien Plans to Quit," *New York Times* 6 Dec. 1949, 28.

173. "O'Brien to Press Drive on Gambling," *New York Times*, 8 Jan. 1950, 46.

174. "O'Brien to Press."

175. Alexander Feinberg. "O'Brien Bids Police Make Own Inquiry Into Gambling Graft," *New York Times* 17 Sep. 1950, 1.

176. Feinberg, 67.

177. Alexander Feinberg. "6 Police Captains to Work Full Time in Gambling 'War'," *New York Times* 19 Sep. 1950, 1.

178. Feinberg, "6 Police"

179. Paul Crowell. "Mayor to Get Data on Gambling Inquiry; Huge Graft Bared," *New York Times* 22 Sep. 1950, 1.

180. Alexander Feinberg. "Today is Deadline for O'Brien to Quit in Police Shake-Up," *New York Times* 25 Sep. 1950, 1.

181. "Text of Impellitteri Speech to Police; Warns Against Weakness Praises O'Brien's Service," *New York Times* 26 Sep. 1950, 34.

182. "Text of Impellitteri."

Case Twenty-Two

183. Thomas P. Ronant. "Murphy Acts to Clean Up Police Force," *New York Times* 27 Sep. 1950, 1.

184. Meyer Berger, "Dewey to Discuss Gambling Inquiry With Mayor Today," *New York Times* 29 Sep. 1950, 1.

185. "Text of Murphy's Announcement of Shake-Up," *New York Times* 30 Sep. 1950, 21.

186. "Murphy Says He Will Refuse U.S. Price Stabilization Job," *New York Times* 16 Feb. 1951, 1.

187. "Murphy Oath Set for 5-Year Term," *New York Times*, 21 Feb. 1951,
18.

188. "Murphy Oath."

189. Milton Honig. "Officials Meet to Promote a 'Clean' City," *New York Times* 31 Mar. 1951, 1.

190. "Mayor Asks Police Not to Join Union," *New York Times* 3 Apr. 1951, 28.

191. "Mayor Asks."

192. "Police Study Pact Remains Unsigned," *New York Times* 6 July 1951,
20.

193. "Murphy Proposes Higher Police Pay," *New York Times* 22 June 1951, 14.

Professional Period: The Fall of Tammany Hall 1951 -1975

Case Twenty-Three

194. "Monaghan to Push Narcotics Inquiry," *New York Times* 1 July 1951,
21.

195. "Monaghan to Push."

196. Charles G. Bennett. "Monaghan Assails Report on Police," *New York Times* 25 Nov. 1952, 1.

197. Bennett, "Monaghan."

198. Stanley Levey. "Monaghan Forbids City's Policemen to Join Any Union," *New York Times* 8 Aug. 1951, 1.

199. Stanley Levey., "T.W.U. Sues to Void Union Ban; Asks Dewey to Act.." *New York Times* 10 Aug. 1951, 1.

200. Levey, "T.W.U." 24.

201. Levey, "T.W.U." 1.

202. Levey, "T.W.U." 22.

203. "Mayor Commends Monaghan Regime," *New York Times* 21 Mar. 1953,18.

204. William R. Conklin. "Mayor, Monaghan Aid House Inquiry into Police 'Deal'," *New York Times* 21 Feb. 1953, 30.

Case Twenty-Four

205. Damon Stetson. "New Head of Police to Have Free Rein," *New York Times*, 26 Dec. 1953, 1.

206. Stetson, "New Head."

207. Will Lissner. "Adams Denounces His Police Critics; Denies Spy Charge," *New York Times* 11 Feb. 1954, 1.

208. "Wagner Affirms Support of Adams in Police Dispute," *New York Times* 16 Feb. 1954, 1.

209. "Detective Reinstated In Umbrella Incident," *New York Times* 28 Sep. 1954, 1.

210. "Detective Reinstated."

211. "Adams Says police are Free of Politics," *New York Times* 5 Oct. 1954, 15.

212. "Mayor Hails 750 added to Police," *New York Times* 1 Jan. 1955, 15.

213. "Adams Urges Ban on Police Politics," *New York Times* 9 Mar. 1955, 29.

214. "Adams Urges."

215. "Wagner Opposes Adams Job Plan," *New York Times*, 10 Mar. 1955, 29.

216. "Wagner Opposes."

217. Paul Crowell. "Adams Quitting Police Post to Resume His Law Career," *New York Times* 23 July 1955, 1.

218. "Text of Adams' Talk Outlining Drop in City Crime," *New York Times* 25 July 1955, 12.

Case Twenty-Five

219. "Kennedy New Police Head," *New York Times*, 3 Aug. 1955, 15.

220. "Kennedy New."
221. Paul Crowell. "Police Head Rejects Order by Mayor to Aid TV Show," *New York Times*, 23 Oct. 1955, 1.
222. "Mayor Affirms Kennedy Backing," *New York Times* 2 Nov. 1955, 24.
223. "Mayor Supports Auto Crackdown," *New York Times* 4 Feb. 1956, 1.
224. Paul Crowell. "Kennedy to get 5 -Year Renewal as Head of Police," *New York Times* 21 Jan. 1956, 1.
225. "Kennedy Insists on Adding Police in '56-57 Budget," *New York Times* 12 Apr. 1956, 1.
226. Murray Schumach. "Tough Boss of 23,000 Police," *New York Times* 4 Mar. 1956, SM9.
227. "Kennedy Rebuffs Powell on Bid To Get 3 Police Officers Shifted," *New York Times* 5 Feb. 1960, 36.
228. Robert Aldent. "Kennedy Differs With City Hall," *New York Times* 23 Aug. 1957, 17.
229. Aldent.
230. A.H. Raskin. "Kennedy Rejects Any Police Union," *New York Times* 22 May 1958, 1.
231. "Mayor Condemns Union for Police," *New York Times*, 12 Dec. 1958, A2.
232. "Mayor Condemns."
233. "Mayor Condemns."
234. Ralph Katz. "Kennedy Rejects Grievance Pleas," *New York Times* 9 Jan. 1959, 18.
235. "Mayor Supports Ban by Kennedy," *New York Times*, 13 Jan. 1959, 25.
236. "Police Head Firm on Full U.N. Duty," *New York Times*, 19 Sep. 1960, 18.

237. "Police Head."

238. "Police Head."

239. Peter Kihss. "Mediation Tried in Police Dispute," *New York Times* 23 Sep. 1960, 1.

240. "Statements by Kennedy and Wagner," *New York Times* 23 Feb. 1961, 16.

241. "Statements."

242. "Statements."

Case Twenty-Six

243. A.H. Lubasch. "Police Morale Up In Murphy's Term," *New York Times* 23 Aug. 1961, 35.

244. "Murphy Cautions on Extra Patrols," *New York Times*, 25 Oct. 1961, 25.

245. Stanley Levey. "Police Dismiss 5 as City's Drivers Strike Over Pay," *New York Times* 28 Nov. 1962, 1.

246. Levey, "Police Dismiss."

247. Thomas Buckley. "Unofficial Citizen Panel to Study Accusations of Police Brutality," *New York Times* 23 May 1964, 11.

248. Homer Bigart. "Murphy Rejects New Review Unit," *New York Times*, 21 Apr. 1965, 31.

249. "Broderick Takes Police Job Today," *New York Times*, 7 June 1965, 31.

Case Twenty-Seven

250. Samuel Kaplan. "Vincent Broderick Named as Police Commissioner," *New York Times*, 20 May 1965, 1.

251. Philip H. Dougherty. "Police Will Form Precinct Community Councils; Broderick Seeks to Iron Out Neighborhood Problems," *New York Times* 10 Dec. 1965, 55.

252. "Cleric Asks Lindsay to Retain Broderick," *New York Times* 20 Dec. 1965, 47.

253. John C. Devlin. "Broderick Hoping to End Increases in Police Force," *New York Times* 24 Dec. 1965, 1.

254. Eric Pace. "City Hall and Police: Supervision or Interference? The Issue is Loaded and Both Sides are Edgy," *New York Times* 5 Mar. 1966, 13.

255. Eric Pace. "O'Connor Assails City Hall Order to Cut Police Jobs," *New York Times* 22 Jan. 1966, 25

256. Pace, "O'Connor."

257. Pace, "O'Connor."

258. Eric Pace. "Police Shake-up Ousts Four Officers," *New York Times* 26 Jan. 1966, 1.

259. "New Police Commissioner," *New York Times* 20 May 1965, 42.

260. "New Police Commissioner."

261. Eric Pace. "Lindsay Seeking New Police Head," *New York Times*, 14 Jan. 1966, 1.

262. Eric Pace. "Broderick Defies Lindsay on Issue of Police Review," *New York Times* 9 Feb. 1966, 1.

263. Pace, "Broderick."

264. "Text of Broderick's Letter to Lindsay Commenting on Police Task Force Report," *New York Times*, 9 Feb. 1966, 30.

265. "Text.of Broderick's"

266. Martin Gansberg. "Murphy, Adams Back Broderick," *New York Times* 10 Feb. 1966, 1.

267. Gansberg, 30.

268. Eric Pace. "Lindsay Appoints Philadelphian as Head of Police," *New York Times* 16 Feb. 1966, L1.

269. Clayton Knowles. "Lindsay Bans Compromise on Police Review Board," *New York Times* 14 Feb. 1966, 1.

270. Eric Pace. "Lindsay Attacks Critics on Police; Leary is Sworn In," *New York Times* 22 Feb. 1966, 1.

271. Pace, "Lindsay Attacks."

Case Twenty-Eight

272. Eric Pace. "Lindsay Appoints a Philadelphian as Head of Police," *New York Times* 16 Feb. 1966, L1.

273. Pace, "Lindsay Appoins."

274. Eric Pace. "Lindsay Enters Bircher Dispute," *New York Times* 24 Feb. 1966, 1.

275. Murphy, P.V. and Plate, T. (1977). *Commissioner: A view from the top of American law enforcement*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

276. Eric Pace. "Police Staff Chief Who Quit in Shift Invited to Return," *New York Times*, March 4, 1966. 66.

277. Pace, "Police Staff."

278. Charles Grutzner. "Shanley Disputes Leary on Ouster," *New York Times* 11 Mar. 1966, 1.

279. Emanuel Perlmutter. "Police Shortage Cuts Car Patrols," *New York Times* 13 Feb. 1967, 35.

280. Richard Reeves. "Leary Urges Stiffer Penalties to Reduce Violent Crime," *New York Times* 19 Mar. 1967, 43.

281. Richard Reeves. "Mending Police Feud, In Wake of Friction," *New York Times* 19 Mar. 1967, 43.

282. Sylvan Fox. "Lindsay Defends Job Done by Leary," *New York Times* 29 Nov. 1967, 1.

283. "City's No. 1 Policeman; Howard Regis Leary," *New York Times* 31 July 1968, 24.

284. David Burnham. "Leary Declares He Alone Makes Police Decisions," *New York Times* 14 Aug. 1968, 1.

285. "Text of Statement by Commissioner Leary," *New York Times* 14 Aug. 1968, 47.

286. David Burnham. "New P.B.A. Order is Reaffirmation of Present Rules," *New York Times* 16 Aug. 1968, 1.

287. Maurice Carroll. "Police Assailed by Mayor On Laxity at Peace Rally," *New York Times* 10 May 1970, 1.

288. "Excerpts From the Transcript of Interview With Police Commissioner Leary," *New York Times*, 8 June 1970, 28.

289. "Excerpts."

290. "Excerpts."

291. Douglas Robinson. "Leary Links Graft to Hypocrisy," *New York Times* 8 June 1970, 1.

292. Peter Kihiss, "No Successor Yet," *New York Times* 6 Sep. 1970, 1.

293. Richard D. Lyons. "H.R. Leary, 82, A Commissioner of Police, Dies," *New York Times*, 2 Feb. 1994, D21.

Case Twenty-Nine

294. Douglas Robinson. "Murphy is Named to Replace Leary as Head of Police," *New York Times* 12 Sep. 1970, 1.

295. Michael Kaufman. "Murphy Plans to Expand Police Anti-Corruption Unit," *New York Times*, 26 Oct. 1970, 28.

296. Kaufman, "Murphy is Named."

297. Lawrence Van Gelder. "Mayor Invokes Police Penalties," *New York Times* 21 Jan. 1971, 1.

298. "Murphy Supports \$15,000 Police Pay," *New York Times*, 23 Jan. 1971, 1.

299. David Burnham. "Murphy is Trying New Police Ratio," *New York Times*, 23 July 1971, 34.

300. David Burnham. "Murphy Relieves 6 Police Captains for Laxity on Job," *New York Times*, 1 Sep. 1971, 1.

301. Thomas Buckley. "Murphy Among the Meaters," *New York Times* 19 Dec. 1971, SM10.

302. Will Lissner. "Murphy Cautions Top-Level Aides a Shake-up is Due," *New York Times* 23 Aug. 1971, 1.

303. Thomas Buckley. "Murphy Among the 'Meateaters'," *New York Times* 19 Dec. 1971, SM10.

304. Buckley, Murphy Among."

305. David Burnham. "Murphy Names Kellerman to Daley Post," *New York Times* 23 May 1972, 29.

306. Burnham, "Murphy Names."

307. Will Lissner. "Murphy Bids Farewell to Force," *New York Times* 5 May 1973, 37.

Case Thirty

308. Murray Schumach. "Cawley, Chief of Patrol, Named to Murphy Post," *New York Times* 13 Apr. 1973, 1.

309. "Cawley, Sworn as Police Commissioner, Vows to Follow Murphy's Policies," *New York Times* 15 May 1973, 43.

310. Dierdre Carmody. "Cawley Finds Department Closing Ranks Behind Him," *New York Times* 17 June 1973, 43.

311. Marcia Chambers. "Cawley Holds Rap sessions With His Men, and Policewomen are Topic A," *New York Times* 5 Dec. 1973, 99.

312. David Burnham. "Fixed Police Term Cited," *New York Times* 8 Dec. 1973, 73.

313. Burnham, "Fixed Police."

314. Burnham, "Fixed Police."

315. Burnham, "Police Fixed."

316. Burnham, "Police Fixed."

317. Murray Schumach. "Codd to Head Police Here," *New York Times* 13 Dec. 1973, 1.

Community Period: Practical Experience Preferred 1976 -2001

Case Thirty-One

318. Murray Schumach. "Codd to Head Police Here," *New York Times* 13 Dec. 1973, 1.

319. Schumach, "Codd."

320. Leslie Mattland. "Beame and Codd Promise New Efforts to Prevent Rape, but Women's Group Assails 'Lack of Funding'," *New York Times* 2 Aug. 1974, 5.

321. Edward Ranzal. "Codd Makes Counteroff to Beame's Police Cuts," *New York Times* 12 June 1975, 80.

322. Selwyn Raab. "Codd Assails the City For Failure to Apply for Special Funds," *New York Times* 16 Oct. 1975, 47.

323. Pranay Gupte. "Codd Orders Police to Enforce the Law or Turn in Badges," *New York Times* 30 Sep. 1976, 85.

324. Gupte, Codd Orders."

325. Gupte, "Codd Orders."

326. Gupte, "Codd Orders."

327. Gupte, "Codd Orders."

328. S.elwyn Raab. "Codd , Once Pride of the Force, Now Butt of Police Officers' Ire," *New York Times* 2 Oct. 1976, 1.

329. D. Gorton. "Codd Leaves Hospital, Plans to Work Sept. 26," *New York Times* 18 Sep. 1977. p. 30.

Case Thirty-Two

330. Leonard Bruder. "A New Leader For the Police," *New York Times* 16 Dec. 1977, 27.

331. Leonard Bruder. "McGuire Warns All in Command By Punishing 3," *New York Times* 29 Mar. 1979, B1.

332. Leslie Maitland. "Koch Unifies Police of 3 Forces to Stop Subway Crime Wave," *New York Times* 11 Sep. 1979, A1.

333. Leonard Bruder. "New York City Has a New Police 'Czar' and a Thriving Controversy," *New York Times* 16 Sep. 1979, E5.

334. Ronald Smothers. "Irritation on New District Lines Persists at City Hall," *New York Times* 21 Dec. 1979, B3.

335. Anna Quindlin. "McGuire : Man In the Middle in City's Labor Dispute," *New York Times* 2 July 1980, B2.

336. Quindlin, "Man."

337. Quindlin, "Man."

338. "McGuire Wouldn't Follow Koch to Albany," *New York Times*, 22 Mar. 1982, B4.

339. M.A. Farber. "After 5 Years in Job, McGuire Is Seen as a Flexible Tactician," *New York Times* 7 June 1983, B1.

340. Sam Roberts. "McGuire Praises His Officers Restraint Amid Charges," *New York Times*, 5 Aug. 1983, B3.

341. Sam Roberts. "Koch Again Urges McGuire to Stay in Police Post," *New York Times* 9 Aug. 1983, B3.

342. Roberts, "Koch."

343. Sam Roberts. "McGuire Is Increasing Staff of Complaint Review Panel," *New York Times*, 16 Sep. 1983, B1.

344. Roberts, "McGuire."

Case Thirty-Three

345. S H Anderson, D.Bird, D. "48 Hours," *New York Times*, 31 Dec. 1983, 1.

Case Thirty-Four

346. Sam Roberts. "Political Realities and Koch's Decision to Name Black Police Commissioner," *New York Times*, 24 Dec. 1983, 27.

347. Roberts, "Political."

348. Michael Goodwin. "Faulted For Having a Women as Guest in Office at Night," *New York Times*, October 19, 1984. p. B1.

349. Goodwin, "Faulted."
350. Goodwin, "Faulted," B3.
351. Goodwin, "Faulted," B3..
352. Michael Goodwin. "Police Unable To Reach Ward In Mass Murder," *New York Times* 25 Oct. 1984, B1.
353. Goodwin, "Police."
354. Joyce Purnick. "Ward Declares Goetz Didn't Shoot in Self-Defense," *New York Times* 22 Feb. 1985, A1.
355. Purnick, "Ward."
356. Selwyn Raab. "Ward Calls Top New York Officers To a Meeting on Brutality Charges," *New York Times* 26 Apr. 1985, A1.
357. "Ward Is Reappointed To Full 5-Year Term," *New York Times* 22 Feb. 1986, 26.
358. Selwyn Raab. "Ward Tells Top New York Officers They Will Be Liable in Brutalities," *New York Times* 27 Apr. 1985, 1.
359. Todd Purdum. "Ward Asks Drug Test For all Officers," 11 June 1986, B4.
360. Todd Purdum. "Ward Appoints A State Official As Top Deputy," *New York Times* 23 May 1986. p. B3.
361. Todd Purdum. "Ward Says Slowdown by Officers Has Worsened and May Be Illegal," *New York Times*, 13 Nov. 1986, B6.
362. Purdum, "Ward Says."
363. Joyce Purnick. "Ward and Police Union Compromise, But Tension Over Transfer Remains," *New York Times* 15 Nov. 1986, 34.
364. Mark Uhlig, M. "Ward Criticizes Leader Of Police Officer's Union," *New York Times* 16 Mar. 1987, B3.
365. Uhlig, "Ward Criticizes."
366. Robert Boorstin. "Ward Defending Transfers, Calls Some Officers 'Bandits'," *New York Times*, 10 Nov. 1986, B1.

367. Todd Purdum. "Ward's Remarks Put Him at Center of Turmoil; Koch Strongly Supports the Commissioner," *New York Times* 1 Aug. 1987, 33.

368. Purdum, "Ward's Remarks."

369. Todd Purdum. "Ward Assails Koch For Jackson Attacks and Urges Apology," *New York Times* 27 Apr. 1988, A1.

370. Purdum, "Ward Assails," B4.

371. Todd Purdum. "Ward Taken to Hospital After Asthma Attack," *New York Times* 1 Oct. 1987, B3.

372. Richard Levine. "Koch's Verdict: Ward's Not Guilty," *New York Times* 8 Aug. 1998, 30.

373. Levine, "Koch's Verdict."

374. M.A. Farber. "Ward Resigns Citing Problem With Asthma," 26 Sep. 1989, B1.

375. Farber, "Ward Resigns."

376. Farber, "Ward Resigns."

377. Farber, "Ward Resigns."

378. Farber, "Ward Resigns."

379. David Dunlap. "Ward Bids Farewell as 'a Cop's Cop'; Eleanor Bumpurs's death was the toughest moment," *New York Times* 27 Sep. 1989, B3

Case Thirty-Five

380. Dunlap, "Ward Bids."

381. Dunlap, "Ward Bids."

382. Dunlap, "Ward Bids."

383. Todd Purdum. "Dinkins Group Considering 11 Candidates for Police Post; The field includes Condon, who has Cuomo's backing," *New York Times* 29 Nov. 1989, B1.

384. Elizabeth Kolbert. "Again, Cuomo Whisper Is a Boom at City Hall," *New York Times* 30 Nov. 1989, B3

385. Kolbert, "Again, Cuomo."

Case Thirty-Six

386. Todd Purdum. "First Non-New Yorker to Run Force Since '66," *New York Times* 19 Dec. 1989, A1.

387. Purdum, "First."

388. Purdum, "First."

389. Purdum, "First."

390. Ralph Blumenthal. "New York Needs More Officers, But Lacks Money, Brown Says," *New York Times* 10 May 1990, B10.

391. Ralph Blumenthal. "Head of Police Assails Media On Job Image; Brown Says the Public Should Cooperate More Head of Police Attacks Media On False," *New York Times* 25 Sep. 1990, B1.

392. Blumenthal, "Head of Police."

393. George James. "Brown Defends Sending Officers to Dinkins's L.I. Friend; The key element seems to be 'accessibility to the Mayor.'" *New York Times* 14 Nov. 1991, B3

394. James, "Brown Defends."

395. James, "Brown Defends."

396. Ralph Blumenthal. "Seeing Challenges Instead of Problems; Lee P. Brown, Relentlessly Optimistic Crusader for Community Policing," *New York Times* 17 May 1992, 35.

397. Blumenthal, "Seeing."

398. Craig Wolff. "Brown to Add Inquiry Power In Police Graft; Planning More Leeway In Officer Surveillance Plan to Widen Inquiries on Police Corruption." *New York Times* 1 July 1992, B1.

399. "Brown Outlines Anticorruption Moves," *New York Times* 5 July 1992, 21.

400. Alison Mitchell. "Dinkins and Brown Walk To Calm Troubled Streets," *New York Times* 9 July 1992, B6.

401. Mitchel, Dinkins.”

402. Calvin Sims. “Force Jolted -Wife’s Illness Is Cited; Brown Resigns as Police Commissioner,” *New York Times* 4 Aug. 1992, B1.

403. Sims, “Force.”

404. Sims, “Force.”

405. Joseph Treaster. “Brown Resignation Highlights High Turnover Among Chiefs,” *New York Times* 8 Aug. 1992, 23.

406. Sims, “Force.”

Case Thirty-Seven

407. Craig Wolff. “A Street-Smart Boss,” *New York Times* 17 Oct. 1992, 28.

408. Alan Finder. “Choosing Kelly for Shaken Force, Dinkin’s Finds a ‘Cop’s Cop’,” *New York Times*, 17 Oct. 1992, 28.

409. Finder, “Choosing.”

410. George James. “Kelly Says He’ll Stress Recruiting More Blacks,” *New York Times*, 20 Oct. 1992, B3.

411. Craig Wolff. “Kelly Report Stops Short, Lawyer Says,” *New York Times* 18 Nov. 1992, B1.

412. Wolff, “Kelly Report.”

413. Craig Wolff. “Exploring What Causes Corruption,” *New York Times* 24 Apr. 1993, 27.

414. Wolff, “Exploring.”

415. Seth Faison, Jr. “Police Commissioner to March in Irish Parade,” *New York Times* 4 Mar. 1993, B3.

416. Faison, “Police Commissioner.”

417. George James. “Kelly Orders Crackdown On Licenses,” *New York Times* 4 May 1993, B1.

418. “Kelly Doesn’t Want F.B.I. Job, He Says,” *New York Times* 21 May 1993, B4.

419. “Kelly Sees Hearings by Panel As 'One-Sided' and 'Scripted',” *New York Times* 30 Sep. 1993, B1.

420. George James. “Kelly Critical of Remarks by Head of Police Union,” *New York Times* 7 July 1993, B2.

421. James, “Kelly Critical.” .

422. James, “Kelly Critical.”

423. James, “Kelly Critical,” B2.

424. James, “Kelly Critical,” B2.

425. James, “Kelly Critical,” B2.

426. Alison Mitchell. “Mayor-Elects Man,” *New York Times* 3 Dec. 1993, A1.

Case Thirty-Eight

427. Alison Mitchell. “Panel Meets With Bratton on Police Post,” *New York Times* 1 Dec. 1993, B3.

428. James Dao. “Dinkins and Giuliani Split on Public Safety Issues,” *New York Times* 11 Oct. 1993, A1.

429. Steven Lee Myers. ““Squeeges’ Rank High on Next Police Commissioner’s Priority List,” *New York Times* 4 Dec. 1993, 23.

430. Myers, ““Squeeges’.”

431. Myers, ““Squeeges’.”

432. Dennis Hevesi. “Bratton Asks Police Aides For Resignation Letters,” *New York Times* 9 Jan. 1994, 23.

433. Hevesi, “Bratton Asks,”

434. Clifford Krauss. “Roles and Goals for an Energetic Bratton,” *New York Times* 22 Jan. 1994, 1.

435. Ralph Blumenthal. “Bratton and Muslim Ministers to Meet on Tensions Over Clash,” *New York Times* 13 Jan. 1994, B3.

436. Clifford Krauss, “Roles and Goals.”

437. George James. "Bratton Puts Focus on Beat For Shake-up," *New York Times* 24 Jan. 1994, B1.
438. Clifford Krauss. "Giuliani and Bratton Begin To Shift Police Aims and Leaders," *New York Times* 26 Jan. 1994, p. A1.
439. Krauss, "Giuliani and Bratton."
440. Joseph B. Treaster. "More Arrests, More Therapy In Drug Plan," *New York Times* 27 Jan. 1994, B1.
441. Treaster, "More Arrests," B3.
442. Treaster, "More Arrests," B3.
443. Treaster, J.B. "Bratton Policing Experiment Gets Results," *New York Times* 25 July 1994, B1.
444. Treaster, "Bratton Policing."
445. Clifford Krauss. "Panels Urge Big Changes In Police Dept.," *New York Times* 28 July 1994, B1.
446. Krauss, "Panels."
447. Clifford Krauss. "Top police Corruption Fighter Forced Out," *New York Times* 28 Jan. 1995, 23.
448. Clifford Krauss. "Bratton Plans New Strategy On Corruption," *New York Times* 30 Jan, 1995, B1
449. Krauss, "Bratton Plans."
450. Krauss, "Bratton Plans."
451. Krauss, "Top Police Corruption."
452. Alison Mitchell. "Top Bratton Aide Quits in Anger," *New York Times* 11 Feb. 1995, 22.
453. Alison Mitchell, "Top Bratton."
454. Alison Mitchell, "Top Bratton Aide Quits," p.1.
455. Mitchel, "Top Bratton," 22.

456. Mitchel, "Top Bratton," 22
- 457 Mitchel, "Top Bratton," 22
458. George James. "Budget Cuts Are Planned By Bratton," *New York Times*, 13 Feb. 1995, B3.
459. James, "Budget Cuts."
460. Clifford Krauss. "A New 'Bratton' Tries Out Lower Profile," *New York Times* 16 Feb. 1995, B1.
461. Krauss, A New 'Bratton'."
462. Krauss, C. "A Few Boos for Giuliani From Police at Ceremony," *New York Times* 17 Feb. 1995, B3.
463. Krauss, C. The Bratton Pulpit," *New York Times* 26 Feb. 1995, 33.
464. Richard Perez-Pena. "Bratton Pledges to Rid Force of those Who Foil System," *New York Times* 8 May 1995, B3.
465. Clifford Krauss. "The Commissioner vs., the Criminologists," *New York Times* 19 Nov. 1995, 43.
466. Robert D. McFadden. "The Police, in an Effort to Identify Gunmen, Release Picture," *New York Times* 10 Dec. 1995, 1.
467. Clifford Krauss. "Poster Boy For a Drop in Crime," *New York Times* 14 Dec. 1995, B1.
468. Nadine Brozan. "Chronicle," *New York Times* 8 Jan. 1996, 28.
469. Clifford Krauss. "Bratton Is Near a Contract For the Story of His Life," *New York Times* 7 Feb. 1996, B3.
470. Krauss, "Bratton Is Near."
471. Steven Lee Myers. "Giuliani And Bratton: The Ties That Chafe; Mayor and Commissioner," *New York Times* 10 Mar. 1996, 33
472. Myers, "Giuliani and Bratton."
473. Myers, "Giuliani and Bratton."
474. Clifford Krauss. "Mayor Is Said to Reject Bratton's Planned Personnel Shifts," *New York Times* 8 Mar. 1996, B1

475. Krauss, "Mayor Is Said."

476. Julia Preston. "Giuliani Acknowledges That His Police Commissioner Is Job Hunting," *New York Times* 25 Mar. 1996, B1.

477. Preston, "Giuliani Acknowledges."

478. Preston, "Giuliani Acknowledges."

479. David Firestone. "27 Months In Job," *New York Times* 27 Mar. 1996, A1.

480. Firestone, "27 Months."

481. Clifford Krauss. "Bratton, Leaving, Predicts Tension Will Stay," *New York Times* 29 Mar. 1996, B8.

482. Krauss, "Bratton Leaving."

483. Randy Kennedy. "Bratton Denies He Was Pushed Out," *New York Times* 1 Apr. 1996, B3.

484. Clifford Krauss. "Amid Jokes and Bagpipes, Bratton Departs," *New York Times* 13 Apr. 1996, 23

485. "Greatest Cops on Earth." *New York Times* 27 Mar. 1996, B4.

486. Jeffrey Goldberg. "Sore Winner," *New York Times* 16 Aug. 1998, SM30.

487. Bratton, William, and Peter Knobler. *Turnaround: How America's Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic*. New York: Random House, 1998. Print..

488. Bratton, W. and Knobler, P., *Turnaround*

Case Thirty-Nine

489. Steven Lee Myers. "Fire Chief Appears to Lead List of Police Candidates," *New York Times* 28 Mar. 1996, B3.

490. Clifford Krauss. "In High Ceremony, Safir Is Sworn In to Lead Police," *New York Times* 16 Apr. 1996, B1.

491. Krauss, "In High Ceremony."

492. W Glaberson. "New Police Commissioner: A Bureaucrat Who's 'All Cop'," *New York Times* 17 Apr. 1996, B1.

493. Clifford Krauss. "Safir, Angered by Article, Bars Reporter From Office," *New York Times* 10 May 1996, B4.

494. David Kocieniewski. "Safir Backed in Reporter's Ouster," *New York Times* 22 May 1996, B5.

495. "Safir Is a No-Show At Council Hearing," *New York Times* 25 June 1997, B2.

496. "Safir is No-Show."

497. Jeffrey Goldberg. "Sore Winner," *New York Times* 16 Aug. 1998, SM30

498. Goldberg, "Sore Winner."

499. Krauss, "Mayor Is Said."

500. Krauss, "Mayor Is Said."

501. Krauss, "Mayor Is Said."

502. Jodi Wilgoren. "Black Officer Gets No. 2 Post On Crime Unit," *New York Times* 20 Mar. 1999, B1.

503. Wilgoren, "Black Officer."

504. Wilgoren, "Black Officer."

505. Wilgoren, "Black Officer."

506. Kevin Flynn. "Safir Faces Criticism After Oscar Trip," *New York Times* 23 Mar. 1999, B5.

507. Flynn, "Safir Faces."

508. Michael Cooper. "McCall Is Among 141 Taken Into Custody at Demonstration," *New York Times* 23 Mar. 1999, A1.

509. Jodi Wilgoren. "Mayor Reserves Judgment on Safir Trip," *New York Times* 25 Mar. 1999, B12

510. Michael Cooper. "Mayor Weighs Whether Police Helped Safir In Private Suit," *New York Times* 9 Apr. 1999, B6.

511. Cooper, "Mayor Weighs."

512. Dan Barry. "Safir Defends Use of Police After Accident," *New York Times* 10 Apr. 1999, B1.

513. Michael Cooper. "Mayor Defends Safir on Wedding Security," *New York Times* 13 April 1999, B4.

514. Cooper, "Mayor Defends."

515. Cooper, "Mayor Defends."

516. Cooper, "Mayor Defends."

517. Michael Cooper. "Vote by P.B.A. Rebukes Safir And His Policy," *New York Times* 14 Apr. 1999, B6.

518. Dan Barry, & Cooper, M. "Despite the Frown, Safir Paints Himself In Brighter Terms," *New York Times* 18 Apr. 1999, 1.

519. Jayson Blair. "Giuliani and Safir Defend the Police in Fatal Shooting of a Hammer-Wielding Man," *New York Times* 5 Oct. 1999, B3.

520. Blair, "Giuliani and Safir."

521. C. J. Chivers. "Safir Formally Resigns," *New York Times* 9 Aug. 2000, B3.

522. Flynn, M. "Safir to Resign as Head of Police, City Officials Say," *New York Times* 8 Aug. 2000, A1.

523. Eric Lipton. "City Hall Split on Who Should Take Over 1 Police Plaza," *New York Times* 11 Aug. 2000, B1

524. Eric Lipton. "Giuliani Chooses a Police Leader, But Won't Say Who," *New York Times* 19 Aug. 2000, B3.

Case Forty

525. Juan Forero. "Kerik Reaches Out to Minority Residents," *New York Times* 21 Aug. 2000, B4.

526. Forero, "Kerik Reaches."

527. Kevin Flynn. "For Kerik, There's One Way To Run the Police, at a Sprint," *New York Times* 26 Mar. 2001, A1.

528. C. J. Chivers. "Kerik Says He Wants to Reward Hardest-Working Officers," *New York Times* 12 Sep. 2000, B2.

529. Kevin Flynn. "For Kerik, There's One Way"

530. William K. Rashbaum. "Port Authority and Kerik Clash Over Airport Crime," *New York Times* 5 Jan. 2001, B4.

531. Rashbaum, "Port Authority."

532. Flynn, "For Kerik, There's One Way," B3

533. Flynn, "For Kerik, There's One Way," B3

534. Robert D. McFadden. "Police Dept. Rejects Punishment For Officers in Diallo Shooting," *New York Times* 27 Apr. 2001, B6.

535. McFadden, "Police Dept."

536. Christopher Drew. "Sad Search By Kerik to Find His Mother," *New York Times* 9 Nov. 2001, D1.

537. Drew, "Sad Search," D5.

538. Kevin Flynn. "Kerik Says He Won't Stay On as Police Commissioner," *New York Times*, 10 Nov. 2001, D6.

539. Jacob H. Fries. "The Tombs to Renamed for Kerik," *New York Times* 6 Dec. 2001, D3.

APPENDIX: A

Police Commissioner Profiles

1.

Michael C. Murphy

February 22, 1901 - January 1, 1902

“What is there to say...in the end, I was Commissioner all through.”

Mayor	Robert Van Wyck
Political Party	Tammany Hall Democrat
Policy Issue	Corruption (Police Graft)
Police Governance	Political Activist
Succession	Scheduled/Institutionalized*
Selection	Man Closest to the Party
Career Path	Outsider
Position before Appointment	President, NYC Health Board
Police Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Non-Political
Manifest Departure	New Administration
Latent Departure	Avoid Removal
Tenure	10 months, 10 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	60
Education	No
Gender	Male
Race	White

*** Four member bi-partisan Board of Police Commissioners and the civil service position of Police Chief were abolished by state legislation. A new civilian position was created which combined the single headed police commissioner and chief of police.**

2.

John N. Partridge

January 1, 1902 - January 1, 1903

"I long ago said in regard to resigning...when the Mayor wants my resignation, he had it."

Mayor:	Seth Low
Political Party:	Fusion - Republican/Citizens Union
Policy Issue	Department (Police Reform)
Police Governance	Political Activist
Succession:	Unscheduled /ad hoc
Selection:	Best Man Available
Career Path:	Law Enforcement Executive
Position before Appointment	New York State Superintendent of Public Works
Police Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Latent Political
Manifest Departure	Health
Latent Departure	Mayor Induced
Tenure	12 months
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Law Enforcement	Yes (Police Chief-City of Brooklyn)
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	63
Education	Undetermined
Gender	Male
Race	White

3.

Francis V. Greene
January 1, 1903 - January 1, 1904

“I shall surrender the administration of affairs of this department...to my successor with a certain amount of pleasure. It has not been a very easy burden.”

Mayor	Seth Low
Political Party	Fusion - Republican /Citizen's Union
Policy Issue	Corruption (Excise Enforcement)
Police Governance	Professional Autonomy
Succession	Unscheduled/ad hoc
Selection	Best Man Available
Career Path	Outsider
Position before Appointment	President of private company
Police Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Non-Political
Manifest Departure	New Administration
Latent Departure	Avoid Removal
Tenure	12 months
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	52
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

“I take pleasure in complying with your request...I would not continue in this office even if you had requested me to do so.”

Mayor	George B. McClellan
Political Party	Tammany Hall Democrat (1 st term) Independent (2 nd term)
Policy Issue	Corruption (blackmail, extortion, and graft)
Police Governance	Political Activist
Succession	Unscheduled/Ad Hoc
Selection	Best Man Available
Career Path	Outsider
Position before Appointment	Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Police Independence	Autonomist
Civilian Control	Political
Manifest Departure	Alleged Misconduct /Dismissal
Latent Departure	Politics (Enforcement)
Tenure	24 months
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Law enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	50
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

5.

Theodore A. Bingham
January 1, 1906 - July 1, 1909

“Tell the Mayor I shall be out of here in twenty minutes.”

Mayor	George B. McClellan
Political Party	Tammany Democrat (1 st term) Independent (2 nd term)
Policy Issue	Corruption (vice and gambling)
Police Governance	Political Activist
Succession	Unscheduled/Ad Hoc
Selection	Best Man Available
Career Path	Law enforcement Executive
Position before Appointment	Federal Superintendent of Public Buildings and Grounds
Police Independence	Antagonist
Civilian Control	Political
Manifest Departure	Dismissal
Latent Departure	Politics (Enforcement)
Tenure	42 months
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Law Enforcement	Yes (Head United States Park Police)
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	47
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

6.

William F. Baker

July 1, 1909 - October 20, 1910

“I am glad to get out, I am relieved of a burden.”

Mayor I	George B. McClellan
Mayor II	William Jay Gaynor
Political Party I	Independent (broke with Tammany 2 nd term)
Political Party II	Tammany Democrat (Gaynor broke with Tammany over patronage)
Policy Issue I	Corruption (gambling enforcement)
Police Governance I	Insufficient data
Police Governance II	Political Activist
Succession	Unscheduled/ad hoc*
Selection**	Deserving Local Fellow
Career Path	Insider Criminal Justice
Position before Appointment	First Deputy Police Commissioner
Police Independence I	N/A
Police Independence II	Autonomist
Civilian Control	Political
Manifest Departure	Policy Differences
Latent Departure	Politics (Enforcement)
Tenure	15 months 19 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Law enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	Yes
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	43
Education	No
Gender	Male
Race	White

*** Baker was appointed by Mayor McClellan. He was retained by Mayor Gaynor. ** Police Administration type was determined at time of departure between Police Commissioner Baker and Mayor Gaynor.**

7.

James C. Cropsey

October 20, 1910 - May 23, 1911

“My conception of the police job is that I ought not to talk.”

Mayor	William Jay Gaynor
Political Party	Tammany Democrat (eventually broke with Tammany Hall over patronage)
Policy Issue	Corruption (Excise Enforcement)
Police Governance	Political Activist
Succession	Unscheduled/Ad Hoc
Selection	Best Man Available
Career Path	Outsider
Position before Appointment	Attorney
Police Independence	Autonomist
Civilian Control	Latent Political
Manifest Departure	Alleged Misconduct
Latent Departure	Mayor Induced
Tenure	5 months, 3 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	38
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

8.

Rhinelanders Waldo
May 23, 1911 - December 31, 1913

“The prospect of getting out makes me feel ten years younger.”

Mayor I	William Jay Gaynor
Mayor II (Acting)	Ardolph L. Kline*
Political Party I	Tammany Democrat (broke with Tammany Hall over patronage)
Political Party II	Republican
Policy Issue	Department (Patronage Reform)
Police Governance I	Team
Police Governance II	Political Activist
Succession	Unscheduled/Ad hoc
Selection	Man Closest to the Party
Career Path	Insider Criminal Justice
Position before Appointment	Fire Commissioner
Police Independence I	N/A
Police Independence II	Antagonist
Civilian Control	Political
Manifest Departure	Dismissed (Insubordination)
Latent Departure	Resignation not accepted
Tenure	31 months, 9 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Law Enforcement	Yes (Headed Ashokan Dam Water Police)
Prior Civilian NYPD	Yes
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	34
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

*** Ardolph Kline became Acting Mayor after Mayor Gaynor’s death. Kline summarily dismissed Waldo for insubordination.**

9.

Douglas I. McKay

December 31, 1913 - April 8, 1914

“You appoint a Commissioner that you expect to retain and support...”

Mayor I	Ardolph L. Kline* (Acting)
Mayor II	John Puroy Mitchel
Political Party I	Republican
Political Party II	Fusion/Reform Democrat
Policy Issue	Enforcement (Criminal Gangs)
Police Governance I	Insufficient Data
Police Governance II	Political Activist
Succession	Unscheduled/ad hoc
Selection	Deserving Local Fellow
Career Path	Insider Criminal Justice
Position before Appointment	First Deputy Police Commissioner
Police Independence I	Insufficient data
Police Independence II	Professional
Civilian Control	Latent Political
Manifest Departure	Desire to seek other employment
Latent Departure	Politics (Enforcement)
Tenure	3 months 8 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	Yes
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	31
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

*** Outgoing Mayor Kline appointed McKay Acting Police Commissioner on December 31, 1913. On January 1, 1914, Mayor Mitchel retained McKay.**

10.

Arthur Woods

April 8, 1914 - December 31, 1918

“Essential to the success of a Police Commissioner is a whole-souled understanding and cooperation of the Mayor.”

Mayor	John Puroy Mitchel
Political Party	Fusiion/Reform
Policy Issue	Community (crime prevention)
Police Governance	Team
Succession	Unscheduled/ad hoc
Selection	Man Closest to the Party (M)
Career Path	Insider Criminal Justice
Position before Appointment	Secretary to Mayor
Police Independence:	Professional
Civilian Control	Non-Political
Manifest Departure	New Administration
Latent Departure	Avoid Removal
Tenure	3 years, 9 months
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Law enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	Yes
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	43
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

11.

Frederick H. Bugher

January 1, 1918 - January 23, 1918

“I could not have continued to serve as Police Commissioner without the abandonment of my principles and the loss of all self-respect.”

Mayor	John F. Hylan (2 terms)
Political Party	Tammany Democrat
Policy Issue	Corruption (Gambling Enforcement)
Police Governance:	Political Activist
Succession	Unscheduled/Ad Hoc
Selection	Best Man Available
Career Path	Insider Criminal Justice
Last Position before Appointment	Private sector
Police Independence	Autonomist
Civilian Control	Political
Manifest Departure*	Resignation/Dismissal
Latent Departure	Politics (Personnel)
Tenure	23 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	Yes
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	43
Education	No
Gender	Male
Race	White

* Bugher resigned citing Mayor's interference with administration of department. Mayor Hylan dismissed Bugher over alleged wrongdoing.

12.

Richard E. Enright
January 23, 1918 - December 30, 1925

“The Police Department will be an administrative unit directly responsible to the Mayor, operated by the Police Commissioner, as the Mayor’s deputy in active charge.”

Mayor	John F. Hylan
Political Party	Tammany Democrat
Policy Issue	Corruption (Vice Enforcement)
Police Governance	Team
Succession	Unscheduled/ad hoc
Selection	Deserving Local Fellow
Career Path	Insider Law Enforcement
Position before Appointment	Lieutenant NYPD
Police Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Non-Political
Manifest Departure	New Administration
Latent Departure	Avoid Removal
Tenure	7 years, 7 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	Yes
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	45
Education	No
Gender	Male
Race	White

13.

George V. McLaughlin

January 1, 1926 - April 12, 1927

“It was our understanding when I accepted the position...that I was not to remain for any definite period of time...”

Mayor	James J. Walker
Political Party	Tammany Democrat
Policy Issue	Department (police administration)
Police Governance	Professional Autonomy
Succession	Unscheduled/Ad Hoc
Selection	Best Man Available
Career Path	Outsider
Position before Appointment	NYS Superintendent of Banking
Police Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Latent Political
Manifest Departure	New Employment
Latent Departure	Politics (Enforcement)
Tenure	15 months, 11 days
Prior Uniform-NYPD	No
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian -NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	38
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

14.

Joseph A. Warren

April 4, 1927 - December 18, 1928

“I shall only be responsible to my superior officer, the Mayor of the City of New York.”

Mayor	James J. Walker (2 terms)
Political Party	Tammany Democrat
Policy Issue	Community (Crime Prevention)
Police Governance	Political Activist
Succession	Unscheduled/ad hoc
Selection	Man Closest to the Party
Career Path	Outsider
Position before Appointment	NYC Commissioner of Accounts
Police Independence	Antagonist
Civilian Control	Latent Political
Manifest Departure	New Employment
Latent Departure	Mayor Induced
Tenure	20 months, 14 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Uniform Law enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	44
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

15.

Grover A. Whalen

December 18, 1928 - May 21, 1930

“Though there was no open break, I felt Mayor Walker had ceased to approve of some of my policies in the Department.”

Mayor	James J. Walker
Political Party	Tammany Democrat
Policy Issue	Department (Police Department Re-Organization)
Police Governance	Political Activist
Succession	Unscheduled/Ad Hoc
Selection	Best Man Available
Career Path	Outsider
Position before Appointment	Private Executive
Police Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Latent Political
Manifest Departure	New Employment
Latent Departure	Mayor Induced
Tenure	16 months, 3 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	42
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

16.

Edward P. Mulrooney
May 21, 1930 - April 12, 1933

“Mr. Mayor...you have conferred a great honor upon the Police Department and myself in appointing me as the administrative and executive head of the Police Department.”

Mayor I	James J. Walker
Mayor II	Joseph V. McKee (Acting)
Mayor III	John P. O'Brien*
Political Party I	Tammany Democrat
Political Party II	Tammany Democrat
Political Party III	Tammany Democrat
Policy Issue I	Community (Crime Prevention)
Policy Issue II	N/A
Policy Issue III	N/A
Police Governance I	Professional Autonomist
Police Governance II	Insufficient Data
Police Governance III	Political Activist**
Succession	Unscheduled/ad hoc
Selection	Deserving Local Fellow
Career Path	Insider Law Enforcement
Position before Appointment	Assistant Chief Inspector, NYPD
Police Independence I	N/A
Police Independence II	N/A
Police Independence III	Professional
Civilian Control	Latent Political
Manifest Departure	New Employment (Gubernatorial Appointment)
Latent Departure	Mayor Induced
Tenure	34 months, 22 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	Yes
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	55
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

* Mayor O'Brien won Special election to complete Mayor Walker's unexpired term;**Police Governance III used in analysis section

17.

James S. Bolan

April 15, 1933 - December 31, 1933

“I want to thank you Mr. Mayor, for the honor and confidence which you repose I me assigning me to this, the most important post in your cabinet.”

Mayor	John P. O'Brien*
Political Party	Tammany Democrat
Policy issue	Department (Police Efficiency)
Police Governance	Professional Autonomy
Succession	Unscheduled/ad hoc
Selection	Deserving Local Fellow
Career Path	Insider Law Enforcement
Position before Appointment	Deputy Chief Inspector, NYPD
Police Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Non-Political
Manifest Departure	New Administration
Latent Departure	Avoid Removal.
Tenure	8 months, 16 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	Yes
Prior Uniform Law enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	61
Education	No
Gender	Male
Race	White

* Mayor O'Brien won Special election to complete Mayor Walker's unexpired term.

18.

John F. O’Ryan

January 1, 1934 - September 24, 1934

“My views and those of the Chief Executive of this city were so widely at variance that I could be of no further service to the administration.”

Mayor	Fiorello LaGuardia (3 terms)
Political Party	Fusion/Republican
Policy Issue	Department (police department morale)
Police Governance	Political Activist
Succession	Unscheduled/Ad Hoc
Selection	Bets Man Available
Career Path	Outsider
Position before Appointment	Mayoral Candidate/Attorney
Police Independence	Autonomist
Civilian Control	Latent Political
Manifest Departure	Policy Differences
Latent Reason for departure	Politics (Enforcement)
Tenure	9 months, 23 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	59
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

19.

Lewis J. Valentine

September 26, 1934 - September 14, 1945

“The policy of the Police Commissioner must be founded on the policy of the Mayor.”

Mayor	Fiorello LaGuardia (3 terms)
Political Party	Fusion/Republican
Policy Issue	Department (reform-elimination of politics)
Police Governance	Political Activist
Succession	Unscheduled/ad hoc; Scheduled/Institutional*
Selection	Best Man Available
Career Path	Insider Law Enforcement
Position before Appointment	Chief Inspector NYPD
Police Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Non-Political
Manifest Departure	New employment)
Latent Departure election	Mayor announced he would not seek re-
Tenure	10 years, 11 months, 19 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	Yes
Prior Uniform Law enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	52
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

* Valentine served eleven years. Re-appointments in February 1936 and 1941 were Scheduled/Institutional.

20.

Arthur W. Wallander
September 23, 1945 - February 28, 1949

“I definitely say that there is definitely no politics in my retirement...”

Mayor I	Fiorello LaGuardia
Mayor II	William O’Dwyer (2 terms)
Political Party I	Fusion/Republican
Political Party II	Tammany Democrat
Policy Issue I	Department (increasing size of police department)
Police Governance I	Insufficient data
Police Governance II	Political Activist
Succession	Unscheduled/ad hoc
Selection	Deserving Local Fellow
Career Path	Insider Law Enforcement
Position before Appointment	Deputy Chief Inspector NYPD
Police Independence I	N/A
Police Independence II	Professional
Civilian Control	Latent Political
Manifest Departure	New Employment
Latent Departure	Political (Personnel)
Tenure	3 years, 5 months
Prior Uniform NYPD	Yes
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	53
Education	No
Gender	Male
Race	White

* Wallander was appointed and served under the LaGuardia Administration for only three months.** Wallander was retained by Mayor O’Dwyer and the February 1946 appointment was Scheduled.

21.

William P. O'Brien

March 1, 1949 - September 25, 1950

“I wouldn’t stay in the department for twenty-four hours if I thought I had to sacrifice my integrity.”

Mayor I	William O’Dwyer
Mayor II	Vincent Impelliteri (Acting)*
Political Party I	Tammany Democrat
Political Party II	Independent Democrat*
Policy Issue I	Corruption (Gambling Enforcement)
Policy Issue II	Corruption
Police Governance I	Professional Autonomy
Police Governance II	Political Activist
Succession	Unscheduled/as hoc
Selection	Deserving Local Fellow
Career Path	Insider Law Enforcement
Position before Appointment	First Deputy Commissioner NYPD
Police Independence I	N/A
Police Independence II	Professional
Civilian Control	Political
Manifest Departure	Position Untenable
Latent Departure	External Corruption Investigation
Tenure	18 months, 24 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	Yes
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	Yes
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	58
Education	No
Gender	Male
Race	White

* Won special election to O’Dwyer’s unexpired term.

22.

Thomas F. Murphy

September 26, 1950 - July 5, 1951

“No police department can ever hope to maintain the status quo. If it is not progressing, it is retrogressing; there is no in between.”

Mayor	Vincent Impelliteri
Political Party	Independent Democrat
Policy Issue	Department (police department re-organization)
Police Governance	Professional Autonomy
Succession	Unscheduled/ad hoc/Scheduled/Institutional*
Selection	Best Man available
Career Path	Insider Criminal Justice
Position before Appointment	United States Attorney
Police Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Non-Political
Manifest Departure	New Employment
Latent Departure	Not receptive to external department review
Tenure	9 months, 9 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Uniform Law enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	Yes
Age at Appointment	44
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

23.

George P. Monaghan
July 9, 1951 - December 31, 1953

“You are liable to wake...any morning and find your head handed to you in the press.”

Mayor	Vincent Impelliteri
Political Party	Independent Democrat
Policy Issue	Enforcement (narcotics)
Police Governance	Team
Succession	Unscheduled/ad hoc
Selection	Man Closest to the Party
Career Path	Insider Criminal Justice
Position before Appointment	NYC Fire Commissioner
Police Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Non-Political
Manifest Departure	New Administration
Latent Departure	Avoid Removal
Tenure	29 months, 22 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	Yes
Age at Appointment	50
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

24.

Francis W.H. Adams
January 1, 1954 - August 1, 1955

“Whenever my private affairs required it, I would be allowed to surrender my post. That time has now come.”

Mayor	Robert F. Wagner, Jr.
Political Party	Tammany Democrat
Policy Issue	Department (police efficiency)
Police Governance	Professional Autonomy
Succession	Unscheduled/Ad Hoc
Selection	Best Man Available
Career Path	Insider Criminal Justice
Position before Appointment	Attorney
Police Independence	Autonomist
Civilian Control	Latent Political
Manifest Departure	Employment (Return to private law practice)
Latent Departure	Mayor Induced
Tenure	19 months
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	Yes
Age at Appointment	49
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

25.

Stephen P. Kennedy

August 2, 1955 - February 22, 1961

“I will not accept another term as Police Commissioner...this inertia, indecision, and drift must end.”

Mayor	Robert F. Wagner, Jr.
Political Party	Tammany Democrat
Policy Issue	Department (Professionalization of Police)
Police Governance	Team
Succession	Unscheduled/ad hoc
Selection	Local Deserving Fellow
Career Path	Insider Law Enforcement
Position before Appointment	Chief Inspector NYPD
Police Independence	Autonomist
Civilian Control	Non-Political
Manifest Departure	Policy Differences
Latent Departure	Mayor Induced
Tenure	5 years, 6 months, 20 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	Yes
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	48
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

26.

Michael J. Murphy

February 23, 1961 - June 6, 1965

“I, as Police Commissioner, having sole responsibility under the law...will go on making my determinations according to professional police judgment”

Mayor	Robert F. Wagner, Jr.
Political Party	Tammany Democrat
Policy Issue	Department (Professionalization of Police)
Police Governance	Team
Succession	Scheduled/Institutional
Selection	Local Deserving Fellow
Career Path	Insider Law Enforcement
Position before Appointment	Chief Inspector NYPD
Police Independence	Autonomist
Civilian Control	Non-Political
Manifest Departure	New Employment
Latent Departure	Politics (Civilian Complaint Review Board)
Tenure	4 years, 3 months, 14 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	Yes
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	47
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

27.

Vincent L. Broderick
June 7, 1965 - February 21, 1966

“It’s a problem job, it always has been a problem job, and it always will be.”

Mayor I	Robert F. Wagner, Jr.
Mayor II	John V. Lindsay
Political Party I	Tammany Democrat
Political Party II	Republican/Liberal
Policy Issue I	Community (community relations)
Policy Issue II	Civilian Review Board
Police Governance I	Insufficient data
Police Governance II	Political Activist
Succession	Unscheduled/Ad Hoc
Selection	Best Man Available
Career Path	Insider Criminal Justice
Position before Appointment	Chief Assistant US Attorney
Police Independence I	N/A
Police Administration II	Autonomist
Civilian Control	Non-Political
Manifest Departure	Expiration of Term
Latent Departure	Mayor Induced (Not re-appointed)
Tenure	8 months, 14 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	Yes
Prior Criminal Justice	Yes
Age at Appointment	45
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

28.

Howard R. Leary

February 22, 1966 - October 8, 1970

“I’ve been around too long to get caught in any type of jam. When I go you won’t even know it.”

Mayor	John V. Lindsay
Political party	Republican/Liberal
Policy Issue	Community (Civilian Review Board)
Police Governance	Team
Succession	Scheduled/Institutional
Selection	Best man available
Career Path	Law Enforcement Executive
Position before Appointment	Police Commissioner (City of Philadelphia)
Police Independence	Autonomist
Civilian Control	Latent Political
Manifest Departure	No reason offered
Latent Departure	External Investigation
Tenure	4 years, 7 months, 16 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Law Enforcement	Yes
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	54
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

29.

Patrick V. Murphy

October 9, 1970 - May 12, 1973

“If it becomes impossible for me to function...I will leave.”

Mayor	John V. Lindsay (2 terms)
Political Party	Republican/Liberal
Policy Issue	Department (Police Reform)
Police Governance	Professional Autonomy
Succession	Unscheduled/ad hoc
Selection	Best Man available
Career Path	Multiple Agency
Position before Appointment	Police Commissioner (City of Detroit)
Police Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Non-Political
Manifest Departure	New Employment
Latent Departure	Mayor announced he would not seek a third term
Tenure	31 months, 3 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	Yes
Prior Law Enforcement	Yes
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	Yes
Age at Appointment	50
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

30.

Donald F. Cawley

May 13, 1973 - January 11, 1974

“I have not submitted my resignation.”

Mayor	John V. Lindsay
Mayor II	Abraham Beame
Political Party I	Republican/Liberal
Political Party II	Democrat
Policy Issue	Department (Police Reform)
Police Governance I	Insufficient data
Police Governance II	Political Activist
Succession	Unscheduled/ad hoc
Selection	Local Deserving fellow
Career Path	Insider Law Enforcement
Position before Appointment	Chief of Patrol NYPD
Police Independence I	N/A
Police Independence II	Antagonist
Civilian Control	Political
Manifest Departure	New Administration
Latent Departure	Avoid Removal
Tenure	7 months, 29 days.
Prior Uniform NYPD	Yes
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	43
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

31.

Michael Codd

January 12, 1974 - December 31, 1977

“The Mayor-elect called...he wanted to appoint me Commissioner...I think Mrs. Codd and I were preparing dinner at the time.”

Mayor	Abraham Beame
Political Party	Democrat
Policy Issue	Department (Police Department re-organization)
Police Governance	Team
Succession	Unscheduled; Scheduled/Institutional
Selection	Local Deserving fellow
Career Path	Insider Law Enforcement
Position before Appointment	Retired Chief Inspector NYPD
Police Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Non-Political
Manifest Departure	New Administration
Latent Departure	Avoid Removal
Tenure	3 years, 11 months, 19 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	Yes
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	57
Education	No
Gender	Male
Race	White

32.

Robert J. McGuire

January 1, 1978 - December 29, 1983

“Day comes I don’t like the game, I’ll pick up my basketball and go home.”

Mayor	Edward I. Koch
Political Party	Democrat
Policy Issue	Department (Police Administration)
Police Governance	Team
Succession	Unscheduled/Scheduled (Feb. 1981)
Selection	Best Man Available
Career Path	Insider Criminal Justice
Position before Appointment	Attorney
Police Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Non-Political
Manifest Departure	New Employment
Latent Departure	Politics (Minority Relations)
Tenure	5 years, 11 months, 29 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	Yes
Age at Appointment	41
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

33.

William Devine

December 30, 1983 - December 31, 1983

“I’ll take it!”

Mayor	Edward I. Koch (3 terms)
Political Party	Democrat
Policy Issue	N/A
Police Governance	Team
Succession	Unscheduled/Ad Hoc
Selection Type	Local Deserving Fellow
Career Path type	Insider Law Enforcement
Position before Appointment	First Deputy Commissioner NYPD
Professional Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Non-Political
Manifest Reason for departure	Health
Latent Reason for departure	Health
Tenure	2 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	Yes
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	Yes
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	54
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

34.

Benjamin Ward

January 1, 1984 - October 22, 1989

“When [Mayor Koch] wants to see me I’m always in the same place 1 Police Plaza.”

Mayor	Edward Koch
Political Party	Democrat
Policy Issue	Community (Quality of Life)
Police Governance	Team
Succession	Unscheduled/Ad Hoc
Selection	Man Closest to the Party
Career Path	Multiple Agency
Position before Appointment	NYC Corrections Commissioner
Police Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Non-Political
Manifest Departure	Health
Latent Departure	Possible advisor to David N. Dinkins, Democratic mayoral candidate
Tenure	5 years, 9 months, 21 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	Yes
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	Yes
Prior Criminal Justice	Yes
Age at Appointment	57
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	Black

35.

Richard J. Condon

October 23, 1989 - January 21, 1990

“The new mayor will do whatever the new mayor wishes to do, and I’ll abide by what the new mayor wishes to do.”

Mayor I	Edward I. Koch
Mayor II	David N. Dinkins
Political Party I	Democrat
Political Party II	Democrat
Policy Issue I	Insufficient data
Policy Issue II	N/A
Police Governance I	Insufficient data
Police Governance II	Political Activist
Succession	Unscheduled/ad hoc
Selection	Local Deserving Fellow
Career Path	Multiple Agency
Position before Appointment	First Deputy Commissioner NYPD
Police Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Political
Manifest Departure	New Administration
Latent Departure	Avoid Removal
Tenure	2 months, 29 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	Yes
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	Yes
Prior Criminal Justice	Yes
Age at Appointment	53
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

36.

Lee P. Brown

January 22, 1990 - August 4, 1992

“When you leave as the Police Commissioner of
New York, where else do you go?”

Mayor	David N. Dinkins
Political Party	Democrat
Policy Issue	Community (Community Policing)
Police Governance	Political Activist
Succession	Unscheduled/Scheduled
Selection	Best Man Available
Career Path	Law Enforcement Executive
Position before Appointment	Police Chief (City of Houston)
Police Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Non-Political
Manifest Departure	Family
Latent Departure	Uncomfortable with media scrutiny
Tenure	23 months, 30 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Law Enforcement	Yes
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	52
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	Black

37.

Raymond W. Kelly

September 1, 1992- January 9, 1994

“I literally grew up in this organization....
To reach this level is mind-boggling”

Mayor I	David N. Dinkins
Mayor II	Rudolph Giuliani
Political Party I	Democrat
Political Party II	Fusion - Republican/Liberal Independent
Policy Issue I	Corruption (Corruption scandal)
Policy Issue II	N/A
Police Governance I	Insufficient data
Police Governance II	Political Activist
Succession	Unscheduled/Ad Hoc (Acting)
Selection	Local Deserving Fellow
Career Path	Insider Law Enforcement
Position before Appointment	First Deputy Commissioner NYPD
Police Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Political
Manifest Departure	New Administration
Latent Departure	Avoid Removal
Tenure	16 months, 8 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	Yes
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	Yes
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	51
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

38.

William J. Bratton

January 10, 1994 - April 14, 1996

“If I don’t deliver, get rid of me.”

Mayor	Rudolph Giuliani
Political Party	Fusion - Republican/Liberal Independent
Policy Issue	Community (Quality of Life)
Police Governance	Political Activist
Succession	Unscheduled/Ad Hoc
Selection	Best Man Available
Career Path	Law Enforcement Executive
Position before Appointment	Police Commissioner (City of Boston)
Police Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Non-Political
Manifest Departure	New Employment
Latent Departure	Mayor Induced
Tenure	27 months, 4 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	No*
Prior Law Enforcement	Yes
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	No
Age at Appointment	46
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

* Served as Chief, New York Transit Police prior to merger with NYPD in 1995.

39.

Howard Safir

April 15, 1996 - August 20, 2000

“I’ve told Rudy that as long as he returns my phone calls, I’m here to stay. The day he doesn’t I’m gone.”

Mayor	Rudolph Giuliani
Political Party	Fusion- Republican/Liberal/Independent
Policy Issue	Community (Crime Prevention)
Police Governance	Team
Succession	Scheduled/Institutional*
Selection	Man Closest to the Party (M)
Career Path	Multiple Agency
Position before Appointment	NYC Fire Commissioner
Police Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Non-Political
Manifest Departure	New employment
Latent Departure	Health
Tenure	4 years, 4 months, 5 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	No
Prior Law Enforcement	No
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	Yes
Age at Appointment	54
Education	Yes
Gender	Male
Race	White

*** Commissioner Bratton’s term expired February 21, 1996. Mayor Giuliani delayed decision until April and selected Howard Safir to a new five year term.**

August 8, 2000 - December 31, 2001

“The most successful rescue mission in the history of this country was done on September 11 and I was in charge of the N.Y.P.D.”

Mayor	Rudolph Guiliani
Political Party	Fusion - Republican/Liberal/Independent
Policy Issue	Community (Community Relations)
Police Governance	Team
Succession	Unscheduled/Ad Hoc
Selection	Man Closest to the Party
Career Path	Multiple Agency
Position before Appointment	NYC Corrections Commissioner
Police Independence	Professional
Civilian Control	Non-Political
Manifest Departure	Family
Latent Departure	Loyalty to Mayor
Tenure	16 months, 23 days
Prior Uniform NYPD	Yes
Prior Law Enforcement	Yes
Prior Civilian NYPD	No
Prior Criminal Justice	Yes
Age at Appointment	44
Education	No
Gender	Male
Race	White

*** Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly was appointed in January 2002 and was still active and not included in this study.**

APPENDIX B:
NEW YORK CITY MAYORS 1901-2001

Term	Mayor	Political Party/Affiliation
1898-1901	Robert Van Wyck	Democrat (Tammany)
1902-1903	Seth Low	Fusion
1904-1909	George Brinton McClellan	Democrat (Tammany)
1910-1913	William Jay Gaynor	Democrat (Tammany)
1913-1913	Ardolph H. Kline (Acting)*	Democrat
1914-1917	John Puroy Mitchell	Fusion
1918-1925	John F. Hylan	Democrat (Tammany)
1926-1932	James J. Walker**	Democrat (Tammany)
1932	Joseph V. McKee (Acting)***	Democrat
1933	John P. O'Brien****	Democrat (Tammany)
1934-1945	Fiorello H. LaGuardia	Fusion
1946-1950	William O'Dwyer*****	Democrat (Tammany)
1950-1953	Vincent R. Impellitteri*****	Democrat/Independent
1954-1965	Robert F. Wagner	Democrat (Tammany)
1966-1973	John V. Lindsay	Fusion (R)
1974-1977	Abraham D. Beame	Democrat
1978-1989	Edward I. Koch	Democrat
1990-1993	David N. Dinkins	Democrat
1994-2001	Rudolph W. Giuliani	Fusion (R)

***When Mayor Gaynor died in office. Alderman President Kline became Acting Mayor.**

****Mayor Walker resigned September 1, 1932. ***McKee became Acting mayor (September 1, 1932 to December 31, 1932). **** O'Brien elected to fill Walker's unexpired term (January 1, 1933 to December 31, 1933). *****O'Dwyer resigned September 2, 1950. ***** Impellitteri was Acting Mayor (September 2, 1950 to November 14, 1950) and elected mayor in November 1950. Acting Mayors Ardolph L. Kline and Joseph V. McKee included in a list of NYC Mayors at <http://www.nyc.gov/html/artcom/html/about/members.shtml#mayors> [2009, January 12]**

Source: New York City Department of Citywide Administrative Services (2007). [Online]. Available: http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcas/html/features/green_book_mayors.shtml. [2007, March 1]

APPENDIX C:

NEW YORK CITY

POLICE COMMISSIONERS TERMS 1901-2001

To explain in detail the varied work which falls to the lot of the police superintendent in New York would occupy many pages, and I can give only a brief sketch of his complex duties. The hours of the day, even when reinforced by those of the night, are barely sufficient to meet all the requirements of the situation...Anything like regular hours or an established routine of work was altogether impossible.

- George Walling, New York Superintendent of Police (1888).

Term				Months	Police Commissioner	
1901 - 1910:						
Feb.	22	1901 - Jan.	1	1902	10M, 8D	Michael C. Murphy
Jan.	1	1902 - Jan.	1	1903	12M	John N. Partridge
Jan.	1	1903.- Jan.	1	1904	12M	Frances V. Greene
Jan.	1	1904 - Jan.	1	1906	24M	William McAdoo
Jan.	1	1906 - Jul.	1	1909	42M	Theodore A. Bingham
Jul.	1	1909 - Oct.	20	1910	15M,19D	William F. Baker
1911 - 1920:						
Oct.	20	1910 - May	23	1911	7M, 3D	James C. Cropsey
May	23	1911 - Dec.	31	1913	31M, 8D	Rhinelanders Waldo
Dec.	31	1913 - Apr.	8	1914	3M, 8D	Douglas L. McKay
Apr.	8	1914 - Jan.	1	1918	44M,24D	Arthur Woods
Jan.	1	1918 - Jan.	23	1918	23D	Frederick H. Bugher
Jan.	23	1918 - Dec.	30	1925	101M, 7D	Richard E. Enright
1921 - 1930:						
Jan.	1	1926 - Apr.	12	1927	15M, 11D	Geo. V. McLaughlin
Apr.	12	1927 - Dec.	18	1928	20M, 6D	Joseph A. Warren
Dec.	18	1928 - May	21	1930	17M, 3D	Grover A. Whalen

APPENDIX C:

NEW YORK CITY

POLICE COMMISSIONERS TERMS 1901-2001

Term				Months		Police Commissioner
1931 – 1940:						
May	21	1930 - Apr.	12	1933	34M, 22D	Edward P. Mulrooney
Apr	15	1933 - Dec.	31	1933	8M, 16D	James S. Bolan
Jan.	1	1934 - Sep.	24	1934	8M, 23D	John F. O’Ryan
Sept.	25	1934 - Sep.	14	1945	120M, 354D	Lewis J. Valentine
1941 - 1950:						
Sept.	23	1945 - Feb.	28	1949	41M, 5D	Arthur W. Wallander
Mar.	1	1949 - Sep.	25	1950	18M, 24D	William P. O’Brien
Sept.	26	1950 - Jul.	5	1951	9M, 9D	Thomas F. Murphy
1951 - 1960:						
Jul.	9	1951 - Dec.	31	1953	29M, 22D	George P. Monaghan
Jan.	1	1954 - Aug.	1	1955	19M	Francis W.H. Adams
Aug.	2	1955 - Feb.	22	1961	66M, 20D	Stephen P. Kennedy
1961 - 1970:						
Feb.	23	1961 - Jun.	6	1965	51M, 11D	Michael J. Murphy
Jun.	7	1965 - Feb.	21	1966	8M, 14D	Vincent L. Broderick
Feb.	22	1966 - Oct.	8	1970	55M, 16D	Howard R. Leary
1971 - 1980:						
Oct.	9	1970 - May	12	1973	31M, 3D	Patrick V. Murphy
May	13	1973 - Jan.	11	1974	7M, 29D	Donald F. Cawley
Jan.	12	1974 - Dec.	31	1977	47M, 19D	Michael J. Codd
Jan.	1	1978 - Dec.	29	1983	71M, 28D	Robert J. McGuire

APPENDIX C:

NEW YORK CITY

POLICE COMMISSIONERS TERMS 1901-2001

Term				Months/Days		Police Commissioner
1981 - 1990:						
Dec.	30	1983 - Dec.	31	1983	2D	William J. Devine *
Jan.	1	1984 - Oct.	22	1989	57M,21D	Benjamin Ward
Oct.	23	1989 - Jan.	21	1990	2M, 27D	Richard J. Condon
1991 - 2001:						
Jan.	22	1990 - Sept.	1	1992	31M, 10D	Lee P. Brown
Oct.	16	1992 - Jan.	9	1994	14M, 24D	Raymond W. Kelly
Jan.	10	1994 - Apr.	14	1996	27M, 4D	William J. Bratton
Apr.	15	1996 - Aug.	20	2000	52M, 5D	Howard Safir
Aug.	21	2000 - Dec.	31	2001	15M, 10D	Bernard B. Kerik

*** William P. Devine served two days as police commissioner.**

Mean = 30.05 months (N=40); 30.82 months (N=39*)

Median = 22 months (N=40); 19.5 (N=39*)

Mode = 9 months (3), 15 months* (N=3).

***Excluding Commissioner William Devine who served 2 days in a prearranged agreement to step down).**

Source: Office of Management Analysis and Planning, New York City Police Department (2006).

APPENDIX D: **PROGRESSION OF MAYORAL INVOLVEMENT**

Political Period 1901-2001

1. Murphy	Non-Political (NP)
2. Partridge	XXXXXXXXXXXXLatent Political(LP)
3. Greene	XXXXXXXX(NP)
4. McAdoo	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXPolitical (P)
5. Bingham	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (P)
6. Baker	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (P)
7. Cropsey	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX(LP)
8. Waldo	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (P)
9. McKay	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX(LP)
10 Woods	XXXXXXXX(NP)
11. Bugher	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (P)
12. Enright	XXXXXXXX(NP)

Reform Period: (1926 -1950)

13. McLaughlin	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX(LP)
14. Warren	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX(LP)
15. Whalen	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX(LP)
16. Mulrooney	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX(LP)
17. Bolan	XXXXXXXX(NP)
18. O’Ryan	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX(LP)
19. Valentine	XXXXXXXX(NP)
20. Wallander	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (LP)
21. O’Brien	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX(P)
22. Murphy	XXXXXXXX(NP)

APPENDIX D:

PROGRESSION OF MAYORAL INVOLVEMENT

Professional Period: (1951-1975)

25. Kennedy XXXXXXXXXX(NP)
 26. Murphy XXXXXXXXXX(NP)
 27. Broderick XXXXXXXXXXXX(NP)
 28. Leary XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX(LP)
 23. Monaghan XXXXXXXXXXXX(NP)
 24. Adams XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX(LP)
 29. Murphy XXXXXXXXXX(NP)
 30. Cawley XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX(P)
 31. Codd XXXXXXXXXX(NP)

Community Period: (1976-2001)

32. McGuire XXXXXXXXXX(NP)
 33. Devine XXXXXXXXXX(NP)
 34. Ward XXXXXXXXXX(NP)
 35. Condon XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX(P)*
 36. Brown XXXXXXXXXX(NP)
 37. Kelly XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX(P)*
 38. Bratton XXXXXXXXXX(NP)
 39. Safir XXXXXXXXXX(NP)
 40. Kerik XXXXXXXXXX(NP)

* Police Commissioners Condon and Kelly's incumbency overlapped into the next administration and resigned once a new police commissioner was named.

APPENDIX E:

CO-TERMINOUS MAYOR/POLICE COMMISSIONER DYADS

<u>Mayor</u>	<u>Police Commissioner</u>
Robert Van Wyck (1:1)	Michael C. Murphy
Seth Low (1:2)	John N. Partridge Frances V. Greene
George Brinton McClellan (1:3)	William McAdoo Theodore A. Bingham William F. Baker
William Jay Gaynor (1:3)	William F. Baker James C. Cropsey Rhinelanders Waldo
Ardolph H. Kline (Acting Mayor) (1:2)	Rhinelanders Waldo Douglas McKay
John Puroy Mitchell (1:2)	Douglas I. McKay* Arthur Woods
John F. Hylan (1:2)	Frederick H. Bugher Richard E. Enright
James J. Walker (1:4)	George V. McLaughlin Joseph A. Warren Grover A. Whelan Edward P. Mulrooney
Joseph V. McKee (1:1)	Edward P. Mulrooney
John P. O'Brien (1:2)	Edward Mulrooney James S. Bolan
Fiorello H. LaGuardia (1:3)	John F. O'Ryan Lewis J. Valentine Arthur W. Wallander

APPENDIX E:

COTERMINOUS MAYOR/POLICE COMMISSIONER DYADS

<u>Mayor</u>	<u>Police Commissioner</u>
William O'Dwyer (1:2)	Arthur W. Wallander William P. O'Brien
Vincent R. Impelliteri (1:3)	William P. O'Brien Thomas F. Murphy George F. Monaghan
Robert F. Wagner (1:4)	Francis W.H. Adams Stephan P. Kennedy Michael J. Murphy Vincent L. Broderick
John V. Lindsay (1:4)	Vincent L. Broderick Howard R. Leary Patrick V. Murphy Donald F. Cawley
Abraham D. Beame (1:2)	Donald F. Cawley Michael J. Codd
Edward I. Koch (1:4)	Robert J. McGuire William J. Devine** Benjamin Ward Richard J. Condon
David N. Dinkins (1:3)	Richard J. Condon Lee P. Brown Raymond W. Kelly
Rudolph W. Guiliani (1:4)	Raymond W. Kelly William J. Bratton Howard Safir Bernard B. Kerik

*** Commissioner McKay was appointed on December 31 by the outgoing Acting Mayor Kline. **Served as Police Commissioner two days in a pre-arranged agreement with Mayor Koch due to illness.**

APPENDIX F

CODING DEFINITIONS

1. SUCCESSION: Terms relating to changes in command are borrowed from Bynander and Hart (2005). The descriptions have been modified to fit the present study. The essence of the original description has been retained.

Scheduled/Institutionalized - a succession which coincides with the expiration of a Police Commissioner's five year term of office as per the City Charter. The first scheduled/institutionalized succession occurred February 21, 1901 and a new term began every five years on or about February 21; 1906, 1911, 1916, 1921, 1926, 1931, 1936, 1941, 1946, 1951, 1956, 1961, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, and 2001, or, a succession which is directly linked to the February 21st date regardless of the date of succession (i.e. Commissioner Brown's term which Commissioner Bratton was completing expired February 21, 1996 and Commissioner Safir was appointed April 15, 1996 to begin a new five year term which technically began on February 22, 1996). As the term expirations are scheduled, and counting the first appointment as a scheduled succession, there are 21 Scheduled/Institutionalized successions.

Unscheduled/Ad Hoc - a succession which does not qualify as a scheduled/institutionalized succession (see above). It is not fixed and can occur at any time during a Mayoral administration.

2. SELECTION: The terms pertaining to appointments are borrowed from Wilson (1968). The descriptions have been adapted to fit the present study.

Best Man Available: (Outsider) - an individual who does not hold a New York City public service post, or uniform or civilian position with the New York Police Department at the time of selection and does not fit any other category.

Local Deserving Fellow (Insider) - an individual who is a member of the New York Police Department either as a sworn uniform officer; an appointed civilian deputy commissioner; or retired from the New York Police Department less than one year at the time of selection..

Man Closest to the Party (Patronage) - an individual who holds a New York City public service post in other than the New York Police Department at the time of selection.

3. POLICE COMMISSIONER APPOINTMENT PERIOD: The period in which the date of the Police Commissioner's swearing in falls. The terms are borrowed from the acknowledged three policing eras found in the literature

Political/Reform, Professional, Community with minor adaptations for the purposes of the present study. Although these are the accepted eras they do not possess fixed starting or ending dates and it is understood that there is overlap. The present study breaks the one hundred year period into four quarters to better accommodate and situate the data. The four appointment periods:

Political:	The swearing-in occurred between 1901 and 1925.
Reform:	The swearing-in occurred between 1926 and 1950.
Professional:	The swearing-in occurred between 1951 and 1975.
Community:	The swearing-in occurred between 1976 and 2001.

4. CAREER PATH The variable is borrowed from Enter (1984). The categories and descriptions have been modified to fit the present study.

Law Enforcement Executive - an individual whose prior law enforcement experience is as head of a Federal police agency (i.e. US Park Police), a municipal police department (i.e. Houston, Philadelphia, Boston, Brooklyn), executive level management position with a Federal law enforcement agency (i.e. US Marshall Service), or local law enforcement agency (i.e. Ashokan Dam Water Police), and fits no other category.

Insider Criminal Justice - an individual who was never a sworn law enforcement officer, but has prior experience in criminal justice i.e. US Attorney's Office, local District Attorney's Office, or as a civilian Deputy Commissioner, New York Police Department, and fits no other category.

Multiple Agency - an individual from a varied career which involved sworn uniform law enforcement experience with the New York Police Department and criminal justice experience with Federal (i.e. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, US DOJ), State (i.e. Division of Criminal Justice Services), or local agencies (i.e. Department of Corrections), and fits no other category.

Insider Law Enforcement - an individual who has sworn uniform law enforcement experience which is solely with the New York Police Department and fits no other category.

Outsider - an individual from a non-law enforcement profession which is not related to criminal justice i.e. politics, military, law, business, public service.

5. METHOD OF DEPARTURE: The manner in which the Police Commissioner vacated the Office of Police Commissioner.

Resignation - the Police Commissioner submitted a formal letter of resignation to the Mayor, or resigned orally.

Dismissal - the Mayor summarily dismissed, or removed the Police Commissioner.

Resignation/Dismissal - the Mayor did not accept a Police Commissioner's letter of resignation, and instead summarily dismissed the Police Commissioner.

6. TYPE OF POLICE GOVERNANCE The terms are borrowed from Mastrofski (1988) and describe the Mayor's level of involvement in police affairs based on the Mayor's words and/or actions. In the event of a discrepancy or difference between the two, the Mayor's actions will dictate the type of police governance.

Professional Autonomist- the Professional Autonomist gives the Police Commissioner a "free hand" in running the Police Department without overt political interference. This type of police governance manifests itself with little contact beyond selecting the police commissioner, making ceremonial appearances, receiving annual reports, and proposing the budget, etc. and does not fit any other category.

Team Player - the Team Player complements the Police Commissioner in a true partnership. This type of police governance manifests itself by regular meetings or conferences with the Police Commissioner regarding policy and operations, frequent communication and collaboration, dispensing direction when requested by the Police Commissioner, strong professional and/or personal relationship with the Police Commissioner, formulation of policy, supporting and defending the Police Commissioner against third party criticism, etc. and does not fit any other category.

Political Activist - the Political Activist is actively engaged and takes a personal interest in police affairs and/or allows someone other than the Police Commissioner to be directly involved in police affairs. This type of police governance will manifest itself in the following manner: bypassing the Police Commissioner, publicly rebuking the Police Commissioner, publicly ordering the Police Commissioner, publicly criticizing the Police Commissioner or allowing others to do so, publicly overruling or vetoing proposed legislation by the Police Commissioner, initiating investigations into police affairs, taking control of the police department temporarily due to unsatisfactory performance, convening committees to probe police related matters, taking a personal interest in a particular incident or police affairs generally, requesting the Police Commissioner's resignation and summarily dismissing the Police Commissioner, selecting another individual other than the incumbent for the place or any other occurrence which shows a propensity to control or direct police affairs and does not fit any other category.

7. CIVILIAN CONTROL denotes the role of the primary individual responsible for the Police Commissioner's departure usually the incumbent mayor and/or mayor-elect.

Political - a departure which is publicly induced by the Mayor/Mayor-elect.

Non-political - a departure which is not publicly induced by the Mayor/Mayor-elect.

Latent Political - a departure which appears not to be publicly induced by the Mayor/Mayor-elect, but which occurs amidst speculation, innuendo, rumor, and conjecture to the contrary, and that the departure was precipitated or provoked privately by the Mayor through acts of commission (i.e. political pressure) or omission (i.e. remained silent as the Police Commissioner is criticized by third parties who called for his resignation and/or removal), etc.

8. MANIFEST RATIONALE: The reason stated by the Police Commissioner and reported in the media as to why the police commissioner departed.

New Administration - the Police Commissioner resigned after the announcement of a successor, or a Mayor's intention to select a different police commissioner.

New Employment - the Police Commissioner resigned for other public or private employment.

Requested to Resign - the Mayor provided an opportunity for the Police Commissioner to resign in lieu of dismissal.

Dismissed - the Mayor removed the Police Commissioner

Term Expired - the Mayor did not re-appoint the Police Commissioner after his term expired.

Declined Retention Offer - the Police Commissioner chose not to accept a reappointment by either an incumbent Mayor or new administration.

Family - the Police Commissioner's resignation is due to a personal family matter

Health - the Police Commissioner's resignation is due to a health concern

Misconduct - the Police Commissioner's resignation is due to allegations of misconduct.

No Reason - the Police Commissioner resigned and did not state a reason

9. LATENT RATIONALE: The underlying cause, or subtext of the Police Commissioner's departure as interpreted by the totality of the circumstances regarding the relationship between the Police Commissioner and Mayor during the term. This category is based on the reported actions and/or statements of either, or both the Mayor and Police Commissioner, third party accounts, newspaper editorials, etc.

Politics (Pull) - political involvement by the Mayor, political machines, elected officials, etc. in an attempt to influence police personnel matters i.e. appointments, transfers, promotions, discipline, etc.

Politics (Enforcement) - political involvement by the Mayor, political machines, elected officials, etc. in an attempt to influence police enforcement efforts against certain crimes i.e. excise, vice, gambling, etc.

Mayor Induced - the Mayor commits acts of commission, or omission, and/or makes public statements either personally or through a spokesman in which it is reasonable to assume the intention is intended to force the Police Commissioner's resignation.

External Oversight/Pressure - a Federal, State, or Local committee convened to investigate the police in general, or the New York Police Department in particular i.e. Curran Committee, Knapp Commission, Mollen Commission, Mayor's Management Team Survey, City Council hearings, Civilian Review Board, police discipline, Gross gambling graft corruption scandal, racial unrest, etc.

10. POLICE INDEPENDENCE: The Police Commissioner's public demeanor toward the Mayor at the time of his departure from office.

Professional: The Police Commissioner does not publicly criticize the Mayor..

Autonomist: The Police Commissioner does publicly criticize the Mayor.

Antagonist: The Police Commissioner is publicly defiant of the Mayor.

11. PRIORITY STATEMENT: Any significant issue to be addressed at the beginning of a police commissioner's term as announced by the incumbent Mayor, Mayor-elect and/or incumbent Police Commissioner, or individual slated to become police commissioner. Policy is comprised of four categories; Corruption, Department, Community, and Enforcement. Absent a clear enunciation of a new policy the last policy is considered in force for the purposes of this study.

Enforcement: Includes references to the enforcement of particular offenses i.e. gangs, narcotics and fits no other category.

Corruption: includes references to the enforcement of particular laws which historically involve graft, extortion, etc. by police i.e. excise, gambling, disorderly houses, prostitution, etc.

Department: includes references to police reform, police department re-organization, elimination of politics in appointments, transfers, assignments, demotions and promotions, increasing department efficiency, administration, morale, size, and police professionalization, etc.

Community: references to community relations, crime prevention, quality of life, community policing, etc. and fits no other category.

12. PRIOR SWORN NYPD LAW ENFORCEMENT EXPERIENCE:

Yes

No

13. PRIOR SWORN LAW ENFORCEMENT BACKGROUND OTHER THAN NYPD

Yes

No

14. PRIOR NYPD CIVILIAN DEPUTY POLICE COMMISSIONER EXPERIENCE

Yes

No

15. PRIOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE BACKGROUND: Any prior experience with a criminal justice agency (i.e. Federal prosecutor, District Attorney, corrections, etc.) other than as a sworn uniform member of a law enforcement agency.

Yes .

No

.

16. LAST OFFICIAL POST: The last formal position held by the police commissioner prior to his selection.

Uniform Member NYPD

Civilian Member NYPD

Uniform Member Other than NYPD

Public Official-Local - New York City

Public Official-State – New York State

Public Official-Federal – US Federal Government

Private - Non-Governmental Organization

17. RANKED EXPERIENCE: The individual's career path experience ranked according to the following criteria: NYPD before another law enforcement agency, sworn uniform before civilian personnel, and law enforcement before other criminal justice experience. Any other path which is not covered by the aforementioned hierarchical criteria.

1. Sworn Uniform Member - NYPD

2. Sworn Uniform Member - Other Law Enforcement agency

3. Civilian Member - NYPD

4. Criminal Justice other than sworn uniform member Law Enforcement

5. Other employment experience including military, or private sector

17. EDUCATION LEVEL:

Yes - police commissioner possesses at least a Bachelor degree or LL.B. or JD.

No/Undetermined - police commissioner does not possess at least a bachelor degree or it could not be determined.

18. DEMOGRAPHICS:

AGE AT APPOINTMENT

Under 40 years

Between 40 and 45 years

Between 46 and 50 years

Between 50 and 55 years

Over 55 years

RACE

White - police commissioner is Caucasian

Black - police commissioner is Negroid

Spanish - police commissioner is Hispanic

Other - police commissioner is an ethnicity not represented by the other three categories.

GENDER

Male - police commissioner is male

Female - police commissioner is female

APPENDIX G

JAMES ISENBERG POLICE CHIEF INTERVIEWS

Chief Richard Pennington, Police Chief of Atlanta:

The first thing you have to do when you're working for a Mayor is know what the vision of the mayor is and the goals that the mayor has set for the city. Then you can never compromise your own position in relation to these goals at anytime....I tell chiefs that working for a mayor is a 'delicate' relationship because one day they love you and the next day they hate you. A lot of it comes from the pressure that is put on them from the community. (182-183)

Former Tulsa Police Chief Drew Diamond:

It's like any other relationship. The Mayor and the Police Chief need to sit down and understand the dimensions of both roles. The Mayor needs to own every success of the police department. That's the reality. If the police department wants to own everything, that doesn't work....some big cities have really good mayors who are not only supporting their police chiefs, but giving them direction in terms of the vision and the community. They're getting it right...Get a contract. (183)

Former Canadian Police Chief Bob Lunney:

Police chiefs are not politicians but they have to have good political sense. They have to have good political skills. You have to...do all the things politicians do....Sometimes if you're in the media too often ...the politicians get jealous. So you have to manage your public profile...So it's a balance there to make sure you're doing your job representing law enforcement and policing to the public and keeping a respectful profile of the politicians. (185-186)

Commissioner Frank Straub, White Plains, New York:

The more you change successfully, the more attention you get, and the more attention you get the more you're potentially in conflict with the mayor or city manager because now you're cutting into their ego and their space. It's like walking a tightrope and you really have to walk it carefully. If you don't change enough, then you're screwed because they don't need you any more because you didn't do the job. If you change too much, now you've crossed over into someone else's political territory....I think it's very hard not to burn out your relationship with whoever is the mayor and the longer you stay the more difficult it is to manage the relationship. Three or three and half years have become the shelf life for a police chief. I don't think there's anything you can do to avoid the conflicts, it just happens. You can get yourself into a hole, pull the top over and sit there, but that's not good for the organization. (180-81)

Former Baltimore Chief Leonard Hamm:

I report directly to him everything we're doing. How we're spending the money and what our goals and objectives are. I solicit input from him to insure that we're working his ideas and my ideas into the same goal. That's our relationship. (186)

Providence, Rhode Island Police Chief Dean Esserman:

Many chiefs have become rock stars. There's a danger in that because they're the most visible person out there besides the mayor. When people ask me about the weather, I tell them what the mayor thinks about the weather....I am only part of the mayor's team and although I am proud to be part of this team, I am only a part of his overall vision....The relationship is often tempestuous and even those that are based on good faith can turn bad. That's a danger because there can only be one casualty and it will always be the police chief. (187-188)

Oakland Police Chief Wayne Tucker:

I think that it's important that I work very hard to be a good subordinate. I generally keep the mayor informed about what my issues are and where I want to go. I try to present the issues and make my decisions on his time. If I see resistance or conflict coming, I make sure he knows in advance. I check off with him so he understands my issues and where I'm coming from. (188-189)

Charlotte, North Carolina Chief Darrel Stephens:

I think the most important thing is to establish a relationship right off the bat where you have open lines of communication. You have a discussion about how you will handle a conflict right up front. The mayor may think that police officers can and should do certain things that are governed by law or criminal procedure, but we really can't do things differently unless the mayor changes the precedent or the law is changed. So we handle conflict and know what to do when we disagree. (178)

Former Houston Mayor and New York Police Commissioner Lee Brown:

As a police chief you have to establish a relationship with the mayor that is clear about the few things he wants to be advised on and what policies he wants to be involved in with the police department. You need to establish this up front and don't have the mayor read something in the paper without first hearing it from you. I think it's important for the chief to insist on meeting with the mayor weekly to insure communication. From the mayor's point of view, I want the chief to know that I'm not the chief, you're the chief and I expect you to run the department and I don't want any surprises. If there's a serious policy issue then let's talk about it together and then you can implement it. However, as mayor, I am the one who will ultimately be responsible for policy in all city departments. As to the chief's longevity, it used to be two years and now it's three, but the number on the chief's tenure is political. A new mayor wants his or her own police chief. They want to pick their own person. (179-180)

Los Angeles Police Chief and former New York Police Commissioner William Bratton:

There's no ideal formula in terms of the timing for a chief. I think it's very situational dependent. For example, I'm going to stay between five and ten years in Los Angeles to institutionalize the changes I think are necessary to reinstate the LAPD on its pedestal and keep it from falling back. In New York City, ironically, after 27 months I spent there the changes had been institutionalized....The length of time that a Chief should be in place varies. Normally and ideally, it should be three to five years because after that they'll be waiting for you out in the department. I've had good and bad relationships with the Mayor and am a product of my experiences. I have a better relationship with former Mayor James Hahn and now Mayor Villaragosa because of the tough relationships with Mayor Giuliani in New York and Mayor Menino in Boston. p.176-177

If I had stayed in Boston, I think that Mayor Menino and I would have worked out okay, but there would have been some rough patches as he is very hands-on, similar to Giuliani. Giuliani wanted to be in the police department managing day to day. This is the total anathema to my style of policing. Which is picking good people and then holding them accountable for their work. The best teams are when the mayor and police chief have similar styles of leadership. The Los Angeles Mayor's leadership style is similar to my own. He wants to hire good people, he wants to be kept informed, and he wants no surprises, but day to day I don't hear from him. He has no role in selection of the personnel that report to me. Mayor Menino and Mayor Giuliani wanted to be involved with what should be the prerogative and responsibility of the police chief. (176-177)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Andrews, Allen H. "Structuring the Political Independence of the Police Chief." *Police Leadership in America: Crisis and Opportunity*. Ed. William A. Geller. New York: American Bar Foundation and Praeger Publishers, 1985. 5-19. Print.
- Astor, George. *The New York Cops: An Informal History*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971. Print.
- Banfield, Edward, C. and James Q. Wilson. *City Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963. Print.
- Bachman, R. and, Robert Paternoster. *Statistical Methods for Criminology and Criminal Justice*. New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1997. Print.
- Bass, Sandra. "Negotiating Change: Community Organizations and the Politics of Policing." *Urban Affairs Review*, 36, 2, (2000): 148-177. *Criminal Justice Abstracts*, Web. 14 June 2008.
- Benson, Bruce L. "View From the Top: The Frustrations of Police Chiefs, and How to Solve Them. *The Police Chief*, 71.8 (2004). Int. Ass. of Chiefs of Police: Alexandria, VA. Web. 7 May 2008.
<<http://policechiefmagazine.org>.>
- Berman, Jay S. *Police Administration and Progressive Reform: Theodore Roosevelt as Police Commissioner of New York*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987. Print.

- “Bingham Yearned to Spank Mayor.” *New York Times* 20 Sep. 1909, 18 ProQuest Historical Newspapers. Web. 2 Jan. 2010.
- Bittner, Egon. *Aspects of Police Work*. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1990. Print.
- Bopp, W. J. “O.W.”: *O.W. Wilson and the Search for a Police Profession*. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1977. Print.
- Bouza, Anthony V. *The Police Mystique: An Insider’s Look at Cops, Crime, and the Criminal Justice System*. New York: Plenum Press, 1990. Print.
- Bratton, William and, Peter Knobler. *Turnaround: How America’s Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic*. New York: Random House, 1998. Print.
- Brown, Michael. *Working the Street: Police Discretion and the Dilemmas of Reform*. New York: Russell Sage, 1981. Print.
- Brzeczek, Richard. “Chief-Mayor Relations: The View From the Chief’s Chair.” *Police Leadership in America: Crisis and Opportunity*. Ed. William A. Geller. New York: American Bar Foundation and Praeger Publishers. 1985. 48-58. Print.
- United States. Bureau of Justice Assistance. *Understanding Community Policing: A Framework of Action*. 1994. National Criminal Justice Reference Service. Web. 10 Dec. 2009.
- Bynander, Fredric. and Paul ’t Hart. “When Power Changes Hands: The Political Succession of Leadership Succession in Democracies.” *Political Psychology* 27.5 (2006): 707-730. Web. *Wiley-Blackwell Full Collection*. 2 Jan. 2007.

Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (CALEA).

Web. 24 April 2008.

Cannato, Vincent J. *The Ungovernable City: John Lindsay and His Struggle to*

Save New York. New York: Basic Books, 2001. Print.

Carte, Gene E., and Elaine H. Carte. *Police Reform in the United States*. Berkeley,

CA: University of California Press, 1975. Print.

“Charter Bill Signed.” *New York Times* 6 May 1897, 1 ProQuest Historical

Newspapers. Web. 28 Dec. 2008.

“Citizens’ Union Plan to Better the Police.” *New York Times* 21 Nov. 1906, 7

ProQuest Historical Newspapers. Web. 9 June 2009.

Citizen’s Union of the City of New York. Web. 8 June 2009.

“Col. Murphy Head of the Police.” *New York Times* 23 Feb. 1901, 1 ProQuest

Historical Newspapers. Web. 9 June 2009.

Deakin, Thomas J. *Police Professionalism: The Renaissance of American Law*

Enforcement. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1988. Print.

Enter, Jack. “The Rise to the Top: An Analysis of Police Chief Career Patterns.”

Journal of Police Science and Administration, 14.4 (1986): 334-346.

Criminal Justice Abstracts. Web. 11 May 2008.

Floherly, John .J. *Our FBI: An Inside Story*. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott

Company, 1951. Print.

Fogelson, Robert M. *Big City Police*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press, 1977. Print.

- Fosdick, Raymond B. *American Police Systems*. Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, 1969. Print.
- Frankel, Bruce. "Police Chiefs Worry About Job Security." *USA Today*, 19 Nov. 1992. 10A. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. Web. 16 Aug. 2007.
- Gates, Daryl and Diane K. Shah. *Chief: My Life in the LAPD*. New York: Bantam Books, 1992. Print.
- Gelb, Barbara. *Varnished Brass: The Decade After Serpico*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1983. Print.
- Geller, William A. Ed. *Police Leadership in America: Crisis and opportunity*. New York: American Bar Foundation and Praeger Publishers, 1985. Print.
- Goldstein, Herman. *Problem-Oriented Policing*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990. Print.
- Guyot, Dorothy. *Policing as Though People Matter*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991. Print.
- Hudnut, William H. "The Police and the Police: A Mayor's Perspective" *Police Leadership in America: Crisis and Opportunity*. Ed. William A. Geller. New York: American Bar Foundation and Praeger Publishers. 1985. 20-29. Print.
- Hudzik, John K., and Gary W. Cordner., *Planning in Criminal Justice Organizations and Systems*. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983. Print..

- Hunt, John M., and Raymond Magenau. *Power and the Police Chief: An Institutional and Organizational Analysis*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1993. Print.
- Isenberg, James A. *Police Leadership in a Democracy...a Conversation with America's Police Chiefs*. Diss. U. of Cal. Berkeley. 2002. Dissertation Abstracts. Web. 15 June. 2009.
- James, Kimberly. *Challenges to Control?: Atlanta's Maynard Jackson and the Politics of Police Reform*. Diss. U. of Mich. 2002. Dissertation Abstracts. Web. 10 Jan. 2008.
- Johnson, Robert B. "Examining the Validity Structure of Qualitative Research." *Education* 118. Winter (1997): 282-292. *Education Abstracts Full-Text*. Web. 2 Jan. 2009.
- Kelling, George and Mark Moore. *The Evolving Strategy of Policing: Perspectives on Policing*, 4 (1988): Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice and Harvard University. Print.
- Kerik, Bernard .B. *The Lost Son: A Life in Pursuit of Justice*. New York: Regan Books, 2001. Print.
- Kimmel, John T., Paul Lindenmuth. "Police Chief Performance and Leadership Styles." *Police Quarterly* 4.4 (2001): 468-484. *Criminal Justice Abstracts*. Web. 22 Dec. 2008.

- Klein, Allison and David Nakamura. "Chief Ramsey to Step Down, Sources Say Replacement May Come From Outside the Force. *The Washington Post*, 18 Nov. 2006 A01. Web. 9 Oct. 2007. <<http://www.washingtonpost.com>>.
- Lardner, James, and Thomas Reppetto. *NYPD: A City and Its Police*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2000. Print.
- Liederbach, John and Lawrence F. Travis. "Wilson Redux: Another Look at Varieties of Police Behavior." *Police Quarterly* 11.4 (2008): 447-467. *Criminal Justice Abstracts*. Web. 17 Nov. 2008.
- Koch, Edward .I., and William Rauch. *Mayor*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980. Print.
- Los Angeles Charter and Administrative Code. Web. 14 Sep. 2006. <<http://www.lacity.org>>.
- Mastrofski, Stephen D. "Varieties of Police Governance in Metropolitan America." *Politics and Policy*, VIII, (1988): 12-31. *Criminal Justice Abstracts*. Web. 7 Aug. 2008.
- Manning, Peter .K. *Police Work*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977. Print.
- Maxfield, Michael G., and Earl R. Babbie. *The Practice of Social Science Research*. 5th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1989. Print.
- Mayo, Louis, A. *Analysis of the Role of the Police Chief Executive*. Diss. The American U, 1983. *Dissertation Abstracts*. Web. 16 Aug. 2007.

“Mayor Vetoes Single Head Police Bill.” *New York Times* 18 Feb. 1901, 1

ProQuest Historical Newspapers Web. 2 June 2008.

McAdoo, William. *Guarding a Great City*. New York: Arno Press & The New York Times. 1971. Print.

Muir, William K. *Police: Street Corner Politicians*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. Print.

---. “Police and Politics.” *Criminal Justice Ethics*. 2.2 (1983): 3-9.

Criminal Justice Abstracts. Web. 5 Dec. 2008.

Murphy, Patrick V., and Thomas Plate. *Commissioner: A View From the Top of American Law Enforcement*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977. Print.

Murphy, Patrick V. “The Prospective Chief’s Negotiation of Authority With the Mayor.” *Police Leadership in America: Crisis and Opportunity*. Ed. William A. Geller. New York: American Bar Foundation and Praeger Publishers. 1985. 30-40. Print.

National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement. *Task Force Report: The Police* (1931). Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office.

New York City. *New York City Charter: Police Department*. 132-133. City of New York. Web. 15 Mar. 2007.

<<http://www.nyc.gov/html/charter/downloads/pdf/citycharter2004/pdf/>>.

New York City Police Department. Web. 14 May 2007.

<<http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/chfdept/history.html>>.

O'Brien, James. "'The chief and the executive' Direction or political influence?"

Journal of Police Science and Administration 6.4 (1978): 394-401. Print.

Penegor, Janice and Ken Peak. "Police Chief Acquisitions: A Comparison of
I
Internal and External Selections." *American Journal of Police* 11.1
(1992):

17-32. *Criminal Justice Abstracts*. Web. 29 Oct. 2008.

"Police Bill Introduced." *New York Times* 10 Jan. 1901, 10 ProQuest Historical
Newspapers. Web. 28 Dec. 2008.

Potts, Lee W. "Integrating the Chief of Police Into the Municipal Administrative
Process." *Criminal Justice Review* 5.2 (1980): 12-21. *Criminal Justice
Abstracts*. Web. 24 Aug. 2008.

Price, Barbara R. *Police Professionalism*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books,
1977. Print.

Rainguet, Fred W., and Mary Dodge, M. "The Problems of Police Chiefs: An
Examination of the Issues in Tenure and Turnover. *Police Quarterly*, 4.3
(2001). 268-288. *Criminal Justice Abstracts*. Web. 4 Nov. 2008.

Reese, Richard. *Leadership in the LAPD: Walking the Tightrope*. Durham, NC:
Carolina Academic Press, 2005. Print.

Repetto, Thomas. *The Blue Parade*. New York: Free Press, 1978. Print.

Richardson, James F. *Urban Police in the United States*. Port Washington:
Kennikot Press, 1974. Print..

Roberg, Roy R., and Jack L. Kuykendall, J.L. *Police Organization and
Management: Behavior, Theory and Processes*. Pacific Grove, CA:
Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1990. Print.

- Robinson, Cyril D. "The Mayor and the Police: The Political Role of the Police in Society." *Police Forces In History* Ed. George L. Mosse. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 1975. 277-315. Print.
- Roosevelt, Theodore. *An Autobiography*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914. Print.
- Ruchelman, Leonard. *Big City Mayors: The Crisis in Urban Politics*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1969. Print.
- . *Who Rules the Police?..* New York: New York University Press, 1973. Print.
- . *Police Politics: A Comparative Study of Three Cities*. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1974. Print.
- Safir, Howard. *Security: An Inside Look at the Tactics of the NYPD*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2003. Print.
- Skolnick, Jerome H., and James J. Fyfe. *Above the Law: Police and the Excessive Use of Force*. New York: The Free Press, 1993. Print.
- Smith, Bruce. *Police Systems in the United States*. 2d ed. New York: Harpers & Brothers Publishers, 1960. Print.
- Sparrow, Malcolm K, Mark H. Moore, and David M. Kennedy, David M. (1990) *Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing*. United States: Basic Books, 1990, Print.
- Stone, Christopher and Merrick Bobb. *Civilian Oversight of the Police in Democratic Societies. on Oversight of Police*. 2002 Web. 29 Dec. 2009. <http://www.vera.org/download?file=95/Civilian%2Boversight%2B2.pdf>

- Sykes, Gary W. M. "The Functional Nature of Police Reform: The Myth of Controlling the Police." 1985. *Criminal Justice: Law and politics*. Ed. George F. Cole. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company. 1987. 136-148. Print.
- "The New York of Today." *New York Times* 1 Jan. 1898, 4 ProQuest Historical Newspapers. Web. 12 Dec. 2008.
- "The Proposed Police Bill." *New York Times* 9 Mar. 1897, 1 ProQuest Historical Newspapers. Web. 28 Dec. 2008.
- Toch, Hans, and Douglas Grant. *Police as Problem Solvers: How Frontline Workers Can Promote Organizational and Community Change*. New York: Plenum Press, 1991. Print.
- Toch, Hans. *Stress in Policing*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2002. Print.
- Tunnel, Kenneth D., and Lawrence K. Gaines. "Political Pressures and Influences on Police Executives: A Descriptive Analysis." *American Police Journal*, 11.1 (1992): 1-16. *Criminal Justice Abstracts*. Web. 11 Oct. 2008.
- U.S. Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. *Challenge of Crime In a Free Society*. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1967. Print
- U. S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. *Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It*. By David H. Bayley. 2001. National Criminal Justice Reference Service. Web. 19 April 2009.

- U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. "Local Police Departments" *Bureau of Justice Statistics Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics*. Eds. Kathleen McGuire and Ann L. Pastore Albany, NY: The Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Center. 1999. Print.
- Valentine, Lewis J., and Fiorello LaGuardia. *Night Stick: The Autobiography of Lewis J. Valentine, Former Police Commissioner of New York*. New York: The Dial Press, 1947. Print.
- Walker, Samuel. *A Critical History of Police Reform: The Emergence of Professionalism*. Lexington, MA. Lexington Books, 1977. Print.
- . *The new World of Police Accountability*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2005. Print.
- Whalen, Grover. *Mr. New York: The Autobiography of Grover Whalen*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1955. Print.
- Wilson, James Q. *Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities*. New York: Atheneum Press, 1968. Print..
- . *Bureaucracy*. United States: Basic Books, 1989. Print.
- Wilson, Orlando W., and Roy McClaren. *Police Administration* 4th ed.. New York: McGraw- Hill, 1977. Print. .
- Wilson, Woodrow. "The Study of Administration." 1887. *Classics of Public Administration* Eds. Jay M. Shafritz and Alfred C. Hyde. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company. 1978. 1-24. Print.

Witham, Donald. *An Exploration of Issues Related to the Performance of Law Enforcement Chief Executives (Professionalism, Training)*. Diss. George

Mason U. 1984. Dissertation Abstracts. 4 Dec. 2007.

Woods, Arthur. *Policeman and Public*. New York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1971. Print.

Zion, Sidney E. "Lindsay and the Police; Mayor to Keep Hands Off the Force But He Faces Supervisory Problems." *New York Times*. 29 Jan. 1966. 1 ProQuest Historical Newspapers