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RURAL LEADERSHIP IN THE CONTEXT OF INDIA'S MODERNIZATION

by

PARMATMA SARAN

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate
Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy, The City University
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1975

This Manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

The main purpose of this study was to explore the extent to which changes in the economic, political, and social conditions in a modernizing society result in corresponding changes in the attitudes and values of rural leaders. Specifically, we explored the conceptualization of modernization and its application to the attitudinal and value profiles of rural leaders in India in the context of social change.

The data for the present study were gathered in the State of Bihar in India during 1964-65. In the original survey, 1293 leaders were interviewed from 96 sampled villages. From this larger survey, we have selected 16 villages on a stratified random sampling basis, and the 608 respondents are the full universe of leaders of these 16 villages. Our study is a secondary analysis of the data compiled by Professor Baidya Nath Varma and his team of researchers.

We first attempted to construct an overall scale of modernization. We found that it was not possible to do so. Hence, we decided to concentrate on pro-change responses in specific areas: land legislation, media exposure, political matters and the Panchayat system. The pro-change attitudes were decided upon as being the nearest indicators

of modernity in our case. We developed specific scales for the first three areas, and constructed an index for the Pan-chayat system. We found that they were independent of one another and as such they measured different dimensions of change.

Our findings indicate that the profile of our leaders does not conform to any pattern, i.e., they come from all groups, young and old, rich and poor, upper caste and lower caste, male and female, but they are predominantly literate (88 percent) and a very large percentage of them have had some formal education (78 percent).

We found that their attitudinal profile does not conform to any unidimensional pattern of traditionalism or modernity. In some areas they are pro-change, in others they are not.

Scores on the different scales and the index showed that our respondents again did not maintain any uniformity: i.e., while their responses were pro-change in one area, in another they were not. We also noted that caste, education, occupation, and income were positively correlated with some scales and not with others. Female respondents scored high (i.e., in the direction of modernity) on the land legislation and political scales.

The findings in the present study indicate two broad conclusions:

The economic, political, and social conditions in a modernizing society do have an effect on the attitudes and values of rural leadership. However, the kind of effect noted by us does not indicate that traditionalism has been replaced by modernity. We also found that modernization does not take place in a unidimensional direction. Leaders may be modern in one area but not in another. The model which conceives of modernization as an outright rejection of all tradition in favor of urban-industrial institutions and values is not wholly applicable in the Indian case.

Our second conclusion is that modernity should be viewed more as a continuum than as a dichotomy with traditionalism in the case of most modernizing nations. In the Indian context, it is clear that modernization is essentially a restructuring of traditional values and attitudes along more democratic lines.

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MAP 1. STATE OF BIHAR



MAP 2. DISTRICT OF PATNA
SHOWING SIXTEEN SAMPLED VILLAGES



0 5 10 15 20
Scale of Miles

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

Socio-cultural and political change in modernizing nations is one of the most important areas of investigation in the social sciences. Indeed, a universal pattern of modernity is developing from the marked diversity of traditional values and institutions around the world. Change, to many millions of people today, means a revolutionary transition in men's way of life from the more closed and rigid structures of traditional societies to the flexible, relatively open structures of advanced nations.

Analyzing socio-economic change in rural communities in terms of any single model is difficult because the newly independent nation-states of Asia and Africa have initiated their own national programs of economic development. These programs differ in ideology as well as modes of implementation. They vitally affect the spheres of political and cultural life.

During the past two hundred years India has been under continuous Western influence. Trade and commerce, education and religion, and political life have all been affected by Western forces. The impact was initially mani-

fested in urban areas, but more recently rural areas have been influenced by these forces.

Since the attainment of independence in 1947, India has taken significant strides in the direction of modernization. Several national plans, comprising multi-purpose river valley projects, mechanization of agriculture, and the development of new industries, have been put into effect. In a few decades the successful implementation of the plans will change the face of the countryside. It is important to note that the study of the traditional ways of life, as well as changes in the Indian village communities, is of interest not only to students of society, but to planners, administrators, and all those who are interested in the problems of social welfare.

India is predominantly an agricultural and rural society. An overwhelming majority of her people live in the countryside. Before the partition of India (into India and Pakistan) in 1947, it was estimated that there were over 700,000 villages in the country. Since then, this number has diminished to 600,000, but the rural-urban ratio of the population remains the same. According to successive dicennial census estimates, about 80 percent of India's population lives in villages.

There is a tendency among some Western as well as Indian writers to regard the rural societies of the East, particularly of India, as static and unchanging. However, a micro-sociological study of the villages shows some unmistakable trends in the direction of cultural and institutional change. One cannot regard the Indian village communities as static, timeless, and unchanging. The interplay of historical, ecological, and sociological factors has influenced the structure, organization and ethos of these communities in many important ways.

It appears that Indian society is neither chaotically fragmented by the impact of modernization, nor has it totally rejected its stimulus. The rural society, by and large, has accepted the challenge of change. In fact, it seems to be undergoing a quiet revolution.

Within the short period of a quarter century after independence, India has undergone a series of changes that have spread throughout the entire society. The old structure of power is giving way to a new structure in the rural community. The pattern of rural leadership, as it exists today, reflects a transition from the hereditary to the elective, and from the ascriptive to the functional type of leadership. In this process, the traditional village lead-

ers are either undertaking new functions and adjusting themselves to the emerging patterns of power, or are being replaced by new leaders. The large-scale development plans of the Union and the State Governments are crucial in bringing about this change in the leadership pattern of village India.

Our venue of study is the state of Bihar in India. We have data on the leadership patterns of 16 villages which represent various village types in India in terms of the size of the village, caste distribution, family structure, and other demographic factors. Our data on rural leadership in these villages will be analyzed in terms of the conflict between tradition and modernity in rural India.

India, since its independence, has set for itself the goal of economic development through democratic means. Its major aim is to achieve an egalitarian society, or what the late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru called the "socialistic pattern of society." This ideology now determines and shapes the goals and actions of most leaders, urban or rural. Many new values and themes have appeared in India as a result of its encounters with the West in the 19th and 20th centuries. Some of these values started the modernization process which can be seen in the form of such

institutions as universal franchise, civil rights, an egalitarian legal system, a constitution, a parliamentary form of government, a party system, a rational bureaucracy, a modern army, and a well-developed educational system. The ideology of the egalitarian society seems to have become the foremost issue in the quarter century of India's independence. We will focus our attention on this and other related issues as we examine the attitudes and changing values of the rural leaders in Bihar.

Purpose of the Study

In this dissertation we wish to explore the extent to which changes in the economic, political, and social conditions in a modernizing society result in corresponding changes in the attitudes and values of rural leadership.

In this context, it is important to consider briefly the concept of modernization. Most theorists identify modernization with the development of an urban-industrial society and make assumptions about the prerequisites of modernization. Among those who feel that there is a need to modify some of the assumptions of modernization theory is Joseph Gusfield.¹ Varma,² in his forthcoming book, also argues along the same lines.

The model which conceives of modernization as an outright rejection of all tradition in favor of urban-industrial institutions and values does not seem to fit the Indian case. On the other hand, the protagonists of traditionalism are hard put to explain the changes occurring in India today. Rudolph and Rudolph³ have suggested that modernization in India is essentially a restructuring of tradition along democratic lines.

The problem of measurement in modernization studies is also important. Among others, Inkeles⁴ has attempted to measure modernity quantitatively. However, the notion of a unidimensional continuum of societal modernization, on which analyses of modernity rest, has been subject to considerable criticism (Bendix, 1967; Blumer, 1964; Gusfield, 1967; Illich, 1969). We will examine these issues in detail when we discuss methodology in Chapter 3.

We hope that the theoretical problems involved in conceptualizing modernization and the methodological problems occurring in quantifying the measures of modernization will be clarified further by our efforts in ordering the Indian data on leadership and social change, the topic of this dissertation.

¹ Joseph R. Gusfield, "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change," in Political Development and Social Change, eds. Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1971).

² B. N. Varma has discussed this problem in Modernization for What (forthcoming).

³ See, Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne H. Rudolph, Modernity of Tradition.

⁴ Alex Inkeles, "The OM Scale: A Comparative Socio-Psychological Measure of Individual Modernity," Sociometry, vol. 29, no. 4 (December 1966), p. 357.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

A Survey of the Theoretical Literature on Modernization

The traditional societies of the world differ markedly among themselves in their "world views," group structures, and modes of dealing with deviance, including entrepreneurship and innovation. Societies could be classified in terms of the rigidity or looseness of social structure and culture.

This was recognized by Ralph Linton,¹ who said:

There are some cultures which seem to be built like finely adjusted clock movements. At the other end of the scale, there are cultures which are so loosely organized that one wonders how they are able to function at all. . . . In closely integrated cultures the introduction of any new culture element immediately starts in train a series of obvious dislocations. . . . In contrast to this, loosely integrated societies usually show little resistance to new ideas (Linton, 1952, pp. 86-87).

For articulating change in society, the theories of Ferdinand Toennies² and Robert Redfield³ suggest themselves as possible frameworks. The changes in a modernizing society can be viewed in terms of the transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft--following Toennies' conception. Redfield's folk-urban continuum is also pertinent for us. The folk society has a certain cycle of life; it maintains

distinctive values. As the people adopt the ways of civilization, their society and culture are transformed to emphasize literacy, urban living, more advanced technology, and other factors.

It is important to consider here some crucial definitions of modernization. We will examine the views of Robert L. Heilbroner,⁴ an economic philosopher, Daniel Lerner,⁵ a sociologist, David Apter,⁶ a political scientist, and Manning Nash,⁷ an anthropologist.

Heilbroner argues that the Great Ascent is not merely a struggle against poverty. The process which is called economic development is also, and in the long run, a process through which the social, political, and economic institutions of the future are being shaped for the great majority of mankind. And he feels that "the price of development is apt to be political and economic authoritarianism."⁸

Lerner⁹ talks about some general criteria of modernization, but emphasizes communication and empathy. He says:

Modernization is the current term for an old process--the process of social change whereby less developed societies acquire characteristics common to more developed societies. . . . The process is activated by intersocietal communication (Lerner, 1967, p. 386).

All modernizing societies are in the process of becoming. Becoming "what" is the puzzle to which David Apter¹⁰ addresses himself:

Modernization is a special kind of hope. Embodied within it are all the past revolutions of history and all supreme human desires. The modernization revolution is epic in its scale and moral in its significance. Its consequences may be frightening. Any goal that is so desperately desired creates political power, and this force may not always be used wisely or well. Whatever direction it may take, the struggle to modernize is what has given meaning to our generation. It tests our cherished institutions and our beliefs. (Apter, 1965, p. 1).

Manning Nash, an anthropologist, presents the definition in the following way:

Modernity is the social, psychological framework, which facilitates the application of science to the process of production. And modernization is the process of making societies, cultures, and individuals receptive to growth of tested knowledge and its employment in the ordering business of daily living (Nash, 1964, p. 226).

Thus, Heilbroner emphasizes the costs of modernization, which may be political or economic authoritarianism. Lerner asks for the development of the communication process. Apter notes the change in the level of aspiration of the new generation. And Nash points to the two crucial aspects of modernity: one, the psychological aspect and the other, the institutional aspect. We will now consider some institutional aspects of modernization.

William J. Goode¹¹ argues that family and industrial variables are independent though interacting. Hence, even when most family systems move toward some conjugal form, under the impact of modernization, specific indices of change will move in different directions, depending on the shape of things at the inception of modernization.

Wilbert E. Moore¹² suggests that possibly the most outstanding effect that industrialization has on religious organization and belief is secularization. In its less extreme forms, secularization involves a reduction of religious control over everyday life, the possible growth of agnostic positions toward theological doctrine, and the substitution of rational for ritual action.

Communication is an all-pervading aspect of our social environment. Unlike family, or the church, it is not a social institution. However, almost every social act in every institution involves some communication.¹³

Lerner¹⁴ says:

The transition to participant society hinges upon the desire among individuals to participate. It grows as more and more individuals take leave of the constructive traditional universe and wedge their psyche toward the expansive new land of heart's desire. The great gap is passed when a person begins to "have opinions"--particularly on matters which according to his neighbors, "do not concern him" (Lerner, 1958, pp. 60-62).

Lerner emphatically asserts that the communication system makes a difference in human behavior.

Katz and Lazarsfeld,¹⁵ among others, have shown that development of a mass media system does not replace or destroy the age-old system of interpersonal communication. The mass media embed traditional channels of contact within a new system of intercourse.

The Case of India

The theoretical perspective on modernization will now be given a focus in the context of India's problems. Many Indian and western scholars have examined India's case carefully. We will present here a brief review of their viewpoints.

Joseph Gusfield clearly demonstrates that there is a need to modify some of the assumptions of modernization theory. He suggests that:

. . . the all-too-common practice of pitting tradition and modernity against each other tends to overlook the mixtures and blends which reality displays. Above all, the contrast of tradition and modernity emphasizes an ideology of rationalism, which denies the necessary and usable ways in which the past serves as support, especially in the sphere of values and political legitimation, to the present and the future.¹⁶

Joseph Gusfield asks for a perspective toward

change which should not deny the specific and contextual character of events.

Many scholars have examined the role of religion in the context of modernization. We may consider religion as a set of symbols that is institutionalized and considered as normative in a society, or that is internalized in a personality. What makes religious symbols different from other kinds of symbols is that they define in broadest terms the nature of reality. The fundamental structure of religious practice changes with modernization. The changes often arise out of widely felt dissatisfaction with the previous structure and form of religion. During modernization, even the most seemingly complete of both old and new faiths continue being amended, adapted, refurbished. Moreover, every movement for religious change leaves some who feel threatened by the proposed change and fight against it. But even in this struggle to preserve the old tradition, religion is characteristically altered in many ways.¹⁷ Milton Singer has perceptively shown how in the city of Madras, for example, the traditional sacred culture has not been secularized but has been democratized in an entirely new fashion.

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There are numerous studies of the caste system of

India. Most scholars look upon caste as a hindrance to modernization. However, Karve¹⁹ argues that caste must no longer be looked upon as a hindrance. She suggests that it is necessary to study how the process reveals some structured details and how other details are being modified. This view is shared by another well-known scholar, M. N. Srinivas,²⁰ who maintains:

Caste is fundamental to Indian society, and it necessarily implies acceptance of pluralism in culture. People get used to cultural and ethical relativism though such relativism is qualified by an attempt, not always successful, to subsume the various systems in a hierarchy. Diverse styles of life, codes of conduct and belief systems can co-exist in a caste society. It is true that all styles of life do not have the same validity and one is extolled above the other (Srinivas, 1972, p. 157).

Thus both in the religious and the caste structures of India, tradition has not been considered as an absolute barrier to modernity.

We should now consider the role of leadership in the modernization of traditional countries. Two categories of leaders have been considered crucial in modernization: the "entrepreneurs" and the "intellectuals." Edward Shills²¹ has emphasized the role of the intellectual in the independence and early phase of modernization in Asia and Africa. Bert F. Hoselitz²² has discussed the role of the entrepreneurs.

In the task of nation-building in transitional societies, bureaucracy also has a vital role to play. It consists, by and large, of people with progressive motivation, wide administrative experience, and a rich store of pooled knowledge. However, lack of adequate appreciation of cultural values and the inability to blend past roles with the emerging ones has been an important factor in the failure of the bureaucracy to be more effective in administering programs of economic growth and planned change.²³

We can thus see that modernization concerns both an ideology as well as a structure of social relations.²⁴ The change agents carry the ideology and participate actively in structuring the social relationships.

In sum, the ideology, as we noted in the theoretical survey, refers to industrial development, participatory democracy, and pervasive change of an egalitarian type in the whole society. To an important measure this can be brought about by the application of scientific knowledge to problems of technological growth as well as to a restructuring of social relationships. We noted that many items of the traditional social structure are not inimical to change. Given the ideology, change can be accelerated if the leadership potential is there.

In our study, we are going to carefully explore the potentiality of the rural Indian leaders, and to find out how their attitudes and values are being shaped by the process of modernization already underway in India.

The Emerging Patterns of Rural Leadership in India

In the study of the emerging patterns of leadership we need to look at various aspects of the phenomenon of leadership. As a starting point, it may be useful to describe the traditional cultural image of the leader in India. This would involve an analysis of the norms of behavior associated with the image of the leader. Also, leadership can be studied properly only in reference to the groups which manifest the leadership. No meaningful studies of leadership can be done without a fair acquaintance with the structure and process of the society of which the groups are constituent parts.

An examination of the nature and structure of the community is equally important. It is imperative to find out to what extent the community is homogeneous, and also to analyze the forces which may lead it toward heterogeneity.

Several attempts have been made to develop typologies of leaders. Using the criterion of the relationship between the leader and the led, Bartlett²⁵ has divided leaders in-

to three groups: institutional leaders, dominant leaders, and persuasive leaders. Following the criterion of the emergence of leaders, they have been classified as self-appointed leaders, group-appointed leaders, and executive-appointed leaders. Finally, on the basis of the objectives of the leadership, they have been classified as executive leaders, intellectual leaders, and artistic leaders.

It is important to find out if the principal mode of exercising leadership is authoritarian or democratic. In the former, the leader tends to centralize and sometimes even monopolize the decision-making process; in the latter, decision-making is carried out by the group itself, the role of the leader that of evolving maximum group participation in the process.

In the study of the power dynamics of a community, the importance of conflict and accommodation cannot be minimized. These may be visualized at three different levels: between the traditional leaders, between the traditional and the new leaders, and between the new leaders.

Almost all the transitional societies recognize the sovereignty of politics, but their political system lacks articulation.²⁶ The study of rural leadership cannot be separated from the wider background of the political process

in the society. As village politics is being linked up increasingly with national politics, intensification of research in this direction will provide valuable insight into the emerging roles of rural leadership.

Although the term "village leadership" is relatively new, the phenomenon itself has been studied for some time. In fact, the expression "village leadership" has now gained general acceptance, not because it opens a new area of research but because it conveniently subsumes the multiple facets of one basic phenomenon, i.e., village leadership.

There are three conceptual approaches prevalent in the study of village leadership. They are the social-anthropological approach, the small group approach, and the combined approach.

The Social-Anthropological Approach

The social-anthropological and sociological methods of studying village leadership, particularly as seen in community studies, are characterized by two distinct features. One of these features is institutional; the other is contextual. The institutional feature of village leadership makes it dependent upon structural rather than individual factors. It is manifested in a relatively established pattern rather than in discrete momentary forms. The

contextual feature considers village leadership as significant only in the context of specific happenings in the village.

The growth of another type of rural leadership study in developing nations may be noted. This is devoted to the analysis of leadership in modern political processes, such as that manifested in elections as well as in the popular participation in local self-government. Such studies are generally conducted by sociologists and political scientists. Their differences lie not so much in the basic strategy as in the area of social activity chosen for examination. Such studies also cover a wider territory than the village, such as a district or region.

The Small Group Approach

In small group research, leadership has come under close scrutiny, and the theory evolved there has, more than any other, influenced recent studies on village leadership. Village leadership studies, carried out by social workers and community organization experts, have been most strongly influenced by this approach. Essentially devoted to the discovery and identification of leaders who evince suitable "leadership" qualities, these studies emphasize the dynamics of the leaders' behavior, the personal qualities of lead-

ers, and their role in informal action situations.²⁷

The Combined Approach

By combining both the social anthropological and the small group methods, a general guide may be formulated for the purpose of our study.

A study of leadership in an established social unit like the village should be carried out through an investigation into the various forms of association among the villagers. One of the best ways of discovering change in the system of influence and authority would be to study both the traditional and the modern forms of association and to observe the functioning of influence and authority as well as their sources. This would be useful in determining (a) how far modern processes of leadership have permeated the traditional associations (which is a sure indicator of institutional change), and (b) to what extent there is an input and continuance of traditional patterns of influence and authority in modern forms of association.

Sociologists talk about the sociology of acculturation. Weiner²⁸ suggests that there is also a politics of acculturation. In the case of India, a new political system has been introduced into a setting far different from

the one in which it originated. Research and analysis of both the orientation and political position of various groups, traditional as well as modern, will not only provide greater understanding of the ways in which Indian politics function, but will give us additional insight into the direction of change in India.

Some Methodological Observations

In general, there may be said to be three methods of research in local community power studies--the positional, the reputational, and the decision-making approaches. There are also variations within each approach.

The positional approach to the study of community power assumes that "an actor's power is closely correlated with his position in an official or semi-official hierarchy."²⁹ This method searches for the "potential power-offices in the community's institutionalized economic, political, and/or civic structures."³⁰

The great advantage of this method is its simplicity. Aside from the task of defining which positions in the community are "on top," this approach presents the researcher with few, if any, procedural problems; it "employs objective, verifiable social characteristics of specified individuals," and "assumes that the power structure consists

largely of those persons who belong in some selected social category."³¹ This very simplicity, however, also is the basis of the many disadvantages of positional analysis, which all accrue from "the shaky assumption on which it rests, for formal position is not necessarily correlated with power."³² There is a complete disregard for those not occupying formal, official positions, and therefore no distinction between authority and control.³³ As we know, the informal social structure is often as important as, or more important than, the formal structure.

We must note that a strict positional analysis is rarely, if ever, employed as the sole method in community power studies, but rather is used as an adjunct to other methods. In some studies, after the power structure is identified by other means, it is compared with a list of occupants of formal positions to determine the extent of their participation. In other studies, lists of occupants of positions in different institutional sectors are compared to determine the amount of overlap. Finally, the lists are used as a preliminary step in both the reputational and decision-making methods which are discussed below. In any event, formal position is usually regarded as only one of the many possible resources in determining an

actor's potential for affecting the behavior of others. It is assumed that there are also power-holders who do not formally hold office in the major institutions and associations.

Currently, the most widely employed approach to the study of community power, and, consequently, the one subjected to the most penetrating examination and criticism, is the reputational approach. In general, the procedure is to "determine community power structures on the basis of judgments by community members who are considered 'knowledgeable' about community life. These 'judges' select names from lists of potential candidates based on imputed degrees of influence. Those persons most frequently selected according to the given criteria are said to constitute the power structure."³⁴

Most of these power-reputation or power-attribution studies stem from the work of Floyd Hunter in Regional City.³⁵ In this study, Hunter secured four lists of civic, governmental, business, and status leaders. Then six judges were selected from among people who had lived in the community for a number of years and had knowledge of community affairs. They were given four lists separately and were asked to select from each list ten persons of influence in rank order of importance. They were also asked to choose

from a list of fifty organizations the top ten in influence. There was a high degree of agreement among the judges as to who the top leaders were in the four fields. A final set of questions was related to two decisions which recently had been made in the community, in an effort to reveal each individual's relation to these decisions. Out of the forty persons studied, the largest number were found directly as administering a major portion of the activities of large commercial enterprises.

The most attractive qualities of the reputational approach are, according to Herson, its transportability and its economy of operation:

Like Henry Ford, Floyed Hunter has found the secret of mass production, and today's builder of community power models no longer need build each model over an attenuated time period, beginning labor with a refining of raw materials.³⁶

Herson feels that a valid conclusion as to the merits of reputational studies is, at present, not easily reached: "The power data now being accumulated by Hunter's method ought be viewed as a mound of smelter's ore, offering promise of further refinement and use."³⁷ Wolfinger's³⁸ evaluation is even less favorable. Those who continue to employ the reputational approach are convinced that questions on methodology are legitimate and that there is no

doubt that more needs to be known about the precision, stability, and congruence of the research operations of power studies. However, they claim that "the evidence is not yet in. Neither Wolfinger nor Polsby have provided sufficient evidence to warrant Mr. Wolfinger's necrology."³⁹

The third approach to the study of community power to be examined in the decision-making process is the issue-analysis approach. It eschews both position and reputation as effective means of ascertaining the power structure or of generalizing about power, and stresses the actual determination of community decisions and the persons involved in making them: "The process of decision-making is recognized as the nucleus of the phenomenon of power and it is this process that is the object of research."⁴⁰ Participation in community decisions is not to be equated with power, but the researcher must, rather, weigh the activities of different participants in decisions and then, by means of an operational definition, appraise their relative power. Dahl considers this operationalism, however crude it may be, as the method's greatest advantage, and other researchers have commented on its effectiveness in representing the realities of community power.⁴¹ Although the reputational approach has received a considerable amount of attention

and criticism, the decision-making approach has received comparatively little of either.⁴² Among the more serious difficulties in its application would seem to be its complexity and the resultant necessity of severely limiting the number and range of issues studied, the exclusion of the researcher from spontaneous and private discussions concerning power, and the determination of criteria by which decisions are to be chosen for examination.

For our study, we did not rely on any particular technique in terms of identifying village leaders. We used a combination of all three methods discussed earlier. On the basis of our experience in the field we found that the positional and reputational approaches were most meaningful and reliable.

We are providing one instance, which will give some insight into the problems of identifying village leaders in India. One of our investigators went to interview an elected member of the Panchayat. While this member of the Panchayat offered himself to be interviewed, he said, "You know, it is true I am a leader in this village, I have been elected to the Panchayat, but you must also interview Mr. Singh--he is a very powerful man in the village and without his help I would not have been elected." When the in-

investigator went to Mr. Singh, he offered himself to be interviewed but politely asked, "Have you interviewed Mr. Ram? You know, he is very important--he has contacts, he can deal with people well, he was instrumental in getting fertilizer from the block office during the last season."

Here we see a very interesting network of leadership in the village setting. Positional, reputational, and functional leaders--all are important in their own spheres but interestingly enough, they all recognize the importance of others and believe that each has his own constituency. In our study then, as far as possible, we interviewed all three types of leaders.

Empirical Studies of Rural Leadership in India

Here we would attempt to review some of the important studies of rural leadership in India and use them as our frame of reference for our analysis of the empirical data.

Oscar Lewis'⁴³ study, Group Dynamics in a North-Indian Village, points out that patterns of influence, or at any rate, of communication, within extended family groups reach out to several villages. H. S. Dhillon⁴⁴ discusses rural leadership at some length, but does not quite define it; he seems to recognize its protean forms and its unre-

liability as a mechanism for extension work. They brought to light the varied roles of kin and caste-oriented factions in the decision-making process in rural India. These studies on the power structure in rural India inspired a number of American, British, and Indian scholars to begin the study of rural leadership in different parts of India.

Another advance in the study of rural leadership came with the publication of the edited volume of Park and Tinker,⁴⁵ which includes a number of papers on the various aspects of leadership in rural India. Wood,⁴⁶ in her article, "Patterns of Influence Within Rural India," points out that in the leadership structure of rural India, one factor is common to the whole countryside: "A would-be or putative leader who offers counsel, or who gives orders calling for a new practice or a changed practice on the part of his fellow villagers, will not be taken seriously for long unless he himself and his family follow consistently the changes required."⁴⁷ The other papers on rural leadership provide us with case studies in specific villages. Beals⁴⁸ suggests that the implication of factionalism for village-wide leadership is, briefly, that there can be no village-wide leadership. McCormack⁴⁹ advances two arguments on the basis of his study, and suggests that two gen-

eral changes have increasingly affected Morsrelli and appear to be related to the growing importance of factional leadership in the village. One of these changes is the shift from a village economy based on subsistence farming and depending on free village group exchange labor among families to an economy in which cash farming with hired labor and outside employment are important. Secondly, the growth of factionalism appears to be related to increases in the extent of direct government interference in village affairs. Bachenheimer⁵⁰ examines the elements of leadership in an Andhra village and suggests that despite the outward-looking groups in Padu, leadership follows a fairly traditional pattern. Among the changes that are sure to take place in the future are an increase in political awareness and the growth of political activity. The Harpers⁵¹ report on political organization and leadership in relation to caste in a Bombay village. They point out that on the whole the village of Totagadde retains its traditional forms of leadership, decision making, and censure. Major leadership roles are filled by the Havik Brahmans and the political dynamics of feud, friendship, faction, and "party" play an important part in determining which individuals will attain these positions.

Srinivas⁵² and Dube⁵³ have also added to the concepts and methods of study of the patterns of rural leadership. Srinivas regards the concept of "dominant caste" as crucial for the understanding of power relations in rural social life. But after a careful analysis, Dube finds the political power concentrated in a few individuals rather than diffused in the caste. In another study, Chandra⁵⁴ makes some generalized statements about rural leadership in India, and emphasizes the "traditional patterns of group leadership" instead of the emerging "individualistic, semi-official and artificate" leadership.

S. K. Srivastava⁵⁵ asserts that there are built-in stresses and strains between the existing traditional ideal of society and the new socialistic concept of society and there are contradictions between the social system, the value system, and the personality system.

Pradipto Roy's⁵⁶ study provides some broad features that characterize the type of person who is emerging as a leader in the Indian village and the mode of his operation.

- a. People with more education participate more in the new social organizations.
- b. Individuals with high income and a high level of living are more likely to become leaders in the

new organizations.

- c. Members of large families are more likely to emerge as leaders.
- d. Age and caste do not seem to determine who will be leaders.
- e. The new leaders seem to have more contact with extension agencies.
- f. The new leaders are a little more secular-oriented than most village people but they are not extremely secular.

This study of a number of villages in Etah district in Uttar Pradesh, India, seems to support Dube's finding that certain socio-economic characteristics are more important than caste in assessing village leadership patterns. Although this study does not directly refute the "dominant caste" hypothesis, it throws some light on the relationship of the caste hierarchy to emergent leadership.

It seems that the new leader in village India is a person of high economic status, some education, good contacts with extension agencies, a large family, and having a somewhat rational perspective on life.

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CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

Background Information

Data for the present study were gathered as a part of the larger study conducted by Dr. Baidya Nath Varma of the City College of New York in the academic year 1964-65.

In the original study, 1600 leaders were interviewed and data were gathered from district, state and national leaders in addition to business leaders and leaders of the working class.

The present investigation uses data from 16 of 96 villages of Patna District, Bihar, which were studied by the original team.

Research Design

Patna District was chosen as the universe of this study for the following reasons:

- a. The city of Patna is the capital of the State of Bihar.
- b. Graduates students of the Department of Sociology, Patna University, were trained to do the field work for this study.

c. Statutory Panchayat (village council, which has become the official organ of the State government, not yet introduced in all districts and villages of the State) was introduced in this district.

d. Since Patna is the capital city, it would have considerable impact on the villages in terms of political awareness and community participation.

Sampling

A list of all villages in Patna District was obtained from the Department of Statistics, Government of Bihar, Patna. The total number of villages included in Patna District was 2,354.

Villages differ according to the size of population, geographical characteristics, environmental influences, etc. In the original selection of villages (in Dr. Varma's sample), care was taken to include villages of heterogeneous and diverse characteristics. Proper representation of various diverse types of village had to be ensured. Size of population of villages was taken as the basic criterion. The other criteria were education, Panchayat, location, caste, faction, and communication. The villages were first stratified according to the number of villages falling in the population range of 500 and less, 501 to 1,000, 1,001 to

2,000, 2,001 and above. Accordingly, the total universe of 2,354 villages was stratified and the distribution was as follows:

TABLE 1

POPULATION CHARACTERISTIC OF THE LARGER SAMPLE

<u>Population</u>	<u>Villages of Patna Dis-</u> <u>trict (Total Number)</u>	<u>Villages in Dr. Varma's</u> <u>Sample (Total Number)</u>
500 and less	946	30
501 to 1,000	700	30
1,001 to 2,000	500	20
2,001 and above	<u>208</u>	<u>16</u>
	Total 2,354	Total 96

The sample covered about 5 percent of the total number of villages in the district. Since there were more villages in the first two categories, the number of sample villages was greater for the first two strata, i.e., 30 each from the first two. In the selection of villages from each strata, the method of systemic sample was followed. The list of the villages was arranged in alphabetical order and the villages were selected by the application of systemic regular intervals. Thus, 96 villages were selected and each investigator was allotted three to four villages. Depending on the size of the village, from 12 to 16 leaders of each village were interviewed with a standard questionnaire consisting of 80 items.

The Present Sample

For the purpose of this dissertation, we first selected 50 villages from Dr. Varma's sample on the basis of the same criteria used by him and as noted above. Then from this universe of 50 villages, 16 villages were selected for the present study on the basis of stratified random sampling. The stratification was done in terms of size of population of the village as noted below. The following variables were used to select our final sample of villages: education, Panchayat, location, caste, faction, and communication.

TABLE 2

POPULATION CHARACTERISTIC OF SAMPLED VILLAGES

<u>Population</u>	<u>Number of Villages Selected According to Population Size</u>	<u>Final Sample of Villages Selected</u>
500 and less	13	4
501 to 1,000	16	5
1,001 to 1,500	6	2
1,501 to 2,000	6	2
2,001 to 3,000	3	1
3,001 to 4,000	4	1
4,001 to 5,000	2	1
Total	<u>50</u>	<u>16</u>

Each investigator lived in his respective villages for a period of three months. Since this study was also co-sponsored by the Department of Sociology, Patna Univer-

sity, it was relatively easy for the investigators to establish rapport with local leaders as well as government officials because the university served as a consultant to the government. First, the investigators were required to take a comprehensive social census of the villages, then they selected respondents from the same village and adjacent areas ("village circle" term coined by Dr. Varma) for the purpose of the interviews. The questionnaire was printed in Hindi, the language with which the villagers are conversant. Investigators were constantly supervised in the field by Dr. Varma (principal investigator) myself (research supervisor), and two other faculty members of the Department of Sociology, Patna University.

Research Tools

The original data include a social census, depth interviews, participant observation and questionnaires. This will allow qualitative as well as quantitative analysis in this study.

In the first stage of the investigation, a comprehensive social census was taken by the investigators. The social census provided a detailed profile of each village (i.e., its history, origin, background, caste structure, occupational structure, factionalism, distance from city,

use of mass media, etc.). The social census was particularly designed to obtain information regarding the socio-political organizations, artisan guilds, frequency of inter-caste marriages, use of mechanized units in agriculture, roads and buildings, voting pattern of the village in national, state, as well as local elections. Sources of this information were villagers, formal leaders, Panchayat (village council) officials, and local government officials. Participant observation, group interviews and interview guides were the tools used in this part of our investigation.

In the second phase of the investigation, intensive interviews were conducted with the help of questionnaires. There are two parts in the questionnaire. Part I consists of 30 questions which provide background information about the respondent as well as his educational profile, exposure to mass media, outside contacts, organizational affiliation and friendship patterns. Part II consists of 50 questions on attitudes, values, beliefs of the village leaders concerning Panchayat (village council), political parties, political leaders, land legislation, bureaucracy, governmental plans, village customs, rural-urban orientation, and social change. (See Appendix 1.)

Problems in Measuring Modernization

We were interested in seeing our respondents' general attitude toward modernization. The general attitude toward modernization could be measured in terms of support for certain kinds of changes in society.

A General Scale of Modernization

On the basis of their potential validity, we selected five items from our schedule for the purpose of constructing a general scale of modernization. Out of the five items, two seemed to be important on the national level. These two items pertained to family planning and the mode of change in the village. Family planning is an issue which concerns all Indians. Most of the people were familiar with it. The other item had to do with whether change should take place quickly or slowly. Two more items concerned land legislation, one dealing with land ceiling and the other with subtenant's right. Another item was in the area of leadership. The question probed whether leaders should be given respect according to their work, or if all leaders should receive equal respect.

We thought that by dichotomizing the various responses we could have an idea as to the extent to which our respondents favored modernization. We labeled those

who would show a more favorable attitude toward these items as pro-change and the others as either neutral or not favoring change. The internal consistency of the responses on the five items was an important criterion in the construction of the scale. We hypothesized that respondents who would be in favor of family planning would favor quick change in the village, and further would also stand for land ceiling and subtenants' rights. Those who would favor giving respect to leaders according to work were considered pro-change. These assumptions governed the selection of the items for the modernization scale. All the items in the schedule were close-ended, so that the responses could be dichotomized.

Reliability of the General Scale

Since the present investigator had not collected the data himself, he felt the constraints of a secondary analysis, especially in attempting to construct a modernization scale. The items were taken from the schedule, so it was not possible to test the internal consistency of the modernization scale in the usual way as is done for scales or tests, such as the split-half, or the test-retest techniques.¹

TABLE 3

DISTRIBUTION OF PRO-CHANGE RESPONSES FOR MODERNIZATION SCALE

<u>No. of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>N</u>
None	0	1
One	4	20
Two	18	98
Three	37	205
Four	32	175
Five	<u>9</u>	<u>47</u>
Total	100%	546

$$\bar{x} = 3.2; \quad \underline{s} = 0.98$$

No response = 62. This includes any respondent who had a missing response on any of the items in the scale.

Table 3 shows that only 4 percent had pro-change responses on one item and 9 percent on all the five items. Eighteen percent had pro-change responses on two items, while 37 percent had pro-change responses on three items and 32 percent on four items.

The internal consistency was attempted to be examined through the following techniques:

- (a) inter-item correlations, and
- (b) item-total correlations.

TABLE 4

TETRACHORIC INTER-CORRELATION MATRIX FOR
ITEMS OF MODERNIZATION SCALE AND
ITEM-TOTAL BISERIAL CORRELATIONS

<u>Modernization Scale Items</u>	Leader's Work	Family Planning	Land Ceiling	Subtenants' Right	Item- Total $\frac{rb}{6}$
	2	3	4	5	
1. Village Change	-0.10*	0.02	0.10*	0.03	0.65*
2. Leader's Work		-0.08*	-0.20*	-0.28*	0.42*
3. Family Planning			0.18*	-0.09*	0.44*
4. Land Ceiling				0.33*	0.72*
5. Subtenants' Right					0.66*

* p .01

The item-total correlation is very high and positive. This gives the impression that the items of the scale go together. However, the internal consistency of the scale itself seems to be in doubt.

To check the internal consistency of the modernization scale, inter-item correlations were run. Table 4 shows that out of 10 inter-item correlations which were run, 8 were significant. Further, all the inter-item correlations with item 2 are negative and against the scored direction of the modernization scale. In addition, another negative correlation is between items 3 and 5, i.e., family planning

and subtenants' right. These two factors make the scale internally inconsistent. The expectation was that all the inter-item correlations would be high and positive.

Validity of the General Scale

We were also interested in checking whether the scale had any external validity. Four items were selected to test the external validity. They were: religiosity, mode of change, perception of progress, and party preference. On the basis of theoretical as well as empirical considerations, we felt that those who were pro-change would score high on the particular test of these items. We expected that respondents of upper caste, higher educational level, professional groups, higher income level, younger age would score high on the modernization scale. We also expected that those who favored cooperative farming, showed preference for helping those who were right, were in favor of majority rule, were against the inclusion of dissidents in the cabinet, were members of leftist parties, were favoring the view that respect should be given to leaders according to work, would score high on the modernization scale.

On the basis of the results (see Appendix 3) on external validity it appears that in the majority of the cases, scores were against the expected direction. Hence, they were not valid. We arrive at the conclusion that the scale is neither internally consistent nor externally valid.

It may be noted that we attempted to construct a scale in the following way: first, we wanted to select items theoretically on the basis of the review of the literature on modernization. And second, we wanted to empirically determine whether the scale we constructed was internally consistent and externally valid. On the basis of the above discussion it is clear that this process does not always lead to a valid scale.

Some (Inkeles, 1966) have attempted to measure modernity quantitatively, while others say that it is not possible or even desirable to do so. The notion of a unidimensional continuum of societal modernization, on which analyses of individual modernity partly rest, has been subject to considerable criticism (Bendix, 1967; Blumer, 1964; Gusfield, 1967; Illich, 1969).

In our attempt to construct a scale of modernization, we found that it was not possible to come up with a valid scale.

As we compare our sample with Inkeles's,² we find

one major difference which may be an important factor in the construction of a modernization scale. Inkele's sample included people from different walks of life and he had a sample of heterogeneous groups. Ours was strictly a village sample and the people of the village are homogeneous. Consequently, our variance scores were not high. Added to this is the fact that our respondents were village leaders and in a sense elite.

We would argue on the basis of our data that a general measure of modernity is not possible and perhaps even not desirable for the study of village leadership. Our contention is partly born out by Portes³ when he says that the assumption of modernity positively linked with all aspects of societal development is not true.

Our position is further supported by Armer and Schnai-
berg;⁴

Thus, we are left with the final conclusion in doubt: either "modernity" does have some distinct empirical reality, and our present measures have not adequately captured this; or, there is no distinctive universal concept of "modernity" that exists, save in the minds of social scientists. Regardless of which position one takes, the notion that social science has been able to develop a universally valid measure of modernity appears to be false.

On the basis of the above considerations, we decided to concentrate on pro-change responses in specific areas,

e.g., land legislation, media exposure, political attitudes and views on the Panchayat system. We felt that pro-change responses could be considered as a measure for modernity in these specific areas.

Although we have questioned the value of a general modernization scale, it is possible that we could ascertain modernity for specific areas of behavior. The specific scales that we have constituted to measure change in particular areas of the leader's behavior prove this point-- that there is no correlation between the various scales of change. However, we wish to emphasize again that the specific scales which are reported below show no intercorrelation between them. In other words, each one of the following scales is independent of the others.

Specific Scales of Modernization

(A) Land legislation scale. Our first scale is in the area of land legislation. Traditionally land is owned by a small elite class (Zamindars or landholders) in the villages. In recent times, their role is increasingly being questioned. The government and the political leaders believe that a more equitable distribution of land is necessary for the improvement of agriculture. In 1955, the Ceiling and Management Bill was proposed in Bihar. Proponents of

this bill argued that it was not only desirable but essential.

We felt that issues like land ceiling, subtenants' right, and village co-operative would be most appropriate to see how village leaders perceive change.

We selected three items for this scale--land ceiling, subtenants' right, and village co-operative. We believed that those who would favor these measures would be pro-change. Our assumption is that the pro-change responses are in the direction of modernity.

TABLE 5

DISTRIBUTION OF PRO-CHANGE RESPONSES
FOR LAND LEGISLATION SCALE

<u>No. of Pro-change Responses</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Percent</u>
0	64	11
1	141	24
2	190	32
3	<u>198</u>	<u>33</u>
	593	100%

No response = 15; this includes any respondent who had a missing response on any of the items of the scale.

$$\bar{x} = 1.81; \quad \underline{s} = 1.00$$

Table 5 shows that the various responses on the land legislation scale are in the expected direction of change, but not all the changes are favored by a majority of the sample. There were three categories in the scale and category "0" indicates responses which were not positive in any category of the scale. It is clear from the table that the responses are fairly evenly distributed with the majority of respondents giving two or three pro-change responses for the items used in the construction of this scale.

TABLE 6

TETRACHORIC INTER-ITEM AND ITEM-TOTAL
BISERIAL CORRELATIONS AND PROPORTION
OF THE RESPONSES FOR EACH ITEM
OF LAND LEGISLATION SCALE

	2	3	<u>rb</u>	<u>Proportion of Pro-change Response</u>
1. Land ceiling	0.29	0.34	0.84	0.72
2. Subtenants' right		0.58	0.94	0.46
3. Village co-operative			0.97	0.70

A look at Table 6 shows that the land legislation scale is internally consistent. First, the inter-item correlations are both positive and significant. Second,

the item-total biserial correlations (r_b) are high and positive.

External validation. The same four items of the General Modernization Scale (discussed earlier) and the same rationale was used to test the external validity of this scale. Results show that respondents scored in the expected direction and therefore we take this scale to have external validity.

(B) Media Exposure Scale. Media habit is considered to be one of the most important factors which brings about change in people's attitudes. The theoretical assumption is that greater exposure to the media leads toward change in attitude in the direction of modernity.

On the basis of the same considerations as the land legislation scale, four items were selected for constructing a scale for media exposure. These items were--newspaper, radio, magazine, and movie exposure. We expected that those who read newspapers and magazines, see movies, and listen to radio would be more favorable to change.

TABLE 7

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES FOR MEDIA EXPOSURE SCALE
(N = 608)

<u>No. of Responses</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Percent</u>
0	50	8
1	98	16
2	95	16
3	165	27
4	<u>200</u>	<u>33</u>
	608	100%

$$\bar{x} = 2.6; \quad \underline{s} = 1.31$$

Table 7 shows that the percentage distribution of responses is more or less as expected. Although equal percentages of leaders were exposed either to one or two media, the exposure to three media was almost double these two. And one third of the leaders were exposed to four media. Only eight percent had no exposure to any medium. In general, among this sample of village leaders, media exposure was quite high.

It may be noted that the media exposure scale is not measuring the same type of thing as other scales; the latter measure attitudes toward matters which have policy implications, while the media scale measures a factor which might influence such attitudes, as well as others. However, in this case degree of media exposure does not correlate highly

with the other scales, suggesting that it is not a factor influencing attitudes toward the factors measured by other scales, at least in this sample.

TABLE 8

INTER-ITEM AND ITEM-TOTAL CORRELATION AND PROPORTION OF ONE RESPONSE FOR EACH ITEM OF THE MEDIA EXPOSURE SCALE

	Items				<u>rb</u>	Proportion of pro-change responses
	1	2	3	4		
1. Newspaper	0.67	0.79	0.60	0.97	0.70	
2. Radio		0.61	0.45	0.95	0.73	
3. Magazine			0.54	0.94	0.39	
4. Movie				0.91	0.79	

The inter-item correlations as indicated in Table 8 are high and positive. The proportion of one response for each variable is also high, positive, and in the expected direction of the scale. Although for item 3 (i.e., magazine), the proportion of pro-change responses is a little low (i.e., 0.39) yet the inter-item correlations with these items are high and positive. This indicates that this item can be retained. This decision is further strengthened by the fact that the item-total correlations for each item of the scale is beyond 0.90. The scale is, then, internally consistent and measures effectively exposure to mass media.

External validation. Results show (see Table 9) that, except in the case of mode of change, responses are in the expected direction and it validates this scale.

(C) Political Scale. Three items--give respect to leaders according to work, help those leaders who are right, and leaders not favoring inclusion of dissidents--were included in this scale on the same considerations as in the two previous scales. Those who were in favor of giving respect according to work, those who wanted to help leaders who are right, and those who did not want dissidents to be included in the cabinet were considered pro-change.

TABLE 9

DISTRIBUTION OF PRO-CHANGE RESPONSES FOR POLITICAL SCALE

<u>No. of responses</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Percent</u>
0	107	19
1	280	51
2	143	26
3	<u>24</u>	<u>4</u>
	554	100%

No response = 54; this includes any respondent who had a missing response on any of the items in the scale.

$$\bar{x} = 1.52; \quad s = 0.78$$

Table 9 suggests that the responses for the scale are not as well evenly distributed as was the case for the

two previously discussed scales. The difference provides an interesting contrast to the generally high proportion of pro-change responses on the land legislation scale and media exposure scale. Here, less than 5 percent give pro-change response on all three items, with over two-thirds giving no more than one. It suggests then that our respondents are either more conservative toward political issues, since these issues do not affect them directly, or they are less concerned with them and tend to take a neutral or conservative attitude toward politics.

TABLE 10

INTER-ITEM AND ITEM-TOTAL CORRELATION AND PROPORTION
OF PRO-CHANGE RESPONSE OF POLITICAL SCALE

	2	3	<u>rb</u>	Proportion of pro-change responses
1. Help right	0.40	0.90	0.81	0.23
2. Respect according to work		0.50	0.81	0.69
3. Dissident inclusion			0.81	0.22

It is apparent from Table 10 that the inter-item correlations are significantly positive. Further, the item-total correlation is beyond 0.80 in all cases. These suggest that the scale is internally consistent. A further

look into the proportion of pro-change responses for each item in the coded direction is high for item no. 2 and equal for items no. 1 and 3. This suggests that items 1 and 3 are equally good.

External validity. As in the case of the other two scales, in this case also we found that, except in the case of mode of change, responses were in the expected direction. Hence, this scale is valid. (1967, p. 117)

(D) Panchayat Index. First, we selected five items for the Panchayat scale on the basis of the same considerations as in the previous scales. These items were: Panchayat good, Panchayat leader, Panchayat vote, Panchayat co-op, and Panchayat successful. "Panchayat good" stands for whether they considered the Panchayat a good thing. The second item asked whether the leaders were good or not. The third item asked whether they voted in the last Panchayat elections. The fourth item asked whether they would co-operate with Panchayat activities. And the last item asked whether they think their Panchayat was successful.

After examining the statistical relationship among these five items, we decided to retain only those three which showed the highest positive relationships with one another.

The items retained were: Panchayat leader, Panchayat vote, and Panchayat success.

We then made a scale of these Panchayat items. They are reported as follows:

TABLE 11

DISTRIBUTION OF PRO-CHANGE RESPONSE ON
DIFFERENT ITEMS OF PANCHAYAT SCALE

	<u>N</u>	<u>Percent</u>
0	18	3
1	83	14
2	132	22
3	<u>366</u>	<u>61</u>
	599	100%

No response = 9; this includes any respondent who had a missing response on any of the items in the scale.

$$\bar{x} = 2.49; \quad \underline{s} = 0.82$$

It is apparent from Table 11 that scale levels 1 and 2 account for 36 percent of the responses, whereas level 3 accounts for 61 percent of the responses. The no pro-change category, i.e., "0," accounts for only 3 percent of the total. This suggests that the scale items are differentially effective and therefore they cannot be used as "items" of a scale.

It was therefore decided to dichotomize the total set

of responses by putting scale levels 0, 1 and 2 in one category and level 3 in the other. The former category was designated showing some disfavor and the latter as total favor. In other words, the responses to level 3 indicate a high amount of agreement suggesting total favor to Panchayat. We thought that by looking into some disfavor responses one could see a meaningful pattern. The Panchayat Scale hereafter will be designated as Panchayat Index, showing two categories of response types--some disfavor and total favor toward Panchayat.

TABLE 12

INTERCORRELATION MATRIX AMONG LAND LEGISLATION, MEDIA EXPOSURE AND POLITICAL SCALES AND THE PANCHAYAT INDEX

<u>Scale</u>	1	2	3	4
1. Land Legislation		-.03	-.06	-.03
2. Media Exposure			-.03	-.01
3. Political				-.01
4. Panchayat Index				

Table 12 clearly shows that there is no significant relationship between the three scales and the one index, i.e., they are independent of one another and measure different aspects or dimensions of change.

¹J. P. Guilford, Psychometric Methods (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954), p. 373.

²Alex Inkeles, "The OM Scale: A Comparative Socio-Psychological Measure of Individual Modernity," Sociometry, vol. 29, no. 4 (December, 1966), pp. 357.

³Alejandro Portes, "The Factorial Stratum of Modernity: Empirical Replication," American Journal of Sociology, vol. 79, no. 1 (July, 1973), pp. 36-37.

⁴Michael Armer and Allan Schnaiberg, "Measuring Individual Modernity," American Sociological Review, vol. 37, no. 3 (June, 1972), pp. 301-316.

CHAPTER IV

LOCATION OF THE STUDY

Introduction to the State of Bihar and the District of Patna

Location of Study

The State of Bihar borders on the Himilayan region and is the richest state in terms of mineral resources. It has a large number of industrial establishments. Its people speak Hindi, which is also the national language of India. It has been called a "buffer" state in the regional and linguistic controversies. The first President of India was a resident of Bihar, the first Satyagraha movement¹ was launched by Gandhi there, and the largest gifts of land for free distribution have been given by the people of this state to Vinoba Bhave for his Bhoodan movement.² The largest agricultural landlords of India are located there, side by side with the strongest peasant or Kisan movement.³

Some of the highest dams in the world have been constructed on the most turbulent of rivers, the Kosi, in this state. The government has often faced the problem of massive relief and rehabilitation for people who have suffered from

the ravages of the river Kosi.

Bihar does not claim to have any big metropolis (five cities have an average population of 100,000; none are above 300,000) or any of the largest cities in India. Internal migration within the state and some out-migration have been common, what with its industrial enterprises and seasonal need for labor in various areas. Thus communications and interchange of values and attitudes among the people of the state are considerable. A sizable segment of the population works in Calcutta. A few places of pilgrimage in the state draw constant streams of visitors from all parts of India. The population is predominantly rural, and the density is very high.

The state legislature during the five general elections (in 1952, 1957, 1962, 1967, and 1972) has been dominated by the Congress Party except in 1972, when the Congress Party failed to obtain a majority and was forced to form a coalition government with the leftist parties. In the national parliament also, Congress is the majority party. However, the Socialist parties, the Communist Party, and a landlords' party have maintained a strong footing in the state legislature since India's independence in 1947.

Patna District

The villages we studied are all located in Patna district. This district was constituted in the year 1865 out of portions of the then districts of Bihar (Vihar) and Tirhut. There were some minor changes of jurisdiction between 1881 and 1931. Recently, in 1973, the districts of the State of Bihar have been reorganized and as a result a new district has been created, known as Nalanda district, previously a part of the Patna district. As the center of the ancient Magadh Empire, the district has a rich history going back 2,500 years.

The district can be divided into three natural divisions, comprising: (1) a narrow strip of somewhat high land about four to five miles in width along the southern bank of the river Ganges, having very fertile soil; (2) an elevated plateau in the southeast containing the Rajgir hills; and (3) alluvial fertile plains in the remaining areas (see map).

The district of Patna is served by a network of roads. The main line of the Eastern Railway passes through the entire length of the district, running parallel to the Ganges River.

According to the 1971 census⁴ the total population of Patna district was 3,556,945, out of which 77 percent lived

in rural areas and 23 percent in urban areas. Its total scheduled caste⁵ population was 588,629, out of which 86 percent lived in rural areas and 14 percent in urban areas. According to the 1961 census, the total population of the Patna district was 2,949,746, out of which 80 percent lived in rural areas and 20 percent in urban areas. The total scheduled caste population was 474,501.

As compared to other districts, Patna's population is slightly higher. It is also the most densely populated district in the state. Its density is almost double that of the state average (694 per square mile) and about four times the all-India average (358 per square mile). Almost 80 percent of the population of Patna district is rural. However, the proportion of rural population in this district is lower than the corresponding proportion in the state.

The literacy rate is high in the district of Patna as compared to state and national literacy rates. In the district of Patna, 847,582 persons comprising 28.73 percent of the population are able to read and write or have at-

tained a higher educational level. The corresponding percentage for Bihar state is 18.40, and for the country 24.02 percent.

It seems clear that Patna district is well ahead in many areas as compared to other districts. Patna, being the capital city, is certainly very active in politics and it can also be assumed that even in the rural sector people are more enlightened.

Profile of Sampled Villages

We will now present a profile of each of the sixteen villages in our sample. The order of description of these villages is based on the size of the population. The smallest village in our sample comes first in our description and it is followed by the larger ones.

We have organized description of these villages in terms of: (a) location, (b) demography (population size, growth rates, etc.), (c) caste distribution, (d) literacy and education (number of schools, libraries, etc.), (e) communication (radio, newspapers, magazines, etc.), (f) Panchayat and political activities, (g) factions, and (h) other (which may include land area, inter-caste marriages, and any other relevant information).

Village Gangapur

Village Gangapur was in the Hilsa block and Biharsherif sub-division.⁶ It was at a distance of 6 miles from block headquarters, 36 miles from sub-divisional headquarters, and 48 miles from district headquarters.

Its population in 1961 was 61 and in 1971 it was 85. During 1961-71 its population had increased by almost 37.5 percent. A majority of its population belonged to scheduled castes. Their number was 47 according to the 1971 census. A total of 45 people were working according to the 1971 census. Thus Gangapur's working population was 52.6 percent of the total population. There were 12 households in the village.

The major castes of the village were Beldar, Dusadh, and Pasi--all scheduled castes. There were a few Kurmis, which is an intermediate caste.

The villagers were mostly illiterate. There were only 6 literate people in 1965, whereas in 1971 there were 8 literates in the village. The nearest Lower Primary School (these schools give education only up to third grade) is located at a distance of about 2 miles.

People of Gangapur had no access to newspapers or magazines; even if they had, it would not matter very much

since most of them were illiterate. There was not a single radio set in this village.

Gangapur was part of a Panchayat⁷ system, whose seat was located in another village. Since the village belonged to a Panchayat, it had one representative in the Panchayat. There were two influential villagers (one Kurmi by caste and the other Dusadh) who were instrumental in all major decisions. They arbitrated in cases of disputes and may be considered influential leaders. This village had no formal political organization and people were generally apathetic toward politics.

The land area of this village was very small. It had about 40 acres of cultivated land--which was owned by landlords who lived in other villages. The economic condition of the village was very poor. Most of the villagers were laborers; only a few tilled their own land. This village, on the whole, would be considered as a backward village.

Village Bhikuchak

Village Bhikuchak was in Barh block as well as Barh sub-division. It was about 15 miles both from the block and sub-divisional headquarters.

According to the 1961 census, its population was 203,

which increased to 244 in the 1971 census. Population growth during the decade was about 19.5 percent. In 1971, 78 people were working members of the population. Therefore, the working population was approximately 32.5 percent.

The largest number of inhabitants in this village were Yadavs, a clean caste. Other castes were mostly scheduled castes, such as Teli and Chamar. Their number was about 50 in the village. A small proportion of the population was Kurmi, again a clean caste.

In 1971, 34 people were literate, a literacy rate of about 14 percent. No school was located in this village.

Villagers had no access to newspapers, magazines, and there was not even a single radio set in the village.

This village had no Panchayat of its own, but was part of a Panchayat which included other villages as well. This village was politically not so conscious and there was also lack of leadership. One absentee landlord dominated the village.

There was no migration in this village. We did not find any evidence of factionalism in this village.

Village Milki

Village Milki was in Ekangarsarai block and Bihar subdivision. Its distance from block headquarters was 7 miles

and from the sub-divisional headquarters 24 miles.

In 1961, its population was 436 and in 1971 it was 459. Its population grew by 5.5 percent during the decade of 1961-71. In 1971, 134 people were working, which means its working population was 28 percent. The number of households in the village was 45.

This village was predominantly Yadav, a clean and locally dominant caste.⁸ There were a small number of Kurmi, an intermediate caste. The population of scheduled castes was also small in this village. They numbered only 28, and included Jamadar, Dusadh, and Teli.

In 1971, 108 people were literate, which was about 22.5 percent of the total population. There was one Lower Primary School in the village. Generally, only scheduled caste members attended this school. However, there were Middle Schools (giving education up to seventh grade) and Secondary Schools (giving education up to eleventh grade, like high school) in the neighboring village of Shivnagar. The nearest degree college (up to B.A.) was in Nalanda, only 14 miles away from Milki. Two villagers had college degrees, and one had a professional diploma. About 20 people were living outside the village for educational purposes. This village had also one library.

The village library received some newspapers and magazines. In addition, some people also got newspapers on their own. There were four radio sets, all privately owned. But villagers did have limited access to these radios sets.

This village had no Panchayat of its own but was affiliated with the Panchayat in a neighboring village, which was called Dumri-Bajitpur-Khirouti Panchayat. Two villagers held offices in this Panchayat. There were two influential leaders in this village--one was Yadav and the other was Kurmi, both clean castes. Mr. Lal Singh Tyagi (who was also a State Minister for some time) had great influence in this village and was much respected.

Only one family of five members migrated permanently from this village as recorded in 1965. The head of this family was fairly well educated. He got a job in the city, sold his land and house, and left with his family.

Thirty-two families depended on agriculture, 14 earned a livelihood as hired labor, and 2 were engaged in small-scale business. There was no electricity for lighting in this village. However, some electricity was used for agricultural purposes. There were two paddy husking machines and four cane-pressing machines, all electrically driven. There were seven bicycles and one automobile in the village.

Two families owned cemented brick houses, which is a sign of prosperity.

Village Milki might be considered prosperous. The villagers were generally happy with the governmental activities. They felt that the Community Development Program had benefited the village a great deal. No sign of factionalism was seen in the village.

Village Kewai

Village Kewai was in Islampur block and Biharsherif sub-division. It was only 3 miles from block headquarters, but 40 miles from sub-divisional and 67 miles from district headquarters.

In 1961, its population was 450, and in 1971 it was 487. Population growth between 1961-71 was about 8.2 percent. Some 255 people were working, hence its working population was approximately 53 percent.

Kurmi and Yadavs (both clean castes) were in the largest number--each constituted about 25 percent of the total population. There were a small number of Brahmins living in the village. In 1971, the number of scheduled castes living in the village was 32; also some members of intermediate castes lived in the village. There were some 50 to 55 Muslims in this village.

In 1971, there were 110 literate people in the village--a literacy rate of 22.5 percent. There was one Lower Primary School located in the village, which had about 45 students and one teacher. It was run by the state government. The nearest Secondary School was at a distance of 2 miles in Islampur and the nearest college was 12 miles away in Hilsa. One of the villagers had a college degree and 3 were attending college.

Villagers did not receive any newspapers or magazines. There was no radio set in the village. Visiting was the only source of information for the people of Kewai.

There was no Panchayat located in this village, but it was affiliated with a Panchayat. Two villagers also held offices in this Panchayat. There was no political organization in the village and villagers were not so active politically.

This village had a Zamindari⁹ background. There were 47 families in the village. Out of these, 8 families were in government jobs, 5 were in business, 19 families had some land but they also worked as agricultural laborers, 3 families had no land and work as landless laborers. Electricity was not available for domestic purposes. However, the village had 4 electric cane-pressing machines. There

were also 3 bicycles in the village. There were two factions in the village, organized along caste lines. One was composed of the Yadavs, Bhumihars, and Muslims, while the other faction was formed of the Kurmis. This village was not so backward, but at the same time it cannot be considered prosperous or progressive.

Village Bedauli

Village Bedauli was in Bihta block and Dinapur subdivision. It was only 3 miles from block headquarters and 27 miles from the sub-divisional headquarters.

Its population in 1961 was 748, and in 1971, 721. This is one of the villages in our sample where there was a decline in population (by 4 percent). The total number of people working in 1971 was 214; therefore, about 29 percent of the population was working.

The village had a number of castes. Kurmi and Koiri were in the largest proportion, about 200 each, and then Yadavs, about 120 in number. There were 85 scheduled caste members living in this village. Some other castes were Brahmin, Rajputs, Kahar, Barhi, Kanu, Nonia, and Baniyas. There were also 3 Muslim families, numbering about 20.

The number of people literate in 1971 was 186 and the literacy rate was 26 percent. Two people had college

degrees and four were going to college. This village had one Primary Girls' School. There was no other educational institution in the village. But in Rambagh, which is only one mile away, there was a degree college, a Secondary School, and a Middle School.

Villagers had access to newspapers and magazines and some got newspapers on their own. There were four radio sets in the village, all privately owned. However, villagers did have access to these sets, and they listened to radio regularly.

There was no Panchayat in this village. This village belonged to the Rambagh Panchayat system and two villagers held offices in the Panchayat. Some castes had their own caste Panchayats.¹⁰ This village was politically very conscious; its members were active and voted in large numbers both in the general elections and the local Panchayat elections.

It was reported that one family had permanently migrated from this village. Some poor villagers go to nearby cities for employment during the off season. There was no evidence of factionalism of any kind in this village.

Village Gangati

Village Gangati was in Rajgir block and Biharsherif

sub-division. Its distance was 14 miles from block headquarters, 24 miles from sub-divisional headquarters, and 112 miles from district headquarters.

Its population in 1961 was 694, and in 1971 it was 794, a population growth of about 14 percent in a decade. Its employed population in 1971 was approximately 235, the percentage of employed being 29 percent.

Kurmis were in the majority in this village; their number was approximately 400. There were also about 185 Kahars, 135 belonged to scheduled castes, and only a few were from upper castes.

The number of people literate in 1971 was 250; its literacy rate was 32 percent. There was a High School in the village. The village had a library which went out of circulation in 1964. Thirteen people had completed High School and one had a Master's degree in Arts.

Some newspapers and magazines were received by the school and villagers did have access to these. The school had also a radio set and villagers listened to it frequently.

Gangati did not have its own Panchayat but it belonged to a Panchayat system. People in this village were politically very conscious. Caste was a dominant factor in local as well as general elections. Villagers actively participated in the Panchayat elections.

Gangati was a fairly old and well known village in the area. Other than caste occupation, the majority of the villagers depended on agriculture. Some villagers worked as laborers in nearby areas throughout the year. Most of these working families were scheduled castes.

Village Maujipur

Village Maujipur was in Fatwah block and Barh subdivision. It was at a distance of 3 miles from block headquarters, 43 miles from sub-divisional headquarters, and 22 miles from district headquarters.

The population of Maujipur was 743 in 1961 and 857 in 1971; therefore, during the decade its population growth was approximately 15.8 percent. The number of people working in 1971 was 385; i.e., approximately 45 percent of the population was working at the time. There were 141 households in the village.

Yadavs constituted about 40 percent of the population. Other dominant castes were Kahar, Teli and Banias. Only a very few members of scheduled castes lived in this village, 15 in number. There were about 100 Muslims living in this village.

The number of people literate in 1971 was 187, making the literacy rate about 22 percent. There was one Lower Primary School in the village. The nearest High School and

Girls' Schools were in Fatwah, which was less than 2 miles away. The nearest college was in Patna-city, which was about 4 miles away. There was also a library in the village. Some had college degrees and some had technical diplomas.

The village library received some dailies and weeklies and it also owned a radio set. Some individuals received newspapers and magazines. There were six radio sets owned privately in this village. Villagers had access to these radios and they listened to radio on a regular basis.

This village also belonged to the Panchayat system, although there was no seat of Panchayat located in the village itself. It belonged to the Jethauli Panchayat. Most of the seats in the Panchayat were occupied by Yadavs--this caste is considered dominant caste in the village. The villagers were politically very conscious and took an active interest in local as well as general elections.

This village had a Zamindari background. Some prominent Muslims of the district came from this village. This village was also known as a center for selling and exchanging animals, such as cows, buffaloes, etc. There was a temple as well as a Masjid (or Mosque) in the village. There was also a homeopathic dispensary, which distributed free medicine. There was no pattern of migration in this

village but some villagers did go to nearby places to earn wages on a daily basis.

Agriculture was the main occupation of the villagers. About 100 families owned land. Some 150 acres of land were owned by absentee landlords. Approximately 100 people worked as agricultural laborers and 25 people were in other jobs-- both government and non-government. Some eight years ago a Chamar woman and a Yadav man developed a close relationship and suddenly left the village. It was said that they wanted to get married and there was great resistance by their respective families and the village community.

Village Rampur

Village Rampur was in Naubatpur block and Dinapur sub-division. It was at a distance of 6 miles from block headquarters, 19 miles from sub-divisional headquarters, and 29 miles from district headquarters.

The population of this village in 1961 was 850 and in 1971 it was 941. During 1961-71 its population growth was about 10.7 percent. In 1971, 339 people were working, i.e., its working population was about 36.2 percent.

There were about 223 members of scheduled castes in this village. Other main castes included Rajput, Bhumi-hars, and Koiris. There were also about 50 Muslims in this village.

In 1971, 328 people were literate and its literacy rate was almost 35 percent. There was a Middle School in the village and also one Primary School for boys and one for girls. Recently, a High School was also started and was located in a house owned by the Mukhia (headman). One degree college was only 5 miles away from the village. Three people had college degrees, two had professional degrees, and a doctor with an M.B.B.S. (like an M.D.) degree had a dispensary of his own.

Only 2 or 3 people in the village received daily newspapers but some 5 to 6 received weeklies. There were 10 radio sets in the village and villagers listened to radio regularly.

There was no seat of Panchayat in the village itself but it belonged to a Panchayat system. The caste factor was very important in local as well as general elections.

Village Rampur was a fairly old village and it had a reputation for commercial activities. This village also had a Zamindari background. Electricity was not available for domestic purposes but it was used for irrigation purposes. There were two factions in the village, one comprised of Bhumihars and scheduled caste members and the other of Rajputs and Kurmis.

Village Nayatola

Village Nayatola was in Phulwari block and Patna sadar sub-division. Its distance from block headquarters was 5 miles and it was 12 miles both from the sub-divisional and the district headquarters.

According to the 1961 census, its population was 900, and in 1971, it was 970. Its growth rate was about 8 percent. The total number of people working in 1971 was 346; its working population was approximately 34 percent.

This village had a predominantly Muslim population. The Hindu population included both upper and lower castes. There were some 275 members of scheduled castes in the village.

In 1971, 262 people were literate, a literacy rate of about 27 percent. Some of these people had some formal education, some had finished high school, and a few had also college degrees.

A good number of people received newspapers and some also got weeklies. There were at least more than 10 radio sets in the village, and villagers regularly listened to them.

This village was not part of the Panchayat system. However, people were generally active in political matters

and had voted in large numbers in the general elections. Leaders had close contact with state leaders and local officials.

This village was so close to the city that it was almost like a suburb. Most of the inhabitants worked in the city. They worked either for the government or in business enterprises including small factories in the adjacent areas.

Village Khusropur

Village Khusropur was in Fatwah block and Barh sub-division. It was at a distance of 10 miles from block headquarters, 31 miles from sub-divisional headquarters, and 58 miles from district headquarters.

The population of Khusropur was about 800 in 1961 and 1,146 in 1971. Its growth rate in the last decade was 43.25 percent. Some 300 people were working in 1971; therefore its working population was about 26.5 percent.

The number of scheduled caste members living in the village was significant, about 280. This was truly a multi-caste village. There were both upper and lower castes living in the village. There was a sizable Muslim population as well.

There were about 300 literate people in this village

in 1971; hence, approximately 26.5 percent of the population was literate. Out of this, 10 had college degrees, 3 had vocational diplomas, and 2 had professional degrees. There was also a High School very close to the village.

There were 6 radio sets owned by private individuals in the village. Villagers had access to these radios and almost every day they listened to them. Five people also received local dailies, and 8 families received weeklies and other magazines.

Khusropur had a seat of Panchayat in the village. There were about 15 members in the Panchayat. Villagers were generally satisfied with the working of this Panchayat and it was considered productive and respectable. Teli was the dominant caste in the village and most of the Panchayat members belonged to this caste. There were also some caste Panchayats in the village. There were no other organizations of any importance. Some informal groups were active in religious and charitable activities. The people of Khusropur have actively participated in general as well as local Panchayat elections. The Congress Party had great influence in this village.

This village had a Zamindari background. There was also seasonal migration. Some families did go to work in the cities when there were no jobs available in the village

or nearby areas. Most of the families, however, owned land. Only some worked as laborers. Some were in government jobs, some taught in neighboring schools. There was no electricity for domestic purposes, but it was used for irrigation and other purposes. There was some evidence of factionalism in the village; feuds generally occurred because of land litigation. This village might be considered as a prosperous village.

Village Pathraura

Village Pathraura was in Rajgir block and Biharsherif sub-division. It was only 3 miles from block headquarters, 22 miles from sub-divisional headquarters, and 104 miles from district headquarters.

The population of Pathraura in 1961 was 994 and in 1971 it was 1,214. Its growth rate during 1961-71 was approximately 21.5 percent. The working population in 1971 was 433, hence approximately 36 percent of the population was working.

There were about 502 members of scheduled castes in this village. Other castes included Brahmin, Kurmi, Sonar, Barhi, Barai, Kahar, Kumhar, Teli and Mali. There were also some Muslims in the village.

About 250 people were literate in 1971; therefore the

literacy rate was about 20.6 percent. Among them, 16 had completed high school, 5 had received the B.A. degree and one had an M.A. degree. There were two Lower Primary Schools in the village. Villagers went to nearby areas like Biharsherif and Patna for schooling.

Apart from the village Panchayat, there were two more organizations in this village. One was an organization for the recreation of children and the other was a literary organization. Both organizations subscribed to newspapers and magazines and villagers spent their leisure time at these places in the evenings. There were two families possessing radio sets, but villagers had no access to these radios except on some special occasion.

There was a seat of Panchayat in the village itself. Villagers were active politically and had participated in general and local Panchayat elections. Caste was a dominant factor in these elections.

This was a fairly old village. It came into being in 1904 when people from nearby villages came to settle here for unknown reasons. There was some sign of caste factions in this village.

Village Indaut

Village Indaut was in Hilsa block and Biharsherif

sub-division. Its distance from block headquarters was 2 miles, from sub-divisional headquarters 29 miles, and from district headquarters 48 miles.

The population of this village in 1961 was 1657, and in 1971 it was 1508. This is the third village in our sample where population had declined, in this case by 9 percent. The number of people working was 603; i.e., 40 percent of the population was working. There were about 240 households in the village.

The number of scheduled caste members in this village was 219 in 1971. Other castes included Brahmin, Kayastha, Sonar, Barhi, Kumhar, Kahar, and Teli. There was only one Muslim family of about 10-12 members in the village.

In 1971 about 305 were literate, which means 20.2 percent of the total population was literate. Out of the 305 who were literate, 200 had had some Primary School, 70 completed Primary School, 15 completed Secondary School, a few entered college and 3 completed the B.A., one an M.A., one an M.B.B.S., one had a diploma in engineering and one a diploma in agriculture. This village had had one Primary and one Middle School for a long time. There were 2 High Schools and one college at Hilsa, which was only 2 miles from the village.

There were 8 radio sets in the village, 6 owned by individuals and 2 by institutions. Two or three people subscribed to local dailies and some weeklies, which were read by the villagers in the evening.

This village belonged to a Panchayat system. It had had a statutory Panchayat ever since the Panchayat system was introduced. Most of the members in the Panchayat were Kurmi by caste. There were also some caste Panchayats in the village. There was also a religious and charitable organization in this village. Villagers had participated actively both in local and in general elections. Congress was the most favored party in the village. Some rich people in the village had important connections in the Congress Party and they had great influence among the villagers.

It was gathered that some Muslim families migrated permanently from this village after partition.¹¹ Some families migrated temporarily for work. There was some element of factionalism in this village which was along caste lines. One group was led by Kurmis and the other by Yadavs. This village might be considered as a well-to-do, educated, politically conscious and progressive village.

Village Ichaous

Village Ichaous was in Islampur block and Biharsherif sub-division. Its distance from block headquarters was 4 miles, 41 miles from sub-divisional headquarters, and 68 miles from district headquarters.

In 1961 Ichaous had a population of 1,200 people and in 1971 it was 1,538. Thus its population growth during 1961-71 was approximately 28 percent. In 1971, 440 people were working; i.e., its working population was about 28.5 percent.

About 450 in this village were members of the scheduled caste. Kurmi is the dominant caste in this village. Other castes include Brahmin, Yadav, Kahar, and Teli.

In 1971, 281 were literate in this village; its literate population was approximately 18.4 percent. There was one Primary School in the village, a Secondary School at Islampur, and a college at Hilsa. Among literates, some 30 had completed Secondary School, some 20 had had one or two years of college.

There was one radio set in the village, owned by a private individual. Villagers had access to this set and they frequently listened to this radio. Two people subscribed to local dailies and in the evening people gener-

ally sat in groups and read these newspapers.

This village belonged to the Panchayat system. Members of various castes held offices in the Panchayat. However, Yadav, Kurmi and Bhumihars had greater representation in it. Villagers had actively participated in general and local elections. It cannot be said which party was most influential since candidates of the Congress, Socialist and Janta parties had been elected to the State legislature with the strong backing of this village.

Village Ichaous had a Zamindari background. Some people (approximately 30) had migrated permanently to obtain jobs and they settled in places like Jharia, Jamshedpur, Patna and Calcutta. Other than Panchayat there was no formal organization in this village. Some people, however, were active in religious activities.

One Brahmin had married a woman of scheduled caste in this village. It was said that the young man felt that such a marriage would help enhance the status of the lower caste. However, this did not seem to make any impact in the village. There was no sign of any factionalism in the village.

Village Korut

Village Korut was in Chandi block and Biharsherif

sub-division. It was at a distance of 2 miles from block headquarters, 19 miles from sub-divisional headquarters, and 48 miles from district headquarters.

The population of this village in 1961 was 1,563 and in 1971 it was 2,025; its growth rate during the decade was approximately 29.5 percent. About 824 people were working in 1971; that is, roughly 40.7 percent of the total population was working. There were about 280 households in the village.

The number of scheduled caste members in the village was 455 in 1971. Kurmi, Kahar and Mushar were the dominant castes in this village. Other castes included Brahmins, Rajput, Yadav, Barhi, Kumhar, and Mallah.

About 554 people were literate in 1971; that is, 27.4 percent of the population was literate. There were two schools in the village; one was a Lower Primary and the other was an Upper Primary.

Two or three people received local newspapers and there were 3 radio sets in the village. Villagers had access to these radio sets and they often listened to them in the evening.

This village, too, belonged to a Panchayat system.

Villagers had actively participated in both local and general elections. Members of various parties had been elected to the Panchayat; therefore there was no single party dominance in this village.

The total land area of the village was 560 acres. Out of this, 420 acres were used for agricultural purposes. This village had a Zamindari background. As a matter of fact, it was named after a Muslim Zamindar (whose name was Oudrat). There were many Muslim landlords living in this village in the past.

Village Gonawa

This village was in Harnaut block and Barh sub-division. It was at a distance of 8 miles from block headquarters, 19 miles from sub-divisional headquarters, and 61 miles from district headquarters.

In 1961 its population was 2,680 and in 1971 it was 3,070. Hence, its population growth during 1961-71 was approximately 14.6 percent. About 1,050 persons, i.e., 34.2 percent of the population, were working.

The number of scheduled caste members in 1971 was about 570. Bhumihaar was the dominant caste in the village. Other castes included Brahmin, Kumhar, Barhi, Kurmi, and Teli.

In 1971, about 700 people were literate; i.e., approx-

imately 22.8 percent of the population was literate.

There were two Lower Primary Schools in the village. There were a Middle and a High School in the village. The nearest college was located in Barh which was also the subdivisional headquarters and 19 miles away. Approximately 60 percent of the literate population had completed Primary school, 40 percent had some high school, and 20 percent had completed high school. Ten persons had college degrees, two had M.A. degrees, and two the M.B.B.S. degree. One had completed an engineering degree. Some women of this village were also educated.

There were about 12 to 15 radio sets in this village. Most of the radio sets were owned by private individuals. The villagers had full access to the school radio and limited access to private ones. Some also subscribed to local dailies, weeklies, and other magazines.

This village, too, belonged to the Panchayat system. Bhumihaar was the dominant caste in the village and had great influence in the Panchayat organization of the village but other caste members also held offices. Villagers had actively participated in the local as well as the state and general elections. Caste was instrumental in politics.

This village had the reputation of having partici-

pated actively in the independence movement. Sir Ganesh Dutt, a well-known leader of Bihar, came from this village. This village was also electrified. Most of the people owned land, but there were some who worked as agricultural laborers.

Generally, the villagers were well-to-do, educated, and politically active. They had close contact with state and some national leaders. This village can easily be termed a prosperous and forward-looking village.

Village Sabalpur

Village Sabalpur was in Patna Rural block and Patna city sub-division. It was at a distance of 13 miles from the block headquarters, 10 miles from the sub-divisional headquarters, and 14 miles from the district headquarters.

Its population in 1961 was approximately 4,000 and in 1971 it was 4,440. Hence, its population growth during the decade was about 11 percent. The total number of people working was 1,674; i.e., approximately 37.7 percent of the population was working in 1971.

There were some 600 members of scheduled caste in this village. Other castes included Yadav, Mallah, Koiri, and Lohar. There was also a sizable population of Muslims in this village.

In 1971, about 1,454 persons were literate; i.e., its literacy rate was about 32.8 percent. There was one Upper Primary School and one Lower Primary School in the village. There was also a High School at Poonpoon which was only 2 miles away from this village. Some young people were also attending college in Patna.

Fourteen people in the village owned radio sets. Villagers had access to these radios and they listened to them on a regular basis in the evenings. Some people also received local dailies and some magazines.

There was a seat of Panchayat in the village itself. There was no other organization except the Panchayat in the village. Villagers were active in the affairs of the Panchayat. Caste had been a major consideration in the Panchayat elections.

It was said that this village had an old history of Zamindari. It was dominated by Muslim Zamindars. One distinguished jurist (sometime Chief Justice of a High Court) was said to have come from this village. After the communal riots in 1946, some Muslim families migrated permanently from this village. Some people had gone temporarily outside the village for jobs, education, and business purposes.

Nearly 45 percent of the population of this village

owned land and depended on agriculture. Some people worked as agricultural laborers and others worked in nearby places as hired laborers. Some people in the village were in government jobs.

Sabalpur can be classified as a large village with respect to size, land area, and population. It can also be termed a sufficiently well-to-do, educated, and forward village. The Hindus and Muslims constituted two distinct sections in the population of Sabalpur. The Muslims were a minority in terms of population, but they were a close-knit group and had great influence in the affairs of the village.

Summary

We had 4 villages with populations of less than 500, 5 between 501-1000, 2 between 1001 to 1500, 2 between 1501 to 2000, 1 between 2001-3000, 1 between 3001 to 4000, and 1 above 4000. Seven villages had also Muslim populations.

The literacy rates of the villages were as follows: below 20 percent--3; 20-25 percent--6; 25-30 percent--4; 30 percent and above--3.

Thirteen villages had radios and also received newspapers and magazines. Eight villages were dominant caste villages and six villages had factionalism of some sort. Four villages were considered prosperous by a village standard.

¹This movement was launched and led by Gandhi in his quest for independence. It was unique in character in that it completely subscribed to Gandhi's preaching of non-violence. Its objective was to paralyze the government by non-cooperation.

²Bhave, a disciple of Gandhi, took up the cause of the landless laborer and led a movement (later joined by Socialist leaders such as Jayaprakash Narayan) to collect land (voluntarily given by the people) to distribute among the landless.

³This movement was aimed at protecting the rights of the peasantry in Bihar.

⁴1941 Census, Government of India.

⁵Scheduled castes, lowest of all the castes, were also known as untouchables. Gandhi called them Harijans (God's people).

⁶Districts are divided into administrative units (subdivisions). A block is the smallest administrative unit of a district which is under the direct control of a magistrate (block development officer).

⁷Every village is part of the Panchayat system but does not necessarily have a Panchayat of its own. Sometimes a number of villages together constitute one Panchayat. It is an administrative unit, generally based on the size of the village.

⁸Srinivas has introduced the concept of "Dominant caste." He suggests that the decision making is controlled in Indian villages by certain castes, i.e., in each village we would find some caste, be it high or low, in the position of authority.

⁹Land was owned by landlords who farmed out their land for cultivation on a commission (i.e., sharecropping) basis. They also collected revenue from the villagers.

¹⁰A caste Panchayat is an informal group of caste members which exercises control over the behavior of its members. Since the introduction of the Statutory Panchayat by the government, such groups are declining, but in some villages they still exist and are functionally important.

¹¹India was divided along religious lines and a new Islamic nation, Pakistan, was created in 1947.

CHAPTER V

PROFILE OF RURAL LEADERS

Behavioral Profile

In this part we will present a full profile of our leaders, which is important for the purpose of our analysis. The kinds of data we have on our leaders may be broken down into the following parts for presentation:

- (a) Background information: sex, age, caste, religion, education, occupation, income, marital status, type of family, whether family head;
- (b) Media habit: whether reads newspaper, listens to radio, read magazine, seen movie, total media exposure, source of news received;
- (c) Outside exposure: visits fair, visits outside state;
- (d) Organizational affiliation: affiliation to political organization, occupational organization, and community organization.

TABLE 13

SEX OF RESPONDENTS

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Male	580	96
Female	<u>27</u>	<u>4</u>
	607	100%
no informa- tion	1	

Out of a total sample of 608, we had only 27 female respondents. This clearly establishes the fact that even today women in India, particularly in villages still occupy traditional roles and in only a few cases have they taken on the role of leadership.

Even though India has a female Prime Minister and there are some female members in the Parliament and state legislatures, the fact cannot be disputed that their presence has not had any significant impact on the roles of most women. Precisely for this reason, even the small number of female leaders in our sample may be considered important and further investigated as an index of some change that might be taking place in rural India with regard to the status of women in the social, cultural, and political spheres.

TABLE 14

AGE OF RESPONDENTS

<u>Age</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
under 30	125	20.6
30 - 39	219	36.0
40 - 49	157	25.9
over 50	<u>106</u>	<u>17.5</u>
	607	100%
no response	1	

We have distributed age in four categories for our sample. Out of a total sample of 608, the largest number, i.e., 219, were between 30 and 39 and the smallest, 106, were over 50 years of age. It is clear that the majority of our leaders (344 in number) were fairly young, i.e., below the age of 39. At the same time, we also find that 263 were more than 40 years of age. This indicates that although leadership was no longer concentrated among the elderly, they did have a fair representation.

This age distribution of rural leaders also suggests that age was not a terribly important factor in determining leadership, since the latter was not controlled by either young or old, but was rather diversified in terms of age.

We also note that 125 of our leaders were below 30, which is quite significant in the context of Indian villages

where old age has been very much respected and younger people were not supposed to be in the position of leadership. On the basis of this it can be argued that leadership has become no longer based on seniority alone, but also related to one's capacity to deliver and to the quality of leadership.

TABLE 15

CASTE OF RESPONDENTS

<u>caste</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
upper	167	27.8
intermediate	266	44.3
lower	<u>168</u>	<u>28.0</u>
	601	100%
no response	7	

Respondents' castes were placed in three categories for purposes of this study. They are: (1) Upper (which includes Brahmin, Rajput, Bhumihaar Brahmin, and Kayastha), (2) Intermediate (which includes Yadav, Kurmi, and Bania), and (3) Lower (which includes scheduled castes).

It is clear that the majority of our leaders came from intermediate castes and representation from upper and lower castes was approximately equal. It can be suggested that leadership was concentrated neither in the upper, lower, or any other caste, but was closely related to the size of

the population of various castes in our sampled villages. The social census data gathered in the villages show that the majority of the population in our sampled villages came from intermediate castes; therefore, the highest number (266) of our leaders having come from intermediate castes is supportive of the fact that leadership in our villages was closely related to the caste factor. However, our data are not sufficient to claim that leadership was essentially determined by caste. We hope to expand on this in our further analysis.

TABLE 16

RELIGION OF RESPONDENTS

<u>religion</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Hindu	572	94.1
Muslim	17	2.8
Christian	4	0.7
Other	<u>15</u>	<u>2.5</u>
total	608	100%

Category "Other" includes Budhists¹ and Sikhs² in our sample. It is quite obvious that the overwhelming majority of our respondents were Hindu by religion. Earlier we have seen in the case of caste that it was closely related to caste size in the villages. Similarly in this case it can be easily argued that the religious factor is also an important basis of leadership, since the religious dis-

tribution as shown in this table indicates that Muslims also take leadership roles whenever they are a sizable proportion in the village.

Religion has been an important aspect of life in village India. We have data on the degree of religiosity of our leaders which will be discussed later. It may throw some light on the state of change in these villages.

TABLE 17

LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF RESPONDENTS

Level of Education	Number	Percent
Illiterate	72	11.9
Literate	58	9.6
Some primary school	80	13.2
Some middle school	161	26.6
Some high school	67	11.1
Completed high school	92	15.2
Some college	31	5.1
Completed college	<u>45</u>	<u>7.4</u>
	606	100%
no response	2	

We note that 11.9 percent of our leaders were illiterate, 9.6 percent were merely literate, and 78.5 percent had some formal education. This is striking in view of the fact that the literacy rate in India was not more than 30 percent and was even lower in the villages.

The city of Patna is the capital of the State of Bihar. Patna district has been generally considered more politically

conscious and prosperous than other districts in the State. We can certainly support this view on the basis of the rate of literacy and level of education that our leaders had.

It is even more interesting to see that 161 had some middle school, 92 had finished high school, and 45 had completed college. This further shows that not only was the rate of literacy high, but large numbers of our leaders were well educated by village standards. It is very clear that more and more people have been going to school and colleges and education certainly has become a factor in achieving the position of leadership.

TABLE 18

OCCUPATION OF RESPONDENTS

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Cultivation	377	62.5
Service	93	15.4
Business	30	5.0
Laborer	27	4.5
Educational	51	8.5
Village	25	4.1
occupation	<u>603</u>	<u>100%</u>
no response	5	

It is not surprising that the largest number of our respondents were engaged in cultivation, i.e., they owned and farmed agricultural land, more specifically, they were

also proprietors. This may be indicative of the fact that land ownership patterns (proprietorship) were significant factors in village life. Our social census data also show that most of the elected Panchayat officials had large parcels of land and were also relatively rich. People in other occupations (especially in caste occupations) were not as independent financially and were also less influential in village politics. People in other jobs were also not in a position of leadership; for example, a schoolteacher is respected but is not really powerful and does not have as much say in the decision-making process as does someone who holds land and is occupationally independent. However, it is not true either that land owners alone were in positions of leadership, since we found service workers, businessmen, people in village occupations, and even poor laborers were part of the leadership structure in our sample villages.

TABLE 19

INCOME OF RESPONDENTS

<u>Income</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Rs. 0 - 999	134	22.8
Rs. 1000-1499	120	20.4
Rs. 1500-2499	142	24.2
Rs. 2500-3999	78	13.3
Rs. 4000-over	<u>113</u>	<u>19.3</u>
	587	100%
no response	21	

The distribution of income for our sample is in terms of Indian rupees.³ At the present rate of exchange, approximately 8 rupees are equivalent to a dollar.

Out of a total response from 587 people (21 missing cases), 134 people had an income of less than Rs. 1,000, which is interesting because it indicates that 22.8 percent of our leaders were very poor. Earlier we have seen that a very large number (377) of our respondents were cultivators and also owned land; however, it does not necessarily mean that they were also economically well off. We also find that 191 had annual incomes of Rs. 2500 and above, which means that 33 percent of our leaders were rich by village standards. Since 142 people had an income of Rs. 1,500 to Rs. 2,499, it seems that a good number of our leaders came from the middle level income group.

On the whole we can say that money, land, and wealth remained an important factor for leadership position in villages; however, since we find that at least 22.8 percent were poor (income of less than Rs. 1000) and 20.4 percent not economically well off in our sample (income between Rs. 1000 to Rs. 1499), we can argue that money or land was not the sole factor in the making of leaders.

TABLE 20

MARITAL STATUS OF RESPONDENTS

<u>Marital Status</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Married	575	94.6
Unmarried	14	2.3
Widower	<u>17</u>	<u>3.1</u>
	608	100%

Since the majority of our leaders were between the ages of 30 and 39 (see Table 14), it is to be expected that they would also be married. As we know, in a traditional society, and more so in the Indian village, marriage is not a matter of choice. Rather, it is customary that girls by the age 14-15 and boys by the age 17-18 do get married in India. As a matter of fact, those 14 who were not married were also under the age of 20, hence they were most likely to get married eventually.

The larger study found many leaders who were never married, but on the village scene it was not so. Therefore, it can be argued that the institution of marriage was more widely accepted in villages than in cities and partly because of the fact that life in the village was organized more along traditional lines.

TABLE 21

COMPOSITION OF RESPONDENT'S FAMILY

<u>Type of family composition</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Joint family	515	85
Nuclear family	<u>93</u>	<u>15</u>
	608	100%

It is clear that an overwhelming majority of our leaders belonged to joint families. On the basis of this it can be argued that the institution of joint-family was still very strong in India, at least in the villages. But the fact that 93 out of 608 belonged to nuclear families, even in the village, cannot be ignored in view of the fact that the institution of joint-family has been much stronger there. The national studies suggest that 25 to 40 percent of the population belong to joint families; we find that village leaders overwhelmingly belong to joint families. It may be argued that the joint-family is a support for the leadership role in the villages.

It should be noted here, however, that a social survey which obtains information about family composition at one period of time does not represent the full range of domestic units over a long period of time. Studies of the domestic cycles in Indian families indicate that what we would

classify as a nuclear family at the present time, at some future time may represent a full joint-family.

TABLE 22

WHETHER RESPONDENT IS FAMILY HEAD

Family head	number	percent
Yes	376	62
No	232	38
	608	100%

We see that 62 percent of our leaders were also heads of their families, which is consistent with the age distribution of our leaders, since we know that most of our leaders were above 30 years of age; therefore, it would be more likely that they would also be heads of their families. However, 232 of our leaders were not heads of the families, which could mean either of two things: either they were very young to be the head of the family or, if they were older, they were part of a joint-family, in which case, in spite of maturity in age, they were younger than the oldest male member, who is the head of the joint-family. On an examination of the age distribution of our sample, it seems the latter is most likely.

TABLE 23

WHETHER RESPONDENTS READ NEWSPAPER

<u>read newspaper</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Yes	424	70
No	<u>184</u>	<u>30</u>
	608	100%

In view of the fact that approximately 88 percent of our sample were literate and 78 percent had some formal education, it is quite natural to find that 70 percent also read newspapers. However, 30 percent of our leaders (only 11 percent of whom were illiterate) did not read newspapers. In other words, roughly 30 percent of those who could read, did not read newspapers.

In any case, the fact is well established that village leaders did care to know what was happening outside the village and educate themselves to carry on their functions as village leaders with the information and knowledge they acquired by reading newspapers.

TABLE 24

WHETHER RESPONDENTS LISTEN TO RADIO

<u>Listen to radio</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Yes	443	73
No	<u>165</u>	<u>27</u>
	608	100%

The proportion of people who listen to radio as opposed to those who read newspapers was slightly higher (by 3 percent), which may suggest that some of those who were illiterate and could not read newspapers did care to educate themselves about recent events outside the village by listening to radio. It may also be attributed to the fact that more people listened to radio because it also provided entertainment.

Twenty-seven percent of our leaders did not listen to radio. This is perhaps due to the fact that there were not many radio sets in the villages and not all sets were available to everybody.

TABLE 25

WHETHER RESPONDENTS READ MAGAZINES

<u>Read magazines</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Yes	238	39
No	<u>370</u>	<u>61</u>
	608	100%

While 70 percent of our respondents read newspapers only 39 percent cared to read magazines. It seems that magazines were more specialized, expensive, and educational in content so that only better educated people cared to read them, whereas the newspapers catered to the needs of a larger

population. This is true also in the case of the urban population; level of education is a contributing factor in determining one's reading habits.

TABLE 26

WHETHER RESPONDENTS HAVE SEEN MOVIES

<u>Seen movies</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Yes	478	78
No	<u>130</u>	<u>22</u>
	608	100%

We note that 78 percent of our leaders have seen movies. It is interesting in view of the fact that in not a single village of our sample was there a movie house, and only in some cases did villagers have easy access to towns or cities. This also suggests then that they had outside exposure, including visits to rural fairs where occasionally movies are shown.

TABLE 27

RESPONDENT'S MEDIA EXPOSURE

<u>Media exposure</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
None	104	17.1
One medium	115	18.9
Two media	177	29.1
Three media	<u>212</u>	<u>34.9</u>
	608	100%

We find that almost 35 percent of our respondents have had exposure to three media (out of a possible four, i.e., newspapers, magazines, movies, and radio). Therefore, their exposure to the media was rather high.

It is also interesting to note that 17 percent of our leaders had had no media exposure at all, i.e., they had not read newspapers or magazines, neither listened to the radio nor seen movies. Approximately 50 percent of the leaders had exposure to one or two media.

TABLE 28

RESPONDENT'S SOURCE OF NEWS

<u>Source of news</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Newspaper	192	32.0
Visitor	178	29.7
Bazaar	25	4.2
Radio	<u>205</u>	<u>34.2</u>
	600	100%
no response	8	

It is quite revealing to see here that a vary large number of our leaders (397 or 66.2 percent) received news through formal channels of communication such as newspapers and radio, while only 203 (34.9 percent) got news through informal channels of communication, such as visitors or by visiting the local bazaar. It is true that informal channels of communication are an important source of the news, but at the same

time formal channels have been becoming more and more important even on the village scene.

TABLE 29

WHETHER RESPONDENTS VISITED FAIR

<u>Visited fair</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Yes	477	78
No	<u>131</u>	<u>22</u>
	608	100%

With regard to outside exposure we find that 78 percent of our leaders had been to a fair. Considering the fact that fairs are very common phenomena for villages since they serve at least two important purposes--providing an opportunity for fun and entertainment; and, since most villages lack adequate shopping facilities, most of the shopping for the year (e.g., clothing, shoes, ornaments, cattle, etc.) is carried on during these fairs. Thus it is not a matter of choice but of necessity for villagers to go to fairs.

TABLE 30

WHETHER RESPONDENTS HAVE VISITED OUTSIDE STATE

<u>Visited outside state</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Yes	337	56
No	<u>270</u>	<u>44</u>
	607	100%
no response	1	

Earlier we have seen that 78 percent of our leaders had been to fairs outside the village, as compared to only 56 percent who had visited places outside the state. Even though the majority have been outside the state, a large portion, i.e., 44 percent, had not visited places outside the state.

In this case it seems that many village leaders lacked first hand knowledge about places outside the state. Merton⁴ and Lazarsfeld would argue that these leaders were local types; therefore, their interests and understanding would have been generally confined within village limits or adjacent areas, or village circle.⁵

TABLE 31

RESPONDENT'S AFFILIATION TO POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

<u>Political affiliation</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Yes	116	19
No	<u>490</u>	<u>81</u>
	606	100%
no response	2	

It is clear that 81 percent of our leaders had no political affiliation (i.e., membership in political parties and/or Panchayat). This reveals two important facts. First, in our sample, leaders were not always members of the Panchayat organization and secondly, other political organizations such

as political parties, were not so active on the village level since only 19 percent of our leaders were affiliated with them. It seems that even though our leaders were generally active and did participate in a variety of activities, their participation in political organizations was minimal.

TABLE 32

RESPONDENT'S AFFILIATION TO OCCUPATIONAL GROUP

<u>Occupational affiliation</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Yes	28	5
No	<u>579</u>	<u>95</u>
	607	100%
no response	1	

We have seen earlier that the majority (377) of our leaders were cultivators who also owned land. Hence it is not surprising to find that only 28 of the total sample belonged to any occupational organization (e.g., union, literary guild, etc.). Those who were in other occupations were simply not numerous enough to form any formal groups or there may have been resistance to belonging to such organizations or a lack of leadership in this matter.

It may also be argued that these are secondary groups and are essentially urban phenomena. Also the pattern of relationship is rather informal between employer and employee in a village setting, therefore such organizations do not exist.

TABLE 33

RESPONDENT'S AFFILIATION TO COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

<u>Community organization affiliation</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Yes	323	53
No	<u>283</u>	<u>47</u>
	606	100%
no response	2	

In this case we find that more than 53 percent of our leaders did belong to community organizations, such as temples, schools, libraries, and recreational groups.

This again supports the suggestion that our leaders may not have had much outside exposure and minimal political affiliation, but they were relatively active participants in local matters. In other words, they were involved and interested most in what concerned them directly.

TABLE 34

NUMBER OF AFFILIATIONS TO ORGANIZATION

<u>number of affiliations</u>	<u>number of respondents</u>	<u>percent</u>
None	231	38.2
1 affiliation	287	47.4
2 or 3 affiliations	<u>87</u>	<u>14.4</u>
	605	100%
no response	3	

Again, we find that a good number of our leaders were

not affiliated to any organization, even though more than 60 percent were affiliated with one or more organizations. It seems that basically life was organized on a personal level of relationship in the village; formation of organizations to carry on various functions has not been really characteristic of Indian villages even though it has begun to take place in a significant manner.

Attitudinal Profile

TABLE 35

RESPONDENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD PANCHAYAT

Respondent's attitude	number	percent
Good	556	92
Bad	46	8
	602	100%
no response	6	

It is very clear that an overwhelming majority of our respondents thought that the Panchayat was a good thing. The institution of Panchayat is not new for Indian villages but in recent times the organization of Panchayats has become more formal: its members are duly elected and it has become a formal part of the governmental machinery. The traditional Panchayats were informal and organized along caste lines. During the 1960's the government of Bihar en-

acted the Panchayati Raj Act and formalized this institution on a village-wide basis.

There is no question about the fact that the Panchayat is a viable institution which was welcomed in the villages. But some people were critical of its organization and performance. Since many of our leaders were also affiliated with Panchayats, it was to be expected that they would be more supportive of the institution.

TABLE 36

RESPONDENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD PANCHAYAT LEADERS

<u>Respondent's attitude</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Good	457	76
Bad	<u>144</u>	<u>24</u>
	601	100%
no response	7	

Seventy-six percent of our respondents thought that the present leaders were good. Out of this 76 percent, not more than 19 percent (see Table 31) were themselves Panchayat leaders. Therefore, despite the fact that only about one out of four of our sample who were favorably disposed toward the Panchayat leaders were themselves members of such governing units, three out of four respondents felt such leaders were good. On the basis of this, it can be argued that although

generally Panchayat leaders did have the confidence of their constituents, and most of them were considered good leaders, there is good reason to believe that a sizable number of our respondents were dissatisfied with their Panchayat leaders.

Since we also know that there was a good deal of factionalism, caste or other kinds, in these villages, it cannot be determined whether these responses were an objective evaluation of the Panchayat leadership or were motivated by factional commitment. However, it should be noted again that the Panchayat leaders were generally considered to be good.

TABLE 37

MOST PREFERRED TRAIT FOR PANCHAYAT LEADERS

<u>Trait</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Social worker	59	9.8
Those who keep in touch	91	15.2
Honest	256	42.7
Educated	89	14.8
Nationalist	14	2.3
Hard worker	60	10.0
Who provide leadership	15	2.5
Sacrificing	<u>16</u>	<u>2.7</u>
	600	100%
no response	8	

Respondents were asked to name the most desirable trait for Panchayat leaders. Table 37 contains a list of the eight traits most preferred by our respondents for Panchayat

leaders. Of these eight, the three most frequently cited traits were "Honesty" (256), "Keeping in touch with common people" (91), and "Educated" (89). Honesty is a trait which is universally desired, more so in the case of public officials. We say, "Honesty is the best policy"--nevertheless, we also find that it is a most scarce commodity. The fact that honesty is the most frequently cited trait by our respondents reflects the socio-political climate as perceived by them.

During informal interviews with respondents, it was noted that their most frequent complaint was that most of the leaders did not keep in close contact with people once they were elected to office. It seems that people really were very sensitive to this, since 91 respondents mentioned contact as a desirable trait.

The third most frequently assigned trait was education. As we look at the educational level of our leaders, we find that 77 percent of them (see Table 17) had some formal education. It simply means that the value of education was increasingly felt to be important in the villages.

TABLE 38

RESPONDENT'S APPROVAL OF PANCHAYAT ACTIVITIES

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Approved		
None	141	23.5
Educational	86	14.3
Developmental	154	25.7
Agricultural	157	26.2
Settling dispute	54	9.0
Maintaining law	<u>8</u>	<u>1.3</u>
	600	100%
no response	8	

In this case respondents were asked to name some of the activities of the Panchayat of which they approved. It is interesting to note that a good number of the respondents did not approve of any of the activities of the Panchayats. Since more than 75 percent did approve of many activities, it seems that those who did not were either very critical or belonged to opposite camps and their responses were politically motivated.

More than 26 percent approved of the Panchayat's agricultural activities, which suggests that this organization was doing good work in the field of agriculture. Secondly, more than 25 percent also approved of developmental activities (roads, bridges, electricity, medical facilities, etc.), which means that Panchayats were generally active in

these matters. It can be seen that only 14 percent approved of educational activities while valuing education seemed to be increasing significantly in the villages. It should be pointed out here that Panchayats do not have any funds with which to start new educational programs. They simply recommend certain projects to higher authorities and help in their supervision, if they are adopted and implemented. Considering this, the fact that more than 75 percent of our respondents did approve of many activities of their Panchayats indicates that Panchayats were performing well.

TABLE 39

RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINTS AGAINST PANCHAYAT

<u>Nature of Complaint</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
None	381	63.5
Groupism	56	9.3
Corruption	60	10.0
Inactive	49	8.2
Favoritism	29	4.8
Discrimination	8	1.3
Casteism	17	2.8
	<u>600</u>	<u>100%</u>
no response	8	

We have seen earlier that only 23.5 percent of our respondents did not approve of any Panchayat activity (see Table 38). Here we see that 63.5 percent did not have any

complaints against their Panchayats. Thus our earlier assumption that Panchayats were performing their duties well is supported by these data. However, many believed that Panchayats were involved in groupism, corruption, favoritism, discrimination, and casteism. Still others (8.2 percent) believed that the Panchayats were not active. In other words, about 40 percent did have complaints of some type. It can be argued that even though a majority of our respondents were satisfied with the functioning of the Panchayat, there was no complete agreement in this matter and some were quite resentful and had expressed their disapproval in many ways. We will present more data on this at a later stage.

TABLE 40

MOST PREFERRED TYPE OF WORK
PANCHAYAT SHOULD DO

Preference for Type of Work	Number	Percent
Irrigation	173	28.8
Development	267	44.5
Agricultural	28	4.7
Educational	72	12.0
Transportation	21	3.5
Settle dispute	13	2.2
Help poor	9	1.5
Unity in village	<u>17</u>	<u>2.8</u>
	600	100%
no response	8	

Our respondents basically emphasized that Panchayats should concentrate their activities in certain areas. Since irrigation is directly related to agricultural development, we can say that almost 33 percent seemed to think that agriculture should be given priority. Then we find that a very high percent of respondents felt that the Panchayat should do developmental work (which includes bridges, roads, electricity, medical facilities, etc.). General facilities in villages were minimal; therefore it is reasonable to expect that villagers would have wanted the Panchayat to work toward providing more facilities. We have seen earlier (see Table 38) that only 14 percent approved of the Panchayat's educational activities, and here again we find that only 12 percent wanted the Panchayat to concern itself with educational matters. It seems that our respondents did not believe that Panchayats had many resources to deal with educational matters. Other matters with which our respondents wanted the Panchayat to concern itself were transportation, settling minor disputes, helping the poor, and maintaining the unity of the village.

TABLE 41

WHETHER RESPONDENTS VOTED IN LAST PANCHAYAT ELECTIONS

<u>Voted</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Yes	526	88
No	<u>73</u>	<u>12</u>
	599	100%
no response	9	

We have seen earlier that 92 percent of our respondents thought that the Panchayat is a good thing, which is further supported by the fact that 88 percent of our respondents voted in the last Panchayat elections. There seem to be two important reasons behind this. First, each and every village leader was deeply concerned about matter concerning his village, and also had first-hand knowledge of leaders contesting Panchayat seats, whereas they were not as concerned about state and national matters and also did not personally know who the candidates were.

In any event, it can safely be argued that the new system of Panchayat recently introduced by the government has the overwhelming support of the village leaders.

TABLE 42

WHETHER RESPONDENTS COOPERATE WITH PANCHAYAT ACTIVITIES

<u>Cooperate</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Yes	590	98
No	<u>9</u>	<u>2</u>
	599	100%
no response	9	

We have seen earlier that 92 percent of the respondents thought that the Panchayat is a good thing, that more than 75 percent approved of various Panchayat activities (see Table 38), and that 88 percent voted in the last Panchayat elections. Thus, it is not surprising that almost all the leaders were willing to cooperate with Panchayat activities. On the basis of these findings, it can be claimed that Panchayat organizations were very much accepted and supported by our respondents.

TABLE 43

WHETHER RESPONDENTS THINK THAT PANCHAYAT IS SUCCESSFUL

<u>Successful</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Yes	463	77
No	<u>136</u>	<u>23</u>
	599	100%
no response	9	

Finally, we can say that villagers not only thought

that the Panchayat was a good thing, approved of most of its activities, were willing to cooperate in its activities, and had voted in the last Panchayat elections, but the overwhelming majority of respondents (77 percent) believed that their Panchayats were successful.

TABLE 44

PARTY MOST PREFERRED BY RESPONDENTS

<u>Party</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Middle of the road--		
Congress	432	71.1
Leftist--		
Socialist	36	5.9
Communist	25	4.1
Rightist--		
Jansangh	21	3.5
Swatantra	30	4.9
None	26	4.3
Don't know	38	6.3
	<u>608</u>	<u>100%</u>

Table 44 indicates that 71 percent of our respondents had shown a preference for the Congress Party, 19 percent were evenly divided among Socialist, Communist, Jansangh, and Swatantra. About 10 percent either did not consider any party good, or did not express a preference for any party. It is clear that Congress had the overwhelming support among village leaders. Since the 19 percent who supported other parties were evenly divided, we can also suggest that neither leftist⁶ nor rightist⁷ parties had strong support

among village leaders. We do have data on the voting patterns of the leaders. It would be interesting to see in our further analysis whether there were any correlation between the party considered good and the party actually voted for.

TABLE 45

RESPONDENTS WOULD VOTE FOR THE FOLLOWING PARTIES

<u>Vote for the party</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Middle of the road--		
Congress	510	84.9
Leftist--		
Socialist	20	3.3
Communist	18	3.0
Rightist--		
Jansangh	22	3.7
Swatantra	19	3.2
Other	<u>12</u>	<u>2.0</u>
	601	100%
no response	7	

It is clear that there was a very close relationship between the party considered good and the party for which our respondents would actually have voted. The distribution between leftist and rightist parties was just the same (about 4 percent for each) as in the case of party of choice. It is quite clear that our respondents were not randomly expressing their preference for parties.

We have convincing evidence then to suggest that the Congress Party did have a solid majority in the villages and

the presence of other parties had not reduced its influence in any significant way.

TABLE 46

WHETHER LEADERS SHOULD FAVOR COMPROMISE,
OR THOSE WHO ACT ON PRINCIPLES, OR BOTH

<u>Should favor</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Compromise only	443	74.8
Principles only	139	23.5
Both	<u>10</u>	<u>1.7</u>
	592	100%
no response	16	

Respondents were asked how leaders should resolve differences and settle disputes in the village, and they were given three choices. As we can see, the overwhelming majority of our respondents preferred compromise as opposed to favoring those who worked on principles. This response is interesting because it also indicates their perception of justice. Strictly from a rational point of view, it would appear that in compromise the rights of some people are abridged but from the point of view of the village it can be argued that compromise is the best possible solution. Since our respondents themselves were in the position of leadership and they had faced these problems and had some experience in these matters, it can be concluded that the village leadership would

favor compromise in settling disputes and resolving differences.

TABLE 47

WHETHER LEADERS SHOULD BE GIVEN EQUAL RESPECT,
ACCORDING TO RANK, OR ACCORDING TO PERFORMANCE

<u>Should be given</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Equal respect	181	31.3
According to rank	381	65.9
According to perform- ance	<u>16</u> 578	<u>2.8</u> 100%
no response	30	

This table shows that almost 66 percent of our respondents felt that leaders should be treated or given respect according to their rank and hardly 3 percent believed that it should be on the basis of performance. However, almost one out of three (31.3 percent) felt that all leaders should be given equal respect.

It seems that an overwhelming majority of our respondents considered rank or position very important in determining the amount of respect to be accorded to a leader. It is clear then that the status hierarchy was an important factor in this case. However, it does not necessarily mean that one's performance was ignored or had no importance. What it really means is that a Panchayat leader, at the village

level, could not match a state level leader or national leader in terms of respect accorded. What it also implies is that leaders in high positions had already done good work in order to occupy such high positions. In this sense, then, high position and good performance were interdependent factors.

TABLE 48

WHETHER THERE IS COOPERATION BETWEEN LEADERS
AND GOVERNMENT STAFF

<u>Cooperation</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Yes	239	42.0
No	322	56.6
Don't know	<u>8</u>	<u>1.4</u>
	569	100%
no response	39	

As we have indicated earlier, some of our respondents were also Panchayat officials and they, as well as other leaders, had to work very closely with local officials, so it is very important to ascertain their perceptions of the pattern of relationship obtaining between officials and leaders.

We find that a significant percentage (42%) of our respondents felt that leaders and government officials did cooperate, but a majority (56.6%) did not share this view. It may be surmised that there were some areas of conflict, so that leaders as well as officials often found it difficult to work together. For example, village leaders were essentially

interested in the welfare of the village whereas government officials were interested in the development of a block, sub-division, or district. Again, government officials were not as sensitive to the needs of the people as they were to bureaucratic rules and this may very well have created problems for them. Finally, it can also be argued that not all government officials were honest and some leaders would resent this. We can also pinpoint the fact that development work is slow in our villages, either because of the inefficiency or the corruption of the officials.

TABLE 49

WHETHER MEMBERS OF OPPOSITION PARTIES
SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE CABINET

<u>Inclusion</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Should be included	449	77.3
Not included	130	22.4
Don't know	2	0.3
	<u>581</u>	<u>100%</u>
no response	27	

After Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru died, the Congress Party also lost its monopoly of power. In the 1960's in many states, Congress did not have a majority to form a government. The first case was in the State of Kerala where Communists formed a government in coalition with

some other parties. Ever since, coalition cabinets have become a reality and changes in government have been more frequent. In the State of Bihar, coalition governments were formed and dissolved at least ten times during the past six years. At the time this study was carried out, this was not the case in the State of Bihar, but it seems that village leaders were quite prepared for this, because they overwhelmingly supported inclusion of opposition members in the cabinet. For those who subscribe to the view that village leaders lack insight in political matters, this should be an eye opener, because their attitude in this case seems to be quite pragmatic.

TABLE 50

RESPONDENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD POLITICAL LEADERS

<u>Respondent's attitude</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Favorable	190	33
Unfavorable	<u>386</u>	<u>67</u>
	576	100%
no response	32	

Our respondents did not have a favorable attitude toward political leaders. Only 33 percent seemed to be happy with political leaders who function outside the village. First, according to our respondents, these leaders

were not honest and had failed to perform their roles competently; secondly, most of our respondents were also leaders in their villages and did have some contacts and dealings with state and national leaders so that they knew what they were talking about. It is possible that they might have failed to get all they wanted from these leaders. In other words, either they wanted favors or their expectations were very high, while the leaders simply did not have enough resources to satisfy all the needs of these villages and their leaders.

TABLE 51

WHETHER INDIA'S NATIONAL LEADERS ARE COMPETENT

<u>Response</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Yes	394	69.0
No	153	26.8
Don't know	1	0.2
Some good, some bad	<u>23</u>	<u>4.0</u>
	571	100%
no response	37	

We have seen earlier that 67 percent were not happy with political leaders outside the village, but in this case 69 percent did think that India's national leaders were competent. It seems that since village leaders have to deal with state politicians, they experienced more frustration and their attitude was rather negative toward them. But they

had no direct dealings with national leaders (at least no working relationship), so there was little room for conflict between them and therefore their attitude was more favorable toward national leaders. It is also possible that village leaders equated national leadership with Gandhi, Tilak, and Nehru, the leaders of the Independence movement, so they had a more favorable attitude toward them. However, this thinking, if true, has been changing, since almost 27 percent of the village leaders had a negative attitude toward national leaders. It is also possible that the more educated leaders and those with greater exposure to the outside world had an unfavorable attitude toward national leaders. We will dwell on this issue later in our further analysis of the data.

TABLE 52

RESPONDENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD LAND CEILING

<u>Respondent's attitude</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Favor	434	72
Don't favor	<u>166</u>	<u>28</u>
	600	100%
no response	8	

It is not surprising to see that more than 72 percent

of our respondents favored a land ceiling. We have seen earlier (Table 19) that more than 68 percent of our respondents had annual incomes of less than Rs 2500/-. It can also be assumed that generally they came from the lower strata and although more than 62 percent (see Table 18) were engaged in cultivation they were not big land holders.

When the Zamindari Abolition Act was enacted by Bihar legislature under the leadership of the then Chief Minister Late K. B. Sahay, there was great opposition to the policy which came from landed interest groups. Views of this policy, it seems, were highly motivated by one's own interest rather than by any ideology. Approximately 30 percent of our respondents were rich by village standards (i.e., they also had large pieces of land) and about the same proportion of respondents (28 percent) did not favor a land ceiling. It is clear then that an overwhelming majority of our respondents favored it because they were poor and did not own large pieces of land. In the absence of any precise measure, we are assuming here that those who owned large pieces of land were also rich.

TABLE 53

RESPONDENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SUBTENANTS' RIGHTS

<u>Respondent's attitude</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Favor	279	47
Don't favor	<u>321</u>	<u>53</u>
	600	100%
No response	8	

While 72 percent favored a land ceiling, only 46 percent favored subtenants' rights. It would be interesting to see why so many favored a ceiling but not subtenants' rights and who they were.

We have seen earlier (see Table 18) that more than 62 percent of our respondents were involved in cultivation (i.e., they owned some land) while 68 percent (see Table 19) had an annual income of less than Rs 2500/- (i.e., they were not big landowners). Therefore, it can be suggested that since most of them did not have large parcels of land they favored a land ceiling but since they were landowners, they did not favor subtenants' rights. Again, it does not seem to be an ideological issue; they supported what was beneficial to themselves.

TABLE 54

RESPONDENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD COOPERATIVE FARMING

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Favor	416	70
Don't favor	<u>181</u>	<u>30</u>
	597	100%
no response	11	

Variation in response in this case is very much like that in the case of land ceiling and perhaps the same argument can be advanced here too. That is, people with small holdings would also support cooperative farming and those with larger holdings would oppose it.

On the basis of the income of our respondents we are also assuming that 68 percent of our respondents were in the lower income group and therefore it is not surprising that they also favored cooperative farming since they were likely to gain by this.

TABLE 55

RESPONDENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD AGRICULTURAL PLAN

<u>Respondent's attitude</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Approve	484	80
Disapprove	<u>129</u>	<u>20</u>
	608	100%

India has Five Year Plans for its developmental work. In addition, community development programs were also introduced in many villages. In the village sector most of the programs were established to improve the agricultural output. It seems that about 80 percent of our respondents approved of the agricultural plans introduced by various agencies. Since such a large number of respondents approved these agricultural plans, it may also be suggested that such plans have been rather successful.

TABLE 56

RESPONDENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD EDUCATIONAL PLAN

<u>Respondent's attitude</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Approve	442	73
Disapprove	<u>166</u>	<u>27</u>
	608	100%

It is interesting to note that somewhat more people in our sample approved of the agricultural plans than of the educational plans of the government. On the national scene, the situation is different. It is believed that government planning is concentrating more on education. As a result we have more graduates coming out of schools and colleges than we can really absorb.

TABLE 57

RESPONDENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD GOVERNMENTAL GENERAL PLANNING

<u>Respondent's attitude</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Approve	396	65
Disapprove	<u>212</u>	<u>35</u>
	608	100%

With regard to the general planning of the government, we find that a much larger percentage of our respondents were dissatisfied than before. This does not mean though that governmental planning was not appreciated by the villagers; as a matter of fact, 65 percent of our respondents did approve of various plans. We can ask why almost 35 percent were opposed to all planning while only 20 percent opposed agricultural plans and 27 percent educational plans. What were the other kinds of developmental programs in which government agencies were engaged? Mostly they were in the areas of medical facilities, transportation, electricity, and family planning. Therefore, we can suggest that while there was greater satisfaction in the areas of agriculture and education, in the above mentioned areas the degree of satisfaction was less.

TABLE 58

RESPONDENT'S WILLINGNESS TO ADVISE IN AGRICULTURAL MATTERS

<u>Willingness</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Yes	371	61
No	<u>237</u>	<u>39</u>
	608	100%

We have seen earlier that more than 80 percent of our respondents did approve of the government's agricultural plans. In this case we find that 61 percent were even willing to advise the government in agricultural policies. There are two factors to be noted here. First, since most of our respondents did support these plans they were also enthusiastic about becoming part of it, and secondly, it concerned them more than anything else and they also felt that they could advise on the basis of their experience in these matters. On the whole, we find that our respondents did have greater enthusiasm for agricultural plans and their attitude toward them was more positive.

TABLE 59

RESPONDENT'S WILLINGNESS TO ADVISE IN EDUCATIONAL MATTERS

<u>Willingness</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Yes	188	31
No	<u>420</u>	<u>69</u>
	608	100%

It is very clear that there was a sharp decline in terms of advising on educational matters among our respondents as compared to agricultural matters. We know that almost 79 percent of our respondents were literate, out of which 77 percent had some formal education. Therefore, we would not suggest that there is any lack of interest in education, but our respondents were hesitant to become advisors since they lacked expertise in this matter.

TABLE 60

RESPONDENT'S WILLINGNESS TO ADVISE ON OTHER MATTERS

<u>Willingness</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Yes	172	28
No	<u>436</u>	<u>72</u>
	608	100%

In this case we find an even further decline in terms of advising the government on other matters. We can say that in matters other than agriculture matters (in which our respondents had some expertise), they were reluctant to advise.

TABLE 61

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ARE WILLING TO GIVE ANY ADVICE

<u>Willing</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Yes	120	20
No	<u>488</u>	<u>80</u>
	608	100%

Our earlier data are further supported by the fact that more than 80 percent of our respondents were not willing to give advice on any matter. We have had similar results on matters in which respondents had little expertise, except in the case of agricultural matters.

It has been pointed out earlier that besides the Five Year Plans (formulated on a national level), the government of India has also introduced community development programs in the villages. The basic expectation was that these programs would allow villagers to participate in planning and make them more aware of the developmental process so that they would be able to take the position of leadership in these matters. On the national scale, of course, this program of getting non-governmental personnel involved in planning was not very successful. We have good reason to believe that in the case of the villagers, too, this effort failed, since it did not achieve the goals of involving villagers in planning and decision-making at the village level.

TABLE 62

RESPONDENT'S EVALUATION OF BUREAUCRATIC WORK

<u>Evaluation</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Satisfactory	210	35.3
Unsatisfactory	383	64.4
Don't know	<u>2</u>	<u>0.3</u>
	595	100%
no response	13	

We have seen earlier (see Table 48) that 42 percent of our respondents felt that there was a lack of cooperation between local leaders and government staff. In this case we find that an even greater percentage of our respondents said that the work done by bureaucrats was not satisfactory, i.e., they did not work well. As we know, there has not been significant change in India's villages in terms of economic development, and community development programs on a national scale have not succeeded in transforming village communities. There are, of course, a variety of reasons for these failures. But generally it has been argued that bureaucrats did not change their attitudes even after independence and they tried to maintain their hold as rulers rather than assuming a new role (which was expected of them), one of working for the welfare of the people and playing an instrumental role in developmental work. Our data support the view that bureau-

crats have failed to work effectively and carry out developmental plans, especially in the village sector.

TABLE 63

WHETHER RESPONDENTS FAVOR UNANIMITY OR MAJORITY

<u>Favor</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Unanimity	93	16
Majority	<u>491</u>	<u>84</u>
	584	100%
no response	24	

We have seen earlier (see Table 49) that more than 77 percent of our respondents believed that members of opposition parties should be included in the government. Here we find that an even higher percentage of our respondents supported the majority rule rather than unanimity. This suggests that politically our respondents were realistic enough to recognize the fact that there cannot be absolute consensus in the decision-making process, that in a democratic society the majority must prevail. It is interesting to note here that while on the one hand their responses are traditional (i.e., the inclusion of dissidents in the cabinet), on the other hand they are modern since overwhelmingly they support majority rule.

TABLE 64

RESPONDENT'S APPRAISAL OF INDIA'S PROGRESS

<u>Appraisal</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Progressing	545	94
Not progressing	<u>32</u>	<u>6</u>
	577	100%
no response	31	

We have seen earlier that more than 72 percent of our respondents approved of educational plans, more than 75 percent approved of agricultural plans, and 65 percent approved of the government's general planning. Therefore, it is to be expected that a great majority of our respondents were reasonably satisfied and felt that India is progressing. However, more than 64 percent also said that bureaucrats were not working well; hence we also assumed that developmental progress was slow in the villages. It seems that respondents were more critical when asked about specific aspects of development, more so in the case of bureaucrats, but their response was overwhelmingly favorable when asked about the general state of progress in India.

TABLE 65

RESPONDENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD FAMILY PLANNING

<u>Attitude</u>	<u>number</u>	<u>percent</u>
Favor	536	93
Don't favor	<u>43</u>	<u>1</u>
	579	100%
no response	29	

One of the major problems India is facing in its economic development is that of the population explosion. The government of India has already spent a good portion of its financial resources in family planning, but the results have been poor. It is of concern that in its last budget the Indian government did not allocate proportionately as much money for family planning as it has in the past. Experts contend that family planning did not have any significant impact in the villages for two reasons: first, because of the lack of education, and secondly, the belief that an extra hand can always be used in an agrarian economy.

It is very clear that our respondents did not share a pessimistic view, since more than 92 percent said that they favored family planning. We have, of course, no data as far as the practice of family planning is concerned. There are two possible explanations for the responses in favor of family planning: either our respondents were very progressive

as compared to other Indian villagers and supported family planning, or their support was only on an ideological basis, but they did not practice it.

TABLE 66

RESPONDENT'S PERCEPTION OF OWN RELIGIOSITY

<u>Degree of Religiosity</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Highly religious	355	60.7
Ordinarily religious	161	27.5
Slightly religious	<u>69</u>	<u>11.8</u>
	585	100%
no response	23	

The respondents were asked to indicate perception of their own religiosity and were given four possible choices, the last being "not religious at all," which was not selected by a single respondent. Knowing the structure and character of Indian villages, it is not revealing that more than 60 percent of our respondents said they were highly religious and the rest also conformed to religion in varying degrees, but none were "not religious at all." It may well be suggested then that our respondents perceived their own religiosity more positively.

TABLE 67

WHETHER CONDITIONS ARE BETTER
IN THE CITY OR IN THE VILLAGE

<u>Conditions are better in</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Village	249	42.7
City	280	48.0
Nowhere	36	6.2
Both places	<u>18</u>	<u> </u>
	583	100%
no response	25	

Even though all our respondents were from villages, the majority of them believed that conditions in the city were better than in the villages. However, almost 43 percent shared the view that conditions in the village were better. This information is rather general because it does not say whether they were talking about economic or social or any other aspect of life. Since generally it was understood that people were better off in cities economically, the 48 percent who believed that conditions in cities were better were referring to the economic factor and those 43 percent who thought that conditions in the village were better were really referring to general life style in the village which was more peaceful.

TABLE 68

INDIA'S WAY OF LIFE SHOULD BE DETERMINED
BY CITY PEOPLE OR VILLAGE PEOPLE

<u>Should be determined by</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Village people	357	60.7
City people	127	21.6
Both	<u>104</u>	<u>17.7</u>
	588	100%
no response	20	

Earlier we have seen that a majority of our respondents believed that conditions in the city were better than conditions in the villages. But in this case we find that a large majority of our respondents believed that village people should determine India's way of life. It is quite possible that even though a large number of our respondents believed that conditions in the city were better they were not in favor of the life style of cities and they wanted to preserve the tradition and culture of the land which perhaps was changing too fast, according to them, in the cities.

TABLE 69

WHETHER VILLAGERS ARE ON THE RIGHT PATH

<u>Response</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Yes	367	62
No	<u>221</u>	<u>38</u>
	588	100%
no response	20	

We find in this case that more than 62 percent of our respondents were of the belief that villagers are on the right path, which is consistent with their opinion that villagers should determine India's way of life. However, since all our respondents were villagers and more than 37 percent were saying that villagers were not on the right path, it seems quite obvious that there was a great difference of opinion among the villagers and a good number of them were not satisfied with the existing situation in their villages.

TABLE 70

WHETHER CITY PEOPLE ARE ON THE RIGHT PATH

<u>Response</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Yes	300	52
No	276	47
Don't know	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>
	580	100%
no response	28	

In this case we find that the majority of our respondents also believed that city people were on the right path even though 47 percent did not share this view. We can argue that there was no clear consensus among villagers in this matter and their view was not hostile toward the city or city dwellers, even though they showed preference for villages and village dwellers.

TABLE 71

WHETHER VILLAGE SHOULD CHANGE QUICKLY OR GRADUALLY

<u>Should change</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Quickly	265	45
Gradually	<u>325</u>	<u>55</u>
	590	100%
no response	18	

Here we find that 55 percent of our respondents were for change but not rapid change, while 45 percent wanted to change rapidly. The question we are basically interested in is what was the attitude of our village leaders toward change in various sectors. Generally we can assume that villagers were tradition bound and therefore not keen to bring about rapid change which our data also support. However, it is important to note that 45 percent of our leaders were not only for change but they wanted change to take place quickly. This is rather significant in the context of Indian villages which are generally projected as static and traditional. This then might be considered as an important index of the attitude of our village leaders toward change.

¹Buddhists--Lord Buddha introduced this religion in 500 B.C. as a reform movement within Hinduism which became a religious sect in India. As a religion, it has a large following in Asia.

²Sikhs--Sikhs are the followers of Guru Nanak, who established a new religion known as Sikhism. It is a religious as well as an ethnic group in India.

³Rupees--Name of Indian currency. At the present rate of exchange, approximately 8 rupees are equivalent to a U.S. dollar.

⁴See Robert K. Merton, "Patterns of Influence: Local and Cosmopolitan Influentials," in Social Theory and Social Structure, revised edition, pp. 441-474 (New York: The Free Press, 1968).

⁵Village circle--this term has been coined by Baidya Nath Varma in the context of interlocking relationships of leaders of a particular village with those of the neighboring villages. It is a different concept than that of a circle of villages, which are tied together in terms of kinship bonds or caste membership. David F. Pocock uses this term in the context of marriage network. See David F. Pocock, "Inclusion and Exclusion: A Process in the Caste System of Gujerat," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, pp. 19-31, vol. 13, 1957.

⁶Parties which advocate state control and more radical changes have been labeled leftist parties, e.g., Communist and Socialist Parties.

⁷Parties which advocate free economy and oppose radical changes have been labeled rightist parties, e.g., Swatantra, Jansangh, etc.

CHAPTER VI

CHANGE AND LAND LEGISLATION

In the first part of this chapter, we will present the relationship between the Land Legislation Scale and various types of variables. The results are reported in the following order: (a) relationship of the scale to various contextual variables: village size, village literacy rate, village caste composition, village factions, location of the village, village media exposure; (b) relationship of the scale to various background variables of the respondents: marital status, family type, age, sex, caste, education, occupation, income; (c) relationship of the scale in terms of religiosity, village change, progress in the country, and party preference. Our total number of respondents is 608 but some of these tables have a smaller number of respondents because we excluded the category of "no responses" in all the tables.

In the second part of this chapter, we will have further discussion of the relationship between land legislation and change as it is revealed in our data.

A few comments regarding the data and the statistical

treatment presented in different tables are in order. Our aim was to see, first, the relationship between a particular variable and the scores on a given scale. For this, we present the frequency distribution (in the column for N in different categories of a variable for a scale), the C or contingency coefficient and the chi-square value. Second, as a measure to report the trend briefly on different scales, we also present the mean scores and standard deviations on different groups of respondents in the first column of the table. The data showing relationship among variables indicate the general trend of the findings. The reporting of the mean is done to indicate the trend a little more clearly. This pattern will be followed for Media Exposure as well as Political Scale.

TABLE 72

SIZE OF THE VILLAGE AND SCORE ON LAND LEGISLATION SCALE

Village size	\bar{x}	s	N
Less than 500	1.90	1.00	139
500-999	1.80	1.00	239
1000-1999	2.00	1.00	136
2000 and above	2.00	0.90	82
Total	1.91	1.00	593

$$\chi^2 = 22.13; \quad df = 9; \quad p = .009; \quad C = .19$$

Table 72 shows that size of the village has some effect on leaders' attitude toward land legislation and it is significant. Leaders from smaller villages, i.e., those with a population of less than 1,000, are less favorable toward land legislation. We may argue that small size villages are more homogeneous and, therefore, respondents from these villages would be less favorable to change, especially in the area of land legislation.

TABLE 73

VILLAGE LITERACY AND SCORE ON LAND LEGISLATION SCALE

Literacy	\bar{x}	s	N
Low (less than 20%)	2.00	1.00	131
Medium (20-25%)	1.90	1.00	159
High (26-35%)	1.80	1.00	303
Total	1.88	1.00	593

$$\chi^2 = 5.5; \quad df = 6; \quad p = 0.48; \quad C = .10$$

In Table 73 we find that the relationship between literacy rate of the village and respondent's attitude towards land legislation is inversely related, even though not significantly. This indicates that respondents from

villages where literacy is less than 20 percent are slightly more favorable toward land legislation. It may be assumed that respondents are also poor in those villages where the literacy rate is low, they do not own much land, and, therefore, land legislation would be beneficial to them.

TABLE 74

CASTE COMPOSITION OF THE VILLAGE AND
SCORE ON LAND LEGISLATION SCALE

Caste composition	\bar{x}	s	n
Dominant caste	1.88	1.00	277
Non-dominant caste	1.88	1.00	316
Total	1.88	1.00	593

$$\chi^2 = 1.79; \quad df = 3; \quad p = 0.62; \quad C = .05$$

Table 74 shows that the caste composition of the village has no significant relationship to leader's score on the land legislation scale. We also note that the degree of favorableness toward land legislation from both types (dominant and non-dominant) of village is exactly the same.

TABLE 75

VILLAGE FACTION AND SCORE ON LAND LEGISLATION SCALE

Village faction	\bar{x}	s	n
Faction	2.04	1.00	156
Non-faction	1.82	1.00	437
Total	1.88	1.00	593

$$\chi^2 = 9.55; \quad df = 3; \quad p = .02; \quad C = .13$$

Table 75 shows that village faction and score on the land legislation scale have a significant relationship. We also note that respondents from villages with factions are slightly more favorable toward land legislation than are respondents from non-faction villages. It may be hypothesized that respondents from villages with factions are more favorable toward land legislation because the factions may have important differences of opinion on this point. Additionally, the factions may diversify the attitudes and values of village people. The non-factional village respondents may be more traditional and status-quo oriented; therefore, the attitudes of respondents from these villages are less favorable.

TABLE 76

VILLAGE LOCATION AND SCORE ON LAND LEGISLATION SCALE

Distance	\bar{x}	s	N
Isolated (over 10 miles)	1.75	1.00	104
Easy access (1-10 miles)	1.92	1.00	489
Total	1.88	1.00	593

$$\chi^2 = 7.28; \quad df = 6; \quad p = 0.26; \quad C = .11$$

Table 76 shows that location of the village and attitude toward land legislation has no significant relationship. However, we also note that the score of respondents from villages with easy access is slightly higher.

TABLE 77

VILLAGE MEDIA EXPOSURE AND SCORE ON LAND LEGISLATION SCALE

Media exposure	\bar{x}	s	N
Poor (no exposure)	2.00	1.00	118
Good (radio and newspaper)	1.90	1.00	475
Total	1.88	1.00	593

$$\chi^2 = 6.00; \quad df = 3; \quad p = 0.11; \quad C = .10$$

Table 77 reveals that there is some relationship between whether respondents come from villages where media exposure is poor or good and their scores on the land legis-

lation scale, and it is nearly significant. Interestingly enough, respondents coming from villages where media exposure is poor are more favorable to land legislation. This may also be a result of the fact that respondents from these village are also poor since they cannot afford radio or newspapers and they do not have large land holdings, hence, they are more favorable toward land legislation.

We will now move from an examination of the contextual variables to analysis of the background of the respondents themselves.

TABLE 78

MARITAL STATUS AND SCORE ON LAND LEGISLATION SCALE

Marital status	\bar{x}	s	n
Married	1.90	1.00	561
Widowed	1.84	1.00	19
Unmarried	1.77	1.00	13
Total	1.88	1.00	593

$$\chi^2 = 1.07; \quad df = 6; \quad p = 0.98; \quad C = .04$$

Table 78 shows that marital status and score on the land legislation scale have no significant relationship. We further note that married and widowed respondents are slightly more favorable toward land legislation than unmarried ones. The respondents who are unmarried are obviously not heads of household. They are also not affected directly by inequit-

able land holdings. This lack of concern may result in a tendency to support the status quo in matters of land ownership.

TABLE 79

FAMILY TYPE AND SCORE ON LAND LEGISLATION SCALE

Family type	\bar{x}	\underline{s}	N
Joint	1.87	1.00	502
Nuclear	1.91	1.00	91
Total	1.88	1.00	593

$$\chi^2 = 1.22; \quad df = 3; \quad p = 0.75; \quad C = .04$$

Table 79 indicates that the type of family does not have a significant relationship with respondent's attitude toward land legislation. However, there is a slight difference in response, i.e., those who belong to a nuclear family are slightly more favorable toward land legislation. We know that members of upper and intermediate castes have a larger number of joint families than do members of the lower castes. We noted earlier the propensity of poorer people to favor land legislation. We can hypothesize on the basis of this table that members of upper castes are less likely to favor land legislation.

TABLE 80

AGE AND SCORE ON LAND LEGISLATION SCALE

Age	\bar{x}	s	n
under 30	1.93	1.00	123
30-39	2.05	1.00	212
40-49	1.71	1.00	156
50 and above	1.72	1.00	101
Total	1.88	1.00	592

$$\chi^2 = 20.49; \quad df = 9; \quad p = 0.02; \quad C = .18$$

Table 80 shows that respondent's age and attitude toward land legislation have a significant relationship. It further reveals that those who are under 40 years of age are more favorable toward land legislation as compared to those who are 40 years old and above.

TABLE 81

SEX AND SCORE ON LAND LEGISLATION SCALE

Sex	\bar{x}	s	n
Male	1.85	1.00	565
Female	2.48	0.64	27
Total	1.88	1.00	592

$$\chi^2 = 10.62; \quad df = 3; \quad p = 0.02; \quad C = .13$$

Table 81 shows that sex and score on the land legislation scale have a significant relationship. It comes as a surprise that female respondents are significantly more favorable toward land legislation than are males. However,

the number of female respondents is very small in our sample, so we cannot advance the hypothesis that there is a significant difference in attitude between male and female respondents. The females in India are generally considered more traditional, but they do not seem to conform to this image in the sphere of land legislation.

TABLE 82

CASTE AND SCORE ON LAND LEGISLATION SCALE

Caste	\bar{x}	s	n
Upper	1.84	1.00	160
Middle	1.67	1.05	263
Lower	2.25	0.87	163
Total	1.88	1.00	586

$$\chi^2 = 41.64; \quad df = 6; \quad p = 0.001; \quad C = .26$$

Table 82 shows that respondent's caste has a significant relationship to his attitude toward land legislation. It is also clear that respondents from lower castes are most favorable toward land legislation. As we know, members of the lower castes are poorer, do not own much land, and often work as agricultural laborers. They are the worst victims of the land structure in the villages; therefore, it seems that this favoring of land legislation is quite in line with their own interest.

TABLE 83

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND SCORE ON LAND LEGISLATION SCALE

Education	\bar{x}	s	N
Illiterate	2.12	0.85	69
Literate	2.04	1.05	54
Some primary	1.86	1.13	79
Some middle	1.81	1.00	159
Some high school	1.77	1.00	65
Completed high school	1.86	1.00	91
Some college	1.65	1.00	31
Completed college	2.02	0.88	43
Total	1.88	1.00	591

$$\chi^2 = 26.21; \quad df = 21; \quad p = 0.20; \quad C = .20$$

Table 83 shows that respondent's educational level and attitude toward land legislation has some relationship and it is near significant. It is interesting to note here that the group of illiterates and merely literates and those who have completed college are more favorable toward land legislation as compared to those who have had some education both in schools and colleges. It appears that those who are illiterates or can only read and write come from the lower strata, that they do not hold land and are also poor, therefore, they are more favorable toward land legislation as noted earlier. Those who have completed college also are more favorable toward land legislation, either because they also come from a lower stratum or an alternative hypothesis

may be advanced that because of their high level of education they are more independent minded and their attitude is not motivated by their own personal interest but by their inclination to favor the "socialistic pattern of society," which has been the avowed goal of the leaders of independent India.

TABLE 84

OCCUPATION AND SCORE ON LAND LEGISLATION SCALE

Occupation	\bar{x}	s	N
Cultivation	1.75	1.03	373
Service	2.10	1.00	88
Business	2.07	0.89	28
Laborer	2.62	0.64	26
Teaching	1.78	1.00	51
Village occupation	2.23	0.69	22
Total	1.88	1.00	588

$$\chi^2 = 37.57; \quad df = 15; \quad p = 0.001; \quad C = .25$$

Table 84 shows that respondent's occupation and attitude toward land legislation have a significant relationship. As opposed to cultivation and teaching, all other occupational groups are more favorable toward land legislation. It is obvious that those who are full-time cultivators also own large parcels of land and, therefore, they would not support land legislation. However, it is not clear as to why those who are in teaching are also less favorable to-

ward land legislation. One possible explanation may be that those who are in teaching come from the upper stratum and they are also holders of land. Therefore, they have a stake in land legislation, even though they have another source of income.

TABLE 85

INCOME LEVEL AND SCORE ON LAND LEGISLATION SCALE

Income in rupees	\bar{x}	s	N
Below 1,000	2.23	0.85	129
1,000-1,499	2.03	1.00	118
1,500-2,499	1.79	1.00	140
2,500-3,999	1.63	1.08	75
4,000 and above	1.56	1.08	112
Total	1.87	1.00	574

$$\chi^2 = 45.10; \quad df = 12; \quad p = 0.001; \quad C = .27$$

Table 85 shows that respondent's income and attitude toward land legislation have a significant relationship. It further indicates that those respondents whose income is less than Rs. 1,500 a year are more favorable toward land legislation. It seems that the occupation of cultivation (as indicated earlier) and income to a great extent influence one's attitude toward land legislation; cultivators who own large parcels of land are in high income brackets and are less favorable toward land legislation,

We will now discuss the relationship of the Land Legislation Scale to some other important variables.

TABLE 86

RELIGIOSITY AND SCORE ON LAND LEGISLATION SCALE

Religiosity	\bar{x}	s	N
High	1.90	1.00	351
Medium	1.90	1.00	155
Low	2.00	1.03	69
Total	1.88	1.00	575

$$\chi^2 = 2.28; \quad df = 6; \quad p = 0.89; \quad C = .06$$

Table 86 shows that attitude toward religion and attitude toward land legislation are not significantly related. However, it seems that those who are less religious are slightly more favorable toward land legislation. Low religiosity means secularization and pro-change attitudes.

TABLE 87

ATTITUDE TOWARD CHANGE AND SCORE ON LAND LEGISLATION SCALE

Mode of change	\bar{x}	s	N
Quick	2.00	1.00	261
Gradual	1.80	1.00	318
Total	1.89	1.00	579

$$\chi^2 = 6.02; \quad df = 6; \quad p = 0.42; \quad C = .10$$

Table 87 shows that respondent's attitude toward change has no significant relationship to land legis-

lation. However, we also find that respondents who favor quick change also score slightly higher on the land legislation scale. Therefore, it may be suggested that one's attitude toward change may have some influence on one's attitude toward land legislation.

TABLE 88

PERCEPTION OF PROGRESS AND SCORE ON LAND LEGISLATION SCALE

<u>Progress</u>	<u>\bar{x}</u>	<u>s</u>	<u>n</u>
Yes	1.90	1.00	536
No	1.70	1.00	32
Total	1.88	1.00	568

$$\chi^2 = 2.42; \quad df = 3; \quad p = 0.49; \quad C = .06$$

Table 88 shows that respondent's perception of progress in the country and score on the land legislation scale have no significant relationship. However, it is apparent that those who see more progress in the country also tend to support land legislation somewhat more than those who do not see more progress.

TABLE 89

PARTY PREFERENCE AND SCORE ON LAND LEGISLATION SCALE

Party preference	\bar{x}	s	N
Middle of the road--			
Congress	1.89	1.00	500
Leftist--			
Socialist	2.00	1.00	20
Communist	2.06	1.00	18
Rightist--			
Jansangh	1.64	1.05	22
Swatantra	1.47	1.00	19
Other	2.16	1.00	12
Total	1.88	1.00	591

$$\chi^2 = 19.32; \quad df = 15; \quad p = 0.20; \quad C = .18$$

Table 89 shows that our respondents' party preferences and attitudes toward land legislation have some relationship and it is near significant. It further shows that those who support radical parties like the Communists and the Socialists are more favorable toward land legislation and those who support middle of the road parties like the Congress Party are less favorable toward land legislation. Those who support the Swatantra Party and Jansangh Party are even less favorable toward land legislation than those who support the Congress Party. This is to be expected, because the Swatantra Party is the party of capitalists and private interests and the Jansangh Party is the party of traditional Hindu ideology, which assigns people to caste and their obligations. The latter is also dominated by large landholders.

Some of our respondents preferred other parties.

Among these other parties were new local ones, which identified themselves with the Socialist Party on the national level. The responses of those who preferred other parties are very much like those of the Communist and Socialist Parties and their supporters, and their attitude toward land legislation is equally favorable.

Discussion

There can be little doubt that in countries where an overwhelming majority of the people live by agriculture, the raising of agricultural productivity is a necessary condition for economic growth and improvement of the standard of living of the masses. Land reform is an important factor in any program of planned development of agricultural communities in underdeveloped economies. This is even more important if the prevailing land system inhibits initiative and presents obstacles to the enlargement of inputs in the agricultural sector of the economy. A feudalistic structure of land rights inhibits the growth of agricultural productivity.

Measures of land reform have been introduced in different parts of the world to meet the individual requirements of the countries. These measures incorporate as many programs as the varying needs of the countries.¹ The prob-

lems of the underdeveloped economy are many.

First, there is the problem of low agricultural productivity. Any measures at an institutional level that tend to remove obstacles in the way of the maximization of agricultural productivity or that promote it directly have often received the top priority in shaping land reform policies. Secondly, land reforms have been undertaken to bring about a fair and equitable distribution of agricultural income.

The principle that there should be in India an absolute limit to the amount of land that an individual might hold was commended in the First Five Year Plan,² and endorsed by official committees of the government,³ and made national policy from the very beginning of the inception of national plans in India. The Second Five Year Plan not only proposed the introduction of ceilings on existing agricultural holdings, but also recommended ceilings on future acquisition of land.

In a conversation with Jayaprakesh Narayan⁴ in August 1972, I asked him what was the main hindrance to Bihar's economic and social progress. He observed that in spite of agrarian reforms the feudal structure remains very strong and that is the main obstacle to Bihar's progress. He fur-

ther elaborated his point and said that the governmental measures had failed in the sense that big landholders were able to manipulate and maintain ownership of large parcels of land. They also invested in property in urban areas and thereby maintained their economic power. In other words, the landless worker remained landless and, for a large part of the year, without a job.

Jayaprakash Narayan and Vinoba Bhave⁵ took the leadership of the Bhoodān movement, which aimed at getting extra land from landholders on a voluntary basis and distributing it among the poor. This movement failed in my opinion. A few years ago, a militant movement aimed at equalizing land holding in the villages took root under the leadership of Charu Mazumdar.⁶ This movement also failed, partly because it was crushed by the government.

After 1947, there has no doubt been a wave of land reform legislation in India. The states where land reform measures have been most publicized in India are Utter Pradesh, which passed its famous U. P. Zamindari Act⁷ in 1950, and Bihar which proposed similar legislation in 1955 and enacted it in 1961.

We will discuss the most controversial land legislation bill proposed in the State of Bihar, known as Bihar

Agricultural Lands (Ceilings and Management) Bill, 1955.

Mr. K. B. Sahay, the then revenue minister of Bihar who was instrumental in introducing this Bill, argued as follows:

About eighty-six percent of the total population of this state is dependent upon agriculture for its livelihood. Owing, however, to limited availability of land for cultivation and the existing inequitable distribution [of it] . . . about thirty percent of the agricultural population of the State is landless and a vast bulk of the rest own fragments which prove far too uneconomic for efficient cultivation. One of the ways to provide land to the agriculturists of this class is to fix ceilings on individual holdings and to distribute the lands in excess of the ceiling to them.

Various arguments have been advanced for imposing a land ceiling. These arguments are based on the assumption that, since the supply of land was limited in relation to the number of people who wanted land, social justice required the redistribution of existing land holdings both to satisfy land hunger and to reduce inequalities in the control and use of land resources.

Many (mostly vested interests) opposed it on the ground that it would lead toward disruption of the village economy and pose a threat to rural stability. The opponents of the said Bill showed their strength in the 1957 general elections. K. B. Sahay was defeated in the general elections, as were several others who supported this Bill. Because of the political climate and a lack of con-

sensus within the Congress Party which ruled the state, the government of Bihar waited until 1961 to introduce a revised version of the original Bill--a version with sufficient loopholes. The new ceiling Bill, the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961, was finally enacted into law.

The impact of the enactment of land ceilings has been minimal. The Act has neither caused agrarian tensions in Bihar, nor provided change in the agrarian structure that can be considered conducive to increasing agricultural output.⁹ The question of redistribution of land still remains more or less in abeyance.

In the light of these controversies about agrarian reforms in general and land ceiling in particular, it would be interesting to examine how our respondents reacted to land ceiling, subtenant's right, and cooperative farming and to see what were some of the important factors that influenced their attitudes toward land legislation.

Our data (discussed earlier) shows that respondent's caste, occupation, and income are closely related factors (see Tables 82, 84, 85) and that in each case those who are upper caste, whose occupations are cultivation and teaching, and those who have a higher income score low on the land

legislation scale. We have also seen earlier (Chapter 5 on attitudinal profile) that the respondent's attitude toward these legislations essentially depends on his own background, i.e., if he owns large parcels of land, has a high income, and belongs to the upper caste. Such a respondent is likely to oppose any imposition of a ceiling on land ownership.

It seems that the educational level of the village is also an important factor in determining one's attitude toward land legislation. We find that respondents from villages where the literacy rate is lowest (see Table 73) score highest on the land legislation scale (i.e., they are in favor of land legislation). In terms of the educational background of the respondents, those who are illiterate score highest on the land legislation scale. As the level of education increases, we find that the respondents are less favorable to land legislation, except in the case of those who have completed college, when this group again shows a more favorable attitude toward land legislation. We also find that respondents who are under 39 years of age are more favorable toward land legislation (see Table 80) than those who are older.

One of the most important differences on the land

legislation scale concerns the responses of female members of our sample. We felt that female members would be more traditional and, therefore, would not support any major change in the area of land reforms. Surprisingly enough, we find that they score higher (see Table 81) on the land legislation scale and do not conform to the image of traditionality projected by many scholars. Although we cannot agree that because they score high on the land legislation scale, they are pro-change in other areas as well, but at least this finding alerts us against impressionistic ideas about the females being always traditional in the population of an underdeveloped country.

Results on the land legislation scale also support the assumption that those whose religiosity is high would score low on the land legislation scale (see Table 86). Also, those who prefer quick change would be more favorable to land legislation (see Table 87). Those who see the country progressing support land legislation more than those who don't see progress (see Table 88). And lastly, but more importantly, respondents who belong to radical parties like the Communists and Socialists favor land legislation more than respondents who belong to conservative parties like Jansangh and Swatantra.

¹U.N. Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, vol. VIII, no. 3 (November, 1957), p. 73.

²India, Planning Commission, Second Five Year Plan, pp. 193-194.

³See, for example, India, Planning Commission, Reports of the Committees of the Panel on Land Reforms, pp. 95-110.

⁴In a private conversation with Jayaprakash Narayan, August, 1972.

⁵Vinoba Bhave led the Bhoodan (land gift) movement in India.

⁶Charu Mazumdar was a militant leftist who led a movement called "Naxalite" to take the land from landholders and distribute it among the landless.

⁷The recent phase of land reforms started in the state of Uttar Pradesh with the enactment of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950, known as the Principal Act, and has culminated in the passing of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1960. (Singh and Misra, A Study of Land Reforms in U.P., 1965).

⁸Bihar, Laws, statutes, etc. (Bills.) Bihar Agricultural Lands (Ceiling and Management) Bill, 1955, "Statement of Objects and Reasons."

⁹F. Tomasson Jannuzi, Agrarian Crisis in India: The Case of Bihar (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1974), p. 85.

CHAPTER VII

CHANGE AND MASS MEDIA

In the first part of this chapter we will present the relationship between the Media Exposure Scale and various types of variables. The results are reported in the following order: (a) relationship of the scale to various contextual variables: village size, village literacy rate, village caste composition, village factions, location of the village, village media exposure; (b) relationship of the scale to various background variables of the respondents: marital status, family type, age, sex, caste, education, occupation, income; (c) relationship of the scale in terms of religiosity, village change, progress in the country, and party preference. Our total number of respondents is 608, but some of these tables have fewer respondents, because we excluded the category of "no response" in all of the tables.

In the second part, we will have further discussion of the relationship between media exposure and change as it is revealed in our data.

TABLE 90

VILLAGE SIZE AND SCORE ON MEDIA EXPOSURE SCALE

Size	\bar{x}	s	n
Less than 500	2.56	1.25	142
500-999	2.90	1.12	240
1,000-1,999	2.04	1.52	143
2,000 - above	2.80	1.21	83
Total	2.60	1.31	608

$$\chi^2 = 65.83; \quad df = 12; \quad p = .001; \quad C = .31$$

Table 90 shows that size of village and score on the media exposure scale have a relationship, and it is significant. However, we find that there is no clear trend as far as size of the village and score on the media exposure scale is concerned. On the one hand, we find that respondents from medium size villages (500-999) have the highest score; on the other hand, the largest size village respondents are only slightly lower in score. This table further reveals that in general leaders from the larger size villages do not necessarily score high on the media exposure scale. On the contrary, the smallest size village respondents tend to score slightly higher than some medium size villagers on the media exposure scale.

TABLE 91

VILLAGE LITERACY AND SCORE ON MEDIA EXPOSURE SCALE

Literacy rate	\bar{x}	s	n
Low (less than 20%)	2.10	1.52	137
Medium (20-25%)	2.40	1.30	163
High (26-35%)	2.95	1.10	308
Total	2.60	1.31	608

$$\chi^2 = 71.41; \quad df = 8; \quad p = 0.001; \quad C = .32$$

Table 91 clearly shows that literacy rate of the village does affect respondent's score on the media exposure scale and it is significant. It indicates that the higher the literacy rate of the village, the higher is the media exposure for the respondents of that village. Because the educational level is dependent on the literacy rate of the village, this result is not surprising.

TABLE 92

CASTE COMPOSITION OF THE VILLAGE AND
SCORE ON MEDIA EXPOSURE SCALE

Caste composition	\bar{x}	s	n
Dominant	2.44	1.42	285
Non-dominant	2.75	1.20	323
Total	2.60	1.31	608

$$\chi^2 = 17.42; \quad df = 4; \quad p = 0.002; \quad C = .17$$

Here we see (Table 92) that respondent's score on media exposure scale and village caste composition have a relationship, and it is significant. We find that respondents from non-dominant caste villages score higher on the media exposure scale than do respondents from dominant caste villages. Since we know from the profile of the villages that non-dominant caste villages are more diversified and have more heterogeneous groups, it would appear natural that they would seek greater exposure to the outside world. Their exposure to the mass media, as shown in Table 92, would be an important basis for their contacts with the outside world.

TABLE 93

VILLAGE FACTION AND SCORE ON MEDIA EXPOSURE SCALE

<u>Village faction</u>	<u>\bar{x}</u>	<u>s</u>	<u>n</u>
Faction	2.59	1.30	159
Non-faction	2.61	1.31	449
Total	2.60	1.31	608

$$\chi^2 = 4.34; \quad df = 4; \quad p = 0.36; \quad C = .08$$

Here we see (Table 93) that there is no significant difference between faction and non-faction villages in terms of respondents' scores on the media exposure scale. Therefore, media habit of the respondents is independent of factionalism in their villages.

TABLE 94

LOCATION OF THE VILLAGE AND SCORE ON MEDIA EXPOSURE SCALE

Distance	\bar{x}	s	n
Isolated (over 10 miles)	2.71	1.11	268
Easy access (1-10 miles)	2.49	1.38	340
Total	2.60	1.31	608

$$\chi^2 = 25.51; \quad df = 8; \quad p = 0.001; \quad C = .20$$

Here we find (Table 94) that village distance and score on media exposure scale have a relationship and it is significant. Interestingly enough, this table reveals that respondents in isolated villages score high on the media exposure scale, which is quite contrary to general expectations. It appears that respondents from those villages which are isolated are particularly keen about reading newspapers and listening to radio because they want to keep abreast of what is going on outside the village. The media seem to be their only access to what is going on in India.

TABLE 95
VILLAGE MEDIA EXPOSURE AND SCORE OF RESPONDENTS
ON MEDIA EXPOSURE SCALE

Village media exposure	\bar{x}	s	n
Poor (no exposure)	2.56	1.30	120
Good (both radio and newspaper)	2.62	1.31	488
Total	2.60	1.31	608

$$\chi^2 = 4.27; \quad df = 4; \quad p = 0.37; \quad C = .08$$

Table 95 shows that there is no significant relationship between village media exposure and score on the media exposure scale. However, respondents from villages with good media exposure do score slightly higher on their individual media exposure scale. This trend is as expected.

We will now move from an examination of the contextual variables to an analysis of the background variables of the respondents themselves.

TABLE 96
MARITAL STATUS AND SCORE ON MEDIA EXPOSURE SCALE

Marital status	\bar{x}	s	n
Married	2.62	1.31	575
Unmarried	2.86	1.29	14
Widowed	1.89	1.24	19
Total	2.60	1.31	608

$$\chi^2 = 9.83; \quad df = 8; \quad p = 0.28; \quad C = .13$$

Table 96 shows that there is no significant rela-

tionship between respondent's marital status and score on media exposure scale. However, it is clear that the highest score on the media exposure scale is in the category of unmarried respondents. The unmarried people are younger and perhaps more educated (see Table 98), which will explain this difference in media exposure.

TABLE 97

FAMILY TYPE AND SCORE ON MEDIA EXPOSURE SCALE

<u>Family type</u>	<u>\bar{x}</u>	<u>s</u>	<u>n</u>
Joint	2.63	1.28	515
Nuclear	2.44	1.47	93
Total	2.60	1.30	608

$$\chi^2 = 7.74; \quad df = 4; \quad p = 0.10; \quad C = .11$$

Table 97 shows that family type and media exposure are not related significantly. However, we find that those who belong to a joint family score slightly higher on the media exposure scale. This may be because of the fact that joint families are more prevalent among the upper castes and they are also well-to-do and can afford to buy a newspaper, spending time reading it, and listening to a radio.

TABLE 98

AGE AND SCORE ON MEDIA EXPOSURE SCALE

Age	\bar{x}	s	n
under 30	2.68	1.29	125
30 - 39	2.75	1.31	219
40 - 49	2.59	1.33	157
50 and above	2.22	1.24	106
Total	2.60	1.31	607

$$\chi^2 = 32.33; \quad df = 12; \quad p = 0.001; \quad C = .22$$

Table 98 shows that the relationship between respondent's age and score on the media exposure scale is significant. We also find that those under forty years of age score higher on the media scale than those who are older. Those who are fifty and above score the lowest.

TABLE 99

SEX AND SCORE ON MEDIA EXPOSURE SCALE

Sex	\bar{x}	s	n
Male	2.64	1.28	580
Female	1.82	1.64	27
Total	2.60	1.31	607

$$\chi^2 = 24.74; \quad df = 4; \quad p = 0.001; \quad C = .20$$

Table 99 shows that respondent's sex and score on the media exposure scale have a significant relationship. It is clear that male respondents score higher on the media

scale than their female counterparts. This can be explained in view of the fact that females in Indian society, especially in a village setting, have little exposure outside their home and family. It should be noted, however, that the number of females in the sample is very low.

TABLE 100

CASTE AND SCORE ON MEDIA EXPOSURE SCALE

Caste	\bar{x}	s	n
Upper	2.93	1.18	167
Middle	2.63	1.24	266
Lower	2.29	1.44	168
Total	2.62	1.30	601

$$\chi^2 = 28.25; \quad df = 8; \quad p = 0.001; \quad C = .21$$

Table 100 clearly indicates that respondent's caste and score on the media exposure scale have a significant relationship. We find that respondents from upper castes score highest and those from the lowest castes score lowest on the media exposure scale. The middle caste respondents' score falls between the two categories of the highest and the lowest castes. It may be argued that media habits depend very much on one's educational and financial background. Since lower caste respondents lack these amenities, their lower score on the media exposure scale is understandable.

TABLE 101

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND SCORE ON MEDIA EXPOSURE SCALE

Education	\bar{x}	s	n
Illiterate	0.79	0.75	72
Literate	1.97	1.21	58
Some primary	2.14	1.27	80
Some middle	2.78	1.07	161
Some high school	2.84	1.05	67
Some college	3.52	0.77	31
Completed college	3.84	0.37	45
Total	2.60	1.31	606

$$\chi^2 = 325.40; \quad df = 28; \quad p = 0.001; \quad C = .49$$

Table 101 shows that there is a significant relationship between respondent's level of education and score on the media exposure scale. We see a clear trend showing that the media exposure scale increases as the level of education increases. This result conforms to our expectations, as discussed earlier.

TABLE 102

OCCUPATION AND SCORE ON MEDIA EXPOSURE SCALE

Occupation	\bar{x}	s	n
Cultivation	2.49	1.28	377
Service	3.38	0.83	93
Business	2.90	1.13	30
Laborer	1.11	1.15	27
Teaching	3.18	1.00	51
Village occupation	1.56	1.56	25
Total	2.61	1.31	603

$$\chi^2 = 137.47; \quad df = 20; \quad p = 0.001; \quad C = .43$$

Table 102 shows that our respondents' occupations and their scores on the media exposure scale have a significant relationship. We note that those who are professionals score the highest on the media exposure scale; next we find cultivators who are also well-to-do people in the villages. Those who are in the traditional village occupations score low and the laborers score the lowest. It is clear that educational and income levels are very important in determining media habits.

TABLE 103

INCOME AND SCORE ON MEDIA EXPOSURE SCALE

Income in rupees	\bar{x}	s	n
Below 1,000	2.22	1.41	134
1000-1499	2.51	1.31	120
1500-2499	3.00	1.16	142
2500-3999	2.71	1.16	78
4000 and above	2.75	1.25	113
Total	2.64	1.29	587

$$\chi^2 = 37.60; \quad df = 16; \quad p = 0.002; \quad C = .25$$

We have seen earlier that education and occupation are significantly related to the media exposure scale. Here we find (Table 103) that income is also significantly related to the media exposure scale. In other words, those who are in higher income groups are likely to score higher on the media exposure scale than those in lower income groups.

The relationship between education, occupation, and income is not accidental; that these variables consistently have a significant relationship with the media exposure scale is a finding in the direction of modernity for our sampled villages.

We will now discuss the relationship of the media exposure scale to some other important variables.

TABLE 104

RELIGIOSITY AND SCORE ON MEDIA EXPOSURE SCALE

Religiosity	\bar{x}	s	n
High	2.58	1.28	355
Medium	2.65	1.40	161
Low	2.68	1.30	69
Total	2.61	1.31	585

$$= 9.83; \quad df = 8; \quad p = 0.28; \quad C = .21$$

Table 104 shows that the religiosity of the respondents and their media habits are not significantly related. However, there is some evidence that those who are more religious also tend to score somewhat lower on the media exposure scale.

TABLE 105

ATTITUDE TOWARD CHANGE AND SCORE ON MEDIA EXPOSURE SCALE

Mode of change	\bar{x}	\underline{s}	n
Quick	2.55	1.37	264
Gradual	2.64	1.26	324
Total	2.60	1.30	588

$$\chi^2 = 5.87; \quad df = 8; \quad p = 0.66; \quad C = .13$$

We see in Table 105 that respondent's attitude toward change and media exposure have no significant relationship. In fact, those who want gradual change score slightly higher on the media exposure scale than those who want quick change. It is possible that those who belong to the upper castes and those who hold land and those who have higher incomes prefer gradual change in the village. A quick change is more likely to affect their status in an adverse direction.

TABLE 106

PERCEPTION OF PROGRESS AND SCORE ON MEDIA EXPOSURE SCALE

Progress	\bar{x}	s	n
Yes	2.62	1.31	545
No	2.75	1.27	32
Total	2.62	1.30	577

$$\chi^2 = 2.83; \quad df = 4; \quad p = 0.59; \quad C = .10$$

Here we find (see Table 106) that the respondent's perception of progress and score on the media exposure scale have no significant relationship. However, we find that those who see less progress score slightly higher on the media exposure scale than those who see more progress. It seems then that those who read newspapers and listen to the radio have a more critical view and their perception of progress in the country is affected adversely thereby.

TABLE 107

PARTY PREFERENCE AND SCORE ON MEDIA EXPOSURE SCALE

Party preference	\bar{x}	s	n
Middle of the road--			
Congress	2.58	1.32	510
Leftist--			
Socialist	3.05	1.20	20
Communist	3.11	1.00	18
Rightist--			
Jansangh	2.91	1.34	22
Swatantra	2.21	1.36	19
Other	3.00	1.21	12
Total	2.62	1.31	601

$$\chi^2 = 28.50; \quad df = 20; \quad p = 0.10; \quad C = .07$$

We see in Table 107 that the relationship between party preference and media exposure is nearly significant. It is quite clear that adherents of radical parties like the Socialist and Communist Parties have higher scores on the media exposure scale. The followers of "other" parties are also higher and they include local parties which often identify with the Socialist Party on the national level in the region in which our study is located. We do not find much difference between adherents of liberal (Congress) and conservative (Jansangh and Swatantra) parties on the media exposure scale, with the exception of the Jansangh Party whose score is slightly higher than that of the Congress Party. It is possible that because the radical parties are critical of the government, their media exposure is higher for they would seek information to confirm their beliefs.

Discussion

Among others, Lerner has argued that communication plays an important role in the process of modernization. Planners and policy makers are greatly committed to the goal of increasing communication with the people because it is felt that economic, social, and political progress is dependent on it. Mathur and Neurath¹ also emphasize this in their study of farm radio forums. Rao² in his study of two Indian villages suggests that with the increasing use of the media,

small communities tend to develop faster. Varma³ suggests that "the mass media disseminated more among the higher castes and the educated sections of the village. . . ."

Results on the media exposure scale support the hypothesis that one's media habit or pattern of communication is related to the larger process of modernization. Here, we can consider some of our results on the media exposure scale. One hypothesis suggested time and again in the literature discussed earlier is that respondents from upper castes, higher income groups, professional groups and of higher educational level would score higher on the media exposure scale. This hypothesis is clearly supported by our data. Table 100 shows that caste is an important factor in media exposure. Members of the upper castes have the highest score, next come the members of the intermediate castes, and the lower caste respondents are at the lowest level of the media exposure scale. Table 103 shows that those whose income is Rs. 1500 and more are more exposed to the media. Also, we find (see Table 102) that laborers and those in village occupations score the lowest on the media exposure scale. Those in service, business and teaching professions score higher. As far as the effect of education on media is concerned, we have very interesting results. Even though

we made a large number of categories for educational level, we find that the score on the media exposure scale increases consistently as the level of education increases. These results also support Varma's thesis that those of higher education and higher caste are more exposed to the mass media.

On the basis of the results on the Media Exposure Scale we can conclude then that the hypotheses advanced by Lerner, Mathur and Neurath, Rao, and Varma are substantiated by our data.

Another commonly suggested hypothesis is that those who are most exposed to outside communication media would be most favorably disposed to rapid change. It is obvious from our discussion of Table 105 that such is not the case. As we have suggested, it is probable that those with the greatest media exposure are also of high caste, higher education, and higher income, and therefore opposed to rapid change on the basis of self-interest. Therefore, to suggest that India's efforts at modernization would be enhanced to a great extent by exposing the village population to more media sources may not be a valid assumption. What would seem to be needed is a channel of communication which would go beyond simply contacting the more educated and

wealthier segment of the rural population.

¹J. C. Mathur and Paul Neurath, An Indian Experiment in Farm Radio Forums, UNESCO, 1955, p. 105.

²Y. V. Lakshmana Rao, Communication and Development: A Study of Two Indian Villages (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1966), p. 97.

³Baidya Nath Varma, "Communication and Social Change in Rural India," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1958, p. 273.

CHAPTER VIII

CHANGE AND POLITICS

In the first part of this chapter we will present the relationship between the Political Scale and various types of variables. The results are reported in the following order: (a) relationship of the scale to various contextual variables: village size, village literacy rate, village caste composition, village factions, location of the village, village media exposure; (b) relationship of the scale to various background variables of the respondents: marital status, family type, age, sex, caste, education, occupation, income; (c) relationship of the scale in terms of religiosity, village change, progress in the country, and party preference. Our total number of respondents is 608, but some of these tables have fewer respondents because we excluded the category of "no response" in all of the tables.

In the second part, we will have further discussion of the relationship between politics and change as it is revealed in our data.

TABLE 108

VILLAGE SIZE AND SCORE ON POLITICAL SCALE

Village size	\bar{x}	\underline{s}	n
Less than 500	1.30	0.85	129
500-999	1.12	0.74	227
1000-1999	1.12	0.81	118
2000 and over	1.05	0.67	80
Total	1.15	0.78	554

$$\chi^2 = 20.63; \quad df = 9; \quad p = 0.02; \quad C = .19$$

Table 108 shows that size of the village and respondent's score on the political scale have a significant relationship. The interesting thing to note here is that respondents from the smallest villages score highest and the score decreases as village size increases. Finally, those from the largest villages score lowest. It implies then that leaders from smaller villages are more pro-change in the political sphere as compared to those from larger villages.

TABLE 109

VILLAGE LITERACY AND SCORE ON POLITICAL SCALE

Village literacy	\bar{x}	s	n
Low (less than 20%)	1.23	0.84	111
Medium (20-25%)	1.13	0.78	152
High (26-35%)	1.13	0.76	291
Total	1.15	0.78	554

$$\chi^2 = 6.71; \quad df = 6; \quad p = 0.35; \quad C = .11$$

Here we find (see Table 109) that there is no significant relationship between village literacy and the political scale. However, it is interesting to note that leaders who come from villages where the literacy rate is low score slightly higher than others on the political scale. It appears that literacy rate as such does not affect the leader's attitude on political matters.

TABLE 110

VILLAGE CASTE COMPOSITION AND SCORE ON POLITICAL SCALE

Caste composition	\bar{x}	s	n
Dominant	1.14	0.82	249
Non-dominant	1.12	0.74	305
Total	1.15	0.78	554

$$\chi^2 = 6.90; \quad df = 3; \quad p = 0.08; \quad C = .11$$

Table 110 shows that the caste composition of the village and political scale have some relationship and it is near significant. We find that leaders from dominant caste villages score slightly higher on this scale. It seems that the existence of a dominant caste creates interest in political matters outside the village and this interest guides the leader's expectations.

TABLE 111

VILLAGE FACTION AND SCORE ON POLITICAL SCALE

Village faction	\bar{x}	s	n
Faction	1.05	0.77	151
Non-faction	1.19	0.76	403
Total	1.15	0.78	554

$$\chi^2 = 4.59; \quad df = 3; \quad p = 0.20; \quad C = .09$$

It is clear from Table 111 that factionalism in the village and respondent's attitude toward political matters has some relationship, and it is near significant. We also note that leaders from non-faction villages score higher than those from faction villages. It is possible that leaders from villages with factions are more absorbed in village issues and hence they do not respond to political issues as actively as leaders from non-faction villages.

TABLE 112

LOCATION OF THE VILLAGE AND SCORE ON POLITICAL SCALE

Distance	\bar{x}	s	n
Isolated (over 10 miles)	1.18	0.82	98
Easy access (1-10 miles)	1.14	0.77	456
Total	1.15	0.78	554

$$\chi^2 = 4.46; \quad df = 6; \quad p = 0.62; \quad C = .09$$

Here we find that there is no significant relationship between village location and respondent's score on the political scale. However, leaders from isolated villages score slightly higher. We have seen similar results in the relationship between access to the city and exposure to the mass media (see Table 94). It is possible that leaders from isolated villages are more interested in political issues, despite their distance from urban centers, so that not being close to the city is not always a disadvantage.

TABLE 113

MEDIA EXPOSURE OF THE VILLAGE AND SCORE ON POLITICAL SCALE

Village media exposure	\bar{x}	s	n
Poor (no exposure)	1.24	0.82	111
Good (radio and newspaper)	1.13	0.76	443
Total	1.15	0.78	554

$$\chi^2 = 7.45; \quad df = 3; \quad p = 0.06; \quad C = .12$$

Table 113 shows that there is a significant relationship between the media score of the village and its respondents' scores on the political scale. Quite contrary to our expectations, we find that respondents who come from villages with poor media exposure score high on the political scale. We can only infer that low media exposure does not necessarily affect attitude toward political issues, i.e., leaders from low media exposure villages may score high on the political scale.

We will now move from an examination of the contextual variables to an analysis of the background of the respondents themselves.

TABLE 114

MARITAL STATUS AND SCORE ON POLITICAL SCALE

Marital status	\bar{x}	\underline{s}	n
Married	1.16	0.77	526
Unmarried	1.17	0.66	16
Widowed	0.81	1.03	12
Total	1.15	0.78	554

$$\chi^2 = 6.71; \quad df = 6; \quad p = 0.35; \quad C = .11$$

Here we find (see Table 114) no significant relationship between marital status and score on the political scale. However, we note that respondents who are widowed score considerably lower on the political scale than others. It appears then that leaders who are widowed (and perhaps older) tend to be less responsive to political issues as compared to those who are married or unmarried.

TABLE 115

FAMILY TYPE AND SCORE ON POLITICAL SCALE

Family type	\bar{x}	\underline{s}	n
Joint	1.14	0.78	469
Nuclear	1.22	0.78	85
Total	1.15	0.78	554

$$\chi^2 = 0.98; \quad df = 3; \quad p = 0.80; \quad C = .04$$

Table 115 indicates no significant relationship

between type of family and respondent's score on the political scale. However, we note that those respondents who belong to nuclear families tend to score slightly higher than those who do not. It may be argued that the leaders who belong to nuclear families are more independent-minded and, therefore, their attitude toward political issues is more in the direction of modernity.

TABLE 116

AGE AND SCORE ON POLITICAL SCALE

Age	\bar{x}	s	n
Under 30	1.24	0.81	116
30-39	1.13	0.80	194
40-49	1.14	0.76	146
50 and over	1.11	0.72	97
Total	1.15	0.78	553

$$\chi^2 = 4.20; \quad df = 9; \quad p = 0.90; \quad C = .09$$

Table 116 indicates that age of respondent and score on the political scale have no significant relationship. However, we also note that those who are under 30 years of age score slightly higher on this scale. It seems then that score on the political scale is not a function of age, but leaders who are very young are more likely to be change oriented in the sphere of politics.

TABLE 117

SEX AND SCORE ON POLITICAL SCALE

Sex	\bar{x}	s	n
Male	1.15	0.78	538
Female	1.27	0.70	15
Total	1.15	0.78	553

$$\chi^2 = 2.24; \quad df = 3; \quad p = 0.53; \quad C = .06$$

Table 117 shows that sex and score on the political scale have no significant relationship. However, it is interesting to note that female respondents score slightly high compared to male respondents. Females in India, especially in the village setting, are considered more traditional and confined to household activities; surprisingly enough, our female respondents do not conform to this image in the political sphere. We noted that the score of female respondents on the land legislation scale was significantly more favorable as compared to that of their male counterparts. Thus it is possible that female leaders, although very few in the villages, are relatively more open and change oriented in the sphere of politics than their male counterparts.

TABLE 118

CASTE AND SCORE ON POLITICAL SCALE

Caste	\bar{x}	s	n
Upper	1.11	0.84	151
Middle	1.19	0.76	248
Lower	1.13	0.75	149
Total	1.15	0.78	548

$$\chi^2 = 7.31; \quad df = 6; \quad p = 0.29; \quad C = .11$$

Table 118 shows that caste of our respondents and score on the political scale have no significant relationship. However, we note here that leaders who belong to upper and lower castes have about the same score on the political scale, and those who are from intermediate castes score slightly higher. It appears that although score on the political scale is not a function of caste as such, our data do suggest that leaders from intermediate castes are slightly more pro-change in political matters.

Much has been made of the "revolution of rising expectations." We may suggest that those in the intermediate castes are most concerned with improving life opportunities because it seems likely for them, and one avenue for improving their own opportunities may be involvement in political affairs. On the other hand, leaders from lower castes are

so removed from the opportunity structure that they do not even have such perceptions. Those from the higher castes are not as concerned with improving their positions (which are already high) through political efforts.

TABLE 119

EDUCATION AND SCORE ON POLITICAL SCALE

Education	\bar{x}	s	n
Illiterate	1.24	0.82	54
Literate	1.24	0.71	51
Some primary	1.04	0.71	74
Some middle	1.06	0.71	156
Some high school	1.08	0.75	62
Finished high school	1.18	0.86	83
Some college	1.29	0.40	28
Completed college	1.43	0.87	44
Total	1.15	0.78	552

$$\chi^2 = 25.94; \quad df = 21; \quad p = 0.20; \quad C = .21$$

Table 119 shows that respondent's level of education and score on the political scale have some relationship, and it approaches significance. It is interesting to note here that those who are illiterate and literate score higher on the political scale than those who have some formal education (i.e., in the primary, middle, and high school levels). However, those who have some college education or have completed college again score high on the political scale. It is not clear as to why there is a sim-

ilarity in this respect between those who have no education and those who have a great deal of education.

TABLE 120

OCCUPATION AND SCORE ON POLITICAL SCALE

Occupation	\bar{x}	\underline{s}	n
Cultivation	1.15	0.75	346
Service	1.25	0.90	85
Business	1.11	1.01	27
Laborer	1.09	0.67	23
Teaching	1.06	0.67	48
Village occupation	1.00	0.80	20
Total	1.15	0.78	549

$$\chi^2 = 21.15; \quad df = 15; \quad p = 0.14; \quad C = .19$$

Table 120 shows that our respondent's occupation and score on the political scale have a relationship and it is nearly significant. We also note that those who are cultivators and are in service score higher on the political scale than to those in other occupational groups. One can suggest that the professionals are well-to-do people and their attitudes are likely to be status-quo oriented to safeguard their own interests.

TABLE 121

INCOME AND SCORE ON POLITICAL SCALE

Income	\bar{x}	s	n
Below 1000	1.15	0.83	113
1000-1499	1.06	0.71	118
1500-2499	1.19	0.81	130
2500-3999	1.19	0.75	70
4000 and over	1.19	0.78	108
Total	1.15	0.78	539

$$\chi^2 = 12.22; \quad df = 12; \quad p = 0.43; \quad C = .15$$

Table 121 shows that respondent's income and score on the political scale have no significant relationship. However, it indicates that respondents whose income is Rs. 1500/ and more score slightly higher on the political scale. Income as such is not an important factor, then, in influencing a leader's attitude toward political issues.

We will now discuss the relationship of the political scale to some other important variables.

TABLE 122

RELIGIOSITY AND SCORE ON POLITICAL SCALE

Religiosity	\bar{x}	s	n
High	1.13	0.80	331
Medium	1.19	0.74	141
Low	1.20	0.81	65
Total	1.15	0.80	537

$$\chi^2 = 7.25; \quad df = 6; \quad p = 0.30; \quad C = .12$$

Table 122 shows that one's religiosity and score on the political scale have no significant relationship. However, there is a slight trend for those who are more religious to score lower on the political scale. The same trend was evident in the case of their scores on the land legislation and media exposure scales. Therefore, it seems that there is some amount of truth to the argument that those who are more religious are also more traditional in other spheres of life, as our data seem to indicate.

TABLE 123

ATTITUDE TOWARD CHANGE AND SCORE ON POLITICAL SCALE

Mode. of change	\bar{x}	s	n
Quick	1.05	0.77	244
Gradual	1.23	0.78	303
Total	1.16	0.78	547

$$\chi^2 = 9.07; \quad df = 6; \quad p = 0.17; \quad C = .13$$

We find that (see Table 123) our respondent's attitude toward change and score on the political scale have some relationship and it is nearly significant. Surprisingly enough, those who want gradual change score higher on the political scale. We found similar results on the media scale. One can argue that those who want gradual change come from upper castes, have higher incomes and edu-

cation, and therefore these factors affect their political orientation, i.e., they tend to be more status-quo oriented on political matters.

TABLE 124

PERCEPTION OF PROGRESS AND SCORE ON POLITICAL SCALE

Progress	\bar{x}	\underline{s}	n
Yes	1.15	0.79	503
No	1.20	0.71	30
Total	1.15	0.78	533

$$\chi^2 = 3.07; \quad df = 3; \quad p = 0.38; \quad C = .08$$

Table 124 shows that our respondents' perception of progress and their scores on the political scale have no significant relationship. However, we also note that those whose perception of progress is more favorable score slightly lower on the political scale. We saw the same trend in the media exposure scale. It appears that those who score slightly higher on the political scale are less satisfied with the existing political climate and their attitude toward political matters is more in the direction of change.

TABLE 125

PARTY PREFERENCE AND SCORE ON POLITICAL SCALE

<u>Party preference</u>	<u>\bar{x}</u>	<u>s</u>	<u>n</u>
Middle of the road--			
Congress	1.16	0.78	468
Leftist--			
Socialist	1.21	0.79	19
Communist	0.88	0.70	17
Rightist--			
Jansangh	1.25	0.85	20
Swatantra	1.22	0.73	18
Other	1.00	0.78	11
Total	1.15	0.78	553

$$= 5.52; \quad df = 15; \quad p = 0.99; \quad C = .10$$

Table 125 indicates that there is no significant relationship between political party preference and score on the political scale. However, we find that Communist Party supporters have the lowest scores and the second group of lowest scores is found in the "other" parties, which identify regionally with leftist parties. We saw earlier that both in the case of the land legislation and media scales Socialist Party members score the same as liberal and conservative party members. It can be argued that the Communist Party was more idealistic than reality-oriented in Indian politics; therefore, its members did not show a close association with political issues. On the other hand, the Socialist Party, even though considered radical, was a part of the mainstream of Indian politics and its adherents were active in the political sphere.

Discussion

The success of democracy depends much on people's participation. Since India got independence, various plans and projects have been introduced and legislations enacted to involve people in planning and decision-making. As we look at the re-structuring of the Indian political system, one of the questions that comes to mind is how successful has been the new system. Has the traditional-authoritarian type of decision-making given place to a new democratic type of system? Toynbee talks about the "psychology of encounters" and in recent years there has been an upsurge of literature on the sociology of acculturation. Weiner¹ suggests that there is also a politics of acculturation. About India, Eisenstadt² states that:

. . . the need to develop a differentiated and plural framework of modern politics may be more easily met in India than in more centralized political cultures; by the same token, the need to develop aggregative mechanisms and action orientations which come from overriding political commitments may provide the major challenge for India's political modernization.

The main concern of this chapter was to find out how our respondents reacted to questions concerning matters which were political in nature. More specifically, we wanted to see whether their responses were pro-change or not. Before we discuss specific questions and explore some hypotheses, we must point out that the scores of respondents on the

political scale are considerably low as compared to other scales. This suggests two possibilities: (a) our respondents are more conservative toward political issues, or (b) they are not sufficiently involved in politics, hence they tend to take a more neutral position in political matters. The second possibility (as we have seen earlier in Chapter 5) seems to be the more appropriate, that our respondents' affiliation to political organizations is very low.

One of the hypotheses that can be explored here is that respondents of younger age, higher income, and lower and intermediate castes are more involved in political issues and are generally in favor of change. In the preceding tables we found that respondents who were thirty years of age or less scored highest on the political scale. Those over fifty years of age scored the lowest; however, those between 30 and 49 years of age had about the same score as the oldest group. Then, we found that those whose incomes were Rs. 1500/ and above scored high, but those whose incomes were less than Rs. 1000/ scored higher than those whose income were between Rs. 1000/ and Rs. 1499/.

We also found that those in intermediate castes scored highest on the political scale. Members of lower

castes scored slightly higher than those of upper castes. The explanation offered earlier was that the members of lower castes were apathetic toward political matters and the members of upper castes were not enthusiastic about it, whereas members of the intermediate castes thought of the political sphere as an arena of improving their life opportunities.

Our data (see Table 122) also support the hypothesis that one's religiosity has some relationship to one's attitude toward change. We find that those who were less religious scored high on the political scale; i.e., their attitude toward political issues was in the direction of modernity.

As in the case of land legislation, so in the case of the political scale, we found that female respondents scored higher than their male counterparts on each of the two scales. We are in a position now to suggest that our female respondents do not conform to traditionalism, that is, at least in two areas, i.e., land legislation and politics, their responses are more in the direction of modernity than traditionalism. It appears that female leaders, although few in village India, are more modern in their orientation than are their male counterparts.

As in the previous discussion dealing with mass media, the anticipated relationship between the political attitudinal scale and the attitude toward change does not correlate in the anticipated direction.

¹Myron Weiner, "Some Hypotheses on the Politics of Modernization in India," in Leadership and Political Institutions in India, eds. Richard L. Park and Irene Tinker (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 38.

²S. N. Eisenstadt, "Tradition and Modes of Response to Modernity," in India and China: Contrasts in Development, eds. R. Maru and Rajni Kothari (New Delhi: 1970), also see India, Rajni Kothari, The Little, Brown Series in Comparative Politics, 1970, p. 257.

CHAPTER IX

CHANGE AND PANCHAYAT SYSTEM

In the first part of this chapter we will present the relationship between the Panchayat index and various types of variables. The results are reported in the following order: (a) relationship of the index to various contextual variables: village size, village literacy rate, village caste composition, village factions, location of the village, village media exposure; (b) relationship of the index to various background variables of the respondents: education, occupation, income; (c) relationship of the index in terms of religiosity, village change, progress in the country, and party preference. Our total number of respondents is 608, but some of these tables have a smaller number of respondents, because we excluded the category of "no response" in all of the tables.

In the second part, we will have further discussion of the relationship between the Panchayat system and change as it is revealed from our data.

TABLE 126

VILLAGE SIZE AND DISFAVOR ON PANCHAYAT INDEX

<u>Village size</u>	<u>Percent "some disfavor"</u>	<u>Total n</u>
Less than 500	34	141
500-999	32	236
1000-1999	55	139
2000 and over	40	83
Total	39	599

$$\chi^2 = 22.37; \quad df = 3; \quad p = 0.01; \quad C = .19$$

Table 126 shows that village size and the Panchayat index are significantly related. Here we find that respondents from villages with populations between 1000-1999 tend more to show "some disfavor" to the Panchayat as compared to those from other villages, and this difference is significant. It seems difficult to explain this result. Also we note that the large-sized villages, i.e., those with populations of 2000 and over, score less on the "some disfavor" category than do those from villages of populations 1000-1999.

It is possible that the villages scoring more on the "some disfavor" index have also Panchayat sittings in these villages and, therefore, respondents from these villages are more critical.

TABLE 127

VILLAGE LITERACY AND DISFAVOR ON PANCHAYAT INDEX

<u>Village percent literate</u>	<u>Percent "some disfavor"</u>	<u>Total n</u>
Low (less than 20%)	39	134
Medium (20-25%)	45	161
High (26-35%)	35	304
Total	39	599

$$\chi^2 = 4.27; \quad df = 2; \quad p = 0.10; \quad C = .08$$

Table 127 shows that village literacy and the Panchayat index have a relationship and it is nearly significant. It also indicates that respondents from villages where the literacy rate is medium, i.e., between 20 percent and 25 percent, score more on "some disfavor" on the Panchayat index than those from other types of villages. There is no plausible explanation for the relationship between the literacy level of the village and the propensity of the respondents to favor the Panchayat.

TABLE 128

VILLAGE CASTE COMPOSITION AND DISFAVOR ON PANCHAYAT INDEX

<u>Village caste composition</u>	<u>Percent "some disfavor"</u>	<u>Total n</u>
Dominant	44	280
Non-dominant	34	319
Total	39	599

$$\chi^2 = 6.42; \quad df = 1; \quad p = 0.01; \quad C = .10$$

Table 128 shows that village caste composition and the Panchayat index are significantly related. We also note that respondents from dominant caste villages score more on the category of "some disfavor" toward the Panchayat than do respondents from non-dominant caste villages, and this relationship is significant. It appears then that the nature of dominance in the caste structure of the villages influences the attitude of its respondents toward the Panchayat. It is possible that respondents from the dominant caste villages do not like the statutory Panchayat, since it is elected and more democratic, and thus it reduces the privileges of the dominant caste.

TABLE 129

VILLAGE FACTION AND DISFAVOR ON PANCHAYAT INDEX

<u>Village faction</u>	<u>Percent</u> <u>"some disfavor"</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>n</u>
Faction	53	157
Non-faction	34	442
Total	39	599

$$\chi^2 = 17.47; \quad df = 1; \quad p = 0.001; \quad C = .17$$

Table 129 shows that village faction and the Panchayat index are significantly related. In this case, we find that respondents from villages with factions score higher on the index of "some disfavor" toward the Panchayat than do the respondents from non-faction villages, and the relationship is significant. It seems that respondents who come from villages with factions are more diversified in their views and also lack consensus on the efficacy of the Panchayat. It is also possible that the factions may be involved in issues which are dealt with by the Panchayat.

TABLE 130

LOCATION OF THE VILLAGE AND DISFAVOR ON PANCHAYAT INDEX

<u>Village distance</u>	<u>Percent "some disfavor"</u>	<u>Total n</u>
Isolated (over 10 miles)	33	104
Easy access (1-10 miles)	43	455
Total	39	599

$$\chi^2 = 10.58; \quad df = 2; \quad p = 0.005; \quad C = .13$$

Table 130 shows that location of the village and the Panchayat index are significantly related. We also note that respondents from villages with easy access to towns score higher on the "some disfavor" index of the Panchayat than do respondents from isolated villages, and the relationship is significant. It is clear that the respondents who have easy access to the towns also have greater exposure to outside influence and contacts; and they may be more prone to be analytical. This may account for their critical view toward the Panchayat.

TABLE 131

VILLAGE MEDIA EXPOSURE AND DISFAVOR ON PANCHAYAT INDEX

<u>Village media exposure</u>	<u>Percent "some disfavor"</u>	<u>Total n</u>
Poor (none)	35	120
Good (radio and newspaper)	40	479
Total	39	599

$$\chi^2 = 0.96; \quad df = 1; \quad p = 0.30; \quad c = .04$$

Table 131 shows that media exposure of the village has no significant relationship with respondent's attitude toward the Panchayat. However, we do find that respondents from villages where media exposure is good score slightly more on "some disfavor" toward Panchayat index. It is possible that those in villages with better media exposure may have a better knowledge of the workings of other Panchayats and hence have a better basis on which to be critical.

We will now move from an examination of the contextual variables to an analysis of the background of the respondents themselves.

TABLE 132

MARITAL STATUS AND DISFAVOR ON PANCHAYAT INDEX

<u>Marital status</u>	<u>Percent "some disfavor"</u>	<u>Total n</u>
Married	39	567
Unmarried	39	13
Widowed	37	19
Total	39	599

$$\chi^2 = 0.04; \quad df = 2; \quad p = 0.98; \quad C = .01$$

Table 132 shows that marital status and Panchayat index are not significantly related. It further shows that marital status of the respondent is not an important factor in influencing attitude toward the Panchayat. The attitude toward the Panchayat is rather uniform in all categories of marital status.

TABLE 133

FAMILY TYPE AND DISFAVOR ON PANCHAYAT INDEX

<u>Family type</u>	<u>Percent "some disfavor"</u>	<u>Total n</u>
Joint	41	508
Nuclear	29	91
Total	39	599

$$\chi^2 = 4.81; \quad df = 1; \quad p = 0.03; \quad C = .09$$

Table 133 shows that family type and Panchayat index

are significantly related. It also shows that respondents who belong to joint families score greater on the "some disfavor" index of the Panchayat than do respondents of nuclear families and the relationship is significant. We know that the joint-family is still an important institution in the Indian village. A large number of our respondents come from joint-families. They are also more active in the political sphere and all of these factors influence their attitude toward the Panchayat, which in this case tend to be more critical.

TABLE 134

AGE AND DISFAVOR ON PANCHAYAT INDEX

Age	Percent "some disfavor"	Total n
Below 30	41	124
30-39	44	214
40-49	28	156
50 and over	43	104
Total	39	598

$$\chi^2 = 10.47; \quad df = 3; \quad p = 0.02; \quad C = .13$$

Table 134 shows that age and Panchayat index have a significant relationship. Those who are between 40 and 49 score lower on the "some disfavor" toward the Panchayat index than respondents in other age categories and the rela-

relationship is significant. However, the anomaly of the respondents of age 50 and over scoring like the groups of respondents below 40 years of age is difficult to explain. One possible explanation may be that respondents who are between 40 and 49 years of age are predominantly in the leadership positions in the Panchayat and, consequently, they are more favorable toward the Panchayat than are all other groups.

TABLE 135

SEX AND DISFAVOR ON PANCHAYAT INDEX

Sex	Percent "some disfavor"	Total n
Male	39	571
Female	44	27
Total	39	598

$$\chi^2 = 0.36; \quad df = 1; \quad p = 0.60; \quad C = .02$$

Table 135 shows that sex and the Panchayat index have no significant relationship. It also shows that there is no difference in the attitude of male and female respondents toward the Panchayat. However, it may be pointed out that female respondents tend to score higher on the "some disfavor" toward the Panchayat index as compared to male respondents.

TABLE 136

CASTE AND DISFAVOR ON PANCHAYAT INDEX

Caste	Percent "some disfavor"	Total n
Upper	36	164
Middle	38	261
Lower	43	167
Total	39	592

$$\chi^2 = 1.94; \quad df = 2; \quad p = 0.40; \quad C = .06$$

Here we find (see Table 136) that caste of the respondent does not have a significant relationship with the Panchayat index. However, we do find that upper caste respondents score somewhat less on the "some disfavor" index of the Panchayat than do middle caste and lower caste respondents, which may indicate that some upper caste respondents hold privileged positions in the Panchayat.

TABLE 137

EDUCATION AND DISFAVOR ON PANCHAYAT INDEX

<u>Education</u>	<u>Percent</u> <u>"some disfavor"</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>n</u>
Illiterate	43	70
Literate	37	57
Some primary	39	79
Some middle	37	161
Some high school	35	65
Finished high school	42	91
Some college	42	31
Completed college	42	43
Total	39	597

$$\chi^2 = 1.83; \quad df = 7; \quad p = 0.97; \quad C = .06$$

Table 137 shows that education and the Panchayat index are not significantly related. It also indicates that the educational level of our respondents has no influence on their attitude toward the Panchayat. However, one notes that respondents who are illiterates and those who have finished high school and above score slightly more on the "some disfavor" index of the Panchayat.

TABLE 138

OCCUPATION AND DISFAVOR ON PANCHAYAT INDEX

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Percent</u> <u>"some disfavor"</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>n</u>
Cultivation	34	373
Service	48	90
Business	45	29
Laborer	41	27
Teaching	47	51
Village occupation	46	24
Total	39	594

$$\chi^2 = 8.67; \quad df = 5; \quad p = 0.10; \quad C = .12$$

Table 138 shows that occupation and the Panchayat index have a relationship and it is nearly significant. It also indicates that those respondents who are cultivators score less on the "some disfavor" index toward the Panchayat than others, and the relationship is nearly significant. We know that cultivators are also wealthier and have greater power in the village setting. It is possible that they are also in leadership positions in the Panchayats and for that reason they score less on the "some disfavor" toward the Panchayat index.

TABLE 139

INCOME AND DISFAVOR ON PANCHAYAT INDEX

<u>Income</u>	<u>Percent "some disfavor"</u>	<u>Total n</u>
Below 1000	46	132
1000-1499	39	120
1500-2499	37	141
2500-3999	40	76
4000 and over	35	111
Total	39	580

$$\chi^2 = 0.25; \quad df = 4; \quad p = 0.50; \quad C = .08$$

Table 139 shows that income and the Panchayat index have no significant relationship. We find though that those whose incomes are less than Rs. 1000/ score greater on the "some disfavor" index of the Panchayat than all other groups. It is obvious that poorer people would have more grievances against the power structure of the village as incorporated in the Panchayat.

We will now discuss the relationship of the Panchayat Index to some other important variables.

TABLE 140

RELIGIOSITY AND DISFAVOR ON PANCHAYAT INDEX

<u>Religiosity</u>	<u>Percent</u> <u>"some disfavor"</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>n</u>
High	36	354
Medium	45	158
Low	38	68
Total	39	580

$$\chi^2 = 3.80; \text{ df} = 2; \text{ p} = 0.15; \text{ C} = .08$$

Table 140 shows that religiosity and Panchayat index have a relationship and it is nearly significant. It also shows that those respondents whose religiosity is medium in our categorization score higher on the "some disfavor" index of the Panchayat than do the other two groups, and the relationship is nearly significant. There is no apparent explanation for this finding.

TABLE 141

ATTITUDE TOWARD CHANGE AND DISFAVOR ON PANCHAYAT INDEX

<u>Mode of change</u>	<u>Percent</u> <u>"some disfavor"</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>n</u>
Quick	42	262
Gradual	37	324
Total	39	586

$$\chi^2 = 2.82; \text{ df} = 2; \text{ p} = 0.24; \text{ C} = .07$$

Table 141 shows that respondent's attitude toward change and the Panchayat index have no significant relationship. We also note that there is no difference in the attitude toward the Panchayat between those respondents who want quick change for the village and those who want gradual change. However, we find that those who want quick change score slightly more on the "some disfavor" index of the Panchayat.

TABLE 142

PERCEPTION OF PROGRESS AND DISFAVOR ON PANCHAYAT INDEX

<u>Progress</u>	<u>Percent</u> <u>"some disfavor"</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>n</u>
Yes	38	542
No	52	31
Total	39	573

$$\chi^2 = 2.22; \quad df = 1; \quad p = 0.13; \quad C = .06$$

Table 142 shows that respondent's perception of progress and the Panchayat index have a relationship and it is nearly significant. Here we also find that those respondents whose perception of progress is less favorable score more on the "some disfavor" index of the Panchayat than those whose perception of progress is favorable. It is apparent that those who do not see much progress in the country also feel that the Panchayat is not working effectively.

TABLE 143

PARTY PREFERENCE AND DISFAVOR ON PANCHAYAT INDEX

<u>Party preference</u>	<u>Percent</u> <u>"some disfavor"</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>N</u>
Middle of the road--		
Congress	37	509
Leftist--		
Socialist	58	19
Communist	29	17
Rightist--		
Jansangh	64	22
Swatantra	42	19
Other	50	12
Total	39	598

$$= 11.62; \quad df = 5; \quad p = 0.04; \quad C = .14$$

Here we find (see Table 143) that respondent's party preference and attitude toward the Panchayat have a relationship and it is significant. Those preferring the Socialist and the Jansangh Parties score more than others on the "some disfavor" index of the Panchayat, even though politically these two parties are far apart. However, those preferring the Communist Party, which is closer to the Socialist Party, score the least on the "some disfavor" index. In other words, the Communist Party members are more favorable to the Panchayat than even Congress Party members. It may be quite possible that the Communist Party members are either apathetic or least involved with the Panchayat. The Congress Party is also the party in power. It is considered a middle-of-the-road party. These results suggest that even though

party preference and attitude toward the Panchayat have a significant relationship, there is no clear explanation of the findings reported above.

Discussion

Panchayat (or village council) is a traditional institution in the Indian polity. The term "Panchayat" does not refer so much to a body of organization as to a characteristic means for making decisions in the Indian villages. The structure of a Panchayat remained ad hoc in the past until the new statutory Panchayat was introduced after India's independence. The traditional Panchayat worked on the principle of unanimous decisions reached after due deliberations.

It is important to understand clearly what Panchayat denotes in the context of Indian villages. Retzlaff,¹ on the basis of his own study, distinguishes among four types of panchayats:

(a) Caste panchayats, which are comprised of caste leaders of each caste in the village. Caste panchayats are essentially responsible for resolving differences within their own caste groups.

(b) General meeting panchayats, which are attended by leaders of different caste panchayats to discuss and re-

solve those matters which concern the larger village community.

(c) Kisan-lagdar (landowners and tenants) panchayats, which convene when tenants fail to resolve differences among themselves. In such cases, two or more members of the landowner's caste and several members of the tenants' caste (the number depends on the nature of the dispute) meet to resolve the differences.

(d) Other panchayats: "The term panchayat tends to cover a variety of situations in which any number of individuals are present and some type of consensus is arrived at."²

The Government of India has revived the traditional institution of the Panchayats, by giving it a new role in the system of local self-government for the villages. It has also introduced the Community Development Programs³ along with the new Panchayat system. A brief description of each of these measures of the Government of India will clarify the picture.

The Community Development Program was initiated on October 2, 1952, in 55 selected units of development, each unit covering an area of about 1,300 square kilometers, with about 300 villages and a population of approximately

200,000. This pattern was revised in April 1958. The unit is now called a "block", which generally covers 100 villages with a population of 60,000 to 70,000 living in an area of 400-500 square kilometers. The block is in charge of a Block Development Officer, who supervises improvements in communication, health, sanitation, housing, education, rural employment, welfare of women and children, and the development of cottage and small-scale industries. Great efforts are made to win the attention and cooperation of the village people (especially their leaders) to participate in these programs. The Village Level Workers assist individual villages in implementing the programs outlined for the villages.

The Panchayati Raj⁴ was introduced in 1959, as a three-tier structure of local self-government, the tiers being the village, the block, and the district, in ascending order of hierarchy. The Panchayats became elective bodies in which each villager had a right to participate both in election as well as in its general activities. The Panchayats are responsible for agricultural production, rural industries, medical relief, maternity and child welfare, village public grazing grounds, village roads, tanks, and wells, and village sanitation. In some parts of the

country, they are also in charge of primary education, maintenance of village records, and collection of land revenue. Thus we notice that the Community Development Program and the Panchayati Raj have many interlocking functions. However, the Panchayati Raj is basically an institution of village self-government through democratic means, and as such, it has its own powers of taxation and its own village courts (Nyaya or Judicial Panchayats) for providing in a cheaper way speedy justice to the villagers. The Panchayat is now a statutory body and has become a formal part of the administrative structure in various Indian states. It is also the scheme of democratic decentralization⁵ in the country.

We may now explore a number of questions arising as a result of the introduction of the statutory Panchayat system. For example: whether or not the new Panchayat is institutionalized in the villages, to what extent it has influenced the power structure of the villages, and what are some other factors that determine the attitude of village leaders toward the Panchayats in the villages of Patna district.

Our tables show that respondents from dominant caste villages score higher on the "some disfavor" index of the Panchayat (see Table 128), respondents from villages with factions score higher on the "some disfavor" index of the Panchayat (see Table 129), respondents from villages where media exposure is good (see Yable 131) score high on the "some disfavor" index of the Panchayat, respondents from lower cases score high on the "some disfavor" index of the Panchayat (see Table 136), and respondents who are in the professions of teaching, service, and business score high on the "some disfavor" index of the Panchayat (see Table 138) when compared to other types of respondents.

Again, we may hypothesize that those whose perception of progress in the country is less favorable would also be less favorable to the Panchayat and those who want quick change in the village would also show less favor to the Panchayat because such respondents may see the Panchayat as a means of delaying change, because the leaders in the Panchayat may often be the traditional leaders of the village. Tables 141 and 142 suggest some corroborative

evidence along these lines.

We consistently found that female respondents were more change oriented, which may be a function of their relinquishing traditional views in order to obtain leadership positions. For instance, they score higher on the "some disfavor" index of the Panchayat (see Table 135) than do their male counterparts. It shows at least that female respondents have critical views on this and some other matters.

The question of the institutionalization of the Panchayat system which we raised earlier is, however, answered clearly. Our respondents overwhelmingly support the new Panchayat system introduced by the Panchayati Raj statutes. As many as 61 percent of our respondents support the Panchayat. But our interest was also in exploring the attitude toward change among our respondents, which showed interesting deviations from the expectations arising out of the theoretical works on modernization. We showed these deviations and the anomalies earlier in the discussion of the tables.

¹Ralph H. Retzlaff, "A Case Study of Panchayats in a North Indian Village," paper presented before the South Asia Colloquium, February 1959, Berkeley: Center for South Asia Studies, Institute of International Studies, University of California (mimeo).

²Ibid.

³See, India, A Reference Annual, Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, March 1974, pp. 193-207.

⁴Ibid. The United Provinces Panchayati-Raj Act came into operation in August 1949 to revive the concept of local self-government for the villages. In 1960 the Government of Bihar enacted Panchayati Raj and formalized this institution on a village-wide basis.

⁵In 1960 the scheme of "democratic decentralization" was initiated with the idea of giving wide powers and the right of self administration to local bodies at the block block and district levels.

CHAPTER X

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter we will summarize our main findings and conclusions in the light of the purpose of this study.

Purpose

The main purpose of this study was to explore the extent to which changes in the economic, political and social conditions in a modernizing society such as India result in corresponding changes in the attitudes and values of rural leadership.

We were also interested in clarifying problems concerning the conceptualization of modernization, evolving quantitative measures of modernization, and exploring whether a unidimensional approach to modernization could explain the Indian data which we undertook to study.

Main Findings

Profile of Leaders

We will recount in this section the general background of rural leaders in the context of the changing socio-political scene of India. Out of a total of 608 respon-

dents, we have 27 who are females. Considering the fact that females in Indian society, especially in the villages, are confined to household activities, it is important to note that some of them emerge as leaders also.

In terms of age, our data indicate that leadership roles in the villages are not confined any longer to older people as was the case in the past. We find that 57 percent of our respondents are below 39 years of age and 21 percent are below 30 years of age.

In terms of caste, the number of leaders from a particular caste is generally in proportion to the size of that caste in the village. In other words, leadership is now distributed among the upper, intermediate, and lower castes of the village, and is not concentrated in the upper caste alone as was the case before. Our respondents were 94 percent Hindus, and 3 percent Muslims and 3 percent others, including Christians. It seems that the leadership roles are not only available to Hindus but also to Muslims and others in the rural communities.

Approximately 85 percent of our respondents live in joint-families. Although the joint-family remains strong on the village scene, it may be noted that there are signs of its decline. Ninety-five percent of our respondents

are married. In Indian villages, it is customary that girls are married by the age of 14-15 and boys by the age of 17-18. Sixty-two percent of our respondents are heads of their families.

Eighty-eight percent of our respondents are literate and 78 percent have had some formal education. For the district of Patna the literacy rate is 29 percent. The literacy rate for Bihar state is 18.40 percent and for the country, 24 percent. It is clear that the educational level of our respondents is strikingly high.

Land and wealth are important factors for leadership positions in the villages. However, we note that at least 23 percent of our respondents are poor (i.e., have an income of less than a thousand rupees per year) and 20 percent are only slightly better than the poor. Also 38 percent of our respondents are not landholders. These data indicate that money or land ownership was not the sole factor in the making of the leaders.

In terms of mass media exposure, we find that 70 percent of the respondents read newspapers, 73 percent listen to the radio, 39 percent read magazines and 78 percent have seen movies. However, it should be noted that 17 percent had no media exposure, 19 percent had one media exposure, 29 percent had exposure to 2 media, and almost 35 percent

had exposure to 3 media. We find that 66 percent of our respondents received news through formal channels, i.e., newspapers and radios, while 34 percent received news through informal channels, like going to shopping centers or through visitors. We also find that outside exposure is rather high for our respondents--78 percent of them have been to a fair (outside the village) and 56 percent have visited places outside the state.

Affiliation to formal organizations for our respondents is rather low. Only 19 percent belong to political organizations, 5 percent to vocational and professional organizations, and 53 percent to community groups. It should be noted that 38 percent do not belong to any organization, 47 percent belong to one organization only, and 14 percent belong to 2 or 3 organizations.

Attitudinal Responses of Leaders

The attitude of our respondents toward the new Panchayat is quite favorable; the Panchayat has an overwhelming support. We find that 92 percent of the respondents say that it is a good thing, 76 percent feel that the Panchayat leaders are good, and only 23 percent of the respondents disapprove of the activities of the Panchayat. Sixty-three percent of the respondents have no complaint against

the Panchayat, 88 percent have voted in the Panchayat elections, 98 percent are willing to cooperate with the activities of the Panchayat, and 77 percent think that their Panchayat is successful. The respondents were asked to select the most desirable traits for a Panchayat leader. Out of the eight desirable traits selected by them for Panchayat leaders, the three most frequently selected were: honesty (43 percent), should keep in touch with people (15 percent), and should be educated (15 percent). Out of the eight items which the respondents wanted the Panchayat to take up, the three most desired items were: development work (44 percent), agricultural or irrigational work (33 percent), and educational work (12 percent).

The Congress Party was the most favored party among our respondents. Seventy-one percent considered the Congress to be a good party and 85 percent had actually voted for the Congress Party. Interestingly enough, 67 percent of our respondents did not like the political leaders, although 69 percent of them felt that India's leaders were competent. It is possible that the respondents were answering the questions about like or dislike in terms of their personal experience, especially with the village leaders, and the question of competence was answered in terms of

their perception of India's national leaders. Sixty-six percent of our respondents were of the opinion that leaders should be given respect according to their position, i.e., their status in the hierarchy, as compared to all leaders receiving equal approbation. Fifty-seven percent felt that there was no cooperation between the political leaders and the governmental staff.

Seventy-five percent of our respondents favored mediation in a dispute as opposed to backing up those who are right. Seventy-seven percent were in favor of including the members of the opposition parties in the cabinet. However, an overwhelming majority (84 percent) of the respondents favored majority decision as opposed to working for a unanimous decision. These findings indicate a clear conflict between traditional values and modern conceptions of justice and democratic rule.

In the area of land reforms, we find that our respondents are generally progressive in their attitudes although they have some reservations, as well. Seventy-two percent favor a ceiling on landholding, 70 percent favor cooperative farming, and 47 percent favor giving subtenants' rights to the tiller of the land.

Our respondents are strongly in favor of the plans

introduced by the government under the auspices of the Five Year National Plans, since 80 percent approve of the agricultural plans, 73 percent approve of the educational plans, and 65 percent approve of all plans in general. However, we note that they are not willing to advise the government on the formulation of these plans to the extent that they approve of them. We find that 61 percent are willing to advise on agricultural matters, 31 percent on educational matters, 28 percent on other matters besides agricultural and educational, and only 20 percent are willing to advise on all matters.

In terms of their attitudes toward conditions in the villages and cities, 43 percent felt that conditions in the villages are better than in the cities; 62 percent are of the opinion that villagers are on the correct track, whereas 52 percent believe that city people are also on the correct track. Sixty-one percent express the view that India's life should be determined by the village people and 45 percent favored a quick change in the villages.

Religiosity is high among our respondents, inasmuch as 61 percent are highly religious. At the same time, our respondents are overwhelmingly in favor of family planning (93 percent), which means that religiosity does not stand

in the way of family planning or birth control. Most respondents were optimistic about the future, because 94 percent felt that India was progressing.

Social Change and Land Legislation

We find that the size of the village, village factions, respondent's age, sex, caste, occupation and income are significantly related to the land legislation scale. We further note that respondents from large size villages, faction-ridden villages, those below 39 years of age, female respondents, respondents of lower caste, respondents of occupational groups other than cultivation and those whose income is less than Rs. 1500/ a year are more favorable toward land legislation than others.

The media exposure of the village, respondent's level of education and respondent's party preference have near significant relationships with the land legislation scale. It is clear that respondents who come from villages where media exposure is poor, respondents who are illiterates, just literate, and those who have completed college, and respondents who prefer radical parties are more favorable toward land legislation. The results on the land legislation scale also show that village literacy rate,

caste composition of the village, location of the village, marital status of the respondent, family type of respondent, respondent's religiosity, respondent's attitude toward change and respondent's perception of progress have no significant relationship with land legislation. However, we note that respondents from villages with low literacy, and easy access, respondents who are married, those who belong to nuclear families, those who are less religious, those who want quick change, all tend to score slightly higher on this scale. Caste composition of the village in terms of dominance of one caste does not make for any differences, i.e., respondents from both the dominant and the non-dominant caste villages score exactly the same.

Social Change and Mass Media

We find that the size of the village, village literacy rate, the caste composition of the village, the location of the village, the age of the respondents, the sex of the respondents, caste of the respondents, educational level of the respondents, occupation of the respondents and the respondents' income have a significant relationship with the mass media scale. We further note that respondents from smaller villages, villages of higher literacy, non-dominant caste villages, those below 40 years of age, male respon-

dents, those of upper caste, of higher educational level, of professional groups and those whose incomes are Rs.1500/ and above per year tend to score high on the media exposure scale.

The results on the media exposure scale also show that the existence of factions in the village, village media exposure, respondents' marital status, their family type, religiosity, attitude toward change, their perception of progress and party preference have no significant relationship to the media exposure scale. However, we note that respondents from villages with factions, respondents from villages whose media exposure is good, unmarried respondents, those who belong to joint families, whose religiosity is low, who prefer gradual change, whose perception of progress is less favorable, and those who prefer radical parties tend to score slightly higher on the media exposure scale.

Social Change and Politics

We find that the size of the village and village media exposure are significantly related to the political scale. We also note that respondents who come from smaller villages and villages with poor media exposure score slightly higher on the political scale.

We find that factionalism in the village, level of education, occupation, and respondent's attitude toward change have a near significant relationship with the political scale. We further note that those who come from non-faction villages, those who are illiterates, literates, and those who have some college education, those in service and cultivation, and those who prefer gradual change score slightly higher on the political scale.

The results on the political scale also show that village literacy, distance, respondent's marital status, family type, age, sex, caste, income, religiosity, perception of progress and party preference have no significant relationship to the political scale. However, it may be noted that those who come from low literacy villages, isolated villages, those who are unmarried, those who come from nuclear families, those under 30 years of age, female respondents, those of lower castes, those with incomes of Rs. 1500/ and more a year, those who are less religious, those who perceive little progress, and those who prefer the Socialist, Jansangh, and the Swatantra Parties tend to score slightly higher on the political scale.

Panchayat and Social Change

We note that the size of the village, village caste composition, village faction, location, respondent's family type, age, caste, and party preference have significant relationships with the Panchayat index. We also note that respondents who come from villages with a population of 1000-1999, dominant caste villages, easy access villages, joint families, those between 40-49 years of age, those from lower castes and those who prefer the Socialist and Jansangh Parties, all score higher on the "some disfavor to Panchayat" index, and this is also significant.

We find that the factors of village literacy, respondent's occupation, religiosity, and perception of whether India is progressing have a near significant relationship to the Panchayat index. We also note that respondents from village with a 20-25 percent literacy rate, respondents who are not cultivators, those not so religious, and those who do not see India as progressing, score high on the "some disfavor to the Panchayat" category, and this relationship is nearly significant. The results on the Panchayat index also show that village media exposure, respondent's marital status, sex, education, income, and attitude toward change do not have a significant relationship

with score on the Panchayat index. However, we find that respondents who come from villages with good media exposure, are either married or unmarried, female respondents, illiterates as well as those who have finished high school, those whose incomes are Rs. 1000 or less per year and those who prefer quick change score high on the "some disfavor to the Panchayat" index, but the relationship is not significant.

Conclusion

On the basis of our findings in the present study, two broad conclusions emerge,

(a) The economic, political and social conditions in a modernizing society do affect the attitudes and values of rural leadership. However, the effect is not so inclusive that traditionalism is replaced by modernity. Modernization does not proceed in a unidimensional direction. Rural leaders may be modern in one sphere but not in another. For example, in terms of political action, seventy-five percent of our respondents favored compromise as opposed to backing up those who act on principles. This seems in tune with traditional attitudes in India. In fact, the respondents (77 percent) went as far as favoring inclusion of dissident members in the cabinet, which was the way the

traditional polity of the Indian villages functioned. A political organization was more like a family than a formal group. However, when it came to choosing between making all decisions of a body unanimous or going by majority vote, a preponderant number (84 percent) favored the latter course, which is clearly the demand of the modernized institutions. The traditional way of decision-making in India was to seek unanimity. Thus, the model which conceives of modernization as an outright rejection of all tradition in favor of urban-industrial institutions and values is not wholly applicable to the Indian case.

We tried to construct an overall scale of modernity and found that such a scale was not applicable to our data. In fact, as we worked on various quantitative measures for our data we were able to construct three scales for independent spheres, i.e., land legislation, mass media exposure and political behavior. We also made an index for sorting responses about the Panchayat system. These scales and the index were meant to differentiate tradition from modernity in these spheres of activity. Our findings have been summarized above.

It seems that there is a continuum between tradition and modernity although in some instances, a dichotomy is

also revealed. In some cases, we note that there are significant relationships between variables which differentiate between the traditional and the modern responses. In other cases, they have near significant relationships, and in still other cases, there is merely a trend. It may be noted that in our findings the pro-change attitude indicated the degree of modernization for a respondent. We also used contextual variables whereby villages were also rated in terms of their modernity, according to criteria such as literacy and media exposure. For example, villages have been rated as poor literacy, high literacy, poor media exposure, good media exposure, which shows the degree of modernization in the village. We are thus led to conclude that modernization in India is essentially a restructuring of traditional values and institutions along more democratic lines.

APPENDIX 1

QUESTIONNAIRE

This is the English translation of the questionnaire administered in Hindi.

Section A

1. Respondent's residence
2. Male/female
3. Age
4. Caste
5. Religion
6. Occupation
7. Income
8. Marital status
9. Type of family - joint/nuclear
10. Total number of family members
11. Are you the head of the family?
12. How many members live outside the family?
13. How many members have middle school education or above?
14. Education - literate/illiterate
if literate -- how much?
15. If literate, do you read newspapers?
16. If literate, do you read weekly, monthly, and other magazines?
17. Do you listen to the radio?
18. Have you ever seen a movie?
19. (a) How many times do you go to Hat (rotating village market) and Bazar (local market)?
(b) Where is this located?

20. How many times do you go to a village fair?
21. Have you ever been to a city?
22. Where else have you been outside the village?
(List district, state, city, foreign countries)
23. Do you participate in the activities of any organization?
24. Are you a member of any of the following organizations?
If yes, name:
 - (a) political party
 - (b) labor union
 - (c) Gram Panchayat
 - (d) caste Panchayat
 - (e) occupational organization
 - (f) community organization
 - (g) others

Section B.

Now I will ask you some questions about the current affairs of the country; please give your opinion. (There is no right answer to these questions: your opinion is what we are interested in.)

1. In your opinion, is Gram Panchayat a good thing?
2. (If respondent has a Gram Panchayat in the village, please ask:)
 - (a) Is your Panchayat in the hands of good leaders?
 - (b) What kind of people should be elected to Panchayat?
 - (c) What activities of your Panchayat do you appreciate most?
 - (d) What complaints do you have about your Panchayat?
 - (e) What kind of work do you want to get done by your Panchayat leader?
 - (f) Did you vote in the last Panchayat election.
 - (g) Would you cooperate in your Panchayat activities?
 - (h) Do you consider your Panchayat successful?
3. How do you get news from outside the village?
4. If there were a national election today, which party would you vote for?

5. In the last national election, which party did you vote for?
6. People have small pieces of land, scattered in many places. Would you approve if one family were given all its land at one place?
7. If there were a law that no family should have more than a fixed area of land, would you approve such a law?
8. Would you approve of a law which would give some right to cultivators of the land?
9. If all the land in the village is given to a cooperative association where everyone would have equal right and which would also increase production, would you give your land to such an organization?
10. Your government has Five Year Plans for national development. Which kinds of things in the plan have you liked most so far? Which kinds of things in the plan are you opposed to?
11. If you were an advisor to the government, what advice would you give first?
12. Are you happy with your M.L.A. and M.P.'s work. If yes, name their good work. If no, what limitation do you see in their work?
13. In your opinion, tell whether or not there has been any change in the attitudes of government bureaucrats. If yes, what difference do you see from before?
14. Do government officials and leaders of political parties cooperate with each other?
15. Is there any project in your village which you like most?
16. What does your village need most today?
17. What makes people good leaders?
18. What makes people bad leaders?

19. How should leaders resolve differences, by compromise or by supporting the one who is right?
 compromise
 helping one who is right
 other
20. Should all leaders receive equal respect or should respect be given by rank or by performance?
21. Do you want to change your village fast, slow, or not at all?
22. Please tell me whether city-dwellers or villagers are well off today.
23. Who should decide how the people of India are going to live, villagers or city-dwellers?
24. Are villagers on the right track today?
25. Are city-dwellers on the right track today?
26. Please tell me whether there should be unanimity or whether the majority should prevail in decision-making by the leaders.
27. Are Indian leaders good in your opinion?
28. Which Party do you like most?
 - (a) Socialist
 - (b) Jansangh
 - (c) Congress
 - (d) Communist
 - (e) Swatantra
 - (f) other
 - (g) no party is any good
29. In your opinion, is India progressing?
30. Some of our leaders say we should not have more children than we can afford. Do you like this idea? If not, why not?
31. Do you believe in religion:
 too much
 sufficiently
 some
 not at all

APPENDIX 2

VILLAGES SHOWN IN TERMS OF POPULATION, DISTANCE, LITERACY,
COMMUNICATION, CASTE DOMINANCE, AND FACTION

TABLE 144

POPULATION AND DISTANCE FROM BLOCK/SUB-DIVISION

Name of Village	Population	Distance from Block/Sub-division*	
	<u>less than 500</u>		
1. Gangapur	69	6	36
2. Bhikuchak	244	15	15
3. Milki	436	7	24
4. Kewai	487	3	40
	<u>500-999</u>		
5. Bedauli	721	3	27
6. Gangati	794	14	24
7. Maujipur	857	3	43
8. Rampur	941	6	19
9. Nayatola	970	5	12
	<u>1000-1999</u>		
10. Khusropur	1146	10	31
11. Pathraura	1214	3	22
12. Indaut	1508	2	29
13. Ichaous	1538	4	41
	<u>2000-above</u>		
14. Korut	2025	2	19
15. Gonawa	3070	8	19
16. Sabalpur	4440	13	10

* Distances are in miles.

TABLE 145

LITERACY RATE

Village	Total Population	Literacy rate	
		Number	Percent
1. Gangapur	69	8	12.0
2. Bhikuchak	244	34	14.0
3. Milki	436	108	22.5
4. Kewai	487	110	22.5
5. Bedauli	721	186	26.0
6. Gangati	794	250	32.0
7. Maujipur	857	187	22.0
8. Rampur	941	328	35.0
9. Nayatola	970	262	27.0
10. Khusropur	1146	300	26.5
11. Pathraura	1214	250	20.6
12. Indaut	1508	305	20.2
13. Ichaous	1538	281	18.4
14. Korut	2025	554	27.4
15. Gonawa	3070	700	22.8
16. Sabalpur	4440	1454	32.7

TABLE 146

ACCESS TO COMMUNICATION

Village	Population	Number Radios	Access to written media	
			Newspaper	Magazine
1. Gangapur	69	none	no	no
2. Bhikuchak	244	none	no	no
3. Milki	436	4	yes	yes
4. Kewai	487	none	no	no
5. Bedauli	721	4	yes	yes
6. Gangati	794	1	yes	yes
7. Maujipur	857	7	yes	yes
8. Rampur	941	10	yes	yes
9. Nayatola	970	10	yes	yes
10. Khusropur	1146	6	yes	yes
11. Pathraura	1214	2	yes	yes
12. Indauit	1508	8	yes	yes
13. Ichaous	1538	1	yes	yes
14. Korut	2025	3	yes	yes
15. Gonawa	3070	15	yes	yes
16. Sabalpur	4440	14	yes	yes

TABLE 147

DOMINANT CASTE AND FACTION DISTRIBUTION

<u>Village</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Dominant Caste</u>	<u>Faction</u>
1. Gangapur	69	no	no
2. Bhikuchak	244	yes	no
3. Milki	436	yes	no
4. Kewai	487	no	yes
5. Bedauli	721	no	no
6. Gangati	794	yes	no
7. Maujipur	857	yes	no
8. Rampur	941	no	yes
9. Nayatola	970	no	no
10. Khusropur	1146	yes	yes
11. Pathraura	1214	no	yes
12. Indaut	1508	yes	yes
13. Inchaous	1538	yes	no
14. Korut	2025	no	no
15. Gonawa	3070	yes	no
16. Sabalpur	4440	no	no

Occupational Categories

Cultivation--Respondents who owned land and were dependent
on agriculture

Service--Respondents who were in government as well as non-
government jobs

Business--Respondents who were in business

Laborer--Respondents who were wage earners, which also
inc'uded agricultural labor.

Teaching--Respondents who were teaching in local schools
and colleges

Village occupation--Respondents who were engaged in tradi-
tional village occupations, e.g., blacksmith, gold-
smith, potter, etc.

APPENDIX 3

TABLES FOR MODERNIZATION SCALE

TABLE 148

CASTE AND SCORE ON MODERNIZATION SCALE

Caste	\bar{x}	s	n
Upper	3.09	0.94	142
Middle	3.11	1.00	248
Lower	3.56	0.90	149
Total	3.23	0.98	539

TABLE 149

EDUCATION AND SCORE ON MODERNIZATION SCALE

Education	\bar{x}	s	n
Illiterate	3.57	0.76	61
Literate	3.14	1.03	52
Some primary	3.32	1.10	72
Some middle	3.21	0.97	147
Some high school	3.13	0.98	60
Finished high school	3.12	0.97	82
Some college	2.83	1.07	29
Completed college	3.44	0.71	41
Total	3.23	0.97	544

TABLE 150

OCCUPATION AND SCORE ON MODERNIZATION SCALE

Occupation	\bar{x}	s	n
Cultivation	3.20	1.00	344
Service	3.22	0.88	81
Business	3.43	1.00	28
Laborer	3.86	0.90	22
Teaching	3.13	1.01	47
Village occupation	3.32	1.06	19
Total	3.24	0.98	541

TABLE 151

INCOME AND SCORE ON MODERNIZATION SCALE

Income	\bar{x}	s	n
Below 999	3.32	0.88	114
1000-1499	3.34	0.06	112
1500-2499	3.25	0.92	130
2500-3999	3.06	0.90	70
4000-above	3.08	1.12	102
Total	3.23	0.98	529

TABLE 152

VILLAGE COOPERATIVE AND SCORE ON MODERNIZATION SCALE

Village cooperative	\bar{x}	s	n
Favor	3.41	0.93	378
Don't favor	2.83	0.98	164
Total	3.23	0.98	542

TABLE 153

AGE AND SCORE ON MODERNIZATION SCALE

Age	\bar{x}	s	n
Under 30	3.18	1.05	112
30-39	3.43	0.98	195
40-49	3.08	0.97	143
50-over	3.13	1.01	95
Total	3.23	0.98	545

TABLE 154

LEADERS FAVOR AND SCORE ON MODERNIZATION SCALE

Leaders favor	\bar{x}	s	n
Mediation	3.26	0.95	400
Help who is right	3.19	1.02	130
Both	3.56	1.13	9
Total	3.25	0.97	539

TABLE 155

MAJORITY RULE AND SCORE ON MODERNIZATION SCALE

Majority rule	\bar{x}	s	n
Unanimity	3.19	0.99	83
Majority	3.25	0.98	456
Total	3.24	0.98	539

TABLE 156

DISSIDENT INCLUSION AND SCORE ON MODERNIZATION SCALE

Dissident inclusion	\bar{x}	s	n
Should be included	3.25	1.00	411
Not included	3.16	0.91	117
Total	3.23	0.98	528

TABLE 157

RELIGIOSITY AND SCORE ON MODERNIZATION SCALE

Religiosity	\bar{x}	s	n
High	3.17	1.01	335
Medium	3.35	0.95	142
Low	3.32	0.83	66
Total	3.23	0.98	543

TABLE 158

PARTY PREFERENCE AND SCORE ON MODERNIZATION SCALE

Party preference	\bar{x}	s	n
Congress	3.23	0.96	463
Socialist	3.50	0.79	18
Jansangh	2.95	1.10	20
Communist	3.38	1.20	16
Swatantra	3.17	0.92	18
Other	3.46	1.37	11
Total	3.23	0.98	546

TABLE 159

VILLAGE CHANGE AND SCORE ON MODERNIZATION SCALE

<u>Village change</u>	<u>\bar{x}</u>	<u>s</u>	<u>n</u>
Quick	3.80	0.82	244
Gradual	2.78	0.85	302
Total	3.23	0.98	546

TABLE 160

LEADERS' WORK AND SCORE ON MODERNIZATION SCALE

<u>Leaders' work</u>	<u>\bar{x}</u>	<u>s</u>	<u>n</u>
Equal respect	2.72	0.91	173
According to position	3.45	0.93	373
Total	3.23	0.98	546

TABLE 161

FAMILY PLANNING AND SCORE ON MODERNIZATION SCALE

<u>Family planning</u>	<u>\bar{x}</u>	<u>s</u>	<u>n</u>
Favor	3.30	0.94	507
Don't favor	2.36	1.09	39
Total	3.23	0.98	548

TABLE 162

SUBTENANT'S RIGHT AND SCORE ON MODERNIZATION SCALE

<u>Subtenant's right</u>	<u>\bar{x}</u>	<u>s</u>	<u>n</u>
Favor	3.79	0.82	248
Don't favor	2.77	0.85	298
Total	3.23	0.98	546

TABLE 163

LAND CEILING AND SCORE ON MODERNIZATION SCALE

<u>Land ceiling</u>	<u>\bar{x}</u>	<u>s</u>	<u>n</u>
Favor	3.56	0.82	394
Don't favor	2.38	0.83	152
Total	3.23	0.98	546

APPENDIX 4

ITEMS ON SPECIFIC SCALES

Items on Specific Scales

1. Land Legislation Scale:
 - Land ceiling
 - Subtenant's right
 - Village co-operative

2. Media Exposure Scale:
 - Radio
 - Movie
 - Newspaper
 - Magazines

3. Political Scale:
 - Give respect to leaders according to work
 - Help those leaders who are right
 - Leaders not favoring inclusion of dissidents

4. Panchayat Index:
 - Some disfavor
 - Total favor

Items on Modernization Scale

- Village change
- Leader's work
- Family planning
- Land ceiling
- Subtenant's right

APPENDIX 5

CORRELATIONS

The inter-correlations with income, education, occupation and caste on the one hand and the land legislation, media exposure and political scales on the other are reproduced here. These inter-correlations were run to see whether income, education, occupation, and caste variables are significantly related to each other and to the scale, and if so, whether some of the correlations reported earlier in chapter 5 are spurious. For the latter purpose, partial correlations were also found. Briefly, income is positively related to education ($\underline{r} = 0.26$), negatively related to occupation ($\underline{r} = -0.19$) as well as caste ($\underline{r} = -0.18$); education is positively correlated with occupation ($\underline{r} = 0.10$) and negatively with caste ($\underline{r} = -0.24$); and occupation is positively correlated with caste ($\underline{r} = 0.15$). All these inter-correlations are significant.

It should be noted that score on the land legislation scale is negatively correlated with income ($\underline{r} = -0.25$), positively with occupation ($\underline{r} = 0.12$) and caste ($\underline{r} = 0.16$), but is independent of education ($\underline{r} = -0.06$). The scores on the media exposure scale are correlated with income ($\underline{r} = 0.15$), education ($\underline{r} = 0.62$) and caste ($\underline{r} = -0.18$), but are independent of occupation ($\underline{r} = -0.04$). The scores on the political scale are independent of income ($\underline{r} = 0.04$),

education ($\underline{r} = 0.06$), occupation ($\underline{r} = 0.05$) and caste ($\underline{r} = 0.01$).

A look at the partial correlations suggests that the relationships are not spurious. They hold good for each of the variables and scales the same way, even when the influence of other variables except one are partialled out. For instance, the partial correlation for the land legislation scale score with income ($\underline{r} = -0.24$), education ($\underline{r} = -0.06$), occupation ($\underline{r} = 0.12$) and caste ($\underline{r} = 0.15$) remains the same. For the media exposure scale scores, the partial correlation with income ($\underline{r} = 0.14$), education ($\underline{r} = 0.62$), occupation ($\underline{r} = -0.03$), and caste ($\underline{r} = -0.18$) is also significant. The partial correlations for the political scale with income ($\underline{r} = 0.03$), education ($\underline{r} = 0.05$), occupation ($\underline{r} = -0.05$) and caste ($\underline{r} = 0.13$) are the same. On the basis of this, it can be concluded that the correlations of different scales, e.g., land legislation, with income, education, occupation, and caste remain the same even after partialling out.

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