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The globalization of Venezuelan foreign policy (1969–1979)

Nones Sucre, Carlos Enrique, Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1994

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THE GLOBALIZATION OF VENEZUELAN FOREIGN POLICY (1969-1979)

by

CARLOS ENRIQUE NONES SUCRE

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in
Political Science in partial fulfillment of the require-
ments for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City
University of New York

1994

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
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
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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

In Memory of
Alberto José Nones Sucre (1952-1991)

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CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION

I. Statement of the hypothesis

This dissertation aims to analyze and explain the process of globalization of Venezuelan foreign policy which underwent its decisive stage during the first presidencies of Rafael Caldera (1969-1974) and Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974-1979). During the 1969-1979 decade the diplomatic network was expanded and diversified both geographically and politically. At the same time, Venezuelan foreign policy was characterized by the rise of a truly worldwide approach within which Venezuela's identity as a developing country predominated, and the country manifested its independence from the superpowers and exhibited intense and proactive international behavior.

This rise to independent globalism and foreign policy activism in Venezuela during the 1970s is explained by a set of three national objectives related to the internal political system and by the constraints and opportunities resulting from the condition of the international environment.

The specific goals stemmed from vital needs of the Venezuelan state, and they were reflected in the decisions of the leaders during the 1970s. First, there was the need for the state to protect the real value of the income derived from the exploitation of its petroleum resources.

Such need led, for example, to a Venezuelan proactive role in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which contributed to the formation of a coordinated foreign policy by Venezuela towards OPEC and its other members individually (in 1969: Algeria, Abu Dhabi, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lybia and Qatar, Saudi Arabia). This need also prompted the intensification of Venezuela's economic and political cooperation with countries in all regions, but especially in the form of financial assistance to oil importing developing countries, which were greatly affected by increases in oil prices.

Second, Venezuela embarked on a policy of pacification of the country based on an amnesty program for social revolutionaries who had taken up arms against the government, and coupled it with a policy of detente in foreign relations, especially with Cuba, the USSR, China, North Korea and other socialist and revolution-endorsing countries.

Third, Venezuela's border disputes with Guyana and Colombia as well as its frontier problems with Brazil became especially sensitive foreign policy issues during the 1970s. In turn, the defense of Venezuelan national sovereignty regarding those issues depended to a large extent on the diplomatic support of other developing countries as well as of such permanent members of the United Nations Security Council as the USSR and China. Thus the goals involved in

the defense of land and maritime borders are highly relevant and synergistic to the explanation of the rise of Venezuelan globalism during the 1970s.

The international system was affected by the decline in U.S. economic and political power and influence during the 1970s. Such condition of the system, regarding the Western Hemisphere's superpower, had important repercussions in Latin America, and especially in Venezuela. To the extent that the above-mentioned decline took place (together with the concomitant development of detente with the USSR and China), it made Venezuelan policies easier to implement by making their cost lower in terms of possible negative responses by the United States.

II. The analysis of Venezuelan foreign policy

The study of Venezuelan foreign policy, especially during the period following the restoration of democracy in 1958 (known as the Democratic Era) is a nascent field of research, both in Venezuela and in other countries including the United States. While in the 1970s Venezuela emerged as a middle range power in Latin America and the Caribbean, it was not until the 1980s that systematic studies of its foreign policy began to appear in the literature. On the one hand, political scientists in the United States and Europe had been traditionally more attracted by large economies such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, or by the intrigue of a

Soviet ally like Cuba. On the other, local research on Venezuela's foreign policy is a recent activity carried out by a few analysts,¹ mostly trained abroad during the 1970s. As a result, a great deal more work remains to be done in the study of Venezuelan foreign policy.

Venezuela exhibits some unique characteristics insofar as it is the only Latin American country among the five founding members of OPEC and also that organization's only stable democracy. Its foreign policy, which became increasingly influential in world politics, calls out for attempts at a systematic explanation.

Researchers in the United States and Europe had thought that Venezuelan foreign policy did not present variations over time that were worth studying given that it was essentially determined by U.S. political and economic preferences. However, the range of options open to Venezuela is wider than presumed and there is evidence of growing independence in its foreign policy behavior during the 1970s (for example in stands in the United Nations and such

¹See, for example, Eva Josko de Guéron, "El Congreso y la política exterior de Venezuela" in Politeia (Caracas), no. 7 (1978): 329-441; Demetrio Boersner, Venezuela y el Caribe: presencia cambiante (Caracas: Monte Avila Editores, 1980); Eloy Lanza, El Subimperialismo Venezolano (Caracas: Fondo Editorial Carlos Aponte, 1980); Alfredo Toro Hardy, Venezuela, Democracia y Política Exterior (Caracas: Proimagen Editores, 1986); Aníbal Romero, La Miseria del Populismo (Caracas: Ediciones Centauro, 1987); Elsa Cardozo de Da Silva, Continuidad y Consistencia en Quince Años de Política Exterior Venezolana, 1969-1984 (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1992); and Carlos Antonio Romero, Las Relaciones entre Venezuela y la Unión Soviética: diplomacia o revolución (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1992).

actions as the nationalization of oil). A traditional premise shared by commentators in Venezuela and elsewhere is the eminently presidential character of the country's foreign policy. While the constitutional powers of the president and the manner in which they are exercised in practice make that valid to a large degree, the ongoing reform of the state² and the increasingly influential role of such other identifiable domestic sources of foreign policy as the political parties, the bureaucracy, business organizations, the Congress, the military, and public opinion, need to be taken into account.³

In addition to the interest of the topic of Venezuela in its own right, to carry out research on contemporary foreign policy today is both a dynamic and fruitful task in view of the changes of unprecedented rapidity and extent taking place in the international system--which challenge several of the traditionally accepted notions (such as that of a Communist threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere, and the concept of alignment of Third World states) and open the way for new approaches to and explanations of the foreign policy of middle range actors

²It should be noted that a Comisión para la Reforma del Estado was created in 1989 and, more important, a process of constitutional reform is currently taking place.

³For an analysis of the foreign policy powers of the President of Venezuela under the 1961 Constitution and of the democratization of the foreign policy powers, see José Guillermo Andueza "Las potestades del Presidente de la República en materia de política exterior," in Revista de Derecho Público (Caracas), no. 10 (1982): 5-24.

such as Venezuela.

In this sense, the literature has been largely historical and prescriptive and has made very little use of available theoretical perspectives as a basis for a systematic analysis of Venezuelan foreign policy behavior.⁴ Venezuelan analysts of the country's foreign policy have predominantly dealt with the post-1958 democratic period.⁵ The authors and works that follow have been selected on the basis of their relevance to the period under study. In the following section all these contributions will be analyzed critically in order to extract from them the insights they can provide for supporting the hypothesis of this dissertation.

III. Review and critique of studies on Venezuelan foreign policy

The most important studies on Venezuela's foreign policy have focused their attention on the period beginning in 1958. The reason for this is in the interest that

⁴See, for example, Antonio Stempel Paris, "Relaciones Internacionales de Venezuela," in 150 Años de Vida Republicana (Caracas: Ediciones de la Presidencia de la República, 1980), 131-145, and Freddy Vivas, Venezuela y la Sociedad de Naciones, 1920-1939 (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, Facultad de Ciencias, Jurídicas y Políticas, 1981).

⁵One interesting exception is the recent work on the negotiation of the trade agreement with the United States under President Eleazar López Contreras in 1936-1939: Clemy Machado de Acedo and Marisela Padrón Quero, La Diplomacia de López Contreras y el Tratado de Reciprocidad Comercial con Estados Unidos: 1936-1939 (Caracas: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1987).

scholars have in studying the manner in which Venezuela developed its foreign policy to support and defend an incipient democratic system in a region where authoritarian governments were proliferating. Therefore, as the year that signalled the beginning of the Democratic Era, 1958 has been accepted as the starting point for any study of Venezuela's contemporary foreign policy.

Traditionally, commentators of the Democratic Era tend to see the first decade (covering the Betancourt and Leoni Acción Democrática (AD) administrations, 1959-1969) as essentially one of defense and consolidation of the new constitutional regime. The second decade (Caldera and Pérez, 1969-1979) is viewed as one of independence and activism while the third (Herrera and Lusinchi, 1979-1989) is perceived as more uncertain. Critical of subordination to hegemonic forces, Demetrio Boersner has made a sharp differentiation between the Caldera/Pérez and the Herrera/Lusinchi decades, considering that the election of Herrera marks the return to an East/West perspective and tendency to work in alliance with the Reagan administration.⁶ Boersner's identification of the Caldera/Pérez decade as some sort of golden period of Venezuelan foreign policy provided a useful hint for the selection of the 1970s as the time frame for this study of the consolidation of independent globalization. Boersner

⁶See Boersner, Venezuela y el Caribe, 95-113.

argues that during this decade Venezuela started to formulate and embrace a more coherent foreign policy based on long-term objectives and strategic priorities. This observation also supports the idea that Caldera's and Pérez's presidencies were guided by stable rather than contingent objectives in foreign policy.

Carlos A. Romero, in considering the 1984-1989 constitutional term, thinks that Lusinchi was able to resist pressures to renounce an autonomous policy in the region.⁷ For Romero, the fundamental strategic problem of Venezuelan policy is the definition of the country's relation with the United States. He has recently analyzed the different levels (concerning the classical external and internal environments of the political system as well as the individual level) and stages of Venezuelan foreign policy formation during the Democratic Era. Romero concludes that (i) Venezuelan foreign policy is highly controlled by the Presidency; (ii) there is little participation of non-state actors; (iii) foreign policy stems more from proposals originating within the government than from the political system as a whole and (iv) decision-making is conditioned by U.S. presence, a high preponderance of the liberal discourse as an intellectual frame of reference and the absence of political and administrative sanctions that might result from foreign

⁷Carlos A. Romero, "Las Relaciones entre Venezuela e Estados Unidos: realidad histórica u opción política," in Política Internacional (Caracas), No. 2, April-June 1986: 11-14.

policy decisions.⁸

The views of Romero as to the centrality of Venezuela/U.S. relations help to illustrate the role of the United States as the hegemonic power, which is an important part of the world politics segment of the hypothesis. On that basis, my hypothesis on the explanation of globalization during the 1970s relies on the observation that U.S. influence in Venezuela diminished during those years.

American analysts such as Robert D. Bond, David E. Blank, David J. Myers, and John D. Martz (probably the senior American Venezuelanist) view Venezuelan foreign policy as inextricably linked to the country's oil resources and evolving from the democratic character of its regime.⁹ Charles D. Ameringer believes that the durable establishment

⁸Carlos A. Romero, "Planos y etapas de la política exterior venezolana," in Revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas (Caracas), no. 74 (1990): 188.

⁹See David E. Blank, Venezuela: politics in a petroleum republic (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984); Robert D. Bond, "Venezuelan Policy in the Caribbean Basin," in Richard E. Feinberg, ed., Central America: international dimensions of the crisis (New York: Holmes and Meir Publishers, 1982); John D. Martz, "Venezuelan Foreign Policy Toward Latin America," in Robert D. Bond, Contemporary Venezuela and its Role in International Affairs (New York: New York University Press, 1977), 156-198; John D. Martz, "Venezuelan Foreign Policy and the Role of Political Parties," in Heraldo Munoz and Joseph S. Tulchin, Latin American Nations in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 133-149; and David J. Myers, Venezuela's Pursuit of Caribbean Basin Interests: implications for United States national security (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1985).

of democracy is important but not an absolute determinant.¹⁰ Franklin Tugwell describes Venezuela's foreign policy as "consociational," seeking "to build institutional and associational frameworks to handle problems on a more organized, long-term basis."¹¹ During the period being analyzed, Venezuela's role in the development of such schemes as OPEC, the Conference for International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), and the Group of 77, is approached taking into account Tugwell's insights into Venezuela's consensus-building policies.

An extreme "liberal/pluralistic" view is provided by Venezuelan scholar Eva Josko de Guernón, who has an image of Venezuela as a state having a complex, multi-faceted identity, being at the same time democratic, oil-exporting, Third World, creditor and debtor, Latin American, Andean, and Caribbean. She sees this Venezuelan flexibility as one of its most important policy resources and rejects the possibility of limiting the breadth of the state's tactical freedom.¹² In turn, Alfredo Toro Hardy considers this approach as a virtual justification of the absence of

¹⁰Charles D. Ameringer, "The foreign policy of democratic Venezuela," in John D. Martz and David J. Myers, Venezuela: the democratic experience (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986), 402-436.

¹¹Franklin Tugwell, The Politics of Oil in Venezuela (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975).

¹²Eva Josko de Guernón, "La política exterior: continuidad y cambio, contradicción y coherencia," in Moisés Naim and Ramón Piñango, El Caso Venezuela: una ilusión de armonía (Caracas: Ediciones IESA, 1986), 350-375.

foreign policy and purely reactive behavior.¹³ While the views of Josko might explain a pragmatic expansion of diplomatic ties, they fail to explain globalization as something happening in both the extent and independent quality of Venezuelan foreign policy. However, Josko's multi-faceted identity argument helps to explain opposition of business groups to globalization policies. In a more recent work,¹⁴ Josko analyzes changes in the objectives and means of Venezuelan foreign policy of the Democratic Era in the light of the permanent traits and the transformations taking place in the Venezuelan political system as well as in the structure of the international system, including the end of the cold war. In that work she seeks to explain policy change more on the basis of the varying conditions of the internal and external political systems than on the political, ideological, or personal preferences of the Presidents, the foreign policy institutions, or the ruling political parties. In her conclusion Josko tends to distance herself from presidential politics as the main source of explanation of Venezuela's foreign policy and updates her analysis of national identities (debtor country; petroleum producer; democratic country; developing country; American,

¹³Alfredo Toro Hardy, Venezuela, Democracia y Política Exterior, 24-26.

¹⁴See Eva Josko de Guerón, "Cambio y continuidad en la política exterior de Venezuela: una revisión" in Carlos A. Romero, editor, Reforma y Política Exterior en Venezuela (Caracas: Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1992), 41-75.

Andean, and Caribbean country; country with neighbors) as factors explaining Venezuelan external actions. However, these elements may help explain the contradictions of Venezuela's foreign policy but not its major trend. Josko's approach identifies and explains variations and contradictions but it does not identify continuities.

José Francisco Sucre Figarella, a critic of Marxism, makes an analysis of a deep crisis of the international political order, taking place in a world which he perceived as bipolar and still dominated by the cold war.¹⁵ In this context, he views Venezuelan diplomacy in need of institutionalization so as to respond to its new international challenges. Sucre attributes foreign policy failures in the Democratic Era to the inadequacy of the Chancellery's information, analysis and decision-making capacity.¹⁶ He sees the "strategic interests" of the United States served best by a foreign policy that would support democratic alternatives in Latin America.¹⁷ The views of Sucre are relevant to this research insofar as they reflect the ideological preferences of part of the elite which had traditionally seen the Soviet Union, for example, more as a threat than as a country that Venezuela could cooperate with

¹⁵José Francisco Sucre Figarella, Venezuela en un Mundo en Crisis (Caracas: Monte Avila Editores, 1988).

¹⁶Ibid., 125-150.

¹⁷Ibid., 151-182.

on the basis of mutual respect. As a diplomat holding key embassies during the period in question and as a former Minister of State for Culture, his highly philosophical 1988 book cited above serves as data source on Venezuelan elite ideology. Following Sucre Figarella's point of view, Isidro Morales Paúl, a former Chancellor, had also stated that Venezuela should rely on a more harmonious relation between the objectives of the foreign policy and the nature of Venezuela's political system. For instance, he argued that many failures of Venezuela's international politics can be understood by the fact that there has not been a clear agreement between the different political parties to support Venezuela's stands in the international arena.¹⁸

Eloy Lanza holds Venezuela as a country having a clear hegemonic vocation which projects itself in the Caribbean and the Andean region. He contends that during the Nixon-Ford period (which covers part of the Caldera/Pérez decade), the United States did not yet have a clear political will to utilize Venezuela in a proxy capacity. However, Venezuelan elites, so goes his argument, had a clear purpose of demonstrating to the United States its inability to achieve

¹⁸See Isidro Morales Paúl, Política Exterior y Relaciones Internacionales (Caracas: Biblioteca de la Academia de Ciencias políticas y sociales, 1989), 207. Morales Paúl gives as an example the lack of political support for the so-called "Hypothesis of Caraballeda" (a draft agreement which would grant Colombia a significant part of the Gulf of Venezuela) in the process of attempting to resolve the national maritime border controversy between Venezuela and Colombia by the Herrera Campins administration.

its goals directly. Such elites wished thus to establish a solid base for a subimperialist pact with the United States.¹⁹ Robert P. Matthews rejects this extreme view, since the Venezuelan behavior reflected a relatively independent choice of the United States foreign policy objectives. He thus contemplates Venezuela's intended role as subhegemonic, rather than subimperialistic.²⁰ Allegedly hegemonic and imperialistic designs of its foreign policy were an important element of the perceptions of Venezuela by countries in the area during the research period (for example, by Prime Minister Eric Williams in Trinidad and Tobago).²¹

Other critical reviews of President Pérez's ambitious foreign policy during 1974-1979 have not been lacking. Matthews considers him more as an aberration than a path breaker and does not see his initiatives as having been durable. Héctor Malavé Mata criticizes the Pérez administration in more general terms and charges his foreign policy with being rhetorical and ineffectual.²² The oil nationalization was carried out under terms which sacrificed fundamental state interests. Soviet scholar Sergo Mikoyan,

¹⁹Eloy Lanza, El Subimperialismo Venezolano.

²⁰Robert P. Matthews, "Oil in Troubled Waters: Venezuelan Policy in the Caribbean," in NACLA Report of the Americas 28, no. 4, (July-August 1984): 21-51.

²¹Boersner, Venezuela y el Caribe, 111.

²²Héctor Malavé Mata, Los Extravíos del Poder (Caracas: EBUC, 1987).

in contrast, views Venezuelan foreign policy during this period sympathetically and opposed, on the whole, to imperialistic interests.²³

Daniel C. Hellinger in a comprehensive analysis of Venezuelan politics that appeared in 1992, sees the trajectory of Venezuelan foreign policy as tending to follow the path of the economy--"innovative and nationalist during the boom, cautious and reactive during the bust."²⁴ He emphasizes in particular that during Pérez's first term Venezuela, together with Panamá, Costa Rica, and Cuba "aided the Sandinistas materially in their successful struggle to overthrow the U.S. backed Somoza dictatorship."²⁵ Hellinger's criticism of Venezuela's contradictory behavior during the research period is important insofar as it links policy quality, in terms of independence and level of activism, with the economic strength of the state.

In the realist perspective, a comparative analysis of Colombian and Venezuelan foreign policies by William A. Hazelton sees the distinction between security and economic interests as leading both countries to identify increasingly with Third World causes without foregoing their traditional

²³Sergo Mikoyan, "Venezuela en el ruedo mundial, política exterior: algunas premisas y peculiaridades de su formación," in América Latina (Moscow), no. 12 (1980): 6-12.

²⁴Daniel C. Hellinger, Venezuela: tarnished democracy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 137.

²⁵*Ibid.*, 138.

ties with the West. He considers the decline in the influence of the United States within the Caribbean Basin as providing the countries greater opportunity to act.²⁶

Hazelton views Venezuela and Colombia as having gained the maturity and confidence to adopt a stand independent of the United States.

Bahgat Korany, although not having dealt at length with Venezuela, has written extensively about Third World foreign policy. In the area of decision-making analysis he emphasizes the "real life" or objective factors as distinct from subjective ones and rejects "the great man theory of history" as having had an unhealthy monopoly of Third World decision-making analysis. He criticizes strategic studies, which focus on national security and war, as being plagued by ethnocentrism and thus increasingly irrelevant to Third World problems. For example, in such an over-researched conflict as the Cuban missile crisis, he affirms, practically nothing is said about the Cuban element in comparison to the emphasis placed on Soviet/American deterrence. The views of Korany are relevant to this dissertation insofar as Venezuela is a Third World country where political adversaries Caldera and Pérez, as presidents in a democratic polity, converge in their interpretation of

²⁶William A. Hazelton, "Colombian and Venezuelan Foreign Policy: Regional Powers in the Caribbean Basin," in Donald L. Herman, Democracy in Latin America: Colombia and Venezuela (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988).

state interests. Moreover, Korany's 1986 book on foreign policy decision includes a comparison between the foreign policies of Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela, which concludes that these policies responded to an autonomous definition of national interests based on strategic choices (section contributed by Jorge Dominguez and Juan Lindau); as well as with decisions in OPEC as an influential non-state actor in world politics. In this sense, Korany is directly relevant to the writer's approach to the study of Venezuelan behavior during 1969-1979.²⁷

Aníbal Romero (a centrist whose 1984 dissertation in King's College, London, was titled The Conservative Challenge: Henry Kissinger and the ideological crisis of American foreign policy) has made a critical review of Venezuelan politics and foreign policy during the 1970s.²⁸ He sees the 1969-1979 decade as one of populist presidentialism in foreign policy, well intentioned but impracticable in Caldera who, as Romero recalls, demanded in Washington in 1970 that the United States become a "pioneer of democracy" in the Continent, ignoring that its operational policy is determined by economic and strategic

²⁷For a relevant sample of Korany's work, see "The take-off of Third World Studies: the case of foreign policy," in World Politics 35, no. 2 (April 1983): 465-487; also see Bahgat Korany with contributors, How Foreign Policy Decisions Are Made in the Third World: a comparative analysis (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986); and Bahgat Korany, "Strategic studies and the Third World: a critical evaluation," in International Social Science Journal 38 (1986): 547-562.

²⁸Aníbal Romero, La Miseria del Populismo.

interests and not by democratic values. He sees Pérez as an over-ambitious populist who set out goals for Venezuela--such as becoming the leader of the Third World--that even Brazil had not dared to contemplate. Aníbal Romero wishes future Venezuelan policy to emphasize: (i) innovation, creativity and learning, to respond realistically to new and more demanding issues; (ii) a dynamic vision of the international system; (iii) a long-term approach to replace improvisation; and (iv) the use of a broader range of instruments of state power.²⁹ In his criticism of "populism" in foreign policies of both Caldera and Pérez, Romero implicitly recognizes the importance of the decade and the fact that bold initiatives were taken in the country's foreign policy. But Romero's focus on an ideological evaluation of Pérez's populism and on alleged corruption and scandals and their impact on Venezuela's foreign policy, appears aimed at discrediting the goals that were achieved through globalization. Thus, Romero's disproportionate emphasis on these prescriptive elements makes his study biased.

Professors Clemy Machado de Mendoza and Marisela Padrón Quero, after research carried out while they were visiting respectively at Princeton University and the Fernand Braudel Center (SUNY, Binghamton), analysed the asymmetrical negotiations whereby the representatives of the

²⁹Ibid., 277.

New Deal and the Good Neighbor policies succeeded in persuading a tenacious but in many ways limited Chancellery to sign a trade treaty which ran contrary to Venezuela's economic interests.³⁰ The study of Machado and Padrón opens the way to a methodological approach used by the writer which, in essence, consists of investigating foreign policy developments from primary sources at both ends of an interaction between actors in dyadic relationships.

1. The writer's view

In an article published in 1959, the writer maintained that the interests of the nation and those of the oil companies were often at odds (in spite of efforts of their public relations departments to show the contrary) and that the development of indigenous downstream industries such as petrochemicals and liquified natural gas were steps that would eventually lead to Venezuelan control of oil (nationalization took place 17 years later under Pérez I).³¹ In another article, "Aspectos científicos y tecnológicos de nuestra cultura dependiente," published in 1979, the writer placed at the top of the agenda of the country's objectives the attainment of cultural autonomy (including its scientific and technological aspects) in order to reach a

³⁰Machado and Padrón, La Diplomacia de López Contreras, pp. .

³¹Carlos E. Nones Sucre, "La industria petroquímica en Venezuela y el mundo," in El Nacional - suplemento de economía (Caracas), no. 112 (1959).

stage of true economic and political independence in the international arena.³² He also welcomed the creation of the Latin American Economic System (SELA), with headquarters in Caracas, as a viable intergovernmental mechanism to promote an independent process of regional integration.

On that account, the writer places himself under a critical category within Realism in terms of his present analysis of Venezuelan foreign policy. As a point of departure, the writer accepts the basic premises of Realism (the power paradigm, balance of power, state sovereignty; the state as actor and rationality assumptions). But he also shares in the criticism of rigid Realism made by such authors as Bahgat Korany (marginalization of Third World issues) and Robert O. Keohane (weakness in accounting for change in the world political economy or in the domestic structure of states).³³ For example, during the period in question, the role of such nonstate actors as transnational corporations and multilateral institutions cannot be neglected in dealing with important decisions of Venezuela such as the establishment of OPEC and its further behavior within it or the country's stands in the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly.

³²Carlos E. Nones Sucre, "Aspectos científicos y tecnológicos de nuestra cultura dependiente," in El Repertorio Americano - segunda época (London), 1 (July 1979).

³³See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: co-operation and discord in the world political economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

In a recent work,³⁴ the writer reaffirms his view that it is possible for developing countries to (a) enjoy a considerable degree of foreign policy independence; (b) carry out external actions of global scope. He also sees the convergence, especially within the UN, of the Group of 77 and the Movement of Non-aligned Countries, as an indication that a global politico-economic alliance of developing countries can survive the end of the cold war.

From a methodological point of view, the writer sympathizes with Keohane's conclusion that "we need both spare, logically tight theories, such as Structural Realism, and rich interpretations, such as those of the historically oriented students of domestic structure and foreign policy. . ."³⁵ For the purposes of the present dissertation, Keohane provides a theoretical framework in which, like Korany, he makes allowance for the role of alliances of Third World states (for example, OPEC) and the relative bargaining power of those states in North/South debates, such as in UNCTAD. He also sees a compatibility of foreign policy studies like this dissertation and more comprehensive theories of the system which, although based on the realist tradition, are able to account for systemic change such as the one which

³⁴Carlos E. Nones Sucre, "Autonomía y visión global en la política exterior de los países en desarrollo" in Temas Internacionales, (Caracas: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1994).

³⁵Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and beyond," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 197.

took place during 1989-1991--which hardly any existing theory would have been able to predict. The writer considers such line of thought useful in elaborating future scenarios for Venezuelan foreign policy on the basis of hypotheses which accord an important role to the sovereign state and the international system.

IV. Review of other pertinent methodological and theoretical approaches

K. J. Holsti's essay on foreign policy change³⁶ focuses on "the dramatic wholesale alteration of a nation's pattern of external relations" which he terms foreign policy "restructuring." Holsti's approach to foreign policy analysis is especially relevant to the study of foreign policy change in Venezuela during 1969-1979. His essay contains case studies on foreign policy restructuring in Bhutan, Tanzania, Canada, Burma, China, and Chile during specific periods ranging from 1958 to 1977.³⁷

Related to the concerns of this dissertation, Holsti

³⁶K. J. Holsti, Why Nations Realign: foreign policy restructuring in the postwar world (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982).

³⁷Such case studies are the following: "From isolation to dependence: Bhutan, 1958-62" (K. J. Holsti); "From dependence to diversification: Tanzania, 1967-77" (Timothy M. Shaw and Ibrahim S. R. Msabaha); "From dependence to diversification: Canada, 1972-78" (K. J. Holsti); "Restructuring Chinese foreign policy, 1959-76: three episodes" (Thomas W. Robinson); and "An abortive attempt to change foreign policy: Chile, 1970-73" (Jacques Zylberberg and Miguel Monterichard). Ibid.

reaches the particularly relevant conclusion that

Foreign policy restructuring . . . is basically an attempt to assert autonomy, to control transnational processes, to destroy the residues of colonialism, to escape from the embrace of the hegemon. . . . [M]any cases of dramatic foreign policy change are a manifestation of nationalism in a world popularly characterized as 'beyond nationalism', where growing 'interconnectedness' between societies is supposedly on the verge of creating a global community.³⁸

From a methodological point of view, Holsti's research project, based on the above-mentioned case studies of six countries, is also useful to this dissertation. Regarding the description of foreign policy reorientation, the research of Holsti and his collaborators uses data on number of treaties signed, number of states as treaty partners, commitments of military capabilities abroad, location of persons studying abroad, voting patterns in the UN General Assembly, patterns of foreign trade, state visits abroad, and number and location of diplomatic missions abroad.³⁹

As to the explanation of cases of foreign policy restructuring, Holsti relies on both "because of" and "in order to" accounts of foreign policy actions and considers that both forms of explanation are intertwined. In general he observes that developing countries had sought to elaborate foreign policy strategies that would improve their

³⁸Ibid., ix-x.

³⁹Ibid., 15.

bargaining position vis-a-vis developed countries, through the formation of trade blocs like the Andean Pact and the Group of 77 in the United Nations, or calls for the New International Economic Order and the creation of commodity associations (such as OPEC).⁴⁰

Of particular importance to this dissertation are theoretical contributions of Venezuelan authors to issues of territorial sovereignty.⁴¹ Such issues, especially frontier controversies, become high priority items in the agenda of Venezuelan leaders after the restoration of democracy in 1958. Several works of Isidro Morales Paúl, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and professor of international law, are relevant in this respect.⁴²

⁴⁰Ibid., 199-200. Holsti makes the point that "some of these strategies may have been responses to the increasing popularity of academic dependence theory . . ." However, he remarks that his studies "cover time periods when dependence theory was still in its infancy, invented, nurtured and understood only by a few academics in Latin America." While Holsti's reasoning is valid, I think that any influence of a theory or philosophy in foreign policy formation would be exerted mainly through its effect on the ideology of political parties and ultimately on the world view and ideology of the decision-makers. At any rate, the main proponent of dependence theory in Latin America, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, is currently the President-elect of Brazil--and his politics seem to have distanced itself from his original thought.

⁴¹Treated below in Chapter 3, in the section on "Venezuelan sovereignty over national territory in border issues involving Brazil, Guyana, and Colombia."

⁴²See La Delimitación de Areas Marinas y Sub-Marinas al Norte de Venezuela (Caracas: Academia de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, 1983); Política Exterior y Relaciones Internacionales (Caracas: Academia de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, 1989); and La Delimitación de Areas Marinas y Submarinas entre Venezuela y Trinidad & Tobago (Caracas: Academia de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, 1993).

Morales agrees with other international law scholars in defining territorial space as land, lake, river, and air spaces taken together. In turn, territorial sovereignty is seen as absolute and as being exercised in an exclusive manner--while not abusively in detriment of other states. He also distinguishes the process of maritime delimitation, as a judicial act of determining the limits of a zone already belonging to a coastal state, from the problem of territorial attribution, which requires the definition of property through the confrontation of titles of sovereignty over a given territorial space.⁴³ Those concepts are essential for understanding the Venezuela/Colombia controversy over the determination of the marine and submarine border between the two countries in the Gulf of Venezuela, a highly relevant issue in explaining the surge of Venezuela's globalization policies in the 1970s.

James Mayall, from the London School of Economics, made a contribution in 1990 to the study of the consequences of nationalism for the international society of states which is important to the present dissertation as it seeks to explain the growth of independence and globalism in Venezuelan foreign policy. Thus it needs to consider the issue of postwar nationalism as an element affecting Venezuela and the other developing countries. Mayall adheres to the conception of international society as "a society of

⁴³Morales, La Delimitación. . . al Norte, 27-34.

states which recognize each other's sovereignty, engage in regular diplomatic relations with one another and uphold international law."⁴⁴ He sees no foreseeable alternative to the separate state system, whose stubborn resistance to disappear defies both Marxism and Kantian liberalism. He reaches, nevertheless, the relatively pessimistic conclusion that "the liberal attempt to construct an international society, in which the diplomacy of pressure and force will be progressively replaced by a rule-based diplomacy insulated from mercantilistic and nationalist rivalries, seems doomed to fail."⁴⁵ He considers that the Third World reform movement (described as anti-colonial nationalism) depended on an alliance between the leaders of developing countries' governments and their supporters in the Western developed world. Yet so far, the way that developing countries' nationalism has reacted against the postwar economic order has not been able to change it in its favor.

In turn, British authors Robert H. Jackson and Alan James tend to reinforce Mayal's approach by underlining the global character of the contemporary process of extension of state sovereignty. As they put it:

One of the most remarkable features of the twentieth century is the globalization of independent--or sovereign--statehood. Most immediately, this development has been expressed through the rise of

⁴⁴See James Mayal, Nationalism and International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 145.

⁴⁵Ibid., 144.

nationalism, the demand for self-determination, and the dismantling of all colonial empires.⁴⁶

Moreover, the latter idea of the demise of all empires has been cultivated by French historian Jean-Baptiste Duroselle since the early 1980s. Such an idea is relevant in attempts to explain not only the end of the cold war in the 1990s but the conditions of the international environment which facilitated the process of globalization of Venezuelan foreign policy during the 1970s. At the close of his research, from which he draws human regularities and dyachronic rules, Duroselle ends with this assessment:

There have always been empires. All those empires finally died. Even the Roman Empire. Even the colonial empires. Even the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Ideology and its concrete social applications have not been able to break the great human regularities. The eternal debate between effectiveness (and consequently discipline, conquest, power, violence) and human dignity (and consequently freedom, justice, peace) seems to have taken a turn at this end of the century for the benefit of the latter.⁴⁷

Howard H. Lentner has recently addressed the current narrowing and abandonment of theory in the analysis of foreign policy.⁴⁸ His recommendations for the restructuring

⁴⁶Robert H. Jackson and Alan James, "The character of independent statehood," in Robert H. Jackson and Alan James, eds., States in a Changing World: a contemporary analysis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 3.

⁴⁷See Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Tout Empire Périra: théorie des relations internationales (Paris: Remand Colin, 1992).

⁴⁸Howard H. Lentner, "Rethinking policy analysis," paper presented to the Conference of the International Studies Association in Washington, D.C., 30 March 1994.

of the subfield has been useful in shaping the theoretical basis of the research carried out under this dissertation.

Lentner's recent paper is relevant to the present essay, insofar as it reviews the evolution of foreign policy analysis and identifies, for example, a trend towards the return to case studies, including the already mentioned work by Bahgat Korany, which emphasizes the study of Third World foreign policy. More generally, Lentner also warns of the failures of the case study approach in terms of its disconnectedness in time and space and its limitations regarding the construction of generalizable theories.

Lentner's call for the incorporation of major substantive challenges into scholarly concerns of foreign policy analysis is particularly relevant to this dissertation. In effect, the dissertation gives consideration to economic and technological problems in the context of Venezuelan development--and, more generally, in the context of "state formation," to use his term. To understand "state formation" and how the state achieves autonomy within the world economy and the political influence of the dominant powers in the international system, it is necessary to analyze, among other factors, the economic development strategies and the actions that countries take in the arena of international politics.⁴⁹

⁴⁹Howard H. Lentner, State Formation in Central America: the struggle for autonomy, development and democracy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993).

V. Overview of the dissertation

In accordance with the hypothesis presented in this chapter, the Venezuelan foreign policy implemented during the 1969-1979 decade can be explained in terms of a small set of internal goals and an external factor. That policy resulted in the institutionalization of the country's global interests and objectives and consequently manifested itself in the diversification and expansion of the diplomatic network. Venezuela also acted with more independence of the United States and emphasized its affinities with developing countries in all regions.

Chapter 2 provides a historical analysis of selected developments leading up to the process of globalization of Venezuelan foreign policy which took place during the 1970s under Caldera and Pérez. First, I identify the political and economic legacy which the twentieth century left to the Democratic Era that began in 1958: international passivity, subordination to the United States, an oligarchic political system, a nouveau riche society, and a distorted economy. Second, I analyze the history of the Democratic Era under Betancourt, Leoni, Caldera, and Pérez, with emphasis on the evolution of Venezuelan foreign policy towards independence and globalism.

Chapter 3 analyzes the elements of the hypothesis proposed to explain Venezuelan foreign policy in terms of three internal goals (protection of oil income, pacification of guerrillas, and territorial sovereignty over frontier issues) and an external factor (decline of United States influence).

On the basis of observed developments analyzed therein, chapter 4 establishes the case for the decisive drive towards the globalization of Venezuelan foreign policy which took place during the administrations of Caldera and Pérez from 1969 to 1979. That process of globalization is identified through evidence of two closely interrelated developments: (a) the expansion and diversification of the diplomatic network and (b) the rise of globalism, independence, and diplomatic activism in Venezuelan foreign policy.

The case studies which are presented in chapter 5 on relations with the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba are particularly illustrative of the expansion and diversification of the Venezuelan diplomatic network which took place during the 1970s. I explain such new policy of globalistic activism and independence of the superpowers by applying to each case study the four elements analyzed in chapter 3. Those case studies are found to validate the relevance of the four elements chosen in explaining the

overall policy of globalization which developed in Venezuela in the 1970s.

Chapter 6 analyzes trends in the evolution of Venezuelan foreign policy from the close of Pérez's first presidency in March 1979 to the time of writing. The analysis shows continuity under Presidents Herrera and Lusinchi in the more permanent aspects of globalization, such as the expansion and strengthening of Venezuela's diplomatic network, but it also highlights a shift toward a revived East-West orientation in cooperation with the Reagan administration. The end of the cold war resulted in a profound change in the international environment, and Venezuelan foreign policy gradually returned to the outlook of the 1970s. Following Pérez's removal from office and a brief interim government, Rafael Caldera came back to the Miraflores Palace in 1994 to resume the tasks of a global foreign policy. These tasks include streamlining and rationalizing the diplomatic machinery.

In chapter 7, this essay concludes that the Venezuelan foreign policy of the 1970s--the globalization of political and economic relations--which is explained by vital state goals and the relative decline of U.S. power, had lasting effects that extended to the 1980s. The revival of the cold war during those years constrained Venezuelan independence, but the diplomatic resources developed in the 1970s

continued to be strengthened. Thus, Caldera and Pérez were both right and visionary in making an opening to the world beyond ideological prejudices--twenty years before the definitive end of the cold war.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE GLOBALIZATION OF VENEZUELAN FOREIGN POLICY

I. Introduction

This chapter provides a historical analysis of selected developments leading up to the process of globalization of Venezuelan foreign policy which took place during the 1970s under Caldera and Pérez. First, I identify the political and economic legacy which the twentieth century left to the Democratic Era that began in 1958: international passivity, subordination to the United States, an oligarchic political system, a nouveau riche society, and a distorted economy. Second, I analyze the history of the Democratic Era under Betancourt, Leoni, Caldera, and Pérez, with emphasis on the evolution of Venezuelan foreign policy towards independence and globalism.

II. The legacy of the twentieth century

The legacy that the first 57 years of the twentieth century (from 1901 to 1958) left to the Venezuelan foreign policy of the Democratic Era was not the most auspicious one for the process of globalization that began a decade later. The main elements of that legacy are stated and commented upon below.

1. A tradition of international passivity and isolation from most of the world outside the Western Hemisphere

and Western Europe. In this respect, Venezuelan historian José Luís Salcedo Bastardo found that Venezuela was the country in the American continent which between 1830 and 1935, attended the fewest international meetings and signed the fewest agreements, ratifying only a few.

The balance of those one hundred and five years shows the meagre number of 246 international instruments (treaties, conventions, acts, agreements, protocols). That number represents an average of two to three a year. About twenty percent of those instruments regard routine postal and telegraph issues; another twenty percent deal with complaints, indemnities and payments requested from the Republic, all of which, together with the standard treaties of friendship, trade and navigation, represented half of the work of the Chancellery. The rest dissolved itself into a miscellanea of unimportant and circumstantial matters, some of which were simply inevitable. The exception to that overall mediocrity, was the conventions of the Bolivarian Congress of 1911 (attended by the five countries liberated by Simón Bolívar: Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú, and Bolivia), subscribed in Caracas on the occasion of the centennial of Venezuela's independence, and ratified unenthusiastically by the Executive more than three

years later. The subjects of the conventions were literary and artistic property; academic degrees; mail, telegraphs and communication routes; consular relations; extradition; patents and rights of invention; execution of foreign acts; trade relations; internal strifes and neutrality; publication of inedited documents; history of The Liberator.¹

2. A history of military dictatorships supported by the United States and subordinated to its political and economic hegemony (which may account for such ulterior developments as the accumulated popular resentment that exploded during the state visit of Vice-President Nixon to Caracas in 1958).
3. A political system dominated by an oligarchy consisting mainly of the military and business groups involved in construction, real estate, and import trade (a legacy which had reached its most visible manifestations under General Marcos Pérez Jiménez at the time of the fall of his dictatorship in 1958).
4. A distorted nouveau riche society and economy, devoid of a technological base, heavily dependent on rents from a petroleum industry totally owned and managed by American and Anglo-Dutch corporations--hardly a sound base for a global and independent foreign policy.

¹See José Luis Salcedo Bastardo, Historia Fundamental de Venezuela (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1972), 403-404.

In regard to the latter element of that legacy, it is important to consider that the distorted nature of the Venezuelan and other economies in a similar situation had structural roots which were studied through the experiences of the 1970s and 1980s. In this context the syndrome named the "Dutch Disease" was described as an economic backlash suffered by a number of nations, both developed and developing, that begin massive exports of natural commodities such as oil and natural gas and earn large amounts of foreign exchange, but that eventually encounter the problems of domestic inflation, unemployment, and stagnation of the economy. The name derives from the situation faced by the Netherlands, which enjoyed considerable economic prosperity after World War II until 1975.² Because of Venezuela's on-and-off economic ills, the similar term of the "Venezuelan Disease" was also coined to characterize, inter alia, the problems arising from the fact that the petroleum industry employs relatively few people and generates little internal demand. The challenge is to find ways to turn the flow of dollars from oil revenues into endogenous growth and a diversified economy.

²See "Dutch Disease" in Gerald W. Fry and Galen R. Martin, The International Development Dictionary (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1991), 131-132, and Malcolm Gills et al., Economics of Development, 3d ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), 434-437.

Lance Taylor makes the point that attempts to increase domestic production capacity via investment will typically put pressure on industries producing goods that cannot be imported, the prime example being construction. The price of construction will rise relative to those for imports and exports. Resources will be drawn away from production of tradables, and the economy will find itself specialized in the production of its primary export and non-tradable goods. At the same time, relatively free imports need to be allowed so that inflationary pressures will not build up. The outcome (the "Venezuelan Disease") will be a highly unbalanced economy, devoid of agricultural and industrial production capacity and technological know-how. When the flow of dollars from mineral extraction abates, due to depletion, lack of markets, or price erosion, there are poor prospects for future growth.³

The history of the pre-1958 twentieth century in Venezuela was determined by a number of distinct economic and political developments. The first of these was economic. In effect, an oil boom started after World War I and matured in 1929 when the country became the world's largest oil exporter. Venezuela held that position until 1970 when it was overtaken by Iran and Saudi Arabia. Such a boom, which by 1926 had already placed oil ahead of coffee as

³See Lance Jerome Taylor, "Back to Basics: Theory for the Rhetoric in the North-South Round," in World Development 10, no. 4 (1982): 327-335.

Venezuela's chief export, brought about the decline of agriculture (due to a rural exodus toward urban centers without an increase in agricultural productivity). It had political consequences as well, the most important one being a renewed avidity to grab power on the part of the higher military echelons and the other oligarchs, in order to obtain control of the growing oil rent being collected by the state. Put differently, authoritarian power became enormously more lucrative, surpassing anything traditional dictators could have imagined.

The second development, which coincided in time with the oil boom, was the dictatorship of General Juan Vicente Gómez, a caudillo from the state of Táchira⁴ who ruled the country from 1908 until his death in 1935. Gómez removed whole generations of democratic opposers from the political system through imprisonment, torture, assassination, and exile. Paradoxically, his autocracy had the unintended effect of unifying the country by bringing warring local caudillos under the absolutist control of the dictator. However, such effect did not result in the pacification of Venezuela, since democratic opposition to Gómez, both internal and from exiled groups, never ceased to stage

⁴Táchira, a coffee producer, had been Venezuela's richest state until the 1920s, and people from that region showed a consistent vocation for military careers leading to power in Caracas. Except for the parenthesis of the Trienio, the rulers of Venezuela from 1899 to 1958 were all generals from Táchira: Castro, Gómez, López Contreras, Medina, and Pérez Jiménez.

rebellions and expeditions against the regime. After Gómez, his Minister of War, General Eleazar López Contreras was elected president by a docile Congress, to be similarly succeeded in 1941 by López's own Minister of War, General Isaías Medina Angarita.

The third defining moment was the Trienio Democrático (1945-1948) which followed the overthrow of President Isaías Medina Angarita (1941-1945) by the so-called Revolución de Octubre.⁵ The Revolutionary Junta which came to power in 1945 was presided over by Rómulo Betancourt, the leader of the Acción Democrática party (AD), founded in 1941. His government convened free elections for a Constituent Assembly and enfranchised women, youth, and the then illiterate majority of the population, by granting the right to vote to all Venezuelans over age 18. After the 1947 democratic Constitution was promulgated, the first universal vote for President in the history of the country was held. AD's candidate Rómulo Gallegos, an educator and famous novelist, was elected by a landslide, only to be overthrown by the military in November 1948, less than a year after taking office. However, the seeds of a modern competitive electoral system had been planted in Venezuela.

In the fourth place, the country endured nearly another decade (1948-1958) of military dictatorship after

⁵For a detailed account of this period, see Andrés Stambouli, Crisis Política: Venezuela 1945-58 (Caracas: Editorial Ateneo de Caracas, 1980).

Gallegos' overthrow. General Marcos Pérez Jiménez, a member of the ruling Junta since the ouster of Gallegos, was proclaimed Constitutional President in 1952 by a Congress which he himself appointed--after refusing to accept the upset victory of the democratic opposition in an already far from free election convened by the military government. Pérez Jiménez became the paradigm of the cold war Latin American authoritarian ruler, receiving the highest honors of the United States in reward for the dubious achievement of his crusade against Communism in Venezuela.⁶

The country's foreign policy--at times wrapped in hypocritical nationalistic rhetoric--was characterized by unquestioning cold war alignment with the United States. As a complement, administrative dishonesty was rampant in governmental contracts for both internally and externally supplied services and goods.⁷ Reinforcing and reflecting its orientation, the dictatorship cultivated relations with like-minded military governments such as those of Odría in Peru, Somoza in Nicaragua, Stroessner in Paraguay, Magloire in Haiti, and Franco in Spain.

In the following sections, a more detailed analysis is made of the legacy left to the Democratic Era by the foreign

⁶See Stephen G. Rabe, The Road to OPEC (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 126-128.

⁷In this respect see Rómulo Betancourt, Venezuela: oil and politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), especially chapter 21, "Disorganized economic and social policies and immoral administration."

policies of (1) the dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-1935), which coincided with the development of the oil boom; (2) the governments of Eleazar López Contreras (1935-1941) and Isaías Medina Angarita (1941-1945); (3) the Trienio Democrático (1945-1948); and (4) the last nine years of military dictatorship (1948-1958).

1. The oil boom during the government of Juan Vicente Gómez: a cooperative and efficient tyrant for the United States

The rise of the internal combustion engine as a main source of power in the first two decades of the twentieth century dramatically increased world demand for oil, making Venezuelan sources of petroleum particularly valuable for the American and European oil producers.⁸ In 1908, with the support of the Theodore Roosevelt administration which had severed diplomatic relations with Venezuela six months earlier, Vice-President General Juan Vicente Gómez seized the presidency from nationalistic Caudillo Cipriano Castro and went on to rule the country until his death in 1935. The United States restored relations in early 1909, under the William Taft administration, and found in Gómez a cooperative and efficient tyrant. Gómez and his friends sought to profit from the country's rich oil deposits and began leasing Venezuelan land under conditions favorable to

⁸For a more detailed explanation of the rise of petroleum in Venezuela, see Rabe, The Road to OPEC and Luis Vallenilla, Auge, Declinación y Porvenir del Petróleo Venezolano (Caracas: Monte Avila Editores, 1986).

the foreign investors. By 1914 a Shell subsidiary started commercial production in the Lake Maracaibo Basin and exports began in 1917.⁹

After the World War I, the Woodrow Wilson administration faced the need to formulate an energy policy and the State Department instructed its officials to assist American companies seeking oil concessions. Such diplomacy was particularly effective in Venezuela and by 1924 American companies began purchasing concessions from an intermediary created by Gómez, the Venezuelan Petroleum Corporation.¹⁰

The entry of Venezuela into the League of Nations following a decision taken by the government of Gómez in January 1920, after intensive pressure from the big powers, provided the first opportunity for the Republic to participate in global multilateral activity.¹¹ Previously, Venezuela participated only in the Panamerican Union (established in 1899 as the Trade Bureau of American Republics), which was based in Washington, D.C.--apart from attending a number of international conferences, mostly in a Latin American context.

Venezuelan participation was notoriously passive in the most important questions dealt with by the League, such

⁹Vallenilla, 41.

¹⁰Rabe, The Road to OPEC, 33.

¹¹See Freddy Vivas, Venezuela en la Sociedad de las Naciones 1920-1939: descripción y análisis de una actuación diplomática (Caracas: UCV, Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas, 1981), 65-88.

as the war between Greece and Bulgaria, Japanese aggression against China, disarmament, mandates, minorities, collective security, and even admission of Mexico.¹² In the relatively few issues with which it became involved, Venezuela only learned the reality that the League was controlled by the big powers (France, Great Britain) and offered little room for maneuvering to weak states.

Venezuelan stands in the League were by no means even-handed and appeared guided by the inherent conservatism of Gómez's Chancellery.¹³ For example, on the question of the military uprising against the Spanish Republic, Venezuela joined other Latin American members in an openly anti-Republic stance. Venezuela also intervened in the question of Soviet aggression against Finland, joining Latin American members in their unanimous condemnation of the Soviet Union, something they had not done in the cases of Japanese aggression against China (1931) or Italian intervention in Ethiopia (1935).¹⁴

¹²Ibid., 335-337.

¹³The Chancellery, formed by only a few dozen diplomats, was headed by ministers unconditionally loyal to the dictator, and Gómez's personal interests and preferences virtually replaced any consistent principles or policies. Gómez's main foreign concern was not to have problems with other countries, especially neighbors, in order to avoid their support for movements opposing his dictatorship. See Arístides Calvani's essay in Venezuela Moderna: medio siglo de historia, 1926-1976, 2nd ed. (Caracas: Editorial Ariel, 1979), 447-448.

¹⁴See Vivas, Venezuela en la Sociedad, and Stempel París, 150 Años, 131-145.

2. López Contreras and Medina Angarita: a post-dictatorial transition presided over by Gómez's military leaders

The death of Gómez coincided with an accelerated decadence of the League, and the new government of Gómez's former Minister of War and Navy, General Eleazar López Contreras (1935-1941), decided in July 1939 to communicate to the Secretary-General its withdrawal from the Organization, to become effective two years later. The López Contreras government, which called itself with patriotic rhetoric Régimen Bolivariano, maintained cordial relations with the fascist regimes of Italy, Germany, and Japan (relations with the latter were established in 1938), while avoiding any hint of even recognizing the USSR, something that, for example, Colombia did in 1935. During the Spanish civil war, López accepted the continuing presence in Caracas of an unofficial representative of General Francisco Franco and after Franco's proclamation as Caudillo de España in March 1939 hastened to recognize his regime. Diplomatic relations with Franco were broken only in 1945 by the Revolutionary Junta administration¹⁵ and resumed after the Trienio by the Military Junta in 1949.

¹⁵Rupture of diplomatic relations with Franco (and establishment of relations with the USSR) had been formally included in the foreign policy platform of Medina's Partido Democrático Venezolano (PDV) in April 1945, reflecting the widespread national anti-fascist sentiment. The Revolutionary Junta, which independently shared both objectives, simply fulfilled the objective of breaking with Franco that was left pending by Medina. See Juan Bautista Fuenmayor, Historia de la Venezuela Política Contemporánea, 1899-1969, vol. 5, (Caracas: published by the author, 1981): 90-92.

In April 1941 General Isaías Medina Angarita was elected president by the Venezuelan Congress for the constitutional term 1941-1946 and took office on 5 May 1941. Medina included in his post-war foreign policy agenda the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Consequently, negotiations to that effect were carried out by the respective ambassadors in Washington, Diógenes Escalante and Andrei Gromyko, in March 1945. On April 6, 1945, the Venezuelan Gaceta Oficial published the decree that created the Venezuelan Embassy in Moscow. During his attendance of the San Francisco Conference of May 1945, in which Venezuela signed the Charter of the United Nations, Medina's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Caracciolo Parra Pérez,¹⁶ held bilateral talks with the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov on the initiation of the diplomatic relations established between the two countries. Such talks led to the actual exchange of Ambassadors a few months later. Apart from that action, Medina's Chancellery was cautious with respect to the expansion of Venezuela's diplomatic network, limiting itself to the resumption of relations with Italy in November 1944 and joining the United Nations in 1945.

¹⁶Parra Pérez was an accomplished historian, jurist, and diplomat who had a sophisticated and forward-looking view of the world. For a background and documents on his contribution to Venezuelan foreign policy, see Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Caracciolo Parra Pérez, Canciller de Venezuela (Caracas: Ministerio de Relaciones Diplomáticas, 1990).

For the constitutional term 1946-1951 a national consensus was reached on the candidature of the Ambassador to Washington, Diógenes Escalante, with the promise that in the first years of his administration a constitutional reform would be introduced in order to provide for the universal and direct election of the President and Congress. Such consensus broke down in September of 1945 due to the sudden illness and incapacitation of Escalante. On 18 October 1945, Medina was overthrown by the military, in alliance with the Acción Democrática (AD) party.

3. The Trienio Democrático

After an honest effort to maintain the independent features of the foreign policy of Medina and his Chancellery, the Junta under Rómulo Betancourt gradually reverted to a close alignment with the Truman administration's conservative foreign policy, which led to the formal adoption of the goal of containment of Communism in 1947. In a press conference of late October 1945 the Junta's spokesman ratified and amplified the orientation announced by Betancourt on the day of his assumption of power, namely the strengthening of relations with Allied nations, especially Laborist Britain, the United States and the USSR; and rupture of relations with the regimes of Franco in Spain and Trujillo in the Dominican Republic.

As for the leadership in the foreign policy area,

Carlos Morales, a politically independent and respected international lawyer, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, and nationalistic Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo--who fifteen years later became instrumental in the founding of OPEC--was given the portfolio of development, which at the time covered oil policy. He also concurrently held the position of legal adviser to the Junta.

However, the postwar shift of the Truman administration from anti-Fascism to anti-Communism and the militant tone of the Truman doctrine had the effect of moving the Junta administration--popular, but its stability threatened by the military--to seek support from the United States by emphasizing AD's own anti-Communist stance and by giving assurances that in any international emergency Venezuela's oil resources would be at the full disposal of the United States.¹⁷

In the end, the Junta's foreign policy alignment with the United States did not serve the purpose envisaged. As an American historian put it:

During the trienio, Acción Democrática's attitude toward both the Department of State and the foreign oil companies was occasionally contentious, but never contemptuous. The adecos knew Venezuela's place in the inter-American political system and in the U.S.

¹⁷See Rabe, The Road to OPEC, 101. Betancourt assured the U.S. ambassador that in the event of U.S. trouble with the USSR he would imprison all active Communists in Venezuela. The offer of oil resources came in the form of a statement by Venezuelan officials to the American oil press on the eve of the 1948 Berlin Blockade.

economic orbit. If they had respected the power of Venezuela's traditional elites as much as they respected U.S. power, the adecos perhaps would not have suffered a decade of exile.¹⁸

To be sure, during this period, Betancourt--and Gallegos in his nine-month tenure--had brief disputes with the Truman administration over matters of oil policy (for example, the 50-50 split of company profits with the government) and trade policy (protectionism towards infant industries and the Venezuelan-sponsored Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, a joint cargo fleet owned by the governments of Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador). In contrast, by 1947 Betancourt granted Nelson Rockefeller a lucrative concession to establish the Venezuela Basic Economy Corporation (VBEC), an American investment for the production and commercialization of food items including country-wide development of farms and supermarket chains.

After the coup against President Gallegos on 24 November 1948, the Truman administration reacted with ambivalence toward the new military government and made the symbolic gesture of taking some time to recognize it. However, in his press conference on arrival to his exile in Havana, Gallegos explicitly blamed the oil companies--which had always been supported by the U.S. government--for having

¹⁸Ibid., 116. Notice that the word adecos, meaning Acción Democrática party members, comes from the AD acronym plus an ad-hoc colloquial suffix. Even though the term initially had pejorative overtones, the party members finished by accepting it.

conspired with the military to precipitate the overthrow of his constitutional government.¹⁹

According to one Venezuelan historian, the Truman administration was sharply divided on the matter. Thus, the Pentagon and its military mission in Caracas, led by the Embassy's military attaché, and also part of the intelligence community, favored the coup, which they considered inevitable, while President Truman and Secretary of State George Marshall disapproved of such action by the Venezuelan military. This may explain the U.S. delay in recognizing the new Junta. Several years later, the Eisenhower administration (1953-1961), as well as the Standard of Jersey subsidiary in Venezuela (Creole Petroleum Corporation), found no difficulty in maintaining relations involving unusually close political and economic cooperation with the military government.²⁰

4. Nine more years of dictatorship

The post-1948 military autocracy went through initial stages of turbulence, including the murder of the Junta's president, but by 1950 it was fully dominated by General Marcos Pérez Jiménez, again a military man born in the state of Táchira. Pérez Jiménez was ousted on 23 January 1958, by a popular and military rebellion that restored democratic

¹⁹See Fuenmayor, Historia de la Venezuela Política, 7: 557-558.

²⁰Ibid., 3: 572-573.

rule. The period of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship was characterized by the largest macroeconomic growth of the country's history. In the years from 1950 to 1957 Venezuela's real GNP increased 87 percent--one of the highest proportions in the post-war world.²¹ However, graft and inefficiency helped to worsen an already deteriorating social situation.²² In the framework of cold war policies, the Eisenhower administration viewed Pérez Jiménez as a sure ally in its struggle against international Communism and granted him the Legion of Merit--the highest U.S. honor given to a foreign national.²³

During the 1948-1958 authoritarian regime, Venezuela carried out an expansion of its foreign relations beyond the traditional regions of its diplomatic interaction. However, cold war alignment with the United States was the decisive consideration. For example, in 1950, diplomatic ties were established with Iran (under Shah Mohammad Riza Pahlevi, before Mossadegh's nationalization), Iraq (under a pro-British regime), Egypt (under King Farouk), Ethiopia (under Emperor Haile Selassie), and Turkey, which had sent troops to Korea and joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. In 1951 diplomatic relations were started

²¹See José Toro Hardy, Venezuela: 55 años de política económica 1936-1991, una utopía Keynesiana (Caracas: Editorial Panapo, 1992), 47.

²²Ibid., 113-133.

²³Rabe, The Road to OPEC, 127.

with Yugoslavia during the Korean War in which Tito sided with the United States and in 1952 with Israel and Japan. The Governing Junta also broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1952. In 1954, relations were established with Jordan, under King Hussein, and Finland, two years before its signature of a mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Union. All new relations fell neatly within a bipolar perspective in which Venezuela gave priority to countries within the United States sphere of influence. While such cold war perspective started to change gradually during the Democratic Era, it was not until the 1969-1979 decade that the expansion of Venezuela's diplomatic network proceeded independently of the East-West conflict in dramatic contrast to the past.

Marcos Pérez Jiménez was overthrown on 23 January 1958 by a national civilian and military uprising. A Governing Junta presided over by Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal was formed, with the task of holding general democratic elections by the end of the year. The controversial visit to Venezuela of Vice-President Richard Nixon in May 1958 is generally viewed as a turning point of Venezuelan-American relations at the dawn of the Democratic Era.

III. The Democratic Era

1. The Nixon visit

An official visit of Vice-President Richard M. Nixon to Caracas, which was part of a two-and-a-half-week tour of eight South American countries, took place on 13-14 May 1958, less than four months after the flight of dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez--who had been supported by the United States--and during a difficult period of transition to democracy in Venezuela.

Nixon and his wife, flying from Lima, landed at Maiquetía airport (about 12 miles from the center of Caracas) on the morning of 13 May. During the ride from the airport to Caracas, the official motorcade, which transported Vice-President Nixon, Chancellor Oscar García Velutini, and their wives, as well as U.S. ambassador Edward J. Sparks, was blocked by angry demonstrators who stoned the car occupied by the Vice-President and the Chancellor and at one point threatened to turn it over. The official programme of Mr. Nixon's visit had to be cancelled.

The scheduling of Nixon's visit to Venezuela was the result of a miscalculation by both governments, which share the blame in failing to assess the situation, including the magnitude of the risks involved. In the days before the visit, hostile reactions to it were building up in Caracas, adding to an ongoing shaky urban situation. The Junta was reluctant to take the drastic measure of cancelling the

visit and implying that it could not control the streets, or was yielding to pressure. Nixon said that he sent word to the Venezuelan government indicating that they were free to withdraw their invitation.²⁴ On the other hand, Vice-President Nixon, the United States Embassy, and their security advisors, ignored signs of serious risk.²⁵ For example, the sizeable Federation of University Students of Central University of Venezuela in Caracas had already declared the United States Vice-President an "undesirable visitor" in a statement published in the main newspapers on 11 May.²⁶ Even the day of his arrival, before Mr. Nixon's plane landed, the Junta's president Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal had personally faced about 1,000 violent demonstrators in front of the Palace and had asked them to go home, stating that "the Junta de Gobierno will meet with Vice-President Nixon who is the representative of a democratic nation."²⁷

That, in the extreme, the Government had the means to ensure security of the visitor became clear when Vice-President Nixon was to go to the airport directly from the

²⁴Ibid., 211.

²⁵See José Rivas Rivas, Historia Gráfica de Venezuela: una historia contada por la prensa, vol. 7 (Caracas: Ediciones Toran, 1989), 110-116, and Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (New York: Touchstone, 1990), 183-234.

²⁶Rivas Rivas, Historia Gráfica, 111.

²⁷Ibid., 113.

farewell luncheon offered to him by the Junta at the Officers' Club on 14 May. However, that result had required the virtual military occupation of the whole route to be followed and the transformation of the motorcade into a military convoy.

As to Vice-President Nixon's account in his 1960 book, Six Crises, of his moments of grave danger in the morning of 13 May 1958,²⁸ one need note that the lives of both the United States Vice-President and the Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs (and to some extent of their spouses, who were traveling in the next car) were equally at risk. In spite of the acknowledged flaws in Venezuelan security measures, Nixon's characterization of the whole situation borders on hyperbole. In fact, Minister Oscar García Velutini, in a letter to Venezuelan newspapers and to The New York Times, following the advance publication of the relevant chapter of the book, corrected several points of Mr. Nixon's version of the incident, including, as is common in such cases, the reversal of the charge that he (Chancellor García Velutini) was "close to hysterics."²⁹

The public announcement on 13 May 1958, of the deployment of troops into the Caribbean area by the United

²⁸See Nixon, Six Crises, 214-220. Vice-President Nixon describes Minister García Velutini patronizingly as a "gentle, well-intentioned man," to whom he did not hesitate "to let him have it with both barrels."

²⁹See Fuenmayor, 11: 247-255, and Oscar García Velutini, La República (Caracas), 8 May 1962.

States in view of protecting the safety of the Vice-President, probably directed primarily to the American public, had the effect of unifying all Venezuelan political parties in protesting American "interventionism."

2. Rómulo Betancourt (1959-1964)

The 1958 democratic restoration resulted in general elections in which former Trienio Junta President Rómulo Betancourt was elected President of the Republic. Under the terms of the pre-election agreement known as the Pacto de Punto Fijo, Betancourt formed a coalition government with all the major contenders in the 1958 presidential election (his own Acción Democrática (AD) party; the Christian Democratic party, COPEI; and the Unión Republicana Democrática (URD) party), excluding only the Communist Party (PCV). His Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ignacio Luis Arcaya, a leader of the left-of-center URD party, came to be known as El Canciller de la Dignidad because of his unyielding, independent position in foreign policy during his short tenure.

On 22 August 1960, Ignacio Luis Arcaya headed the Venezuelan delegation to the Seventh Consultative Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics convened by the Organization of American States (OAS) in San José, Costa Rica. The agenda contained four basic points: (i) strengthening of continental solidarity in the face of

extra-continental threats of intervention; (ii) OAS cooperation for the defense of democracy against subversive activities; (iii) economic and social factors of political instability; (iv) international tensions in the Caribbean and the assurance of peace in the region. The San José Declaration issuing from the conference made a forceful condemnation of the intervention of extra-continental powers (meaning Sino-Soviet intervention) in the affairs of American republics. Venezuela, with the support of Mexico, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia, sought to introduce an amendment to condemn also any intra-continental intervention.³⁰ Arcaya made a statement in support of Cuba and its government which made Betancourt indignant. When the amendment was defeated, Arcaya considered that Venezuela had to vote against the original proposal supported by the United States, which was clearly aimed against Cuba. Rather than yield on what he considered a matter regarding the fundamental principle of Venezuelan independence, Arcaya decided to publicly resign from his Ministry.³¹ The events

³⁰See Stempel Paris, 150 Años, 162. Also see Julio Portillo, Venezuela-Cuba: relaciones diplomáticas, 1902-1980 (Caracas: Editorial Arte, 1981), 68.

³¹As Charles D. Ameringer puts it in his essay "Foreign Policy of Democratic Venezuela" in John D. Martz and David Myers, eds., Venezuela: the democratic experience (New York: Praeger, 1986), 406-407: Foreign Minister Ignacio Luis Arcaya, who represented the Democratic Republic Union (URD) in the cabinet, refused to sign the San José Declaration. . . . This episode demonstrated Betancourt's control over foreign policy. As further evidence, Betancourt made the decision to sever relations with Cuba in

leading to Arcaya's resignation in 1960 could be seen as symbolic of President Betancourt's capitulation to the U.S. on the goal of an independent foreign policy by Venezuela after the 1958 democratic restoration. In fact, Betancourt's own AD party was hardly unanimous behind its position. Arcaya's departure ultimately led to the separation of the URD party from the governing coalition.³² President Betancourt's priority was what he conceived as the defense of democracy through expected collective Hemispheric action against Cuba.

Betancourt (1908-1981) began his political career as one of the leaders of the student uprising against the Gómez dictatorship in 1928. During his exile he lived in Costa Rica where he participated in the founding of the Communist Party.³³ The democratic Trienio started by Betancourt's Junta ended with the overthrow of President Gallegos by the military--a development in which there were allegations of U.S. involvement. In his new exile, Betancourt's politics started to move sharply to the center. Independently of the evolution of his thinking, he was consistently a leader who saw the world through an "us" versus "them" perspective. In

November 1961, despite the disruption of the governing coalition and dissension with his own party. He explained that he could no longer maintain "national decorum" and "endure Castro's insults."

³²Portillo, Venezuela-Cuba, 69.

³³See Manuel Caballero, Rómulo Betancourt (Caracas: Ediciones Centauro, 1977).

his whole life, he visited only one socialist country: Hungary, privately, while he was living in Switzerland, from 1964 to 1969. During his constitutional presidency, he broke diplomatic relations with Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru. That was done in application of the "Betancourt Doctrine," based on the Venezuelan sponsored principle of repudiation of de facto regimes in the region. The policy ended up isolating Venezuela more than the governments against which it was directed.

Betancourt's East-West perspective of the world was also characterized by a rejection of Venezuela's role in the emerging North-South debate. As his leading American biographer put it, Betancourt disliked the Third World notion. He refused to have Venezuela participate in the nonaligned bloc, and except for relations with the Middle Eastern oil-producing countries, the focus of attention of his foreign policy was consistently on the Western Hemisphere seen through cold war glasses. He felt that Venezuela and Latin America's interests lay with the West in the continuing struggle between it and Communism represented by the Soviet Union and countries allied with and controlled by it. The common interests of democratic countries were stronger than their bonds to the economically underdeveloped but politically heterogeneous nations of the Third World.³⁴

³⁴See Robert Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1982), 524-525.

3. Raúl Leoni (1964-1969)

During his term, Raúl Leoni governed with several coalitions, excluding the Social Christian (COPEI) party which had been the main partner of his predecessor, Rómulo Betancourt.

While Leoni's foreign policy continued Betancourt's anti-communist orientation, it became more flexible and broader in political and geographical scope. Efforts were made to expand and diversify Venezuela's international relations. Still invoking the Betancourt Doctrine, Leoni refused to recognize the overthrow by the military of Brazil's constitutional government of João Goulart in 1964. He also condemned President Lyndon Johnson's intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and, to Leoni's satisfaction, United Nations Secretary-General U Thant designated Venezuelan José Antonio Mayobre as his Personal Representative in the Dominican Republic during the crisis.

By the end of his administration, Leoni had significantly advanced in making a transition from Betancourt's foreign policy to that of the autonomistic decade of presidents Caldera and Pérez. Having announced a program of political pacification of the country in 1966 and with the Communist Party's abandonment of armed struggle the following year, Leoni moved towards the normalization of

Venezuela's relations with the Soviet Union, an initiative that was frustrated mainly by the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces in 1968. He had established diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia in July 1968 and Romania in 1967, which already represented a departure from the policies of the previous administration.

Moreover, Leoni initiated ties with a number of countries which were members of the Group of 77 in the United Nations, including some which were also members of OPEC, namely Kuwait, Libya, and Nigeria, and thus were of special interest for Venezuelan oil diplomacy. The others were Morocco, Tunisia, Liberia, Guinea, the Philippines, and the English-speaking Caribbean countries of Jamaica and newly independent Guyana, the latter being the subject of territorial claims by Venezuela.

During the presidential decade following Betancourt and Leoni, Rafael Caldera (b. 1916), the principal founder of the Social Christian (COPEI) Party, and Carlos Andres Pérez (b. 1922), a former Secretary-General of the Social Democratic (AD) party, in the course of their respective presidencies effectively changed Venezuelan foreign policy both in quality and in quantity of activity. As is shown in succeeding chapters of this dissertation, both leaders displayed an unprecedentedly high degree of independence in their foreign initiatives.

4. Rafael Caldera (1969-1979)

President Rafael Caldera took office on 11 March 1969. He had won by a slim margin, receiving 28.7 percent of the vote, the lowest plurality in the Democratic Era. Acción Democrática had experienced a major split between the supporters of the candidature of Gonzalo Barrios, Minister of the Interior under President Leoni and Luis Beltrán Prieto, President of that party, who was nominated by the splinter Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo (MEP).³⁵

Caldera also found himself without a majority in the National Congress. While he did not contemplate the formation of a coalition government, he reluctantly admitted the possibility of parliamentary alliances. Hence compromises had to be laboriously negotiated with the opposition parties and especially with Acción Democrática.

The assumption of power by Caldera represented the strength of the constitutional system after 10 years in place.³⁶ The will of the people had been respected when a

³⁵Ramón J. Velásquez, "Aspectos de la evolución política de Venezuela en el último medio siglo," in Venezuela Moderna: medio siglo de historia, 1926-1976 (Caracas: Editorial Ariel, 1979), 333-344.

³⁶Ramón Velásquez recognizes the importance of this event. Ibid., 342:

The event of the 11th of March was historic. For the first time in our one hundred and fifty-three years of republican life, a political party has given power to another without violence and has gone to Congress as an opposition party. And this change didn't result in a political and military collapse of our system, as it always has happened in the past.

close and disputed election was won by the opposition. Such circumstances had not failed to generate considerable stress on the political system, which resisted well.

Rafael Caldera had the legitimacy of being one of the architects of the post-1958 democratic restoration and his inauguration brought to the presidency the dignity of both his distinguished political career and his membership in the academies of law and social sciences and of language, his position as a proponent of sociological theories, and his standing as a university professor for almost 25 years.

In his inaugural speech, Caldera faced the issue of insurrection still existing in Venezuela and offered those who took the path of the guerrilla the opportunity to rectify, since "in Venezuela circumstances are not propitious for the success of the insurrection movement and those who defend ideologies can do so within the framework of law."³⁷ Caldera's policy of internal pacification consisted of offering incentives to the participants in the subversive movement of the 1960s to abandon armed struggle and join the country's political process under conditions of legality.

As Caldera stated, pacification had both a national

didn't result in a political and military collapse of our system, as it always has happened in the past.

³⁷Rafael Caldera, "Discurso del Presidente Dr. Rafael Caldera en el acto de la toma de posesión del cargo" (Caracas: Ediciones de la Presidencia de la Republica, 1969).

and an international side. It was also necessary to normalize the relations of Venezuela with Cuba and the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist camp.³⁸ During the Betancourt presidency an apparently irreconcilable division took place between the Left and the mainstream political system in Venezuela. The Communist Party and the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) were banned. Also, at the international level, relations with Cuba were broken and relations with the Soviet Union, already broken in 1949 by the military government, became even more tense with the October 1962 missile crisis. Nine years later, following his politics of pacification not only from an internal but also from an international point of view, Caldera achieved the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union one year after his inauguration.

President Caldera appointed Arístides Calvani (1918-1986) Minister of Foreign Affairs. Also a professor of law and founder of the Catholic University during the years of the preceding term, Calvani had been a Congressman and directed the training center for COPEI party political cadres.

In a historical essay on Venezuelan foreign policy

³⁸Daniel I. Premo, "Coping with Insurgency: the politics of pacification in Colombia and Venezuela," in Donald L. Herman, editor, Democracy in Latin America: Colombia and Venezuela, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988), 226.

published in 1979, Calvani defined the ideological basis of the foreign policy of the Caldera administration, indicating that in 1969, "new fundamental principles come up which would guide the implementation of a new perspective of Venezuelan international policy."³⁹

The foreign policy of the Caldera administration was based on elaborate Christian Democratic ideology which reflected the social doctrine of the Catholic Church as expressed by Pope John XXIII in his 1966 Encyclical Letter Populorum Progressio.⁴⁰ As presented by Caldera and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Calvani, Venezuelan foreign policy would be guided by the principles of international social and universal common good. As Caldera put it at the installation of the Twenty-first Ministerial Conference of OPEC in December of 1970:

As a norm of our foreign policy we have proclaimed the idea of international social justice. We believe that the international community becomes stronger as time passes; not in relation to the power or wealth of each country, but in relation to the responsibility of each of them towards universal common good.⁴¹

The idea of the universal common good called for a comprehensive system of global economic integration for the

³⁹Calvani, Venezuela Moderna, 476.

⁴⁰For a discussion of the Vatican process leading to Populorum Progressio, see Peter Hebblethwait, John XXIII Pope of the Council (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1984), 325-340; and Vittorio Gorresio, New Mission of Pope John XXIII (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), 288-289.

⁴¹ Freddy Alvarez Yáñez, ed., Selección de Fichas Bibliográficas, Charlas, Declaraciones, Conferencias, Textos, Posiciones Sobre Política Internacional del Dr. Rafael Caldera, (Caracas: RENACE, 1993), 156.

benefit of all countries and not for a group of privileged nations. Such an idea made it necessary to question the economic growth models of both East and West. The principle of international social justice represented the transposing into the international sphere of the traditional claims of labor in the national arena.⁴² It also postulated the need for justice in the relations of cooperation among developing countries especially between the relatively better off and the least developed countries.

Caldera also proclaimed the need for Latin American unity and integration on the basis of ideological pluralism.⁴³ In addition, international ideological pluralism (peaceful coexistence of different ideologies) had to be reflected in the internal order. Such a system of principles was compatible with the rise of the demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) during the 1970s and the historical tradition of Latin American integration.

Caldera's policy of support to Latin American integration was grounded on the concept of pluralistic solidarity. He was convinced that Venezuela had an important role to play in the historical objective of Latin American economic and political integration. This was a goal that he felt could not be postponed on the account of differences in

⁴²Aristides Calvani, Politica Exterior, Caracas, IFEDec, mimeo, 1974.

⁴³See George W. Grayson, "Venezuela's presidential politics," in Current History (January 1974): 26.

political principles and forms of social organization. Caldera's view of ideological and political pluralism in the common endeavor of defending the interests of the region allowed him to define a bloc that extended from Cuba to Brazil or from the Dominican Republic to Chile or from Haiti to Colombia.

In the Council of the OAS he made the point that he considered it more dangerous for Latin American countries to entertain a colonial mentality than for the United States to have an imperialistic conception.⁴⁴ He meant that Latin American countries had often been guilty of their own stance of subordination at the same time that they magnified their differences. It was necessary to form a unified and compact bloc strong enough to sustain a real dialogue with the United States and reach a new form of hemispheric friendship on the basis of equality, mutual respect and recognition of Latin American rights.

Caldera also thought it necessary that Latin America take part in the establishment of a new international economic order whose juridical grounding should be found in social justice. His argument was that social justice demands that those who are more affluent should not receive more but should have the obligation to give more. Thus, having more

⁴⁴Rafael Caldera, "Caldera: autoanálisis de su política exterior," in Perfil Internacional no. 3 (Caracas: 4th quarter, 1980): 11.

wealth does not entail greater rights but rather greater responsibility.

On the national scene, traditional resentment over U.S. hegemony was conspicuously present and could be used by Caldera's opposition at any occasion. Thus Caldera's foreign policy required the practice of a delicate internal balance of power. His official trip to the United States required the approval of the Senate. The President's trip was opposed by a combination of Left-wing parties and the Right-wing Cruzada Cívica Nacionalista which supported former dictator Pérez Jiménez⁴⁵. Senator Jesús Soto Amesty of the moderate leftist URD brought in the argument that Caldera's visit might appear as a manifestation of support by Venezuela to "the aggressive and brutal policies of President Nixon," including his administration's conduct of the Vietnam war and student repression in the United States.⁴⁶ After a debate which lasted all night, the majority of the Senate voted the authorization of President Caldera's trip to the United States on the grounds that it was necessary to bring to the U.S people and government Venezuelan demands for a fair treatment of its oil exports. Equally important was to deliver the country's call for the commitment of the United States to the democratization of the continent and the principles of international social justice.

⁴⁵Velásquez, Venezuela Moderna, 362.

⁴⁶Ibid., 362-363.

Caldera spoke before a joint session of U.S. Congress in June 1970 and presented his vision of international social justice together with Venezuela's claims for a greater and more predictable share of oil exports to the United States.⁴⁷ It became apparent that Venezuela's ultimate aspirations of more equitable oil revenues would not be easily fulfilled through bilateral interaction with the United States. In the first place, Venezuela had tended to be taken for granted as an oil supplier by the United States and particularly by the Nixon administration. At the same time, like his predecessors, Caldera was seeking to increase government revenue through increased taxes on oil industry profits. Moreover, in early 1972 the Venezuelan Congress passed a law which ordered foreign investors to post bonds on their property to ensure that oilfield equipment and infrastructure would be maintained in proper condition when concessions reverted back to the government on their expiry in 1983.

The oil companies with the support of the Nixon administration responded with a drop in production which contributed to the creation of a budgetary deficit in Venezuela in the fiscal year 1972.⁴⁸ In September of that

⁴⁷Rafael Caldera, "International Social Justice for Developing Countries," address of the President of Venezuela, Rafael Caldera, to the Joint Session of the United States Congress (Oficina Central de Información, Washington, 3 June 1970).

⁴⁸Rabe, The Road to OPEC, 176.

year the United States government--after sending Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally to Caracas to complain of the country's nationalistic tendencies towards U.S. investment--kept Venezuela from receiving any share of the increase in its latest oil import quota amounting to 600,000 barrels a day.⁴⁹

The pressure exerted on Venezuela by the United States was perceived by Caldera in the context of a changing international political and economic system within which U.S. power was being eroded. In particular, the war in Southeast Asia was becoming a matter of public concern in Venezuela. In May 1970, Venezuela witnessed unusual political and street agitation connected with a geographically remote international development. It was a result of the invasion of Cambodia by American troops. Students called for a country-wide mobilization and the ensuing demonstrations were dispersed by the police, with one student dead and 15 injured.⁵⁰

In the purely economic domain, the unilateral decision of the Nixon administration to cease to provide the convertibility of the U.S. dollar was perceived as an additional sign of declining leadership. Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly, Minister of Foreign Affairs

⁴⁹Ibid., 177. See also Guillermo D. Marquez, La Economía Venezolana en la Década de los Setenta (Caracas: Monte Avila Editores, 1983).

⁵⁰Velásquez, Venezuela Moderna, 361.

Arístides Calvani underlined the destabilizing effect of this measure for developing countries in particular. The international image of the United States also suffered in the light of the Watergate affair which led to the president's resignation in 1974 and brought Vice-President Gerald Ford to the presidency. One needs to recall that Ford had previously been designated by the Senate to fill the vacancy left by Spiro Agnew, Nixon's running mate who had resigned in the midst of another scandal.

Thus during the 1970s Venezuela's drive towards a major expansion and diversification of diplomatic relations and the application of a more independent foreign policy was facilitated by the relative power decline of the United States. That decline made foreign policy experimentation and the diversification of diplomatic relations less risky in terms of the possibility of running into a political confrontation with the hemisphere's historical hegemonic power. To this must be added the fact that the detente initiated by the Nixon administration with the Soviet Union in the early 1970s constituted an encouragement for Latin American developing countries to seek a share of peaceful coexistence in their own foreign policy. Therefore, the process of globalization of Venezuelan foreign policy benefited from a considerable measure of start-up momentum coming from the state of the international system, and especially from the power image of the United States itself.

The relatively short-lived success of OPEC was enough to maintain a belief in the ultimate benefits of cooperation and solidarity among developing countries, and the Government of Venezuela also began exploring the possibilities of nationalization of the country's oil industry. The efforts of the 1960s towards establishment of closer ties with oil exporters in the Middle East which led to the establishment of OPEC had stimulated the formation of a common policy towards foreign oil investment. Caldera, when receiving the news of the revolution in Libya--and independently of its political orientation--felt relieved by the fact that it would be no longer possible to invoke Libyan oil competition as an excuse for the low price of Venezuelan crude oil.⁵¹

Caldera's foreign policy had to face the historical legacy of border disputes with Guyana and Colombia. Both questions required careful bilateral negotiations and skillful handling of the legal issues. In addition, it was important to obtain the support of the developing countries. This created additional incentives for a more Third World-oriented foreign policy.

In the national elections of 9 December 1973 Pérez received close to 49 percent of the vote and his AD party gained a comfortable control of the Congress. In conceding Pérez's victory, Caldera affirmed that the Venezuelan people

⁵¹See Caldera, Perfil Internacional, 10.

demonstrated that they believed in democracy. Moreover, with fiscal income at historically high levels resulting from a sizeable increase of oil prices in real terms and with the country at peace, Pérez could begin his administration under almost ideal conditions for carrying out the vigorous North-South-oriented foreign policy on which he had campaigned.

5. Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974-1979)

When Carlos Andrés Pérez took office on 12 March 1974, he wielded an amount of power that exceeded that of any other Venezuelan president in history.⁵² As President-elect Pérez announced, Venezuela would not wait until the expiry of oil concessions in 1983 and would work towards the nationalization of foreign oil companies. In a display of policy continuity, President Caldera's 1974 New Year's address fully backed Pérez and urged him to nationalize the iron ore and petroleum industries.⁵³

During his administration President Pérez advanced the globalization of Venezuelan foreign policy at a fast pace, and its political foundations were developed along the lines of the New International Economic Order. Pérez was able to build his foreign policy on the foundations provided by the initiatives of his predecessor, Rafael Caldera, as well as by the financial resources coming

⁵²Velásquez, Venezuela Moderna, 413.

⁵³Rabe, The Road to OPEC, 183.

from the mid-1970s oil bonanza.

In the course of his first year in office, Pérez recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) and established ambassadorial-level relations with Beijing (June 1974). Cooperation with China developed rapidly during Pérez's presidency. Venezuelan exports to that country included steel, aluminum, petrochemicals, and oil products. China's increasing coincidence with the goals of the Group of 77 facilitated a political rapprochement with Venezuela.

Pérez also resumed diplomatic relations with Cuba in December of 1974. Economic and cultural exchanges between the two countries expanded dramatically and cooperation with the Third World on political matters became routinized. Pérez also coped with the problems created by the asylum of Cubans in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana and the trial in Venezuela of the persons indicted in the bombing of a Cuban Airlines passenger airplane off Barbados in 1976. After Pérez, the political and legal problems associated with the trial plagued the Herrera and Lusinchi administrations, and even Pérez's second presidency. The case did not finally end until mid-1994.

The diplomatic breakthroughs represented by the normalization of relations with the PRC and Cuba are analyzed in detail under specific case studies elsewhere in this dissertation.

Venezuelan foreign policy under Pérez was based on a

definite Third World orientation and on the premises of the New International Economic Order sought by the Group of 77 in the United Nations and in other international fora. That foreign policy was supported by expanded state resources obtaining from increases in oil prices which took place during the mid and late 1970s. Such resources not only made Venezuela more powerful in the international arena but also allowed it to continue to improve its foreign policy apparatus, as well as to engage in bilateral economic and technical cooperation--especially in Central America and the Caribbean.

From the beginning of his administration Pérez announced that foreign policy would be put into effect which would be in the service of all national aspirations and goals. More broadly, Pérez considered his foreign policy to be based on the concept of interdependence. For him, that involved the equal recognition of the needs of both weak and powerful states, of rich and poor nations--and dealing with them on the basis of even and fair treatment of all. He saw the Third World as the group of the developing countries which opposed the economic absolutism of great powers seeking to control Third World resources. However, the redress of such a state of affairs could not be the task of

a single nation: it had to be based on Third World solidarity.⁵⁴

In the OAS Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Quito in November 1974, Venezuela proposed the lifting of economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed against Cuba in 1964. The proposal was two votes short of the two-thirds majority required. Without being deterred by this diplomatic setback, Pérez went ahead with negotiations for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba at the level of ambassadors. Pérez's move had been motivated in part by his conception of pluralism and the need for economic integration in Latin America. He had clearly removed the condition of similar ideology and economic and social system for diplomatic relations when he established ties with Bulgaria and North Korea⁵⁵ earlier in 1974. Pérez was continuing a trend which can be traced back to the policy of his predecessor Caldera and to some actions by Leoni.

⁵⁴See Robert D. Bond, "Venezuela's role in international affairs," in Robert D. Bond, ed., Contemporary Venezuela and Its Role in International Affairs (New York: New York University Press, 1977). Also see Robert P. Matthews, "Oil on troubled waters: Venezuelan policy in the Caribbean," in NACLA Report of the Americas 17, no. 4 (July-August 1984): 21-51.

⁵⁵In the establishment of relations with North Korea there was the additional strong motivating factor that a Venezuelan editor of Spanish publications with the Foreign Ministry in Pyongyang, the poet Alí Lamedá, was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment over an accusation of political disloyalty by the North Korean government. The liberation of Lamedá became a national crusade, and the establishment of relations made it more feasible. Lamedá was released in 1974 and returned to Venezuela. See Alí Lamedá, "A personal account of the experience of a prisoner of conscience in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (London: Amnesty International, 1979).

Relations with Cuba were particularly important for Venezuela in view of the history of interaction between the two countries which included on the negative side a measure of Cuban support to armed insurgency in Venezuela especially during the Betancourt administration. Pérez believed that ceasing the isolation of Cuba would contribute to its reconciliation with Latin America and eventually to Cuba's liberalization and democratization. Cuba had potential for becoming a powerful ally of Venezuela in the Group of 77 in the United Nations as well as in the Movement of Non-aligned Countries.

Pérez, along with Mexican President Luís Echeverría (1970-1976), sponsored the establishment of a new regional multilateral organization, the Sistema Económico Latinoamericano (SELA), whose membership includes all the developing countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. SELA is a forum for consultation, coordination, cooperation, and joint economic and social policy formulation. At its origin, SELA was strongly influenced by the principles of the global North-South negotiations developed by UNCTAD and was meant to adopt common regional positions and strategies for those negotiations. The SELA secretariat was established in Caracas and the organization's charter was signed by 23 nations on 18 October 1975 during a conference held in Panama. SELA provided a needed Southern cooperative forum

for Latin America and the Caribbean, which differentiated itself from the hemispheric OAS both in composition (it did not include developed countries such as the United States and Canada) and substantive scope (it did not engage in political and security issues per se).

In the internal scene, Pérez did not face any significant threat from residual guerrilla activity. Like Caldera, Pérez viewed the maintenance of peaceful relations with Cuba as a necessity for a durable pacification of the country, both to eliminate incentives for material support and encouragement of rebels by Cuba and to offer them a credible peaceful alternative for their political struggle.

IV. Conclusion

The durable establishment of constitutional democratic rule in Venezuela, made possible by the overthrow of military dictatorship in January 1958, marks the beginning of a distinct period in Venezuelan foreign policy, characterized by increased activity, independent initiatives, and growing influence in the international system, particularly in the Latin American and Caribbean region. On the U.S. side, Vice-President Nixon's near-tragic visit to Caracas had demonstrated the failure of a U.S. policy of support of unpopular right-wing dictatorships in Latin America--especially in Venezuela.

While an anti-colonial orientation of the foreign policy of Venezuela stems from its own independence struggle in the 19th century and the historical legacy of Simón Bolívar, its realization in terms of effective actions was constrained by the power configuration of the Western Hemisphere, where the United States traditionally played a hegemonic role. In the case of Venezuela, that factor is compounded by the country's high vulnerability to reductions of its oil income and the increasing burden of its external indebtedness. Leaders like Caldera and Pérez in the 1970s, who sought to put into practice a neo-Bolivarian policy vision (solidarity with the goals of newly independent nations; assertion of Venezuela's regional leadership; Latin American unity) had to take into account the realities of that historical hegemony.⁵⁶

Nevertheless, one common feature of contemporary Venezuelan foreign policy actions that have had an important impact on the international system has been their lack of conformity to the preferences of the United States at the time they took place. Those actions are perceived by many commentators as manifestations of autonomous policy trends

⁵⁶As an example, due to the opposition of the United States and some Latin American countries to Cuba's participation, Pérez had to abandon his plans to hold a Hemispheric summit in Caracas to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the Panama Congress convened by Simón Bolívar in 1826. (In this respect see Ameringer in Venezuela, 420; and Martz in Contemporary Venezuela, 191.)

developing within the externally constrained Venezuelan state. In that context, the decline during the 1970s of both U.S. power in the world, and its traditional influence in Latin America, was an important factor in facilitating the rise of a more independent Venezuelan foreign policy.

CHAPTER 3

STATE GOALS IN VENEZUELA'S POLICY GLOBALIZATION

I. Introduction

In order to explain the process of globalization of Venezuelan foreign policy during the 1970s, I describe and analyze in this chapter three internal goals (protection of oil income, pacification of guerrillas, and territorial sovereignty over frontier issues) and an external factor (decline of United States influence). In chapter 5, I apply those elements to the cases of Venezuela's diplomatic normalization with the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba. Such cases are significant because they involve among the most controversial, sensitive, risky--and also profitable--decisions by the Venezuelan leaders and thus are appropriate for testing the explanatory relevance of the four elements with respect to the process being investigated.

II. Introductory analysis of the globalization of Venezuelan foreign policy during the 1970s

In accordance with the hypothesis advanced in chapter 1 of this dissertation, Venezuelan foreign policy during the 1969-1979 decade can be explained parsimoniously in terms of a small set of internal goals and an external factor. That policy resulted in the institutionalization of the country's global interests and objectives and consequently manifested

itself in the diversification and expansion of the diplomatic network. Venezuela also acted with more independence of the United States and emphasized its affinities with developing countries in all regions.

1. Internal goals

The three internal goals discussed in this chapter relate directly to the most vital needs of the state as often presented in the foreign policy literature. For the purposes of this research, one particular characterization of the national interest in terms of state needs was found useful. It involves the following basic elements: self-preservation, independence, territorial integrity, military security, and economic well-being.¹

The conceptual interrelation between the goals analyzed and vital needs of the state expressed in general terms is summarized in the following table.

¹See "Foreign Policy Components: National Interest" in Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary, 4th ed. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio., 1988), 10.

Table 1Venezuelan globalization policies during 1969-1979

<i>Internal goals</i>		<i>Vital needs of the state</i>
1.	Maximization and protection of real income from petroleum resources	Economic well-being; independence
2.	Internal pacification	Self-preservation; military security
3.	Sovereignty over national territory (Brazil, Colombia, and Guyana issues)	Territorial integrity

2. External factor

In addition to the above three internal goals, the hypothesis includes an external factor, namely the relative decline of United States influence in Latin America. This factor relates to the conditions of the system during the 1970s. The interrelations between such external factor and the general state of the system are summarized in Table 2, which follows.

Table 2External elements in Venezuelan globalization

<i>External factor</i>	<i>Relevant conditions of the international system in the 1970s</i>
(a) Structural decline of U.S. influence in Latin America (and consequently in Venezuela) (b) U.S. policies of detente, especially towards the USSR and the PRC	1. Structural decline in U.S. economic and political supremacy 2. Temporary relaxation of cold war tensions 3. Decrease in the system's bipolarity 4. Growing recognition of the PRC by the international community and formal recognition by the U.S. in 1979 5. Collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and continuing crisis of the dollar 6. Oil shocks of 1973 and 1979

3. Case studies on relations with the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba

The factors considered were found to be distinctly relevant in explaining the events analyzed in the three case studies which are presented in chapter 5. In this respect, the resumption of relations with the Soviet Union and Cuba and the recognition and establishment of relations with the PRC were among the most salient political developments in

the process of globalization during the 1970s.² On the other hand, the overall expansion of Venezuela's political and economic cooperation, especially with the English-speaking Caribbean, non-OPEC African countries, and countries in Asia and the Pacific, as well as with socialist countries in Europe, is discussed in chapter 4.

Table 3, which follows, summarizes the relevance of the factors in explaining the main events of the three case studies. Such relevance is estimated on the basis of the definition and analysis of the factors given later in this chapter and the degree to which they contribute to explain the instances of expansion and diversification of the diplomatic network examined in detail in chapter 5. For example, the need for internal pacification and the decline of U.S. influence were seen as determining or highly relevant factors common to all three case studies. Likewise, the relevance of oil income and frontier issues was considered moderate in the case of relations with China.

²China and the Soviet Union, in addition to being the two non-Western nations among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, represented close to one-third of the world's total population in 1976. Cuba was a key country for Venezuelan foreign policy because it was significantly influential in world politics, particularly in the Western Hemisphere and Africa.

Table 3

Degree of relevance of the elements of the hypothesis in explaining the normalization of Venezuela's relations with the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba (1969-1979)

Case Studies*	Relevance of elements**				Venezuelan President	
	Oil	Pacification	Frontiers	U.S. influence decline	In office at the time	Precursor of the action
Soviet Union (April 1970)	strong	very strong	moderate	very strong	Caldera	Leoni***
China (June 1974)	moderate	very strong	moderate	strong	Pérez	Caldera
Cuba (December 1974)	moderate	very strong	strong	very strong	Pérez	Caldera

*The dates of resumption or establishment of relations are given in parenthesis.

**The degree of relevance of the factors in explaining diplomatic events of each case study is indicated as moderate, meaning significantly relevant to the explanation; strong, meaning highly relevant; or very strong, meaning that it was a determining factor.

***Constitutional term 1964-1979.

4. Interrelation between the factors

During the decade, the pursuit of maximization of the income derived from oil resources made the support of OPEC a priority. The defense of territorial integrity in frontier issues also required international support. Thus, globalization of the diplomatic network became necessary as a tool for obtaining that support and especially for the related objective of establishing a leadership position within the developing countries in the North-South dialogue. Therefore, both oil (in terms of OPEC objectives) and border issues came high in the agenda of Venezuela's Third World diplomacy. In turn, pacification was a determinant in the development of cooperation with the socialist countries,

including Cuba, which was both Third World and socialist. China, already a nuclear power, was not considered Third World in spite of its low income. However, China supported Third World economic objectives and was an important political and economic element in the global diplomatic network being built by Venezuela.

5. Brief explanation of Venezuelan policy

In the light of historical and other evidence analyzed in this chapter and in chapters 4 and 5, the four proposed elements provide an adequate and compact explanation of Venezuela's normalization of relations and further diplomatic interaction with the Soviet Union, China and Cuba.

Those case studies, which are presented in chapter 5, validate the rise of a unified and consistent foreign policy in the 1969-1979 decade, based on the definition of Venezuelan interests in global terms and the consequent diversification and expansion of the diplomatic network. Thus the proposed elements explain not only relations with the three countries during the decade, but the process of globalization of Venezuelan foreign policy as a whole.

That process included the following elements of action by Venezuela, under the leadership of the Presidents and the Chancellery:

- a) definition of an independent and proactive global foreign policy aimed at the development of cooperation with countries in all geographical, political, economic and cultural regions of the world;
- b) adoption of a position of independence with respect to the superpowers in all regions and discontinuation of the definition of Venezuelan interests exclusively in terms of the East-West conflict;
- c) practice of a new diplomatic activism, in contrast to previous traditional passivity, including the rapid expansion and diversification of the Venezuelan diplomatic network, to include the East and developing countries from all regions, independently of ideological differences;
- d) assignment of high priority in the foreign policy agenda to relations with other developing countries, especially OPEC countries, insular countries in the Caribbean and the least developed countries.

III. The explanatory elements proposed

1. Maximization and protection of real income derived from the exploitation of petroleum resources

Income derived from petroleum has so far been the principal source of financing of Venezuelan development. To have an idea of the country's economic dependence on oil, suffice it to consider that from the mid-1920s to the

mid-1970s oil steadily accounted for 90 percent of export earnings; 65 percent of fiscal income and 20 percent of the gross domestic product.³ In the light of those facts, Venezuelan foreign policy has been conditioned by the need to maximize oil income and to protect it from erosion due to external factors, for example, declines in international oil prices; world inflation and eventual devaluations of the U.S. dollar, which is the currency in which oil export sales are denominated.⁴

More broadly, the challenge of Venezuelan development is ultimately to diversify the economy, industrialize the country and create the conditions for a durable, socially equitable and independent growth. However, in order to achieve such goals, Venezuela had to rely to a large extent on the income afforded by the exploitation of its petroleum resources (first through transnational corporations and from 1976 directly by nationally controlled enterprises). That income results especially from the exports of crude oil, natural gas, refined products including fuel oil and gasoline and, to a lesser degree, of petrochemicals.

³Robert J. Bond, "Venezuela's Role in International Affairs" in Robert D. Bond, ed., Contemporary Venezuela and its Role in International Affairs (New York: New York University Press, 1977), 228.

⁴The devaluations of the U.S. dollar in 1971 and 1973 prompted immediate demands, which were satisfied, from the oil exporters seeking to at least maintain the real price of oil. See for example Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations, 4th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 266.

While such dependence on oil still remains a reality, it was much more acute during 1969-1979. Thus during that decade Venezuelan foreign policy regarding the petroleum issue sought to build an effective alliance of oil exporters having similar problems and to secure complete national control of the crude oil, refining and natural gas industry. In reaching those objectives, the building of a global diplomatic network which would function at a high level of activity and independence was a decisive factor.

Starting in 1917, the Venezuelan petroleum industry was developed through a regime of concessions granted by the dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez to foreign corporations (including, for example, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Royal Dutch Shell) and thus oil income flowed essentially as taxes and royalty payments. Thus government-industry relations at home, which were based on evolving national oil legislation, constituted another public policy area which was vital to the interests of Venezuela.

In this context, the administration of Isaías Medina Angarita (1940-1945) and the governments of the Trienio Democrático (1945-1948) presided over by Rómulo Betancourt as Junta President and, afterwards, by Rómulo Gallegos as Constitutional President, made a significant advance by passing the Hydrocarbons Bill of 1943 and subsequently the Income Tax Law of late 1948. These came to constitute the bases of the famous "fifty-fifty", or

equal split of profits, between the industry and the government, a formula which inspired similar legislation in the Middle East after the end of the Second World War.⁵

Venezuela's political and technical leadership vis-à-vis Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries became more assertive with the restoration of constitutional democracy in 1958. During the administration of Rómulo Betancourt (1959-1964), Venezuelan Minister of Petroleum Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo (a lawyer and petroleum policy-maker who had been Minister of Development during the Trienio) and his Saudi Arabian counterpart Abdullah Tariki were together instrumental in the establishment of OPEC. Pérez Alfonzo and Tariki capitalized on the increasing frustration of Middle East oil exporting countries with the price reductions of 1959 and 1960, which represented a serious threat to their fiscal shares per barrel of oil.⁶

Thus, the five major oil exporters, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela (representing at the time 80 percent of world oil trade), met in Baghdad and formed OPEC in September 1960 as a means of protecting the price of

⁵In this respect see Luis Vallenilla, Auge, Declinación y Porvenir del Petróleo Venezolano, 2nd ed. (Caracas: Monte Avila Editores, 1990), 138-147, 186-188. Also Kim Fuad, "Venezuela's Role in OPEC: Past, Present and Future," in Bond, Contemporary Venezuela, 123.

⁶See, for example, Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations, 264.

oil and the revenues of their governments.⁷ Facilitating bilateral contacts, Venezuela's diplomatic network included since the 1950s three of the above founding members: Iran (1950), Iraq (1950) and Saudi Arabia (1952). Relations with Kuwait were established in 1965 and by the mid-1970s Venezuela had diplomatic relations with all of the other 12 members of OPEC.

The need to protect oil income as the principal financial basis of development was a determining factor shaping post-1958 Venezuelan foreign policy. During the administrations of Presidents Caldera and Pérez (1969-1979), foreign policy put a dramatically new emphasis on the creation of global alliances with the other developing countries while asserting national independence and moving away from the predominantly East-West perspective of world affairs which characterized the Betancourt and Leoni administrations. Consequently, global alliance-building efforts made within the framework of OPEC, and the subsequent national control of the oil industry, have to be seen as new means of responding to the fundamental need of effectively financing Venezuela's independent development.

⁷For more details on the role of Venezuela in the process of the founding of OPEC see Fuad in Bond, Contemporary Venezuela, 122-133; Vallenilla, Auge, Declinación y Porvenir, 246-251; Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations, 261-265; and Dankwart A. Rustow and John F. Mungo, OPEC: Success and prospects (New York: New York University Press, 1976), 1-32.

In terms of the element being introduced, Venezuelan foreign policy during 1969-1979 aimed at

- (a) Supporting OPEC's role in defending oil prices.
- (b) Cooperating bilaterally with OPEC members, including making available to them Venezuelan oil experience.
- (c) Cooperating with developing countries in general to promote their solidarity with OPEC and to help mitigate the effects of higher oil prices.
- (d) Generating broad international support to Venezuelan oil policy objectives, including national control of the industry.

Venezuela's foreign policy--as shaped by the state goals of protecting national oil income and exercising full sovereignty over its natural resources, reached a crucial point with the entry into force on 1 January 1976 of the Organic Law Reserving to the State the Industry and Commerce of Hydrocarbons. Such law, which effectively resulted in the nationalization of the foreign-owned Venezuelan oil industry, represented the culmination of a long process of conflicts and negotiations between the Government of Venezuela and the American and Anglo-Dutch oil companies regarding the concessions granted to them for the exploitation of the country's oil.⁸

⁸See Franklin Tugwell, "Venezuela's oil nationalization: the politics of aftermath" in Bond, Contemporary Venezuela, pp 99-100.

The 1973 oil price increases, which afforded the surplus funds needed for compensation, made nationalization of the industry a feasible proposition--both financially and politically. Thus, a broad consensus quickly developed in Venezuela on the need for the country to assume control of its oil. Beyond divergences regarding legal provisions allowing for the formation of mixed capital enterprises in the future, both presidents Caldera and Pérez worked harmoniously towards national control of Venezuelan oil resources.⁹

Less than two years after President Pérez took office in 1974, a state-owned holding company, Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), began to operate, replacing successfully the foreign firms.¹⁰ PDVSA became one of the world's four largest oil companies and also held a high place in the list of the Fortune 500.

The Venezuelan nationalization was part of a general trend among OPEC members and was preceded by actions in the same direction taken by those countries in the early 1970s, namely Algeria, Libya, Iran and Iraq. Moreover, in 1970 Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and Kuwait increased their share in the ownership of companies exploiting concessions

⁹In this respect see, for example, the speech by Life Senator Caldera at the opening of the debate in the Venezuelan Congress on the Oil Nationalization Bill, in Rafael Caldera, La Nacionalización del Petróleo (Caracas: Ediciones Nueva Política, 1975).

¹⁰See, for instance, Tugwell in Contemporary Venezuela, p. 101.

in their territory.¹¹ In fact, by late 1973 OPEC already started to manage the international oil market directly by effectively determining prices unilaterally.¹²

Thus, under the new market conditions created to a large extent by the actions of OPEC, the takeover of the oil industry by the state in Venezuela became inevitable for, on the one hand, the oil companies were curtailing their investments and exploration activities¹³ and, on the other, the Venezuelan Government, backed by a national consensus, had grown in self-assurance regarding its ability to operate the industry more profitably for the country.

The increases in oil prices of 1973 and 1974 obviously affected all consumers and especially the developing countries. It thus became the task of the economic diplomacy of OPEC members to seek ways of rapidly assisting the more vulnerable countries in the different regions of the developing world. Venezuela took responsibility for the Central American and some specific Caribbean countries¹⁴. In December 1974, President Pérez, meeting with the

¹¹See Gustavo Sanchez Guerrero, La Nacionalización del Petroleo y sus Consecuencias Económicas (Caracas: Monte Avila Editores, 1990), p. 9.

¹²See Luis Lugo, La Singular Historia de la OPEP (Caracas: Ediciones CEPET, 1994), p. 35.

¹³See, for example, Gustavo Coronel, The Nationalization of the Venezuelan Oil Industry: from technocratic success to political failure (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988), pp. 97-99.

¹⁴See Alfredo Peña, Conversaciones con Carlos Andrés Pérez, vol. 2 (Caracas: Editorial Ateneo, 1979), 262-263.

respective presidents in Puerto Ordaz, concluded an agreement to finance oil imports of Central American countries and Panama. The benefits of such agreements were extended to Jamaica in 1976 and to the Dominican Republic in 1977.¹⁵ By then Venezuela was devoting the greater part of its official development assistance, which represented more than 3 percent of the country's gross national product in 1974, to oil-related cooperation.¹⁶

Such assistance policies were sound not only on solidarity grounds; they aimed at maintaining the future viability of Venezuela's natural oil markets. In this respect energy conservation measures and refining investments by oil importers were emphasized.

Venezuela and the other OPEC members, in responding to the problems of developing countries as a whole, took an interest in promoting such aid schemes as the OPEC International Development Fund, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development within the United Nations system. In doing so they did not overlook the fact that the future expansion of the global oil market would significantly depend on the growth of the demand for energy (which increases with economic development) in developing

¹⁵For a detailed description of Venezuelan action in this respect, see George W. Grayson, "Venezuela and the Puerto Ordaz agreement", in Inter-American Economic Affairs 38, no. 3 (Winter 1984): 49-73.

¹⁶See, for example, Bond, Contemporary Venezuela, 228.

countries accounting for three-quarters of the global population.

Thus, Caldera and Pérez conceived Venezuelan oil policy as closely related to their diplomacy based on Third World solidarity. For example, Pérez thought that Venezuela would not have been able to nationalize its oil industry if it had not put in practice a foreign policy which made an opening to the Third World, to the nonaligned countries, a policy of international solidarity.¹⁷ He applied that concept also to the role of OPEC in oil pricing. To him, there was a crude reality in the fact that absent its cooperation with the developing countries, OPEC would have been quickly neutralized by the developed countries with the support of the oil-importing developing countries.¹⁸

Pérez's mid-1970s Third World-ism adhered to the demands of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which sought to reform the world economy and redistribute global wealth. Specifically, the developing countries called for increased foreign aid from rich to poor countries, access to technology, a greater portion of decision-making power in global economic institutions (such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), higher and more stable prices for raw materials, and improved access to markets in the

¹⁷See Peña, Conversaciones con Carlos Andrés Pérez 2: 188-189.

¹⁸Ibid., 262-263.

developed countries. After OPEC's success in raising oil prices, Pérez became a strong advocate of massive financial assistance from oil producing to oil consuming developing countries.

During the 1969-1979 decade, Venezuelan diplomacy played a significant role in the global economic negotiations between the developed and the developing countries, which came to be known as the North-South dialogue. This dialogue could be considered to have been launched at the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which was held in 1964 at the initiative of the Group of 77 seeking to make international trade a more powerful instrument of economic development. As an example of Venezuela's contribution to that process, a well known Venezuelan political figure, Manuel Pérez Guerrero, served as UNCTAD Secretary-General from 1969 to 1974, making a decisive contribution to the consolidation of UNCTAD and its secretariat in Geneva.¹⁹ Pérez Guerrero, then Minister of State for International Economic Affairs in the administration of Carlos Andrés Pérez, was also elected Co-chairman (together with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada) of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC),

¹⁹In this respect, see The History of UNCTAD, 1964-1984 (New York: United Nations Publications, 1985), 1, especially the address by UNCTAD Secretary-General Gamani Corea at the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of UNCTAD.

which met in Paris from 1975 to 1977 to discuss in an integrated manner the issues of energy (raised by the North after the first oil shock); raw materials and trade; development; and money and finance, all in the context of North-South negotiations. In addition to his chairmanship in the Conference, Pérez-Guerrero acted as spokesman for the nineteen developing countries taking part in the CIEC.²⁰

Venezuela spent considerable efforts to promote the support of the Third World to the objectives of OPEC,²¹ especially within its own region. The results of those efforts may be exemplified by the close alliance built between Venezuela and Jamaica, especially during the years of the administration of Carlos Andrés Pérez. As an Iranian participant in CIEC remarked, although the developing

²⁰For a discussion by the other Co-chairman of Pérez Guerrero's contribution to the efforts of CIEC, see Allan J. MacEachen, "Conference on International Economic Cooperation: An Opportunity Missed," in Mikio Tajima, ed., Peace through Economic Justice: Essays in memory of Manuel Pérez Guerrero (Geneva: Published by the editor, 1988), 61-73. That book is also available in Spanish: La Justicia Económica es la Paz: Homenaje a Manuel Pérez Guerrero (Caracas: Banco Central de Venezuela, 1988). See also El Universal, 1 November 1988, Year 80, no. 28509, for an account of the session held in Caracas to pay tribute to the memory of Pérez Guerrero on the third anniversary of his death, in which ex-presidents Carlos Andrés Pérez and Luis Herrera Campins participated, together with the Minister of the Interior and former Chancellor Simón Alberto Consalvi and Minister of Energy and Mines Julio César Gil. As to Pérez Guerrero's own publications and major statements, see a lifelong compilation in Eduardo Praselj, ed., Manuel Pérez Guerrero en la Escena Internacional (Caracas: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1989).

²¹The stated objectives of OPEC have been to coordinate and unify petroleum policies among its members in order to secure fair and stable prices for petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on capital to those investing in the oil industry.

countries in the Conference, which represented the Group of 77 of the United Nations, did not follow any specific country's lead, their solidarity to the very end was remarkable. He noted with admiration that it was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Jamaica, an oil-importing small island country, who at the closing plenary of the Conference "defended OPEC's position and priorities with great eloquence and unmistakable sincerity."²²

2. Internal Pacification

During the 1969-1979 decade, a strong determinant of the foreign policy implemented by Presidents Caldera and Pérez was the need to adapt and utilize the diplomatic network in order to support the pacification of Venezuela, a country still being afflicted by a partisan armed conflict which had mobilized the two sides of the cold war. As we shall see, the need to achieve a lasting pacification became an important motivation in the process of globalization of Venezuelan foreign policy. Indeed, Venezuelan history has been one of continuing violence: wars of conquest, colonization and independence, followed by social wars, revoluciones and all kinds of matzones (merciless battles). In the democratic era, constitutional governments have been challenged by bloody military rebellions, civilian armed insurgencies and guerrilla warfare. Likewise, various other

²²Jahangir Amuzegar, "A requiem for the North-South Conference", in Foreign Affairs 56 (October 1977): 155.

forms of violence have continuously afflicted Venezuelan society.²³ Against this background, the immediate origin of the post-1958 conflict is to be found in the years of the administration of Rómulo Betancourt (1959-1964). At that time, the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) and other factions of the political left, including splinter groups of Betancourt's Acción Democrática (AD) party, especially the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), maintained a climate of violent urban agitation and were heavily repressed by police forces. In February 1963, the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) were constituted in a meeting in Caracas by the leaders of PCV, MIR, and dissidents from the military. The ensuing rural guerrilla war, coupled with raids by urban groups, quickly acquired international dimensions, with Cuba and other socialist countries providing some measure of moral, logistic and material support to the rebels and the United States continuing its traditional military role by providing training and keeping its lucrative arms sales to the Venezuelan army, especially for its counterinsurgency operations.

According to one estimate, by mid-1965 the administration of Raúl Leoni (1964-1969) had about 9,000

²³For the results of a research study on the sociology of violence in Venezuelan daily life (in the streets, barrios, schools and in politics) see Luís Pedro España N., ed., La Violencia en Venezuela: Perspectiva actual (Caracas: Monte Avila Editores, 1994).

troops, close to one-third of the army, engaged in fighting the guerrillas.²⁴ However, the existence of deep internal divisions within the FALN, as well as their lack of military success or widespread popular support, stimulated Leoni to begin a limited amnesty effort aimed at PCV and MIR leaders.²⁵ Leoni also initiated negotiations with a view to restoring diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

From the first day of his administration, President Rafael Caldera (1969-1974) launched a pacification campaign which his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arístides Calvani, described as having interrelated external and internal dimensions.²⁶ Calvani saw a Venezuelan diplomatic opening to the East (including the USSR, Cuba, and China) as a necessary complement to an amnesty program--in order to achieve durable pacification of the guerillas. In terms of foreign policy, Caldera took a decisive step towards the globalization of Venezuelan diplomacy by reestablishing relations with the USSR in 1971. Moreover, he made important progress in improving relations with Cuba and the

²⁴Daniel L. Premo, "Coping with insurgency: The Politics of Pacification in Colombia and Venezuela," in Donald L. Herman, ed., Democracy in Latin America: Colombia and Venezuela (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988), 223.

²⁵Ramón J. Velásquez, "Aspectos de la evolución política de Venezuela en el último medio siglo," in Venezuela Moderna: Medio siglo de historia, 1926-1976, 2nd ed. (Caracas, Editorial Ariel, 1979), 318-319.

²⁶Arístides Calvani, "La política internacional de Venezuela en el último medio siglo," *Ibid.*, p. 476.

People's Republic of China. Those developments are analyzed in the respective case studies in a subsequent chapter.

The question of relations with the socialist countries had been, historically, a relevant issue for the Venezuelan left and it continued to be so for Venezuelan guerrillas in considering peace offers. In effect, the possibility of a presence of some of those countries' embassies in Caracas offered a psychological element of guarantee that pacification conditions would be respected by the government. For example, in late March 1969, days after Caldera's inauguration, FALN insurgents in the Falcón state included demands for diplomatic relations with all socialist countries as one of their conditions for laying down their arms.²⁷

In August 1968, the Soviet Union had invaded Czechoslovakia, putting a brutal end to the relatively modest democratization experience which came to be known as the "Prague Spring." Teodoro Petkoff, former PCV leader and founder of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), published in 1969, Checoeslovaquia: el socialismo como problema, which coincided with the views expressed by French Communist dissident André Garaudy in support of the Dubcek government. This book was symbolic of the intense debates which led to

²⁷Daniel L. Premo, "Coping with Insurgency: The Politics of Pacification in Colombia and Venezuela," in Donald L. Herman, ed., Democracy in Latin America: Colombia and Venezuela (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988): 219-224.

the division of the PCV.²⁸ The establishment of MAS in 1971 came to be regarded as an important side effect of Caldera's pacification policy, bringing this party as a new dynamic force into the Venezuelan democratic political system.²⁹

Having reduced political violence to an insignificant level and resumed diplomatic relations with the USSR as well as a virtual normalization with Cuba and China, Caldera's pacification drive has been considered by a wide variety of commentators as one of the most important political innovations of his administration.³⁰ He acted quickly and decisively and with both understanding and firmness convinced conservative adversaries of the ultimate benefits of his policies. By the end of his term, Caldera was right on target in both his foreign policy detente and internal peace objectives.

Like Caldera, Pérez viewed the maintenance of peaceful relations with Cuba as a necessity for a durable pacification of the country, both to eliminate incentives for Cuba's material support and encouragement of the rebels

²⁸On the founding of MAS, see Steve Ellner, Venezuela's Movimiento al Socialismo: From guerrilla defeat to innovative politics (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), 58-63.

²⁹To stress this point, it should be noted that in 1994 MAS is one of the members of the governing coalition of Caldera's second presidency (1994-1999), after playing an important role in his presidential campaign.

³⁰See, for example, Premo, Democracy in Latin America, 224, citing the return of the left to parliamentary politics, "through the PCV (1969), MAS (1971), and MIR (1973)."

and to offer them a credible alternative for the continuation of their political struggle by peaceful and legal means.

On the internal scene, Pérez did not face any significant threat from residual guerrilla activity. To be sure, there were armed attacks on regular army units just before the President's inauguration in March 1974 and by late 1977 a limited mobilization of counterinsurgency forces occurred. However, in the latter case the action of such forces was essentially preventive.

A final comment on the pacification goal is in order. The relevance of this element in explaining the transformation of Venezuelan foreign policy refers here to the 1969-1979 decade. Once the country was in a state of peace and the former insurgents back in the democratic process, it would seem that the importance of the goal disappears. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that Venezuela's long history of violence often leaves the possibility of resurgence of rebellions, military or civilian, inspired by ideologies of the right or the left. Thus, there was a need for a global foreign policy that would become institutionalized, beyond the immediate historical circumstances which prompted diplomatic detente in the 1970s. In chapter 6, I will analyze the consequences of such foreign policy up to the present time and the role

of goals such as internal peace in explaining the process of policy globalization.

3. Venezuelan sovereignty over its national territory in border issues involving Brazil, Guyana and Colombia

Venezuelans have the perception that, since the establishment of the Republic in 1830, their national territory has been progressively and unfairly reduced to the benefit of neighboring countries.³¹ Some accounts estimate territorial losses at 300,000 square kilometers, representing one quarter of the country's original extension.³² It is therefore not surprising that especially after the 1958 democratic restoration, Venezuelan foreign policy gave high priority to resolution of border issues, within which those involving Brazil, Colombia and Guyana are the more important and sensitive. During the 1969-1979 decade, the administrations of Presidents Caldera and Pérez dealt with such frontier issues in the context of the new foreign policies being put in practice, which sought to reach settlements by peaceful means and the use of the

³¹Earle Herrera, ¿Por Qué Se Ha Reducido el Territorio Venezolano? (Caracas: Alfadil Ediciones, 1990), 11.

³²Ibid, 107.

diplomatic network to build the broadest possible support for Venezuela's positions.³³

Currently there are no demarcation disputes between Venezuela and Brazil (most issues were settled with the Border Treaty of 1859). However, a situation of tension between the two countries has developed resulting from Brazilian pressures on the frontier, for example, the construction of numerous human settlements and landing strips close to the Venezuelan border and even within Venezuela--as well as frequent incursions into Venezuelan territory by Brazilian nationals, especially gold miners. All this, coupled with previous Brazilian support given to Guyana in its border dispute with Venezuela, tended to revive the fears of a Brazilian expansionism which goes back to the nineteenth century.³⁴

With Colombia, there is a dispute touching on the demarcation of the marine and the petroleum-rich submarine areas of the Gulf of Venezuela, subsequent to the definition of the land frontier in the arbitration award of 1891 of the

³³For a comprehensive analysis by a leading Venezuelan geographer on the territorial aspects of Venezuela's development, including the issues raised by the defense of the country's borders, see Pedro Cunill Grau, Venezuela: Opciones geográficas (Caracas: Fundación Eugenio Mendoza, 1990), especially pages 44-58. Cunill also provides a coherent view of Venezuela's geopolitical alternatives in the light of its privileged situation in the world's tropical zone.

³⁴See Alejandro Mendible Z., Venezuela y sus Verdaderas Fronteras con el Brasil: Desde el tratado de Tordesillas hasta la incursión de los garimpeiros (Caracas: Universidad Simón Bolívar, 1993), 175-217, and Herrera, ¿Por Qué Se Ha Reducido el Territorio Venezolano?, 63-73.

Regent of Spain and the 1941 border treaty between the two countries. Figures 1 and 2 give a condensed image of the evolution of the Venezuelan positions on the Gulf dispute. Regarding Guyana, a Venezuelan claim is still pending which involves the territory lying west of the left margin of the Essequibo River (128,000 square kilometers) which amounts to approximately 60 percent of Guyana's land area. The claim stems mainly from the Venezuelan contention that the 1899 award of the tribunal of arbitration meeting in Paris, which granted the Essequibo territory to Great Britain, was fraudulent and thus null and void.³⁵


In Venezuela's post-1958 democratic system, issues regarding the defense of the integrity of national territory have naturally involved a public opinion which often manifests itself in an emotionally charged way.³⁶ Moreover, the military holds a veto power over any solution that may be proposed in each case,³⁷ and parties in Congress have

³⁵For more details on the legal aspects of this matter see Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, The Venezuela-Guyana Border Dispute: Britain's colonial legacy in Latin America (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), 111-129.

³⁶For example, the widespread emotional commitment of the Venezuelan public to the position of Argentina during the 1982 Guerra de las Malvinas, with Great Britain, can be explained by the analogies it evoked regarding the possible outcome of Venezuela's dispute over the former British Guiana.


³⁷See Alberto Mueller Rojas, "Militares y política exterior de Venezuela," in Carlos Romero, Reforma y Política Exterior en Venezuela (Caracas: Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1992) for a complete account of Venezuela's armed forces influence in foreign policy. See also Charles Ameringer, "The Foreign Policy of Democratic Venezuela" in John D. Martz and David Myers, eds., Venezuela: The democratic experience (New York:

Figure 1



Note: Venezuela's official position since the 1940s has been that the area of the Gulf of Venezuela is defined by the extension of the land frontier from Castilletes to Punta Macolla.

Figure 2



Note: In 1983, after three years of negotiation, the Venezuelan and Colombian Chancelleries agreed on a proposal for resolving the Gulf of Venezuela dispute. This draft agreement, called the "Hypothesis of Caraballeda," had to be submitted in Venezuela for the consideration both of the official political parties and of public opinion before its endorsement by the government and its presentation to Congress. In Venezuela the draft agreement was openly rejected both by the most important political parties and by public opinion because it abandoned Venezuela's official position. In the proposal, the line that defined the Gulf was dropped from Punta Macolla to Punta Salina.

struggled to find the "politically correct" position somewhere between peaceful compromise and intransigent firmness. The possibility of armed conflict, while remote, cannot be excluded and thus all the ingredients are there to make the Brazil, Colombia and Guyana issues a continuing Presidential preoccupation.

Against this background, it can be said that during 1969-1979 Presidents Caldera and Pérez, with their Ministers of Foreign Affairs, designed their foreign policy with the full awareness of its value in reaching a solution to outstanding border issues. The expansion of the diplomatic network and the diversification of international political support to Venezuelan positions were key elements in this respect. In order to define this factor further, I shall briefly analyze foreign policy developments on the Brazil, Colombia and Guyana issues until 1979.

a. Brazil

During 1969-1979, Caldera and Pérez had authoritarian presidents as their Brazilian interlocutors, respectively Generals Emilio Garrastazu Médici (1969-1974) and Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979). Since Venezuela had abandoned the

Betancourt doctrine as far as Brazil was concerned in 1966, diplomatic relations proceeded normally during the decade. Therefore it was possible to make significant progress at the technical level regarding the 2,200 kilometer long Venezuela-Brazil frontier. The Joint Venezuelan-Brazilian Commission on Borders which had been carrying out field surveying for the previous three years, concluded its work in 1973 and, as a result of detailed rectifications based on the Treaty on Borders and River Navigation of 1859, the Venezuelan land area was increased by 4,000 square kilometers. This development, announced by Caldera at his press conference of 23 July 1973, demonstrated the possibilities of cooperation of reciprocal interest between the two countries.³⁸

However, elements of rivalry were also there in the relations between Venezuela, an emerging middle-range power with the highest income per capita in Latin America, and Brazil, the biggest economy in the region, and one of the largest countries in the world in both land area and population. Having those rivalries in mind, one can

³⁸See Mendible, Venezuela y sus Verdaderas Fronteras, 171-178.

understand how deeply offended Venezuela was by public statements of President Nixon, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Mr. Nelson Rockefeller insisting on promoting Brazil as the regional leader of South America. The widespread resentment generated in Venezuela by such public manifestations by U.S. leaders was indicative of this underlying rivalry existing between Venezuela and Brazil. Such a situation was only made worse in Venezuela by what appeared as the promotion of a Brazilian hegemony by the United States. As a matter of fact, in December 1971, during the visit to Washington of President Garrastazu Médici, Nixon had stated that Brazil would set the pace for progress in the rest of the continent.³⁹ In turn, Rockefeller declared in January 1972 that the United States wished that Brazil would become the leader of Latin America⁴⁰ and Kissinger affirmed in September 1973 that the United States should promote the emergence of regional

³⁹Rafael Caldera, Habla el Presidente: Diálogo semanal con el pueblo venezolano, (Caracas: Ediciones de la Presidencia de la República, 1972): 471 and Eloy Lanza, El Subimperialismo Venezolano (Caracas: Fondo Editorial Carlos Aponte, 1980), 35.

⁴⁰See Caldera, Habla el Presidente, 494-495.

leaders, such as Brazil, which were able to replace U.S. political leadership.⁴¹ Finally, by February 1976, Secretary of State Kissinger had gratuitously recognized Brazil as having the status of a great power.⁴²

Moreover, on frontier issues the two countries upheld divergent international law principles regarding the basis for legitimate territorial possession, with Brazil putting de facto possession above historical titles.⁴³ On that basis, and also for its own strategic reasons, Brazil sided with Guyana on its border dispute with Venezuela and offered the Guyanese financial and technical cooperation. In fact, the Caldera administration feared that Brazil would be seeking an outlet through Guyana to project its power into the Caribbean, a high-priority zone in the Venezuelan foreign policy agenda. In what was widely perceived as a response to a Brazilian programme started in 1966 to develop the Amazon region with the help of the armed forces, President Caldera created the Commission for the Development

⁴¹Lanza, El Subimperialismo, 35.

⁴²See John D. Martz, "Venezuelan Foreign Policy Toward Latin America," in Bond, Contemporary Venezuela, 187.

⁴³Venezuela with the other Spanish American nations adopted the doctrine of uti possidetis jure; or uti possideatis, ita possideatis (as you possess, you will continue to possess), which assumes that boundaries must be as they were in law at the declaration of independence. In contrast, Brasil assigns legitimacy to the incorporation of territories through the principle of uti possidetis de facto, defined as the gentle and peaceful possession, independently of any other title.

of the South (CODESUR) and launched his own plan to populate and develop the Venezuelan Amazonia, including the construction of a jungle road to reach the Brazilian frontier.⁴⁴

More generally, during 1969-1974 Médici's foreign policy was at odds with that of Caldera on questions of principle. For example, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gibson Barboza termed the possible role of the Third World as an international political force as an "illusory concept" and a "wish of sub-history." The Brazilian Chancellery believed that the North-South dialogue was not a priority, since inequalities among nations were an inevitable trait of the world economy, and thought that Latin American relations should be primarily bilateral.⁴⁵ Such stated views were perceived as disdainful of the policies of Caldera and Calvani which emphasized a North-South perspective, international social justice, common good, pluralistic solidarity and Latin American integration.

In that connection, it could be significant to note that in the itinerary of President Caldera's trip made from 6 to 12 February 1973 to six South American countries having a broad range of political regimes (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile and Argentina), Brazil was omitted. The

⁴⁴See Julio Portillo, Venezuela-Brasil: Relaciones diplomáticas, 1942-1982 (Caracas: Editorial Arte, 1983), 169-170.

⁴⁵Ibid., 171-172.

Venezuelan foreign policy message of the trip was that pluralistic solidarity would make it possible to achieve international social justice. On 13 February 1973, Venezuela signed the so-called Lima Consensus, which provided for the country's formal entry into the Andean Pact, an economic alliance which was nevertheless widely perceived as ultimately having balance-of-power implications vis-a-vis Brazil.⁴⁶

While on 20 February 1973 Caldera met with the President of Brazil, Emilio Garrastazu Médici, on the occasion of the inauguration of the trans-Amazonian highway linking the two countries, the joint declaration issued did not reflect any breakthroughs with respect to the policy differences existing between Venezuela and Brazil.⁴⁷ It was only in 1994 that relations between the two countries rose to a level of strong cooperation, as symbolized by President Caldera's endorsement in the United Nations General Assembly of Brazil's aspiration to permanent membership in the Security Council.⁴⁸

⁴⁶See, for example, Donald L. Herman, Christian Democracy in Venezuela (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 183.

⁴⁷See Portillo, Venezuela-Brasil, 173-174; Ameringer, in Moritz and Myers, Venezuela, 416-417 and Caldera's press conferences given in the capitals visited and on his return to Caracas, in Caldera, Habla el Presidente, 4: 531-584.

⁴⁸United Nations General Assembly, 49th session, Official Records, 12th meeting, 30 September 1994.

b. Colombia

During the Caldera and Pérez administrations, relations with Colombia presented two main areas of discord. In the first place, there was the illegal presence of over 1,000,000 Colombian economic immigrants in Venezuela, whose number had been building up since the 1960s. By 1970, border tensions were transforming the problem of the illegal Colombians into a security and sovereignty issue, because of their concentration in areas surrounding the Gulf of Venezuela. Secondly, there was the already mentioned dispute over the demarcation of the marine and submarine areas of the Gulf.

Regarding the dispute, Caldera continued talks discreetly at the ministerial level both in Caracas and Bogotá and in Rome through negotiating delegations from both countries. Colombian President Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966-1970) in his last presidential message to the Congress stated that Venezuela could not claim complete possession of the Gulf. This had the effect of exacerbating tensions and prompting announcements by both countries of proposed arms purchases in Europe. However, a further irritant was removed when, pending an agreement, both Venezuela and

Colombia called off any exploratory drilling for oil in the Gulf area.⁴⁹

In April 1973 the Rome negotiations were interrupted due to lack of progress on the Gulf delimitation. Colombia wished that the issue be resolved by the International Court of Justice while Venezuela, perhaps influenced by its bitter experience with past arbitrations, favored a bilateral settlement at the level of ministers of foreign affairs. With elections due in December, it was clear that the matter would be passed on by Caldera to the next administration.

President Pérez dealt on this issue with Colombian President Alfonso López Michelsen (1974-1978), who in 1974 had advanced the hypothesis of a condominium of the Gulf by the two bordering states. By 1977 that option had been rejected by most Venezuelan actors consulted by Pérez. Shortly before the end of his mandate in 1979, Pérez signed with the new Colombian President, Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978-1982), the so-called Maracaibo Declaration which stressed the need to persist in the conduct of direct negotiations. It was a favorable result for the Venezuelan position--if only on the question of procedure. On the other hand, by 1979 the potential market value of the Gulf's

⁴⁹See Hermann, Christian Democracy, 190-196. For a comprehensive chronology and documentation covering the Caldera/Pérez decade, see Leandro Area and Elke Nieschulz de Stockhausen, El Golfo de Venezuela: Documentación y cronología (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1984).

oil had increased dramatically, but so had Venezuela's overall economic and political power.

c. Guyana

Venezuela's territorial claim over the Essequibo territory in the former British Guiana became a major challenge to the country's foreign policy during the 1969-1979 decade. Beyond the legal complexities of the border dispute, by granting independence to Guyana in 1966, Great Britain certainly had not made Venezuela's task of recovering the Essequibo region easier. From then on, the victim's role--in a way--shifted from Venezuela, originally robbed by British imperialism, to Guyana, a small, poor country whose oil-rich neighbor now wanted to deprive it of nearly two-thirds of its territory.

Well aware of the value of those perceptions, Guyanese diplomacy aimed at internationalizing the border dispute by seeking the support of the non-aligned countries as well as the other English-speaking Caribbean countries and any other possible allies. Venezuela's response to such foreign policy strategy could only be to use its diplomatic network to reaffirm its leadership in the global context and to seek to reinforce the legitimacy of its claims on historical grounds. Thus, in my terminology, both Guyana and Venezuela were following "policies of globalization" to serve their particular national interests. Venezuela's policy also

included an element of bilateral negotiations and economic and technical cooperation between the two countries as means to facilitate a possible future resolution of the border dispute. For reasons similar to those indicated regarding the dispute with Colombia, Venezuela did not favor the option of having the case adjudicated by an international court.

President Caldera received a legacy from the previous democratic administrations. First, the reopening of the claim by the administration of Rómulo Betancourt (1959-1964) in 1962, contending that the late nineteenth century award was null and void. Raúl Leoni (1964-1968) followed the matter and finally obtained that representatives of Venezuela, Great Britain and British Guiana, meeting in Geneva in February 1966, sign an instrument recognizing the claim being made by Venezuela and forming a commission in view of reaching an agreement by February 1970. Guyana received its independence from Great Britain in May 1966, but Venezuela accepted as Guyana's territory only the area lying east of the right margin of the Essequibo River.

Negotiations carried out by Caldera's Chancellery with Guyana in 1969 and early 1970 were inconclusive. However, in June 1970 (past the Geneva deadline), the two countries agreed under the Protocol of Port-of-Spain to freeze the dispute for twelve years; that the Protocol was renewable for twelve year periods and that previous claims would not

lose their validity. Caldera and Calvani succeeded in 1973, against the strong opposition of AD and some of the smaller parties (URD, FDP, FNO), in having the Protocol ratified. AD claimed that the protocol was a solution that would help Guyana to reassure its position in the territory under dispute by delaying Venezuela's claim for twelve years. It was also pointed out that Venezuela had agreed by the Leoni decree of 1968 not to explore and exploit oil resources in this area while the Protocol of Port-of-Spain did not forbid Guyana from doing the same thing. Thus AD, through former presidents Raul Leoni and Rómulo Betancourt, denounced the protocol as a disaster and stressed that it did not protect the country's interests.⁵⁰

Venezuelan diplomacy had also used its influence to put direct pressure on Great Britain and Guyana in the OAS, by being instrumental (together with the United States, Guatemala, and Argentina) in the adoption in December 1964 of a new article of its charter, which had the effect of barring from admission political entities involved in territorial disputes with members of OAS. This excluded Belize, British Guiana, and the Malvinas Islands, or any successor independent state, from entering the OAS and the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB),⁵¹ two key political

⁵⁰For a complete account of this debate, see Herman, Christian Democracy in Venezuela, 198-199.

⁵¹Membership in the IDB is open only to OAS members.

and economic multilateral bodies in the region. It should be added that the signature of the above mentioned Port-of-Spain Protocol did in no way change the implications for Guyana of Article 8 of the OAS charter.⁵²

During the Pérez administration (1974-1979), Venezuelan diplomacy emphasized economic cooperation with Guyana, avoiding public mention of the territorial dispute. As a symbol of improved relations, the Prime Minister of Guyana, Forbes Burnham, visited Caracas in 1975 and President Pérez visited Georgetown in 1978. Venezuela's growing wealth and power coupled to the increasingly Third World orientation of its foreign policy made the Guyana border dispute a good case for the application of a cooperative non-confrontational style of diplomacy, compatible with the spirit of the Protocol of Port-of-Spain and the more general goals of the globalization policies of the decade. To be sure, Venezuela was not prepared to yield on such principle questions as the legitimacy of its territorial claim; refusal of the admission of Guyana to the OAS and IDB or of that country's participation in the Puerto

⁵²Article 8 of the OAS Charter reads as follows:


The Permanent Council shall not make any recommendation nor shall the General Assembly take any decision with respect to a request for admission on the part of a political entity whose territory became subject, in whole or in part, prior to December 18, 1964, the date set by the First Special Inter-American Conference, to litigation or claim between an extracontinental country and one or more Member States of the organization, until the dispute has been ended by some peaceful procedure.

Ordaz Agreement. However, specific bilateral economic cooperation seemed to be a distinct possibility.

From 1975 Burnham sought to obtain the participation of Venezuela in the hydroelectric project of Upper Mazaruni⁵³--already endorsed by the World Bank--as a purchaser of part of the energy to be produced. By 1976 Pérez and Burnham were negotiating Venezuela's participation in exchange for a practical and definitive settlement of the territorial dispute, but many obstacles appeared in the way of a bilateral agreement. Firstly, the technical difficulties and the high cost of energy transmission to Venezuelan industrial centers. But secondly, and more important, there was a strong opposition in Guyana to the granting of any territorial concessions. Likewise, in Venezuela the governing AD party argued that acquiescence to the construction of a large dam in the Essequibo area, was tantamount to a renunciation to Venezuelan rights to recover the disputed territory. Figure 3 gives an overall view of the territories and resources involved. Thus, at the end of the Pérez administration, the Guyana issue--like that of Colombia--remained at a standstill.

⁵³A dam was to be built in the valley of the Upper Mazaruni River, about 50 kilometers from the existing border with Venezuela.

Figure 3



4. The decline of United States' influence in Latin America

a. Background

The traditional military, political and economic hegemony of the United States in the Western Hemisphere could be traced back to the doctrine stated by President James Monroe (1817-1825) in his message to Congress in 1823 as an exclusionary warning to Russia and other members of the Holy Alliance.⁵⁴ By the corollary to this doctrine, developed in 1904 and 1905 by President Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909), the United States virtually arrogated to itself the right to exercise police power in the Hemisphere, especially Latin America and the Caribbean.

Such U.S. hegemony was not absent in Venezuela, where Juan Vicente Gómez (b. 1857) held absolute control of the country from 1908 until his death in 1935. He had in fact seized power from President Cipriano Castro that year with the support of United States warships under Theodore Roosevelt's administration.⁵⁵ U.S. relations with Gómez

⁵⁴In a different hegemonic vein, during 1845-1860, the slogan "manifest destiny" was used frequently by the advocates of U.S. expansionism to promote the goal of occupation of the whole continent of North America. However, while constantly appealing to the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, U.S. Secretary of State William S. Seeward obtained the complete withdrawal by 1867 of French troops of Emperor Louis Napoleon who had established Maximilian of Hapsburg as Emperor of Mexico in 1864. See Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), 134-135, 378.

⁵⁵See Stephen G. Rabe, The Road to OPEC (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 11. As part of the expedition, Theodore Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Elihu Root, had dispatched veteran diplomat William I. Buchanan aboard the battleship North Carolina to negotiate with Gómez.

went occasionally through difficult periods, for example, during the First World War when Venezuela maintained neutrality and the dictator openly sympathized with Germany. However, by the 1920s Venezuela was becoming a preferred locus of American oil investments abroad and Gómez appeared to be a satisfactory protector of U.S. interests.

To most observers, after World War II, the United States' influence in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean began to erode. For example, in terms of economic influence, it is noted that the share of U.S. trade with the region went from close to 50 percent in 1957 to 37.7 percent in 1967 and 29 percent in 1977.⁵⁶

While U.S. military and political interventions⁵⁷ (for example, in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and Chile in 1973) taking place during the broad period covered by this research, reflected continuing domination by the U.S. in the military-security area, such interventions had a down side in terms of influence, as they left in key political elites a feeling of resentment over a continuing intra-hemispheric

⁵⁶Robert Wesson, "Introduction" in Robert Wesson, ed., U.S. Influence in Latin America in the 1980s (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 17.

⁵⁷For an analytical study of U.S. interventions in Latin America, including Mexico (1914-1941); Bolivia (1952-1964); Guatemala (1951-1954); Cuba (1959-1961); and the Dominican Republic (1965-1966), see Cole Blaiser, The Hovering Giant: U.S. responses to revolutionary change in Latin America (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976). For a recent study of U.S. postwar relations with Central America, see John H. Coatsworth, Central America and the United States: The clients and the colossus (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994).

threat to sovereignty and independence of individual states in the region. Such interventions were criticized by the Venezuelan administrations in office at the time they occurred.⁵⁸

According to Robert Wesson, the Vietnam war contributed to diminish U.S. influence in Latin America after 1967, as its military efforts began to be perceived as a failure against a background of growing unpopularity of the war. He considers that "the United States influence in Latin America declined during the Nixon and Ford Administrations because of neglect. It declined further during the Carter administration, not only because of the domestic troubles of the United States and the continued shrinkage of its world stature, but also because Carter policies were seen as contradictory and thus not to be taken seriously."⁵⁹

By the end of the 1969-1979 decade with which this dissertation deals, a special issue of Business Week

⁵⁸For a critical opinion of the American intervention in the Dominican Republic, see, for example, Raúl Leoni, "The View from Caracas" in Foreign Affairs 43, no. 4 (July 1965): 639-646. President Leoni thought that the U.S. actions "tend to revive the era of unilateral intervention, which one supposed had been left far behind by the evolution of international life." On Chile, see Caldera, Habla el Presidente, 5: 344-356.

⁵⁹Wesson, U.S. Influence, 6-7. In the case of Venezuela, Presidents Pérez and Carter exchanged visits to Washington and Caracas in June 1977 and March 1978 respectively, and their personal relationship was especially warm. Pérez had strongly supported Panamanian leader Omar Torrijos in the Panama Canal negotiations that led to the Carter-Torrijos Treaty of 1978. Relations remained cordial in spite of Pérez's involvement in the overthrow of the Somoza regime.

reflecting the opinion of American business circles, ran a comprehensive review of the decline of U.S. power and what it meant in economic and financial terms. As the magazine put it:

Between the fall of Vietnam and the fall of the Shah of Iran, the U.S. has been buffeted by an unnerving series of shocks that signal an accelerating erosion of power and influence. Although the shocks themselves have occurred primarily in the military and foreign policy arenas, they have deep-seated economic and monetary roots. That erosion of power is the product of the failures of U.S. leaders to recognize the connections between political, military, and economic events and to develop coherent approaches that deal with them in an integrated fashion.⁶⁰

In fact, one of the effects under the Bretton Woods system was that the dollar was overvalued, fostering U.S. multinationals to move abroad. One third of the overall multinational profits were overseas. On the other hand, the defense system--that is, the military expenses during the cold war--were provided by U.S. taxpayers. This economic unbalance led to "stagflation," double-digit interest rates, loss of internal and external confidence, and, ultimately, to the erosion of power and influence of the U.S. throughout the world. The magazine attributes the beginning of that decline to a miscalculation made in 1956 by the Eisenhower administration ("dominated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' dogmatism") which failed to see the economic and monetary consequences of foreign policy. The magazine

⁶⁰Business Week, "U.S. power: the new debate over guns and butter," special issue, 12 March 1979, industrial edition, 36 and ff.

refers specifically to the decision to force Great Britain and France to withdraw after they captured the Suez Canal to protect the free passage of oil supplies.⁶¹ This miscalculation by Foster Dulles (who saw the Suez crisis as a simple colonial problem) also gave the Soviet Union an easy path to influence the political events in the Middle East.⁶²

While forecasts of United States economic and political power into the 21st century certainly differ, most analysts agree that by the 1970s such power was rapidly declining. The drop in U.S. share of world output, exports, and monetary resources, added to rising inflation at home, suggested a "bearish" economic outlook. On the political side, the Vietnam defeat, several other foreign policy fiascos, and the weakening of the institution of the Presidency, completed the bleak picture in terms of American power in the 1970s.

⁶¹Ibid., 39.

⁶²Ibid., "It all started with Suez," 40. Also see Kevin Middlebrook and Carlos Rico, "The United States and Latin America in the 1980's: Change, Complexity, and Contending Perspectives" and James R. Kurth, "The United States, Latin America, and the World: The Changing International Context of U.S. - Latin American Relations" both in Kevin J. Middlebrook and Carlos Rico, The United States and Latin America in the 1980's (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986). The authors illustrate how in Latin America during the 1970s the decrease of U.S. GNP and the increase of European and Japanese investment in the region helped several countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela augment their political autonomy and economic competitiveness in international markets.

In this connection, an American analyst of postwar international economics writing not too long ago said that international developments during the 1970s, both political and economic, were becoming inextricably intertwined. In particular, he thought that OPEC oil price actions had been synchronized with a U.S. power decline. As he put it,

The defeat of American forces in Vietnam formally signalled the end of the Pax Americana. OPEC was quick to take advantage of the changes in America's world position; there was nothing accidental in the timing of its dramatic entry into prominence in 1973. If instead of in 1973 OPEC had tried to raise oil prices and restrict production in 1953 or in 1963, American marines would almost certainly have been dispatched to teach the lessons that were taught to the Lebanese in 1957 [actually 1958] and the Dominicans in 1965.⁶³

While Marglin refers to a possible action by OPEC in 1953 on purely hypothetical terms (since the organization was founded only in 1960), I interpret his point to imply that while American military interventions have varying degrees of political and economic motivation, they ultimately constitute assertions of power which are conditioned by the effective level of that power at the time they occur. Thus, for example, in 1958 President Eisenhower decided to intervene in Lebanon (together with Great Britain) against pro-Nasser nationalists to support a conservative government which sought to remain in power beyond its constitutional term. In 1965, President Johnson

⁶³Stephen A. Marglin, "Lessons of the Golden Age: An Overview," in Stephen A. Marglin and Juliet B. Schor, eds., The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting the postwar experience (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 23.

intervened in the Dominican Republic to prevent the restoration to power of democratically elected President Juan Bosch. In both cases, the main concern was the preservation of U.S. strategic interests--not commodity supplies. A different point is made by two American authors who argue that prior to the 1973 oil shock the United States had a much greater supply capability, with a spare crude oil producing capacity of around 25 percent in 1956-57 and in 1967, and was thus less vulnerable to economic disruption.⁶⁴ However, it would be difficult to affirm that a hypothetical OPEC action in the 1950s or 1960s (involving nationalization of foreign companies and/or unilateral determination of reference oil prices and production controls) would not have triggered some form of coercion by the United States and its Western allies, as was the case in Iran in 1949-1953. In fact, during those years, Iran (which would later become a founder of OPEC) experienced interventions to back the dominance of the "seven sisters" (Standard of New Jersey, Standard of California, Gulf, Mobil, Texaco, British Petroleum, and Shell) in world oil. Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh nationalized British oil concessions in 1951, triggering a dispute involving the British government, which imposed an economic embargo on Iran and threatened military intervention. The United States helped the shah, Mohammed

⁶⁴Joel Darmstadter and Hans H. Landsburg, "The Economic Background," a paper published in Raymond Vernon, ed., The Oil Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1976), 15-37.

Riza Pahlevi, and the opposition to Dr. Mossadegh's National Front to overthrow his government in 1953. Since the nationalization decree was not revoked nor the National Iranian Oil Company dissolved, foreign management of Iranian oil continued under the legal fiction that foreign companies were involved only in its production. A profitable concession was given to a consortium in which British Petroleum shared the benefits with the rest of the seven sisters.⁶⁵

As to a largely optimistic interpretation of the evolution of U.S. power, Joseph Nye made a thorough analysis in the early 1990s of the much debated issue of the decline of U.S. power.⁶⁶ The essence of his argument is that while Americans are "rightly concerned about the changing position of the United States in world politics," it is misleading to describe it as an "American decline." That, he feels, would deviate attention from the real causes of the problem, which lie in the long-term transformation of the international system, and thus suggest remedies that would "weaken rather

⁶⁵On this episode, see Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations, 261-263, and Dankwart A. Rustow, Oil and Turmoil: America faces OPEC in the Middle East (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982), 96-100. See also Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The struggle for the control of Iran (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), for his memoirs as the U.S. intelligence agent in charge of the operation leading to Mossadegh's overthrow.

⁶⁶Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The changing nature of American power (New York: Basics Books Publishers, 1990).

than strengthen American standing"--such as withdrawal from global commitments.⁶⁷

However, for the purposes of this dissertation, the relative decline of U.S. influence in Venezuela during the 1970s as a factor in the country's foreign policy globalization does not concern the long-term future of U.S. power. Even less so is that relative decline tied to--as Nye puts it--"value judgments about the quality of American civilization at the end of the twentieth century."⁶⁸ I refer instead to the development of new conditions in the international system of the 1970s, which facilitated the rise of a considerably more independent behavior on the part of Venezuela. Those conditions were, on the one hand, the loosening of bipolarity as well as the emergence of East-West detente and, on the other, the exertion of a diminished level of pressure by the United States on Venezuela regarding foreign policy matters.

In fact, Nye considers that a country's power decline relative to others may result from its opting not to use the resources at its disposal. For instance, the United States emerged from World War I as a dominant global leader, but it chose a policy of isolationism that made it a secondary power in world affairs. Thus, the reason why U.S. influence

⁶⁷Ibid., 259.

⁶⁸Ibid., 16.

became lesser in 1928 than in 1918 was its lack of will to lead rather than the loss of material power resources.⁶⁹

Again, the phenomenon of diminished U.S. influence in Venezuela during the 1970s had to do more with the effects of a combination of political and economic setbacks than with a loss of material capabilities.

As it is discussed in chapter 6, during the 1980s President Reagan's new dominance and interventionism in Latin America (for example, in Central America and Grenada) quickly brought Venezuela back into alignment under the Herrera and Lusinchi administrations. Thus new U.S. hard-line policies toward the region had more effect on Venezuela than the huge global military buildup which the United States undertook during those years.

b. The development of Venezuelan perceptions

Insofar as the Caldera and Pérez administrations are concerned, diminished U.S. economic power and influence during the 1970s was clearly perceived. Consider, for example, the measures announced by President Nixon in his televised address to the nation of 15 August 1971 regarding the cessation of the convertibility of the dollar into gold; the imposition of a 10 percent surcharge on about one-half of dutiable imports by the United States; and the imposition of a 90-day freeze on prices, wages and rents. By December

⁶⁹Ibid., 15-16.

1971 the dollar had been devalued by about 10 percent and even a second devaluation of the same magnitude in February 1973 could not preserve the fixed parity system.

From the late 1960s the United States had been practicing an international monetary policy of "benign neglect," permitting a disproportionate buildup of foreign holdings in dollars and failing to intervene during currency crises. As a U.S. analyst summarized the situation at the time of President Nixon's measures:

By late summer 1971, benign neglect was no longer a sustainable policy. In the spring and summer of 1971, there was a run on the dollar, and for the first time in the twentieth century, the United States showed a trade deficit. The U.S. gold stock declined to \$10 billion versus outstanding foreign dollar holdings estimated at about \$80 billion, inflation was rampant, and unemployment widespread. Political problems due to the economic situation led to pressure from all political quarters to do something.⁷⁰

By suspending the convertibility of the dollar into gold and other reserve assets, President Nixon put an end to the system of international monetary management based on the agreements reached at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944. The consequences were not minor for United States leadership. As an American economic historian reminds us, "It was U.S. insistence that gold play a role in international finance that led to the dollar attaining its peculiar place in the IMF operations. The dollar was valued in terms of gold, and other currencies were valued in terms

⁷⁰Spero, International Economic Relations, 45.

of the dollar."⁷¹ The reaction was of widespread concern and frustration in both developed and developing countries. Japan and the Western European countries were especially touched by the dollar inconvertibility and U.S. import surcharges action, meant to force them to revalue their currencies against the dollar.⁷² Japan additionally indicated its aggravation at Nixon's sudden change of China policy in the same year, equally without prior consultation with Japan. As two historians of American foreign policy put it, the new policy "was not only taken as an insult but also read as a humiliating incentive for Japan to elaborate an independent course toward China."⁷³

In this context of political and economic disarray, the Latin American and Caribbean countries, on the one hand, and the OPEC countries, on the other, were taking a rather critical stand towards U.S. economic unilateralism, and Venezuela sought to play a leading role within both groups of countries. Indeed, Venezuela was particularly vulnerable during the monetary crisis of the early 1970s, since that

⁷¹Anthony S. Campagna, U.S. National Economic Policy, 1917-1985 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987), 363.

⁷²Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), 363.

⁷³James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, United States Foreign Policy and World Order, 4th ed. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1989), 324.

crisis was affecting the real value of its oil income and international reserves.⁷⁴

That year in the United Nations General Assembly, Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs Calvani strongly criticized both the measures themselves and the fact that the developing countries had been ignored when the United States took such decisions.⁷⁵ Calvani stated that they went against the principles of common good which his government upheld and referred also to the appeal to the conscience of the developed countries made in Venezuelan statements some days earlier at the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board in Geneva⁷⁶ and at the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the OAS Interamerican Social Council in Panama. In the latter meeting, the Venezuelan Viceminister of Development had stated that the Latin American bloc rejected U.S. measures as being "unjust, unnecessary and inadmissible." He felt that Latin America should not be punished for a problem it

⁷⁴See the section on "Maximization and protection of real income from the exploitation of petroleum resources" above.

⁷⁵United Nations General Assembly, 26th session, Official Records, 1994th meeting, 29 September 1971, paras. 34-40.

⁷⁶For a summary of the interventions made in September 1971 by the Venezuelan delegation on the issue of the international monetary crisis, see United Nations Report of the Trade and Development Board (14 October 1970-21 September 1971), A/8415. The Board called for the participation of all countries, including the developing countries, in the reform of the international monetary system.

did not cause nor be responsible for a process in which it had not participated.⁷⁷

In the same General Assembly, a major political development took place. A resolution calling for the seating of the People's Republic of China and the expulsion of Taiwan was adopted by a two-thirds majority. The event was recognized as a defeat for the United States which was widely perceived as having lost its ability to influence the Assembly after widespread lobbying efforts undertaken at all levels by the Nixon administration. In the case study on the establishment of relations with the People's Republic of China, an analysis is made of the Venezuelan policy position and of the issues involved in this vote.

While the decline of U.S. influence cannot possibly account for the totality of Venezuelan foreign policy behavior, it certainly had a strong explanatory value as in cases in which Venezuela had to consider the possible costs of actions which diverged from U.S. preferences.⁷⁸

For a further example, consider the Ford/Pérez exchange on the energy crisis. President Gerald Ford

⁷⁷Organization of American States, statement by Viceminister Antonio Casas Gonzalez (Washington: 15 September 1971), OEA/Sec. H/X.19, CIES 1709.

⁷⁸In this connection, it should be noted, for example, that the fact that in 1971 Venezuela voted with the United States against a large majority of the General Assembly on the question of China, if taken in isolation, could point to an increase rather than a relative decline of U.S. influence in Venezuela. However, the country's subsequent behavior--even limiting it to cooperative actions directed at the PRC--tends to show the contrary.

addressed the United Nations General Assembly on 18 September 1974--in the midst of the so-called first oil shock. In his statement, he blamed oil producers for the world food, energy and inflation crises and their overwhelming effects on the poorest countries. He thus warned OPEC members in the following terms:

... it should also be clear that by confronting consumers with production restrictions, artificial pricing, and the prospect of ultimate bankruptcy, producers will eventually become the victims of their own actions.⁷⁹

Carlos Andrés Pérez hastened to reply to Gerald Ford via an open letter which was published in The New York Times, Washington Post, and The Los Angeles Times, under the official seal of the Republic of Venezuela and with the heading, "The President of Venezuela Responds to the President of the United States." Such a media effort by Pérez on a controversial and politically sensitive issue for the United States signalled a new degree of self-assurance which could come only from the perception of a relative less threatening interlocuter. While Pérez wrote his letter to Ford from the position of a traditional friend of the United States, his assertiveness was unprecedented in seeking to occupy a public opinion space which he felt belonged to Venezuela.

⁷⁹Official records of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Plenary meetings, 18 September 1974.

As the President of a founding member of OPEC, Pérez wished to explain that the establishment of OPEC was "a direct consequence of the developed countries' use of outrageously low prices for our raw materials as a weapon of economic oppression." He also stated that "it is a well-known fact that oil prices account only for an insignificant percentage of production costs in the United States and the other developed countries."⁸⁰

In reflecting on the matter several years later, Pérez placed his 1974 reaction to President Ford's statement in the context of the unavoidable confrontations that an independent policy brought. He felt that as President Ford had not spoken out of the White House but rather at the United Nations, Pérez's public reply could not be considered an intervention in U.S. politics. He confirmed that his tough message had caused considerable irritation in the U.S. government, but thought that it had clearly placed Venezuela in the role of international spokesman for the Third World.⁸¹

c. Significance of the factor

In explaining the new foreign policy of Venezuela during the 1970s, the decline of U.S. influence in Latin

⁸⁰Carlos Andrés Pérez, "The President of Venezuela Responds to the President of the United States," The New York Times, p. C-19, 25 September 1974. See a reproduction of Pérez's letter in the appendices to this dissertation.

⁸¹See Peña, Conversaciones con Carlos Andrés Pérez, 2: 191-192.

America belongs to the category of systemic factors, namely those which account for Venezuelan behavior in terms of the characteristics of the international system. As will be shown in examples of specific policies and decisions, this condition of the international environment had a strong explanatory relevance in terms of Venezuelan foreign policy actions directed at or having consequences for the United States, a superpower, and the Western Hemisphere's hegemon.

The factor is enhanced by the perception by Venezuela (government, decision-makers, elites, public opinion) of a relative decline of U.S. influence.⁸² Such perception made

⁸²In this respect, it could be relevant to look at international public opinion toward the end of the 1969-1979 decade. For example, a survey was made by the Gallup Poll in January 1978 (covering Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Philippines, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela). Asked about the likelihood that, in each case, the power in the world of the United States, China and the Soviet Union would increase or decline in 1978, Venezuelans viewed the three countries as about equally likely to increase their power (respectively, 72, 71, and 67 percent of the respondents). As to the likelihood that such power would decline or not change, including those who did not know, the percentages were respectively 28, 24, and 23. Americans' responses to the same questions yielded the following results. Power will increase: 42, 56, and 53 percent respectively. Power will decline, not change or do not know: 58, 44, and 47 respectively. Venezuelan expectations of a power increase of the United States, USSR and China were in each case the highest in the 20-country survey. If Venezuelans in 1978 were more optimistic about the United States power than the Americans themselves (72 to 42 percent), they also showed by far the highest expectations, within the different country polls, for a power increase by China or USSR. It should be noted that the Gallup question referred to increase or decline of power in the world which does not necessarily equate with influence in Latin America or, more specifically, in Venezuela. This notwithstanding, the data suggest that Venezuelans were no longer viewing the United States as the world's sole dominant power. See The International Gallup Polls: Public opinion in 1978 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1980), 4-5.

autonomous foreign policy actions more viable as the costs of taking actions which could differ from, or even contradict, United States preferences appeared lower than in the past. In turn, the relative success of such autonomous actions contributes to validate the explanatory value of the factor. Moreover, those successes tended to reinforce the determination of Venezuelan leaders of the 1970s to act more autonomously.

IV. Conclusion

The three internal goals just described and analyzed (protection of oil income, pacification, and sovereignty over frontiers) relate directly to the essential components of the Venezuelan national interest. In this sense, they have a degree of continuity in time, as will be shown in chapter 6. For example, the oil element has been there on a relatively long-term basis. By the time of the death of dictator Juan Vicente Gómez in 1935, oil income was already providing 29 percent of the budget of Venezuela, making state decisions on the oil industry a vital element of the country's economic security. What became new during the 1970s was putting the defense of oil revenues in a North-South perspective and linking it to a globalistic foreign policy. The most evident manifestations of such policy are found in Venezuela's strong leadership role within OPEC and its assistance to oil importing developing countries. These

goal-oriented elements are used to develop a coherent explanation of the foreign policy followed by Caldera and Pérez during the 1969-1979 decade. The external factor relating to the relative decline of U.S. influence is included in the hypothesis because of its consistently high relevance to the explanation of Venezuelan policies. In chapter 5, three case studies are presented on relations with the USSR, China, and Cuba and the related policy developments are analyzed in terms of the four elements proposed.

CHAPTER 4

THE PROCESS OF GLOBALIZATION OF
VENEZUELAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1969 TO 1979I. Introduction

Relying on observed developments described and analyzed herein, the present chapter seeks to establish the case for the decisive drive towards the globalization of Venezuelan foreign policy which took place during the administrations of Caldera and Pérez from 1969 to 1979. That process is identified through the evidence presented here of two closely interrelated developments, namely (a) the expansion and diversification of the diplomatic network and (b) the rise of globalism, independence, and diplomatic activism in Venezuelan foreign policy.

II. Background of Venezuela's diplomatic globalization

Since the establishment of the Republic of 1830 and well into the twentieth century, Venezuela had been a poor, rural and isolated country. By 1926¹ Venezuela's diplomatic relations were limited to 19 states: 8 Latin American countries, 9 European countries, the United States, and the Holy See.² In terms of human resources devoted to the

¹During the long dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-1935).

²While at the time the number of sovereign states available to have diplomatic relations with was much smaller than in the 1970s, it is useful to note by way of comparison that by 1926 the United States, for example, already had diplomatic relations with 40 states.

foreign policy area, the personnel of the extremely modest Ministry of Foreign Affairs included at the time only 43 posts at the Chancellery in Caracas, 49 diplomatic posts and 47 consular posts abroad, for a total of 139 posts.³ Against that background the subsequent rise of a global foreign policy in Venezuela appears as a surprising phenomenon even today. By quantifying the progressive expansion of Venezuela's diplomatic network, Table 4 presents the share of the total number of sovereign states in the world with which Venezuela had diplomatic relations from 1926 to 1994.

Table 4

Evolution of Venezuela's diplomatic relationsStates in the World

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total number</u>	<u>Number having relations with Venezuela</u>	<u>Percentage of the total</u>
1926	62	19	30.6
1958	85	35	40.1
1969	117	65	55.5
1978	119	92	76.2
1994	184	144	78.0

Source: The World Bank, "World Development Report - 1991"; United Nations and Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

³See Arístides Calvani, "La política internacional de Venezuela en el último medio siglo," in Venezuela Moderna: Medio siglo de historia, 1926-1976, 2nd ed. (Caracas: Editorial Ariel, 1979), 448. According to Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Libro Amarillo (Caracas: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1964, 1993), the total number of posts of the Ministry reached 541 in 1964 and 1,411 in 1993.


In Figures 4 and 5 the expansion of the diplomatic relations of Venezuela is graphically illustrated. The shaded areas of the world map represent the countries with which Venezuela had diplomatic relations at the date indicated. From 1958 to 1978, such expansion brought relations with 57 countries accounting for 64 percent of the world's mid-1976 population and 54 percent of the land area of the world. As suggested by Figure 5, the most important stage of the expansion took place during the 1969-1979 presidential decade, adding 33 politically diverse countries which accounted for 36 percent of the world's population and 39 percent of the world area.

III. Expansion and diversification of Venezuela's diplomatic network in 1969-1979

During the presidencies of Rafael Caldera (1969-1974) and Carlos Andres Pérez (1974-1979) the Venezuelan diplomatic network was expanded through the establishment or resumption of diplomatic relations with 33 countries and the Sovereign Military Order of Malta (SMOM).⁴ Those diplomatic partners were situated in all geographical regions of the world; represented every stage of economic and social development; and had a wide range of national political and


⁴The SMOM is a unique sui generis institution that currently maintains diplomatic relations at the Ambassador's level with 64 United Nations Member States and the Holy See. In 1994 the SMOM was granted observer status in the UN General Assembly. For more details on the SMOM, including its diplomatic relations, see Yearbook of International Organizations 1992-93 (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1992), 10415.

Figure 4



SOURCE: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela, Caracas, 1994.

Figure 5



SOURCE: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela, Caracas, 1994.

economic structures as well as diverse foreign policy preferences within the international system of the 1970s. A list is given in Table 5 of those new relations. States are grouped according to Venezuela's areas of foreign policy emphasis, namely, regional (Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe); economic (OPEC); or political (Socialist countries).

1. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

As elaborated in chapter 3 of this dissertation, Venezuela was a founder of OPEC in 1960, together with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait, and a continuing key player within the Organization. Within OPEC, Venezuela was a country with diminishing oil revenues and a sizeable and fast-growing population. Thus it favored a firm policy of production control and defense of prices against world inflation. Venezuela clearly sought to use diplomatic leverage in intra-OPEC policy negotiations. In this context, diplomatic interaction with the individual OPEC members became a necessity for Venezuelan foreign policy in the 1970s and thus Presidents Caldera and Pérez established diplomatic relations, at the ambassadorial level, in cases where they did not exist before, with every OPEC member.

Table 5
Venezuela's diplomatic relations established or
 resumed during the 1969-1979 presidential decade

<u>State and grouping</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>President</u>	<u>Number of states</u>
<u>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC):</u>			5
Algeria	1971	Caldera	
Quatar	1973	Caldera	
Gabon	1975	Pérez	
Bahrain	1975	Pérez	
United Arab Emirates	1977	Pérez	
<u>Socialist countries:</u>			8
Hungary	1969	Caldera	
Soviet Union	1970R	Caldera	
German Democratic Republic	1973	Caldera	
China	1974	Pérez	
Bulgaria	1974	Pérez	
Democratic Republic of Korea	1974	Pérez	
Cuba	1974R	Pérez	
Albania	1975	Pérez	
<u>Latin America:</u>			5
Argentina	1969R	Caldera	
Bolivia	1969R	Caldera	
Panamá	1969R	Caldera	
Perú	1969R	Caldera	
Haiti	1972R	Pérez	
<u>Caribbean:</u>			5
Barbados	1974	Pérez	
Suriname	1975	Pérez	
Bahamas	1977	Pérez	
Grenada	1977	Pérez	
Dominica	1977	Pérez	
<u>Africa:</u>			7
Uganda	1970	Caldera	
Kenya	1970	Caldera	
Senegal	1970	Caldera	
Cote D'Ivoire	1970	Caldera	
Mali	1975	Pérez	
Zaire	1977	Pérez	
Zambia	1978	Pérez	
<u>Asia and the Pacific:</u>			2
Australia	1973	Caldera	
New Zealand	1979	Pérez	
<u>Western Europe:</u>			2
Sovereign Military Order of Malta	1970	Caldera	
Republic of Malta	1977	Pérez	

Total: 34

R = Resumption of diplomatic relations.

Source: Data provided to the author by the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In the balance, five OPEC countries (two African and three Arab states) were added to the Venezuelan diplomatic network.

2. Socialist countries

While Venezuela had established diplomatic relations with two socialist countries by 1960, namely Yugoslavia in 1950 and Poland in 1960, it was not until the Caldera/Pérez decade that a new foreign policy towards the socialist countries was put in place (see chapter 5 of this dissertation for the analysis of this policy's implementation). As a result, relations were established or renewed with eight socialist countries, including two permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (USSR and China).

3. Latin American countries

During the preceding decade, the administration of Rómulo Betancourt (1959-1964) had put into effect a policy of non-recognition by Venezuela of de facto regimes in Latin America (including in particular those issuing from a growing number of military coups in which democratically elected leaders had been overthrown).⁵ Such policy came to

⁵Betancourt had suffered a ten-year exile during the military dictatorship which followed the overthrow of President Rómulo Gallegos by the military in 1948.

be known as the Betancourt doctrine.⁶ The administration of Raúl Leoni (1964-1969) began to apply the Betancourt doctrine in a flexible manner and it was abandoned altogether by presidents Caldera and Pérez. Thus the Caldera administration resumed diplomatic relations with the de facto regimes of Argentina, Bolivia, Panamá and Perú which had been broken by Betancourt and Leoni. Pérez in turn resumed relations with Haiti as well as with Cuba (which is shown under socialist countries in Table 5). In the case of Caldera, resumption of relations with de facto regimes in the region was prompted by the goal of Latin American integration and followed the principle of pluralistic solidarity, which accepted different economic and political regimes in Latin America and the Caribbean on the basis of the promotion of self-determination and non-intervention and the relaxation of regional tensions. In essence, Caldera's principle gave priority to the strengthening of Latin American unity (within the North-South context) over conditioning diplomatic relations solely on the democratic legitimacy of Latin American governments.⁷ During the Pérez administration diplomatic relations with Latin American and

⁶For more details on the origins, development, and application of the Betancourt doctrine, see Robert Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1982), 524-528.

⁷On the application by Caldera of the principle of ideological pluralism in Latin America, see Donald L. Herman, Christian Democracy in Venezuela (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 174-176.


Caribbean countries were decided by Venezuela in terms of a global North-South perspective which, by giving priority to Third World solidarity, in practice led to the same result in the hemisphere as in the case of Caldera.⁸

4. Caribbean countries

Newly independent states in this area comprising insular countries in the Caribbean, as well as Suriname and Guyana, were a high priority geographical area of Venezuelan foreign policy since (i) an important part of its own territory is insular and located within the Caribbean and (ii) sea lanes and navigation straits which are vital for Venezuela's commerce and security are in that area (for an illustration of these vital navigation straits, see Figure 6). Thus Venezuela developed a strong policy of political and economic cooperation with Caribbean states. In terms of diplomacy, Venezuela established relations with those countries soonest after their independence, and thus its ambassadorial-level presence in Caribbean countries matched and even surpassed that of the United States. The emphasis during the 1969-1979 decade was on economic and technical cooperation with the countries of the area, including financial aid.

⁸For Perez's approach to Latin American relations and the abandonment of the Betancourt doctrine, see Alfredo Peña, Conversaciones con Carlos Andrés Pérez (Caracas: Editorial Ateneo, 1979), 183-185.

Figure 6



5. African countries

During the decade, Venezuela established relations with nine African countries (counting Algeria and Gabon--shown under OPEC in Table 5). Because of previous neglect, Africa needed special efforts. In fact, Africa was the region having the largest number of states within the Group of 77. Thus, Venezuela had to count on African solidarity within the framework of its new policies of leadership in support of collective self-reliance and the demands of the New International Economic Order (NIEO). Venezuela also had its own need to promote OPEC goals and other Southern objectives in the worldwide context of the developing countries, a foreign policy objective which Perez used to describe as his opening to the Third World. Regarding political diversification of the diplomatic relations it is worth mentioning that those nine countries were members both of the Group of 77 in the United Nations and of the Non-Aligned Movement.⁹

6. Asia and the Pacific

Looking at the region geographically, diplomatic developments during the Caldera/Pérez decade regarding Asia and the Pacific illustrate well the policy goal of balanced

⁹In this connection see Carlos Nones Sucre, "Autonomía y visión global en la política exterior de los países en desarrollo," in Temas Internacionales - 1994 (Caracas: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1994).

expansion and diversification of Venezuela's diplomatic network. Venezuela established navigation straits diplomatic relations with Australia and New Zealand (in addition to China and the Democratic Republic of Korea, which appear under socialist countries in Table 5). The first Venezuelan ambassador to Australia was accredited in 1978. He also served as ambassador to New Zealand and the Philippines and, from 1983, as ambassador to Fiji.

7. Western Europe

While Venezuela's traditional diplomatic network included most of Western Europe, there were still possibilities for expansion in this region. Caldera established diplomatic relations with the Sovereign Military Order of Malta which, besides its historical and symbolic significance to Latin America, carries out an important program of humanitarian assistance and is tied to powerful banking centers, especially in Europe. In 1977 Pérez established relations with Malta, which had become a republic in 1974 and was a member of the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement. (In 1980, the administration of Luis Herrera Campins established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Ireland.

8. Increase in resources assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and changes in its organization

During the Caldera administration the total allocation for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs increased continuously from 1969 to 1974. From 1973 to 1974 the budget increased by a factor of nearly 3.5, already reflecting the needs of the process of globalization coupled with the surge in fiscal income due to the marked improvement in oil prices. During the Pérez administration (1974-1979) the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to increase on the average, at a still faster rate. Table 6 shows the total budget allocation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1962 to 1982. Of equal significance was the fact that during the Pérez administration the foreign affairs budget doubled its share of the total national budget from 0.5 percent during the previous decade to 1 percent, a proportion which has remained fairly stable until the present time.

During the 1970s human resources assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and the Institute of Foreign Trade established by the Caldera administration in 1970) were increased and developed in order to support the new policies of globalization. This increase concerned both staff abroad (especially in the new embassies being opened)

and the staff in Caracas. Moreover, human resources in the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, especially those assigned to international relations and OPEC matters, grew accordingly.¹⁰ Finally, the appointment of internationally prestigious Manuel Pérez Guerrero as Minister of State for International Economic Affairs during the Pérez administration provided a key cabinet player in the context of the foreign policy globalization process.¹¹

Professionalization of the foreign service was intensified and recruitment of university graduates at the entry level through competitive examinations (foreseen in the Law of Foreign Service Personnel) started to become an important steady source of new staff. For example, the number of successful applicants went from 9 in 1970 to 7 in 1971, 10 in 1972 and 21 in 1975.¹²

¹⁰See Oficina Central de Presupuesto, 40 Años de Presupuesto Fiscal, 1948-1988 (Caracas: Oficina Central de Presupuesto, 1988), 18-28.

¹¹Pérez Guerrero operated with a small think tank and relied especially on the support of the Institute of Foreign Trade, which was formally under the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

¹²See Calvani, Venezuela Moderna, 500.

Table 6
Budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total allocation at the end of the fiscal year** (in million bolivares)</u>
1962	40.0
1963	41.1
1964	46.2
1965	57.9
1966	62.1
1967	73.0
1968	74.7
1969	77.6
1970	86.9
1971	91.0
1972	99.0
1973	112.0
1974	390.3
1975	319.9
1976	401.9
1977	544.5
1978	262.1
1979	267.2
1980	307.5
1981	474.5
1982	438.4

Source: Oficina Central de Presupuesto (OCEPRE), 40 Años de Presupuesto Fiscal, 1948-1988 (Caracas: OCEPRE, 1988).

*Includes the budget for the Institute of Foreign Trade from 1970.

**Includes any additional allocations approved by Congress.

Changes in the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also reflected the process of globalization in its critical phase of the 1970s. In 1964 (beginning of the Leoni administration) the Directorate for International Politics had only two departments, devoted to interamerican and world affairs, respectively. In the Department of World Affairs, the Division of International Relations had a separate Europe Desk, while matters regarding Asia, Africa, and Oceania were lumped together in a single Desk, revealing relatively little interest in those parts of the world in terms of Venezuelan policy. In addition, there was a relatively small Directorate dealing with frontier issues.

The Directorate for International Trade and Consulates, and its Department of Trade Policy, hardly emphasized an integrated approach to economic diplomacy by the Ministry. In fact, the latter Department dealt only with the areas of transport, trade agreements, and relations with regional economic organizations.

In contrast, by 1979 the Ministry had a separate Institute of Foreign Trade¹³ as well as strengthened and specialized directorates-general dealing, inter alia, with (a) economic issues and international cooperation and (b) frontier issues.¹⁴ The Directorate-General for International Politics included a Directorate for Foreign Policy and, under it, adequately sized units dealing with Europe; Eastern Europe; North America; Latin America and the Caribbean; Asia and Oceania, and Africa and the Middle East. Moreover, the Directorate for Multilateral Affairs included a unit of UN Affairs which emphasized an overall approach to the members of the Group of 77.

¹³As already indicated, in 1970 the Caldera administration created the Institute of Foreign Trade, attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a response to the need for structured support to Venezuela's economic diplomacy.

¹⁴For an overall analysis of the Venezuelan foreign policy subsystem, including public and private entities, see Carlos A. Romero, "La complejidad organizacional en el sector externo de Venezuela" in Carlos A. Romero, ed., Reforma y Política Exterior de Venezuela (Caracas: Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1992), 209-238.

IV. Globalism, independence, and foreign policy activism

The expansion and diversification of Venezuela's diplomatic network just described was accompanied by an important shift in the state's foreign policy. Caldera's foreign policy orientation had been outlined during his campaign in 1968. First, Venezuela began to contemplate its cooperation with other states in global terms--making such cooperation truly worldwide in scope and application. Second, Venezuelan foreign policy decisions became more independent of the United States, as evidenced, for example, by a diminished agreement with that country in UN General Assembly roll-call votes. Third, the level of Venezuelan foreign policy activity had increased rapidly during the decade and, as analyzed above, the resources assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the Institute of Foreign Trade, improved substantially in both quantity and quality.

1. Venezuelan globalism

The process of globalization of foreign policy led to the development of new capabilities, intellectual and material, within the Venezuelan state. Those capabilities comprised a strengthened Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Institute of Foreign Trade and an expanded diplomatic network. Venezuelan globalism in the 1970s sought to give

the country a leading role in the North-South debate and to play down the confrontational East-West view of the world which had strongly influenced Venezuelan foreign policy during the 1960s. As a point of comparison, it is interesting to read Professor Erisman's work on Cuba's foreign policy. There he contends the following:

Especially since 1975, when Cuba became deeply involved in the Angolan war, the island's foreign policy has assumed international implications as Havana has sought to influence the dynamics of the international system in a variety of geographical and issue area contexts. This capacity to wield wide-ranging leverage abroad on a regular basis--unique among comparable underdeveloped nations--may be called Cuban globalism . . .¹⁵

In my view, Venezuelan globalism during the 1970s differed fundamentally from Cuba's in its genuine commitment to democracy and to independence from both superpowers as well as in its unwillingness to rely on the use of national military forces abroad as a foreign policy instrument.

In addition to bilateral embassies, Venezuela's diplomatic network had included separate permanent representation (at the ambassadorial level) in the United Nations (New York); the specialized agencies and other UN

¹⁵See H. Michael Erisman, Cuba's International Relations: The anatomy of a nationalistic foreign policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), xii-xiv.

bodies with headquarters in Geneva¹⁶; the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Rome; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Paris; and in the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington. Such diplomatic missions, especially that at the United Nations in New York, were strengthened and the scope of their contacts and negotiations became increasingly global. In particular, the Venezuelan Mission to the UN negotiated the resumption of diplomatic relations with the USSR and Cuba.

As to other non-state actors, the country played a decisive role in the activities of OPEC. Examples of relevant developments can be cited as follows. Venezuelan specialist Francisco R. Parra, a top adviser at OPEC headquarters, also served a one-year term as Secretary-General of the Organization in 1968, a year in which its Conference adopted in Vienna the historical "Declaratory Statement on Petroleum Policy in Member Countries" (June 24-25).¹⁷ Moreover, Caracas hosted OPEC conferences of oil

¹⁶Through an office covering the following:
 International Labour Organisation (ILO)
 World Health Organization (WHO)
 International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
 and such UN bodies as:
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
 General Agreement and Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
 Commission on Human Rights

¹⁷For the text of the Declaration, see Dankwart A. Rustow and John F. Mugno, OPEC: Success and prospects (New York: New York University Press, 1976), 166-172.

ministers in 1970, 1977 and 1979.¹⁸ Relations with OPEC and its Secretariat in Vienna were conducted out of Caracas, primarily by the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, with the full involvement of the Chancellery and the diplomatic network in matters of international politics. Presidents Caldera and Pérez personally took part in key decisions regarding OPEC. During President Pérez's administration, another important player on OPEC policy matters was his Minister of State for International Economic Affairs, Manuel Pérez Guerrero.

2. Foreign policy independence

Venezuela's foreign interactions had been historically confined to the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe. Moreover, during the 1959-1969 presidential decade following the restoration of democracy in 1958, the country's foreign policy still remained to a large extent aligned with that of the United States. Thus the process of globalization of Venezuelan foreign policy in the 1970s necessitated an opening to the other developing countries and the Eastern countries, which could only be achieved by moving to a foreign policy which would be more independent of the United States and placing Venezuela closer to the middle between

¹⁸An OPEC conference was held in December 1979 under the Presidency of Luis Herrera Campins. It agreed, inter alia, to convert the OPEC Fund into a development agency with its own legal personality.

the two superpowers in the context of the cold war.

Foreign policy independence, defined as the ability of a state to act alone, could be seen as an ideal type in the Weberian sense.¹⁹ Thus, while in practice there is no such thing as absolute autonomy, variations were continuously observed, for example, in the degree of alignment of states during the cold war years. As for Venezuela during the 1970s, the following can be given as examples of increasingly autonomous foreign policy actions of the state.

- Diversifying to the extent of globalization of its diplomatic ties, including the establishment or re-establishment of relations with the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, North Korea, and countries in Eastern Europe;
- Becoming a key founding member of OPEC and actively supporting its defense of international oil prices;
- Nationalizing the country's oil and iron ore industries;
- Assuming predominantly Third World stands in the United Nations;
- Strongly supporting Panama in its negotiations with the United States on the Canal Treaty;
- Independent peace-making diplomacy in Central America and support of the Nicaraguan revolution;
- Long-term quest for a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba together with the lifting of economic sanctions by the United States.

The index of Venezuela's coincidence with the United States in roll-call votes in the United Nations General Assembly began to diminish by 1967 and diminished rapidly during the

¹⁹See Nones Sucre, Autonomía y visión global.

1969-1979 decade.²⁰ More significantly, Venezuela disagreed with the United States in specific votes of importance to that country such as the 1975 vote on the resolution branding Zionism as a form of racism (by abstaining while the U.S. voted against after vocal dissent with the draft sponsored by a group of Arab and Islamic countries, Ukrainian SSR and Cuba). In contrast, Venezuela had agreed with the United States in the 1971 vote on the recognition of the People's Republic of China.²¹ The evolution of the index of coincidence²² in General Assembly roll-call votes between Venezuela and the United States is presented in Figure 7. For comparison, the index for Cuba and the global mean are shown in that figure.


Venezuela also disagreed with the United States in votes cast in United Nations organs other than the General Assembly. For example, since 1960, Venezuela was elected to the 24-member Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (also known

²⁰Based on the methodology used by the U.S. mission to the UN.

²¹For a discussion of this issue see the case study on China in Chapter 5 of this dissertation.

²²See Eva Josko de Guernón, "Modelling Venezuela's Foreign Policy: Acquiescence in Venezuela's Relations with the United States," paper presented to the Conference of the International Studies Association in 1980. For a general analysis of General Assembly roll-call votes, see Miguel Marín Bosch, "How Nations Vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations," in International Organization (Autumn 1987, vol. 41, no. 4: 705-724), as well as that author's definitive book Votos y Vetos en la Asamblea General (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1995).

Figure 7
Index of Coincidence with USA in United Nations General
Assembly Plenary Roll-Call Votes, 1946-1988



Source: Data provided by Miguel Marin Bosch to the author. See also Miguel Marin Bosch, *Votos y Vetos en la Asamblea General* (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1995).

* There were no roll-call votes in 1964.

** The index, divided by 10, approximates percentage coincidence in a given year.

*** Global weighted five-year mean value.

as the Decolonization Committee). The case that Puerto Rico was a territory which had not yet attained independence was brought before the Decolonization Committee in 1972 and 1973. The Committee recognized Puerto Rico's "inalienable right to self-determination in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960" and on both occasions Venezuela's position of abstention did not coincide with the vigorously expressed preferences of the United States (which was not a member of the Committee but exerted considerable pressure on its members). In 1977 the issue of Puerto Rico's status was again raised in the Decolonization Committee, which decided to postpone the matter.²³

Venezuela was a nonpermanent member of the Security Council during 1977 and 1978, and while the Carter administration's foreign policy positions on such matters as apartheid were congenial with those of Venezuela, there were still disagreements on specific votes in the Council, for example, in the case of Rhodesia in 1978.

In effect, on 14 March 1978, the Council, on the basis

²³Venezuela actually withdrew from the Decolonization Committee in 1975, but returned in 1980 and subsequently voted for the resolutions sponsored by Cuba on Puerto Rico's self-determination. For further details on the question, see Robert A. Pastor, "Puerto Rico as an International Issue: A Motive for Movement?", in Richard J. Bloomfield, ed., Puerto Rico: The search for a national policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 99-132. Also, see Raymond Carr, Puerto Rico: A colonial experiment (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), especially chapter 4, "Puerto Rico in the United Nations: The Anticolonialist Offensive," 339-365.

of the proposal co-sponsored by Venezuela, adopted resolution 423 with the abstentions of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The resolution strongly condemned the illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia and the continuing execution of freedom fighters, and called for a genuine majority rule and for that country's independence in 1978. In October of 1978, Venezuela voted with the majority (Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States abstaining) to adopt resolution 427, which expressed regret and concern at the decision of the U.S. government to allow the entry into the U.S. of Ian Smith and some members of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia in contravention of previous resolutions of the Council and of the UN Charter.²⁴ In those and other cases, Venezuela displayed a consistent anti-colonial posture.²⁵

3. Foreign policy activism

During the 1969-1979 presidential decade Caldera and Pérez coincided in gradually restructuring Venezuela's foreign policy in order to support state goals on the basis of an independent view of the world which deemphasized cold

²⁴See United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1978 (New York: UN Publication, 1981), 224-228.

²⁵For Security Council statements by Venezuela on Rhodesia, see Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Venezuela en el Consejo de Seguridad (Caracas: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1989), 103-106.

war alignment with the Hemisphere's superpower. Those policies sought to halt the erosion of Venezuelan oil income due to declining prices in real terms; pacify the country, using as an incentive cooperation with the external ideological supporters of insurgents; seeking Southern solidarity in territorial sovereignty issues (such as in the cases of land and maritime borders with, respectively, Guyana and Colombia). In addition, the development of Venezuela's leadership role was made easier by the decline of U.S. influence in Latin America.

The level of foreign policy activity of Venezuela increased dramatically. Evidently, such development was inseparable from the successful implementation of globalization policies. In the first place, the expansion of the diplomatic network resulted in the growth of foreign policy activity with the consequent multiplication of initiatives directed at states and groups of states in all regions of the world. This included the strengthening of alliances of Venezuela with countries sharing its goals and problems--in particular the other developing countries.

Such activism presented itself in sharp contrast to the international passivity shown by Venezuela from the establishment of the Republic of 1830 to the death of dictator Juan Vicente Gómez in 1935.

Venezuela's new activism in the 1970s also represented a significant change with respect to the level of foreign

policy activity during the immediately preceding administrations of Presidents Betancourt and Leoni. As an indicator, in Table 7 the number of international instruments signed by Venezuela during the two decades are compared.

Table 7

International Instruments Concluded by Venezuela (1959-1979)

<u>Administration</u>	<u>Number of Public Treaties and International Agreements Signed*</u>
Betancourt (1959-1964)	72
Leoni (1964-1969)	158
	TOTAL: <u>230</u>
Caldera (1969-1974)	161
Pérez (1974-1979)	366
	TOTAL: <u>527</u>

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tratados Públicos y Acuerdos Internacionales de Venezuela, 1820-1984, Índice General, volume XXVII (Caracas: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1987).

*Includes ratifications after approval by the Congress, as needed.

While the relative importance of different international agreements concluded by Venezuela necessarily varied, the fact that their total number more than doubled during the 1970s clearly reflects an overall increase of diplomatic activity, including the signature of numerous formal agreements with new and even prospective diplomatic partners (as in the case of Caldera's anti-hijacking

agreement with Cuba²⁶).

Such findings are corroborated by the increase observed in other indicators of foreign policy activity such as the number of state visits, including those by the presidents, exchanged by Venezuela with other countries.²⁷ The relative priority given to foreign policy by the Venezuelan presidents from 1959 to 1979 can be inferred from the time devoted to this area in presidential addresses to the Congress, including their inaugural messages. Caldera and Pérez not only granted much higher overall priority to foreign policy issues than Betancourt and Leoni, but did so emphasizing a global North-South context rather than a Western Hemisphere perspective dominated by the Cuba issue.²⁸

²⁶For more details on this and other examples of significant international agreements concluded by Venezuela during the 1970s, see the case studies in Chapter 5 of this dissertation.

²⁷For data in this respect regarding countries in the Western Hemisphere, see Elsa Cardozo de Da Silva, Continuidad y Consistencia en Quince Años de Política Exterior Venezolana, 1969-1984 (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1992).

²⁸For more details on presidential emphasis regarding foreign policy, see Eva Josko de Guerón, "El Congreso y la Política Exterior de Venezuela," in Politeia (Caracas), no. 7 (1977): 329-441.

CHAPTER 5

EXPLAINING GLOBALIZATION IN THE 1970S THROUGH THE CASES OF
RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA, AND CUBAI. Introduction

The case studies which are presented in this chapter on relations with the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba are particularly illustrative of the expansion and diversification of the Venezuelan diplomatic network which took place during the 1970s. In order to explain such new policy of globalistic activism and independence of the superpowers I apply to each case study the elements introduced in chapter 3, namely, three internal goals representing fundamental motivations of the leaders and an external factor reflecting changes in the power configuration of the international system, particularly the decline of U.S. influence in Venezuela. The three studies are found to validate the relevance of the four elements chosen in explaining the overall policy of globalization which developed in Venezuela in the 1970s.

II. Case study on diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union1. Background

Venezuela's general motivation in the resumption of diplomatic, consular and trade relations with the USSR in 1970 was political in the sense of reaffirming the country's independence of the superpowers. Such ties represented

another important step taken within the framework of the policies of globalization of the country's foreign relations as initiated by President Caldera and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Calvani and continued and expanded by President Pérez. In resuming diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, Venezuela also aimed at the external side of pacification. It was part of a coherent foreign policy strategy designed by Caldera from the time of the 1968 electoral campaign. The important role of the pacification goal in this case is evident from President Caldera's inaugural speech; from his weekly presidential press conferences; and from his public statements after leaving office. The state goal proposed operated as a strong motivating element in order to achieve internal pacification in a durable manner.

The territorial sovereignty goal as it regarded frontier issues with Colombia and Guyana was particularly relevant in explaining Venezuela's decision to resume diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Colombia had established relations with the USSR ahead of Venezuela in 1968, while Guyana did so in April 1970. Thus Venezuela could not have afforded to isolate itself in the race for

international influence, in which its two neighbors were involved.¹

In considering the economic side of relations, it is observed that trade between Venezuela and USSR was slow to develop because of the lack of complementarity of the economies. During the period from 1970 to 1980, USSR imports from Venezuela were sporadic and amounted to only 4.7 million rubles and USSR exports to that country barely reached 4.8 million rubles.² (As a point of comparison, total exports from the USSR to Latin America during the same period amounted to 5.4 billion rubles.) Even a creative reciprocal agreement for the delivery of Venezuelan oil to Cuba and Soviet oil to Spain (initially up to 20,000 barrels per day) faced some difficulties of implementation. In effect, seeking to rationalize the transportation conditions of existing contracts for supplying Venezuelan oil to Spain and Soviet oil to Cuba, it was agreed in 1976 by the four countries involved that Venezuelan oil would be delivered to Cuba and Soviet oil to Spain (at the cost of the original supplier in each case).

Venezuela resumed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1970 after an interruption of 18 years. A look at

¹See Cole Blaisier, The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), 17, and Roger Hamburg, "The Soviet Union and Latin America," in Roger E. Kanet, ed., The Soviet Union and Developing Nations (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 180.

²Blaisier, The Giant's Rival, 50-51, tables 4 and 5.

the history of relations between the two countries shows commonalities as well as sharp contradictions in governmental interests.

During World War II, Venezuela lent its political, economic and military cooperation to the allied powers, and Venezuelan petroleum exports represented an important contribution to the allied victory. In that context, Venezuela decided to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union towards the end of the administration of President Isaías Medina Angarita (1941-1945). Following negotiations carried out in Washington between the respective ambassadors to the United States, Diógenes Escalante and Andrei Gromyko, a joint announcement of the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations at the ambassadorial level was made on 14 February 1945.³ On the occasion of the San Francisco Conference which adopted the

³ Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Libro Amarillo, (Caracas: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1945). The following day, the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs also announced that the Government recognized the existence of the state of belligerence between Venezuela and both Germany and Japan. Consequently, President Medina granted Ambassador Escalante full powers to sign the United Nations Declaration of 1 January 1942. That was a formal step that was needed in order to join the United Nations. In spite of the widespread anti-fascist sentiment of its population, Venezuela did not declare war to the Axis powers earlier because the Chancellery wanted to keep a tradition of non-belligerence which went back to the origin of the Republic in 1830. See José Rivas Rivas, Historia Gráfica de Venezuela, vol.2 (Caracas: Ediciones Torán, 1989), 191. On different positions held by Latin American countries regarding the declaration of war on the Axis powers--including Somoza's Nicaragua in the extreme of unconditional alignment with the United States and Peron's Argentina in the extreme of fascist sympathies--see Demetrio Boersner, Relaciones Internacionales de América Latina: Breve historia (Caracas: Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1982), 246-249.

Charter of the United Nations, the Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Caracciolo Parra Pérez, met in May 1945 with his Soviet counterpart Vyacheslav Molotov and held further discussions with a view to exchanging ambassadors between the two countries.⁴ By September 1945 the appointed ambassadors were on duty, respectively, in Caracas and Moscow.

On the whole, Venezuelan relations with the USSR had developed without significant incidents--notwithstanding the political turbulence of the 1945-1952 period. However, the Military Junta installed in November 1948, after the overthrow of constitutional President Rómulo Gallegos (who had taken office in February of the same year) met with student resistance and a threatening oil industry strike in 1950, which led it to increase its initial repressive measures. The Junta had already dissolved the Acción Democrática (AD) party in December 1948, sending most of its leaders into exile and banning the publication of pro-AD newspapers throughout the country. In May 1950 the

⁴Minister Parra Pérez kept President Medina continuously informed of his different political contacts in San Francisco. After his conversation with Assistant Secretary of State for Interamerican Affairs Nelson Rockefeller on 6 May 1945, Parra sent a telegram to Medina informing him of Rockefeller's warning about an inevitable early confrontation between the Soviet Union and "the Anglo-Saxon block." Parra ended his message insightfully by saying: "As you and I had foreseen, the North Americans are starting now to speak of Communism as they talked before of Nazism and to invoke continental solidarity and the defense of the hemisphere against Communism." See Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Caracciolo Parra Pérez, Canciller de Venezuela (Caracas: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1990), 537.

Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) was accused of promoting illegal strikes and other acts against public order and was dissolved by decree.⁵ Diplomatic ties, which had already declined to a low level, continued to deteriorate and in June 1952 the provisional government presided over by Germán Suárez Flamerich⁶ broke off relations with the Soviet Union over a controversial but relatively minor airport incident involving Chargé d'affaires Leon Krylov, and the Venezuelan Ministry of Interior's security authorities (Seguridad Nacional).⁷

With the restoration of constitutional democracy in Venezuela in 1958, all political parties recovered their legality, including AD and the PCV which had been dissolved by the previous dictatorial government. That, unfortunately, did not mean the end of political discord and

⁵Considering that the PCV was on the opposition side during the Trienio and that the military dictatorship's main adversary was the Acción Democrática party (AD), Wayne S. Smith's affirmation that Pérez Jiménez "allowed the Communists a rather free hand in the labor movement up until about 1956 in return for tacit Communist support" is misleading insofar as it applies only to the Black Communists, a minority splinter faction of the Party. See his "Introduction: an overview of Soviet policy", in Wayne S. Smith, ed., The Russians Aren't Coming (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 8-9. On the Venezuelan Black Communists trade union activities, see Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1957), 267-269.

⁶After the overthrow of President Gallegos, a Junta Militar de Gobierno took over. The Junta's president, Lt. Colonel Carlos Delgado Chabaud, was assassinated in November 1950 and Germán Suárez Flamerich, a civilian, was appointed to replace him in the provisional government, renamed Junta de Gobierno.

⁷José Rivas Rivas, Historia Gráfica de Venezuela, 4: 189-190.

violence in Venezuela. In effect, faced with perceived threats to its stability, the administration of Rómulo Betancourt (1959-1964) suspended the PCV (Partido Comunista de Venezuela) and MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria--an AD splinter group) in 1962, and most of their leaders then joined the ongoing armed insurrection. The need to put an end to that insurrection and pacify the country began to influence foreign policy priorities, and during the later part of the administration of President Raúl Leoni (1964-1969), negotiations were undertaken for the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Those negotiations were abruptly discontinued after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union. Despite such last-minute setbacks, the Leoni administration had been encouraged by a Soviet policy of "peaceful road" to socialism which fitted well with its early efforts at pacification and amnesty to insurgents. In fact, Soviet political analyses of the Venezuelan situation had been critical of the insurrectional line of the PCV.⁸

⁸This is reflected, for example, in a major history of workers' and liberation movements published in Moscow in 1978. There, the following assessment was made:

The government of Leoni tried to carry out a more flexible foreign and domestic policy but opposition in the country to the anti-democratic regime continued to grow. However, the Communists at that time made a serious mistake. They concentrated all their strength in the development of the partisan struggle and significantly weakened their work in the masses, which led to growth in the party of sectarian tendencies. . . .

2. Relations with the Soviet Union under the Caldera administration

The normalization of diplomatic relations between Venezuela and the USSR can be explained basically as serving the need of the Venezuelan government to reinforce, through its foreign policy, the domestic pacification of the country. The close link between domestic and foreign affairs involved in the resumption of relations with the USSR was acknowledged both by President Caldera and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arístides Calvani. Nevertheless, the other elements--such as the need to protect oil income and the decline of U.S. world influence--did also play an important role in explaining the considerations and the structural factors that permitted Venezuela to resume diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the USSR, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, was an actor of major importance on the world political stage, and one that had to be taken into consideration should any of Venezuela's border dispute become armed conflicts and thus come up on the agenda of the Security Council.

In the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee in April 1967, the Communist Party of Venezuela was subject to criticism for its mistakes and worked out a new political line. That line was directed at the development of the mass movement for satisfying the economic demands of the workers, against the terror and repression, for the liberation of political prisoners, and the legalization of the Communist Party of Venezuela and the left revolutionary movement.

As quoted by Blasier in the Giant's Rival, 88-89.

In his inauguration speech of 11 March 1969, Caldera alluded to the existence of a mature awareness in the country's public opinion concerning the establishment of relations with states whose political organization and ideologies are different from those of Venezuela,⁹ but whose influence in the world economy could not be ignored.¹⁰ He also indicated that he was prepared to offer the opportunity of a rectification to those who took the road of armed insurrection and still persisted.¹¹ Shortly after, he signed a decree legalizing the PCV and made concrete offers of amnesty to the insurgents; Minister of Interior Lorenzo Fernández announced the abolition of the repressive Dirección General de Policía (DIGEPOL) and its replacement by a new organization. Caldera also appointed the Archbishop of Caracas, Cardinal José Humberto Quintero, as head of a Pacification Commission that was to mediate between the Government and the guerrillas.

Caldera's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arístides Calvani, viewed the above developments as the proclamation and immediate implementation by the President of an

⁹In spite of the cold war climate, Venezuelan public perception of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries was not negative. On this point, see, for example, John T. McNelly and Fausto Izcaray, "International news exposure and images of nations" in Journalism Quarterly 63, no. 3 (1986): 546-553.

¹⁰Rafael Caldera, Discurso del Presidente de la República Dr. Rafael Caldera en el Acto de Toma de Posesión del Cargo (Caracas: Ediciones de la Presidencia, 1969), 28.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 9.

integrated pacification policy having a dual perspective: internal and external.¹² Calvani's interpretation of pacification is helpful in analyzing Venezuelan foreign policy during the 1969-1979 decade and, more important for this dissertation, it tends to validate part of my hypothesis that the globalization of Venezuelan foreign policy can be explained in terms of state needs (pacification, territorial integrity, protection of national income) and a relative decline of U.S. influence. In effect, the external perspective of pacification was reflected in the foreign policy actions for which Calvani had responsibility. First, he saw a pacification message in Caldera's early decision to discontinue the application of the Betancourt doctrine by resuming diplomatic relations with the de facto governments of Argentina, Panama, and Peru as well as in the initiation of detente with Cuba and the resumption of relations with the USSR. As far as world politics was concerned, Calvani considered that the thaw began in U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China and the USSR provided an additional element which was favorable to the new Venezuelan foreign policy. On the latter point, my account places the praxis of detente by the United States among the world politics factors which together with the relative decline of its influence are

¹²Aristides Calvani, "La política internacional de Venezuela en el último medio siglo" in Venezuela Moderna: Medio siglo de historia, 1926-1976, 2nd ed. (Caracas: Editorial Ariel, 1979), 476.

highly relevant to the explanation of Venezuelan foreign policy globalization, since detente made it more difficult for the United States to deny to Venezuela the right to become independent through a policy which it was itself implementing.

The venue of negotiations for the resumption of diplomatic relations between Venezuela and the Soviet Union was not Washington, as in 1945, but New York, and the responsibility for such negotiations was given to Ambassador Andrés Aguilar Mawdsley, Caldera's new Permanent Representative to the United Nations and to his Soviet counterpart Ambassador Jakob Alexandrovitch Malik. In the course of the negotiations, Venezuela and the Soviet Union had to agree on security-related issues, which included, for example, the maximum number of diplomats that each embassy could comprise, a matter of much concern at the time to the Venezuelan ministries of interior and defense.¹³ The process went on without major difficulties and the announcement of the resumption of relations was signed on 16 April 1970.

As proven by the sensitivity shown by the Nixon administration at Caldera's announcement of his trip to the United States jointly with the reopening of relations with the USSR, the United States was not indifferent to the

¹³In the end, as Venezuela wished, the number of diplomats was limited to ten on each side.

desire of Latin American countries to have more autonomy in their foreign policy. The U.S. Congress certainly monitored developments closely. For example, in the hearings before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles A. Meyer, was asked by the Committee in March 1971 whether more Communist countries were becoming involved diplomatically with Latin American nations than had been the case in the past year. He submitted material about to be published by the State Department which indicated that the overall diplomatic representation of Communist countries in Latin America and the Caribbean had continued to increase during 1970. He pointed out the fact that the Soviet Union had established diplomatic relations with Guyana in December 1970 and announced its agreement with Costa Rica to exchange diplomatic representatives at the ambassadorial level. Moreover, Venezuela and the USSR had resumed diplomatic relations in 1970 and exchanged ambassadors in February 1971. Thus the USSR had diplomatic relations with Mexico, Costa Rica, Cuba, and all the nations in South America except Paraguay.¹⁴

The State Department's interpretation of this diversification of relations by the countries of the region,

¹⁴ U.S. State Department, "Communist activity in Latin America", in Inter-American Economic Affairs 25, no. 2 (Autumn 1971): 91-96.

which tends to coincide with mine, was given by Mr. Meyer as follows:

This increased exchange of representation results from both an initial interest in expanded trade and new export markets and from the desire of Latin American nations to express their independence through the conduct of diplomatic relations with all nations.¹⁵

On the USSR side--if we make allowances for traditional cold war rhetoric--the analysis of diplomatic relations with Latin American countries showed significant coincidences with the State Department's assessment. For example, an official compendium on Soviet foreign policy indicated that the striving of the Latin American peoples for closer relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries gained strength "despite the obstacles erected by imperialism and reaction." The Soviet people showed their solidarity with the Latin American peoples, "who were upholding their right to freedom and genuine independence, to be the masters of their homes." The point was also made that, in the context of "progressive anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic reforms," some other Latin American states nationalized branches of the economy "dominated by U.S. monopolies".¹⁶ The Soviet compendium pointed out further that a growing number of Latin American

¹⁵ Ibid., 92. In the case of Venezuela, I would have of course put "independence" before "trade."

¹⁶See A. A. Gromyko and B. N. Ponomarev, eds., Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1980 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980), 407.

states established diplomatic and beneficial trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union and by the close of 1970 the USSR had normal relations with 15 countries of that continent. In just the period 1969-1970, diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were established by Bolivia, Venezuela, Guyana, Costa Rica, Peru, and Ecuador. Such analysis appears to be different from Assistant Secretary of State Meyer's assessment only in its rhetorical tone.

All those considerations notwithstanding, when it came to informing the Venezuelan nation on his resumption of diplomatic relations with the USSR, President Caldera was surprised by the extreme sensitivity shown by the Nixon administration, including in particular the U.S. State Department, at the possible meaning of procedural details. The United States made a case out of the planned announcement, at the same press conference, of both Caldera's official visit to the United States (which took place in June 1970) and Venezuela's resumption of relations with the USSR.

President Caldera had established the practice of informing the country of important developments, particularly on foreign policy matters, in his weekly televised press conference. The official agreement for the resumption of diplomatic relations between Venezuela and the USSR had been signed in New York on 16 April 1970. The dates of Caldera's visit to the United States had also been

agreed shortly before, and thus both developments were included in the introduction to President Caldera's press conference of 16 April.

United States pressures over that apparently trivial matter, which nevertheless seemed to activate cold war reflexes in some U.S. officials, threatened to create an incident between the two countries. In an interview given in 1980, Caldera underlined the firmness of his reaction to U.S. pressures to change the contents of the introduction to his press conference. He put the issue as follows:

I do not know how this matter came to the previous knowledge of the U.S. State Department, but as a consequence of it, unprecedented pressures were made in order that the information would not be given jointly in my introduction. Venezuela was committed, through its Mission to the United Nations, to announce the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union at a given date, so my reply was that the most we could do was to postpone the visit to the United States, or its announcement--but the other decision had already been taken and we could not back down on that matter.¹⁷

Clearly, President Caldera had been strongly disappointed at the attempted interference of U.S. officials in the contents of the introduction to his press conference, which was, after all, a matter of the exclusive competence of Venezuela. The announcements were thus made as planned.

In the ensuing discussion Caldera was asked a question by Irving Jordan, correspondent of The Daily Journal

¹⁷ See Rafael Caldera, "Caldera: autoanálisis de su política exterior" in Perfil Internacional (Caracas) no. 3 (4th quarter 1980): 9.

(Caracas' English language daily), who wanted to know what relation existed between his trip to the United States and the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Caldera replied that the simultaneous announcement he had just made of both decisions was the result of a mere coincidence. In effect, at the conclusion of negotiations that had been taking place for some time, the Venezuelan representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Andrés Aguilar, had to sign the relevant notes concerning the resumption of relations with the Soviet Union before leaving that week on an official mission to the Far East. As to President Nixon's invitation to visit the United States, the agreement on the dates of the trip had also been reached just that week.¹⁸

During that press conference there were also domestic questions showing concern over the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. For example, Miguel Conde, a Venezuelan correspondent representing the daily El Mundo and Radio Capital asked the President what economic advantages may have inspired the Venezuelan decision on the resumption of relations with the USSR--since the Government went ahead in spite of contrary opinions from certain national sectors. Caldera assured that he had carefully analyzed all opinions on the matter. He understood and

¹⁸ Rafael Caldera, Habla el Presidente: diálogo semanal con el pueblo Venezolano, vol. 2 (Caracas: Ediciones de la Presidencia de la República, 1972), 62-63.

respected opposing arguments, but the promise he made to the electorate during his campaign had been a decisive factor. At a time when the cold war was being put to an end, Caldera said, "a failure to resume our relations with the USSR could be a way of isolating Venezuela and even of falling into what could be considered as an inferiority complex." In South America, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. He saw no reason to consider that "the position of Venezuela could be weaker than that of those countries or that our ability to manage, maintain and defend our own interests could be lesser than theirs."

In referring to Venezuelan economic considerations, Caldera believed that Venezuela had to convince the USSR and other petroleum exporters of the fact that they had to reach a just and reasonable agreement that would prevent a suicidal price war in the marketing of this commodity. That fundamental objective of Venezuela could hardly be reached if it isolated itself from a country that had a great production volume and that was sometimes displacing Venezuela from its natural markets.¹⁹ On the latter point, Caldera was obviously alluding to the loss by Venezuela to the Soviet Union of the Cuban oil market, which represented 130,000 barrels per day at the time. Also to the fact that

¹⁹ Rafael Caldera, Habla el Presidente: diálogo semanal con el pueblo venezolano, vol. 2 (Caracas: Ediciones de la Presidencia de la República, 1972), 63-64.

the USSR was the world largest oil producer with 12 millions barrels per day and had exports of three millions barrels per day.

Venezuela's new assertiveness and independence vis-a-vis the superpowers--stimulated by OPEC successes as well as by the national debates related to the approaching general elections--was contributing to make the tone of the Venezuela/U.S. dialogue more acrimonious. In turn, the USSR, adjusting well to its new Venezuelan relations, kept a noncontroversial political low profile.

By 1973 the U.S. market experienced an energy crunch in both fuel shortages and rising prices. In April, President Nixon had announced the abandonment of the mandatory oil import program. Thus Venezuela's longstanding objective of preferential treatment for its oil exports to the United States, for which Caldera had fought so hard during his 1970 visit,²⁰ had become very much pointless. The realization that Venezuela had been right all along in its demands, made Caldera react with words of recrimination:

If the United States did not have the intelligence to offer us a hemisphere preference ... for so long, it now makes very little difference to us... What we cannot understand, and must therefore attribute to dissembling manipulations is the fact that during the last ten years oil prices have gone down in our chief markets. Why down? Were people consuming less?

²⁰See Stephen G. Rabe, The Road to OPEC: United States relations with Venezuela, 1919-1976 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 175.

Was oil less important? Or was it because we became the victims of manipulation on the part of those who held control of the valves, who could open here and close there, and thus could cheat the people of those countries with oil resources?²¹

At that time, the Soviet Union was following oil market developments with a combination of interest and concern. While its own oil exports were being revalued thanks to OPEC action, sales to the socialist countries were governed by trade agreements which did not allow much immediate flexibility, as was the case with Cuba. New ideas were beginning to be explored regarding the rationalization of, for example, transportation costs of oil exports.

3. Relations with the Soviet Union during the Pérez administration (1974-1979)

When Carlos Andrés Pérez took office in 1974, Venezuela was becoming aware of the extent of the bonanza produced by the success of OPEC. The Chancellery realized that the viability of OPEC and the possibility of oil nationalization was going to require a new global diplomacy toward the Third World. Venezuela had to become a provider of economic assistance to poor oil importers. Moreover, relations with the Soviet Union, China, Cuba and other socialist countries needed to be developed and used creatively in support of Venezuelan policy objectives and

²¹Quoted in Franklin Tugwell, The Politics of Oil in Venezuela (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1975), 141-142.

OPEC as a whole. In fact, the United States was using the argument that OPEC was crunching the most vulnerable of all, the least developed countries (LDCs in United Nations terminology).

The most salient development in Venezuela/USSR relations during the Pérez administration was his official trip to the Soviet Union in November 1976. He became the first Venezuelan Head of State ever to visit the USSR. President Pérez was received by Nikolai Podgorni, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet; Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party, the country's three most important figures, not necessarily in that order. While the trip was important as a symbol of Venezuelan independence in world relations, it also allowed for the signing of several economic, scientific, technological and cultural agreements which provided a basis for the development of future Venezuelan/Soviet exchanges.²²

Since it was a priority for Venezuela's newly nationalized oil industry to find new markets, it was considered a breakthrough that during his stay Pérez was able to sign an agreement with the USSR on reciprocal granting of petroleum quotas. Through that agreement--under

²²See Carlos Antonio Romero, Las Relaciones entre Venezuela y la Unión Soviética: Diplomacia o revolución (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1992), 79. For example, Romero considers that Perez's trip to the USSR was "the main event which gave impetus to the development of relations between the two countries."

the circumstances of the 1970s--Venezuela obtained the possibility of making a start towards an eventual recovery of the Cuban oil market. On Third World policy issues which were priorities for Venezuela, President Pérez did not hesitate publicly to criticize Soviet positions. For example, in his speech before President Podgorni on 24 November 1976, Pérez indicated his concern for the nonparticipation of the USSR in the North-South dialogue and hoped that the stands of the developing countries would be supported by the USSR in the United Nations. He also warned that concerning the Conference on the Law of the Sea the developing countries were unanimous in maintaining that "the division of the common heritage of mankind--of oceans and seas--would cause an irreparable damage to mankind and to peace."²³

Venezuela was starting to carry out industrial research in order to develop its own technologies (for example, in the petroleum field) and found a potential for cooperation in the Soviet Union. With this idea in mind, Venezuela and the Soviet Union also signed during Perez's visit an Agreement on Economic and Industrial Cooperation and it was decided to exchange trade missions and to appoint Commercial Counselors in the respective embassies. Pérez gave a great deal of importance to the question of

²³ Carlos Andrés Pérez, Manos a la Obra, vol. 2 (Caracas: Ediciones de la Presidencia de la República, 1978), bk. 3, 76-78.

technological cooperation between the Soviet Union, as well as other Eastern European countries, and Venezuela. Thus his administration created a post of Technology Counselor to work out of the Venezuelan Embassy in Vienna covering the whole area.²⁴

By the end of 1976, in the midst of the oil bonanza, Venezuela had already achieved a credible pacification. The left had rejoined legal political life and the PCV had been badly hurt by the split resulting in the founding of the "Eurocommunist" Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in 1971. In the 1973 elections MAS ended up with nine deputies and the PCV with two. While the Communist Party of the Soviet Union criticized MAS and its "renegade" presidential candidate Teodoro Petkoff,²⁵ the pro-Soviet PCV had long suspended armed action. Thus, during the visit of Pérez to Moscow issues relating to possible Soviet involvement in Venezuela internal politics were a thing of the past and therefore appropriately absent from all discussions, formal or informal.

As already mentioned, negotiations started by the Leoni administration (1964-1969) with a view to the

²⁴ Author's own recollection and discussions with staff of the Ministry of Science and Technology at the time. On 18 December 1975, Venezuela and the Soviet Union had signed a Basic Agreement on Cultural, Scientific and Technological Cooperation between the two countries.

²⁵ See Steve Ellner, Venezuela's "Movimiento al Socialismo": From guerrilla defeat to innovative politics (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1988), Appendix I.

resumption of diplomatic relations between Venezuela and the USSR were interrupted by Venezuela as an act of protest against the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. It is worth noting that presidential elections were to be held in December of that year (which Caldera narrowly won) and thus complex electoral calculations were probably not absent from Leoni's decision. Venezuela took a strong public position on the invasion and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ignacio Iribarren Borges demanded the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia. In 1969, Caldera's U.N. ambassador started fresh diplomatic negotiations with the USSR in New York.

This notwithstanding, President Pérez in his book-length interview of 1979 to Alfredo Peña made a categorical assessment of the process of USSR relations. In the relevant passage, Peña expressed the view that the pacification policy of Rafael Caldera had been positive, and that his legalization of MIR and the PCV as well as the resumption of diplomatic relations with USSR had been an important contribution to create a climate different from violence in the life of the country.

Pérez shared that view, while observing that relations with USSR had practically been resumed during the Raúl Leoni administration. Only the official announcement seemed to be lacking, but "the invasion of Czechoslovakia took place and then the government of Venezuela, as a way of protesting,

adjourned the process." As Pérez said, Caldera started the steps again and completed them. Something similar happened in the case of China: President Caldera initiated the contacts for the establishment of relations, but it was during the next administration that these were "formalized in a full and official manner." For Pérez, "relations with the socialist countries were necessary in terms of the national interest. They represented participation in international life without any kind of domination."²⁶

Beyond differences of interpretation, I observe a strong element of continuity in what I call the "globalization policies" of Venezuela which were implemented by the Chancellery under the Caldera and Pérez administrations. Pérez's final stress on the need for an independent foreign policy is especially significant. This is an idea shared all along by both presidents.

On 13 December 1974, in the presidential press conference following the elections won by Carlos Andrés Pérez, Caldera was asked by the correspondent of the Cuban Press Agency, Prensa Latina, what were the new areas and perspectives opened by his foreign policy. In the first place, Caldera thought that the Betancourt doctrine had had to be abandoned--irrespective of its lofty intentions. His policy emphasized the concept of "pluralistic solidarity,"

²⁶ See Alfredo Peña, Conversaciones con Carlos Andrés Pérez, vol. 1 (Caracas: Editorial Ateneo, 1979), 244-245.

on the basis of which Latin American unity was above differences in ways of thinking and acting. Caldera expected this policy line to be ratified by the new administration of Carlos Andrés Pérez. He also had opened the field of relations with socialist countries. Those relations had been established without haste but also without delays. The respect of the principles of non-intervention and self-determination had been guaranteed at all times. He had no complaints about any of the diplomatic missions from socialist countries having attempted to intervene in Venezuelan internal affairs or to ignore or fail to respect Venezuela's government system and political values. This situation was expected to continue and open further possibilities for international trade. Caldera had tried to delineate a foreign policy premised on national sovereignty. An example was the unilateral denunciation of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement with the United States. He thought that the new administration would maintain that policy.²⁷ In fact, The Reciprocal Trade Agreement between the United States and Venezuela signed in Caracas in November 1939 came into effect definitively in December 1940. The Agreement lowered the import tax on Venezuelan crude oil and fuel oil by 50 percent while Venezuela reduced tariffs on most exports which were important to the United States, particularly manufactures. The agreement was

²⁷ Caldera, Habla el Presidente, 5: 531-532.

unsatisfactory to Venezuela, especially since, in practice, access to the U.S. oil market became conditioned by preferential import quotas which were granted unilaterally by the U.S. government. Attempts to modify the Agreement by the Betancourt and Leoni administrations proved unsuccessful. Thus, in mid-1972, Caldera terminated the 31-year-old bilateral instrument. In doing so, he was not only demonstrating Venezuela's new independence vis-a-vis the United States, but was also sending a signal regarding Venezuela's frustration over the discriminatory treatment it received in Hemispheric oil preferences.²⁸

III. Case study on diplomatic relations with China

1. Background

Latin America and China showed little interest in each other during the late nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century, to the extent that the only countries of the region which ever accredited representatives to the Chinese Imperial Court were Brazil and Peru.²⁹ In the case of Venezuela, while formal contacts

²⁸In this respect, see, for example, Rabe, The Road to OPEC, 189, who sees Caldera's decision as "a near-final effort to pressure the Nixon administration into lifting the quotas on imported oil . . . "

²⁹Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, vol. 3 (New York: Longman Green, 1910-1918), 492. Peru accredited plenipotentiaries in 1874, 1875, and 1882. Brazil did so in 1880.

were initiated by the Republic of China during the latter part of the dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-1935),³⁰ it was not until October 1936 that the first representation of Venezuela in China was opened in the form of a Consulate-General in Shanghai.³¹ The invasion of China by Japan in 1937 and the ensuing war forced Venezuela to evacuate its consular mission.

In the midst of World War II, diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level between the Republic of China and Venezuela were formalized (in 1943) and the Chinese Plenipotentiary in Cuba was accredited also in Venezuela.

With the inauguration on 1 October 1949 of the new government of the People's Republic of China (PRC), presided over by Mao Zedong in Peking, the issue of recognition presented itself to all countries having diplomatic relations with China at the time. The Truman administration refused to recognize the PRC government,³² recalled its

³⁰In May 1930 China had submitted through its Legation in Washington a draft treaty of friendship, trade and navigation to the Venezuelan representative in that city. See Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Central Archives, Directorate of International Politics, 1930, Vol. 122, File 141.

³¹Ibid., 1936, Vol. 104, File 326.

³²On the general question of recognition of governments, see, for example, Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary, 4th ed. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1988), 258-259. In particular, the end comment: "The cold war encouraged the granting and withholding of recognition as a discretionary political technique governed by the decisionmakers' interpretations of the state's national interest, as in the refusal of the United States to recognize the government of the People's Republic of China from 1949 to 1979."

ambassador from Peking in August 1949,³³ and adopted a wait-and-see attitude regarding the Chiang Kai-shek regime in Taiwan. By January 1950 the official American position, as expressed by President Truman, was that the United States had no intention of providing more than economic assistance to Chiang Kai-shek's government. In fact, the administration was assuming, internally, that Taiwan would fall.³⁴ However, the outbreak of the Korean war (June 1950-July 1953) changed the whole situation dramatically and before the end of that war the United States had recognized the government of the Republic of China in Taiwan and appointed an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary who presented his credentials to Chiang Kai-shek on 2 April 1953.

Regarding policy towards China after 1949, Latin American countries followed from the beginning a path even more exclusionary of the PRC than that of the United States. In the case of Venezuela there was a de facto recognition of the government of the Republic of China in Taiwan and the Chancellery accepted the claims of its diplomatic envoys to represent the totality of China.

³³See United States Department of State, Principal Officers of the Department of State and United States Chiefs of Mission, 1978-1990 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 67.

³⁴See James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, United States Foreign Policy and World Order, 4th ed. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1989), 94.

The implications of continuing relations with Taiwan as if nothing had happened were raised by a Brazilian commentator in the case of his country. He recalled that when Chiang Kai-shek withdrew to Taiwan in 1949, the Brazilian Embassy staff was transferred first to Tokyo, next to General Douglas MacArthur's occupation headquarters, and then to Taipei. He also made the point that an official statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs affirmed that Brazil maintained diplomatic relations with the Taiwan government. Thus he concluded that in so doing Brazil was recognizing the government of Chiang Kai-shek as the only legitimate one in China and consequently that, for example, the treaties concluded between Brazil and the Republic of China in 1943 and 1946 were binding solely on Brazil and the Chiang Kai-shek regime.³⁵

In fact, that was a policy common to all Latin American governments at the time. Such regional unanimity started to be broken by Cuba's Revolutionary Government, when its Ambassador to the United Nations abstained in the vote on the resolution to postpone discussion on the China representation question in 1959.³⁶ After that initial

³⁵See José Honorio Rodrigues, "Brazil and China: The Varying Fortunes of Independent Diplomacy," in A. M. Halperin, ed., Policies Toward China: Views from six continents (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965), 463.

³⁶See Jorge I. Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's foreign policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 221.

gesture, Cuba went on to establish diplomatic relations and to exchange ambassadors with the PRC in 1960.

Venezuelan relations with the Republic of China (ROC) became particularly warm during the dictatorship of General Marcos Perez Jimenez (1952-1958). In the succeeding constitutional era, the policy of the Venezuelan Chancellery of recognizing the government of the ROC as the only legitimate one of China did not change until the globalization drive of the 1970s and the establishment of relations with the PRC at the ambassadorial level in June 1974³⁷ under the administration of President Carlos Andrés Pérez. Venezuela thus became the ninth country in the region to take such action (after Cuba, Chile, Peru, Mexico, Argentina, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago).³⁸

2. Venezuelan policy in the United Nations

As in the case of most Latin American countries, Venezuelan stands with respect to the representation of China in the United Nations were continuously in conformity with the preferences of the United States from the first attempt to seat the PRC on 19 September 1950 until the General Assembly decided to uphold the rights of the PRC on 25 October 1971. In effect, during 1950 to 1957 Venezuela

³⁷Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Libro Amarillo (Caracas: Miisterio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1974).

³⁸Samuel S. Kim, China, the United Nations and World Order, (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1979), 511-512.

was under a military dictatorship devoid of foreign policy independence which instinctively aligned itself with the United States. In 1958 after the democratic restoration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made no attempt to change the situation. During the Betancourt (1959-1964) and Leoni (1964-1969) administrations, Venezuela still chose to align its votes with those of the United States. While Caldera started a new and more independent foreign policy, Venezuela's 1971 vote with the United States--decided after considerable internal debate--was conditioned by the weight of 20 years of history of relations with Taiwan.

Venezuela's growing prosperity as a leading oil exporter, together with its recognition of the ROC in 1949, prompted the regime of President Chiang Kai-shek to make considerable efforts to cultivate diplomatic relations³⁹ with the military regime that lasted from 1948 to 1958--in a Latin American country having a good potential for becoming a center of considerable influence in the region. Thus in the 1950s the ROC Embassy and lobby groups--like the Venezuela-China friendship and trade societies--became especially active in the country at a time when Taiwan was

³⁹For example, in September 1953 the ROC Charge d'affaires presented the President of Venezuela, General Marcos Pérez Jiménez, with an oil portrait of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in a well-publicized ceremony which took place at the Miraflores Presidential Palace in Caracas. See Libro Amarillo (1954).

receiving considerable economic assistance from the United States.⁴⁰

After the overthrow of the dictatorship in 1958, Venezuela made some unsuccessful attempts at a more independent foreign policy during the tenure of Romulo Betancourt's first Minister of Foreign Affairs Ignacio Luís Arcaya (February 1959 - October 1960). Already at the time of the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1959, Minister Arcaya was personally approached by Secretary of State Christian Herter seeking to avert the possibility that Venezuela would break a long-standing tradition of fidelity to the United States, and fail to vote against the draft resolution from India calling for the seating of the PRC. Moreover, there was the U.S.-sponsored "moratorium" resolution seeking to postpone discussion of the matter. Arcaya did explain to Mr. Herter that there was a difference between the votes of the illegitimate authoritarian regime of the past years and those to be cast by the democratic constitutional government he represented.⁴¹ Actually, Venezuela voted with the United

⁴⁰The ROC Embassy in Caracas was among the largest diplomatic representations of the ROC in Latin America. It was also well endowed and carried out costly promotional activities to reach Venezuelan elite sectors. The importance of the Caracas Embassy continued until the 1970s and in 1972 the high-ranking ROC Ambassador to Buenos Aires was transferred to Caracas.

⁴¹Julio Portillo, Venezuela-Cuba: Relaciones diplomáticas, 1902-1980 (Caracas: Editorial Arte, 1980), 33. On Chancellor Arcaya's break with Betancourt on policy towards Cuba in OAS, see Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

States that year in pursuance of President Betancourt's previous instructions.

Although Venezuela continued to vote with the United States during the administration of President Raúl Leoni (1964-1969), some dissent began to appear in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the question of China in the United Nations. In the first place, most analysts of the issue in and outside Venezuela considered that the seating of the PRC was only a question of time and critics of the existing policy thought that Venezuela's faithful alignment with the United States, coupled with the ostensible lobbying campaign by the ROC Embassy in Caracas, was conveying a degree of hostility towards Beijing which could be undesirable for the future relations of the Venezuelan state. Perhaps more important, some of Venezuela's key neighbors in the Caribbean, Netherlands Antilles (represented by the Netherlands in the UN), Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Guyana, had started to abstain and show signs of leaning towards seating the PRC. Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Guyana, as members of the Latin America and the Caribbean Group (GRULAC) in the UN, consulted regularly on China representation and other important matters before the General Assembly. Therefore, Venezuela was beginning to appear in the GRULAC to be less independent of the United

States than smaller countries with which Venezuela needed to negotiate sensitive land and marine border issues.⁴²

The administration of President Rafael Caldera (1969-1979) found itself in a situation of great difficulty in regard to the China question in the United Nations. Indeed, the new policies of diversification of foreign relations, Venezuelan autonomy and the principles of international social justice, coupled with the existence of controversial border issues which involved Guyana and Colombia, and finally Trinidad and Tobago's frequent denunciations of Venezuelan "imperialism," suggested that a fresh look should be taken at the China question in order to consider the following policy matters:

- a) The possible role of China in the United Nations Security Council in case of armed conflict between Venezuela and Guyana, Venezuela and Colombia, or even both.
- b) Trinidad and Tobago had abstained in the 1970 UN votes on both the important question resolution and on the seating of the PRC and was beginning negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC. Moreover, Trinidad and Tobago's Prime Minister,

⁴²On the marine and submarine delimitations, see Isidro Morales Paúl, La Delimitación de Areas Marinas y Submarinas al Norte de Venezuela (Caracas: Academia de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, 1983), as well as, by the same author, La Delimitación de Areas Marinas y Submarinas entre Venezuela y Trinidad & Tobago (Caracas: Academia de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, 1993).

Eric Williams (who was in office from 1962 to 1981), had at the time become increasingly vocal against what he perceived as Venezuela's efforts to recolonize the Caribbean. The possible recognition of the PRC by Venezuela and the establishment of diplomatic relations with that country might, for example, contribute to moderate Prime Minister Williams' attacks and help to counterbalance Guyana's diplomatic campaign to obtain international support in the border dispute with Venezuela.

Nevertheless, Caldera decided to adopt a cautious position regarding Venezuela's vote in the United Nations, avoiding revision of past policy. In compensation, he did not exclude trade, cultural and other non-diplomatic exchanges with the PRC and approved the establishment of an office in Caracas of Beijing's New China and Sinjua news agencies, whose representatives participated in the President's weekly press conferences.

In the General Assembly of 1970, Venezuela voted once more with the United States at a time that the resolution (sponsored by Albania and 18 other countries) calling for the seating of the PRC and expelling the ROC obtained a simple majority for the first time. However, a two-thirds majority was needed in view of the procedural resolution continuously passed since 1961, which considered the China issue as an "important question" and thus any action on it

required the above-mentioned qualified majority for adoption.

That year on 16 April Venezuela and the USSR had restored their diplomatic relations. Notwithstanding slow progress in trade between the two countries, by 1971 Venezuela/USSR relations were quite cordial. The diplomatic negotiations on behalf of Venezuela and the USSR had provided the opportunity for the ambassadors to establish a direct communication channel between the two countries at UN Headquarters. Insofar as U.S. relations were concerned, Caldera had undertaken an official trip to the United States in June, before and during which important disagreements became apparent between the Nixon and Caldera administrations, especially regarding preferential treatment of Venezuelan oil imports by the United States.⁴³

In the socialist camp, the Sino-Soviet rift deepened at the rhetorical level--after the 1969 fighting at the Ussuri River border. In anticipation of what began to appear as a crucial China vote in the UN--and while lobbying within the UN intensified both by the United States and the ROC--on 4 March 1971 Caldera announced Venezuela's position on the China question that he favored the admission of the PRC to the UN, but that the country could not abandon the

⁴³In this connection, see above, the case study on the Soviet Union.

ROC with which it had long-standing diplomatic relations.⁴⁴ This position coincided with that of the United States, which was actively pursuing the Nixon/Kissinger China opening.

As to bilateral pressures, the ROC was lobbying Venezuela intensely in view of the UN vote expected in September. An official delegation headed by the Minister of Communications of the ROC visited Venezuela in July.⁴⁵ Furthermore, the United States was carrying out an unprecedented lobbying campaign, first in New York with ambassadors to the UN through US Ambassador George Bush and second with ambassadors in Washington through the State Department. For example, in August, Julio Sosa Rodríguez, Venezuelan Ambassador in Washington, attended a meeting at the State Department in which a statement of Secretary of State William Rogers on the China question was circulated to all ambassadors accredited in the capital. Ambassador Sosa informed Minister of Foreign Affairs Arístides Calvani of the fact that in the forthcoming General Assembly, the United States would favor the seating of the PRC but would strongly oppose the expulsion of the ROC. The United States expected difficulty in making its position prevail.⁴⁶

⁴⁴Caldera, Habla el Presidente, 2: 582-595.

⁴⁵Libro Amarillo (1971).

⁴⁶Sosa to Calvani, Correspondence archives of the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington, 4 August 1971.

Third, President Richard Nixon was directly in contact with a number of heads of state, including, for example, President Alejandro Lanusse of Argentina and President Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal, in a last-minute effort to win their support for the U.S. position.

When the matter came before the General Assembly, Ambassador George Bush won a procedural point (ultimately a Pyrrhic victory): voting on the "important question" resolution would take place before that on the Albanian resolution. In effect, not only was the "important question" resolution defeated for the first time in eleven years, but immediately afterwards the Albanian resolution passed by a two-thirds majority when only a simple majority would have been enough.⁴⁷

In his explanation of vote before the vote on the "important question" resolution, Ambassador Aguilar stated that on the seven occasions on which the Assembly had to take a decision on that matter, Venezuela had voted in favor and would do so again this time.⁴⁸ In an intervention the following day, he also explained that Venezuela had voted against the Albanian resolution on the basis of the position adopted by President Caldera on 4 March 1971 in the sense

⁴⁷Peter A. Poole, China Enters the United Nations: A new era begins for the world organization (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1974), 6.

⁴⁸United Nations General Assembly, 26th session, Official Records, 1976th meeting, 25 October 1971, paras. 310-319.

that Venezuela had no doubt as to the need for the universality of the United Nations and the importance of the role that the PRC should play in this respect, but Venezuela also maintained relations with the ROC, whose representation did not deserve a slight by Venezuela. Aguilar added that Minister of Foreign Affairs Calvani in his statement in the General Assembly on 22 September, had hoped that "a formula could be found that would allow for the full participation of the People's Republic of China without excluding the Republic of China." As a conclusion, Ambassador Aguilar, in a conciliatory spirit, said that Venezuela respected the decision of the General Assembly taken by an unequivocal two-thirds majority, and hoped that the presence of the PRC in the Organization would contribute, in accordance with its Charter, "to solving the major problems confronting the international community, and thus to achieve the supreme objective of true peace throughout the world."⁴⁹

On 28 October 1971, Caldera spoke on the admission of the PRC in the United Nations in the context of his weekly press conference. He referred to Venezuela's vote cast three days before and insisted on the historical argument on the relations of Venezuela with the ROC and asserted that in that light it would have been improper to turn Venezuela's

⁴⁹United Nations General Assembly, 26th session, Official Records, 1977th meeting, 26 October 1971, paras. 65-71.

back on the ROC and to have simply joined a majority vote.⁵⁰ While the option of abstaining was there (in the region, Argentina, Barbados, Colombia, Jamaica, and Panama abstained), Venezuela's interests and strategy were different. Seeking to accommodate both Taiwan and the United States, Venezuela would simply vote as it had traditionally been doing and, after the expected defeat of that position in the General Assembly, the Chancellery would pursue a gradual opening toward the PRC. In fact, the situation on the day of the vote appeared rather clear to most delegations. As the author of a book dealing with the issue candidly put it:

Some delegates may have been impressed by a newspaper photo showing President Nixon's Special Assistant, Henry Kissinger, meeting that very day (October 25) with Chinese leaders in Peking--the capital city of mainland China. This photograph told the world that, no matter which way the UN vote went, the U.S. was in the process of establishing a good relationship with Peking. It made other governments realize that their countries too should start to improve their relations with Peking, just as the United States had done, and that it would be easier for them to do so if they voted for the resolution to admit Communist China to the UN.⁵¹

With U. S. power in relative decline and Venezuela moving up a few notches in power, the question of China had to be seen in a new political and economic light. Venezuela could independently contemplate China as an economic

⁵⁰Caldera, Habla el Presidente, 3: 388-389.

⁵¹ Poole, China Enters the United Nations, 4.

partner--especially as a future market for its exports, including petrochemicals.

In terms of oil wealth and power, by June 1973 President Caldera began to see his nationalistic oil policy vindicated and Venezuela's long-standing problem of Western Hemisphere preferences quickly becoming irrelevant in view of the rapid catch-up oil prices with world inflation after their stagnation and decline in real terms during past decades. Those were early signs of the upcoming first oil shock which marked the emergence of Venezuela as a middle-range actor in the regional scene.⁵² Put differently, Venezuela was becoming bolder and more powerful in the international context. Inheriting a situation of a sudden financial bonanza and increased power resulting from the actions of OPEC, the succeeding administration quickly started to take further independent foreign policy initiatives.

President Pérez took office on 12 March 1974 to fulfill the 1974-1979 constitutional term. By mid-1974, Pérez was already fully engaged in continuing and expanding Caldera's foreign policy, characterized by a shift from the East-West constraints and the expansion and diversification of relations. In this context, through a joint statement of June 1974 signed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Efraín Schacht Aristeguieta and Tsai Su-Fan, Vice-Minister of Trade

⁵²See above, the case study on the Soviet Union.

of the PRC, Venezuela recognized the government of the PRC as the only legal one in China and took note of China's position reaffirming that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC. Official ties with the ROC were discreetly discontinued and Taiwan kept a trade office open in Caracas. The recognition and normalization process had been thus concluded and by October, both countries' ambassadors had arrived in Beijing and Caracas.

3. Analysis of Venezuelan policy

As the situation presented itself in 1971, while there was almost universal ambivalence towards China's rising power, the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy had embarked on a rapprochement with China as a major power-balancing move with respect to the Soviet Union. The costs of such a policy shift in terms of loss of influence and prestige worldwide, for example, at the UN and vis-a-vis Japan,⁵³ were probably underestimated by the United States. In the General Assembly the United States was faced with the rebellion of a majority that it had controlled since the 1950s on the China issue. The effect of U.S. disarray was compounded by the failure of one of the most vigorous lobbying campaigns ever on a General Assembly vote-- personally involving, inter alia, President Nixon, Secretary of State William Rogers, and Ambassador George Bush.

⁵³See chapter 4, p. 34, concerning the effect on Japan.

Moreover, the sudden unilateral reversal by Nixon of U.S. policy towards China became a psychological catastrophe for Japan--which had no means of saving face in terms of the insult and humiliation endured. Even the credibility of the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" came into question in Tokyo. Japan was also shocked when the Nixon administration forced it to realign the value of the yen, with the consequent reversal of its trading position. In turn, Venezuela, which was pursuing goals of accelerated development and independence from the superpowers through policies started mainly in 1969, was initially caught unprepared to deal optimally with the new U.S. pragmatism towards China. By the end of the 1970s, both Pérez and Carter had formally recognized the People's Republic of China and started to develop intense economic cooperation with that country.

Indeed, the question of the representation of China in the United Nations and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China was among the most complex--in policy and juridical terms--that Venezuela had to deal with in order to fulfil its goal of developing a new foreign policy characterized by autonomy, global diversification and democratic nationalism.

At the United Nations the Caldera administration followed a cautious policy, being constrained by the legacy of previously consistent positions which stemmed from the original decision adopted by the Venezuelan state in

recognizing the ROC and ignoring the PRC after October 1949. This decision, while taken by a de facto military government largely on the basis of unquestioning alignment with the United States during the cold war, continued to be supported, including in its ramifications regarding China's representation in the United Nations, by the Betancourt and Leoni administrations of the constitutional era. In this respect, one needs to take also into account that during the turmoil created by the Cultural Revolution in China from 1966 to 1968, the international image of the PRC undoubtedly deteriorated and in those years a large majority of countries voted in the UN against seating the PRC.

The Caldera administration chose not to change a long-standing policy in the United Nations. The President decided to proceed gradually and allow the necessary transition time before establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC--which implied breaking them with the ROC. It was a state policy that had to be designed and implemented on a long-term basis and that sought a broad consensus of national political actors.

Moreover, the fact that Caldera had established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries in the early 1970s gave additional reason to be cautious about not appearing to be carrying out a wholesale and precipitous opening to socialist countries as was the case, for example, with President Salvador Allende's

government in Chile (1970-1973).⁵⁴ The presence of a Soviet Union Embassy in Caracas, in the midst of the Sino-Soviet rift, could have contributed further to Caldera's cautious approach to China.

In particular, one needs to recall the high level of hostility of the exchanges in the General Assembly between Ambassador Chiao Kuan-Hua, Deputy Foreign Minister of the PRC, and Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations Jakob Malik. The United States came in second place as a target for Chinese attacks during this tense period which lasted until the end of 1972. China accused the Soviets and Americans of plotting against her, and Malik attributed to China designs of becoming a superpower seeking to dominate developing countries in Africa and Asia.

In the case of the UN vote of 1971, it would appear clear that Caldera had decided to accede to the request for help made by President Nixon in order to save face with regard to Taiwan. Caldera also needed to consider the undeniable existence of more than 20 years of diplomatic relations with the ROC. Moreover, the unexpected two-thirds majority vote for the Albanian resolution should have given Caldera further evidence of the relative decline of U.S.

⁵⁴Jacques Zylberberg and Miguel Masterichard, "An Abortive Attempt to Change Foreign Policy: Chile, 1970-1973", in K. J. Holsti, Why Nations Realign: Foreign policy restructuring in the post-war world (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982), 172-197.

influence, not only in Latin America, but worldwide as reflected in the General Assembly overall.

In the latter context, the world press reflected this perception in its coverage of the developments of 25 October 1971 and their aftermath. For example, both Le Monde and The New York Times referred to a major American defeat in the United Nations. The latter's analysis indicated:

... There is a growing sentiment among congressmen and officials in Washington that the net result of the defeat in the United Nations Monday has been a diminution of American influence overseas ...⁵⁵

After the UN vote helped to clarify juridical issues, Caldera felt free to deal with the China question on a bilateral basis. The PRC was now sitting in the Security Council as a permanent member holding veto power and determined to prevent the Organization from being dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Clearly, on pacification grounds, Venezuela had to consider in the 1970s a policy leading to normalization of relations with China, and the relevance of the internal pacification goal was evident. It should be mentioned in this respect that a delegation of the Partido Comunista Venezolano (PCV) visited the PRC in 1965 and Venezuela was endorsed as a target for revolution by Beijing in the same year. Also, a few active guerrilla groups in Venezuela

⁵⁵Terrence Smith, "Heavy Cost Seen in U.N. Defeat", in The New York Times, 30 October 1971, p. 10.

proclaimed themselves as Maoists, and the PRC perceived Venezuela as a hostile country.⁵⁶

Caldera laid the ground for Venezuela's final recognition of the PRC by the following administration through the development of trade and other non-diplomatic relations, including the export of Venezuelan petrochemical products, particularly urea, from the Nitroven state enterprise to the PRC.⁵⁷ Moreover, the Partido Comunista Venezolano (PCV) supported Venezuelan claims regarding the Law of the Sea, including rights over a two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone.⁵⁸ Caldera also noticed that Colombia had chosen to change its traditional US-aligned China vote to abstention in 1971 and that Guyana had already established diplomatic relations with the PRC in June 1972.

In the 1971 General Assembly the stands of Venezuela and Colombia were, respectively, against the Albanian resolution and abstention. While both countries were firmly against the expulsion of the ROC, in his statement in the general debate of the Assembly the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs did admit that "the 'two Chinas' thesis cannot fail to raise questions of the legal interpretation

⁵⁶See Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's support for wars of national liberation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970), 148, 172-173.

⁵⁷Alliance for Progress Weekly Newsletter, vol. 11, no. 32 (August 1973).

⁵⁸See United Nations Yearbook, vol. 30, 1976 (New York: United Nations, 1979), 87-89 and also Caldera, Habla el Presidente, 5: 640.

of the United Nations Charter regarding the presence of two representative Governments of one nation."⁵⁹ However, in their subsequent foreign policy actions both countries behaved in a manner which to some extent contradicted their 1971 stands.

In effect, the fundamental difference between Colombia and Venezuela in their state behavior towards China lay in the fact that President Caldera, after voting with the United States, went on to prepare Venezuela for the recognition of the PRC which took place some two and a half years later at the beginning of the Pérez administration. Colombia, which had abstained, only established diplomatic relations with the PRC eight years later in February 1980 under President Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978-1982). The motivation of the Colombian Chancellery to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China was essentially political, as evidenced by the fact that, while relations were cordial, trade with China remained very modest by the end of the 1980s.⁶⁰ The administrations of Misael Pastrana Borrero (1970-1974) and Alfonso López Michelsen (1974-1978) were deterred by the military as well as by the most conservative civilian sectors from taking the

⁵⁹United Nations General Assembly, 26th session, Official Records, 1952nd meeting, 5 October 1971, para. 174.

⁶⁰See, for example, Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, Colombia: A country study, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 247.

step of recognizing the PRC and breaking relations with the prosperous ROC. Only after such action was taken by the United States under President Carter in January 1979 (and tacitly ratified by Ronald Reagan), Turbay Ayala felt comfortable to go ahead.⁶¹ However, both Venezuela and Colombia were seeking the diversification of their international relations in order, among other things, to gain the broadest possible international support in their border dispute which--it was not unthinkable--could one day end up in an armed conflict involving the Security Council.

In any case, Caldera had established a timetable which did not include formal recognition of the PRC during his administration. During his weekly press conference of 26 October 1972, he was asked a direct question by Andrés Herrera, correspondent of the New China Press Agency:

Mr. President, I wish to convey to you the desire of the Chinese people to establish relations with your country. This wish was expressed on several occasions by Chinese officials to Venezuelan officials that visited China. What can you tell us on this?

Caldera replied, friendly but cautiously, that the matter was "being considered with much interest" by the

⁶¹See Rodrigo Pardo and Juan G. Tokatlian, Política Exterior Colombiana: ¿De la subordinación a la autonomía? (Bogota: Tercer Mundo Editores, 1989), 103-111, 133-141, and 165-181. Colombian foreign policy sought a political diversification of the country's diplomatic relations. In this sense, it was symbolic that the October 1971 statement by Pastrana's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfredo Vásquez Carrizosa, in the UN General Assembly was titled "Ideological pluralism and the end of the cold war."

Chancellery, adding that as always in such cases, "there are processes and circumstances and even steps which are taken".⁶² He ratified that one of the foreign policy objectives of his administration was broadening the relations of Venezuela to include the greatest possible number of countries.

Nineteen seventy-three was an election year and foreign policy matters such as relations with Cuba and the PRC were beginning to come up in Venezuelan electoral politics. Attempts were made to make foreign policy a campaign issue, but in Venezuela, foreign relations--save the Gulf controversy with Colombia or the question of the Essequibo territory--generally fail to become significant electoral factors.⁶³ Nevertheless, it was wise for Caldera to leave the final decision on China to the next administration.⁶⁴ On the basis of the work already done by the Chancellery during the Caldera administration, President Carlos Andrés Pérez moved swiftly after taking office in

⁶²Caldera, Habla el Presidente, 4: 402.

⁶³While some commentators consider that, for example, Cuban normalization hurt COPEI in the 1973 elections, I do not think this was the case, since there was no popular animosity towards socialist countries at the time. See Donald L. Herman, Christian Democracy in Venezuela (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 188-190.

⁶⁴See Habla el Presidente, 5: 562.

March 1974 and proceeded to exchange ambassadors with the PRC a few months later.⁶⁵

In the following case study, regarding the renewal of diplomatic relations with Cuba, I will analyze the contribution of the Caldera and Pérez administrations to this regional aspect of the globalization of Venezuelan foreign policy.

IV. Case study on diplomatic relations with Cuba

In retrospect, Venezuelan foreign policy towards Cuba under presidents Caldera and Pérez showed remarkable continuity and exemplifies the primacy of state interests over political partisanship. The need for normalization of Venezuelan relations with Cuba stemmed from the premises of the process of globalization which took place during the 1970s: autonomy in decisions; internal and external pacification; North/South vision of world affairs and broadening of relations within all regions. To the extent that the Caribbean was a priority area for Venezuelan presence it became imperative that beyond the history of the largely ideological confrontations of the past decade, an effort be made to develop common interests that would permit resumption of peaceful relations between Venezuela and Cuba.

⁶⁵See the Joint Communique signed in Caracas on 28 June 1974 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela and the Viceminister of Trade of the People's Republic of China on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. In Libro Amarillo (1974).

To make this possible, changes had to take place on the positions of both sides of the interaction and, to some extent, of other actors--especially the United States.

Historically, the peoples of Venezuela and Cuba had been bound by intense cultural and human affinities and relations.⁶⁶ After the overthrow of the Venezuelan dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez in 1958, and that of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba the following year, the prospects of political and economic relations between the two nations appeared bright. However, in spite of their strong social commitments, the policies of Venezuela's newly restored constitutional democracy and the Cuban Revolution became quickly at odds over disputes that ultimately reflected opposing cold war alignments. Such tensions were aggravated by the clash of the personalities of the young and impetuous Prime Minister of Cuba, Fidel Castro Ruz (b. 1927) and the mature but equally confrontational President of Venezuela Rómulo Betancourt (b. 1908)⁶⁷.

⁶⁶For example, the nineteenth century Cuban national hero José Martí (1835-1895) identified closely with Venezuela, where he lived for some time. When departing from Venezuela for New York in 1881 he wrote: "Let Venezuela give me a task in which to serve her. She has in me a son" See Juan Mariniello, José Martí (Madrid: Ediciones Júcar, 1976), 10-12.

⁶⁷For a good summary of the effect of Betancourt's personal characteristics on Venezuelan policy, see Margaret G. Hermann, Charles F. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy Behavior", in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr. and James N. Rosenau, New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1987), 319-320.

On 11 November 1961, less than a year after a similar action by the United States, Betancourt broke diplomatic relations with Cuba, citing that Venezuela could not continue patiently to accept verbal affronts which negated the traditional ties of fraternal friendship between the two peoples. Hostility between the governments continued to escalate, and in 1962 Venezuela actively supported the exclusion of Cuba from the Interamerican system by the Ministerial Meeting of Punta del Este, Uruguay, which was held in January. By December 1963, Betancourt presented a formal complaint to the Organization of American States (OAS) over the introduction of arms and combatants in Venezuela by Cuba and, on the basis of the report of the investigation carried out by OAS, his successor Raúl Leoni demanded in July 1964 the application of sanctions against Cuba by the Ninth Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OAS held in Washington.

Those sanctions were requested under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) of 1947 on the ground of Cuba's proven subversive aggression against Venezuela during 1963. The Venezuelan request was strongly supported by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk who considered punitive sanctions necessary to discourage new acts of Cuban subversion. A resolution providing for the mandatory imposition of sanctions, which was adopted in the early hours of 26 July 1964, received more than the required

two-thirds majority. It called, inter alia, for member states not to maintain diplomatic or consular relations with Cuba and to suspend all trade, whether direct or indirect with Cuba, except for that of a humanitarian nature. The resolution also enabled the OAS Council to lift the sanctions, by a two-thirds majority of its members, when Cuba had ceased to be a danger to the peace and security of the Continent. The decision was not unanimous, as Bolivia, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay voted against it (Venezuela as the plaintiff could not take part in the vote). Mexico had strong reservations regarding the juridical soundness of the action taken and stated that it would break its diplomatic relations with Cuba only if the OAS decision was submitted to the International Court of Justice, and the Court upheld its legality.⁶⁸

1. Normalization efforts by the Caldera administration

The most important accomplishment of the joint diplomacy of Caldera and Calvani towards Cuba was to put a stop to a process of escalating confrontation with that country and bring about an effective pacification in Venezuela, both internally and externally.⁶⁹ On the basis of the changed conditions in this respect, which were in

⁶⁸Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (3-10 October 1964), 20336.

⁶⁹For a convergent view see, for example, Demetrio Boersner, Venezuela y el Caribe: Presencia cambiante (Caracas: Monte Avila Editores, 1978), 102-103.

place at the end of Caldera's term, the Pérez administration was able to develop its own strategy vis-a-vis the OAS, and resume diplomatic relations with Cuba by the end of 1974.

The difficulties for the normalization of relations with Cuba were considerable, while not insurmountable. The fact that Venezuela had initiated the action leading to the 1964 OAS sanctions against Cuba, made the matter particularly sensitive for the Caldera administration. On the one hand, Caldera was the first Christian Democratic President in the country's history, and had been elected on a platform of national policy changes: El Cambio. Those factors tended to facilitate a thaw with Cuba. On the other, there was the hostility of conservative interest groups in the Venezuelan political system, including part of the business sector, and the relatively small but influential Cuban exile lobby. When asked in a press conference about the compatibility of his Catholic beliefs with a Venezuelan policy of normalization of relations with Cuba, Caldera, after explaining what he saw as the trans-ideological nature of state relations, recalled in passing that the Holy See maintained diplomatic ties with the Government of Cuba.⁷⁰

⁷⁰See Caldera, Habla el Presidente, 5: 503-504. The question referred to a public letter by the President of the Sociedad Venezolana de la Defensa de la Tradición, la Familia y la Propiedad asking Caldera not to resume relations with Cuba.

The achievement of stable relations with Cuba was one of the objectives of Venezuelan foreign policy in the Caribbean region as it had been stressed both by President Caldera and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arístides Calvani. During 1969 and 1970 the Venezuelan Chancellery was busy enough negotiating the resumption of relations with the Soviet Union as well as with several Latin American de facto military governments with which relations had been broken by the Betancourt administration under the doctrine of non-recognition of extra-constitutional regimes which bears his name. However, the question of normalization with Cuba--a longer process to be sure--was prominent since it constituted one important element of the new "internal/external" pacification policy of the Caldera administration.

In a statement made in 1979, Calvani felt that an internal pacification would have been inconceivable without a corresponding opening in Venezuelan foreign relations. To begin with, the Betancourt doctrine had to be phased out and Cuba was undoubtedly the main objective. Therefore, initial conciliatory gestures were made: the Caldera administration opposed, for example, the installation by a group of Cuban exiles of a powerful radio station in central Venezuela aimed at broadcasting messages hostile to the Government of Cuba. In Calvani's view, Venezuela's new policy towards Cuba had to be contemplated as a succession of stages,

beginning with a process of "pacification of the minds," to be followed by an exchange of persons and ultimately leading to the restoration of diplomatic relations.

In keeping with the Caldera administration's policies of regional integration based on ideological pluralism, Calvani saw that it was necessary to bring Cuba closer to its natural area, and thus a little foreign policy revolution took place. By 1971, at the request of Peru, Venezuela supported Cuba's entry into the Group of the 77 within UNCTAD. Also, Venezuela did not oppose the incorporation of Cuba to the Latin America and Caribbean caucus on the Law of the Sea at the United Nations. Bilateral exchanges also took place, and Venezuela started to import Cuban sugar. At one point a Venezuelan warship made a visit to Cuba, and a lucrative trade of Cuban cigars developed. Sports exchanges intensified, as well as a series of official visits.⁷¹

Undoubtly, the political climate between Cuba and Venezuela had been steadily improving since Caldera's inauguration in March 1969. Verbal attacks by Cuba had ceased and its foreign policy had taken a turn to "peaceful coexistence" with a number of countries in the region, including Venezuela. As a sign of the ongoing detente, a UNESCO Regional Ministerial Conference on Education and

⁷¹Julio Portillo, Venezuela-Cuba: Relaciones diplomáticas, 1902-1980 (Caracas: Editorial Arte, 1981), 92-93.

Science and Technology held in Caraballeda, Venezuela, in December 1971, was attended by Cuba's influential Vice-Minister of Education José Ramón Fernández, who on the occasion held bilateral political talks with Venezuelan government officials.⁷² In December 1972, Fernández became Minister of Education.

Caldera was certainly not feeling isolated in his efforts. In May 1972, Peru made an attempt to have the OAS lift the 1964 sanctions against Cuba, and while the proposal was defeated by seven votes for to thirteen against and three abstentions, including that of Venezuela, in June Peru resumed diplomatic relations with Cuba at the ambassadorial level. Later that year, Barbados, Guyana--an OAS observer⁷³--Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, established full diplomatic relations with Cuba. Such ties, added to those with Mexico (which had never broken its relations), contributed to ease Cuba's regional isolation.⁷⁴

On 6 July 1973, the Governments of Cuba and Venezuela concluded an agreement on hijacking of air and sea vessels, and other crimes. It was the first bilateral agreement between these two nations since 1920. This important instrument was signed the same day in Caracas and Havana by

⁷²Author's own participation and recollections.

⁷³Guyana could not become a member of OAS at the time, on account of its border dispute with Venezuela.

⁷⁴Jorge J. Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's foreign policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 225-226.

the ministers of foreign affairs in their respective capitals, and by viceministerial rank officials of the other country who travelled for the occasion.⁷⁵ By mid-1973, the Caldera administration began to explore the possibility of seizing the OAS assembly on the discontinuation of the sanctions imposed against Cuba in 1964.⁷⁶ Such eventual action was contemplated in the resolution adopted by OAS at the time. However, the matter was not pursued beyond informal consultations.

2. Resumption of relations with Cuba by the Pérez administration

After Carlos Andrés Pérez took office in March 1974, normalization steps were continued by the Chancellery-- concurrently with a campaign to lift sanctions in the OAS. Thus specific negotiations for the resumption of diplomatic relations between Venezuela and Cuba were undertaken by the respective ambassadors in the United Nations, Simón Alberto Consalvi and Ricardo Alarcón. According to Consalvi, no special conditions were set for the resumption of ties except for a maximum in the number of staff in each embassy. He also thought that the United States did not appear to object to the actions of Venezuela⁷⁷ in view of its own

⁷⁵Libro Amarillo (1973).

⁷⁶See Caldera, Habla el Presidente, 176-177.

⁷⁷See Portillo, Venezuela-Cuba, 95.

detente with Cuba which--under the Carter administration in 1977--led to the opening of United States and Cuba interest sections in Havana and Washington respectively.⁷⁸

On 29 December 1974, ambassadors Consalvi and Alarcón signed in New York a joint declaration in which the two countries agreed to resume diplomatic consular and trade relations at the ambassadorial level. The declaration indicated that this was done in keeping with "the invariable friendship which unites the peoples of Venezuela and Cuba and consistent with the sovereign right of both countries, their mutual respect and the equality of the States."⁷⁹ In a gesture which was symbolic of policy continuity, Pérez designated as ambassador in Havana the same diplomat who had been the first ambassador to the Soviet Union after the reopening of relations by Caldera in 1971.

As indicated above, in 1974 the Pérez administration embarked on a major effort to have the sanctions against Cuba lifted by OAS. The center of these actions was the 15th Consultative Assembly to be held on 8-12 November in Quito. On 9 September Venezuela, jointly with Costa Rica and Colombia, submitted a resolution to the OAS permanent council requesting a review of those sanctions in the light

⁷⁸For a vivid history of the U.S. thaw with Cuba during the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations, see Wayne S. Smith, The Closest of Enemies: A personal and diplomatic account of U.S.-Cuban relations since 1957 (New York: Norton, 1987), especially pp. 93-100 and chapter 4.

⁷⁹Portillo, Venezuela-Cuba, 136.

of "profound changes" taking place in the international situation which had "opened the way to political pluralism" in the region. On 20 September, the council decided unanimously to include the question in the agenda of the Quito meeting. In Quito on 12 November the proposal to lift sanctions failed to gain the two-thirds majority required for adoption.

On the question of sanctions against Cuba, the United States had been ambivalent all along, which of course did not help Pérez and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Efraín Schacht Aristeguieta, in their earnest efforts to bring Cuba into a more normal relationship with the interamerican system. In effect, at his first press conference on 23 August 1974, President Gerald Ford stated rather ambiguously that the United States would decide in agreement with the other OAS members whether the sanctions against Cuba should be lifted. On 21 October, during an official visit to Mexico, President Ford became clearer, in saying that the United States had not changed its attitude towards Cuba because that country had not changed vis-a-vis the United States.

On the eve of the November vote, the head of the U.S. delegation, Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll, announced that his country would abstain. To most observers this could only mean that the Venezuelan proposal was doomed. But, in any case, at the time of the vote six OAS

member states (in addition to Guyana, which was a permanent observer) had diplomatic relations with Cuba in defiance of the 1964 mandatory sanctions resolution. Four others stated at the assembly that they would resume relations with Cuba shortly.⁸⁰ Thus, the credibility of the OAS sanctions was further eroded.

President Pérez had sought to secure the lifting of OAS sanctions as a previous step to restoring relations with Cuba. In 1974 an influential Venezuelan analyst strongly criticized both OAS and the Venezuelan approach chosen. He considered it an error to seek to "rescue" the regional organization from the contradictory situation in which it found itself. He thought that a better course would have been first to resume relations with Cuba as a legitimate act of national sovereignty, in the manner that several other OAS members had already done, and then promote the OAS action as a critical stand, without excessive hope of obtaining the required two-thirds majority.⁸¹ In fact, while Pérez restored relations with Cuba only several weeks after the Quito vote, it was no less true that due to expectations created by the possibility of adoption of the

⁸⁰For a summary of the different reactions to the defeat of the Venezuelan proposal, see Kessing's Contemporary Archives, (16-22 December 1974), 26863.

⁸¹Demetrio Boersner, "La hora internacional", in Revista SIC (Caracas), (December 1974), as quoted by Portillo in Venezuela-Cuba, 94. For President Pérez's own view on the matter, see Peña, Conversaciones con Carlos Andrés Pérez, 2: 186-187.

resolution jointly sponsored by Costa Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela, the result of the vote was widely reported as a Venezuelan diplomatic setback.⁸²

However, in an interview given in 1988, Efraín Schacht Aristeguieta, Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs during that period, preferred to stress the breakthrough nature of the restoration of diplomatic relations with Cuba in December 1974, which represented the acceptance by Venezuela and Cuba of ideological pluralism in the region. In his view, the main reason for not obtaining the two-thirds majority in Quito "was the coup d'état that took place in Bolivia and the attempted one in Guatemala." Schacht indicated that "those developments contributed to the loss of some allies and helped to modify the initial position of the United States." However, under those circumstances, he felt that to have obtained twelve votes for the proposal sponsored by Venezuela could hardly be considered a failure of the Chancellery.⁸³

The following year, the OAS passed what came to be known as the "Freedom of Action" resolution on sanctions

⁸²In this respect, see Charles Ameringer, "The Foreign Policy of Democratic Venezuela", in John D. Martz and David J. Myers, ed., Venezuela: The democratic experience (New York: Praeger, 1986), 421 and John D. Martz, "Venezuelan Foreign Policy Towards Latin America", in Robert D. Bond, ed., Contemporary Venezuela and its Role in International Affairs (New York: New York University Press, 1977), 174.

⁸³Raquel Gamus, Una Fugaz Convergencia: Carlos Andrés Pérez y la Internacional Socialista en Centroamérica (Caracas: Editorial Acta Científica Venezolana, 1990), 211.

against Cuba. A proposal allowing member states to restore relations with Cuba had been introduced during a meeting of plenipotentiaries held in San José, Costa Rica from 16 to 26 July 1975. Although the meeting had been convened mainly to consider amendments to the Rio Treaty of 1947, subsequently a special consultation meeting was held on 29 July to act on the proposal regarding Cuba. A resolution was adopted there by 16 votes to three, with two abstentions. It stated that the 21 signatories of the TIAR would henceforth be "free to normalize or conduct, in accordance with national policy and interests, relations with the Republic of Cuba at the level and in the form which each state decides advisable."

The 16 countries which voted for the "Freedom of Action" resolution were the same 12 countries voting for the Venezuelan resolution on 12 November 1974 in Quito, plus the United States, Bolivia, Guatemala and Haiti. As before, Paraguay and Uruguay voted against, while Brazil and Nicaragua abstained. Later, the American Representative of the OAS explained his country's vote for the "Freedom of Action" resolution, saying that it was a "generally acceptable solution," which "places the issue in the proper perspective and permits us to concentrate our multilateral

energies on the more fundamental problems of the hemisphere."⁸⁴

In view of the considerable number of countries in the region which already had relations with Cuba, the "Freedom of Action" resolution had to be viewed essentially as a face-saving device for the OAS. In fact, it did not put an end to the 1962 exclusion of Cuba from the interamerican system⁸⁵ nor did it rule out the possibility for any country legally to maintain an economic embargo against Cuba. That was precisely the case of the United States which had imposed a trade embargo on Cuba since 1962, two years before the multilateral action by OAS.⁸⁶ As far as Venezuela was concerned, the "Freedom of Action" resolution was no more than "a consolation prize" after the previous year's setback, as one analyst put it.⁸⁷

⁸⁴See Kessing's Contemporary Archives, (25-31 August 1975), 27300, for a summary of the circumstances relating the adoption of the "Freedom of Action" resolution.

⁸⁵To be sure, President Castro indicated that his country was not interested in returning to the OAS, which he described in a speech on 26 July 1974 (21st anniversary of his assault of the Moncada barracks) as a "putrefied corpse."

⁸⁶Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 27300.

⁸⁷See Ameringer, Venezuela, 421.

Building on the detente achieved by the Caldera administration (1969-1974), the Pérez administration (1974-1979) multiplied exchanges of all kinds between Venezuela and Cuba. The development of trade was relatively uneven, but Venezuelan oil exports to Cuba were made more viable under the agreement concluded with the Soviet Union on the reciprocal granting of petroleum quotas up to 20,000 barrels per day. This agreement allowed a quadrangular arrangement whereby Venezuela delivered its quota to Cuba at the expense of the Soviet Union and that country delivered the same amount to Spain at Venezuela's expense. Savings in transportation costs yielded a profit of at least \$1.20 per barrel to Venezuela.⁸⁸ At the political level, there were important government visits. For example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela, Simón Alberto Consalvi, headed the Venezuelan delegation which participated in the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the Cuban Revolution on 1 January 1979.⁸⁹

The trial in Venezuela of the defendants in a 1976 terrorist bombing of a Cuban Airlines passenger flight became indeed a serious issue which had the potential of endangering the newly resumed relations between Venezuela and Cuba. On 6 October 1976, a Cuban Airlines DC-8 aircraft

⁸⁸Alfredo Baldó Casanova, "La política exterior de Venezuela: 1974-1979", in Política Internacional (Caracas), no. 4 (October-December 1986): 17.

⁸⁹Ibid., 19.

covering flight 465 from Barbados to Havana blew up in the air shortly after take off. All 73 persons on board, mostly athletes returning from international sports events, died as a result of sabotage caused by terrorists. The Venezuelan Government condemned the criminal act and arrested four persons, Orlando Bosch, a well-known anti-Castro Cuban activist living in Venezuela; Luis Posada Carriles, a Cuban who owned a private detective agency in Caracas; and Freddy Lugo and Hernán Ricardo Lozano, Venezuelan photographers with links to the Venezuelan intelligence community. Bosch was charged with homicide and related criminal offenses and the other three with high treason. All four defendants were brought to trial by a military court and on 28 July 1978 the military prosecutor asked for the maximum sentence in each case.

On October 1976, Fidel Castro, in this capacity as President of the Council of State of Cuba, had sent to President Carlos Andrés Pérez the following message.

I wish to express to you my deepest gratitude on behalf of the people and the Government of Cuba for your profound message of condolences for the tragic event which took place in Barbados. At the same time, Mr. President, I wish to express our satisfaction for the speedy diligence with which Venezuelan authorities took charge of the investigations, indicting those persons that have participated from Venezuelan territory in the organization and execution of this horrible crime.⁹⁰

⁹⁰Portillo, Venezuela-Cuba, 145.

Castro's telegram reflected a new relationship. The bombing of the plane had shocked Cuban people and there were calls for immediate retribution on the perpetrators. Castro controlled the situation and decided to trust the Venezuelan Justice. On his side, Pérez managed to have the two Venezuelans extradited from Trinidad and Tobago and the other two defendants were apprehended in Caracas.⁹¹

Apart from that grave incident and frictions concerning the asylum of Cuban dissidents in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana, on the whole relations between the two countries developed smoothly during the Pérez administration, with a modest increase in trade, including the already mentioned supply of petroleum to Cuba. Venezuelan cooperative behavior towards Cuba had been conditioned by security considerations which led to mutual concessions on the part of both countries. In fact, Cuba was definitively to stop fomenting armed insurgency and revolution in Venezuela, which would work with its allies in the region to help to end campaigns for economic and

⁹¹Minister of Foreign Affairs Consalvi, after leaving office in 1979, stated: "The issue of the airliner was dealt with great transparency. We condemned the action and apprehended the terrorists. Our Government feared that the Cubans would take justice in their own hands". See Portillo, Venezuela-Cuba, 101.

political destabilization of Cuba. On the question of Venezuelan policies regarding oil, including in OPEC, and trade with the United States, Cuba expressed a great deal of support to Venezuela.⁹² The day that the news reached Cuba of the public letter reply from Pérez to Ford's "oil-shock" speech at the United Nations, Havana celebrated with a profuse display of Cuban and Venezuelan flags throughout the city.⁹³ Nevertheless, Castro expected OPEC members to recycle their surplus funds into aid and investment programmes for the least developed countries to a greater extent than they were already doing.

The pacification goal was one of the most powerful determinants in the normalization of relations with Cuba. Consider that by December 1964 the Conference of Latin American Communist Parties adopted what amounted to a Soviet compromise with Cuba, in the form of a Final Declaration which recognized Communist support for armed struggle in six Latin American countries (Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, and Haiti). The Cuban counterpart

⁹²See, for example, H. Michael Erisman, Cuba's International Relations: The anatomy of nationalistic foreign policy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), 49-50; Herman, Christian Democracy in Venezuela, 188, and also Caldera, Habla el Presidente, 5: 92-92.

⁹³Peña, Conversaciones, 188.

compromise with the Soviets lay in the Final Declaration's recognition of the peaceful road as a legitimate path for pro-Soviet Communist parties to follow in the rest of Latin America.⁹⁴ However, by the time Caldera took office in 1969, Cuba had abandoned--even in theory--its support for armed struggle in Venezuela and was ready for detente with the new administration there.

Regarding the territorial sovereignty goal and its border issues with Guyana and Colombia, Venezuela could take comfort in the fact that Cuba's position was one of neutrality, at least during the years of the Pérez administration. Cuba and Guyana had established relations in 1972 which developed normally until 1980. Cuba and Colombia resumed diplomatic relations in 1975, and the value of Colombian imports from Cuba grew already in 1976. However, Colombia broke diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1981 over allegations of Cuban support to the M-19 Revolutionary Movement in Colombia. Afterwards there was a warm personal relationship between Fidel Castro and Conservative President Belisario Betancour (1982-1986),

⁹⁴See Walter Raymond Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985).

probably facilitated by their common friend Gabriel García Márquez, a Colombian-born Nobel Laureate novelist. However, diplomatic ties were not reestablished until 1993. It should be recognized that, in view of their border disputes, Venezuela, Colombia and Guyana had an interest in keeping as good relations as possible with Cuba, among other reasons because of its rising influence in the Group of the 77 in the United Nations as well as in the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries. Therefore, the situation just described underscores the soundness of Venezuelan policies of diversification and globalization of its relations in terms of defending its own territorial sovereignty.

The thaw started in 1973 in the relations between the United States and Cuba led to the establishment from September 1, 1977 of interest sections, staffed by American and Cuban diplomats in each case, in Washington and Havana. Those developments certainly made the Venezuelan process of normalization with Cuba easier, at least in regard to the possibility of negative repercussions of that process on the relations of Venezuela with the United States during the 1970s.

V. Conclusion

The above analysis of the cases of normalization of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba is meant to validate the relevance of my four hypothetical elements in explaining the globalization of Venezuelan foreign policy during the 1970s.

In the three cases, it was found that the relative decline of U.S. influence in Venezuela acted as a very strong factor in the country's diplomatic opening at the time. In effect, throughout the process of normalization of relations with the USSR and Cuba, and recognition of the PRC, Venezuela met with subtle forms of opposition and pressure by the Nixon and Ford administrations (denial of oil import quotas; shifts on the lifting of OAS sanctions to Cuba; pressures in the UN China vote) which could be overcome only by Venezuela's calculation that the political cost of its actions would be tolerable in terms of possible U.S. negative responses.

The internal pacification goal was also found to be a very strong determinant in the three areas, since the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba were moving away from previous policies of support to Venezuelan revolutionaries and its was rational for Venezuela to seize the opportunity to use the combined incentives of diplomatic and internal peace openings. The border issues (essentially with Colombia and

Guyana, and residually with Brazil) were to be relevant in the case of the Soviet Union and China in view of their role as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and their potential influence with the members of the Movement of Unaligned Countries and the Group of 77 in the UN. In the case of Cuba, Venezuela was strongly motivated by the possibilities (later demonstrated) of Cuba's influence both in the Caribbean region as well as with developing countries globally.

The goal of revaluation of oil income was found to be strongly relevant to the resumption of relations with the Soviet Union in view of that country's role as oil producer and exporter and as possible facilitator of Venezuela's recovery of the Cuban oil market. In the case of China, the oil element was relevant in terms of its solidarity with OPEC objectives and its rise as oil producer, consumer, and exporter during the 1970s. As for Cuba, in the process of normalization started by Caldera and completed by Pérez, oil was also found to be relevant due to Cuba's strong support

for Venezuela's leadership role in OPEC. In turn, the resumption of relations with the Soviet Union in 1970 and with Cuba in 1974 made possible an arrangement for Venezuela to start supplying part of the Cuban oil market.

CHAPTER 6

VENEZUELAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 1979: FROM THE HERRERA ADMINISTRATION TO CALDERA'S SECOND PRESIDENCY

I. Introduction

This chapter analyzes the new trends in the evolution of Venezuelan foreign policy from the close of Pérez's first presidency in March 1979 to the time of writing. The analysis shows continuity under Presidents Herrera and Lusinchi in the more permanent aspects of globalization, such as the expansion and strengthening of Venezuela's diplomatic network, but it also highlights a shift toward a revived East-West orientation in cooperation with the Reagan administration. During Pérez's second presidency the cold war ended, resulting in a profound change in the international environment, and Venezuelan foreign policy gradually returned to the outlook of the 1970s. Following Pérez's removal from office and a brief interim government, Rafael Caldera returned to the Miraflores Palace in 1994 to resume the tasks of a global foreign policy. These tasks include streamlining and rationalizing the diplomatic machinery.

II. Analysis of foreign policy developments

1. Luís Herrera Campins (1979-1984)

With the election of Luís Herrera Campins to succeed Carlos Andrés Pérez, the Christian Democrats (COPEI party)

returned to power in Venezuela. As a reaction to what he considered to be Pérez's disproportionate emphasis on foreign policy, Herrera, in his inauguration speech of March 1979, pledged to concentrate on remedying the country's domestic problems.¹ What soon became evident was that the country's foreign policy was returning to the overall conservative orientation of the Betancourt and Leoni decade. For instance, President Herrera took office on 12 March 1979 and on 19 July 1979 the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) gained control of the government of Nicaragua. Rather than providing policy continuity, in this brief period the Herrera administration managed to dissociate itself from the support afforded to the FSLN by Carlos Andrés Pérez and by 1980 Herrera was imposing stringent political conditions upon the continuation of Venezuelan economic assistance to Nicaragua. At the same time, he strengthened his ties with the conservative Catholic hierarchy and the opposition daily La Prensa.²

Moreover, international political developments beginning in the last two years of the Carter administration (for example, the Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions; the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan; and the civil war in El Salvador) brought with them the recurrence of East-West

¹Luis Herrera Campins, President of Venezuela, "Inaugural Address to Congress" (Caracas: Ediciones de la Presidencia, 1979).

²See Alfredo Toro Hardy, La Maldición de Sísifo: Quince años de política externa venezolana (Caracas: Editorial Panapo, 1991), 71-72.

tensions and, in particular, a hardening of the U.S. line towards Latin America and the Caribbean. Except in a limited number of specific situations, such as the Malvinas war, Herrera acted in tacit alliance with the Reagan administration.

Herrera's Chancellery continued, albeit at a slower pace, the expansion and reinforcement of the Venezuelan diplomatic network. Relations were established with other developing countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Cyprus, Fiji, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, and Thailand, as well as with Ireland. Also, Venezuela recognized the Democratic Saharan Arab Republic and established diplomatic relations with its provisional government in exile in Algiers. In qualitative terms Venezuelan foreign policy made a sharp shift towards a conservative stance which fitted well with the preferences of the administration of President Reagan, who took office in January 1981. In fact, during the U.S. transition period, Herrera's Minister of Interior Rafael ("Pepi") Montes de Oca publicly stated that he and Reagan's Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, Jr., "saw eye-to-eye" and stressed "the absolute coincidence of views between the United States and Venezuela."³

³In the face of profuse criticism at home of Montes de Oca's statement, Venezuelan Chancellor José Alberto Zambrano Velasco was compelled to declare that Venezuela was "not a puppet of the United States." In this connection, see Robert P. Matthews, "Oil in troubled waters: Venezuelan policy in the Caribbean," in NACLA Report on the Americas vol. 18, no. 4 (July-August 1984): 33.

Regarding relations with Cuba the Herrera administration managed to undo virtually all the work of Caldera and Pérez to reach diplomatic normalization. By September 1980, the Venezuelan military court trying the defendants on the 1976 bombing of the Cubana de Aviación airliner in Barbados, in a reversal, agreed to acquit the four men who were indicted for that crime during the Pérez administration.⁴ The Cuban government accused the Herrera administration of instigating the decision and made clear that it would sever diplomatic relations with Venezuela in the event of a definitive acquittal. The four men remained under detention until the end of Herrera's term--with the formal court verdict still undefined. However, by then the Cuban Embassy in Caracas had been nearly abandoned.⁵

Moreover, in a clear gesture of hostility towards the Cuban government, the Herrera administration authorized the holding of a congress attended by 300 Cuban exiles led by Huber Matos (an estranged companion of Fidel Castro in his struggle against Batista). The congress, which took place in Caracas in October 1980, adopted a plan calling for the

⁴For details on the aborted acquittal and on the public position of the defendants, who claimed that the sabotage against Cuban communists was justified, see Alicia Herrera, Pusimos la Bomba--y Que?: Confesiones de los terroristas a la periodista Alicia Herrera (Valencia, Venezuela: Vadell Hermanos, 1981).

⁵Ibid., 33. On the question of the trial of the suspected perpetrators of the bombing, in 1984 the Venezuelan Supreme Court of Justice resolved the conflict of competence between military and ordinary justice by entrusting the case to the ordinary penal jurisdiction.

encouragement of conditions for an anti-Castro uprising in Cuba as well as the opening of a liaison office of the group in Caracas. To increase aggravation, leaders of the governing COPEI party participated in the meeting.⁶

Invoking the threat of Cuban air strike capabilities, the Herrera administration requested in 1981 the sale of 48 F-16 jet fighter bombers (at \$22 million apiece) to Venezuela. The Reagan administration agreed, and while eventually only half of the number of aircraft requested was approved by the U.S. Congress, such technology made the Venezuelan Air Force the most advanced in Latin America. In view of Venezuela's frontier disputes, it was not surprising that Colombia and Guyana protested the purchase as a threat to their security, regardless of the fact that the official justification was Cuba.

In 1982, the Herrera administration suspended petroleum shipments to Nicaragua under the San José Agreement, claiming payment arrears that countries such as Guatemala and Honduras had equally incurred without sanction.⁷ Furthermore, Venezuela made a late and weak complaint when U.S. forces occupied Grenada and overthrew

⁶See John D. Martz, "Ideology and Oil: Venezuela in the Circum-Caribbean," in H. Michael Erisman and John D. Martz, eds., Colossus Challenged: The struggle for Caribbean influence (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982).

⁷See Matthews, "Oil in troubled waters," 431.

the government there.⁸

By 1983, that alliance between the Reagan and Herrera administrations also manifested itself in Central America and the Caribbean. In El Salvador, Herrera provided military and financial support to fellow Christian Democrat José Napoleón Duarte, in contradiction to Venezuelan official calls for the cessation of all forms of external military intervention, the demilitarization of the region, and negotiations within the Contadora Process, including in United Nations General Assembly resolutions on the matter endorsed by Venezuela. However, Herrera maintained that those actions did not imply intervention.⁹

The Herrera Chancellery disagreed with the Reagan administration only in a few instances, the most conspicuous of which was the South Atlantic war of 1982, when Venezuela sided with Argentina, outraged at U.S. support of Great Britain. In this case the weight of the analogy was heavy between Argentina, seen by the Venezuelan public as the victim of British imperialism which took the Malvinas away from it in 1833, and Venezuela, which had been robbed of the Essequibo territory through a British-orchestrated fraud in

⁸See, for example, Charles Ameringer, "The Foreign Policy of Democratic Venezuela," in John D. Martz and David J. Meyers, eds., Venezuela: The democratic experience (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1986): 431.

⁹On military and police training as well as financial support to Duarte, see Alfredo Peña, Acusa Luís Herrera: Lusinchi Fracasó (Caracas: Editorial Ateneo de Caracas, 1987), 228-229.

the Paris 1899 arbitration.¹⁰ However, in spite of the fact that Herrera provided military assistance to Argentina during the war, his strident militancy, aimed essentially at domestic consumption, was short-lived. By the end of 1982 Venezuela's foreign debt, which was negligible in 1969, had grown to exceed \$30 billion, mostly owed to U.S. banks. Thus, the Herrera administration quickly came back to giving priority to its U.S. alliance, in the hope of finding a bilateral solution to the serious problem of the country's indebtedness. The other exception occurred when the anti-colonialist line of the Chancellery was allowed to show itself in Venezuelan votes after 1980 for the Cuban-sponsored resolution on the issue of the status of Puerto Rico in the United Nations Decolonization Committee.¹¹ In 1981 President Herrera said in his address to the UN General Assembly that he hoped that the day would not be far when Puerto Rico would occupy its place there,¹² and in the same forum in 1983 his Chancellor José Alberto Zambrano Velasco affirmed that among Venezuelans existed "a deep-rooted feeling that Puerto Rico should be a member of the Latin

¹⁰See Donald L. Herman, Christian Democracy in Venezuela (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 196; and Jaqueline A. Braveboy-Wagner, The Venezuela-Guyana Border Dispute: Britain's colonial legacy in Latin America (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), especially the letter from Mallet-Prevost, available after his death.

¹¹See Pastor, "Puerto Rico as an international issue," 114.

¹²See Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Venezuela en las Naciones Unidas, 1945-1985 (Caracas: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1986), 430.

American family."¹³

Venezuela's return to a conservative foreign policy under President Herrera may be seen as an attempt by the state to adapt to new conditions of the external environment, namely the reactivation of the cold war, especially in Central America, under Carter's final years and continuing with the Reagan and Bush administrations. During the 1980s there was a revival of American interventions in the Western Hemisphere (for example, covert support of the Nicaraguan contras; mining of Nicaraguan harbors; involvement against the insurgents in the civil war in El Salvador; involvement in the Malvinas war on the side of Britain; invasion of Grenada; invasion of Panamá; tightening of the embargo against Cuba). Under such conditions, the external factor considered in the explanation of Venezuelan behavior in 1969-1979 (relative decline of U.S. power) moved to a position characterized by greater willingness by the U.S. to use force and other coercive means in Latin America and thus began to have opposite effects on Venezuelan actions. However, the effect of the internal goals (oil income, pacification, and territorial sovereignty), although mitigated by the dominance of the external environment, did not disappear entirely as evidenced by the fact that Venezuela's brief displays of independence vis-a-vis the U.S. under Herrera

¹³Ibid., 446-447.

were related to issues of sovereignty in the region (Malvinas war and Puerto Rican self-determination).

On the other hand, the relevance of the oil income goal as such was played down by the issue of indebtedness, which actually resulted in a reduction of disposable fiscal income, due to the increasing obligations of debt servicing, and required that a relative priority be given to negotiations with the creditors and their governments over negotiations with the other oil producers to defend prices. As to pacification, internal stability was taken for granted and the Herrera administration saw its future in terms of helping the U.S. to crush revolutions in the region. In the 1983 election, AD returned to power, its candidate Jaime Lusinchi winning an absolute majority of the vote.

2. Jaime Lusinchi (1984-1989)

Venezuelan foreign policy during the Lusinchi administration was hampered by a bleak internal economic situation inherited from the Herrera administration (the first major devaluation of the bolivar in the country's history; four consecutive years of no growth of real GNP; 20 percent unemployment), aggravated by mounting external indebtedness that made Venezuela the country with the fourth largest foreign debt in Latin America.

As in the case of the preceding administration, frontier issues at times became critical in Venezuelan

foreign policy. For example, the deliberate incursion in the Gulf of Venezuela by a Colombian naval vessel in 1987 (the "Caldas" incident) brought Venezuela and Colombia to the brink of war.¹⁴ In turn, the Guyana territorial dispute remained relatively dormant during the Lusinchi administration.

Hoping to avoid further divergences with Washington over Central America, Venezuela, rather than taking independent initiatives likely to move things along, continued to play a colorless contrast role within the Contadora group that had aimed at seeking a diplomatic end to the internal armed conflicts in the region. For example, in situations of tension, Venezuela frequently sided with Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica in contrast to Mexico, which favored Nicaragua.

Lusinchi sought a normalization with Cuba and diplomatic relations were brought back to the ambassadorial level. However, numerous incidents made it a still cool

¹⁴During the Lusinchi administration, the Colombian battleship Caldas, armed with sophisticated missiles, penetrated traditional Venezuelan internal sea waters and stayed for eleven days from 7 to 13 August 1987. But on 15 August Colombia replaced the Caldas with the Independiente, placing the latter farther north, and the president of Colombia announced his decision to take the case to OAS. However, the Independiente was also removed, on 18 August, and on 21 August the OAS Secretary-General supported the Venezuelan position regarding the bilateral character of the controversy. The apparent aim of Colombia had been to provoke an armed confrontation that would, it hoped, bring the delimitation dispute to arbitration or international judicial instances. See Toro Hardy, La Maldición de Sísifo, 26-30, and Carlos A. Romero, "Planos y etapas de la política exterior de Venezuela," in Revista de la Facultad de Ciencias, Jurídicas y Políticas (Caracas), no. 74 (1990): 220-221.

relationship. Issues involved the asylum of Cubans in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana and complications arising from the lack of a final resolution of the case of the four detainees. In fact, by a decision of the Supreme Court the defendants were now being held under the jurisdiction of a Venezuelan ordinary penal tribunal. In the latter respect, matters became worse with the evasion abroad of one of the detainees, the Cuban Luís Posada Carriles.

In continuing the globalization policies of the past decade, the Lusinchi administration established diplomatic relations with Nepal, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe and resumed them with Uruguay. In spite of financial difficulties, the means of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Institute of Foreign Trade were also moderately strengthened. In particular, an independent Council of Legal Consultants was established at the level of the Minister and also the continuing education of diplomatic staff was intensified through the in-house "Pedro Gual" Diplomatic Academy, which was finally enabled to grant post-graduate degrees.

In the Latin American context the Lusinchi administration responded in a moderate manner to the deteriorating economic situation of the late 1980s, a decade that was almost universally identified as the "lost decade for development" in Latin America. While achieving a high degree of convergence with the other democratic governments

in Latin America through new multilateral mechanisms, Lusinchi's centrism failed to find the way of utilizing the combined weight of all the partners in such important issues as debt negotiations. Those failures represented the loss of a significant opportunity, since conditions existed for the debtor group to exercise discreet but firm collective pressure on the creditors in favor of a solution that would preserve economic growth in the region. Regarding relations with the United States, the Lusinchi administration showed greater timidity than Herrera towards the conservative Reagan administration. For example, it failed to seek regional support to press Venezuelan grievances regarding threats of the imposition of new duties on Venezuelan oil imports.

Regarding the technical and financial cooperation programmes of the previous decade, involving Caribbean and other oil-importing developing countries, the Lusinchi administration had to curtail Venezuelan activities. Mexico, the cooperating partner in the San Jose agreements for the financing of oil purchases, was also hit heavily by the drop in the petroleum market. As a result, both countries started to limit the financing of oil purchases to only 20 percent of the total and related interest rates were increased.

The Lusinchi administration also limited its actions in Central America to the multilateral level in order to reduce the risks of individual activism in times of

increased vulnerability to United States reprisals. To illustrate the achievements of the concerted regional approach mentioned above, consider that in 1985 the Contadora group was reinforced by the appearance of the Lima Support Group, composed of Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay. In 1986 the Rio Group (or Group of Eight) was constituted as a result of the interaction of the Support Group and Contadora and in 1987 the First Presidential Meeting of the Group of Eight (officially named Mecanismo Permanente de Consulta y Concertación Política) was held in Acapulco, Mexico. In that context the lack of economic leadership--especially by Venezuela, which, inter alia, is the host country of SELA--appears all the more regrettable, since political conditions and good will existed for making use of a well-organized and coordinated regional alliance mechanism (the Group of Eight, or Rio Group) which would have been able to start playing the collective negotiating role vis-a-vis the United States, Europe, and Japan that the Group has come to perform in the 1990s on, for example, trade issues.

However, the Lusinchi administration encouraged the PDVSA's policy of oil internationalization by acquiring controlling interest in refining companies in Germany, the United States, and Sweden. In addition, when Shell decided to abandon its refinery in Curacao, Netherlands Antilles, Venezuela came to the rescue by leasing the refinery for

five years. That arrangement had continued to be renewed-- for even longer periods--up to the present time.¹⁵ The alternation of Social Democrats and Christian Democrats (AD and COPEI parties, respectively) in the Miraflores Palace since 1969 created the expectation of success for candidate Eduardo Fernández in the 1988 election. However, he was easily defeated by Carlos Andrés Pérez, who decided to embark from the start on a neoliberal programme in his second presidency.

3. Carlos Andrés Pérez (1989-1993)

The Pérez administration sought to revitalize Venezuelan foreign policy and in the VIII National Development Plan submitted to Congress in 1989, the bases of the new foreign policy were stated as follows:

- (a) a new approach to Latin American integration;
- (b) strengthening of trade and investment diplomacy;
- (c) South-South cooperation;
- (d) North-South dialogue.

Such bases implied the goals of modernizing the structures and institutions and of broadening political and economic openings to the rest of the world. Venezuela joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1990, seeking the country's integration into world markets. They

¹⁵In September 1994 the lease of the ex-Shell Isla refinery was extended for a period of 20 additional years.

also implied the idea that it was possible to rescue Venezuela's historical role in defending a new international economic order and promoting technical and economic cooperation among developing countries.

With the aim of stimulating the flow of new foreign direct investment, the country also joined the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), established in 1986 as an autonomous institution linked to the World Bank, as well as the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), established in 1986 in Washington, D.C., under the World Bank Group. Likewise, bilateral agreements for the reciprocal promotion and protection of foreign investments were signed with Chile, Argentina, Ecuador, Netherlands, and Switzerland. Negotiations were started for the conclusion of similar agreements with the United States, Canada, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, Great Britain, Sweden, and Poland.

But this administration of Pérez was marked by a succession of political and economic crises, which began with a popular uprising shortly after Perez's inauguration in which hundreds died in widespread violence following increases in the price of gasoline. After two attempted coups by the military, such crises culminated in his impeachment and trial by the Supreme Court on charges of mismanagement of public funds. The Venezuelan Congress declared Pérez's presidency effectively ended and elected

Senator Ramón J. Velásquez as interim President in June 1993. During Pérez's tenure the Gulf War did have a transitory effect in increasing Venezuelan oil income, but the country tended to distance itself from OPEC.

The end of the cold war stimulated Venezuela to continue previous policies of expansion and geographical as well as political diversification of its diplomatic network, together with a reinforcement of the Chancellery apparatus. Diplomatic relations were established with Afghanistan, Armenia, Benin, Bosnia, Cameroon, the Comoros, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Togo, Ukraine, and Vietnam.

During Pérez's second presidency four different chancellors were in charge of Venezuelan foreign policy, including General Fernando Ochoa Antich, who was moved from Defense to Foreign Affairs in the aftermath of the attempted coup of November 1992--thus becoming the first military man in active service to occupy the position of Chancellor in the history of Venezuela. However, foreign policy maintained its fundamental autonomistic characteristics in spite of the reigning conditions of internal instability.

Considering the magnitude of the economic crisis that developed, the two bloody military coup attempts of 1992, and Pérez's constitutional replacement in 1993, the efforts of the administration, and particularly of the Chancellery,

to respond to national needs of state autonomy were adequate and balanced. Credit should be given in this respect to the impetus given to the principles of globalism, independence, and foreign policy activism which were established during the 1970s and, with varying fortunes, were able to survive into the 1990s.

After the impeachment of President Pérez in 1993 by the Supreme Court, the Venezuelan Congress appointed Senator Ramón Velásquez as Interim President, giving him the fundamental task of ensuring the smooth conduct of the December 1993 elections.

4. Ramón J. Velásquez (1993-1994)

Senator Ramón J. Velásquez was Venezuela's interim president from June 1993 to February 1994. During his tenure Venezuela's foreign policy continued its post-cold war orientation under the Minister of Foreign Affairs appointed by Pérez in 1992, Fernando Ochoa Antich. In keeping with Venezuela's longstanding anti-apartheid policy, diplomatic relations were established with the Republic of South Africa in December 1993, as soon as it was clear that multiracial elections would be held.

Velasquez also sought to reassure Colombia, which looked with apprehension at the continuing political destabilization and economic decline of its neighbor.

5. Rafael Caldera (1994-1999)

The 1993 electoral campaign and elections developed normally, considering the political circumstances in which the country was living. The traditional AD and COPEI parties saw their strength halved and were defeated by Rafael Caldera running as an independent supported by a broad coalition of small parties.

On December 5, 1993, Rafael Caldera became the second Venezuelan to be elected Constitutional President for a second time during the Democratic Era (the first having been Carlos Andrés Pérez, whose second presidency ended in political disarray). Thus the two presidents of the globalization decade have had their second opportunity to leave their imprint on Venezuelan foreign policy before the end of the century.

Caldera was inaugurated on February 2, 1994, and began to face the worst economic crisis in the country's history, caused by the drop in the real export prices of oil, iron, steel, and aluminum, while the population doubled since 1979. In addition, the effects of a long recession were compounded by the failure of a large part of the private banking system. As a result of the banking system crisis, and the need to provide fiscal help to that system, the country lost a considerable part of its monetary reserves. However, foreign policy was not put on the back burner. The Chancellery is being reorganized and the functioning of the

diplomatic network rationalized, by the designation of particular ambassadors to cover several countries (for example, the Ambassador to the Philippines being accredited also in Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia, or the Ambassador in Helsinki being concurrently assigned to the Baltic countries). In June of 1994 Venezuela established relations with Cambodia and now maintains relations with 144 countries, accounting for 78 percent of the world's sovereign states.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS OF THE DISSERTATION AND THE FUTURE OF VENEZUELAN FOREIGN POLICY

I. Introduction

This chapter concludes that the Venezuelan foreign policy of the 1970s--the globalization of political and economic relations--which is explained by vital state goals and the relative decline of U.S. power, had lasting effects that extended to the 1980s. The revival of the cold war during those years constrained Venezuelan independence, but the diplomatic resources developed in the 1970s continued to be strengthened. Thus, Caldera and Pérez were both right and visionary in making an opening to the world beyond ideological prejudices--thirty years before the definitive end of the cold war.

The independence of Venezuelan foreign policy in the last years of the century is expected to survive a serious economic crisis--ultimately caused by the progressive decline of the price of oil in real terms coupled with the doubling of Venezuelan population between 1970 and 1990. Future emphasis will be on economic diplomacy aimed at promoting exports other than oil and on strategic alliances with foreign enterprises to maintain technological competitiveness.

II. Venezuelan foreign policy during the Democratic Era: from cold war I to cold war II and the post-cold war world

1. Why Venezuela globalized its foreign policy during the 1970s

During the Betancourt administration (1959-1964) and to a lesser extent during the Leoni administration (1964-1969), Venezuela's foreign policy worked in the direction of isolating the country from the rest of the world. In the first place, regional policy was guided by the Betancourt doctrine which required the severance of diplomatic relations with de facto regimes in the Hemisphere. In the global context, Venezuela practiced a policy of strict security alignment with the United States, which represented both the regional hegemon and the Western pole in the cold war. Furthermore, as a consequence of its alignment, Venezuela rejected the possibility of diplomatic, trade and cultural relations with the East--and especially with the USSR and China. While meant to protect the newly restored Venezuelan democracy, the Betancourt doctrine inevitably led to the isolation of the country from significant political and economic centers in Latin America, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Cuba. Moreover, rigid cold war alignment with the United States isolated Venezuela not only from the East but also tended to isolate it from the rest of the Third World. During the presidencies of Rafael Caldera (1969-1974) and Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974-1979) a decisive thrust was

given to the country's foreign policy--in a context of continuity of goals and actions--which led to the globalization of the country's foreign policy.

The globalization of Venezuelan foreign policy is conceptualized here as the pursuit in scope and application of truly worldwide relations of cooperation in the areas of diplomacy, security, investment, trade, culture, science, and technology. More important, the resulting policies are characterized by independence from the superpowers in foreign policy actions (for example, in diplomatic relations, trade, stands at the UN, and other multilateral fora and alliances with other developing countries such as in OPEC)--starting by a movement away from rigid traditional alliances and dogmatic anti-Communism. The amount of Venezuela's bilateral and multilateral activity increased and the pursuit of independent initiatives soared. Such initiatives responded predominantly to specific interests of Venezuela and other developing countries in all regions. All that policy change is interpreted as a reaction to the isolation and Western fundamentalism of the past, which ran contrary to the developmental, security, and ultimately national goals of Venezuela.

At least during the 1970s, these national goals were shown to be at work in producing the above policy changes, namely the protection of the country's fiscal income derived

from the exploitation of its natural resources, especially petroleum; the pacification of the country in the face of armed insurgency by revolutionaries (who were seeking ultimately a more equitable distribution of national income); the defense of territorial sovereignty in cases of still unresolved delimitations of vital areas. In fact, those objectives serve to explain the process of the 1970s insofar as, firstly, the protection of oil income required inter-regional cooperation with other oil producers and the promotion of formal mechanisms such as OPEC; that, in turn, necessitated global alliances with Third World countries which were not possible without moving away from the cold war alignment with U.S. foreign policy. Secondly, in order to reach the pacification goal, it was essential to profit from international detente and simultaneously reach a settlement with the insurgents and a diplomatic opening to the centers which inspired their revolutionary project. Thirdly, the defense of territorial sovereignty--in which the use of force is only an improbable ultimate possibility --needed to be contemplated as a matter of international law and legitimacy. Such legitimacy, which was based on historical territorial titles, had to be supported also by the collective force of Third World countries, which naturally were being courted by the other territorial contenders. In the case of Venezuela, close alignment with the United States was not an advantageous position in

seeking such Third World support.

The policies of globalization with the resulting expansion and diversification of Venezuela's diplomatic network coupled to a new foreign policy activism exposed the country to the possibility of confrontation with the leader of the West, namely the United States. Such threat became lesser through a changing external environment or, in the language of the dissertation, the policies adopted are explained in terms of an external factor found to be consistently relevant: the decline of American influence in Latin America and the rise of international detente during the 1970s.

After the decade of Caldera and Pérez (1969-1979) the process of globalization became irreversible due to the internalization--within the Chancellery and its diplomatic network--of the state goals of independence, sovereignty, and international leadership. On the other hand, there was no guarantee that the priority assigned to those goals would not change in one direction or another. Thus the revival of the cold war during the Reagan administration and part of the Bush administration caused Venezuela to revert to Western alignment and to a measure of dogmatic anti-Communism in the decade of the Herrera and Lusinchi administrations (1979-1989). However, the definitive end of the cold war in 1989 left decision makers relatively free to define Venezuelan foreign policy in terms of the country's

own national interests. They did so by resuming the globalization policy that had been inaugurated by Presidents Pérez and Caldera in the 1970s.

When contemplating the current Venezuelan global diplomatic network in 1994, covering 144 sovereign states representing 78 percent of the world's total number, it is important to consider the benefits that Venezuela obtained, and can obtain in the future, from the globalization of its foreign policy--durably launched during the 1970s. In the first place, the Venezuelan leaders of the 1970s were right in making an opening to the world beyond ideological prejudices. In fact that is precisely what the Western industrialized countries did with respect to the East anyway. We should not forget that the United States established diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1933, and the United Kingdom with the PRC in 1954.

One important example of the results of foreign policy globalization was the election in 1991 of Venezuelan jurist and diplomat Andrés Aguilar Mawdsley as a Judge in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The election procedure involving both the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly, where a two-thirds majority was required, made the election of Aguilar by 143 votes (91 percent of the total of 156 valid ballots) a triumph of Venezuelan

globalization policies.¹ Indeed it was also the recognition of Aguilar's outstanding juridical qualifications and personal prestige. In the final analysis, Venezuelan foreign policy, as viewed for example by the developing countries which made up the majority of the General Assembly, was resoundingly endorsed. Elected for a term ending on 5 February 2000, Aguilar had been Minister of Justice, Ambassador to the United Nations and Ambassador in Washington. He was serving for a second time as Ambassador to the United Nations at the time of his election.

Aguilar's entry in the ICJ had implications for Venezuelan territorial issues since it became symbolic of Venezuelan Third World support for a post with a bearing--even if only indirectly--on the unresolved issue of the Gulf of Venezuela. In reality, Venezuela expects to resolve the Gulf issue by direct negotiations with Colombia, but Colombia has at times tested Venezuela's resolve, for instance, by undertaking naval incursions in waters traditionally under Venezuelan control, with the intention of provoking an armed incident that could be used as a pretext to request some form of outside arbitration, possibly by the Court. The presence of Venezuela in the ICJ has an extraordinary moral weight in such relatively remote

¹See United Nations General Assembly, 45th session, Official Records, 38th meeting, 15 November 1990 (Election of five members of the International Court of Justice).

eventuality. On the other hand, the evolution of the Court's jurisprudence in favor of Venezuela in cases similar to that of the Gulf could be a factor which would bring Colombia to a resolution of the case by direct negotiation between the two countries.

2. The continuity of globalization and the changing fortunes of independence

The achievement on the expansion mentioned above of the Venezuelan network of diplomatic relations is impressive enough. The 19 states with which Venezuela had diplomatic relations--being a mere 31 percent of the total number of sovereign states in the world of 1926 during the Gomez dictatorship, compared with the 144 (78 percent of all the world's independent states in 1994) represents a decisive foreign policy advancement. In effect, Venezuela today means to exert significant international influence worldwide.

In addition to the election of the person of Andrés Aguilar to the ICJ in 1991, Venezuela was elected to serve as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council in 1977-1978, in 1986-1987, and again in 1992-1993. Those are elections requiring a qualified two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, and their accelerating frequency speaks eloquently of Venezuela's prestige as a nation among United Nations member States, a majority of which are developing countries.

Venezuela benefitted from the enduring personal prestige in the United Nations of diplomatic leaders of the globalization period such as Manuel Pérez Guerrero who, in a telling symbolism, was elected to exercise Venezuela's role as speaker of the Group of 77 in 1980 in spite of the fact that he was not the chief diplomatic representative of Venezuela in the UN at the time. In the Security Council during 1986-1987, the chief Venezuelan representative was Ambassador Andrés Aguilar who had been President Caldera's negotiator in the resumption of relations with the USSR in 1970.

During the relatively passive and conservative Herrera/Lusinchi decade, the Venezuelan Chancellery showed signs of independence of both superpowers which can be traced back to the 1969-1979 globalization decade. That was the case when Venezuela decided in 1981 to recognize the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic and establish diplomatic relations at the ambassador's level with the provisional government of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saquia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario), in exile in Algiers. That decision brought continuing tension with Morocco, a country with which Venezuela had had diplomatic relations since 1965. However, Venezuela joined a group of more than 63 countries that recognized the Polisario provisional government.

In conclusion, the globalization policies of the 1970s

had lasting effects that extended through the next decade (1979-1989) in spite of the renewed cold war. However, the latter development prompted a shift to the right in Venezuelan foreign policy and the surge in prominence of conservative leaders of foreign policy from COPEI and AD. As a token of the new international orientation of the Herrera administration during the initial Reagan years, the influential Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Policy of the Senate, José Rodríguez Iturbe (COPEI), developed a close friendship and affinity with Jeanne Kirkpatrick, President Reagan's Ambassador to the United Nations and chief ideological spokesperson.²

III. The future of Venezuelan foreign policy

Venezuela will enter the twenty-first century after enduring the economic shock of 1993-1994, characterized by the failure of more than half of the banking system, an estimated drop of 10 percent in the real GNP, 60 to 70 percent inflation, and the need to impose a temporary control of monetary exchange, which is naturally bringing a high degree of overall fiscal austerity, expected for most of the Caldera administration (1994-1999). Thus, the resources available to the Chancellery and the Institute of

²See Robert P. Matthews, "Oil in Troubled Waters: Venezuelan Policy in the Caribbean," in NACLA Report on the Americas vol. 18, no. 4 (July-August 1984), 33.

Foreign Trade are not bound to grow significantly in real terms (the 1994 hard currency budget of the Chancellery is about \$100 million).

One consequence will be that economic diplomacy (emphasizing the promotion of foreign direct investment and non-traditional exports) will become a high-priority area of Venezuelan foreign policy. In this connection, the role of the foreign policy involvement of the Ministry of Energy and Mines--which has traditionally played a lead economic policy role regarding OPEC--as well as the Investment Fund of Venezuela (whose president has Cabinet level) is expected to become more important and that will require the establishment of effective coordination mechanisms with the Chancellery and the Miraflores Palace. Likewise, the nationalized holding company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) is expected to work more closely with the diplomatic network in order to facilitate the worldwide export of OrimulsionTM (an advantageous patented Venezuelan emulsified fuel which uses a heavy crude base). PDVSA is also expected to cooperate directly with Venezuelan diplomacy in the promotion of strategic associations with foreign enterprises aimed at improving technology and increasing oil production.

The end of the cold war has created a new international environment which will favor the continuation and revitalization of Venezuela's autonomous foreign policy

oriented towards worldwide economic and political cooperation. Venezuela's relationship with the United States will become more economic, technical and cultural--even though important Hemispheric problems will require an enlightened political cooperation (such as the achievement of genuine democratization in Latin America and the Caribbean, for example in Cuba, Haiti, and Central America).

The question of Venezuela's development model and the priority given to social equity will become a new area of debate in relations with the United States. Since the end of the cold war, and with the spread of political democratization in Latin America, United States policy emphasis has now shifted from the advocacy of democracy and anti-Communism during the cold war to the promotion of a neoliberal economic model in the region. Thus the new perjorative label of "populism" was pasted over the old one of "socialism." Too much emphasis on such post-cold war ideological rhetoric is likely to generate tension in relations between Venezuela and the United States insofar as it would appear as an attempt to curtail the country's independence in both economic development and foreign policies.

Venezuela's economic globalism in the next century will be based on cooperation with centers of advanced technology in the downstream industrialization of petroleum--not exclusively to produce petrochemicals--in projects such

as the worldwide export of liquified natural gas from the Gulf of Paria in eastern Venezuela. The association of American and Japanese companies with PDVSA is envisaged in a vast project involving an investment initially estimated at \$5 billion.

Venezuela will use its United Nations mission more extensively for the negotiation of specific bilateral issues, especially with countries with which diplomatic relations have not yet been established. One specific aspect in this connection was the negotiation of the establishment or resumption of diplomatic relations (for example, with the USSR in 1970 and with Cuba in 1974).

Political globalism will also require the formulation by the Chancellery of specific regional policies towards Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, the Middle East and Europe as a whole, including the 15-member European Union. The development of Venezuelan direct investment abroad is expected to be pursued on the basis of previous experience (for example, in oil refineries in Germany, Sweden, the United States, and the Netherlands Antilles, mentioned in chapter 6). A diversification will be made in terms of geographical areas and industrial fields of investment. This future policy will be facilitated by the series of bilateral agreements negotiated during the early 1990s on the reciprocal promotion of protection of foreign investments which are in the process of being concluded.

Regarding future policy within OPEC, Venezuela is expected to continue to support the agreed role of the Organization in coordinating and unifying the policies of its members in order to secure fair and stable oil prices. It will also support the goal of providing an efficient, economic, and regular supply of oil to consumers and a fair profit to those investing in the industry.

On the basis of its history of previous relations of cooperation, Venezuela will continue to support the political and economic democratization of the Russian Federation and other Eastern European countries and will intensify its economic cooperation with them--especially in international trade.

The possibility of Russia's entry into OPEC is being actively pursued by Venezuela. The vital geographical area of the Caribbean, through which Venezuela's most important sea lanes pass, will be given renewed priority. Venezuela will seek the projection of its leadership role and will continue to work for the consolidation of the newly formed Association of Caribbean States (ACS), comprising the sovereign states of the Caribbean³ region as well as associate members, the territories currently under the

³Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.

jurisdiction of Great Britain, the United States, France, and the Netherlands.⁴ Venezuela will support the ACS goal of promoting the integration of the Caribbean and the eventual creation of a regional trade bloc.

In the global context of developing countries Venezuela will continue to support the Group of 77 in the United Nations, recently joined by South Africa, and the effective coordination of its actions with the Movement of Non-aligned Countries--whose presidency will be passed on by Indonesia to Colombia in September 1995. Colombia will hold such presidency for a period of three years, thus posing a challenge to Venezuela in its competition with that country for influence within developed nations.

To sum up, during the 1970s Venezuela, under the presidencies of Rafael Caldera and Carlos Andrés Pérez, took a major step in durably detaching itself from its cold war alignments, which kept it considerably isolated in global terms. The country built an expanded and effective diplomatic network able to support a new foreign policy based on the principles of democratic nationalism and independence from the superpowers, and on a goal of leadership within the developing countries. The globalization of Venezuelan foreign policy in the 1970s was

⁴Anguila, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Turk and Caicos Islands, British Virgin Islands, United States Virgin Islands, Montserrat, Puerto Rico, Guadeloupe, French Guiana, and Martinique.

designed with a view to vital goals of the state, which were served by mobilizing external support to the revaluation of oil income, the defense of territorial borders, and the country's internal peace.

At the turn of this century, in a transformed international environment, the prospects for a new surge in Venezuela's independent cooperation with the world at large appear enhanced by the achievements and other lessons of the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed, without that crucial foreign policy experience, Venezuela would not have been able to cope, as it is presently doing, with the economic and political challenges of development in a still dangerous post-cold war world.

APPENDIX A

Speech by President Rafael Caldera before the
United Nations General Assembly on 30 September 1994

(interpretation from Spanish)

On behalf of the Government and people of Venezuela, I wish to congratulate you, Sir, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Côte d'Ivoire, on your election as President of the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session. I am confident that under your guidance the Assembly will at this important session contribute to progress in the carrying out of the important task with which the Organization is charged - the constant quest for peace.

I also take pleasure in paying tribute to Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary-General, whose intelligent and expert leadership have given the world fresh hope, as we are about to enter a new millennium, so that we may be optimistic about the future, even though there are still grounds for concern.

The twentieth century, which is drawing to a close, has witnessed momentous events for mankind. Two world wars, which cost an enormous number of human lives and immense physical, economic and cultural losses, demonstrated the extent to which man is capable of destruction - above all, self-destruction. The world's political map has been changed many times, with predictable consequences.

Science and technology have made remarkable progress. The discovery of antibiotics has provided undreamt-of opportunities for surgery. Surgeons have converted the human body into a fruitful field for operations capable of correcting natural defects and injuries arising from circumstances prevailing in an increasingly complex society. Life expectancy has risen steadily, and terrible endemic diseases that used to claim countless victims have vanished almost completely.

Communications have been the greatest marvel of this century. The twentieth century has been the era of radio broadcasting and television. Important events occurring in any part of the world are immediately known in the most distant regions. The fax has supplanted the mails and improved on the telegram and the telex. Communications are the principal reason why the inhabitants of this planet are gradually recognizing their role as members of a single, vast community of nations.

Of necessity, institutions have endeavoured to keep in step with the rapid and unrelenting march of events. Both internal and international juridical norms are subject to constant change. Fundamental concepts of nationality and sovereignty are being reconsidered, and formulas are being sought so that inalienable and traditional rights may exist in harmony with the requirements of the supranational community. Amongst these values are the self-determination of nations and non-intervention, as laid down in the Preamble to our Constitution. Accordingly, Venezuela has been and remains permanently disposed to promoting the peaceful spread of democracy to every nation on Earth, and especially to those of our continent. We have consequently supported efforts aimed at reintroducing a fully democratic system in those Latin American countries where it is not at present established. Their situation is inevitably of deep concern to us by reason of history and natural affinities. For the same reason, though, Venezuela did not support military intervention in Haiti, despite the fact that the United Nations has lent it multilateral and institutional support.

At the same time, regional integration is expanding, with profound effect on the exercise of rights within every country. This process is rapidly leading to hemispheric and universal integration. For Latin Americans, the bicentennial of the birth of Antonio José de Sucre, the young man who consolidated our independence at the battle of Ayacucho, will provide an opportunity to reassert the unbreakable links of our solidarity. As we see it, the objective of the forthcoming meeting of Heads of State or Government, convened by the President of the United States, will be the encouragement of a genuinely democratic system in the American continent and throughout the world. It is our hope in this regard that there will be a commitment to fight without quarter against poverty and an effective agreement to stamp out corruption.

The United Nations has managed to avoid most of the obstacles that caused the failure of its immediate predecessor, the League of Nations. Next year it will celebrate its first 50 years of existence: a time in which, amidst contradictions and disappointments, it has provided a unique forum for constant dialogue, in every language and in the most contrasting tones. It has made uninterrupted progress and shown a willingness to accept the structural changes that changing times have imposed. For this reason we are awaiting further changes, such as the expansion of permanent representation on the Security Council to Latin America by granting Brazil permanent membership. Latin America has every right to this by virtue of its spiritual strength and its constant espousal of liberty and international friendship.

However, despite all the progress achieved, it is undeniable that we are still a very long way from having established a stable, universal peace or a harmonious coexistence amongst nations. Nor have we developed standards of living that permit all social strata in the various continents to enjoy a fitting human existence, with a satisfactory world-wide level of equity in social relations.

The struggle for human rights has spread significantly, and international treaties have been signed to ensure that protection of such rights transcends all borders. But the basic human right to life itself, the right to work and the right to have enough to eat for healthy living are far from having been secured for a considerable part of mankind.

The momentous International Conference on Population and Development, recently held in Cairo, seemed to be based on the assumption that it is impossible to guarantee development - interpreted as participation by the whole human being and by all human beings in economic and social processes - if the population continues to increase. This is because many countries have not ensured, as is essential, that everyone who is born will have the means to enjoy a decent existence. In my country, at the beginning of the century, a time of manifest poverty and backwardness, there was a saying that every child was born with an arepa under the arm. "Arepa" is a bread made of maize and is a popular staple of the daily diet. This saying has now dropped out of popular usage.

In spite of the dramatic repercussions of the events following the destruction of the Berlin Wall, peace has not yet been achieved. Just as we were ready to thrill with emotion at the arrival of universal peace, the Gulf War awakened us from that dream. Recent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, two countries so fundamentally different one from the other, have stirred up vestiges of barbarism that had supposedly disappeared for ever. Religious conflicts and ethnic antagonisms, thought to have been overcome once and for all, have re-emerged with unbelievable bitterness. Events recall the Biblical commentary of the Peruvian Victor Andrés Belaunde, an illustrious Latin American, greatly appreciated in the United Nations, who said that human beings bear the weight of a curse implicitly imposed by God when He cast them out of the Garden of Eden: Since they refused to be governed by God, they would have to govern themselves.

The United Nations faces a constant challenge: the quest for peace. It is clear that peace will not be achieved simply through political discussion or diplomatic negotiation, still less through the mere use of force. It has often been said by knowledgeable speakers that peace is the fruit of

justice: that is, without some degree of justice, peace is unattainable.

That was understood by the negotiators at Versailles at the end of the First World War when they included in their Peace Treaty a lengthy clause devoted to the International Labour Organization and inspired by the notion of social justice. Undoubtedly, however, the need for justice goes far beyond international conventions and recommendations with regard to labour, and meeting that need is becoming a matter of increasing urgency.

The rapid process of globalization we are witnessing is unstoppable and unavoidable. The steps being taken in this direction are dictated by the state of today's world and the demands of the immediate and mid-term future. The conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the World Trade Organization represent undeniable progress for mankind. The bilateral and multilateral agreements reached on all continents are signs of progress and stimulate the creation and exchange of wealth. It is nevertheless essential to introduce into relations between States instruments that will prevent commercial interchange from becoming an economic war to the death. It is inappropriate to transfer to social relations the concept of the struggle for existence in the sense that nature itself, through this struggle, will automatically ensure the survival of the fittest - in other words, the absolute predominance of the strongest and the disappearance of the weakest. The acceptance of such an idea would be a crime against humanity.

It must be recognized that the United Nations and its important subsidiary bodies have made great efforts to alleviate the sufferings and shortages of those sectors of humanity where the standard of living is below what is deemed humanely indispensable. It is encouraging to note that institutions directly related to the United Nations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund recognize that the fight against poverty must be a top priority. It is not, however, enough to give humanitarian assistance to the neediest. It is essential to afford nations the conditions they require to enable all their inhabitants to compete efficiently, to ensure their healthy survival and to encourage their progress.

It is true that economic-liberalization measures in less-developed countries have produced positive macroeconomic results, but in some countries that point with satisfaction to the tremendous economic progress they have achieved one can note, at the same time, a growing concern about that portion of the population that is living in poverty and, even more distressing, in critical and even extreme poverty.

I share the aspiration voiced by the President of Colombia to a new model of development for our countries, for an "alternative model," as he put it when addressing the Assembly. He proposed the establishment of

"a new and more productive citizen in the economy, a citizen who participates to a greater degree in politics and who is more supportive in the social sphere."
(*Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 5th meeting, [p. 27]*)

In recent years my country, Venezuela, has faced a difficult economic situation and disquieting social circumstances. Undeniably, the blame lies largely with us. Grievous mistakes in running the country and the poisonous plague of corruption are the principal causes of the acute crisis we are experiencing, but external factors have also played a part. I am not here to pronounce judgement on the past. As I have pledged to my compatriots, I must find ways of restoring the confidence that is indispensable if coming generations are to be able, with training and hard work, to avail themselves of the opportunities the country has to offer. Serious institutional problems - such as the legal proceedings against two former Presidents of the Republic, one of whom was suspended from office while still President - have been handled within the legal system with strict adherence to the Constitution. The people's conduct has been truly exemplary. The natural resources with which providence has endowed us and the favourable prospects guaranteed by our human resource, our people, who have always demonstrated intelligence, creative audacity and courage in times of danger, inspire us with optimism. We realize that we must seek within ourselves the essential elements that will enable us to win the struggle for development to which we are so seriously committed. We have put forward an economic stabilization and recovery programme that has been in large part accepted. It lays out a feasible and clearly defined course that will ultimately lead to a solution of the crisis. However, we feel that we are in duty bound to explain to international forums, and most particularly to this world forum, the need for favourable prospects to open up that can help us to avoid exerting our efforts in vain and ensure instead that they will be successful and will contribute to a better future for mankind.

For example, when considering the need to strengthen trade relations throughout the world we must call for

guaranteed access to the markets of the developed countries, where mechanisms are sometimes in place that are skillfully used to exclude our competition. We agree with the need for environmental protection for the benefit of the world's inhabitants, and we are certainly ready to contribute to that goal. However, we must make the point that on more than one occasion the ecological struggle for a healthy environment has been hypocritically used as a way to prevent developing countries from gaining access to the markets of wealthy nations. We further believe that transfer of technology must be wide ranging and genuine, for if it is not the gap between us and the developed countries, which increases every year, will ultimately become impossible to bridge and will lead to a sharp and bitter rift between two sectors of mankind, with unforeseeable but undoubtedly disastrous consequences.

Access to capital is a requirement that is becoming ever more acute as technological advances make productive processes more capital- and less labour-intensive. At the same time, there must be fair payment for the raw materials that represent the principal contribution of the underdeveloped countries to international trade but that are constantly losing their relevance in end products. Consequently, access to capital must be arranged on equitable terms to protect the interests of producers, who are often obliged to accept conditions that are little more than adhesion contracts. This struggle to obtain better prices for raw materials, which are almost invariably subject to conditions imposed by consumer countries without any real participation by the producers, and the establishment of reasonable terms for international loans are part of the struggle for justice and an integral part of the struggle for peace.

The external-debt problem of the developing countries is still far from being solved. It is true that there have been negotiations on restructuring and that they have temporarily alleviated the dreadful burden that problem represents for the debtor countries, but as the repayment deadlines fall due the burden for those in debt becomes harder to bear with the passing of every year. To cite a concrete example: in my country next year's debt servicing payments will amount to 35 per cent of the national budget, and in coming years the situation will become even more acute. The drop in the price of our main export has made it very difficult to meet the basic needs of our population. We have never given any thought to disavowing our obligations. We are resolved to meet them, but we consider that this subject must be placed on international agendas and that a search must begin for a broad solution that will open up new horizons of justice and peace.

I believe that as we approach the beginning of the second half of the United Nations first century the

fundamental aim of the United Nations must be the search for justice in relations among peoples.

Social justice has been one of the most important achievements of this twentieth century that is now drawing to a close. This demands of every individual and every group whatever is required for the common good. Above and beyond the numerical equality of commutative justice, it also requires of all of us that we make a contribution to the community of nations in proportion to our individual possibilities. This concept has still not gained acceptance in the international field. It is true that there have been some minor concessions to the most needy countries but there is a lack of any clear course towards the achievement of universal well-being. It is not only States that should be the agents. Once the door was opened by the International Labour Organization (ILO), international organizations also provided access for unofficial bodies. The large transnational corporations which have and exercise real power must become involved in the management of programmes that will seek peace through justice; economic justice in so far as it concerns them; and respect for the sovereignty of both large and small States.

Those of us who love freedom; those of us who have struggled to achieve it, regardless of cost and sacrifice; those of us who consider democracy and respect for human rights as priority objectives; those of us who sincerely yearn for friendship and fruitful understanding among all nations; those of us who believe in dialogue and resolutely support the endeavours of the United Nations to encourage it - all of us desire to see the United Nations displaying unflinching determination that the search for justice - and I shall never tire of repeating this - must play a key role in the building of peace.

If peace is our goal let us strive to make justice its foundation. In this way we shall realize the ideal which our Liberator, Simon Bolivar, visualized as the most important goal of the best system of government: "the greatest possible degree of happiness", in other words, happiness for all.

Source: United Nations General Assembly, Official Records, 49th session, 12th meeting, 30 September 1994, A/49/PV.12.

Carson
September 19, 1974

This policy of our country—which is supported by all parties and all segments of opinion—has been developed as a part of our national economic strategy. It is designed to help the domestic and foreign economies to produce and sell to us. We have other ways to encourage international trade, but this has been shown to be the best way to encourage trade. We have been successful in this regard, and we are now working to make trade and commerce much more for the benefit of our country. We are now working to make trade and commerce much more for the benefit of our country. We are now working to make trade and commerce much more for the benefit of our country.

guaranteeing remunerative prices for the raw materials used to produce goods that are in the necessary and rising demand with the prices of the manufactured goods we import.

I would remind Your Excellency that in the 1970s, international relations that have been set in the world stage, inequalities and injustices prevailing in international trade, the developed countries have undertaken to contribute 1 per cent of their national product to the developing countries. This target has never been achieved. Our country is prepared to do this consistently demonstrated, to make its own contribution, but we demand and hope that the powerful countries will provide the compensation to which they have committed themselves.

It is our countries that have always borne the unacceptable burdens of international trade. Our complaints and demands have never been heeded, and our legitimate aspirations have been flouted. It is a well known fact, confirmed by figures given by organizations of oil producing countries, that authority in the world, that oil prices account for 40 per cent, significant percentages of production costs in the United States and the other developed countries.

have never been herded, and our legitimate aspirations have been frustrated. It is a well known fact, confirmed by figures provided by organizations of recognized and indisputable authority in the world, that oil prices account for only an insignificant percentage of production costs in the United States and the other developed countries.

and to the most basic and immediate situations was poor. Governments, and to this end we engage in co-operative efforts in keeping with the interests of our country and the protection of our economy, particularly with regard to the management of our natural resources. On a previous occasion, on 15 July 1974, replied to a memorandum from the United States Embassy in Caracas, in response to the question of the Government of Venezuela on the subject of the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

of the relationship between the major developed countries, including your own, and our countries is agreed to the need to arrive at solid-state formulas for equal treatment and mutual respect in economic matters with a view to safeguarding the interests of each country in ensuring the well-being of its people. In view of your important treatment in the United Nations, I wish to place on public record this statement of Venezuela's position and the willingness of my Government to work in an emotional forum to establish a lasting relationship.

APPENDIX B

This policy of our country — which is supported by all —
 parter and all segments of opinion and by our people — has been
 developed as part of our national education, which carries and
 disseminates this conviction that Venezuela is a country
 producing oil, and that oil is an increasingly valuable source and
 product of national development. We have no other way to develop
 the economy, to maintain the level of the best countries in the
 world, to build a modern and stable society, and to level the
 world as we are threatened by political instability in the form
 of Nazi fascism, the first, which year after year is coming nearer,
 considering the threat of a nuclear and chemical war that could
 be the greatest of all threats.

The United States Government, which is also supporting
 to hold in November will not be able to do so fully
 if we in the developing countries do not succeed in
 producing reasonable prices for the raw materials we
 produce, since the price of the raw materials is the only factor
 with which we would be able to develop our economy.

I would remind you, President, that the United States
 Government has been very active in the past
 in the oil industry, and that it has been very active in the
 development of the oil industry in the United States.

Our national product has been under attack since 1973, and
 has never been achieved. Our national product has been under
 constant attack, and we have been unable to achieve a
 consistently demonstrated, to make a significant contribution
 but we demand and hope that the powerful countries will pro-
 vide the cooperation to which they have committed themselves.

It is our countries that have always borne the unbearable
 burdens of international trade. Our commodities and demands
 have never been heeded, and our legitimate aspirations have
 been frustrated. It is a well known fact, confirmed by figures
 provided by organizations of recognized and indisputable
 authority in the world, that oil prices account for only an im-
 portant percentage of production costs in the United States and
 the other developed countries.

My Government has a sincere interest in maintaining
 the most cordial and fruitful relations with your Government,
 and to this end we engage in co-operative efforts in keeping with
 the interests of our country and the protection of our economy,
 particularly with regard to the management of our natural
 resources. On a previous occasion, on 15 July 1974, replying to a
 memorandum from the United States Embassy in Caracas, I
 gave instructions to the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 to conduct a series of studies on the oil industry in the United
 States and in which my Government expressed the concern
 that the United States Government should be aware of the
 fact that the United States Government is the main source of
 oil for the United States, and that the United States Govern-
 ment should be aware of the fact that the United States Govern-
 ment is the main source of oil for the United States.

In view of your important statement in the United
 Nations, I wish to place on public record that statement of
 Venezuela's position and the willingness of my Government to
 work in an international forum to establish a balanced relation-
 ship between the raw materials produced by our countries, on the
 one hand, and the manufactured goods and technology, on the
 other, which are possessed by the developed countries and are
 in essence the source of economic marginality and growing
 poverty in which over half of mankind continues to live.

Venezuela performs a sympathetic view of any
 attempt at finding solutions to the great problems of our time in
 global terms, but only if a global perspective does not mean
 that the large countries will prevail over the small countries. It
 would be dangerous, ineffective and harmful for global and
 universal solutions to lose sight of the fact that the world
 includes us as well. It cannot be supposed, Mr. President, that
 consumers are limited to one part of the world. I share your
 hope and wish that petroleum-producing and petroleum-con-
 suming countries will arrive at broad, sensible, sound, lasting
 and equitable agreements. It is my aim in this message.

Mr. President, to convey my thoughts and feelings to you in all
 candor, which cannot and should not be interpreted, by any
 means, as a hostile reaction to what you said in your important
 message to the United Nations. However, it seems to me, as
 President of Venezuela, that I am contributing to good feelings
 between our countries in sending you this message and in making
 representative statement of our Latin American interests, which
 is not incompatible or in conflict with the national interest of
 your country or of any other nation that wishes to achieve
 the true fruits of international justice and not of unilateral
 domination.

You may count on the cooperation and support of
 Venezuela, a country with a history of long and continuing
 friendship for your own, in seeking to achieve the above-
 mentioned objectives.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Carlos Andrés Pérez

CARLOS ANDRÉS PÉREZ
 PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA

I have read with careful attention and particular in-
 terest the official version of your speech to the United Nations
 General Assembly. I want to inform you that your words held
 a clear significance for Venezuela because our country has been
 an underprivileged and unstable member of the international petroleum
 prices over the last 15 years and has not failed to involve itself
 in the just controversy over the world raw materials situation in
 order to defend the position of our countries in respect of the
 so-called terms of trade. The great world forum in which you
 chose to present the views of the Government of the United
 States on the most important issues which today affect or pre-
 occupy all the peoples of the world makes it reasonable and advis-
 able for me to communicate with you publicly and directly,
 rather than through the customary diplomatic channel, in order
 to inform you of my Government's reaction to the views expressed
 by the United States Government.

For many decades, we in Latin America have perma-
 nently demanded just and equitable treatment by the developed
 countries and primarily of course, by our neighbor and trade
 partner, the United States of America. We have repeatedly
 pointed to the improvement of our countries as a condition
 of the North American economy, before the energy crisis and
 before petroleum prices reached the levels at which they stand
 today, the raw materials produced by our countries were pur-
 chased year after year at prices which were very in proportion
 to the equilibrium with the prices of the manufactured goods
 which our countries require for their development and which
 have been purchased largely in the United States, not only for
 geographical reasons but also because of the credit used to the
 United States economy that have traditionally been made
 available to us.

Each year we, the countries which produce coffee,
 wheat, tin, copper, iron or petroleum, have been handing over a
 larger amount of our products in order to obtain imports of
 machinery and other manufactured goods, and this has resulted
 in a constant and growing outflow of capital and impoverishment
 of our countries.

In Latin America, as in the other developing countries,
 we can assert that the developed countries have been taking
 advantage of the fundamental needs of the Latin American,
 Asian or African man. To cite the particular case of Venezuela,
 petroleum prices show a steady decline for many years, while
 our country was obliged to purchase manufactured goods from
 the United States at these higher prices, which today are being
 restricted even further the possibilities of development and
 well being for Venezuela.

The establishment of the Organization of Petroleum
 Exporting Countries (OPEC) was a direct consequence of the
 developed countries' use of a policy of outrageously low prices
 for raw materials as a weapon of economic oppression. In a
 sense, this fact demonstrates the truth of your statement to the
 United Nations that any attempt by a country to use a product
 for political purposes will inevitably tempt other countries to
 use their products for their own purposes. At this very time, we
 are seeing how the refusal of the developed countries, including
 the United States of America, to agree to just and fair prices for
 coffee has resulted in the creation of the International Coffee
 Organization, which was established precisely to achieve a
 satisfactory and just equilibrium between producers and con-
 sumers. The coffee-producing countries of Latin America and
 Africa will lose roughly 30 per cent of their foreign-exchange
 earnings, while manufactured goods from the developed nations
 have doubled or tripled in price.

The world food crisis is a consequence, *inter alia*, of
 the high prices at which the developed nations sell us agricul-
 tural and industrial machinery and other inputs essential to
 agriculture and the growth of our economies.

My Government shares the view which you expressed
 before the United Nations General Assembly, that a world of
 economic contradictions cannot be a world of political co-opera-
 tion. The economic confrontation has been created by the major
 Powers, which refuse to allow the developing countries equal
 participation in the search for an indispensable balance in the
 terms of trade. Within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
 Countries (OPEC), Venezuela has not used and will not use its
 energy resources as a political weapon because that is not and
 never has been the purpose for which that organization was
 established; rather, its purpose was to protect the basic wealth
 extracted from our subsoil at prices that have never compen-
 sated for the costs of our imports and of the technology needed
 for our development.

Very rarely in the history of the OPEC, I would
 assert, could it be the hope of our petroleum-producing countries
 that an agreement between the countries producing raw mate-
 rials and the industrialized countries which will be equitable
 and bring us national justice can be reached, through a world
 body such as the United Nations, with a view to striking a
 proper and acceptable balance between the prices paid to us for
 the labor of the men and women of our poverty-stricken
 countries and those paid by our economies for the imports
 we require.

[Text of Appendix B]

The President of Venezuela Responds to the President of The United States

HIS EXCELLENCY
GERALD R. FORD
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Caracas
September 19, 1974

I have read with careful attention and particular interest the unofficial version of your speech to the United Nations General Assembly. I hasten to inform you that your words hold a clear significance for Venezuela because our country has been an indefatigable and resolute defender of international petroleum prices over the last 15 years and has not failed to involve itself in the just controversy over the world raw materials situation in order to defend the position of our countries in respect of the so-called terms of trade. The great world forum in which you chose to present the views of the Government of the United States on the most important issues which today affect or preoccupy all the peoples of the world makes it possible and advisable for me to communicate with you publicly and directly, rather than through the customary diplomatic channel, in order to inform you of my Government's reaction to the views expressed by the United States Government.

For many decades, we in Latin America have persistently demanded just and equitable treatment by the developed countries and primarily, of course, by our neighbor and traditional friend, the United States of America. We have repeatedly pointed to the impoverishment of our countries as dependants of the North American economy. Before the energy crisis and before petroleum prices reached the levels at which they stand today, the raw materials produced by our countries were purchased year after year at prices which were never in proportion to or in equilibrium with the prices of the manufactured goods which our countries require for their development and which have been purchased largely in the United States, not only for geographical reasons but also because of the credits tied to the United States economy that have traditionally been made available to us.

Each year we, the countries which produce coffee, meat, tin, copper, iron or petroleum, have been handing over a larger amount of our products in order to obtain imports of machinery and other manufactured goods and this has resulted in a constant and growing outflow of capital and impoverishment of our countries.

In Latin America, as in the other developing countries, we can assert that the developed countries have been taking advantage of the fundamental needs of the Latin American, Asian or African man. To cite the particular case of Venezuela, petroleum prices showed a steady decline for many years, while our country was obliged to purchase manufactured goods from the United States at ever higher prices, which, day after day, restricted even further the possibilities of development and well-being for Venezuelans.

The establishment of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was a direct consequence of the developed countries' use of a policy of outrageously low prices for our raw materials as a weapon of economic oppression. In a sense, this fact demonstrates the truth of your statement to the United Nations that any attempt by a country to use a product for political purposes will inevitably tempt other countries to use their products for their own purposes. At this very time, we are seeing how the refusal of the developed countries, including the United States of America, to agree to just and fair prices for coffee has resulted in the inaction of the International Coffee Organization, which was established precisely to achieve a satisfactory and just equilibrium between producers and consumers. The coffee-producing countries of Latin America and Africa will lose roughly 30 per cent of their foreign-exchange earnings, while manufactured goods from the developed nations have doubled or tripled in price.

The world food crisis is a consequence, *inter alia*, of the high prices at which the developed nations sell us agricultural and industrial machinery and other inputs essential to agriculture and the growth of our economies.

My Government shares the view which you expressed before the United Nations General Assembly that a world of economic confrontation cannot be a world of political co-operation. The economic confrontation has been created by the major Powers, which refuse to allow the developing countries equal participation in the search for an indispensable balance in the terms of trade. Within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Venezuela has not used and will not use its energy resources as a political weapon because that is not and never has been the purpose for which that organization was established; rather, its purpose was to protect the basic wealth extracted from our subsoil at prices that have never compensated for the costs of our imports and of the technology needed for our development.

Venturing to interpret the policy of OPEC, I would assure you that it is the hope of our petroleum-producing countries that an agreement between the countries producing raw materials and the industrialized countries which will be equitable and bring international justice can be reached, through a world body such as the United Nations, with a view to striking a proper and acceptable balance between the prices

paid to us for the labor of the men and women of our poverty-stricken countries and those paid by our economies for the imports we require.

This policy of our country--which is supported by all parties and all segments of opinion and by our people--has been developed as part of our national education which conveys and disseminates the conviction that Venezuela is an oil country producing and selling an increasingly valuable, scarce and strategically vital commodity. We see no other way to confront the economic totalitarianism that has been coming to the fore in business and world trade and portends as much evil for the world as was threatened by political totalitarianism in the form of Nazi facism, against which your great country fought, rendering the world a heroic and splendid service that earned the gratitude of all mankind.

The World Food Conference which FAO is preparing to hold in November will not be able to achieve its lofty objectives if we in the developing countries do not succeed in guaranteeing remunerative prices for the raw materials we produce, prices that are in the necessary and fitting balance with the prices of the manufactured goods we import.

I would remind Your Excellency that in the various international forums that have been set up to study the great inequities and injustices prevailing in international trade, the developed countries have undertaken to contribute 1 per cent of their national product to the developing countries. This target has never been achieved. Our country is prepared, as it has consistently demonstrated, to make its economic contribution, but we demand and hope that the powerful countries will provide the co-operation to which they have committed themselves. It is our countries that have always borne the unacceptable burdens of international trade. Our complaints and demands have never been heeded, and our legitimate aspirations have been frustrated. It is a well-known fact, confirmed by figures provided by organizations of recognized and indisputable authority in the world, that oil prices account for only an insignificant percentage of production costs in the United States and the other developed countries.

My Government has a sincere interest in maintaining the most cordial and fruitful relations with your Government, and to this end we engage in co-operative efforts in keeping with the interests of our country and the protection of our economy, particularly with regard to the management of our natural resources. On a previous occasion, on 15 July 1974, replying to a memorandum from the United States Embassy in Caracas, I gave instructions to the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs to dispatch a memorandum of reply which is being made public today and in which my Government expressed the concerns that I have recapitulated in the present message, namely, the lack of understanding between the major developed countries, including your own, and our countries in regard to

the need to arrive at satisfactory formulas for equal treatment and mutual respect in economic matters with a view to safeguarding the interests of each country in ensuring the well-being of its people.

In view of your important statement in the United Nations, I wish to place on public record this statement of Venezuela's position and the willingness of my Government to work in an international forum to establish a balanced relationship between the raw materials produced by our countries, on the one hand, and the manufactured goods and technology, on the other, which are possessed by the developed countries and are in essence the source of economic marginality and growing poverty in which over half of mankind continues to live.

Venezuela perforce takes a sympathetic view of any attempt at finding solutions to the great problems of our time in global terms, but only if a global perspective does not mean that the large countries will prevail over the small countries. It would be dangerous, ineffective and harmful for global and universal solutions to lose sight of the fact that the world includes us as well. It cannot be supposed, Mr. President, that consumers are limited to one part of the world. I share your hope and wish that petroleum-producing and petroleum-consuming countries will arrive at broad, sensible, sound, lasting and equitable agreements. It is my aim in this message, Mr. President, to convey my thoughts and feelings to you in all candor, which cannot and should not be interpreted, by any means, as a hostile reaction to what you said in your important message to the United Nations. However, it seems to me, as President of Venezuela, that I am contributing to good relations between our countries in sending you the clearest and most representative statement of our Latin American interests, which is not incompatible or in conflict with the national interest of your country or of any other nation that wishes to act within the true limits of international justice and not of unilateral domination.

You may count on the co-operation and support of Venezuela, a country with a history of long and continuing friendship for you own, in seeking to achieve the above-mentioned objectives.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

CARLOS ANDRÉS PÉREZ
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA

APPENDIX C

STATES WITH WHICH VENEZUELA HAS ESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
(AS OF 31 JULY 1994)

AFGHANISTAN, Republic of	10-12-1990
ALBANIA, Republic of	14-10-1975
ALGERIA, People's Democratic Republic of	23-03-1971
ANGOLA, Republic of	09-11-1986
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA	15-06-1982
ARGENTINA, Republic of	23-04-1969**
ARMENIA, Republic of	30-10-1993
AUSTRALIA, Commonwealth of	31-05-1973
AUSTRIA, Republic of	28-07-1947
BAHAMAS, Commonwealth of	21-04-1977
BAHREIN, State of	31-05-1977
BANGLADESH, People's Republic of	09-06-1975
BARBADOS	06-1974***
BELGIUM, Kingdom of	XIX century***
BELIZE	1991***
BENIN, Republic of	20-06-1991
BOLIVIA, Republic of	14-04-1953**
	10-10-1969**
BRAZIL, Federative Republic of	29-12-1966
BULGARIA, Republic of	01-08-1974
CAMBODIA	18-06-1994
CAMEROON, Republic of	25-06-1991
CANADA	06-10-1952
CHILE, Republic of	14-04-1853
CHINA, People's Republic of	28-06-1974
CHINA, Republic of	1943***
	(interrupted in 1974)
COLOMBIA, Republic of	10-06-1833*

* Initiation

**Resumption

***Exact date not available.

COMOROS, Federal Islamic Republic of	26-10-1990
COSTA RICA, Republic of	03-03-1958
CROATIA	08-02-1993
CUBA, Republic of	28-12-1974**
CYPRUS, Republic of	01-12-1982
CZECH REPUBLIC	01-01-1993
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Federative Republic of	10-07-1968
DENMARK, Kingdom of	28-08-1959
DOMINICA, Commonwealth of	16-01-1979
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	06-09-1965
ECUADOR, Republic of	20-12-1860
EGYPT, Arab Republic of	15-11-1950
EL SALVADOR, Republic of	1824***
ESTONIA, Republic of	11-07-1994
ETHIOPIA, People's Democratic Republic of	20-07-1950
FIJI	08-04-1983
FINLAND, Republic of	1954***
FRANCE (French Republic)	1833***
GABON (Gabonese Republic)	11-11-1975
THE GAMBIA, Republic of	17-08-1974
GERMANY	XIX century***
GERMANY, Democratic Republic of	23-07-1973
GERMANY, Federal Republic of	01-09-1951
GHANA, Republic of	16-03-1965
GREAT BRITAIN and Northern Ireland	1825***
GREECE, Republic of	1964***
GRENADA, State of	16-04-1977
GUATEMALA, Republic of	16-09-1964**
GUINEA, Republic of	16-06-1965
GUINEA-BISSEAU, Republic of	07-05-1981
GUYANA, Co-operative Republic of	26-05-1966
HAITI, Republic of	08-06-1972**
HONDURAS, Republic of	11-10-1969**
HUNGARY, Republic of	30-04-1969
ICELAND	15-01-1981

INDIA, Republic of	01-10-1959
INDONESIA, Republic of	09-10-1959
IRAN, Islamic Republic of	09-08-1950
IRELAND, Republic of	26-09-1980
ISRAEL, State of	1952***
ITALY, Republic of	16-11-1944**
IVORY COAST	15-07-1970
JAMAICA	29-07-1964
JAPAN	01-06-1938*
	10-10-1952**
JORDAN, Hashemite Kingdom of	1954***
KENYA, Republic of	30-04-1970
KOREA, Democratic Republic of	28-10-1974
KOREA, Republic of	29-04-1965
KUWAIT, State of	13-09-1965
LATVIA, Republic of	23-04-1992
LEBANON, Republic of	10-07-1946
LESOTHO, Kingdom of	20-06-1983
LIBERIA, Republic of	16-03-1965
LIBYA, Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	18-06-1965
LITHUANIA, Republic of	10-02-1992
LUXEMBOURG, Grand Duchy of	1948***
MALAYA, Republic of	18-12-1986
MALI, Republic of	24-12-1975
MALTA, Republic of	17-09-1977
MALTA, SOVEREIGN MILITARY ORDER OF	03-08-1970
MEXICO	10-06-1933*
MOROCCO, Kingdom of	18-05-1965
MYANMAR, Union of	14-12-1990
NAMIBIA, Republic of	22-03-1990
NEPAL, Kingdom of	27-04-1987
NETHERLANDS	20-08-1884**
	11-05-1920**
NEW ZEALAND	01-1979*

NICARAGUA, Republic of	20-01-1949**
NIGERIA, Federal Republic of	16-03-1965
NORWAY, Kingdom of	10-08-1962
OMAN, Sultanate of	29-09-1986
PAKISTAN, Islamic Republic of	1966***
PANAMA, Republic of	11-05-1951
PAPUA NEW GUINEA, Independent State of	21-12-1990
PARAGUAY, Republic of	XIX century***
PERU, Republic of	10-05-1852*
PHILIPPINES, Republic of	16-08-1968
POLAND, Republic of	18-08-1960
PORTUGAL, Republic of	XIX century***
QATAR, State of	24-05-1973
ROMANIA	26-01-1967
RUSSIAN FEDERATION	30-12-1991
RWANDA, Republic of	18-08-1981
SAHARAN ARAB REPUBLIC	08-12-1982
ST. KITTS-NEVIS	31-10-1983
ST. LUCIA	14-09-1979
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	29-10-1981
SAUDI ARABIA, Kingdom of	1952***
HOLY SEE	01-07-1946
SENEGAL, Republic of	01-06-1970
SEYCHELLES, Republic of	15-04-1991
SIERRA LEONE, Republic of	29-10-1990
SINGAPORE, Republic of	01-08-1987
SLOVAKIA	01-01-1993
SLOVENIA, Republic of	28-12-1992
SOUTH AFRICA	03-12-1993
SOVIET UNION	14-03-1945*
	16-04-1970**
SPAIN, Kingdom of	04-04-1949
SRI LANKA, Democratic Socialist Republic of	09-04-1987
SURINAME, Republic of	25-11-1975
SWEDEN, Kingdom of	24-05-1938

SWITZERLAND	XIX century***
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	1958***
TANZANIA, United Republic of	11-12-1981
THAILAND, Kingdom of	27-08-1982
TOGO, Republic of	21-12-1990
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	14-09-1962
TUNISIA, Republic of	26-03-1965
TURKEY, Republic of	29-12-1950
UGANDA, Republic of	27-04-1970
UKRAINE	29-09-1993
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	18-06-1975
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	23-10-1824
URUGUAY, Republic of	01-03-1985**
VIETNAM, Socialist Republic of	18-12-1989
YUGOSLAVIA, Federal Republic of	29-05-1951
ZAIRE, Republic of	18-03-1977
ZAMBIA, Republic of	02-11-1978
ZIMBABWE, Republic of	07-04-1987

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