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THE NUMERICAL DISTINCTNESS AND
IDENTITY OF PARTICULARS

by

Alan Brody

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

May 12, 1977
date

Barred E. Myers
Chairman of Examining Committee

May 12, 1977
date

Barred E. Myers
Executive Officer

Charles Landesman

Milton Munitz

John Lango

Henry Finch
Supervisory Committee

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PROLOGUE

In this prologue I will give the reader a rough idea of the problem that I have concerned myself with in my thesis. I will also state why I take it to be a serious problem and why I have chosen to deal with it in the way that I have, e.g., by concentrating upon the body of literature that I have rather than on another body of literature. In addition, I will mention several issues that are related in various ways to the problems that I deal with in the thesis and state why I have decided not to say more about those issues. I will start by discussing what problem I take to be of central concern for my thesis.

In our ordinary day to day affairs we may come upon a problem that arises because there are ways in which things may be similar with respect to each other. We, for example, see someone who looks similar to someone we know. We approach that person and greet them. Shortly, and to our surprise, we are told that we are not known to the person whom we greeted. Then we go away embarrassed, and perhaps excusing ourselves, with the thought that the person we know and the one that we greeted look so alike that it was easy to make such a mistake.

The reader may remember stories or incidents involving people who because they were twins and looked alike, were able to play all sorts of tricks on others.

Just as in the example that I have previously cited, people may look so similar to each other that we cannot, or find it difficult to, tell who is who or which is which. Their visible features are so alike that difficulties and problems may arise for us. But, we may console ourselves with the thought that it is only a rare pair of twins that are so alike in their visible features that not even their mother could tell them apart. Close enough observation may reveal some slight difference in their features and we might avoid difficulties and embarrassment if we pay careful enough attention to peoples' visible features.

However, such a procedure will have its limits. It is not something unfamiliar to us to consider two things, such as two billiard balls or shells, that look so alike that just by looking at them with the naked eye, we cannot discern any mark or feature by which we could tell which was which. For example, most of us are familiar with the game where one object, like a pea, is placed under one of three objects, such as three shells, and the latter are quickly shuffled from place to place. The idea is then to identify which shell has the pea under it. Unless we can determine the spatial path of the shell from start to finish, we will be left with guessing which shell has the pea under it. And since the visible features of the shells look so alike, we are generally unable to determine what we

wanted to find out and are left with just guessing. Some objects look so alike, and are so alike in their visible features, that their features are no help to us in determining which object is which. And to solve that problem we must rely on some other means.

I have described some difficulties and problems that we may ordinarily encounter due to things having certain features in common. But, if we think about such objects, we may uncover problems about that do not have to do just with the practical difficulties previously mentioned. There are certain questions and problems that may arise when we think about what features, characteristics or properties (I use these terms interchangeably) distinct things might have in common. And these problems are not ones of practical concern as were the ones that I cited earlier. I will now elaborate upon this point.

Suppose that we show someone two billiard balls of the same size, shape, color and texture. One is picked up off a table and held in the right hand and the other in the left hand. Then, behind our back, we hold the billiard balls and exchange the hands that each one is in. We do this several times. Some person watches us but he cannot see which billiard ball is being exchanged into which hand. After some time we place them on the table before him and ask him to tell us, without guessing, which one was originally

held in the right hand and which was originally held in our left hand. At this point he may protest and say that he cannot do so because all he has to go on is how they look, and that is no help to him since they look so alike. Now, suppose that we say to him that he cannot tell which is which since the visible features of each are so alike. Each has the same size, shape, color, and texture. No visible mark or feature can help him figure out which is which. Would he agree to that? I think that he would. So far, nothing very puzzling has been stated or uncovered. No philosophical problem has been presented to that person. Now we go on and ask him if in spite of the fact that they are alike in several respects, there is not some way, any way, in which they are not exactly like each other. What might he say to us? Well, he may tell us that they have a different history, e.g., that only one was picked up off the table, by me, in my left hand, or that they are placed differently, e.g., that only one is right next to his left hand. And so, he may say, they do differ from each other in some way. Now, at this point we ask him to consider the following. The two spherical objects, i.e., billiard balls, differ in position. However, they might have differed in a way that they never did, or do not now, differ in. One might have been the only one that ever was, or is presently, in New York while the other might only have been in Chicago. If so, they would have still

differed spatially, i.e., in their spatial properties, since each would not have had exactly the same location as the other. He may understand this and agree with us. If so, we then ask him if each or two such spherical objects might not differ from each other in that way at all. That is, is it possible for two extended things, such as two billiard balls, not to differ in the position or place that each has? What would he say in response to such a question? Well, he might not understand what is being asked--it is certainly not like raising one of the practical concerns that would, most likely, be familiar to him. Perhaps with some further discussion he would say that he understands it and that the answer is No--or that he does not know what the answer to that question is. Certainly, as an ordinary person, i.e., a nonphilosopher, his day to day concerns involve no such questions and its answer solves no practical problem for him. But as philosophers we may want to raise this question--a question that concerns what might be the case and concerning what is possible. We may want to ask if it is possible for two copresent objects, such as two billiard balls, not to differ in position or place and hence in their spatial relationships and properties. Furthermore, we may go on to ask if they must differ in some other way or ways, e.g., in their size, shape, color, texture or history if they do not differ in their spatial properties. Here we are

wondering about what is possible, and our questions are of interest and significance to us as long as we are curious about such possibilities--even though they may be of no practical concern to us. In addition, if someone comes along and raises those questions in order to show us that certain of our commonly held beliefs are false, then those questions are invested with significance for us--given that we care about the truth or falsity of those beliefs. What I will do in my thesis is attempt to answer those questions in a way that challenges some of our commonly accepted beliefs--thereby discussing issues that we may care, as well as wonder, about. I will now give the reader a rough idea of what I am going to argue for. Then I will consider some of the assumptions that I make in this thesis, and why I do not take up certain related issues that I will mention.

My position may be roughly stated as follows. I believe that two nonconscious colored shaped things, such as two billiard balls, that have portions, parts or constituents in common--what I call two "particulars"--must differ from each other in some of their properties. Consider two particulars, A and B, where a is part of A and b is a part B. A and B must differ from each other in properties because only A has the properties "is distinct from B," and "has a as a part." I do not believe that two particulars, say A and B, must differ in spatial properties. And I also hold

that even if they do not differ in their spatial properties, but nonetheless differ from each other in other properties, they might not differ in any of their nonrelational properties, e.g., size, shape, color and texture, and historical properties as well. Two particulars might not differ in any of their spatial, nonrelational, or historical properties. These, I take it, are very bold claims. The defense of this position involves challenging beliefs that most philosophers and non-philosophers would ascribe to. For example, most people would ascribe to the belief that two objects--of the sort that I call particulars--must differ in their places or positions.

What I wish to argue for has consequences with respect to a principle known as the identity of indiscernibles--or at least with respect to how contemporary philosophers have interpreted it. According to that principle two things must differ in their properties. Contemporary philosophers have formulated various versions of it that raise interesting issues concerning what properties objects must differ in. Although contemporary philosophers are willing to concede that distinct things must differ in their properties, when it comes to objects that I call "particulars" they disagree as to what properties they might have in common. Some, for example, would hold that particulars might not differ in their spatial properties, while most others would disagree

with that claim. In my thesis I have restricted my concern with the issues that I have previously raised to the body of contemporary literature, since--as the reader shall see--one finds a concern with the same issues, questions and manner in which they are approached that I have raised or followed myself. Furthermore, such a restriction, I believe, has allowed me to offer a less complicated but well defended thesis.

In arguing for my position, as well as in framing the very questions that I deal with, I assume that objects, i.e., particulars, have properties. This is a framework in which I work and one that I believe can be used for making true assertions. However, I will not attempt to give an analysis of what a property is. To do so would be beyond the scope of this thesis--so much so that it would require doing another thesis. This is not to say that I do not reject certain views of what a property is in order to defend my position. When I discuss what I call the "Realist Bundle Theory" I will argue against a certain view of what a property is. But, as I previously mentioned, I will not go on to present, discuss and defend some other view concerning what a property is. I will just assume that things such as billiard balls, have various properties.

Throughout my thesis I used the expressions, "might," "might not," "possible," "impossible," "must," and "cannot."

I say, for example, that distinct particulars must differ in certain properties. Although I believe that this is so, I offer no analysis of any of the truth of that statement in terms of its being what has been described as an "analytic" or "synthetic necessary" truth. I offer no such analysis for any statement in my thesis that incorporates any of the expressions mentioned above. I do not do so for several reasons. First of all, such a discussion would not help to settle the issues that I have concerned myself with in my thesis, e.g., whether or not two particulars must differ in their spatial properties. As long as I can justify my claims about what might have been the case without having to decide if my claims are of the category of analytic or synthetic necessary truths, that issue, although interesting in itself, is tangential to my thesis. And I have not seen any good reason for believing that I must take up that issue in order to present good arguments for what I say and claim in my thesis. Secondly, if I were to address myself to that issue, i.e., discuss and evaluate which claims were analytic or not, I would first want to state what I mean by an "analytic" truth or a "synthetic necessary" truth. But to do so seems to me to be an enormously difficult task, too great to incorporate into this work. Hence, I will not address the issue as to whether or not any of the claims that I make are to be regarded as analytic or synthetic yet necessary. It should

also be obvious that I am assuming that certain things, i.e., states of affairs, can be correctly and informatively said to be possible or impossible. In other words, I am assuming that we can use those expressions to make correct and informative claims.

Before I begin my first chapter I would like to make two brief statements concerning another two topics that I will not be dealing with extensively in my thesis. The first concerns the topic of individuation. Often it is asked, what is it that "accounts" for the numerical distinctness of two things? When applied to objects such as physical objects, one well-known, and ancient, response is in terms of the matter comprising each object. The familiar response as to what accounts for the distinctness of two copresent statues is that each is made up of a bit of matter unique to each, i.e., not shared by the other. Now, I do not take up this response because it is irrelevant to my concerns. As I have previously stated, I have limited my concerns to questions about sharing nonrelational, spatial and historical properties. And remember, I have limited my discussion to objects that are particulars. They must, as I state in my first chapter, differ in their properties due to the fact that they do not have any parts, portions, or constituents in common. If two particulars are made out of something called "matter" and only one has a property such as "is made out of a bit matter a" then that

property is of the sort that I have chosen not to argue about. I have already conceded that particulars must differ in certain properties because they will have different parts, portions, or constituents. So, finding out that different bits of matter might be unique to distinct particulars does not help us settle any of the issues that I take up in my thesis.

The other, and second, topic--previously alluded to--concerns proper names. Throughout my thesis I ask the reader to consider cases under which two objects can be referred to, or are referred to, by use of proper names such as "Castor," "Pollux," "A," and "B." However, I defend no theory about proper names, for example, that they are shorthand expressions for descriptions about objects. As I state and show at various places in my first chapter, my views will not be affected by whether or not proper names are disguised descriptions. My views are logically independent of issues about the correct analysis of what proper names are, and how we manage to use them to refer uniquely. I refer the reader to my first chapter for substantiation of this point. And I now turn to that chapter.

CHAPTER I

I. Introduction to the Problem

Recent philosophical discussions have revealed an interest in questions about the numerical distinctness of physical objects. One question that has often been raised, especially with regard to physical objects, is the following:

Assume that there are *two* things both of which have the same nonrelational characters. What accounts for their being (numerically) different? That is the problem of individuation.¹

According to this quotation, one problem with respect to the numerical distinctness of objects alike in their non-relational characteristics, is to "account" for that distinctness. One interpretation of what is requested by asking for an "account" of their distinctness is to analyze it as a request for the specification of something that is or must be unique to each of those objects. What is it that each of them has, and perhaps must have, that is not shared by any other object? Now that request might be taken to be partly answerable by reference to the sort of thing (or sorts of things) that compose (make up, constitute) objects, e.g., physical objects. Physical objects that are spatially related to each other may be thought of as each being composed of something, such as a bit of matter, that is not identical with what composes any of the other physical objects. On this view two, e.g. spatially related chairs or spatially

related marble statues would be regarded as composed of something of a certain sort; and each of them would also be viewed as composed of something that is not identical with what composed the other. It should be noted that in answering the question about what accounts for the numerical distinctness of physical objects alike in their nonrelational characteristics, no particular view about what they are composed of need be offered. A philosopher may wish to argue that regardless of what composes or makes up or constitutes spatially related physical objects, each of those objects has a constituent that is not identical with any constituent of the other objects. Each of those objects is composed of something unique to it.

The view just sketched can be appropriately used as a response to the question about what accounts for the numerical distinctness of physical objects. It attempts to offer a candidate for what it is that is unique to each spatially related physical object in terms of what each is composed of. In addition, it may also be held that apart from each being identical with an object that no other object is identical with, spatially related physical objects must be unique *only* in that compositional way.

However, the question as to what it is that is or must be unique to each thing need not be limited only to an inquiry concerning what those objects are made up of.

We may also want to know if there is a uniqueness with respect to the characteristics of the objects. That is, we may want to know if for any two distinct physical objects one must have a characteristic that the other does not. Is it a necessary condition for copresent physical objects to be distinct, that they differ in their relational characteristics? This is another question we may want to ask with respect to the ways in which physical objects are unique. And it is another way of responding to the request for an "account" of numerical distinctness with respect to physical objects. As the reader shall see one answer to the question about what it is that is unique to each distinct physical object has often been given in terms of the notion of characteristics. Defenders of a principle known as the identity of indiscernibles (henceforth, II) often account, at least in part, for the numerical distinctness of two physical objects alike in their nonrelational characteristics, by answering that they must differ in their relational characteristics. The II is the principle that distinct things must differ in their characteristics, and defenders of the II commonly hold that copresent things, like two chairs or two rocks, that are alike in their nonrelational characteristics must differ in their location or position. At least with respect to such objects, it is believed that the II is obviously safe from falsification.

It should now be apparent that several responses to the question about what accounts for the numerical distinctness of physical objects may be given. A response may, for example, be given in terms of the notion of a thing that makes up, or things that make up, physical objects. It may be given in terms of the notion of characteristics. And it may or may not be held that the only way in which each physical object, e.g., each lump of clay, must be unique is by being composed of a unique instance of the sort of thing that physical objects, e.g., lumps of clay, are composed of.

However, some philosophers believe that the correct answer to the question: What are physical objects composed of? provides an affirmative answer to the question: Must distinct physical objects differ in their characteristics? They may view this to be true as a result of their analysis of what a physical object is composed of, e.g., that it is nothing but a "bundle of characteristics." And what they mean by that is that a physical object is a whole whose constituents are characteristics of the object, such as its color and shape, that are related to each other in certain ways. For these philosophers, the complete and correct answer to the question about what is unique to each physical object can be given in terms of the notion of characteristics. The answer that they give to the question:

What accounts for the numerical distinctness of two copresent physical objects that are alike in their nonrelational characteristics? will be the answer that defenders of the II give to that question--that they differ, and must differ, in other characteristics, e.g., in their spatial relationships.

Max Black has argued that the II on a "nontrivial" interpretation (to be discussed) is false. He asks us to consider an imaginary universe consisting only of two iron spheres exactly alike in all their nonrelational characteristics. Each sphere is at a distance from the other. He tries to show that no object in that universe has any property that the other does not have (admitting one qualification that will be mentioned). As a result, those who claim that numerically distinct copresent physical objects that are alike in their nonrelational characteristics must differ in their relational ones, e.g., spatial characteristics, are mistaken.

Black's universe raises important issues concerning the numerical distinctness of physical objects. It sets the stage for a dialectic between opponents and defenders of the II and for alternative views on individuation. If the II is rejected as a true principle, does that mean that we must reject a view of physical objects as being wholes whose constituents are characteristics? In other words, does it mean that we are committed to a view of physical objects

as being composed of some thing, or things, which are not identical with any characteristic or characteristics? If we do reject the II, what sort of thing, or sorts of things, if any, are we committed to as being the constituent(s) of a physical object? Also included within the controversy, is the status of Black's hypothetical universe as a counter-example to the II. Has Black successfully established a case against the II by the production of a purported counter-example to that principle? The possibility of a universe in which the II or some version of it does not hold also raises certain epistemological questions. It raises questions about what the relationship is between our ability to distinguish as well as to know that there are or might be distinct physical objects and the necessary conditions for the distinctness of those objects. Furthermore, in discussing what I just alluded to, namely, the necessary conditions for the distinctness of objects (e.g., physical objects), I will have occasion to discuss questions about the identity of objects. For example, if A is identical with B, what properties must B have in order to be identical with A? As the reader shall see, certain views on the necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of, e.g., a physical object A such as a rock with a physical object B, might be appealed to to defend some version of the II.

In this thesis I will (i) examine various inter-

pretations of the II, (ii) state significant arguments given in support of the II with respect to those interpretations of that principle and (iii) assess the truth value of the II relative to the interpretations considered. However, before I begin, I will make some further preliminary remarks designed to give the reader a rough, but intuitively satisfying, grasp of what I am going to argue for (i.e., my main thesis) and how I go about doing so.

In my thesis I take the II to be the principle that distinct things must differ in their properties. There are two points, concerning this principle, that I now wish to make. First, it might be thought that by taking the II to be a principle about what must be the case I am either breaking with or distorting the traditional way of viewing that principle, namely as a contingent truth. Didn't Leibniz, it might be pointed out, regard the explanation for its everlasting truth to rest only on God's never creating any world where objects do not differ in their characteristics? I will (briefly) take this point up again later on. But for now, I will offer the following: as the reader shall see contemporary discussions of the claim that given any two things each will differ in properties from the other, revolve around considering whether or not that claim, or various interpretations of it, might turn out to be false. And the discussions proceed independently of theological considerations.

In this thesis I concern myself with that approach, and treat the II, and various interpretations of it, as candidates for necessary truths that hold but not because some God sees to it that any of them hold. Secondly, I am limiting my discussion about whether or not the II, and any versions of it that I mention, are true, to certain types of objects. That is, there are certain types of objects that I call "particulars" that constitute the entire domain to which those principles (i.e., the II and its versions) are to be taken to refer to. When I mention particulars I am talking only about nonconscious colored shaped objects which have no portions, parts, or constituents in common. To talk about two particulars is therefore to talk about two nonconscious colored shaped objects which have no portions, parts, or constituents in common. Two billiard balls would be an example of two particulars.

In my thesis I consider various interpretations of the II. One interpretation that I consider I refer to as the "I/I." The I/I is the principle that distinct things must differ in properties expressible by using property terms that are wholly (or purely) general in meaning. Or, in other words, it is the principle that distinct things must differ in properties that can be mentioned in descriptions that involve no descriptive terms that are not wholly general terms. (Later on, I will discuss this principle in more

detail.) I am going to argue that the I/I is false. However, my main concern in this thesis is to justify my rejection of another principle that I refer to as the "PII;" and I argue against the I/I in order to strengthen my case against the PII.

Before I give a rough definition of the PII I will make a few preliminary remarks. There are several ways in which particulars may differ from each other. Consider two billiard balls, A and B. A may have been made before B. It may then have been shipped after being stored for a long period of time, while B may not have been stored anywhere at all before or after it was made. A may have been touched by someone more times than B was touched by that person. So, A and B might have had different properties due to the different things that have happened to them. In short, their history might be different so that they differ from each other in their historical properties. Also, A and B might differ from each other in their nonrelational properties, i.e., their size, shape, color, texture and (sharable) arrangement that any parts, portions, or constituents might have with respect to each other. Also, there are spatial properties in virtue of which A and B may differ from each other. A may be arranged differently from B with respect to some object C; and, of course, A may be at a distance or next to B although B could not also have been

either next to or at a distance from B. Let us say that any historical, nonrelational or spatial property is a "nonformal" property. Any other property, e.g., "is identical with A," "is distinct from B," and "has c as a constituent," is a "formal" property. (Perhaps the expressions "formal" and "nonformal" are not the best ones to use but their use does fit into the general line of thought of the rest of this thesis. So, I will use them here.) Now, the PII may be defined roughly as the principle that distinct things (i.e., particulars) must differ in their nonformal properties. Such a claim may not seem to be very bold. It is commonly believed that any two physical objects, such as the two billiard balls A and F, will differ in their spatial properties. As a result the PII may seem to be a pretty safe doctrine. However, I will argue that the PII is false. The boldness of my thesis rests, at least, in my attempt to show that no version of the II is successfully justified as a true principle on the basis of the claim that particulars must differ in their spatial properties. And this means that for any two copresent particulars A and B, I reject the claim that they will differ in their spatial properties either because A will be arranged differently from B with respect to some object C--as when A is closer to C than B is to C--or because A will have the property "is at a distance from B or is next to B" that is not a

property shared by B. What I will attempt to show is that two copresent particulars might not differ in their spatial properties because each might not be either next to or at a distance from any other particular.

Most people who would defend the PII would hold that two copresent spheres with the same nonrelational properties must--apart from any consideration of their history--differ from each other in their spatial properties. Max Black has attempted to show that copresent spheres with the same nonrelational properties might not differ in their spatial properties. Since Black's claim, if true, would be relevant to establishing a case against the PII, I will examine in detail Black's statement of and position on this topic. Afterwards I will be in a better position to restate and clarify my views.

II. Black's Interpretation of the II

The II as Black considers it is the principle that ". . . it is logically impossible for two things to have all their properties in common."³ It should be noticed that in discussing the II, Black speaks about the "properties" of an object. However, at other times he uses the expressions "characteristics" and "qualities." Discussions of the II usually include some or all of these expressions taking them

to be synonymous. I will also do so. In order to assess Black's arguments against the II, we must determine what properties Black is concerned with when he denies that the II is true. Consider the following argument in support of the II:

If two things, a and b, are given, the first has the property of being identical with a. Now b cannot have this property, for else b would be a, and we should have only one thing, not two as assumed. Hence a has at least one property, which b does not have, that is to say the property of being identical with a.⁴

As Black points out,⁵ a similar argument can be constructed concerning difference. Each object, i.e., a and b, is different (distinct) from the other. Only one of the objects will have the property "being different from a" and only one the property "being different from b." Each will therefore have a property that the other does not. This argument, it is claimed, shows that any two objects must differ in their characteristics.

Black thinks that all that the above argument proves is that a is a and b is not a, that is to say, b and a are different.⁶ In fact, Black thinks, that by arguing for the II in this way the proponent of the principle is "merely redescribing the hypothesis that a and b are different by calling it a case of 'difference properties.'"⁷ However, a proponent of the II might argue that no matter how trivial his claim is, if there are two objects, say a

and b, then each will still have a property that the other does not have. The principle does not cease to be true because it is trivially true! Each will be identical with an object that the other is not; and each will be distinct from an object that the other is not. Those differences exist and they can be mentioned when, for example, the objects are named. So, given that all distinct objects must differ with respect to the objects that they are identical with and distinct from, all distinct objects must differ in certain properties. And those properties can be mentioned if, for example, the objects are referred to by using their names.

Whether or not Black would concede that the objects a and b have such property differences is not clear. He does seem to grant that they may be counted as properties when he objects that "if you [the defender of the II] want to have an interesting principle to defend, you must interpret 'property' more narrowly, enough so, at any rate, for 'identity' and 'difference' not to count as 'properties.'"⁸ His position seems to be that we can count ascriptions of identity and difference as ascriptions of properties, but if we do so we will have made the II trivially true and therefore uninteresting. For a to have the property "being different (distinct) from b," which b does not have, is simply, for a to be distinct from b. But then the respect

in which the distinct objects, a and b, differ is simply in being distinct from each other! And that follows logically from the mere supposition that there are two distinct objects, a and b.⁹ Black thinks that such differences are not very interesting. So, if they are counted as differences in properties the II will have become an uninteresting truism. I will now comment on this result.

(1) Black appears to concede that one can use the word "property" in the way that the supporter of the "trivial" argument has used it. He may believe that the supporter of the II is not extending the meaning of the expression "property." Distinct objects differ in the objects that they are identical with and distinct from. Each is identical with and distinct from an object that the other is not. And as long as that is a respect in which they differ, isn't there sufficient reason for saying that they differ in their properties? That they do differ in their properties can also be seen by the fact that once they are named we cannot ascribe (truly) the same thing to both--isn't that so?

It may be objected that one can surely adopt the criterion suggested above for objects having different properties without defending the II. Properties are generally regarded as being capable of being shared. Two things can, for example, both be red, so they both can have a property

which is the same. But consider the "property" "being identical with a." That cannot be shared, so it really is not a property. Just because two things may "differ" in a certain way does not mean that they have different properties. It merely means that one is not something that the other is, e.g., that each is not the object that the other is. It does not mean that the difference that each has from the other is a difference that other objects may share.

Even if the above reply is effective with respect to a purported property involving the identity of an object with itself, it does not succeed in rebutting the "trivial" argument for the II. Many objects can be distinct from, say b. Of course, b cannot be distinct from b, but that does not obviate the fact that a may have the sharable property of "being distinct from b." So, the trivializing interpretation of the II is not subject to the objection that it does not work in favor of the II because what it takes to be properties are not sharable and hence not properties at all. So, if Black is to offer us a successful argument against the II, then the properties to which the II are to be taken must exclude properties such as "is identical with a," and "is distinct from b." But, it may be asked, why not just end the discussion over the truth of the II here since we now know that distinct things must differ in their properties?

One reason for not ending the inquiry about the II at this point is that there are still significant questions and issues to be raised--especially about what sorts of properties distinct objects must differ in. We may want to know, as Blanshard does, whether or not "for things to be different there must be something distinguishing them other than mere difference itself or anything that is analytically involved in this notion."¹⁰ Similarly, we may put the issue as Broad does when he states McTaggart to be concerned with showing "that any two particulars must be dissimilar in some respect *which is not a mere analytic consequence* of the fact that they are two."¹¹

The philosophers mentioned above are interested in the II interpreted in a way that excludes certain properties as the properties to which the II should be taken to refer to. What properties they want to exclude are not always clear, but they do want to exclude the respect in which objects differ because the objects that each is identical with and distinct from are not the same. Roughly put, they wish to exclude any difference that two objects might have in virtue of some entity that some other entity is identical or distinct from. This point will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

(2) It may be thought that Black might have allowed properties of identity and difference to count without his

needing to be concerned that the II would be supported in a trivial way. First note that if there are two distinct objects each will have the property "being identical and distinct from an object that the other object is not."

That property is shared by both spheres. It is not a property in virtue of which the spheres differ in properties because only one has it. So, objects may have properties involving identity or difference which can be shared. It does not follow from the fact that two objects each have a property involving identity or difference, that that property can successfully be appealed to, to support the II. Now, there are certain types of properties which involve identity or difference that can be successfully appealed to in behalf of the II. Properties that can be mentioned by using a designating expression, such as a proper name, may be appealed to in behalf of the II. For example, an object a may be said to differ in properties from an object b, because a but not b has the properties "being identical with a" and "being distinct from b." One strategy then that Black might have adopted could have been to argue that properties whose mention requires designating a particular by using certain expressions, such as proper names, are not the sort of properties which could be used to support the II. Such a strategy would seem to be an attractive one for Black, since he does argue that not all objects, e.g., his spheres,

have differences in properties of the type whose mention involves the use of a proper name.¹² If Black is correct with respect to this contention, then perhaps all that he needed to do was to use his own argument that this spheres do not have any properties of the type that could be mentioned by using proper names against the II being even trivially true. And he might then claim that even though distinct things can be regarded as being identical with and distinct from an object that no other object is identical with and distinct from, that is a property which all distinct things share and does not imply a difference with respect to which the objects differ in their properties.

III. Black's Position Evaluated

In order to evaluate the adequacy of the strategy previously outlined, as well as the adequacy of Black's position against the II, I will now turn to Black's statement and rebuttal of another argument (besides the "trivial" one) in support of the II. It is in response to that argument that his views about the relationship between property difference and proper names are revealed. It should be remembered that Black is concerned about establishing the falsity of a version of the II given that ascriptions of identity and difference are to be excluded from counting

as property ascriptions. So, if his defense against the following argument in support of the II--as he interprets it--is successful, his position against the II will not have been defeated.

In the hypothetical universe that Black puts forth as a counterexample to the II, there are supposed to be two distinct spheres each with the same spatial characteristics. Each of the spheres is at the same distance from a sphere with exactly the same nonrelational characteristics. (Black does not mention anything about their history, but let us assume that there are also no historical properties which one has that the other lacks.) Now suppose that someone visited that universe and named one sphere "Castor" and the other "Pollux." If so, wouldn't it be possible for that traveller to "recognize that *being at a distance two miles from Castor* was not the same property as being at a distance of two miles *from Pollux*?"¹³ He certainly could not assert truly the exact same thing about both spheres. If he said that Castor is at a distance from Castor, that would not be correct. But what he said about Castor may be asserted truly about Pollux, namely, that Pollux is at a distance from Castor. They therefore have different properties that can be mentioned; and so the II is true at least with respect to physical objects.

Black denies that the argument just given succeeds

in supporting the II.¹⁴ His basic point is that the defender of the II in that argument is using the expressions "Castor" and "Pollux" each as proper names. But, since the spheres by hypothesis have no names and are descriptively alike, those expressions cannot be used to designate and thereby distinguish the spheres from each other. If an object has no name than under that condition no name can be used to designate it and consequently to designate it in order to ascribe a property to it or to another object by mentioning a name that it has. Therefore, according to Black the attempt to show that each sphere has certain distinguishing properties by using designating expressions such as proper names fails.

There is a counter reply available to the defender of the II. Black recognizes it and states it as follows:

You surely don't want to say that the arrival of the name-giving traveller creates spatial properties? Perhaps we can't name you spheres and therefore can't name the corresponding properties; but the properties must be there.¹⁵

Black's reply to the charge that the properties mentioned by the name-giving traveller must still exist even if no traveller actually went to the hypothetical universe, consists in a reassertion that if they do not have names then we cannot say that "they have certain properties which cannot be referred to without using names for the spheres."¹⁶

It might seem that if we are asked to suppose that two spheres or any sort of objects exist, we may also suppose that each could be talked about by using an expression which distinguishes them even though we assumed that they were not named. We can, for example, assume that there might have been objects named either "a" or "b" which at one time might not have been named. However, at the time that they were not named each would still have been either a or b. So a still would have been at a distance from b without b being at a distance from b. a and b therefore would still have differed in properties even if they had no names, since only one would have had the property "being at a distance from b." We simply need the use of designating expressions such as "a" and "b" to mention the properties that only one might have had at the time that they were not named. Therefore, the spheres in Black's universe need not be named in order for them to have different spatial relationships.

Black would reply that in supposing that the objects a and b were unnamed at some time but named at another we are changing the type of example that he is concerned with. According to this example, the spheres do not have any names--and that means that we should not take his example to be about spheres which were unnamed at some earlier time and named at some later time. Any attempt to assume that either sphere may be designated as

as "a," "b," "Castor," or "Pollux," or by any proper name is by that very assumption changing his original example. In that example it was assumed that neither ever had a name.¹⁷

However, this reply is not successful in securing Black's position against the II. Let us suppose that the following case were true. Someone has postulated that there were once two spheres alike in their nonrelational properties. Those spheres were also made out of a certain material which makes it likely that they still exist. In fact, this person, say P_1 , has found a way to determine where they are likely to be. Although at one time no one knew any means by which only one of the spheres could be referred to, the spheres were subsequently found and named. Each was named either "Castor" or "Pollux." Now, suppose someone asked P_1 if the spheres ever had exactly the same spatial properties. What might his reply be? He might point out that since Castor was always either next to or at a distance from Pollux, they always differed in their spatial properties. Only one had the property "being either next to or at a distance from Pollux."

Suppose that another person, say P_2 , objects to what P_1 claims about how the spheres differed in their properties. He argues that there was once a time in which the spheres were not named. And if someone, at the time,

wanted to describe each of those spheres as being at a distance from the other, and to do so by using names to refer to each of the spheres, then that person would have failed. It would not have helped him if he had just stipulated that, or decided to suppose that the spheres were named "Castor" or "Pollux." He still would not have succeeded in using either of those expressions to refer separately to each of the spheres. As Professor Black states, you can't name an object merely by stipulating that a certain expression is its name. If we are talking about the spiders in my garden and I only suppose that one of them is named "Castor," surely I have not named it! First, it has to be singled out in some way, for example, by pointing to it or describing it uniquely. Supposing that something is named so-and-so is not, by itself, naming it.¹⁸ So, if someone had at the time that the spheres were not named attempted to attribute a property to only one of them by saying, for example, "Only one of the spheres that exists is at a distance from Castor," he would have failed. And it would not have helped him to have previously stipulated or supposed that one of the two spheres that exists was named "Castor."

But why does that mean that neither of the spheres had a property of the type whose mention incorporates a reference to only one of them by use of a proper name?

Well, continues P_2 , at the time that the spheres were unnamed anyone who supposed that they were named, in order to show that they differed in their properties, would not be considering the spheres under the conditions that actually prevailed. He would be thinking about spheres which were named, and drawing conclusions about them from the way they are in the situation in which they were given their supposed names. It does not follow from the fact that since the spheres differ in their properties under the one condition (when they are named) that they must differ in the same properties under different conditions (when they are not named). And that is the faulty inference used by someone who tries to show that we may conclude from the fact that since they can be shown to differ in their spatial properties under conditions where they are supposed to be named, then they could have those differences in spatial properties when they are not named. So, if anyone at a time after the spheres were named, tries to show that the spheres differed in their spatial properties before they were named he would be employing an unsound inference. He would be considering them by using names. But that, just as before, is to consider the spheres under conditions that they were not in fact under. As a result, he would have failed to show that the spheres had the same sort of property differences. Even if they differ in their

spatial properties under the conditions that they are named, it does not follow that they must have the same sort of differences under conditions in which they are not named. The conditions are still different. In short, it will not help the defender of the II to appeal to cases which involve supposing that the spheres are or might have been named in order to support his position.

If the only reasons behind P_2 's defense are the ones just stated, they would fail to support his position. Why assume, that just because we are not in a position to mention a property no property is there to be mentioned? That is surely false. In the example with P_1 and P_2 the spheres were once not named but subsequently named. After that was done it was possible to state that Castor and Pollux existed *before* they were named; and to state that *before* they were named they were at a distance from each other. That means that Castor and Pollux were at a distance from each other at the time that they were not named. And in virtue of that fact, if Castor was at a distance from Pollux, they then differed in that respect even before they were named. In addition, if they were (contrary to fact) never named, that would not entail that Castor and Pollux could not exist at a distance from each other. It is a perfectly sound claim that Castor and Pollux might never have been named but still could have been at a distance from each other.

And that means that Pollux could still have been at a distance from every object that Castor was, namely, Pollux. We may therefore correctly conclude that objects which might not have even been named, can still differ in properties whose mention incorporates a reference to only one of them by using an expression such as a proper name. Nothing that P_1 states shows that to be false.

This point, as well as the weakness in Black's position, can be brought out more forcefully by examining and evaluating the following two arguments in support of Black's position.

(A)

P_1 might offer another reason for why unnamed spheres cannot differ in such properties as "being at a distance from Pollux." Consider the following argument. (It might lead the unwary into thinking that Black's spheres do not differ in their properties.) If at some time, say t_2 , we would not be making a true property ascription, F_1 , about an object as it was at some time, t_1 , then at some time after t_1 the ascription of F_1 to that object as it was at time t_1 will still fail to be true. Now, according to the story about the spheres at some time, say t_1 , each sphere could not (under the conditions that prevailed) be singled out separately by using a description to refer to only one of them. So at that time (t_1) we would not have

succeeded in making a property ascription true of only one of the spheres if we had said that only one of them had the property F_1 ("being at a distance from Pollux"). But then, we cannot go on and assert truly, at some time t_2 later than t_1 , that only one of the spheres had the property F_1 ("being at a distance from Pollux"). If it failed to have F_1 at time t_1 , that will still be false. So just because it seems reasonable to say that only one of the unnamed spheres had a property like "being at a distance from Pollux," it could not have had such a property. Note, however, that an inability to ascribe a property such as "being at a distance from Pollux" does not occur with such properties as "being a sphere." Anyone who ascribes that latter property to the spheres, at any time that they existed, would have made a true assertion. But it is not the case with such properties as "being at a distance from Pollux." What explains that difference, argues P_1 , is that there was no sphere that had the property "being at a distance from Pollux" before they were named.

The mistake committed in the above argument is in the supposition that at the time before the spheres were named what failed to be asserted truly about only one of the spheres is what was asserted as true of only one of the spheres after it was named. If I assert "John is tall," I would not be making a false assertion merely because there

is someone named "John" who is short. Whether it is true or false depends, in part, on who is designated by the name "John." In addition, if I asserted "John is tall," and there was no one who was John, then I would not have made a true assertion. Whether I do or not depends, in part, on who is being referred to or if anyone is being referred to at all. If I did not refer to someone named "John," then I may correctly claim that I did not assert the very same thing that I might have if I were talking about an actual person named "John." I did not assert the same thing in both cases because in one of the cases I was not talking about the thing (i.e., person) that I spoke of in the other case. So I would not have said the same things in both cases.

The problem with the defense that we are now considering is that in it the name "Pollux" is not used to refer to the same thing in both instances of its use. Before the spheres were named, "Pollux" was not the name of Pollux. The condition necessary for establishing reference to only one of the spheres as, e.g., Pollux, had not occurred. But after they were named, "Pollux" could be used to refer to Pollux. As a result, the expressions were not used in the same way. Only in the second instance, after the sphere was named, was "Pollux" used to designate an object. It is true that before the spheres were named,

anyone who asserted that some sphere that exists has the property "being at a distance from Pollux," would not have ascribed a property to Pollux that Pollux had. But that does not mean that he would have mentioned the same property that someone else might mention--by asserting that some sphere had the property "being at a distance frpm Pollux." It depends, in part, on whether or not both people are using the expression "Pollux" to refer to the same thing. And if one of them, and only one of them fails to refer to anything when it is asserted that some sphere has or had the property "being at a distance from Pollux," then they are not making the very same assertion.

In addition, on a certain occasion the name "Pollux" was used (in our hypothetical case) to refer to only one of the spheres; and *only one* of the spheres was identical to that one--even when it was not named. So, even before they were named only one of the spheres was at a distance from that one. The spheres still differed (before they were named) in that respect. Furthermore, even if the proper names such as "Pollux" and "Castor" are shorthand descriptions, including, perhaps, some demonstrative element, e.g., "Pollux" means "the sphere that broke into pieces, one of which is on *this* planet," that does not alter the fact that the spheres had different properties. Pollux would still have been, in any possible world, identical with the sphere which in fact is referred to uniquely by way of some

description that "Pollux" is short for. And that object could have been at a distance from an object that had a numerically distinct object at a distance from it. In other words, arguing that proper names are disguised descriptions and that Black's spheres were descriptively alike, will not support Black's case. We can use differentiating descriptions to talk about objects under conditions where they do not have certain of the properties that they may now differ in. Neither sphere in our hypothetical case might have had the property "being identical with Pollux" at some time if we assume that proper names are disguised descriptions that might have been shared by other objects. But only one would still have been none other than the sphere which, in our hypothetical case, is in fact identical with Pollux (where some particular use of the word "Pollux" is short for some description picking out Pollux but not Castor). And only one of the spheres was at a distance from that sphere when each was not named. So the spheres still had spatial differences from each other.

How shall we evaluate Black's position? The spheres that we said were found and then named were at one time like Black's spheres. They did not have names. Yet even then they did have different spatial properties. The arguments that we considered to the effect that they could not have had the property differences that they were claimed to have

had were not sound. Even though Black would point out that his case is different from the one I have constructed due to the fact that in his case his spheres were never named, that objection misses the crucial point against his position. The point is that even if the spheres, in my case, were not named then *at that time* they still had property differences. Distinct physical objects need not have been named in order for them to differ in properties in virtue of the fact that each is at a distance from the other. One they are given names those differences in properties can be mentioned. We may use those names to make correct statements about how they were, are, or might have been. We can say, for instance, about our two named spheres "Castor" and "Pollux," that they might never have been named. They might have been unnamed as well as the only two objects that existed (each at a distance from each other), but that would not obviate the fact that Castor would still be Castor at a distance from Pollux; and even under those conditions Castor would still have had a property that Pollux did not, namely, "being at a distance from Pollux." Black has therefore failed to show that given his two spheres were never named it follows from that, that they do not differ in their spatial properties.

(B)

At this point there is another objection that

might be raised in support of Black's case. It was claimed that even if Black's spheres had properties that could not be referred to without designating each of them separately, that does not mean that those properties did not exist; and if they were named then those properties could be mentioned. Now, it might be thought that in talking about properties which cannot at some time be referred to, but may be referred to at another time if something were to be the case, e.g., if the spheres were named, we are saying no more than something to the effect that if something which is not true were to be true, then the spheres would have mentionable properties. And that does not support the case against Black. It is true that if something that is not the case were to be the case, then the spheres could have property differences capable of being mentioned. If, for example, they were to be named then each could have a property which both could then be mentioned and not shared by the other, for example, "being named 'Castor'" or "being named 'Pollux.'" That fact surely does not support the II. So, in what way does the claim that Black's spheres have properties which might be mentioned, avoid the objection that all that is being shown by the arguments previously given, is that if certain things were to occur, e.g., the spheres were named, then the spheres would have property differences which could then be mentioned?

The answer is that in the case where the spheres were never named, they had a property difference in virtue of the fact that they were spatially related to each other, and did not acquire that difference simply because they had been named. But in the case where they acquired the mentionable properties "being named 'Castor'" and "being named 'Pollux'" they acquired those property differences only after they were named. So, what is being claimed against Black's position is that there will be a respect in which his spheres differ spatially if the spheres are at a distance from or next to each other.

Well, what is that respect in which they are not alike spatially? What is that difference which they do not acquire when each becomes separately designatable? The answer was given previously: they differ in the objects that they are at a distance from. To be spatially related to an object that is not the object that another object is related to is to differ in a certain way from that object. Of course, Black's spheres are *both* at a distance from an object that each is distinct from. But each has that same sort of spatial relationship to things that are different. And that is a genuine difference between them. It is a difference in virtue of which it is possible to state different things about each one. And each differs from the other in a way that can be shared. Several objects

may all be at a distance from one of the spheres that is not at a distance from a sphere that all of the other objects are at a distance from.

Before I end this section, I would like to note once again an interesting fact about Black's attack on the II. It is surprising that Black did not argue that his spheres do not even differ in a trivial way. One argument that he considers in behalf of the II mentions an object a which differs from an object b in having the property "being identical with a." It would seem that Black, following his own claims about properties and names, should have held that his spheres do not even differ in any properties concerning identity and difference. Furthermore, if he recognizes that each sphere is identical with or different from a sphere that the other is not, and that those differences *may* be appealed to, to support what he calls a "trivial" form of the II, it is surprising that he failed to recognize that there are differences that each object has due to each being at a distance from an object that the other is not. And that those differences may be appealed to as I have done, to support the II. So, it seems that the II is trivially true only if Black's spheres differ in their spatial properties.

IV. The I/I

It may be held that the discussion over the II should not be ended at this point. There may be significant issues still to be solved. What was previously regarded as a difference between the spheres in virtue of which they differed in spatial properties, may not be the only sort of difference that we should concern ourselves with when we defend or attack the II or various versions of that principle. There may be certain sorts of differences between objects which must obtain if those objects are to differ in the objects that they are at a distance from. This possibility should be explored.

In the last section it was argued that Black did not succeed in establishing his claim that his spheres do not differ in their properties. His argument that they did not differ rested upon the false belief that if the spheres are not or have never been named then they would not have differences in their spatial properties. But, as I previously argued, it doesn't follow from our inability to ascribe a difference in spatial characteristics to each by designating each separately that no such differences exist. We may just not be in a position to state the respects in which they do differ simply because we lack any means to refer to each without referring also to the other. Black's purported counterexample fails to show that the II, at least

as far as Black has interpreted it, is false. However, it may be held that there is an interpretation of the II that is not supported by there being property differences of the sort whose existence is denied by Black. If that is so, then there is still a problem about the status of Black's counterexample with respect to that interpretation of the II. Some philosophers have held that Black has attempted to describe a possible state of affairs that violates a certain interpretation of the II even though on that interpretation Black's spheres are not taken as differing in their properties simply because each is at a distance from a sphere that the other is not at a distance from. And the very fact that his purported counterexample violates that interpretation is, it is held, good reason to judge his purported counterexample to be that of an impossible state of affairs. In other words, according to these philosophers, Black has described an impossible state of affairs and not merely failed to provide a counterexample to the II or to their version of the II. Let us first explore the possibility of an interpretation of the II according to which Black's spheres would not be taken as differing in their spatial properties.

Ayer suggest that if we are trying to find a form of the II which is not trivially true¹⁹ then we must interpret the II according to the rule that any "qualitative

or relational predicate may be admitted, provided that it has descriptive meaning."²⁰ And it is "essential that its meaning be purely descriptive."²¹ Ayer tells us that the objection to the expression "being identical with A" "is not that it mentions the dubious relation of identity but that it contains the name 'A.'"²² Why, according to Ayer's interpretation of the II, should that term be objected to? Is its meaning not "purely descriptive?" The answer is that it is not.

The principle which here comes into play is that descriptions are essentially general; to describe anything is to attribute to it a property of a certain sort, a property which is capable, in theory, of being manifested in any number of different contexts, whether or not it is so manifested in fact. And the corollary of this is that a description may contain no reference to any object which is not itself described in this indefinite way.²³

For Ayer, by asserting that A is identical with A, we would be assigning a property by using a predicate that is not purely descriptive in meaning. The statement would therefore not be regarded as "essentially general." One reason he has for believing this is that the property "is identical with A" is not capable of being shared (i.e., it is not capable of being manifested in any number of different contexts).

Ayer stipulates by his corollary that if a description incorporates a reference to an object, it must be achieved in an indefinite way. When we describe an object in an inde-

finite way, according to Ayer, we are referring to it only by way of properties which are capable of being shared. Consider, for example, a statement made by using a demonstrative. Such a statement might be "A sphere that existed many years ago is none other than this sphere" where "this" is used as a demonstrative to designate some sphere. That statement would not count, for Ayer, as an essentially general one. It is true that the entity referred to was referred to as a sphere but that is not where the problem arises for Ayer. Many things can be referred to as spheres. However, the sphere that was referred to was referred to in a certain way--as "this sphere." Reference to that sphere was achieved in a certain way that violates Ayer's corollary. It was achieved in a way that does not completely depend on mentioning only sharable properties. Some sphere was the only sphere referred to, but that was not done only by mentioning some sharable property or properties of that sphere such that it and only it is the sphere that has that property or those properties.

Ayer regards the expression "being identical with A" as not being an expression that is purely descriptive in meaning. It contains the name "A" whose employment in a description renders that description not purely descriptive in meaning--just as the demonstrative "this" did so. We may refer to some sphere by using the term "A." But if

reference to that sphere is thereby achieved without mentioning only some sharable property of that sphere or sharable properties of that sphere, then it was not achieved by using a description that is "essentially general."

Consider the property "is distinct from B." This property is sharable because several objects can be distinct from B. However, it may still violate Ayer's corollary. Suppose that B is some physical object referred to in describing A as distinct from B. In referring to B was B referred to only by mentioning some sharable property or sharable properties that some object might have? If not the "is distinct from B" is not a predicate that is "purely descriptive in meaning."

Ayer's approach to the II may be interpreted as follows. We want a certain interpretation of the II that excludes certain types of properties. By mentioning some properties, e.g., "is identical with A" or "is distinct from B" mention is made of something that is not a sharable property--namely the objects A and B. We may exclude from the domain of properties to which the II is to be taken to refer any property whose mention requires reference to what is not a sharable property. What we get is the principle that I previously referred to as the "I/I." Any expression used to mention a property that requires not mentioning only some sharable property or properties is "not purely general

in meaning." So, we are left with the principle that distinct things must differ in properties expressible by property terms that are purely general in meaning--which is the I/I.

V. The PII

Ayer's interpretation of the II, namely the I/I, as well as his views concerning what properties the II should be taken to refer to, seem to be shared by other philosophers. Consider what Strawson claims:

According to this doctrine [the II], in the only form worth discussing, it is necessarily true that there exists, for every individual, some description in purely universal, or general, terms, such that₂ only that individual answers to that description.²⁴

Notice that Strawson, like Ayer (who adopts the I/I in order to avoid "trivializing" the II) seems to think that there is only one form of the II worth discussing. In stating that there is only one such form, I assume that Strawson, like Ayer and Black, seeks to avoid counting properties such as "is identical with A" and "is distinct from B" as properties to which the II should be taken to refer. Perhaps Strawson believes that the I/I is the only interpretation of the II that does not make the II trivially true as the result of following from the assumption that

that distinct objects are not identical with each other. (Note that Ayer, as we shall see, will attempt to argue that the II is a logical truth in virtue of the very notion of what a thing is. So, it is not just by making the II a logical truth that Ayer considers the II to be trivialized.)

In addition to Strawson, Pears²⁵ also restricts himself to discussing, analyzing, and evaluating the II either in the form that Black and Ayer regard as trivial, i.e., true due to differences in the objects that distinct things are identical with and distinct from, or in the following form suggested by Pears: if the defender of the II should "wish to defend the principle in an interesting form he should not rely on property-phrases whose meaning is explicable only by reference either to unique names or to demonstrative words."²⁶ (Pears gives credit for this interpretation of the II to Ayer.²⁷)

What the above mentioned philosophers are doing is suggesting that there is only one form (interpretation) of the II that is interesting or worth discussing or not trivially true. I disagree with that claim. I think that there is an interpretation of the II that is not a trivially (logically) true principle, interesting, worth discussing, as well as highly controversial and false.

Let us first consider two red round spheres, A and B, at a distance from each other. In what ways must

those two spheres differ from each other? Well, there is the trivial way previously mentioned--each must be identical with and distinct from a sphere that the other is not identical with and distinct from. But there are other differences that they must have. Each will have certain parts, portions or constituents that (i) are not the parts, portions or constituents that the other has and (ii) are closer to or further away from certain parts, portions or constituents than those of the other. So, there are several ways besides the trivial differences previously mentioned, in which spatially related copresent things must differ. However, two spheres that have no parts, portions or constituents in common might not have existed at the same time. If so, then either might have had parts, portions or constituents that were not necessarily spatially related to those of the other. If A had not existed at the same time that B existed, it would not follow from that that one of them must have existed before the other (which would be a difference between in virtue of which they would differ in properties). Let us suppose that A, as well as its parts, portions or constituents, never existed at all. Given that is it possible for B to have had all the properties that A, in fact, had? The answer is No. B could not have had certain properties of A had A, as well as all of its parts, portions or constituents, never existed. B would still not have been

identical to A and it would not have ceased to be distinct from B. B would also have had different parts, portions or constituents spatially related to each other but not spatially related to those of A that are themselves spatially related to those of A that are themselves spatially related to each other. If B had existed while A, as well as A's parts, portions and constituents, had not, B would not have been either spatially related to A or spatially related to any of A's parts, portions, and constituents. A and B would not have existed at the same time, i.e., they would not have been copresent objects. If I speak about the II or some version of it being true for noncopresent objects I will be speaking about how similar some object B could be to some object A under the previously mentioned condition, i.e., where B existed while A, as well as A's parts, portions and constituents did not. To ask if the II or some version of it holds for noncopresent objects is therefore to ask if some object B might have had all the properties or "relevant" properties of A, had A as well as its parts, portions and constituents, never existed.

I have mentioned several ways in which distinct objects, copresent or noncopresent, will differ from each other. In doing so I have concerned myself with colored shaped objects that have no parts, portions or constituents in common. It should be remembered that I have called such

objects "particulars" and that whenever I speak about copresent or noncopresent objects, I am speaking only about particulars.

So, particulars, whether copresent or not, will differ from each other in certain ways that have to do with their parts, portions or constituents being distinct from those of other particulars and being spatially related or unrelated in certain ways to the parts, portions or constituents of those other particulars. They must also, whether copresent or not, differ from each other in the objects that each is identical with or distinct from. However, philosophers have thought that besides these ways in which objects, e.g., particulars, must differ, they must differ in virtue of their spatial relationships to things. Black thought that this was not so, but, as I have argued, he did not succeed in showing this. Other philosophers have not tried to show that colored shaped entities, such as tables and rocks, might not differ in virtue of their spatial relationships. In fact, as I said earlier, most philosophers have held the II or some version of it because they believe that things of the type that I call "particulars" must differ in their spatial relationships. For example, one philosopher writes that

. . . a thing is itself because nothing else shares every last one of its properties; i.e., if 'two' things

were alike in every respect, they would not be two, but only one. Two grains of sand, or two hydrogen atoms, or what-have-you, between which we might hastily suppose we have no way of distinguishing, are still two precisely because this one is over here and that one is there so that location is at least one property that they do not have in common. Everything considered, this is a pretty safe doctrine! . . . ²⁸

Anthony Quinton has stated that the

. . . belief that there is no more to a thing than its properties owes a good deal of its hold to the authority of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. If everything that has all and only the properties of a given thing is identical with that thing it follows that the total set of a thing's properties is proprietary to it. Anything that had all and just those properties would be that very thing. Two things can be different only if there is a point of difference between them and this point of difference must be a property that can be predicated of one of them but not of the other. As long as the reference to properties in the principle is understood to include positional as well as qualitative properties it is clearly a necessary truth . . . Position alone is sufficient to individuate. From this point of view qualities proper are superfluous; there is nothing left for them to do.²⁹

Two things that are particulars must, according to popular doctrine, differ positionally. Now, some philosophers who believe this doctrine may include as a positional difference, between two things A and B, A being ten feet away from B but B not being ten feet away from B. Those that do may then judge Black's spheres to differ positionally since each has a distance from a sphere that is not the distance that the other has to that same sphere. Those that do not, may not because they regard Black as having failed to describe a

logically possible state of affairs. (Members of the former group might also regard Black as having described an impossible state of affairs.)

Let us say that if two particulars differ in the objects that each is or was spatially related to, or differ in the way in which each is or was spatially related to some object, e.g., one is or was ten feet from some object while the other is or was only nine feet away from that object, then those differing spatial relationships will be regarded as differences in position. Now let's consider two particulars, A and B, ten feet away from an object C. A has a certain position. It is ten feet away from C. It has the property "is ten feet away from C." It also has the property "is at a distance from C." Although B also has those properties, it might not have had them. Suppose that A had never existed. B still might then have lacked the property "is ten feet away from C." If C had never existed B might then have lacked the property "is at a distance from C." So, B might have lacked certain spatial properties that A has. In light of this let us say that given two particulars, A and B, if B had been at a different distance from an object that A is at a distance from, or had not been spatially related to some object that A is spatially related to, then B would have differed in position from A, i.e., the position of B would have been different from the position of A. In

short, the position of an object will be counted as the same position that some other object has, had or might have had only if each of those objects--under the conditions in which they exist, existed, or might exist--is spatially related the very same objects in the same ways.

Earlier I mentioned several ways in which particulars must differ from each other. However, I did not include in any of those ways positional differences. Let us now change the use of the terms "formal" and "nonformal." Even if two particulars did not differ in their spatial properties, there would still be certain ways in which those particulars must and would differ from each other. I will refer to those ways in which two particulars must differ from each other as "formal." For example, A has the property "is identical with A" but B does not have that property and B has the property "is identical with B" but A does not have that property. For A and B to differ from each other in that way is for A and B to differ from each other in the objects that each is identical with. But to differ in that way is to differ in a way in which all particulars must always differ. All particulars must be identical with different objects. Hence, for A and B to differ from each other by being either identical with A or identical with B is for A and B to differ in a formal way from each other. Let's take another example. Assume again that A and B are two copresent particulars. We may suppose

that B might have existed even though A had never existed. If that had been the case then certain portions of B, that are now spatially related to certain portions of A, would not have been spatially related to any of the parts or portions or constituents of A that they are now spatially related to. Let $\underline{b}'$ and $\underline{b}''$ be two portions of B, and $\underline{a}'$ and $\underline{a}''$ be two portions of A. A now has two portions, namely $\underline{a}'$ and $\underline{a}''$, spatially related to each other. If B was the noncopresent object that existed although A had not existed, B would have had portions $\underline{b}'$ and $\underline{b}''$ spatially related to each other. However, B could not have been a noncopresent object with respect to A, and still have had the properties that A in fact has. B would have had no portion spatially related to either $\underline{a}'$ and $\underline{a}''$. Hence, the two particulars A and B must always differ from each other in certain ways if either had been the noncopresent object that existed instead of the other. However, for noncopresent objects A and B to differ in that way is for them to differ in a way that all noncopresent particulars must differ in--with respect to the parts or portions or constituents that each would have as spatially related to each other. And to differ in that way is to differ in a formal way from each other.

Let us say that any properties that either copresent or noncopresent particulars must have in virtue of which they

differ from each other in a formal way are to be called "formal" properties. Two particulars, A and B, must, if they are copresent particulars, differ in the objects that each is identical with. They must differ in that way in virtue of the fact that A will be identical with A and B will be identical with B. So, the properties "is identical with A" and "is identical with B" are properties in virtue of which A and B differ in a formal way. Hence, they are formal properties. B must, if it is a noncopresent object with respect to A, differ from A in having portions or parts or constituents not spatially related to any of those of A that are themselves spatially related to each other. They must differ in that way in virtue of the fact that B must have some portion, b', not spatially related to some portion, a', of A under the condition that B and not A was the noncopresent particular that existed. So properties such as "has a portion spatially related to a'" or "has a portion a' spatially related to a'" are properties in virtue of which the noncopresent particulars A and B differ in a formal way under the condition that they are noncopresent particulars. Hence those properties are formal properties.

Particulars, whether copresent or not, must have properties that are not the same. They must differ in properties that are formal. In addition, they--whether copresent

or not--must have differences in the combinations of properties that they have. For example, A and B may both be red. A will have the property "is red" and so will B. A will also have the property "is identical with A" but B will not. A will therefore have the property "is both red and identical with A" but B will not. A will differ from B in being both red and identical with A. Let us say that any combination of formal and nonformal properties is itself a formal property. Also, any combination of formal properties with formal properties will be considered a formal property.

I am now in a position to state my view. Distinct particulars, whether copresent or noncopresent, must differ in formal properties. However, I do not believe that they must, under either condition, differ in their spatial positions, i.e., differ in the objects that each is spatially related to--as when A is either next to or at a distance from B but B is neither next to nor at a distance from A, or differ in how they are spatially related to objects--as when A is two feet away from C but B is only one foot away from C. And I do not think that they then must differ each other in some other nonformal way, e.g., by having different colors or historical properties. I therefore reject the following version of the II: No two distinct things can have all of the same nonformal properties in

common. I call this principle the "PII." A logically equivalent formulation of PII is the following: If A has all its nonformal properties in common with B, the A is identical with B. Defenders of the PII will hold that two particulars, whether copresent or not, must differ in some nonformal property such as a positional one. Some defenders of the PII might also hold that Black has described a possible state of affairs and that his spheres do differ positionally. Hence, he has not provided a counterexample to the PII. Defenders of the PII who hold the I/I may believe that Black has not described a possible state of affairs even though the PII is not violated by Black's purported counterexample to the II. I will argue that the PII, as well as the I/I, is not a true principle with respect to both copresent particulars and noncopresent particulars. But before I proceed, I will make a few last remarks that will serve as a summary. I have mentioned three principles in this chapter. They are the following:

- (1) The II is the principle that distinct things must differ in their properties.
- (2) The I/I is the principle that distinct things must differ in properties expressible by using property terms that are wholly general in meaning.
- (3) The PII is the principle that distinct things must differ in their nonformal properties.

Now, it should be remembered that by "things" we are restricting our domain of discourse to particulars. In addition, I

am taking these principles as claims that range over both copresent and noncopresent particulars. And last, I am going to argue that (2) and (3), i.e., the I/I and PII, are false and that they do not hold with respect to both noncopresent and copresent particulars.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

¹Edwin B. Allaire, "Another Look at Bare Particulars," reprinted in Michael J. Loux, 1964; *Universals and Particulars* (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1970), pp. 204-216.

²Max Black, "The identity of Indiscernibles," reprinted in Loux, 1954; *Universals and Particulars*, pp. 204-216.

³*Ibid.*, p. 205.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 204.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 205.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 206.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰Brand Blanshard, *Reason and Analysis* (Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1964), p. 398.

¹¹C.D. Broad, *An Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy* (London: Cambridge University Press, Vol. I, 1933), p. 173.

¹²Black, "The Identity of Indiscernibles," p. 211.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 201-211.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 211.

¹⁵*Ibid.*,

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 208.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 208-209.

¹⁹A.J. Ayer, "The Identity of Indiscernibles," reprinted in Loux, 1954; *Universals and Particulars*, p. 220. Ayer has

subsequently reversed his view on the I/I in "Names and Descriptions," *The Concept of a Person and Other Essays* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1968), pp. 129-161. However, Ayer does not tell us what he thinks was wrong with the arguments he previously put forth in behalf of the I/I.

²⁰Ibid., p. 220.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

²⁴P.F. Strawson, *Individuals* (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1963), p. 17.

²⁵D.F. Pears, "The Identity of Indiscernibles," *Mind*, (1955) Volume 64.

²⁶Ibid., p. 323.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Gerald B. Standley, *New Methods in Symbolic Logic* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971), p. 153.

²⁹Anthony Quinton, *The Nature of things* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 24.

CHAPTER II

I. Ayer's Defense of the I/I

In his article, "The Identity of Indiscernibles,"¹ Ayer presents his defense of the I/I as well as his criticism of Black's rejection of it. Ayer wants to argue that given any individual and the set of predicates descriptive of that individual, i.e., predicates purely descriptive in meaning, any other individual will have a set of descriptive predicates which must differ from the former set by at least one predicate.² If this is true then, according to Ayer:

. . . the principle of the identity of indiscernibles becomes analytic; for it will then be necessarily true that there is no difference between things that cannot be represented as a difference between properties.³

In effect, what Ayer is claiming is that the statement that different (distinct) things differ in their properties is analytic. Ayer's strategy requires that he establish that "to speak of different objects can only be a way of speaking of different sets of properties . . ."⁴ Given that, it follows according to Ayer, that to hold that different things have different properties is to hold that different "sets" of properties have different properties. And so, to assert the I/I is to assert an analytic truth.

Before we evaluate Ayer's claims about the analytic status of the II, let us examine Ayer's reason for believing

that statements about different objects are correctly analyzed into statements about different sets of properties. He tells us that the motive for holding that different objects are nothing but different sets of properties is that if we are to have an informative answer to "what the thing is that has the properties in question, the only informative answer that we can give is to enumerate further properties."⁵ We might think that there is something more to an object than the properties that it has. We might believe that what "remains undescribed is the thing itself, the substance, the 'unknown somewhat' in which the properties adhere."⁶ Ayer rejects this view since it concerns itself with an "unknown something" that is simply ". . . is a metaphysical invention."⁷ So given that

. . . it is a metaphysical invention, then it seems to follow that things can be differentiated only through their properties. And this, on the interpretation that we have given, is just another way of saying that things are different only to the extent that they are discernible from one another.⁸

Ayer's strategy is easy to state. First argue that things are nothing but "bundles of qualities" and then show that the II follows as a logical truth given that analysis of what a thing is. As for Black's purported counterexample to the I/I, a "possible way to meet it would be to maintain that such examples seem intelligible to us only because we

tacitly introduce into them some feature by reference to which we do in fact discern between the objects which we are supposing to be in discernibles."⁹

Ayer is not begging the question (of the truth of the I/I) by supposing that such examples as Black's seem intelligible to us, only because some sort of difference has been tacitly introduced by us in order to distinguish the objects that we are supposing to be distinct. Given his argument for the I/I, it follows that if there are distinct things then they must be different in their properties.

On Ayer's analysis, it appears that Black begs an important issue. Only by presupposing that the bundle analysis of a thing is wrong can Black's purported counter-example succeed. An approach like Black's seems to work only by assuming a false conception of the nature of a thing or, in other words, a false distinction between subjects and predicates.¹⁰

It is true that Black does not discuss the argument that Ayer uses in defense of the I/I. But even if he neglects to rebut Ayer's contention that things are merely bundles of properties, and Black's position presupposes for its truth that that contention is false, it does not follow that Ayer's position is correct. Black's argument against the II may be incomplete in certain respects. But whether or not Ayer's position is the correct one must be examined. I will do so now.

II. Evaluation of Ayer's Defense

Ayer's position is not clear enough for us to understand why, from what he says about what a thing is, namely, a bundle of qualities (properties), the I/I follows. There are several comments with regard to this point that I wish to make.

First, the reader may think that if we are going to analyze things into properties we should talk about "organized" or "related" bundles of properties to indicate that the properties of a thing are related to each other in such a way that without that relationship among the properties there could not be the thing which is held to consist entirely of those properties. The reader, if he wishes, may reinterpret Ayer (who does speak in this way in the following quotation) along this line. It will not affect what I say about Ayer's position.

Secondly, in *Language, Truth and Logic*, Ayer presents a view about the nature of a thing that seems to be very similar to the view that was just discussed.¹¹ To see the difficulties in Ayer's position it will be useful to examine that view. There he states that as a matter of fact, "we cannot, in our language, refer to the sensible properties of a thing without introducing a word or phrase which appears for the thing itself as opposed to anything which may be said about it."¹² He then goes on to suggest

that even though

. . . in talking of "its" appearances we appear to distinguish the thing from the appearances . . . that is simply an accident of linguistic usage. Logical analysis shows that what makes these "appearances" the "appearances of" the same thing is not their relationship to an entity other than themselves but their relationship to one another.¹³

From the preceding remarks of Ayer's, it appears that a thing is a bundle of "sensible properties." Another way of stating that point seems to be to say that a thing is nothing more than its "appearances." These "sensible properties" or "appearances" are also regarded as being related to each other in certain ways; and a thing is nothing more than those properties or appearances related to each other in certain ways. Perhaps what Ayer is saying can be understood in the following way: we see the various aspects (features) of things. For example, we see the color and shape of things. We see where it is at (located). We can observe what happens to it (its historical features). A thing is nothing other than all or some select group of the sensible aspects of it each of which has certain sorts of relationships to the others. Other terms synonymous with "sensible aspects" are "sensible properties" or "appearances."

If the notion of thing just sketched is what Ayer is referring to when he argues, via his bundle analysis,

for the I/I then it is hard to see how that principle is supported. Ayer has told us that the properties that he is referring to are capable of being shared. Two objects may, for example, be of the exact same shade of red. Each, with respect to that shade, might be exactly like the other. But if each may have a property in virtue of which they are like each other, how are we to interpret his analysis of a thing? Are we then to say that the sensible properties or appearances of each thing are themselves sharable? But what does that mean? Are we to suppose that the sensible properties or appearances are entities of a certain sort and that different objects may be constituted out of those very same entities? That sounds like the position of those who call themselves "realist" with respect to universals. They regard properties, or some properties, as entities of certain sorts each of which, or some of which, may be the very same constituent of distinct objects. But the author of *Language, Truth and Logic* warns us against treating universals as entities.¹⁴

However, Ayer certainly *seems* to speak about the "sensible properties" (appearances) as if they were themselves entities: in that they are said to be bundled together making up all that an object is and also capable of being sensed. Furthermore, even if we do interpret the sensible properties to be sensibly given entities, Ayer's argument

would still need further support if the I/I is to be a consequence of it. Some philosophers may regard the properties constitutive of an object each to be a numerically distinct entity from the properties of any other object. If, e.g., the objects are exactly alike in color, then that would say that the color of each is a numerically distinct entity from the color of the other. If so, then for objects to have different properties would be, in part, for them to have numerically distinct constituents (i.e., properties). It therefore still remains to be shown that such entities cannot be constitutive of objects without those objects being, in wholly general terms, completely alike descriptively--a possibility that defenders of the I/I would wish to deny.

Suppose that we interpret Ayer's talk about properties of things to be nothing more than talk about predicates true of an object. Will Ayer's argument then support the I/I? I do not see how. He would then not be making any claim about what makes up or constitutes objects. He would be speaking only about the predicates true of them. And in arguing against the "metaphysical invention" it would seem that he would then have been saying that there is nothing hidden from sense experience which must be or is referred to in order to either *describe* a thing, or to convey all the information there is about that thing. But if this is his

position, then why not hold that distinct objects might still be, in an essentially general way, descriptively alike? To hold that certain collections of predicates apply to each thing does not warrant the claim that distinct things must therefore have different predicates that apply to each. Whether or not we interpret Ayer's statement about a thing being a bundle of properties as a claim about certain "entities" within sense experience, he does not succeed in supporting the case for the I/I.

Thirdly, let us assume that there is a sense in which it is correct to say that distinct objects are different bundles of properties. How does that admission help the defenders of the PII or I/I? There are certain ways in which things differ from each other that philosophers have called "trivial." For example, to differ in the objects that each is either identical with or distinct from. So, why not hold that distinct things are different bundles of properties in virtue of those "trivial" properties? In other words, why not include those trivial properties as members of the bundles that things are and rest the case for the II merely on them? It does not follow from the mere fact that since things are different bundles of properties then those bundles must contain properties that support either the PII or I/I. That would still remain to be shown.

As the reader shall see, Ayer's approach to defending

the I/I, i.e., by arguing that things are nothing but bundles of properties, and his remarks on distinctness, e.g., to talk about different objects is to talk about different bundles of properties, are defended in various ways by different philosophers. I will now turn to an examination of other arguments given in support of various versions of the I/I.

III. Blanshard's Approach to the Problem

(A)

Blanshard defends a certain version of the II that seems to be the I/I.¹⁵ His defense includes an attack on Black's purported counterexample to the II. I will begin my examination and evaluation of Blanshard's position by first presenting his attack against Black's views.

Blanshard thinks that Black has not described a possible state of affairs. Blanshard's position is, in part, determined by what he regards as the unacceptable consequences of Black's arguments. If we want to say that the spheres, that Black describes, differ in their spatial relations because only one is above or to the left of the other we cannot, according to Black, correctly describe them as such. We cannot do so because "these relations could only exist from a point of view of an observer outside both, and that is excluded by hypothesis."¹⁶ In addition, Blanshard agrees

with Black if we want to distinguish each from the other by using expressions such as "A" or "B" to refer to each separately, we cannot do so. According to Blanshard, that would require that there be a means for "selecting one rather than the other to start with, and to start thus would be impossible, since there is no ground on which either could be distinguished from the other."¹⁷ In other words, if only one of the objects were to be referred to as "A", then that would require that "A" be used to refer to only A and not to B; and that can be achieved only if A is describable in a way that B is not. Blanshard wants it to be clear that Black has not supplied us with any means for distinguishing what Black claims to be two distinct objects. Blanshard is concerned that this point be clear, since it serves as the starting point for the attack against Black's position. It seems that for Blanshard, using expressions such as proper names is in some way dependent on the entities referred to being describable in terms none of which are proper names. I think that Blanshard believes that unless the I/I is true, no uniquely referring expressions of any type could be used to refer uniquely. Consider what else he states in support of his position that Black has not described a possible state of affairs. Is there a means by which each sphere could be distinguished from the other so that one could be called "this" and the other "that"? "No,"

answers Blanshard, not according to what Black says.¹⁸ But it is simply because of this that Black's purported counterexample fails. It fails, says Blanshard, because

. . . we who hold that twoness is based on dissimilarity are maintaining that where you have nothing on which you could base a 'this' and 'that', you cannot have two things; and hence to begin by saying in effect, 'Take a world consisting of two things that do not even differ as this and that,' is asking us to do what we are maintaining we cannot do.¹⁹

So, Blanshard does appear to hold that unique reference is achieved by mentioning in wholly general terms, some unique property or set of properties had by only that object. In addition, Blanshard accuses Black of having begged the question against the II and it also appears, against the I/I. But, has Black done what Blanshard says he has done? Black did not ask us to consider a universe in which two spheres had all their properties in common (with the exception of those having to do with each being identical or distinct from a sphere that the other is identical or distinct from). We were asked to consider a universe in which the only things that exist are two spheres alike in their nonrelational properties as well as each being at a distance from each other. It was *then* argued that with respect to such a universe it could not correctly be held that they differed in their relational properties, i.e., their spatial properties. Therefore a purported counterexample to the II was given without describing it by reference to "indistinguishable" things

existing in that universe.

Furthermore, it might be pointed out that Blanshard has so far done no more than deny the meaningfulness and/or possibility of a universe that his opponents have argued is possible. Opponents to Blanshard may add that the proposition that two things can have all their properties in common may be false, but it--as Wittgenstein once said--is nevertheless significant.²⁰ So, why should those of us that think that such a proposition is meaningful and have argued against it in a non-question begging way, reject as meaningless or impossible what seems to us to be neither? What Blanshard needs to do, if he is going to convince the opponents of the I/I, is to offer us reasons for doubting the significance and/or possibility of what seems meaningful and possible to his opponents. If he is not to beg the question in favor of the I/I, he must give us reasons for believing that he is not just failing to understand what is understood; or that he is not making an error in thinking that what appears to us to be possible is in fact not possible.

Blanshard does offer reasons for his rejection of Black's purported counterexample which do not consist of a mere denial of what his opponents think is significant and possible. However, the reader should note that Blanshard does seem to be convinced that Black has not described a universe in which the objects could be distinguished. In

the last chapter it was shown that two spheres such as Black's could be assigned different properties, e.g., by using their names if they are at some time named. And they could then be spoken about as they were *before* they were named. In addition, it was pointed out that Black failed to establish what he wanted to establish, namely that his spheres did not differ in any respects (excluding certain ones having to do with identity and distinctness). Yet, Blanshard seems to agree with certain arguments of Black that are not successful in establishing Black's position. So, if Blanshard is to successfully defend his position on Black's universe, what he has to show is that even if it is granted that two things at a distance from each other differ in the objects that they are at a distance from, that does not mean that Black has described a possible state of affairs. If Blanshard has no arguments against Black's position that do not themselves incorporate the mistakes Black makes, then Blanshard's position simply rests on the same mistakes that Black's position rests on. However, Blanshard does seem to have arguments that do not obviously rest upon those mistakes. In order to both interpret his position as being consistent and unique and give Blanshard the benefit of the doubt, I will consider him to be defending the I/I.

One argument that Blanshard uses in favor of the

I/I is based upon his claim that "we never ascribe twoness or otherness in the absence of any perceived distinction at all."²¹ If, to paraphrase Blanshard, I should look at a lamp-post and claim that there are two distinct lamp-posts in front of me, you may reply that you see only one. If I say that they have the same nonrelational properties, e.g., size, shape, and color, as well as spatial location, you would "harbour suspicions about my health of mind."²² This is one of Blanshard's arguments for the I/I. But how is this argument relevant to the truth of the I/I? Blanshard claims that it is because "otherness is based on dissimilarity, not dissimilarity on logically prior otherness"²³ that suspicions of the sort previously mentioned would arise. Blanshard wants to show, by way of his lamp-post example, that his position on the I/I is correct. Now, there does seem to be a connection between dissimilarity and distinctness. Situations that would ordinarily be described as involving two physical objects that look exactly alike are not situations that look like those that involve only one of those physical objects being seen. In the former case we see a dissimilarity not sensed in the latter--we see certain sorts of objects next to or at a distance from each other that are not seen in the latter case. But it is not clear how any of these admissions serve Blanshard's position. How, for example, does this show that Black has failed to describe a logically

possible state of affairs?

Let us interpret Blanshard as holding that if we perceive two physical objects, such as lamp-posts, then there must also be a dissimilarity of a certain sort between them such that that dissimilarity could be experienced by someone. For example, when looking at two lamp-posts that are near each other we see one in some place or position that the other is not in. So, their dissimilarity with respect to their locations is capable of being sensed by us. Blanshard seems to have such a view in mind, and he concludes from that that if someone claimed that they saw two physical objects that did not look dissimilar from each other in any way, then the situation that they claimed to have seen would be an impossible one. And, if they were serious about their claim, we would then have good reasons to doubt their mental health.

If the above line of reasoning is Blanshard's, then it faces difficulties in its use as a defense of the I/I. It is still not clear how Blanshard has avoided simply assuming the impossibility of a situation that he should justify as impossible, i.e., Black's universe. His example involves perceiving physical objects. And he seems to be arguing that no one could perceive two distinct physical objects that looked exactly like each other. But even if this is true it fails to support his position. If physical

objects must be dissimilar in the ways that Blanshard thinks that they must be dissimilar in order to be perceived, that does not mean that they must be dissimilar in those ways when they are not perceived. So, if a philosopher intends to argue for the I/I based upon considerations involving what pluralities of objects must look like, he must meet the objection that I have just mentioned. And Blanshard must meet these if he is to show us that Black has not even described a logically possible state of affairs. Let us examine Blanshard's position in further detail.

(B)

It might be thought that Blanshard has presented us the outlines of a successful argument for the I/I. Physical objects such as two chairs, rocks or trees, or lamp-posts, must be either next to or at a distance from each other. Anyone who claimed they saw two, e.g., lamp-posts that were not either next to or at a distance from each other, would not be taken seriously. Anyone who claimed that they saw two such physical objects alike in all their observable features, e.g., color, size, location, etc., would be claiming that he was seeing two physical objects that had no observable dissimilarity. But physical objects of those sorts must be either next to or at a distance from each other; no one could see two such physical objects if they did not differ at all with respect to position. As a result,

we, as Blanshard suggests, might then have good reasons for doubting the mental health of someone who seriously claims to see such a situation--he could not possibly be seeing a situation like that! In short, any two physical objects (that have no parts, portions, or constituents in common) must always be dissimilar with respect to the objects that they are at a distance from. Hence distinct physical objects such as two chairs or lamp-posts, must differ in their properties because they must differ in their position.

The argument above constitutes an important defense of the PII. I intend to show the reader, in my last chapter, how it fails to successfully support the PII. But for now, I wish to point out that this is not the line of defense for the I/I that Blanshard takes. Remember, Blanshard does not believe that Black has described a possible state of affairs. He does not state that any two objects that are at a distance from each other, differ in the objects that they are at a distance from. He does not appeal to that as one way in virtue of which Black's spheres differ in their properties. But the argument that we have just considered, does appeal to this consideration. And it does follow from it that Black's two sphere universe is impossible. That universe is one in which the objects do differ in their properties because they differ in the objects that they are at a distance from. What still remains to be shown is that

distinct particulars must differ in their spatial relationships in a way other than just differing in the objects that each is at a distance from or next to. Let us now see whether or not any of Blanshard's other arguments for the I/I support such a claim or the I/I.

(C)

Blanshard wants to show that there is a connection between the notions of distinctness and dissimilarity that can be appealed to to successfully support his position on the I/I. In defense of this position he writes the following:

How can you speak of 'each' of a pair or a series when you expressly remove the possibility, in either practice or theory, of discriminating one member from another? It is true that we often use 'each' without specifying what distinguishes one from another in a set; we speak of each of the beads on a string or of each man in a crowd. But in such thought there is always the presumption of a ground on which each *could* be distinguished if necessary: the third bead from the end can be marked off from the fourth; the man with ~~the~~ brown hat can be singled out from those around him.²⁴

Let us grant the claim that the use of an expression such as "each" to say something about a plurality of objects, requires for the correctness of the claim that the objects referred to by using "each" are capable of being distinguished in terms of their properties. But, an argument for the I/I, if it is to succeed in establishing that principle, must be stronger than this. It must do more than establish that

there is a connection between distinctness and dissimilarity such that two objects are distinct only if they also *could* be distinguished. First of all, any two physical objects could be distinguished if certain things were to occur. If, for examples, two spheres were named they could be distinguished from each other by using their respective names. In this way we could say which of the two we were referring to and assign different properties to each, e.g., "being distinct from Castor," "being called Pollux." An argument for the I/I would not be successful in establishing that principle if all that was established was that any two objects must be dissimilar from each other in some way. The dissimilarity of each from the other could then be a formal one. And such a difference could serve for our distinguishing one from the other in the sense of our being able to refer to each separately and/or to correctly assert that something is true about one and not the other. No two distinct objects are distinct from all of the objects that the other is distinct from. That can serve as the basis upon which they can be assigned different properties. In short, an argument for the II that involves showing that if an object is to be one object distinct from others it must be capable of being distinguished from any other object is not necessarily an argument for the I/I or PII.

If Blanshard is to establish his position he has to show that there must be a difference between objects that

is of such a sort that the I/I is true hence, Black has failed to describe a possible state of affairs.

Blanshard does seem to indicate that he has in mind a certain sort of difference that he believes must exist among objects. He says that "to count is to distinguish a first from a second, or a second from a third, by some observable difference which makes it another case."²⁵ Here, he holds that objects that can be counted have "observable differences" between them; and we may assume that Blanshard thinks that Black's spheres lack such differences so that Black has not described a universe in which there are two objects. Well, what are "observable differences?" And why must objects have them? Does Blanshard have any further arguments besides the ones already discussed? Notice the examples that Blanshard chooses to illustrate the sorts of differences that he is concerned about: cases concerning a difference in the position of each bead on a string, the color or shade of a hat, the position of two lamp-posts. And he states about such objects that "it is because they observably differ in some respect--in quantity, in location, in time--that we call them two."²⁶ If these are what Blanshard takes as the ways in which objects may have "observable differences" we still need to know why Black's spheres do not differ in that way, i.e., have observable differences. Each sphere is at a distance from a sphere that the other is not

at a distance from. Is that not sufficient for regarding them as differing in location and thereby having "observable differences?" Let's assume that for Blanshard it is not sufficient. And let's try to find reasons for why Blanshard believes that it is not a sufficient difference.

Blanshard tells us that "to count is to distinguish a first from a second, or a second from a third, by some observable difference which amkes it another case."²⁷ And Blanshard wants to convince us that there is a connection between numerical notions and observable differences such that from an analysis of the former it can be shown that there could not be, or it makes no sense to say that there could be, a plurality of objects that have no observable differences. Unfortunately, Blanshard does not elaborate upon his assertions in such a way that we can easily understand how the connection between numerical concepts and the notion of difference is as Blanshard suggest it is. However, I will state what I think might be Blanshard's reasons for holding the position that he does.

(D)

Imagine that you see several chairs. (This example and what I say about it is an elaboration upon Blanshard's own cases, e.g., seeing several lamp-posts, beads, men in hats, etc.). You want to count them and intend to do so by

counting one at a time. You look at one, count it, and go on to count another. You do not want to count the same object more than once. How can you manage to count each of the objects only once? Well, you can proceed to count according to a rule, e.g., you count from left to right; and the objects on the left nearest to you are counted before the objects on the left farther away from you (this might be only one part of the rule). The rule according to which you proceed need not be consciously formulated. One may simply remember which objects have been counted and proceed to count each of those not yet thought to have been counted. But in either case, i.e., where one follows a rule of the first sort or relies on memory, the objects to be counted must be distinguishable from each other. That is, there must be some feature (including as a feature of the object the object's position) that is (i) capable of being observed and (ii) unique to each object that is to be counted only once. For example, remembering which objects are the objects that have already been counted and which have not, requires some means by which they can be identified as the ones previously counted or not. If one is to count, without making an error an object previously counted cannot be judged as one that was not counted and vice versa. If two objects were to have all the same observable features, then one would have the features

remembered to belong to the one that was already counted. It would have those features associated with an object already counted and therefore would be judged to have been already counted. In short, determining without making a mistake in counting, how many of the objects there are of the sort that one is concerned to count involves not counting the ones already counted. And not counting those twice involves recognizing them as already having been counted. And that involves observing features unique to each by which each can be identified as having already been counted. So, when we see the exact same feature or features again of objects already counted, the objects with those features are taken to be objects already counted. In order both to count observable objects and to count them correctly those objects must have observable differences.

I think that the considerations about counting just stated have convinced Blanshard that there is a connection between numerical concepts and the notion of "observable difference." But I do not think that the above considerations show that the I/I must be a true principle, or that Black has failed to describe a possible state of affairs. Blanshard, given that he uses the previously stated argument, seems to think that there is a connection between determining the number of objects in a certain group and their having observable differences such that doing the former depends upon the

existence of the latter. And from this he seeks to derive support for the I/I. But his argument does not serve his purposes. We may determine the number of objects in a certain group in ways that do not involve perceiving differences of the sort that Blanshard believes must exist among diverse objects. For example, we may determine how many stars there are in a certain region of space by observing certain gravitational or optical effects. So employing numerical concepts correctly and determining the number of objects there are in a certain group of objects does not necessarily depend on perceiving "observable differences" of those objects. Blanshard's examples concern objects that have certain sorts of differences at the time that they are being perceived by someone who is perhaps also counting them. At best those examples only show that in order to determine the number of those observable objects by the method that Blanshard presents, i.e., looking at them in order to count them, the objects counted must have observable differences if they are to be counted (or perhaps we should say "correctly counted") by that method. But even if that is true it does not show that objects must always have differences of the sort that they must have if they are to be counted by that method. So, it does not seem that we have yet found a correct analysis of counting that successfully links it in such a way to the notion of differences among

objects that the truth of the I/I follows.

(E)

At this point a philosopher may wish to defend Blanshard's position in the following way. Blanshard has presented us with cases of perceived objects that may be counted. If they are perceived then they must exhibit certain sorts of differences that Blanshard says they will have. For example, each object must be located in a different area of one's visual field. So it will have a positional difference from the other objects in the same visual field. Since there might be objects that do not exist in anyone's visual field, e.g., two stars, it does not follow that they must still have the same sorts of differences, i.e., observable differences, as perceived objects must have. But this assumption is not true. Each star, for example, will still differ from the other in its location--which is an observable difference for Blanshard. Each star will have different positions with respect to the other physical objects in our universe. For example, two stars at a distance from earth will not have the exact same distance from every brick or portion of every brick of every building on earth. So, they will differ in their spatial relationships. The two star example does not show that Blanshard is wrong about observable objects differing in their location.

Let us concede that any two physical objects, such

as two stars, at a distance from earth will have "observable differences." However, it does not follow from that that Blanshard's position is the correct one. It still would not have been shown that those two physical objects *might not have been* the only two that existed. And if that is granted as possible, then it still needs to be shown why Black has failed to describe a possible state of affairs, since it still needs to be effectively argued that a universe consisting of only two physical objects, such as two spheres or two stars, must contain two physical objects that differ from each other in ways compatible with the I/I. The argument discussed in this section does not help Blanshard to establish the impossibility of a universe such as Black's.

(F)

Blanshard wanted to show us that the notions of counting, plurality, distinctness and discernibility are related to each other in such a way that a version of the I/I must be true. Furthermore, he wanted to show that Black has not described a possible state of affairs. Now, it might be thought that each of the notions just mentioned are related to each other in a certain sort of way, or certain sorts of ways that up till now, have not been elicited. Consider a case where several objects, say billiard balls, on a table are to be counted. In order for you to count

the number of billiard balls there are, you must know what a billiard ball is, then you must be able to identify an object as a billiard ball. And that also involves being able to identify something which is not a billiard ball as not being a billiard ball. For example, if you believed that a pair of billiard balls is what one billiard ball is, then you would not have the concept of a (one) billiard ball. So, having the concept of a billiard ball involves being able to identify both a billiard ball as a billiard ball, and something that is not a billiard ball, e.g., a plurality of billiard balls, as not what a billiard ball is. In short, if you have the concept of one billiard ball then you know how to tell the difference between one billiard ball and a plurality of billiard balls. If someone can tell the difference between two such cases, then one billiard ball can be identified as a case of only one billiard ball by that person: and a plurality of billiard balls can be identified by the person as a case of a plurality of such objects. Now, how might these considerations be used to support the claim that there are various sorts of relationships among the notions of counting, plurality, distinctness, difference, that entail the truth of the I/I?

A philosopher might argue that if someone could not tell the difference between a case of two billiard balls and a case of more than one billiard ball then he would not

have the concept of a billiard ball. And if we assume that two billiard balls could be so alike that we might not be able to tell if we had a case of one or more billiard balls--because there were no observable differences between them--it would not be possible for us to tell whether or not *any* case was a case of one or more billiard balls. And this contradicts the original premise that if we have the concept of a billiard ball then we are able to tell the difference between there being a case of one billiard ball and a case of a plurality of billiard balls.

One reply to the above argument might be to say that the defender of the I/I (who uses that reply) is confusing a conceptual ability with an epistemological one. In spite of the possibility of mistakes it is still logically possible for there to be a case of only one billiard ball and for me to be correct about the fact that there is only one billiard ball, e.g., on my table. And it remains logically possible for there to be only two billiard balls on that table and for me not to be correct about that fact also. So, denying the I/I does not entail that I do not have the ability, as the argument above suggests, to correctly describe a state of affairs as a case of one billiard ball and another state of affairs as a case of several billiard balls. It might be the case that I do not know whether or not I am correct about how many billiard balls are on some table.

But that is an epistemological matter, and the possibility that I may not ever be able to determine for sure whether or not my judgment is correct does not obviate the fact that I may be able to correctly describe some cases of one or more billiard balls as cases of one or more billiard balls. And if I can do that, then I do have the concept of one billiard ball.

At this point there are several replies concerning enumerating objects, that the defender of the I/I may make in behalf of the principle. In addition, there are several counterreplies that may be given to those replies. I will begin my examination of the replies and the counterreplies to those arguments under the next section.

IV. Enumeration: Replies and Counterreplies

Russell, like Blanshard, thinks that there is a relationship between the notions of counting and the II such that, from considerations concerning the former, it can be shown that the latter is a true principle. (Note that if there are good arguments for the I/I based upon considerations of counting, then those arguments also support the II.) Russell's argument can be seen as one reply to my last argument presented in the previous section. According to Russell, the rejection of the II

. . . makes enumeration theoretically impossible. Suppose you wish to count a collection of five objects, A, B, C, D, E and suppose that B and C are indistinguishable. It follows that, in the moment of counting B, you will also count C, and therefore you will conclude that there are four objects to be counted. To say that B and C are 'really' two, although they seem one, is to say something which, if B and C are totally indistinguishable, seems wholly devoid of meaning.²⁸

Russell presents us with a strategy for defending the I/I. He attempts to defend the II by arguing that an opponent of the II has not made a meaningful assertion if he says that two objects could be "totally indistinguishable" so that they may seem to be one but are really two objects. Russell does not make it clear why he believes this, but I will pursue some possible lines of defense for this claim.

(A)

One line of defense that we may omit as irrelevant to our concerns is as follows. A is assumed to be distinct from B. A is said to be "totally indistinguishable" from B. A therefore is not unlike B in any respect. But if A is distinct from B, and like B in every way, then B is distinct from B. But it doesn't make any sense to say "B is distinct from B." So, to say that A is totally indistinguishable from B is not to assert any meaningful claims.

This argument, even if sound, establishes only the truth of the II but not the I/I or the PII. Since we are concerned with whether or not a nonformal version of the

II is correct, e.g., the I/I or PII, this argument is irrelevant to our concerns. In addition, even if it is a good argument for the II, it does not succeed in establishing what Russell believes it establishes, namely, that given the II mistakes in counting cannot arise due to two objects being so alike that they appear to be only one. If A differs from B in having the property "being distinct from B" and B differs from A in having the property "being distinct from A," it does not follow from the fact that A and B are different in those ways that A and B cannot be so alike that one cannot tell whether or not one or two of them exist. This seems to be something that Russell does not want to admit, making enumeration "theoretically impossible." Since the argument for the II that we have just considered does not rule out this possibility, I will interpret, for the purposes of argument, Russell as defending the I/I and not merely the II.

(B)

It may be held that one way to defend Russell's position, as well as the PII, is by arguing for a criterion of meaning which rules out as meaningful counterexamples to either principle, e.g., a verificationist theory of meaning. Russell seems to be concerned with the possibility of correctly counting a number of objects, and he thinks that if the I/I is not true, then we would have to say that objects might not

be "distinguishable" from each other. If so, this would affect counting objects since, according to Russell, we would then not be able to tell or determine whether or not we counted correctly. However, Russell's objection is not to the claim that there always exists the possibility that we have not counted correctly. That would be too weak a claim. It seems that Russell's objection has to do with an inability to ever figure out how many objects there are. That is, he seems to be saying that the result of denying the I/I is accepting the possibility of objects being so alike that there would be no way that would be relevant to finding out if someone counted correctly or not in any given case. And such a supposition seems to entail, for Russell, that to say that "indistinguishables" can exist is not to say anything meaningful at all. Perhaps this is not Russell's position. But let us suppose that that is his position--since I think it likely that many philosophers have or would be sympathetic to it. It appears that Russell, and perhaps also Blanshard, believe that if the I/I is false then we could not ever tell if we counted some observed objects correctly. Why do they believe this? It seems that they think that denying the I/I is accepting the possibility of distinct objects being in the exact same place at the same time. And I think they believe that if that were to be the case, then such a situation would not differ

observationally from one in which there were not several objects in the exact same place at the same time. If the I/I is false then there would be no experiences relevant to determining whether or not several objects are in the exact same place at the same time.

First, let us consider whether or not it would be possible, under such circumstances, to specify observations that would be relevant to determining whether or not there is a plurality of objects that did not differ with respect to location.²⁹ Consider a world in which there were different sorts of extended objects that looked similar to some of the objects that we are familiar with, e.g., rocks, bodies of water. And imagine that no objects in that world behave in such a way that there was any need to explain their behavior by utilizing a theory about any structure that might be possessed by such objects. For example, the things that look like rocks do not behave as rocks do. If they are hit by something that would ordinarily shatter any rock, they do not break. Atomic theory serves no useful function for the prediction and explanation of the behavior of those objects. To use a technical expression of geology, there is simply not good reason to attribute "cleavage", i.e., structure by virtue of which they break more readily in certain ways than in other ways, to them. And upon observing the behavior of such objects, we might suppose that they have no molecular

structure at all. We might then explain their non-rock-like behavior by supposing that each is a continuous bit of stuff. In other words, I am asking the reader to consider a world in which objects need not be considered, for the purposes of simplicity, explanation and prediction, to be anything more than continuous bits of stuff.

I am presenting a view of extended things that may have been, in certain ways, similar to the view of physical objects that people had before they made references to bodies having a structure of composition hidden to sense experience. These things are to be viewed as made up of continuous bits of the same sort of stuff throughout. To view a diamond in this way would be to view it as composed of nothing that is not itself one bit (portion) of diamond. In addition, I am asking the reader to suppose that the behavior of these objects is so simple and predictable that empirical generalizations based upon observation of them can serve to predict all their behavior. So, any other theory about their composition that may be appealed to to predict these objects' behavior will not be either simpler, or more fruitful for purposes of prediction.

Now, let us modify our example and suppose that in such a universe the following also occurred. Whenever two bodies struck each other at a certain speed, say S_1 , (the same speed for all bodies) there occurs an odd phenomenon.

What happens can most easily be described in the question begging way that they "appear to merge" and "appear to reemerge." First, there are continuously decreasing sized portions (of what looks like portions of each object) external to and next to each other. Subsequently, there are continuously increasing portions (of what looks like the portions of each object) external and next to each other. Two objects, each of which looks exactly like the other, may strike each other, "merge" together so that what is seen looks like only one of those objects, and subsequently seems to "reemerge" and to continue in the direction and with the speed that "they" normally would have had, had each not struck any other object.

What I am concerned with here is the question of what the correct description is of the phenomena just mentioned. Should we say that the two bodies (or in some case portions of them) were in exactly the same place at the same time? Someone may object by saying that the existence of such an occurrence can best be explained by the inhabitants of that universe, supposing that those bodies have an atomic structure or some other sort of unseen structure. We might say, for example, that the entities that struck each other have atomic structures and that the atoms or molecules of each became so close that there emerged a new object composed entirely of what the two "merging" objects were composed of.

What was formed was an object that contained the intermingled atomic particles of both objects. And what followed this intermingling of particles was the eventual separation of these particles to form two distinct bodies external to each other and traveling in different directions.

It should be noted that the theory just proposed serves, in the type of world that has been described, to explain why one sort of phenomenon, namely, the "merging-reemerging" phenomenon. As a result, various complications now arise. Entities such as atoms and molecules, or some other sorts of entities, have been postulated only to explain one sort of phenomenon. Furthermore, various explanations about how those "atomic" entities behave, so that the behavior of the bodies composed of them can be explained, must also be explained. But, why do any of this? Why not, in the face of such a phenomenon say that the bodies in that world act in such a way that when they reach a certain speed, namely, S_1 (which holds for all objects), and strike each other, both (or portions of both) will then be in exactly the same place at the same time? (We may suppose them to be like that for some finite duration of just for an instant, e.g., at twelve o'clock but not before or after.) If we do suppose this, then we have an explanation for the odd phenomena in this world; and it is a simpler explanation than the one we get by assuming that each object has a "hidden"

structure. This latter theory adds a complexity to the analysis of the objects, and their behavior, that the former explanation can avoid. Remember, the latter theory serves no useful purpose beyond perhaps providing one explanation for one sort of occurrence. And the theory that certain objects, or parts and portions of objects, can have at the exact same time the exact same location, provides an explanation without postulating any further entities or structures.

At this point we may state an important point with respect to Russell's defense of the I/I. The simpler hypothesis that we have been considering as an explanation for the phenomenon previously mentioned, is compatible with determining how many objects there are in the exact same place at the same time. By observing the way objects behave in the world that we are discussing, we can calculate how many objects "merge" by looking at the number that "reemerge."

It might be objected that we may still not be able to tell when we have two or more objects at the exact same place. If copresent objects may not differ in their spatial relations to other things, then perhaps more than two merge but only two reemerge. We could not therefore determine how many are at the exact same location. Although this point may be conceded it cannot serve Russell's purposes. If he admits that it is possible for objects to "merge" then he has given up his defense of the I/I. If we adopt a theory of meaning

which rules out as meaningless the purported "supposition" that perhaps the number of objects that merge is in principle impossible to determine, it doesn't follow from that that we cannot hold it meaningful to describe what we see as the merging of two and only two objects--given that we see what looks like only two reemerge from the exact same place. Speculations about an indeterminate number of merged objects could be ruled out as meaningless, leaving us to describe what we observe in such a way that we need not suppose that it makes sense to say that there may be an indefinite number of merged objects even though we could never have any experiences which would be relevant to determining the truth of that claim. In short, Russell's belief (according to one interpretation of his position) that talk about "indiscernible" objects is meaningless because there is no way that would be relevant to the determination of how many of them there are at some given place-time, is not true. And I have tried to show that there could be observations that may be appealed to in order to determine whether or not several objects occupy the exact same place at the exact same time.

When philosophers discuss whether or not two copresent objects can be in exactly the same place, there is usually someone who will state that physical objects cannot be in exactly the same place at the same time since anything that behaves like that would not, by definition, be a physical object. But this response does not save the I/I. First of

all, even if true, that does not mean that there could not be extended things that were like physical objects in many respects except that they can both occupy, at the same time, the exact place. And such a possibility would be relevant to discussions over the truth of the I/I given that we are concerned to find out if it holds for any sort of thing and not just physical objects. Secondly, it is not so obvious that extended objects such as I have described would not be physical objects. If one of them had all the observable features of a rock except that under very limited conditions it could be at the exact same place as another object at the same time that that latter object is in that place, would we want to say that it was not a physical object? It is only under unusual circumstances that it can "merge" with another object. Nevertheless, as long as it is admitted that something can occupy the exact same place, at the same time, of another entity, that is relevant to the truth or falsity of the I/I. However, there are two further problems with Russell's argument for the I/I that I would like to mention.

(1) Even if a philosopher should put forth criteria or a criterion of meaning on the basis of which a purported counterexample to the II, or some version of it, is rejected, that philosopher would not have established the truth of his position. If a standard for judging whether or not someone has said anything meaningful has been proposed, we

may reject it as inadequate if it rules out cases that we think are meaningful. So, a philosopher who defends the II or some version of it by appealing to some theory of meaning, is in the position that he can be accused of not arguing but begging the question by adopting a theory of meaning that rules out as meaningless the very claim that his opponents think is meaningful. Hopefully, he will be able to show his opponents that if they do not adopt his views or some of his view on meaning, then they will be involved in holding inconsistent claims or claims that they themselves do not find acceptable. But, so far that remains to be shown to be the case for those who reject the I/I or the PII.

(2) Perhaps some philosophers who defend the II or some version of it believe that the only way in which the II or the version that they are concerned with can be shown to be wrong, is by first establishing the claim that two physical things can occupy the very same place at the same time. Perhaps Russell thought that that must first be done--the possibility of a universe such as Black's might never occurred to him. Someone arguing against the I/I does not, in order for his argument to be successful, have to argue that two things, e.g., two particulars, may at the same time have exactly the same location. Defending the possibility of Black's universe is another way to attack the

I/I. But, it might be thought, if the PII is to be charged with not holding for particulars, then surely the only way to do that is to show that two particulars may have, at the same time, the exact same location! I do not believe that this is the only way to argue against the PII; and I will not argue against it in this way. My purpose in taking up this issue has been to criticize the use of Russell's argument in behalf of the II or some version of it. My purpose has not been to lay the foundations for establishing the claim that distinct particulars can occupy, at the same time, the very same place and therefore may not differ at all with respect to location. What I have argued for may be used by someone who wants to attack some version of the II. However, I will not argue against the PII and I/I in that way.

V. Further Arguments for Versions of the II

(A)

McTaggart is aware of the argument that for any two substances a and b, a must differ from b with respect to being identical with a and distinct from b.³⁰ But according to McTaggart, "there must be some other dissimilarity between diverse substances, besides this one."³¹ Let us see if McTaggart has an argument for some version of the II interpreted in a nonformal way, e.g., the I/I or the PII.

He says that if we remove "in thought all difference of nature from two substances, we shall find that, when we have succeeded, we are no longer contemplating two substances, but one."³² Now, McTaggart, in line with what was previously stated, considers such properties as "being identical with a," "being distinct from b," not to be relevant to this "thought experiment." I think that what McTaggart is getting at is the following. Suppose that there is an object a. a has certain properties that could be possessed by some other object--either at the same time or at a different time. For example, some other object might have the size or shape or color of a. And some object other than a might have occupied the exact same place that a does--e.g., perhaps at some time in the past. But suppose that there is another object b like a in many respects but not in all respects. And let's say that the only sharable respects in which it differs from a, excluding being identical with a and distinct from b (and anything having to do with their parts, portions or constituents), are spatial ones. Now try to imagine that b had the same history as a, e.g., that b occupied the exact places as a at exactly the same times that a occupied those places. What you would be imagining, suggests McTaggart, is not some object b not identical with a, but a itself referred to as b. And states McTaggart, the truth of this claim is derivable not from "the impossibility of our dis-

tinguishing the two substances--which would not prove that there were not two--but from the recognition of the impossibility of diversity without similarity."³³

It might seem that McTaggart does not offer any justification for his version of the II. Furthermore, he seems to be merely presenting us with an intuition of his that he takes to be true but which cannot be used as a premise in an argument for the I/I or PII or some other version of the II without begging the question. However, it should be noted that the debate over the I/I and the PII need not end up simply as a clash of intuitions over the truth of the very principle itself. One side may have reasons for their intuitions which seem more acceptable than those of the other side. Later I will try to show that this is the case and that accepting either the I/I or the PII leads to several undesirable consequences. If I am right then those who derive their commitment to the I/I or PII on the basis of its "intuitive" appeal, might find themselves committed to what they may not be willing to accept--and which many of us, I suspect, would also not want to accept.

(B)

McTaggart has another reason for believing in the "dissimilarity of the diverse." He states that the

. . . nature of a substance expresses completely what the substance is. And the same complete expression of

what a substance is cannot be true of each of two substances. The substance is made this substance by its nature, and if the nature is the same, the substance is the same.³⁴

Here we are presented with a very sketchy, unclear argument in behalf of some version of the I/I. The "nature" of a substance is supposed to "express completely" what the substance is. And each substance is made the substance that it is because of the nature that it has. From these considerations, McTaggart concludes that no two substances can have the same nature and therefore diverse substances must be dissimilar. I will now examine this argument in greater detail.

McTaggart wants to show that no two objects can have the same nature and that, according to him, entails that all diverse substances must be dissimilar in certain respects.³⁵ From what McTaggart says we may conclude that having a nature seems to consist in having properties in virtue of which each substance is similar or dissimilar in certain respects to other substances. (Excluding perhaps formal properties such as "being distinct from b.") He also tells us that the nature of a substance "expresses" what the substance is, and is determined by what properties the substance has. Now, it might be held that (i) by having the properties that it does have, a thing is a certain sort of thing or various sorts of things, e.g., a red thing, a

round thing, etc., and without each or any of those properties it would not be the sort or sorts of thing(s) that it is. It might also be held that (ii) in order for a substance a to be identical with a substance b, b must have *all* and only the properties of a (or perhaps all and only those of a certain group, e.g., nonformal properties, of a). Either (i) or (ii) can serve as an explanation of what McTaggart means by saying that each substance is made the substance that it is because of the nature (i.e., properties) that it has. But how does any of this, if true, support the I/I or PII? Nothing said so far shows that either principle is true. At this point I would like to present two comments on McTaggart's position.

First, it should be noted that McTaggart does say that "a substance is nothing apart from its qualities."³⁶ But it should not be thought that he regards substances as wholes composed only of properties and concludes from that that different substances must therefore have different properties. He explicitly denies such a "bundle" analysis of a substance.³⁷ (Even if it were his position it does not obviously follow from that position that different substances must differ in those properties that would support either the I/I or PII. In my first chapter, I pointed this out.)

Secondly, there seems to be an ambiguity in McTaggart's argument for his version of the II. I think that it is impor-

tant to bring out this ambiguity, since I believe that philosophers other than McTaggart may easily fall prey to it or a related sort of ambiguity in arguing for versions of the II.

McTaggart talks about the "nature" of a substance. He says that it "expresses" what the substance is. But he fails to recognize that the expression "what the substance is" may be used in an ambiguous way similar to the way that the expression "makes the substance the substance that it is" may be used ambiguously. "What the substance is" may be used as in (i) above to mean "what sort of thing or sorts of things the substance is." But it may also be used as in (ii) above to mean "the substance that the substance is," in the sense of the one that it is identical with. And the expression "makes the substance the substance that it is" may be used to mean "makes the substance the sort of thing or sorts of things that it is;" or "makes the substance the substance it is identical with." It can now be seen how one can invalidly go from statements about the qualities of an object having a bearing upon either *what* the substance is, or "making" the substance the substance that it is, to the claim that diverse objects must be dissimilar. A philosopher may think that the properties of a thing "determine" or "make" the thing (e.g., substance) what it is. This may seem plausible if we interpret this to mean that the properties of a thing

determine what sort of thing or things the substance is. But having granted this, a philosopher may go on to interpret the expression "what the thing (e.g., substance) is" in a way that is different from the previous interpretation. He may then interpret what he said as meaning that the thing's properties of those of some specific set, that he has in mind, of the things's properties, determine what substance the substance is in the sense of determining the substance that it is identical with. What I am attempting to do, is to make obvious this faulty reasoning. It may account for some philosophers believing that the I/I or PII follow from the fact that *what* a thing is can be stated by mentioning its properties. Statements may be made about the properties of thing being related to what the thing is. And then those statements may be interpreted in a sense that is different from some initial interpretation of them that made them seem plausible and nonquestion begging. But the latter interpretation given to them is such that it is then thought that the properties of a thing, e.g., those expressible in wholly general terms, have a bearing upon what the thing is, in the sense of which thing it is identical with. But as I have shown this line of reasoning is faulty and needs to be exposed as such. I do not think that McTaggart's arguments for any version of the II will be very convincing to most philosophers. However, I have mentioned the one

that I have because, as just revealed, I think that they are conducive to instructive comments being made about them.

(C)

McTaggart makes a claim that suggests a previously unmentioned explanation for this belief in the dissimilarity of the diverse. McTaggart believes, as I previously pointed out, that a substance is not a whole whose only constituents are properties. He confronts the objection to his position (on the II) that if a substance is something not analyzable wholly into properties there may therefore be distinct substances that have (i) the same properties and (ii) something numerically distinct from what any other has.³⁸ McTaggart's answer, consists in part, in claiming that "when we try to explain what we mean by this distinct aspect of the substance--indeed, when we assert that it exists--we can only do so by asserting qualities of the substance."³⁹ He then concludes from this, along with the claim that substances have natures, that "it is therefore impossible to distinguish the substance from its qualities in such a way as to allow the substances to be different while their natures are the same."⁴⁰

Here we think we have an argument for some version of the II that utilizes in that argument the notion of "what we mean." McTaggart is saying that in order to identify which substance we are speaking about, or to make reference

only to one particular substance, we must mention that substance's properties. But, why conclude from this that some version of the II must be true? Let us explore this issue further by first turning to what another philosopher has, in a way similar to McTaggart's, argued.

(D)

What do considerations of what we mean have to do with the principle that diverse things must differ in their properties? Brentano answers

. . . that the concept of there being two things implies that we do not mean by the one what we mean by the other. Only in this way would there be one thing and not another. To be sure, they must both have in common the property of being a "thing" and they may have many other properties in common as well, but when one is thought of in terms of an exhaustive definition, it must be presented in some way that the other is not.⁴¹

Brentano, like McTaggart, relies on the notion of "what we mean" in establishing that diverse things must have different properties. Unfortunately his argument is not very clear. Suppose that you are thinking that two objects a and b are distinct from each other. Now, it is true that we can think about each as distinct from the other without also thinking of any properties unique to each. In order to think about the fact, for example, that at least two men have crossed river R at some time, we need not refer to any differences that they may have had from each other, or to the fact that

they were unlike each other in a certain respect. However, according to Brentano, even if "we are not in a position to have an intuitive presentation of the individuating property of a thing . . . we can still say that it is in reality never absent, and it would be discovered in an exhaustive definition of the thing."⁴² Now, why is that so? Why believe that the two things must have different properties? And why believe, as Brentano says, that the reason why that is so is implied by the very concept of their being two things? One interpretation of Brentano's argument is as follows.

Suppose that we had a list of all of the properties of something called "A" and those of something called "B." Let's say that the properties of A are $P_1, \dots, P_n$. A is an object that has all and only the properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$. We may define "A" as meaning "an object that has all and only the properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$." "A" may therefore be used to refer to A. Now, suppose that someone were to claim that there is another object B, that has all and only the properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$. B would then be an object that has all and only the properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$. But to say that, is to say that B is A since to say of an object that it is A is to say that it is an object that has all and only the properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$. And that means that to state that B can have all and only the properties that A has and still

not be A, is to state a contradiction. So, from the preceding remarks, it can be seen that no two objects can be alike in all properties.

I do not think that the preceding argument succeeds in establishing any version of the II. First of all, if "A" is defined as "an object that has all and only the properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$," then B is A, i.e., an object that has all and only the properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$. But that does not mean that one is thereby committed to the contradiction that one object, namely B, that is not identical with some object that is A, is identical with A. By saying that B is A we may wish to convey the information that B is an object that has all and only the properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$. We may mean by that claim nothing more than that B is an object that has all and only the properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$. But we may not. We may view that statement as an identity claim about an object referred to by "B" and another object referred to by "A" where "A" is not used to mean "is an object that has all and only the properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$." "A" and "B" each might be used as names of distinct objects without meaning "an object that has all and only the properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$." However, it does not follow from that that the objects referred to as "A" and "B" each might not have, or have had, properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$. If Black's spheres acquired the property "named 'Castor,'" then we can

use the expression "Castor" to speak about only one of them. And we may use it to state that properties that each had *before* they differed in that way. In other words, if two objects have the same properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$ then they still can be assigned different properties, e.g., if each should be named differently. And that would not obviate the fact that they could share all the properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$ before they ceased to share the same properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$. As I have previously pointed out,⁴³ even if proper names are shorthand descriptions neither the I/I nor the PII follows as a consequence of using each of them both as descriptions and uniquely referring expressions.

It might be held that any list of all the properties of B could not contain the same list of properties that A has given that A is not identical with B. That is so simply because there are formal properties, e.g., "being distinct from A," that each cannot share. But if the properties that Brentano is referring to do include formal ones, then he has not shown that the I/I or the PII is true. And that is what we are interested in finding out. So if he, as other philosophers do, intended to eliminate formal properties as relevant to the discussion of the II, then his argument, as I have interpreted it, fails to support either the I/I or PII.⁴⁴

(E)

So far, an argument for the I/I or PII that appeals to the notion of "what we mean" has not been shown to successfully defend either principle. But we may view that argument in a way that I have merely alluded to. That way is presented by Russell in his book on Leibniz.⁴⁵

Russell thinks that Leibniz has argued, in a way not consistent with his own philosophy,⁴⁶ for the II by accepting the premise that whatever "can be validly said about a substance consists in assigning its predicates."⁴⁷ And Russell thinks that if that is true, then the "substance is, therefore, wholly defined when all its predicates are enumerated . . ."⁴⁸ And from these considerations Russell concludes that

. . . if a substance is *only* defined by its predicates--and this is essential to the identity of indiscernibles--then it would seem to be identical with the sum of those predicates. In that case, to say that such and such a substance exists, is merely a compendious way of saying that all its predicates exist.⁴⁹

Here, Russell views the defense of the II to rest on a certain conception of a substance. The reader should not be confused by Russell's apparent identification of substance with collections of *predicates*. Russell is speaking loosely (inaccurately) here. He speaks about a substance as something made up of only ". . . qualities which are supposed to be its

predicates."⁵⁰ But Russell is presenting us a certain argument for the II that he attributes to Leibniz, namely that "a particular is constituted by qualities; when all its qualities have been enumerated, it is fully defined."⁵¹ Russell does say why he thinks that such a view commits one to the II. "Indeed [states Russell] if we admit that nothing can be said about a substance except to assign its predicates, it seems evident that to be a different substance is to have different predicates."⁵² In other words, if a substance is a whole composed only of qualities, then a different substance must be a different whole with different qualities. How does this show that the II is true? If we say that different substances can have numerically distinct instances of exactly the same sorts of (nonformal) properties, e.g., that there are numerically distinct instances of the same shade of red, then can't we avoid holding the I/I or PII even if it is granted that substances are wholes constituted only by their properties? Such a possibility is denied by Russell. In *Human Knowledge, Its Scopes and Limits* (which is where the previous quotation was taken from and where Russell summarizes how he thinks Leibniz treats the concept of a substance) he states that "when the same shade of color exists in two places at once, it is one, not two . . ."⁵³ There he treats the properties of things as universals. If two things are exactly alike in color, then,

according to Russell, the color of each is the identical property of both. So given the bundle analysis of a thing, anything with exactly the same properties as some entity A, purported to be distinct from A, is really identical with A.

We can now have a new interpretation for the argument that if some entity A has all and only the properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$, then any entity B that has all and only the properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$, is identical with A. A can be defined as "an object that has all and only all of the properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$." And, if some object B is said to have all and only the properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$, then B has been defined as A was; and given that the properties of things are treated as universals entirely constituting the thing, B would be what A is, i.e., identical to A. And a defender of this bundle analysis may claim that the properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$, may be those that are expressible only in purely general terms. In other words, it may be thought that the I/I is true as a result of what a thing is, namely, a bundle of properties expressible in wholly general terms purely descriptive in meaning.

One way to deal with this argument is to show that things such as particulars, e.g., chairs, tables, and rocks, are not wholes whose constituents are only universals. I will discuss this position in greater detail in my next chapter. And I will offer criticisms of it so that I may

offer a well defended and supported position of my own
against both the I/I and PII.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter II

¹A.J. Ayer "The Identity of Indiscernibles," reprinted in Michael J. Loux, 1954; *Universals and Particulars*, (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1970), pp. 217-234.

²Ibid., p. 219.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 220.

⁵Ibid., p. 221.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid., p. 222.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 223.

¹¹A.J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1952), p. 42.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 57-8.

¹⁵Brand Blanshard, *Reason and Analysis* (Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1964), pp. 395-9.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 396.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 397.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1960), 5.5302.

²¹Blanshard, *Reason and Analysis*, p. 396.

²²*Ibid.*

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 397.

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 396.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 397.

²⁸Bertrand Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (Baltimore: Pelican Books, Inc., 1967), p. 97.

²⁹The example that I present is similar to the one discussed by D.J. O'Connor in "The Identity of Indiscernibles," reprinted in Loux, 1954; *Universals and Particulars*.

³⁰John McTaggart, *The Nature of Existence* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 96.

³¹*Ibid.*

³²*Ibid.*

³³*Ibid.*

³⁴*Ibid.*

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 96.

³⁷*Ibid.*

³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 97.

³⁹*Ibid.*

⁴⁰*Ibid.*

⁴¹Franz Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, ed. by Oskar Krauss and Linda McAllister, translated by Antos C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, and Linda McAllister (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 314.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³I discussed this point at length in my first chapter. See Chapter I, section III.

⁴⁴There are certain arguments of Bradley's that appear to be similar to those of McTaggart and Brentano. For a discussion of those arguments see Richard Wollheim, *F. H. Bradley*, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 149-156. In my last chapter I deal with many of the issues that Wollheim raises.

⁴⁵Bertrand Russell, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1967).

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 58-59. I do not think that Leibniz reasoned in the way that Russell suggests that he did when Leibniz attempted to argue for the II. I think that careful examination of Leibniz's works shows that he regarded the II to be based on the contingent theological principles of sufficient reason. See, for example, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, edited and translated by Leroy Loemaker (Illinois: University of Chicago Press, Vol. II, 1965), pp. 1139-1140.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 58.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 59.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 60.

⁵¹Bertrand Russell, *Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), p. 292.

⁵²Russell, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, p. 58.

⁵³Russell, *Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits*, p. 298.

CHAPTER III

In the last chapter I mentioned an analysis of things, such as colored shaped objects, according to which such things are wholes composed ultimately of universals. I will call that view of the nature of an object the "Realist Bundle Theory" (henceforth RBT).

In this chapter I will argue both that the attempt to derive the truth of either the I/I or PII from the RBT does not succeed. In order to do this I will show how the defense of the RBT itself requires acceptance of a version of the II that remains to be justified. Afterwards, I will argue that the RBT lacks explanatory power and as a result the justification for believing the RBT is undermined.

With respect to my first claim, my strategy involves showing that there is a certain dubious version of the II that needs to be assumed as true in order for the RBT to be established. And unless it is assumed as true, the defender of the RBT is not justified in both holding that the RBT is true and in rejecting as a possibility at least one of the alternatives to the RBT that will be mentioned. I will also show why the truth of any of those alternatives do not entail the truth of either the I/I or the PII. So, I am going to argue the case that even if the RBT might be true, it can be shown that we would still not be justified in holding that it is anything more than a contingently true

view to which there are alternatives that do not entail the truth of either the I/I or the PII. To show that either of those principles is true one has to show that all objects *must* differ in certain ways. But the defense of the RBT is at best successful in establishing the RBT as one possibility among alternatives that do not entail that objects must be as the I/I or PII requires. So, if I show this, then I will have shown that defending either the I/I or the PII by appealing to the RBT does not succeed. Before I start, I will now make a few additional remarks concerning my approach.

The RBT theorist has a certain conception of what a colored shaped object, e.g., a table, is. The RBT theorist believes that such objects are composed of universals and universals are properties. However, as I shall use the term "RBT," that theory need not commit its holders to the view that all the object's properties are entities. A defender of the RBT may want to hold, e.g., that the property "is identical with A" is not an entity of any sort, i.e., that an object A's identity with itself is not any sort of entity.

Now, according to the RBT, the properties that objects have may be shared. Two red objects that are exactly alike with respect to color are both comprised of an entity that is the very same universal, namely, the color of each. The red color of the one is literally the very same entity that the red color of the other is.

One question that we may wonder about with respect to the RBT is: Why should we believe that any of the properties of objects are entities.¹ And we may also want to know why, if they are entities, one should not hold that each property is a numerically distinct entity from any other property. For example, why not say that the color of one object is a numerically distinct entity from the color of another object even though both objects are exactly alike in color? How can the defender of the RBT prove that two distinct objects exactly like each other in certain respects do not have properties that are all numerically distinct from each other? If the defender of the RBT cannot establish that point, then he has failed to show that his position, even if true, is not merely a contingently true one. I will discuss the RBT, in part, by examining and evaluating the claim that two objects may be exactly alike with respect to color yet have only numerically distinct properties. It is through a discussion of this claim that I will show how the RBT fails to successfully support either the I/I or PII.

In the first part of this chapter, section I, I present my argument that even if we hold the RBT to be true, we are not justified in holding it to be anything more than a contingently true position to which there are alternatives that do not entail either the I/I or PII. In the second part of this chapter, section II, I attempt to undermine the

reasons for believing in the RBT by showing that it lacks explanatory power.

I. The RBT as Contingently True

One view put forth against the RBT is that of Stout.² According to Stout, a "character characterizing a concrete thing or individual is as particular as the thing or individual which it characterizes."³ On this view, two things no matter how similar they are to each other, have numerically distinct characteristics (properties). For example, on this view the white of one piece of paper is a numerically distinct characteristic from the white of another piece of paper even though both pieces of paper are exactly alike with respect to color. Each has a characteristic in virtue of which it is colored white. The white of each is distinct from the white of the other, and each is a characteristic of a certain kind or sort that is the same kind of characteristic that both have. To have either of those characteristics, or that sort of characteristic, is to be colored white. Defenders of this view have called such (particularized) characteristics "abstract particulars." I will therefore refer to their position as the "Abstract Particular Theory" (henceforth, APT).

Now, one way to view and interpret the APT is as

follows. The APT is a position put forth in opposition to the RBT. According to the RBT the characteristics of things, or at least some of them, are entities called 'universals'. Each entity is sharable, i.e., distinct objects may have characteristics that are the very same entities that are the characteristics of another object or other objects. For example, the color of each object exactly alike with respect to color is the very same entity that each of those objects have as its color.⁴ But the APT opposes the view that the characteristics of things are universals. According to the APT, as I will interpret it, at least some of the characteristics of objects are entities but none are universals. So, e.g., each color of each object is an entity that is not identical with any entity that is the color of any other object--no matter how similar the color of each object is to the color of the other object. As I have said, the entities regarded by the APT as the characteristics of objects are called "abstract particulars." If two objects are exactly alike in color the RBT theorist would say that since the color of each is exactly like the color of the other, the color of each is the very same entity, namely, a universal. The APT theorist would say that even though the color of each is exactly like the color of the other, the color of each is a numerically distinct entity from the color of the other, namely, an abstract particular.

If a defender of some version of the II appeals to the RBT to establish the truth of that version, then he may do so in at least two ways. He may try to show that that version of the II is true simply because the RBT is true. That means that that version of the II follows from the RBT and that no other alternative to the RBT could be true--otherwise, it would not follow simply on the basis of objects being as they are taken to be on the RBT, i.e., only bundles of universals. To argue for the II or some version of it in this way is therefore to argue that the RBT is necessarily true. The other way for a defender of the RBT to use that position to argue for some version of the II is to argue as follows. Although the RBT is contingently true at best, when true, objects are as that version takes them to be and when not true, objects would still be like that since it follows from each alternative to the RBT, that objects must differ from each other in ways that are compatible with that version being true. However, if, as it will be shown, there are alternatives to the RBT, such as the APT, that do not entail that objects differ from each other in the relevant ways, then appealing to the RBT to defend some version of the II involves showing that the RBT is necessarily true. The defender of the RBT must show not only that the APT is false, but that it could not be true. And he must do so in such a way that no tenet used

to establish the falsity of the APT, undermines his own position. In short, he has to show us that the characteristics of things must be universals and not anything else such as abstract particulars. Establishing this position involves establishing the following two claims. First, that the characteristics of objects, or at least of some of those characteristics, are themselves entities. Second, that these entities are not abstract particulars but universals. I now proceed to discuss the first of these claims. (Remember, I am using the expressions "property," "characteristic," and "quality" interchangeably. However, in this chapter, for purposes of speaking most naturally about the topics that I will deal with, I will use the expression "characteristic(s)" more often than the others.)

(A)

Consider the following view of a body that Hume expresses:

'Tis confest by the most judicious philosophers, that our ideas of bodies are nothing but collections form'd by the mind of the ideas of the several distinct sensible qualities, of which objects are compos'd, and which we find to have a constant union with each other. But however these qualities may in themselves be entirely distinct, 'tis certain we commonly regard the compound, which they form, as ONE thing, and as continuing the SAME under very considerable alterations.⁵

Hume goes on to consider why, if bodies are compounds of qualities, we neglect to notice this fact. However, I will

not discuss the answer that Hume offers. For my purposes, I will attend only to the notion of a body that Hume presents.

According to the previous quotation, it seems that Hume regards a body, e.g., a table, as a collection of sensible qualities that have a certain relationship to each other. Bodies, according to Hume, are "bundles" or groups of characteristics related to each other in certain ways. These qualities or characteristics form a collection of a certain sort that makes the body a compound, i.e., a whole, whose parts are those characteristics.⁶ Furthermore, the qualities are "sensible." That is, they are capable of being sensed by us.⁷ This is an important point. Hume seems to provide us with a defense for the view that objects (here to be understood as colored shaped things) are complex, i.e., wholes composed of distinct parts. The defense of this view is simply that one can sense the distinct qualities making up the parts of an object. What we are sensing when we sense those parts are, according to Hume, qualities of the object. We can see the color of an object. We can see the shape of an object. And Hume suggests that if we are careful not to let our minds trick us into thinking that bodies are uncompounded, we may find "that all these qualities are different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other . . ."⁸

In accordance with the above view of the nature of a body, a philosopher may begin to argue as follows, in

behalf of the RBT. Consider Hume's point about the visible complexity of a body in light of what follows. Suppose that you have two red stamps, A and B, and one yellow stamp C. A and B but not C are exactly alike in color. B and C but not A are exactly alike in shape and size. In looking at the stamps one can see the red color that A and B but not C has. One can compare the color of A and B with the color of C. One can see the color of each stamp and notice how alike the color of A is to the color of B as well as how dissimilar the color of A and B is to the color of C. Just consider certain experiences you may have with color comparisons.⁹ Suppose that you are painting a wall of your house. You want to paint only a portion of that wall, but you want the color of the freshly painted portion to match the color of the portion of the wall that is not to be painted. You know that freshly applied paint dries to a different shade of color than it had when it was first applied. You have several batches of paint. So you decide to choose the batch of paint that you will use on the wall by comparing the color of boards painted with paint from each batch. Those boards have only dry paint on them. You then, in good lighting, hold each board up to the wall to compare the color of each with the color of the wall. You do this because you hope to find an exact match in color. The test of whether or not the wall and board match in color is, for you, a visual one. That is, you

look at the board and the wall to see if the color of the one looks like the color of the other. You may still see the shape of the board, and perhaps the shape of the wall as well. They may not have the same shape. But you do not reject the board's color being exactly like the color of the wall because of that. What you are comparing is the color of the board to the color of the wall, and not the shapes of the board and wall. You may sense the shape of the board and wall, but you focus attention on the color of each so that you can see if (to you) they look exactly alike. The test, in this case, of exact likeness in color is carried out by comparing the board's color with that of the wall. One looks at the color of each to see if the color of each looks exactly like the color of the other. And if they do, then that constitutes evidence for one of the buckets of paint containing paint that will dry to the shade of color that the wall has.

Let us now turn to the case of shape. Köhler presents an example designed "to clarify the concept of shape as a visual attribute."¹⁰ (That is, it is designed to show that the concept of shape is the concept of a visual attribute, or to put his point more simply, one of the visual attributes of an object is its shape.) Suppose that we are well acquainted with how a certain country, as depicted on maps, is shaped. Now suppose that we see a map that con-

tains certain areas shaped in unfamiliar ways and an area representing the country whose shape we are familiar with. Köhler makes the following observation about what often occurs. "Suddenly . . . a radical change occurs in our visual field: the unknown shapes disappear, and the well-known shape of the country in question emerges in perfect clearness."¹¹ Here Köhler is trying to show us that in this case there is a certain phenomenon that occurs. That phenomenon is describable as the shape of the country becoming visually prominent. Something "stands out" from the rest of the map and that something is the shape of the familiar country. We can see it. It is a visually presentable item and it may be more prominent than other features of what you see.

One may have seen, by successively shining differently colored lights on objects, colored shaped objects that appear change rapidly in color. Notice that as the color rapidly changes, you may still see something that does not change, namely, the shape of the object. The object may move around. It may appear to change rapidly in color. But, there is something that still may look the same. The object has not changed its shape. The shape may look, from moment to moment, exactly what it previously looked like. Once again, here is an instance of where what it is that noticeably stands out is the shape of some object.

From considerations such as the ones just stated,

some philosophers may conclude, in agreement with Hume, that bodies are wholes comprised of qualities (characteristics, properties) that are visibly presentable. In their view, such objects as well as any colored shaped thing, may be regarded as complex. That complexity consists in entities that are characteristics of objects making up the objects that have those characteristics.¹² And, it may be claimed, any philosophy about the nature of objects that denies or ignores the sensible complexity of objects fails to give us an adequate view of the nature of objects. In short, at least some of the characteristics of an object are entities of certain sorts.

(B)

At this point a defender of the RBT may now proceed to the second stage of his argument in behalf of the RBT. He will now attempt to answer the following question. Given that at least some of the characteristics of an object are themselves entities, and given two objects exactly alike in color, why must the entity that is the color of one of them be identical with the entity that is the color of the other? In other words, why must the characteristics of each, or at least some of them, be universals and not abstract particulars? One answer to the question has been given by Blanshard. I will now explore that answer.

(1)

Blanshard asks us to consider two stamps that are exactly alike with respect to color. He states that

. . . if there is no difference between them, we are moved to ask, what ground have you for calling them two? If, as you admit, there is no qualitative difference, does not that mean that there is qualitative identity? How can you both admit that the qualities do not differ and deny that they are the same? This looks like sheer self-contradiction.¹³

In response to Blanshard's assertions it might be claimed that the color of each does differ in a certain respect from the color of the other--namely, in its spatial location. Consider, for example, the fact that a red stamp in the left part of my visual field is at a distance from a red stamp in the right side of my visual field. The color of each stamp may look exactly like the color of the other stamp. But, isn't the color of each also situated in a different part of my visual field? Furthermore, hasn't Blanshard begged the question? The APT theorist claims that the color of each object is numerically distinct from the color of any other object--no matter how alike the two objects are with respect to color. And doesn't Blanshard simply beg the question by taking this to mean that the color of each must be identical? That is the very point at issue! So, why not say that they differ numerically and perhaps also that they differ in position? Why assert that they are universals and no abstract particulars?

Blanshard could reply that he has not begged the question. He may say that he has available to him a justification for his belief that the color of each stamp is and must be a universal. This justification is such that an appeal to different places cannot be successfully utilized to prove that there are two colors each of which is in a different place. Although the color of each of the objects may be in a certain part of one's visual field it does not follow from that that the very same color is not in both parts of the visual field. In fact, the principle that no entity can be in two locally separate places at the same time must given up.¹⁴

When we explore Blanshard's writings to find what his justification is for holding that if the color of one object is exactly like the color of another object then the color of each object is identical with the color of the other object, we find that it consists in adherence to some version of the II.¹⁵ His version of the II is one from which it does not follow that if A is at a place that is locally separate from the place that B is at, then A is not identical to B.

But, how can he establish the claim that at least some of the characteristics of things are universals without begging the question as to the truth of that version of the II? Blanshard's arguments for his version of the II are, as we

saw in the last chapter, unsound. Furthermore, Blanshard's version of the II is not justified by the failure of Black's example to be a counterexample to the II. As I have shown, one reason why Black's example failed in that respect is because his spheres differed in certain spatial characteristics. Blanshard has proposed a version of the PII according to which different spatial characteristics are not relevant to the support of the PII. So, appealing to Black's failure in order to establish the existence of universals does not, by itself, succeed in establishing that. Consequently, Blanshard is still in the position of having to successfully defend a nonformal version of the II. However, if in spite of this he should accept his version of the II anyway, then he has simply begged the issue. In short, Blanshard's defense of the RBT by appeal to some version of the II does not succeed. Let us now turn to another approach to establishing the claim that at least some of the characteristics of things are universals and could not be abstract particulars. This approach is, in certain respects, similar to that of Blanshard as exemplified in the previous quotation.

(ii)

The defender of the APT does not believe that the color of one object is the identical entity that is the color of any other object. He does not believe that universals

exist. Instead, he commits himself to the view that the color of each object is a numerically distinct entity from the color of any other object. In light of this, the APT theorist describes, e.g., two chairs, as being *alike* or *exactly alike* in color. There is according to him, therefore some respect or way in which colors themselves are either alike or exactly alike. If presented with two red chairs he may say that the red of the one is like or is exactly like the red of the other. But what if each is scarlet in color. How would he compare the chairs with respect to color? Well, he might say, e.g., that the scarlet color of one is exactly like the scarlet color of the other. He might speak in this way given that the color of each chair is scarlet. But now, doesn't a problem arise with the APT? How can it be correctly denied that the color of each is the very same color that is the color of both? If, as on the APT, we say that the color of one is *not* the very same color as the other, then we would be denying that both are exactly alike with respect to color! This may be shown as follows. Suppose that two things, A and B, are exactly alike in color. Let's say that each is colored "pure scarlet," and that nothing could be pure scarlet in color unless it was exactly like either A or B in color. We want, on the APT, to say that the color of A although exactly like the color of B is numerically distinct from the color of B. But, if the

color of A is pure scarlet and we deny that the color of B is the color that is the color of A, then we are denying that the color of B is pure scarlet. And if the color of B is not pure scarlet (which is the color of A), then contrary to assumption, A and B are not exactly alike with respect to color. It therefore seems that on the APT, the absurd result follows that no two things could be exactly alike with respect to color.¹⁶ If A is exactly like B in shade of color then it follows that the color of each must be the very same color that both have. It "...is part of our notion of a shade that where no difference is discernible we have the same, not similar shades."¹⁷ If I wanted to tell you that A and B were not exactly alike in color or shade of color, I could do so by saying that A has a color that is not the very same color that B has. To deny that the color of one object is the color of another object is to deny that the objects are exactly alike in color. So, given our notion of a color or a shade of color, Blanshard is correct in holding that it is contradictory to say that the color of A is exactly like the color of B but the color of A is not identical with the color of B. And the defender of the RBT may now draw the conclusion that if the color of some object is exactly like the color of another object, then the color, itself being an entity of a certain sort, is a universal and cannot be an abstract particular.

It has just been claimed that our notion of color is such that where the color of one object A is exactly like the color of another object B, it follows that the color of A is the very same color that is the color of B. One reply that might be given to this argument is as follows. The argument simply begs the question. It relies on considerations about how we ordinarily speak. We do often say that the color of each of two objects is the same if the color of each is exactly like the color of the other. But we also "say that the two colors are completely alike, or are exactly the same kind of color."¹⁸ And it is this latter way that is the more exact. By speaking in this way we do not appear to be asserting an identity between the color of one object and the color of another. The question of their identity is left open. Our ordinary use of the word "color" is such that either of these modes of speaking is familiar, and to appeal to one to decide the issue is simply to beg the question.¹⁹

I think that it is correct to say that we do speak about the color of each of two objects being exactly like the color of the other object. However, the previous argument that appealed to our notion of color does not appeal to our ordinary way of speaking to establish its point. The proponent of that argument can hold that the correct answer as to whether or not the color of each of two objects is the very same color, if the objects are exactly alike with respect to color, is

not decided by appeal to what we ordinarily say. But, he may claim, the point that was made in favor of the RBT by mentioning what our notion of a color is, was established by an argument that reduced the APT to absurdity. And that was done without appeal to what our ordinary usage is. Given the tenets of the APT, and certain true claims about objects being exactly alike in color, it was shown how the APT entails the result that two objects cannot be exactly alike with respect to color. Two objects, A and B, exactly alike with respect to color were considered. We named the shade of color that each was colored "pure scarlet." There is nothing objectionable about this. Distinct objects may be colored in exactly the same way and described in some way that is exactly the same way. They may both be describable as red, or burgundy, or "pure scarlet" in color. But if this is so, which it is, then the APT cannot be correct. If we say that the color of A is pure scarlet and is exactly like the pure scarlet color of B then we have identified the color of each in such a way that it then follows that the color of each is identical. By admitting, e.g., that the color of A is pure scarlet, we have said what the color of A is. We have given information concerning which color, among many, is A's color. And if we then go on to admit that since distinct objects may be describable with respect to color in exactly the same way so that the color of B may

also be pure scarlet, then we have identified the color of B with what was identified as the color of A. And this is not just to mention how words are used. It is to say what color the color of A is, and what color the color of B is. And if the color that is the color that A is, is the color which is the color of B, then the color of B has been identified with the color that is the color of A. This shows us that if the color of A is exactly like the color of B, then the color of B is also the very same as the color of A.

The defender of the APT might respond to the previous argument in the following way.²⁰ It is, we may be told, important in understanding the APT to recognize a distinction between the characteristic of an object and the sort to which the characteristic may belong. The color of each is a characteristic of that object. If the object is pure scarlet in color then any object exactly like that one in color is also colored pure scarlet. We may say that they have the same color--but what that means (or should be taken as meaning) is that the color of each is of a certain kind, namely, pure scarlet. Pure scarlet is the kind of color each of the colors are. So, the color of one object pure scarlet in color is of some sort that is precisely the same type or sort as the color of any other object pure scarlet in color. Colors are "particulars" not universals, and there are different kinds, types, or sorts of particulars. Two

colors might be of exactly the same sort. By using the expression "pure scarlet" to describe the color of each of two objects we are referring to the color in saying that the color is of a certain type, but we are not identifying it with any entity thought to be identical with some shade of color. The RBT theorist may attempt to establish the existence of universals by identifying the color that is interpreted to be an entity, with a shade of color interpreted to be an entity. First, he argues that the color is an entity--a visibly presentable entity. Then he points out that two objects may be colored in exactly the same way. Then he points out that the shade of color that is the color of one is also the color of the other. But here an identification has been made. It has been said that the color is, e.g., pure scarlet. And this "is" has been treated as short for "is identical with." So, the color has been identified as being an entity that is, in the sense of "is identical with" a shade of color that the object is of. And now the RBT theorist is in the position to draw the conclusion that since the color of one object is pure scarlet and the color of the other is pure scarlet, then the very same entity, namely the shade of color of each object, is identical with the entity that is the color of each of the objects. But, the APT theorist need not interpret the statement that the color of each is pure scarlet as an identity claim. He need

not interpret it to be a claim about an entity that is the color of an object and an entity that is a shade of the color. He may hold that the color of an object is an entity of a certain sort. But he may also hold that we may specify the sort of entity that it, or one sort of entity that it is, by mentioning the shade of color in which the object is colored. Two objects may both be of some sort that is the same. One man may be distinct from another man yet both may be of the same sort--each is a man. In the case of characteristics, the color of one object may be distinct from the color of another object, yet each color may be of a sort that is the same. In both cases we are classifying the items mentioned as certain types of things. In the latter case we are classifying some entity as being a red-scarlet in color and in the former case we are classifying some object as being a man. So, the APT does not entail that two objects cannot both be colored in exactly the same way, e.g., as both being pure scarlet in color. If each has a red scarlet color, then each is colored in some way that is the same for both.

The RBT theorist may reply that what is not clear is what it is for distinct colors to be of the same sort. Consider a case of two animals, A and B, that are both the same type or sort of animals, e.g., both are horses. If each belongs to the species "horse," and that is the sort of animal that each is, then A is a horse and B is a horse. Now, if

A' is a color of the same sort the B' is, then how do we describe A' and B'? Should we say that A' is a pure scarlet color and B' is a pure scarlet color? What does that mean? Are we identifying A' and B' as shades of the same type? What are we saying about the color A', taken to be an entity and the color B' also taken to be an entity, when we say that each is of a certain shade of color? In the case of animals we understand what it is to say that the one is a man or a horse. But what does it mean to say that the type of color that some entity is, is pure scarlet if we are not identifying the color with a certain shade of color? Are we saying that the color is itself colored, i.e., that it is pure scarlet in color? But the colors are not themselves colored! Are we saying that each color is identical with an entity that is a shade of color even though each shade of color is numerically distinct from every other shade of color? But that makes the APT absurd. If A' is a shade of color and B' is a shade of color, and the shade of color of A' is pure scarlet and the shade of B' is pure scarlet, then A' and B' have both been described as having the shade of color that is pure scarlet--which is the very same shade of color that both were said to have. If the APT theorist identifies the color of each object with an entity that is a shade of color, then he commits himself to the existence of universals. And it will not help him to say that each

of the shades, A' and B', are numerically distinct although each is a shade of color of some sort that is the exact same sort as the other. Each would then be held to be a distinct shade of color that was an instance of the very same shade or shades that the other was. But it is not clear what each could be an instance of. Furthermore, our notion of a shade of color is such that we cannot correctly describe two things as having distinct shades of color yet being exactly alike in color. If each of two things has a shade of color that the other does not have, then they are not exactly alike in color. So, it seems that whether or not the APT theorist interprets the shade of color that each object has as itself an entity, his position leads to absurdity.

Given the above arguments it seems that the problem for the APT theorist is to explain what is meant by "the color" of an object; and to do it in such a way that he does not commit himself either to any unclear and/or absurd statements, or to the existence of universals. I will now present interpretations of the APT designed to avoid such results. (I use the expression "interpretation" loosely so that I may simplify my discussion.)

(C)

In defense of the RBT, a view of certain objects, i.e, colored shaped objects was presented. Those objects were held, with respect to that defense, to be visibly

complex. It was claimed that we see the colors and shapes of objects. These are visually presentable phenomena, i.e., they are entities of certain sorts that are capable of being seen by us. Then it was argued that our notion of color is such that if the color of one object is exactly like the color of another object, then the color that each has must be the very same entity. However, the APT theorist may now challenge the defense of the RBT by trying to show that it incorporates certain assumptions that beg crucial issues. The RBT theorist, as I have presented him, has described certain phenomena in ways that are controversial and in need of justification. Let us grant that objects have a certain visually presentable complexity, i.e., we can see distinct entities that are identical with certain aspects or features of colored shaped objects. And let us also grant that it is true that we sometimes say that we see the color or that we see the shape of an object. One feature of objects we often say we see is color, and another is its shape. The APT theorist need not deviate from such ways of speaking. However, he may say, these ways of speaking are misleading. Consider the following distinction made by Reid:

. . . the whiteness of this sheet is one thing, whiteness is another; the conceptions signified by these two forms of speech are as different as the expressions. The first signifies an individual quality really existing, and is not a general conception, though it be an abstract one: the second signifies a general conception, which

implies no existence, but may be predicated of everything that is white, and in the same sense. On this account, if one should say that the whiteness of this sheet is the whiteness of another sheet, every man perceives this to be absurd; but when he says both sheets are white, this is true and perfectly understood.²¹

Reid is here distinguishing between an entity existing as the quality of an object and a concept that is employed to describe objects. Reid takes the whiteness of an object to be an entity that is one of the qualities of the object. However, according to Reid, in speaking about whiteness, as opposed to the whiteness of a particular sheet, one is not mentioning anything other than a notion or concept. Stout also mentions a similar distinction believing that it should be made in order to avoid confusion. First, Stout says of two white pieces of paper, that the "white of this piece may be of exactly the same sort as the white of that piece of paper; nevertheless there are two particular whites and not one individual white."²² For Stout, these particular whites are the characters, i.e., qualities characterizing the pieces of paper.²³ Then Stout goes on to talk about the use of certain expressions in ambiguous ways. For example, "the same word 'red' is used for red in general and also for its specific cases, when we say that this or that is red, so the same word 'red' is used both for redness in general and the particular reds which are its instances."²⁴

In speaking about the various features of an object,

we use expressions such as "color," "white," "red," "shape," "roundness," that have different senses associated with them. When we say, e.g., "Look at the color of that bird" or "Look at the shape of that cloud" we are referring to certain features of things as "the color" and "the shape." And when we say, e.g., "The white of this paper looks just like the white of that paper," we are referring to a certain feature of the paper as "the white" of that piece of that piece of paper. But we should be careful not to conclude from our use of such expressions, that they are being used in the ways that commit one to the existence of universals. When, e.g., I use the word "color" and say "Look at the color of that bird" I am not, goes this argument in behalf of the APT, using the word "color" in the same sense that I use it when I ask "What color is that bird?" In the former case I use the word "color" to refer to an entity of a certain sort that is one of the visible features, or in Reid's terminology "qualities," or in Stout's terminology "characters," of an object. In the latter I do not. In that case I am asking about the way in which something, i.e., the bird is colored. Is it colored red, or green, or blue? In what way is it colored? What is the shade of color in which the bird is colored? I am not asking about an entity called "the color" that the bird is comprised of. And when someone answers, e.g., that the color of the bird is burgundy,

they are telling me that the bird is colored burgundy. And that is not to refer to any entity besides the bird. To say that the bird is colored burgundy is simply to describe the bird in a certain way without referring to an entity other than the bird. Let us distinguish, so goes this line of defense, these different uses of the word "color." When we use the word "color" to refer to a certain sort of entity that is one of the visible features of an object, it will be written not as "color," but as "color₁." And when we use the word "color" in a way that does not involve referring to any such visibly presentable entity, e.g., when we are mentioning the way in which something is colored as when we say "the color of the bird is burgundy," it will be written not as "color" but as "color₂." Here we have two different senses of the word "color," namely, color₁ and color₂.

The RBT theorist (as interpreted here) confuses these two sense of the word "color." We do say that we see the color of an object. But this is a loose and misleading way of speaking. We see the color₁ of an object. We do not see the color₂ of an object. Two entities with the same color₂ (i.e., colored in the same way), have different colors₁. If we are not careful enough we may interpret the claim that we see the color of each of two objects exactly alike in color₂ to mean that we see only

the $color_1$ of each object. We may conclude that since each object has a visibly presentable color (i.e., $color_1$) that is an entity of a certain sort, and since each can only be correctly describable as having the same color (i.e., $color_2$), then the entity that is the color ($color_1$) of each is the very same color ($color_2$) that both have.

Such loose and misleading ways of speaking also occur with such terms as, e.g., "shade," "red," "white," "shape," "round." Tokens of the same type are used to express different sorts of things. They are used to refer to various visible aspects of objects and they are used to communicate information about objects without such a reference being made. The RBT runs together both uses thereby incorporating a fallacy that leads to the conclusion that universals exist. Using the word "color" to say that we see something of a certain sort, does not entail that what we see is the color of the object in the sense of seeing the $color_2$ of the object. In that sense, we no more see the color of an object than we literally see the point of an argument.

A defender of the APT might suggest that since our ordinary way of speaking about the observable features of an object are not precise, we should, for philosophical purposes, not say that we see the color or shape of an object at all. Instead it would for philosophical purposes be better to classify the various features of objects in different

ways. For example, when we see some feature of an object that would be ordinarily and loosely called its "shape," we should say that we see its "hape." "Hape" would then be an expression used to refer to entities of a certain sort that are seen by us. When we see some feature of an object that would ordinarily and loosely be called its "color," we should say that we see its "olor." "Olor" would then be an expression used to refer to entities of another sort that are also seen by us. And when we want to speak about the way in which something is shaped or colored, we should speak about the objects as being colored or shaped--realizing that we see colors and shapes only in the sense of seeing olors and hapes. Perhaps this will help to avoid making the errors that lead to the RBT.

The APT theorist may agree with the RBT theorist that colored shaped objects have a certain sort of visible complexity. Both can agree that a red round object has at least two different types or sorts of entities comprising it and that (i) red round objects must have entities of those types if they are red round objects and (ii) those entities are capable of being seen. However, the APT theorist may object to the accuracy, and deny the justification of, any interpretation of those visibly presentable entities from which it follows that we are seeing universals. We do not see colors or shapes if what is meant by "color" and "shape"

involves a notion of color or shape from which it follows that if A is exactly like B in color and shape then the color of A is the very same color of B, and the shape of A is the very same shape as the shape of B. To use such a notion of color or shape in describing what one sees when one looks at colored shaped objects, is simply to beg the issue in favor of the RBT. It is to beg the issue about whether or not the entities that one sees are correctly describable in that way, i.e., by employing such notions. It is true that we often say that we see, e.g., the color or shape of things, but it does not follow from that, that we are not (i) using our language in a loose and misleading way or (ii) that the expressions "color" and "shape" each may be used to refer to something seen but not used in any sense that entails the existence of universals. In short, the APT theorist may claim that our talk about seeing colors, and shapes is loose and misleading. Such talk makes it easy to unjustifiably interpret what is seen so that, given the or a notion of color and shape that we have, we use it to justify the claim that what is seen are universals. And to interpret what is seen in this way is to assume what is to form complex objects are correctly describable as universals. And to interpret what is seen in this way is to assume what is to be proven, namely, that the entities seen to form complex objects are correctly describable as universals.

So far that has not been shown to be the case. The APT theory therefore still awaits refutation.

(D)

I have tried to show how the defender of the APT may extricate himself from certain difficulties that seem to commit him to the existence of universals. Basically, I have argued that the APT theorist may correctly accuse the defender of the RBT of interpreting what he claims to see in a way that begs significant issues. The RBT theorist still has to justify his use of certain notions in describing what he sees. However, there are other arguments that a defender of the RBT may appeal to in order to do just this. I will now present an argument that may be used in order to show that the only correct way to interpret the type of entities that are seen when we ordinarily say that we see either the color or the shape of some object, is to interpret them as being universals and not abstract particulars.

Consider the following argument given by Dawes Hicks against Stout's view.

In what sense can it be asserted that a visual sense-datum *has* a specific colour? Each infinitesimal portion of such a sense-datum is *ex hypothesi* no less numerically distinct from every other portion than one sense-datum is numerically distinct from another. If, then, the colour of one sense-datum A cannot be identical with the colour of another sense-datum B, how can the colour of the part x of the sense-datum A be said to be identical with the colour of the part y of the sense-datum A? In other words, where, in such a case, do we ever

reach a concrete particular thing which can be rightly said to have a particular character?²⁵

According to the APT, as Hicks understands it, each colored, shaped object is supposed to have its own color distinct from the color of any other object. Hicks brings out the following problem with this belief. The color of each colored object is said to be a particular. But how can this be? An extended colored thing has portions that are also extended and colored. If we consider, e.g., two portions of the object that together make up the object, each portion may be spatially next to the other. Therefore, according to the APT, each of those portions would also have its own color. Furthermore, each of those extended colored portions also have extended colored portions. Each extended colored portion has extended colored portions. So, there seems to be an infinite number of such portions. In other words, each extended colored portion may be considered to be a whole whose parts are also extended colored portions. And if this is so, then there is an infinite number of colored extended things making up anything that is itself a colored extended thing. Are there therefore an infinite number of characters of the type called "colors" had by any colored extended thing? What does the APT theorist mean when he says that each colored thing has *its* own particular color? How many "colors" does a colored thing have?

Hicks does raise problems for the APT. However,

I will show that those problems do not present any difficulties with the APT that serve to support the claim that at least some of the visible features of things are universals and not abstract particulars. I will argue that the defender of the APT can deal with these problems in such a way that no justification arises for preferring the RBT over the APT.

Consider two white pieces of paper, A and B, that are exactly alike in color but not in size. A is twice as large as B. According to the RBT, the color of A and B is a universal. So the color of each is therefore an entity that is identical with the color of both A and B. But if the colored area of A is larger than the colored area of B, can it be explained how the very same entity can be the color of two colored areas one of which is larger than the other? Is this explained by saying that the color has a size? And if that were so then couldn't the same entity that is the color of both A and B have two sizes simultaneously?

The RBT theorist may reply that the color of A and B does not have a size. We do not take the question "How large is the color white?" seriously. To consider a color to have a size is to commit a category mistake. The color white is simply not the sort of entity that could have a size.

Now , we are still left the problem of how to explain the differences in size of the colored areas of A

and B. Each has the very same entity as its color, but what difference between A and B explains how the same entity can be the color of two different sized colored objects if the color is not the sort of entity that has a size? In addition, what is it for one entity to "have" a color if the color is thought of as an entity itself? In answer to this latter question we may be told that a color may be *spatially* related to other universals in such a way that a group of spatially related universals can form a colored, shaped object. But this answer does not explain how it is that different sized colored areas arise if they are comprised of the same entity, namely, a color. Remember it is an entity of no size. Furthermore, other perplexities arise on the RBT. Each colored piece of paper is external to the other, i.e., it is either next to or at a distance from the other. Even though the colored papers are external to each other, they both, according to the RBT, have the same entity that is the color of each. But each colored piece of paper has portions that are both external to each other. They are themselves extended things that have the exact same color that the pieces of paper have of which they are portions of. So those portions according to the RBT must also have the very same color. How many portions of each of the pieces of paper have the same color? How many entities, i.e., portions, does the same color comprise? Any finite

amount specified in answer to this question seems arbitrary, since each extended colored portion itself is comprised of at least two extended colored portions.

The RBT theorist may respond to the questions and perplexities just raised in the following way. Although the color of an object is not the sort of entity that is equal to, larger or smaller than any entity, i.e., it has no size, the color of an object may be "spread out" over an area. And so, the larger the spread of color the larger the colored area. The two pieces of paper, A and B, may have the same color yet have different sized colored areas. The same color comprises each but it is spread out to different extents in each case.

Now, this last response raises the further question: What is it for a color to be spread out? In other words, what analysis is offered for what it is for an entity of no size, namely, a color, to be spread out? If it has no size what does it mean to say that it is "spread out?"

The RBT theorist may answer as follows. Previously it was pointed out, by employing a line of reasoning that was used to attack the APT, that an extended colored object has extended colored portions and also that any extended colored portion also has extended colored portions. Those portions, if exactly like each other in color have the very same color which is an entity comprising each, even though they may all

be external to each other. And although some portions are larger than others, according to the RBT, the same entity may be the color of each of them. It can comprise objects that are both external to each other and different in size no matter how many colored objects or colored portions of objects there are. A color may have certain spatial properties in virtue of which it forms a "color spread." A spread of the same color consists of one entity, namely the color, at multiple places at the same time. It is simultaneously at multiple locations in being in each of the colored portions. However, it is not in those places, as say, a book may be in a certain place. A book is an entity with a certain size and is in a place by occupying an area equal to the area of the book. A color does not have a size. So, it is at numerous *points* within certain areas, e.g., the half way point between two colored portions. In being simultaneously at numerous points, an unextended entity that is a color, may be all over the surface, i.e., at every point on the surface of an object. It forms a "spread" of color in that way. A uniformly colored surface has a color that is an entity at every point on the colored surface. So now it can be seen how different sized colored areas may each have the same entity (the color) that has no size and yet form those different sized colored areas. The same color is simultaneously at different points, and in

being at certain points and not others it thereby forms a spread of the color. And in this way different color spreads each may be of a different size. One colored spread could become a larger color if, in addition to all of the points at which the color is when it formed the smaller spread of color, the color subsequently became a color at other points as well.

We have just been given an analysis of what it is for a color to be spread out. It has been given in terms of the color simultaneously being at certain points. Previously it was said that an extended colored area contains an infinite number of extended colored portions. This is what Hicks claimed when he argued against the APT. In light of this and the analysis given of a spread of color, a universal, e.g., the color of an object, seems to be an entity that is at an infinite number of places. The color of a uniformly colored object is the color of an infinite number of portions each of which is itself external to some other portion colored in exactly the same way. It is "spread out" over all of these portions. Such a view commits one to the principle that a color may simultaneously be at an infinite number of places, or more specifically, that it may simultaneously be at an infinite number of points. In that way, we were told, "spreads" of a color may be formed. And they may be of different sizes even though the entity that is the

color is itself of no size. By being at different points, a color may also be the color of an infinite number of colored portions.

Let us now look at another consequence of Hicks' argument for the RBT. If, as Hicks suggests, an extended colored thing has an infinite number of extended colored portions, then the number of shapes of those portions could also be infinite. Assuming for the sake of argument that the portions being infinite in extent also have a shape. If that is so, then it follows on the RBT that an extended uniformly colored shaped object may really be composed of a color and an infinite number of shapes that that color is related to in a certain way or in certain ways.

In the light of the previous remarks, it can be seen how the divisibility of a colored thing into an infinite number of colored portions raises questions for *both* the APT and RBT. But as a result of such questions being raised, one may also see how both theories may deal with those questions in significantly similar ways. The RBT theorist may hold, in his analysis of what it is for a color to be spread out all over the surface of an object, e.g., as when a book is colored blue all over, that the color is at an infinite number of places or points. And he may also hold that since an extended colored thing may have an infinite number of extended colored portions of different shapes and sizes,

a colored shaped object is really composed of an infinite number of universals. Now, the APT theorist may hold that instead of analyzing a uniformly colored object, in part, into one color having no size by simultaneously at an infinite number of points, a uniformly colored object may be analyzed into an infinite number of such entities at those points. A color spread, he may say, is formed by an infinite number of entities of a certain type, and not, as the RBT theorist may think, by one type of entity at an infinite number of points. And just like a universal that is a color, that type of entity is an entity of no size. It might also be pointed out that this position has the advantage of not committing one to the objectionable principle that an entity may simultaneously be at locally separate places.²⁶ Anyone who believes that a universal can be simultaneously at different points, is committed to that doctrine. If the RBT theorist can explain the notion of a color being spread out over an area by appealing to the notion of an infinite number of places or points, so can the APT theorist. The APT theorist may just claim that there exists an infinite number of entities of a certain type and that they are at an infinite number of points. In this way colored areas and colored areas of different sizes may be formed. Each of those entities might loosely be called a "color." If the RBT theorist claims that the type of entity that forms a spread of color

has no size, i.e., a universal, the APT theorist may agree. But he may disagree about the further properties of the entity that does that. According to him, colored areas may be formed by certain types of entities, i.e., "abstract particulars" and not universals.²⁷

What I have tried to show is that Hicks' argument does not present the RBT theorist with a successful justification for holding that a colored object must be comprised of universals and could not be comprised of some other sort of entity instead, e.g., abstract particulars. (Given, of course, that the APT can be interpreted broadly enough so that the type of entities appealed to, in offering the alternative that I have offered to the RBT, are taken to be what the APT theorist calls "abstract particulars," "characters," "qualities," or "properties.") I therefore conclude that the defender of the RBT has still to establish that the RBT, if true, is not just a contingently true position. It appears that there is no good reason for rejecting only the APT as necessarily false. In addition, it should be noted that the truth of either the I/I or the PII does not follow from the truth of the APT. No tenet on the APT requires that distinct objects differ in any way that is nonformal. They must have formal differences. And on the APT this would include each having numerically distinct constituents, i.e., numerically distinct abstract particulars. But to differ in

that way is not necessarily to differ in a way that supports a nonformal version of the II. Two objects may each be round and red, and at a distance from a red round sphere. And so it still remains to be shown that both could not be describable in the very same wholly general way. Hence, even if the APT is the correct view it does not follow from that that the I/I is a true principle. We may therefore conclude that appealing to the truth of the RBT does not help the defender of the I/I or the PII to establish the truth of either principle. In order to do that he must show that the RBT is true but not contingently true, or that even if contingently true, every other possibility with respect to what the constituents of objects are also entails either the I/I or the PII. Remember, these are principles not about how certain entities just are, but about how such entities must be, i.e., they must differ from each other in certain ways. So, even if some colored, shaped objects are bundles of universals, it remains to be shown either that (i) no colored shaped object could be identical with something that is not a bundle of universals or (ii) even if (i) is false, those colored shaped objects must differ in ways that are consistent with the requirements of either the I/I or the PII. But, as I have argued, this has not been shown to be true. And, it now appears that if the defender of the RBT is to establish the truth of that position, he has

to appeal to some nonformal version of the I/I in order to do so--just as Blanshard did. In that way he may be able to derive the conclusion that the entities that comprise a colored shaped object must be universals and cannot be abstract particulars.

II. The RBT Lacks Explanatory Power

In part I of this chapter I suggested that a defender of the APT may view an object in similar ways to the way that a defender of the RBT views an object. Both may view at least some of the "characteristics" of an object to be different types of entities. And each may agree that the type of entity that goes into making up a colored area, is an entity that has no size. Both can agree that the characteristics of objects are themselves entities that have no size.

A defender of the APT has, in addition to the above analysis, another analysis available with respect to what sorts of things characteristics are. He may still think that some of the characteristics of an object are entities, but he may not interpret them to be entities that have no size. Consider the following claims made by Stout. What he says may be regarded as an answer to the question about how many "colors" a uniformly colored object is supposed to

to have according to the APT. (Henceforth, I will use the expressions "color₁" and "shape₁" when I want to point out that those expressions are being used strictly to refer to a certain type of entity and that those expressions are therefore not being used in any way that involves a notion of color or shape from which it follows that an exact likeness between two objects with respect to either implies an identity in color or shape.)

A colour, whether it is absolutely uniform or varied in shade, is co-extensive with the place in which it is. To use an expression once favored by Professor Moore, it is spread out over a surface so that the larger the coloured surface, the more colour there is. There is more colour in a wide expanse than in a small speck. The extent of a coloured patch in visual space simply is the extent of the colour. Each part of the patch has its own bit of colour which is contiguous to some of the surrounding bits, and more or less distant from other bits.²⁸

On one interpretation of the above it would seem that according to Stout, the expression "the color" is used, at least some of the time, to refer to a colored expanse. In other words, according, to Stout, we sometimes use it to refer to something that is colored and of a certain size--a "color₁." It is therefore an entity of a certain size. The color₁ of a uniformly colored object is, according Stout, as large as the colored surface of that object. In addition, any part of a colored area, is itself a colored area having a color₁ that is numerically distinct from any other color₁ of any other colored area. In other words, a colored surface has

extended colored portions each of which has its own color₁.

Stout's notion of the character characterizing an object that is called the "color" of that object, seems to be similar, in certain respects, to our notion of stuff. For example, a table top may be made out of a certain sort of stuff, e.g., wood. The piece of wood that is the table top is an extended entity of a certain size. We may think of the bit of wood as having portions, e.g., a left and right hand portion equal in size and shape. Those portions are themselves bits of wood. However, this notion of a bit of wood may be developed in certain ways. Some people may think that, or have thought that, any portion of a bit of stuff is itself a bit of stuff of the same sort, e.g., any portion of a bit of wood, no matter how small, is a smaller bit of wood. And this conception of a bit of stuff is like Stout's conception of the color₁ of an object. There is a certain sort of entity that is extended, has a size, comprises an object, and is called by Stout "the color" of the object. And any portion of that, no matter how small, is itself a color₁.

Now, one way to respond to the question about how many "colors" a uniformly colored object has is as follows. The APT theorist may claim that a colored shaped object is made up of at least two visibly present entities. One is ordinarily called the "shape" and the other is ordinarily

called the "color." That which is called the "color" is itself an extended colored entity. It has colored portions and since each colored portion is an extended colored entity it is also called "a color." That entity, namely color_1 of an object, is an extended colored thing having colored portions distinct from each other. There are as many "colors," (i.e., colors_1) to an object as there are extended colored things that are its portions.

At this point the reader may wonder about the difference or differences between the color and the colored object. The color seems, on Stout's view, to be an extended colored thing. But, so is the colored object that has that color. So, for Stout, what difference is there between the "color" (i.e., the color_1) and the colored object that has that color_1 ?

Unfortunately, Stout cannot help very much. His discussion of the shape of an object is confused (as I will point out) and does not permit us to interpret his notion of a shape in such a way that we may easily give a satisfactory answer to this question. Consider what he states about the shape of an object:

. . . I ask what a shape is in visual space. The only answer I can find to this question is that the shape is a particular place having a certain uniform or approximately uniform colour and that this particular is bounded off by a qualitative difference between this colour and that of the surrounding visual field. But what is thus

demanded is still only a particular place. If places are particular, then a place bounded off in this way is also particular. But a place bounded off in this way is just what we call a shape. Hence *shapes* are particulars and not universals.²⁹

According to Stout, a particular place "bounded off" in a certain way *is* a shape. Since each object has some place that it is in but no other object is in, Stout regards the place of the object as a particular that that object has. But if the place of an object were its shape, then a moving object could not, by occupying different places, have the same shape throughout. Doesn't this show that Stout's analysis of shape is incorrect? Perhaps Stout would answer that since on the analysis that he is offering the expression "shape" is to be used to refer to a particular place bounded in a certain way. For an object to change its place is for it to change its shape--in one sense but not in all senses. And of course, he might say, it can still remain a round object even though it moves. In that sense it may maintain its shape even though it changes its shape (i.e., bounded place).

According to the previous interpretation, Stout's view seems to be that a colored object is composed of particular characters in the sense of (i) having a shape₁ that no other object has, i.e., having a place that is (a) bounded off in a certain way and (b) that it is not the very same place that any simultaneously existing object has as its

place and (ii) having a "color₁" that no other object has, i.e., having an extended colored thing of a certain size. On this interpretation, Stout does not appear to differentiate colored extended objects such as pieces of cloth from what he calls the "color" (i.e., color₁). And one may now wonder why Stout, if this be his view, did not simply say that his position on the nature of characteristics commits him to no more than there being distinct colored objects of various sizes that are in unique places! If this is all that he is saying why did he speak in such confusing and misleading ways?

The view just presented as an interpretation of Stout's position, will hardly appeal to the type of RBT theorist that we have been considering. According to that theorist, objects are visibly complex in ways that require interpreting them to be made up of distinct sorts of entities. The place of an object is not (it may be claimed) an entity; nor is the place of an object that which we look at and identify as the visible shape of an object. If an object moves, one can still see the one shape of an object. If an object moves, one can still see the one shape that an object may have throughout the movement. The defender of the RBT may claim that if the APT theorist interprets the APT as Stout, as on the previous interpretation of his position does so, then that theorist has failed to explain certain phenomena, namely, the visible complexity of colored shaped

objects.

However, a defender of the APT need not adopt the view that Stout appears to have adopted. And perhaps Stout, while stating and defending the APT, did or did not always adopt that view either. It may be that in the passage about shape just quoted Stout spoke in a confused way that misleads us into thinking that he held the view that I just attributed to him. It might be that he spoke as if he was confusing the shape of an object with a means of identifying the shape of the object, and that he neither realized nor intended to identify the shape with the place that an object is in. I will now offer a second interpretation of Stout's position. In doing so, I will try to make this interpretation of Stout's position clear by putting forth several claims that might also be given in support of that position.

Stout seemed to regard the color₁ of an object to be an extended colored entity of a certain size. Now, one sort of colored thing that may be seen is that which may be seen by following the steps that I will mention. First, find a uniformly colored and perfectly smooth large wall. It should have no textural differences at any places. Without wearing glasses, go close enough to the wall so that you do not see anything other than the wall. You will then not see where the wall ends and anything else begins. What you will

see is an extended colored expanse without seeing any shape to that colored expanse. Such colored expanses may be of different sizes. In order to see a colored expanse larger than the one seen by following the procedure just mentioned, do the following. Look straight up at (without glasses) a uniformly colored sky. The sky that you look at should have no clouds or be shaded differently at various spots. Look straight up at it so that what you see is only sky and not anything else, e.g., the horizon. By doing this you can see, once again, a colored expanse without seeing any shape to that colored expanse. And it will look larger than one seen by looking at the wall.

The colored things that we usually see do not look like the colored expanses that you can see by following the procedures just mentioned. The colored things that we ordinarily see have a complexity about them missing in the type of colored expanses just mentioned. As a defender of the APT, as well as RBT, might put it, what we see are shapes along with extended colored expanses. The extended colored expanses that we see are of certain sizes and they are spread out in various directions until they, at various points, stop being spread out any further. At these points where the edge or the border of the colored expanse is, something can be seen. And that which we see is what we ordinarily call "the shape" of the object. Consider what follows as an

attempt that might be made by a defender of this view, to clarify, and elaborate on, and defend this view. Look at the place where some wall meets the ceiling. You will see what may be usefully, if perhaps misleadingly, described as a "line" running all along the border. You actually see something there, and if the height of the wall is not totally even at all places then what you see, i.e., the "line" will become even more prominent. It will curve upwards and downwards where the wall gets higher and lower. At the border between things one can see something, and that is what we are seeing when we say that we see "the shape" of something. We see something on the border between one things and its surroundings. That thing is itself extended and surrounds a colored expanse. The colored expanse is one thing and the entity seen at the border, e.g., completely surrounding the colored expanse as in the case of a square block or a round ball, is another. When we compare two objects with respect to color, as in the case of the painted boards and the wall to be painted (that I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter), we focus our attention on extended colored expanses and compare them. We do not focus attention on the visibly presentable entities referred to as the "shapes." But when we do so in comparing two objects with respect to shape, we look at the borders of each object and compare each thing that we see at the border of each object with

each shape we see at those borders. Then we may realize how alike the two objects are with respect to shape.³⁰ A colored shaped object in "visible space" is visibly complex. It is comprised of a colored extended entity that is spread out to a certain size the "color" (i.e., the color₁) has and also in certain directions up to certain points. And at the points at which it stops, there exists something else that is visibly present. That which is visibly present is what we ordinarily refer to as "the shape" (i.e., the shape₁) of the object. The expression "the shape" of an object is ambiguous--in similar ways as the expression "the color" was explained to be. Both expressions may be used to talk about a visibly presentable item within experience or both may be used in another sense. If used in that latter sense, then they are used to describe and classify but not to refer to any entity visibly seen that comprises any colored shaped object, e.g., when we ask what is the color or shape of the object.

It now seems that we have an interpretation of the APT that differs considerably from the former. According to the former the visible "characteristics" of objects are similar to universals in the sense that they are, like universals, entities of no size. It is not the case that the "color" (color₁) or the shape (shape₁) of an object is of a certain size. The former interpretation of the APT will henceforth

be referred to as the APT'. According to the latter interpretation of the APT, the "color" ($color_1$) and the "shape" ($shape_1$) of an object do have a certain size or extent. Furthermore, the $color_1$ may or may not be regarded as a colored entity--just as the defender of the RBT may not, and probably would not hold that the color of an object is itself colored. Of course, it is still open to the defender of APT, to hold that something that he calls the "color" of an object is a colored entity. And it is even open to the APT' theorist to agree.³¹ I will henceforth refer to this latter interpretation of the APT as the APT".

I will now proceed with my argument that the RBT lacks explanatory power. My strategy is to state an argument that a defender of the APT" might use in defense of this position and also to argue that both the APT' and RBT lack explanatory power.

We have seen that the APT', APT" and RBT offer rival analyses of the purported fact that colored shaped objects are visibly complex. It has been claimed that when looking at such objects we see distinct things, often called "the shape" and "the color." They are distinct components of those visibly complex objects. However, the defender of the APT" may claim, both the APT' and RBT in offering their analyses, can be shown to involve either a false claim or one that lacks explanatory power. And furthermore, it may

be claimed that the reasons offered to justify this latter assertion are such that in order to avoid either of the difficulties just mentioned, a defender of either the APT' or the RBT should give up his position and accept the APT".

Consider the claim, used in support of the RBT that we see the color of an object. What sort of thing, according to the RBT, is the color of an object? It is a universal. It is an entity capable of simultaneously comprising distinct objects that are external to each other. Furthermore, the color of an object is not an entity of a certain size. Now, if we see the color of an object and the color of an object is an entity, but not an entity of a certain size, then it follows that seeing the color is seeing an entity of no size. And this result is perplexing. It is claimed that when we see a colored shaped object of a certain size we also see something that is not identical with an entity of a certain size. But if that is so, then are we correct in saying that we see something that looks just like what an entity of no size might look like? Are we to understand that since we do see an entity of no size (a color), then we are visibly acquainted with something that could not and does not look exactly like anything of a certain size? If so, wouldn't we be looking at something that looked neither larger nor smaller, longer nor wider, than anything else that we may also look at? But surely we do see anything that looks

like that. There is nothing in our visual field of which we would want to say "Look, there is an entity that is of no size! Don't you see that it has no extended parts or portions!?" Any view that commits one to answering the previously raised questions affirmatively, is simply wrong. If our commitment to the RBT involves holding that there exists an entity of no size (a color) so that to see it is both (i) to see at least one entity of a certain size, e.g., a colored shaped object, and (ii) to see something that does not look exactly like what anything of any size looks like, then that position is a very poor one.

I think that the defender of the RBT and APT', who tells us that a universal or an abstract particular is a perceived entity of no size, does not intend any commitment to the view that since we see colored shaped objects, we also know what an entity of no size looks like. The defender of either the APT' or RBT might point out that the problem just raised is handled by appealing to the notion of a color spread. When we say that we see the color of an object we do not imply that *all* that we see is the color, i.e., that we do not imply that we do not see other objects as well or the shape of the object whose color we are looking at. So, when it is said that we see the color of an object, that statement alone does not adequately characterize our experience completely. Other descriptive statements are

needed. Now consider this point in light of the following claim that the APT' or RBT theorist might make. He may say that one does not see just the color. One does see the color, but a more complete description of what one sees should and can also be given. One sees the color "spread out." And failure to take this into account might cause some philosophers to argue against the APT' or RBT in the way that was just done. A white wall may be white all over. The color is at every place or point on the white wall. The color is therefore spread out all over the surface of the wall. When we see the color, we are seeing the color spread out all over the colored object. To put the counterreply succinctly and perhaps in an easier form to grasp, one sees an entity of no size but one does not see it as an entity of no size. One sees that entity but, when one sees it, it is simultaneously at various points, i.e., all over (every point on) the surface of the object.

In response to the above, a defender of the APT" can point out that the defense of the RBT has now resulted in the undermining of the explanatory power of a central tenet of the APT' and RBT. We are told that one sees the color "spread out." It is at various points on the surface of something. If the object is, say white all over, then that color is at every point on the surface. That is what you see. So, to see the white color is to see the white

color of that object spread out all over the surface of that object, and that is to see a surface that is white all over. That is *what* one is seeing when one sees a color spread out all over the surface. It is to see something that is white all over. It is to see something of a certain size and color made up of something of a certain size and color made up of something of no size (and color). So, it now seems that to see the color of an object is to see an extended colored thing of a certain size, but not something that looks like an entity of no size. We are now told that nothing that we see looks like that and what we do see when we look at the color is a spread of color. But that is something that is colored and of a certain size! And this is what the APT theorist says that we see when we look at "the color" of an object. And if it is also what the defender of the APT and RBT says that we see when we look at and perhaps compare objects with respect to color, then why hold that the colored thing that you see is made up of an entity of no size? There seems to be no need to believe in such entities. They do not account for any phenomena visibly seen. Nothing seen looks like what an entity of no size might look like. Mentioning them to describe what one sees when one sees a colored object of a certain size does not help one to describe what the entities that one sees look like. If in looking at a colored object one says that one sees something that looks

like what no entity of a certain size looks like, then that is not a correct description of what the colored object looks like. So, appeal to any entity of no size, a universal or an abstract particular, to explain what the components of the visible complexity of a colored shaped object are, leads one either to false or unnecessary claims. When we say that we see the color of some object, we are therefore speaking in a loose and misleading way. That claim is open to several interpretations. To use such a claim to conclude that we must be seeing something of no size (since it is absurd to say that the color of an object is something of a certain size) is to make a mistake that has its sources in the loose and misleading way that we often describe our experiences in. The defense of the APT' and RBT involves making that mistake. Both incorporate the unnecessary tenet that some visibly presentable presentable entity is an entity of no size. That tenet lacks explanatory power. It seems that the only justification the RBT theorist has for believing that we do see entities of no size, that he calls the "color" and "shape" of objects, is the argument that since we see the color and shape of objects, and since it makes no sense to say that either is of a certain size, then both must be of no size. But, as I have shown earlier in the case of color, an unjustified and superfluous identification has been made in that argument. It needs to be shown that the

notion of color employed in that argument is used to correctly characterize the type of entity claimed to have been seen. And what I have just been arguing is that apart from any theoretical issues or arguments, we would not think that our experience was being correctly characterized if when we looked at colored shaped things, someone told us that we were looking at entities of no size. The RBT (and APT') theorist may disagree with this and say that our experience is of colored patches made up of an entity or entities of no size. But, if they do not assume what they are to prove, then even on their own views such entities play no explanatory role. Apart from begging the issue, there is simply no need to explain anything that we experience by analyzing what we experience as identical with an entity or entities of no size. And if they are then rejected by the APT' and RBT theorist as having no explanatory value, then their positions become identical with or very similar to the APT".

Given my arguments in this chapter I, therefore, conclude that defending either the I/I or the PII by appealing to the RBT does not succeed in establishing the truth of either principle. As a result, it still remains to be shown that either one is a true principle.

Before I end this chapter, I would like to make my position on the APT" clear. In this chapter I have not

committed myself to *any* of the arguments given in behalf of the RBT, APT' or the APT". It is true that I have used the APT' and APT" to attack the RBT as a position that can successfully be appealed to in behalf of any version of the II. But what I was concerned to show was that if we believe that certain features of colored shaped objects, such as their color and shape, are themselves visibly presentable entities, then (i) it does not follow that those entities are or must be universals, and (ii) that there are good reasons for not regarding them to be universals. I have thereby not committed myself to the view that certain features of colored shaped objects are themselves entities of any sort. I must admit, however, that with respect to that view, I have not yet made up my mind as to its truth or falsity.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter III

¹This question will be dealt with as I discuss various interpretations of what it may mean to say that the color of an object is an entity.

²G.F. Stout, "The Nature of Universals and Propositions," reprinted in *Studies in Philosophy*, ed. by J.N. Findlay, 1921; (London: Oxford University Press, 1966). pp. 5-24. See also, "Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular?," reprinted in *The Problem of Universals*, ed. by Richard J. Van Iken, 1923; (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), pp. 166-170; "Universals Again," *Aristotelian Society Supplementary*, Vol. XV (1936); "Things, Predicates and Relations," *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy*, Vol. XVIII (1940).

³*Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁴In this chapter I will deal with only certain types of properties, e.g., with the color of each of two objects that are exactly alike in color. I will not discuss the question of whether or not on the RBT or APT every property, e.g., "roundishness," "reddishness," should be considered an entity. It is enough for my purposes to consider whether or not some must be entities.

⁵David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 219.

⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 219-222.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 221. Hume does not mean that the qualities can exist just by themselves. He means that there are different sorts of qualities, we make assertions about each individuality, and certain types of qualities may or may not exist along with other types of qualities.

⁹Hume gives an example of the same sort that I present. See p. 25 of the Selby-Bigge edition of the *Treatise*.

¹⁰Wolfgang Köhler, *Gestalt Psychology* (New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1970), p. 181.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²This claim will be critically examined in Part I, section (B) and in Part II of this chapter.

¹³Brand Blanshard, *Reason and Analysis* (Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1964), pp. 394-5.

¹⁴Brand Blanshard, *The Nature of Thought* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., Vol I, 1969), p. 649.

¹⁵Blanshard, *Reason and Analysis*, pp. 398-399.

¹⁶I think that this is the argument that Moore was once getting at. See pp. 158-160 in the *Problem of Universals*, ed. by Van Iten.

¹⁷Charles Landesman, *Discourse and Its Presuppositions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 149.

¹⁸Stout, "Universals Again," p. 9.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 9-10.

²⁰Ibid., p. 2-3.

²¹Thomas Reid, "Of Abstraction," reprinted in Van Iten, *The Problem of Universals*.

²²Stout, "Universals Again," p. 3.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Dawes Hicks, "Are the Characteristics of Things Universal or Particular?," reprinted in Van Iten, *The Problem of Universals*, p. 172.

²⁶It may be thought that if holding the RBT involves one in holding such a principle then the RBT surely must be false, since (it might be thought that) a contradiction is logically deriveable from that principle. I do not think that this is the case, although I will not argue it here.

²⁷A defender of the RBT may claim that a universal, e.g., a color does not have a spatial location. But then he is presented with the problem of explaining what sort of relationship, if not spatial, universals have to each other when they charac-

terize objects; and what it means for some object to "have" a universal as a characteristic. The APT theorist may then also claim that objects, in the same nonspatial sense, "have" the abstract particulars in the nonspatial sense of "have" that the RBT theorist adopts. Furthermore, he may adopt the position that abstract particulars can be shared, in the RBT sense of share. He may hold that the portions of colored things all have the very same abstract particular, although not all things colored and shaped in exactly the same way have the numerically identical abstract particular. Of course, the reply to this position is to say that it is at the very least, uneconomical and that the APT theorist should just admit that there are universals and not abstract particulars. But, the APT theorist may just reply that distinct objects may also have distinct abstract particulars even though they may be exactly alike in color, and even though some colored portions "have" the same abstract particular. The defender of the RBT still has the job of showing that this is not possible. If he cannot, then he has not shown that his position is not merely a contingent one. Also notice that this strategy is available to the defender of the APT even if he holds that abstract particulars are spatially related to each other.

²⁸ Stout, "Universals Again," p. 11.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 12.

³⁰ This account will not do for all shaped objects. But, for the sake of simplicity, I will not discuss how the APT theorist may elaborate on it. As it stands, the APT serves my purposes.

³¹ This would be similar to Hume's position in the *Treatise*, except that Hume held that the colored entities of no size that made up a colored object were finite in number. See Part II, section I, of the *Treatise*.

CHAPTER IV

Up to now I have not attempted to show why the PII is not successfully defended by the argument that any two particulars, e.g., two billiard balls, must differ in their spatial relationships (i.e., position). In this chapter I will attempt to do so. I will argue that both the PII and the I/I are not true principles.

In my first chapter I argued that Black's spheres differed in their spatial properties because they differed in their spatial relationships. Each sphere differs in its spatial properties from the other sphere because each is at a distance from a sphere that the other is not at a distance from.

In my second chapter I stated Ayer's defense of the I/I and his objections to the possibility of counter-examples to the I/I. Basically, his position was that since things are nothing but sets, or bundles of properties, different objects must therefore have different properties. In light of this, it may then be argued that Black has failed to describe a logically possible state of affairs. However, as I have previously stated it is not clear how such an argument successfully supports the I/I. I pointed out, in chapter II, that if by "properties" one means to refer to certain types of entities, then it doesn't follow that distinct objects must differ in any nonformal way, e.g., that they must

differ in a way other than having constituents that are unique to each object. It is important to know what type of entities "properties" are interpreted to be. If one, e.g., Ayer, does not interpret properties to be universals then it is not clear why things cannot be descriptively alike in a way that is incompatible with both the I/I and the PII. A further question that I raise about Ayer's approach concerns the fact that Black's spheres do differ in their properties. If one holds that things (i.e., particulars) are sets or bundles of properties, and consequently that different things must be different sets or bundles of properties, why not grant that Black has described a logically possible state of affairs? His spheres do differ in their properties. Why on this "bundle" approach, is this not a sufficient difference between Black's spheres for them to be things that can exist? Each sphere does have a different set or bundle of properties.

In chapter II, I attempted to present numerous arguments that could be used in defense of either the I/I and PII. Included in that chapter were arguments against the possibility of a universe such as Black's. However, I found that those arguments were not sound or simply begged the question at issue. In that chapter I also stated, once again, an argument that might be used against either the I/I or PII. It was based on an analysis of a particular into a bundle of universals. If such an analysis were to be held

by a defender of either the I/I or the PII, then he might attempt to employ it in defending either principle. He might also appeal to that analysis of a particular in order to argue that Black has failed to describe a logically possible state of affairs. In order to guard against such a strategy in chapter III I examined and evaluated the foundations of such a defense. I argued that even if that bundle analysis is correct, it is at best a contingently true position. Hence the I/I, the PII and the impossibility of Black's universe do not follow given the truth of that analysis. Furthermore, I showed why that view of the nature of a particular should be rejected.

In light of my arguments, one may wonder about the possibility of a universe such as Black's. What good reason is there for believing that Black has failed to describe a logically possible state of affairs? It may seem that Black has described a possible world, and that any version of the II from which it follows that Black has not described a possible world, is a false principle. In other words, why believe that the I/I is a true principle? There does not seem to be any good reasons for rejecting the possibility of counterexamples to it. However, certain philosophers have argued that all purported counterexamples to versions of the II fail to provide any good reason for believing that they are counterexamples. It has been held that the very

same description used to construct a purported counterexample to some version of the II will be compatible with a state of affairs in which that version holds. But if those descriptions are not capable of being the descriptions of a state of affairs in which that version holds, then the purported counterexample has simply been described in a question begging way.

In order to defend my argument against the I/I and the PII (yet to be given) it is important that I show that not all nonquestion begging purported counterexamples to versions of the II are compatible with those versions being true. I will argue that a nonquestion begging counterexample to the I/I can be given. However, notice that even if I do succeed in showing that Black (given some slight modification that I will add) has described a counterexample to the I/I, it does not follow from that that the PII is false.

In this chapter I will argue first against the I/I and then against the PII. I will present my arguments in support of the claim, with some modifications added, that Black has described a nonquestion begging counterexample to the I/I.

I. On Giving Counterexamples to the I/I

One way to argue in behalf of the claim that Black has described a purported counterexample to the I/I in a question begging way is as follows. Opponents of the I/I want to describe a world in which two objects, A and B, have with the exception of certain types of properties, all their properties in common. Certain properties "trivialize" the the II, e.g., "being identical with A" or "not being identical with A." So, to avoid such trivialization philosophers who argue against some version of the II by describing purported counterexamples to that version of the II exclude such properties as relevant to the truth or falsity of the II. But, states Lambert and von Fraassen, this "makes their efforts *prima facie* fruitless of necessity, for if they describe such a world the Leibnizian will conclude from its description that this world contains only one thing, with two names."¹

We are now given a strategy for defending the I/I against any purported counterexample to it. The claim is made that the defender of the I/I, without any inconsistency arising, may redescribe the world proposed as a counterexample to the I/I as one in which one object with two names exists. But, why should we believe that efforts to describe a counterexample to versions of the II become fruitless once the properties that "trivialize" the II are excluded from counting

for or against that principle? Lambert and van Fraassen are not very clear about this. One attempt to understand their position is as follows. The II is the principle that if an entity A and an entity B have all their properties in common, then A is identical with B.² So, the opponent of the II must show that A can be distinct from B although A and B have the same properties. What he wants to show, with respect to his purported counterexample, is that an entity A and an entity B ascribed certain properties in that purported counterexample, are such that A is distinct from B. But how can he do this if the opponent of the II excludes as relevant trivializing properties such as "is distinct from B?" What property or properties can he assign to A that would, as the trivial ones do, entail that A is distinct from B? If he does not assign any properties that would entail such a result then the defender of the II or version of the II being considered, can claim that A is identical with B. He can do this without any inconsistency arising since an object can have all the properties it does have. A may consistently be interpreted as being identical and not distinct from B. Why not assign to A a property that is not "trivial" and which an object could have only if some other objects exists? Why not attribute to A a combination of properties from which it follows that A must be distinct from something just like it in all the respects relevant to

disproving the version of the II being considered? Well, if the opponent of that principle does attempt to do so, then the Leibnizian may respond by claiming that the description of the purported counterexample either lacks some relevant information or is simply the description of an impossible state of affairs. When further details that can be filled in are filled in about the state of affairs held to be a counterexample to the version of the II, it will be found either to be compatible with that version of the II or it can be regarded by the defender of that version as an example of an impossible state of affairs.³ Setting up a counterexample to some version of the II in order to derive the conclusion that A is distinct from B--although no differences in properties have been assigned to A or to B--is like trying "to demonstrate that something can be both round or square by mentioning the round square!"⁴

On the one hand it seems that what the authors are claiming is that the defender of, e.g., the I/I, may always regard a purported description of a counterexample as the description of an impossible state of affairs. Perhaps their point is that the defender of the I/I may claim that by just describing a state of affairs in which the I/I does not hold, he, i.e., the defender of the I/I, has not been given any good reason for giving up his principle. He can and may simply view the described state of affairs as

an impossible one. (Later on I will comment on this defense.) On the other hand, it might also seem as if Lambert and van Fraassen are claiming that a description of a purported possible state of affairs in which some version of the II does not hold, for an object A and an object B, will beg the very question at issue if that state of affairs cannot be redescribed as one in which A is identical to B. But why they believe this, if they do, is not clear.⁵ Perhaps the reasoning is as follows. If some object other than A is asserted to exist, then it can be appealed to in order to show that some version of the II is false only if that object has all the relevant properties that A has, i.e., the properties relevant to the truth or falsity of that version of the II. So, to describe a counterexample to it one has to provide more than the mere assertion that there is besides A some object in the world that A exists in. But if, in order to do that, one assigns it all the relevant properties that are assigned to A, then the example becomes useless for convincing the defender of the version of the II being attacked, that his principle is wrong. One has simply asked the defender of that principle to imagine that some object other than A has each of the relevant properties that A has. And to do that is just like defending the possibility of a round square by asking someone to imagine that some object is round and also has the properties of being a square! In

describing purported counterexamples to versions of the II one either risks assigning properties to the object A and the object B (that are to be deduced as distinct from each other) such that A and B will therefore be consistently describable as identical, or one simply describes the very sort of world that the defender of the attacked version of the II takes to be impossible. Hence, describing counterexamples to any version of the II fails to help establish the falsity of any version of the II. (I will reserve comment on this argument till later.)

In a recent article on the I/I Ian Hacking takes an approach to the I/I that is similar to the one taken by Lambert and van Fraassen concerning the II. Hacking contends that "it is vain to contemplate possible spatiotemporal worlds to refute or establish the identity of indiscernibles."⁶ His reason for believing this is, with a qualification to be mentioned, is that "there is no possible universe that *must* be described in a manner compatible with I/I."⁷ (Hacking uses the expression "I/I" as I use it.) He claims that if we listed "all the true propositions, expressed in purely general terms . . ."⁸ that occur in the description of a world purported to be a counterexample to the I/I, then the defender of the I/I can, without inconsistency, interpret that description to be of a world that does not violate that principle.

Someone, according to Hacking, may attempt to argue

for the possibility of a world consisting of only two "indistinguishable" drops of water, i.e., two drops of water alike in all descriptions expressible in purely general terms. He may ask us to suppose that there is a universe in which every drop of water is ten diameters from some drop. In this way that person avoids using the question begging expression "'There are two drops.'"⁹ (Later on I will discuss the "question begging" status of this claim.) So, says Hacking, it may now seem to the opponent of the I/I that his universe cannot, without inconsistency, be redescribed as one in which there is only one drop of water.¹⁰ Doesn't this show that counterexamples to the I/I cannot be redescribed to conform to the I/I? At this point Hacking states that the assertion that every drop of water is ten diameters from some drop is itself question begging--given that we are not committing ourselves to there being some absolute space.¹¹ On a relativistic view of space, says Hacking, "spatial relations are relations between objects and are determined by the objects."¹² And in light of this Hacking claims that given a relativistic view of space, the assertion concerning some drop of water being ten diameters from another would be question begging.¹³

At this point I will comment on certain claims that Hacking has made. First, Hacking tells us that the expression "There are two drops" would be a question begging

expression if used by the opponent of the I/I in describing his counterexample. It seems that in holding this Hacking has the following reasons in mind. Suppose that the opponent of the I/I wants to show that there can be a world in which two "indiscernibles" exist. He has to show without begging the issue, that even though he has assigned the very same properties to whatever was asserted to be a drop of water in that world, there still must be two, and not one, of them. Hence to start out by assuming that there are two of them, is to beg the issue.

I have just offered one interpretation of Hacking's position. But if it is his position then it seems as if his position is the same as that of Lambert and van Fraassen. The opponent of the I/I is going to assign certain properties to an entity A and an entity B. He may state that A is a drop of water and B is a drop of water. He may then proceed to mention A and B in order to assign properties to A and to B. His aim in doing so is to show that in spite of the fact that every drop of water mentioned, namely, A and B, has been assigned the same properties, and in spite of the fact that nothing was assumed which was to be proven, the world that he describes is one in which A is distinct from B, e.g., in which there are two drops of water.

But there does seem to be something amiss or misleading about Hacking's claim that "there are two drops" is

a question begging description. Consider an object A that is assigned the property "distinct from some drop of water that exists at the same time that A does." As long as that drop of water is not assigned the very same properties that A is assigned, then it will not follow that A is, in all the relevant respects, just like that drop of water. The counterexample becomes question begging only if the same relevant properties assigned that drop of water are those assigned to A. If that were done then one would have assumed a distinction between some object and some object assigned the same *relevant properties*. But one was supposed to prove that there were two such objects and not assume that. So it is not just by using the expression "there are two drops" in a counterexample to the I/I designed to show that there can be two "indiscernible drops" that the question has been begged. Perhaps what Hacking is saying is that if one tries to show that there could be a world in which only two indiscernible drops of water, A and B, exist, it is question begging to assign to A the property "is one of two drops of water" if one goes on to assign to each of those drops, the very same relevant properties. The counterexample was supposed to show that although A and B have the very same properties, A is distinct from B. I will take this to be what is meant by saying that the description "there are two drops of water" is question begging (when one seeks to describe a world in which only two indiscernible drops of water exist).

Secondly, Hacking's point about the spatial expression "ten diameters from some drop" being a question begging expression is best viewed in the same way that the expression "there are two drops of water" was viewed as question begging. The opponent of the I/I, who wants to show that there can be two "indiscernible" drops of water, does not beg the issue by supposing that A (a drop of water) is ten diameters from B (a drop of water). He may assign to B properties that are incompatible with the ones that A has. But if he concludes, on the basis of assignments of the very same properties to both A and B that they are indiscernible, then has he begged the issue? However, and oddly enough, Hacking thinks that the opponent of the I/I begs the issue only if the property "is ten diameters from some drop" is assigned to a drop (of water) given a relative but not absolute view of space.¹⁴ I do not see why this is so. However, perhaps Hacking has reasoned as follows. On a relative view of space distance is a relationship between distinct entities capable of movement. On an absolute view of space it is a relationship between distinct places not definable in terms of movable spatially related entities. What it means on a relative view of space for one drop to be ten diameters from some drop is for one drop to be ten diameters from another drop. What it means on an absolute view of space for one drop to be ten diameters from some

drop is for one drop to be at a place ten diameters from the place of another drop. So if, in the purported counter-example, it can be concluded on the basis of assigning the property "is ten diameters from B," to A, that A is distinct from B, then A has already been assumed to be distinct from B. It has been assumed to be distinct from B because what it means for A to be ten diameters from B (which is some drop) is for A to be ten diameters from something distinct from A, that is B. Hence, to conclude that A is distinct from B (or some drop) even though B (or some drop) was assigned the very same properties, is to have already assumed that distinction in the premisses of the argument.

Perhaps my interpretation Hacking's point concerning absolute and relative space is incorrect. However, I need not concern myself with other interpretations of what Hacking means. My arguments against the positions of Lambert, van Fraassen, and Hacking do not commit me to assigning to any entities those properties that Hacking would regard as question begging.

I will first argue against Hacking's position. I intend to show that even if object A is, without begging the question, assigned certain properties that an object B is assigned, and the descriptions of A and B are compatible with either A being identical with B or A being distinct from B, the I/I can still be violated. I will concede all

of Hacking's claims concerning which descriptions involve begging the issue. And I will appeal to none of them in constructing the state of affairs that I will mention. Yet, that state of affairs will not be compatible with the I/I being true. After I present my first argument against Hacking's position I will deal with the previously mentioned views of Lambert and van Fraassen.

(A)

Some one may have three colored shaped objects P, Q, and R on his desk. Suppose that that person tells us that there is something called "A" and something called "B" that is not on his desk. He wants us to figure out, from the information to be provided, whether or not A is distinct from B. In order for us to do so he tells us the following. A as well as B belongs to a group of objects comprised of P, Q, R, A, and B. Each of these objects is "wholly independent" from the other. What it means to say that each member of this group is wholly independent from the other is that (i) each member of this group is an object that could be spatially related to any other member, and (ii) any member of this group might have existed even though any other member or all other members had not existed. Let us assume that P, Q, and R have the same nonrelational properties, and that the nonrelational properties of A are the same as those of B. Let "K" stand for any set of nonrelational properties

that objects such as P, Q, and R, i.e., colored shaped objects, might (i) simultaneously share, (ii) have in combination with any of the others in that set, and (iii) have in such a way that that set of nonrelational properties does not lack some property whose addition to the set would form a set of properties that satisfies conditions (i) and (ii). To say that some object might have had a K set of properties is to say that some object might have had a set of nonrelational properties that satisfies conditions (i), (ii), and (iii). A is an object that has some K set of properties called " K_1 ." B is an object that has the same K_1 set of properties as A. It might have been the case that before some event O_1 (A exploding), A had its K_1 set of properties neither before nor after B had its K_1 set of properties. In addition, before O_1 , A as well as B might have been entities that began to exist after any entity other than either A or B. In addition to having such properties A as well as B might also have had the following properties. A as well as B might not have been spatially related to any entity not identical with either A or B that (i') was at a distance from A as well as from B, or (ii') next to A as well as to B, or (iii') either next to A but not next to B, or next to B but not next to A.

If A and B did have the combination of properties that A and B were previously said to possibly have had,

would it then be true that that A is, must be or must have been, distinct from B? If A and B were as we just said them to be, would it be true that A would then have been both distinct from B and spatially related to B? I do not think a possible world in which A and B are taken as two distinct objects rather than the same object can correctly be inferred from anything previously stated about A and B. (So far Hacking seems right.) Nothing stated about A or B is incompatible with A being the very same object that B is. A as well as B was said to be an object that belongs to the group of "wholly independent" objects. However, that does not entail that A is not identical with B. If A is distinct from B then A is wholly independent from B. But in order for that to be true A must be distinct from B and just being a member of the group of wholly independent objects does not entail that A is distinct from B. Two objects can share all of their nonrelational properties. But if A has the same nonrelational properties as B, that does not mean that A is distinct from B. The same object may have all and only those characteristics that it itself has. So, if A is identical with B, then A will have all of the same nonrelational properties as B. Furthermore, no claim was made from which it follows that some entity was spatially related in any way to A but not to B. The statement including parts (i'), (ii'), and (iii') concerning entities distinct from A and B, was

concerned with denying that A and B were spatially related to anything external to A as well as to B. And such a denial does not entail that A is distinct from B, or that A is spatially related to something in a way that B is not so related.

However, even though it does not follow from anything stated about A or B that A is distinct from B, or that A might have existed under conditions in which it must have been distinct from B, the combination of properties that A and B might have had are such that the I/I might not have held if A and B had that combination of properties. What I will show is that the information given about A and B is such that we may reason soundly from that information to the conclusion that the I/I might not have held with respect to certain particulars. And the way in which I will do this is compatible with Hacking's position.

It may not seem that anything stated about A and B provides any good reason for thinking that if A and B existed with the combination of properties they were said to possibly have had, then the I/I might then have been violated. Now, this is true with respect to the I/I being violated by two distinct entities each of which is identical with either A or B. As I previously showed, whatever was said about A is compatible with B being either distinct or identical with A. But, as I will show, it does not follow

from that that every universe compatible with redescribing A as identical with B, is one in which the I/I also holds. My argument for this is in two parts.

First, let us *assume* that A and B are distinct objects. Given what was said about A and B, no inconsistency arises if we assume that A is distinct from B. (Although we do beg the issue given that that is what we are to prove.) So, assuming that A is distinct from B, what may we then conclude--given that they had the combination of properties that A and B were said to possibly have had--concerning how similar A might have been to B? Well, if A is distinct from B, and A as well as B belongs to the group of wholly independent objects consisting in part of P, Q, and R, then A is an object that is wholly independent from B. A is therefore an object that can be spatially related to B or exist even though B did not exist. B is also a wholly independent object. So, either A or B may or may not be spatially related to the other; and either might have existed even though the other had never existed. Let us now consider the case of A and B as two objects that might have been spatially related to each other.

Given the assumption that A is distinct from B, A might have been spatially related to B. Now, how similar would A and B have been if each had the combination of properties previously attributed to A and B? Both A and B

would not have existed, e.g., have been formed, after any entity other than either of them. Both would have had a K_1 set of properties. So each, given that they are taken to have been spatially related to each other, would have been spatially related to an object with the same nonrelational properties, namely the K_1 set of properties. Neither A nor B would have had their nonrelational properties either before or after the other object did. And given (i'), (ii'), and (iii'), no object other than A and B would have been external to both A and B. In short, if we assume that A is distinct from B, then A and B might have been as Black's spheres might be thought to be--two copresent objects differing in no way compatible with the I/I being true. Notice, however, that I described A and B in such a way that they would then have no historical differences, e.g., being formed in different ways, or one existing before the other, or one having events occur to it that differentiate it, in the relevant way, from the other. Black mentions no historical features of his spheres. Consequently, the defender of the I/I may say, as Lambert and van Fraassen might have correctly said, that Black's universe is possible because his two spheres may differ in ways that Black has not discussed, namely historically.

It seems that A and B, under the conditions just described, have the same nonrelational properties, no his-

torical differences, and no spatial differences relevant to supporting the I/I.

Now, if we assume that A as well as B might have existed without the other having ever existed, then we may, given the combination of properties assigned to A and B, draw the conclusion that either might have had those properties even if the other had never existed. But if this is true, then the I/I is not a true principle. Given what was said about A and B, and assuming them to be noncopresent objects, either one might then have had the K_1 set of properties even though it was never spatially related to anything else. This would have been the case if (i'), (ii') and (iii') are assumed to hold of A or B even though only one and not the other had existed. Either A or B might also have been, given that either might have had the combination of previously mentioned properties, objects that existed after no other object. In effect, if we assume that A as well as B are wholly independent objects that might have had the combination of properties that A and B were said to possibly have had, then each might have had those combinations even though the other had not existed. As a result, each could then have had no differences, relevant to supporting the I/I, in properties from what properties the other might have had.

Notice that if the I/I can be shown to not hold with respect to either copresent or noncopresent objects,

then the failure of the I/I to hold in one case may be appealed to in supporting its failure in the other case. If the I/I does not hold in one of the cases, then the I/I, just by itself, is not a principle that can be successfully appealed to as the reason for why the other case might not violate the I/I. So if it can be established that a universe such as Black's might exist and also violate the I/I, then that result can be appealed to to show that the I/I may not also hold for noncopresent objects.

In response to the proceeding statements, it may be pointed out that I have, as yet, provided no good reason for believing that A is distinct from B. The previously mentioned combination of properties attributed to A and B may, without inconsistency, be attributed to A and B even though A is identical with B. So, I have not provided any good reason for believing that two objects might not conform to the requirements of the I/I. Although this is correct, I have not intended anything that I have just said to be taken as an argument against the I/I. What I have been doing is putting forth the first stage of an argument against both the I/I and Hacking's position. I will now turn to the second stage of that argument.

Let us reconsider the objects P, Q, R, A, and B. Each was said to be an object with a K set of properties. A and B were described as having a K_1 set of properties.

A therefore has the same nonrelational properties as B. Now, A, as well as B, is an object with a K set of properties. To have a K set of properties is to have a set of nonrelational properties that colored shaped objects might simultaneously share given that that set of properties satisfies the previously mentioned conditions (i), (ii), and (iii). So, it follows from what has been stated that if A or B is an object with a K set of properties, then some set of nonrelational properties that colored shaped objects might simultaneously share are the properties of A and B. And no inconsistency then arises if A and B are assigned some set of properties that colored shaped objects might simultaneously have in common. As long as that set of properties is a K set of properties, it may be assigned to A and to B without any inconsistency arising. If K_2 is the K set of nonrelational properties described below, so that that set of properties is a set of nonrelational properties that some colored shaped objects, e.g., P, Q, or R might simultaneously share, then A as well as B may, without inconsistency, be described as being an object with a K_2 set of properties. In other words, if K_2 is a set of K characteristics, no inconsistency arises in supposing A and B to have a K_2 set of properties.

Some square object, e.g., a square wooden block, might be a square object of exactly the same size and shape

as another square object. It might be two feet in length, width and height. That object might also have the same nonrelational properties as the other square object, e.g., both may have the same size, shape, color, and arrangement of constituents. Both of them may be placed together to form a rectangular object two feet in width and height and four feet in length. Each half of the rectangular object would then have the same nonrelational properties as the other. Although that rectangular object does not have all of the same nonrelational properties as any of its parts or portions, some part or portion may have all of the same nonrelational properties as some other part or portion.

The rectangular object that has just been described may have a certain set of nonrelational properties that can be shared by other objects. If A is distinct from B, then each might simultaneously share that set of nonrelational properties.

Let " K_2 " be any set of nonrelational properties that a rectangle, such as the one just described, might have. Since A, as well as B, may be assumed, without inconsistency, to be an object whose K set of characteristics is a K_2 set of characteristics, we may suppose that A as well as B is an object with a K_2 set of characteristics. What now follows is that even if we take A to be identical with B, under those conditions previously described by the mention of the possible world in which A as well as B had a certain combination of

properties, that world could be described, without inconsistency, as one in which the I/I does not hold. Given what was claimed about what A and B might have been, if A is identical with B, A would then have been an object that was spatially related to no other object. But, if A also had the K_2 set of properties just described, then two entities would have existed without satisfying the requirements of the I/I. Half of A, had A had a K_2 set of properties would have had the same nonrelational properties as the other half. And under the previously mentioned conditions each half would not have had, given what was said about A and B, any historical or spatial relations in virtue of which each half differed in a way that supports the I/I. Neither half would have differed from the other in any way that supports the I/I. So, even if the world in which A and B is redescribed to contain only A as identical to B, the I/I would still be violated. In other words, even if the descriptions of A and B are compatible with a world in which only A exists as identical to B, the I/I may still not hold under those circumstances. And if to avoid this consequence the defender of the I/I describes A and B as two objects then, given what was stated about A and B, they still would not have existed under conditions compatible with the I/I (as previously shown). If we interpret A to be identical with B, then it still is the case that there are conditions under

which A might exist without the I/I being satisfied. Each half of A might not have any difference of the sort that supports the I/I--if A has a K_2 set of properties. In short, we may be given nonquestion begging descriptions about an object A and an object B and about the conditions under which A and B might exist, and given those conditions, whether or not A and B are interpreted to be identical, the I/I might still not hold. Furthermore, no reliance on a non-relational notion of space was needed in order to show that this is so. Hacking's position, insofar as it interprets a denial of the very possibility of there being such an argument, is therefore incorrect.

(B)

At this point it may be objected that I have not provided any reasons for believing that what was previously stated as to what might have been the case with respect to A and B, could be the case. Why not believe that I have simply described an impossible state of affairs, instead of a possible one? Consider the following attempt to provide a "demonstration" that a round square might have been an iron sphere completely embedded in a block of concrete. He proceeds to state what might have been the case with respect to that object. That concrete object might have been square and called "A." A might have been spatially related to other objects. It might also have been the case that every entity

spatially related to (the square object) A, was also spatially related to a square object. Given these conditions, we may conclude that under these conditions A would have been both round and square. The iron sphere is both round and a part of A. It is spatially related to objects that A is spatially related to. So, given the premises that iron sphere must also be something that is square. Hence, it is a round object that is also square! But, since that is impossible the "demonstration" offered is simply unsound. And, it may be thought, such a "demonstration" reveals the problem with my attempt as well as any attempt to describe a counterexample to the I/I. The defender of the I/I may view the purported counterexample to be the description of an impossible state of affairs. Or, if he does think it is the description of a possible state of affairs, he may claim that I have not provided all the relevant information concerning how the objects mentioned in that description differ. And so, there are still ways in which those objects might differ in accordance with the I/I.

It is true that someone may hold that the description of a purported counterexample to the I/I is not the description of a possible state of affairs. However, if their reason for believing this is simply that those descriptions are descriptions of a state of affairs in which the I/I does not hold, then they are the ones who are begging the

issue. In evaluating the purported counterexamples, they are assuming the truth of the very principle whose justification is being sought after. In other words, they are approaching the question of the truth of the I/I in a prejudiced way. The defense of the I/I just mentioned, is therefore acceptable only to those who are willing to appeal to that principle in order to evaluate the soundness of an argument. My purpose here is, in part, to consider what reasons there are for accepting or rejecting the I/I. And I exclude as being relevant to this goal arguments that beg the question. If Black or I can present nonquestion begging descriptions of possible worlds by mentioning certain combinations of properties that, in themselves do not seem incompatible, then I will consider such purported worlds to provide us with good reasons for rejecting the I/I. The fact that a defender of the I/I may charge his opponent with having described an impossible state of affairs is, by itself, an unsuccessful defense of that principle. My purpose here is not to marshal arguments to convince defenders of the I/I or PII to give up their position, but to find out if there are any good reasons for believing in these principles.

If we evaluate arguments for and against the I/I or the PII without incorporating any prejudice either in behalf of or against that principle, i.e., begging the question, it may be possible to find considerations against

either the I/I or PII must give up if he is to hold on to those principles. I will attempt to point out such consequences.

I have been arguing against Lambert's, van Fraassen's and Hacking's position on the pointlessness of providing counterexamples to versions of the II, e.g., to the I/I. I have, without begging the question, described a state of affairs that does not conform to the requirements of the I/I. Even if the object A and the object B are assigned the very same nonquestion begging properties, the I/I will not hold if A is interpreted to be either identical with or distinct from B. Hacking probably holds that any purported description of a counterexample to the I/I could be a description of a counterexample to the I/I only if the description is not the description of an impossible state of affairs. But if Hacking does hold such a principle and also claims that I have produced the description of an impossible state of affairs, then his position would still have difficulties. He would be in the position of claiming that I have not described a possible state of affairs. But why believe that? After examining many arguments in behalf of the I/I I have formed no sound argument in defense of the I/I. And nothing that Hacking states seems to support the claim that my purported description of a counterexample to the I/I is the description of an impossible state of affairs. If Hacking

does claim that then he is in the position of having to justify such a claim. And that still remains to be successfully done. The positions of Lambert, van Fraassen and Hacking incorporate certain confusions that I should clear up, if my position is to be made a strong one. So, I now turn to an examination and criticism of an approach to the II common to their positions.

(C)

Someone may interpret the II to be the principle that if an entity A and an entity B have all their properties in common, then A is identical with B. They may then think that any purported description of a counterexample to the II, or any version of it, must proceed as follows. Some object A is to be assigned certain properties and some object B is to also be assigned certain properties. Furthermore, it may be held that what is assigned to A and B are to be properties only of a certain type, e.g., expressible in wholly general, or purely descriptive, terms. Attempting to produce a counterexample to the I/I consists in describing A and B in such a way that, without begging the question, A can be deduced as distinct from B although A and B differ in no way relevant to supporting the I/I. This approach as to what is required in order for a description of a counterexample to the I/I to be acceptable, is the approach that Hacking, Lambert and van Fraassen have taken. However, its

requirements are unnecessarily narrow and they foster a misunderstanding of what is needed in order to present a nonquestion begging counterexample to the I/I.

In describing a counterexample to the I/I it is not necessary to present an argument whose conclusion consists in stating some entity to be distinct from some entity. In order to describe a counterexample to the I/I, it is not necessary to have a conclusion of the form "A is distinct from object B." We may start out by *assuming* that some object A is distinct from some object B, and without begging the question as to their "indiscernibility," we can ascribe certain properties to A and B. We may construct an argument whose conclusion is that A is "indiscernible" from B. And if we do not assume, in any of the premisses what we are to prove, then a nonquestion begging argument has been given. In that way it may be shown that A is "indiscernible" from B. And if that is done then a nonquestion begging state of affairs incompatible with the I/I has been described. Instead of starting out by ascribing properties to A and B in order to deduce that A is distinct from B, in spite of the fact that each has been assigned the same properties, we may reverse this order. Without begging any question against the I/I we may seek to show that A is "indiscernible" from B even though A has not been assumed to be indiscernible from B. I think that certain philosophers may have not

realized this partly because of the way in which they interpret the I/I. They interpret it as the principle that if an object A and an object B have all their properties in common, then A is identical with B. And so, they then think that a counterexample to that principle must be one in which some object A is deduced as being distinct from some object B. But as I have pointed out, that principle may be attacked in another way. We may assume that some object A is distinct from some object B, and/or that A is at a distance from B. And it can be shown, in a non-question begging way, that A can have all and only all of the relevant properties that B can have, then the I/I will have been shown to be false. This is the approach that I will now take.

II. Arguments Against the I/I and PII

In this section I will present arguments against the I/I and the PII. I will begin by describing a certain state of affairs. In describing this state of affairs or possible world I will not beg any question against the I/I. In fact, the entities that I describe will be ones that differ in ways that are compatible with the I/I. After describing that state of affairs I will argue that there are good reasons for believing that the state of affairs

might have differed in such a way that the I/I would then not have held. I will argue that if we accept the I/I and appeal to it as the reason for why that state of affairs could not have occurred, then that acceptance of the I/I means giving up other beliefs that seem, apart from considerations of the I/I, acceptable. It should be remembered that the I/I is a principle for which successful support remains to be given and that I am now presenting further considerations for not believing that principle.

(A)

Imagine that on some planet there were two creatures, one called "A" and the other called "Not-A." They were created by a scientist who thought that they would provide the perfect solution to ecological pollution. Each creature could eat any waste material without creating any waste material of its own. Everything eaten by each was incorporated into its body. Each creature was made out of various substances arranged in various ways. Nothing from any living or dead creature was used to make up their bodies.

A and Not-A differed in many respects. A was created before Not-A; A was petted before Not-A was petted; A lived only in a brown cage and Not-A lived only in a green cage. In spite of these differences, A and Not-A were alike in many respects. Each was the identical twin of the other. Both

creatures had a spherical body with a mouth that looked like a line running across the middle of it. Each had two claws whose talons all looked alike. Each ate at the same rate, and each grew in such a way that they remained the same size as well as identical twins. They ate and grew but they always remained identical twins.

Each kept eating and growing. They ate all the waste material there was to eat. And when there was no more of their preferred waste material food to eat, they ate what they were not supposed to eat. They ate plants and insects, trees and birds. They ate anything that they could get their talons on.

Finally, A and Not-A ate all the people on their planet and there was only the planet and each other left for them to eat. They began to eat the very planet they were on. As they did so they grew larger. No waste material of their own was produced. When there was no more planet left to eat, A and Not-A extended their claws, now quite large, and grabbed onto another planet. They ate that too.

The universe in which A and Not-A existed had very few things left to eat. When they finished eating the rest of the planets and everything on them, nothing was left for the twins to eat except for each other. After eating all that they are they were left neither next to nor at a distance from anything besides each other. A extended its claws to

eat Not-A. Not-A had ended up, after eating all that it ate, with its back facing the mouth of A. A ate Not-A. A remained the only thing left besides, of course, whatever A was made out of--which now included whatever Not-A was made out of. A reached out for more to eat. but there was nothing left for A to eat. A tired and eventually A stopped moving its claws. A's body stopped functioning. All that then remained was the body of the creature A. And this is how the story ends.

Nothing that I have said with respect to this story presupposes for its possibility that the I/I be false. A and Not-A had certain differences, e.g., one was created before the other. So, even if A and Not-A had ended up as two things with the same nonrelational properties as well as both being external to no entity identical with either of them, the I/I would still hold of them. Furthermore, it is compatible with the I/I to hold that either A or Not-A might have eaten the other. Either might have ended up as a creature external to no other thing. And, we may also suppose without any inconsistency with respect to the I/I, that each creature's body might have also ended up with the same nonrelational properties that the other creature's body might have ended up with. Each creature's body would still have been different from what the other creature's body would have been like if the other creature had eaten it.

And that is true because each creature's body had the different history that it had. So, the I/I has not been shown to be false. Let us now reconsider the I/I in light of these results.

I have attempted to describe a certain situation, concerning two creatures, that is not incompatible with the I/I. One conclusion that I have drawn, in light of that situation, is the following. One may, without inconsistency, hold the I/I and also hold that two things that have the same nonrelational properties, e.g., the bodies of creatures A and Not-A, might be at a distance from each other without both being external to any object not identical with either of them. Let us call such a state of affairs a "symmetrical state." At this point one may wonder why the body of A and the body of Not-A must have had a history in virtue of which they would differ in some way supportive of the I/I. It seems that if we hold on to the I/I we can hold that two objects, e.g., A and Not-A, could be in a symmetrical state only if some event before the occurrence of that state was one in which the two objects differed in accordance with the I/I. We would have to hold such a principle since that would be--given that they are in a symmetrical state--the only way left in which they could differ in some way supportive of the I/I. But why should we believe in that principle if we do not already assume the truth of the I/I? If we do

hold that principle we could also consistently hold that two objects with the same nonrelational properties could be at a distance from each other without *both* being external to anything else. However, if we hold the I/I, then we must also hold that those objects must have had some difference in virtue of which they differ in the appropriate way, i.e., in accordance with the I/I. But, if we believe that two things may be in a symmetrical state, why is it true that they must have *arrived* at that state by first going through any process, stage or series of events? If it is possible for two objects, e.g., A and Not-A, to be in a symmetrical state, why couldn't they be in such a state without having arrived at that state by first having gone through some other stage or process? The story of A and Not-A does not seem to be either counterintuitive or incompatible with the I/I. Yet, if we are also to hold on to the I/I, then we must accept some necessary connection between two objects being in a symmetrical state and their having arrived at that state after something happened to either one or both of them. I do not see why we should accept there being such a connection. The two states of affairs are logically independent. To hold that those two are necessarily connected so that the one could occur only if the other occurred first seems to be false. And if the I/I is itself not supported by sound arguments, then it will be reasonable to reject it

on the basis of its consequences. Even if there are some arguments in favor of the I/I that seem to be good, they will be acceptable only if the consequences of accepting those arguments, and the I/I, are themselves acceptable. But the counterintuitive consequences, just mentioned, of the I/I weigh against that principle being true. If we do not first beg the question in favor of the I/I, then there does not appear to be any good reason to believe that there is a necessary connection of the sort just discussed. In fact, the opposite seems to be more plausible.

(B)

In the story about A and Not-A, A ate Not-A. A's body ended up both with a certain set of nonrelational properties, call it "T," and no spatial relationship to anything not identical with A. In other words, A's body ended up neither next to nor at a distance from any object. Let us say that an object not spatially related to any other object has a "solitary experience." The body of either A or Not-A might have ended up with both: a solitary existence and the properties of set T. As I previously pointed out such a possibility is not incompatible with the I/I. A was created before Not-A. A's body would therefore have differed from Not-A's body, under the previously mentioned conditions, because the bodies would still have had certain historical differences under those conditions. (Henceforth, "A'" will

be used to refer to A's body and "Not-A'" used to refer to Not-A's body.) It is compatible with the I/I to hold that A' as well as Not-A' might have had a solitary existence even though each might then have had the nonrelational properties that the other might have had in its solitary existence. We may now wonder why it should be believed that A' and Not-A' can have the same set T of nonrelational properties together with a solitary existence, only if either or both first pass through some previous stage or process in virtue of which either would differ from the other in a way supportive of the I/I holding for noncopresent objects? If, e.g., either A' or Not-A' can end up as a spherical shaped red entity with claws, as well as neither next to nor at a distance from any other entity, why is it impossible for either to have been like that without having first having passed through any stage or process in order to arrive at that state? And why must either under the previously mentioned conditions, first have to have something occur to them in order for either to exist under those conditions? Each might be an entity that had the T set of properties together with a singular existence. Why should we believe that an entity can be like that only if it first passes through some stage or process? Either one or both would have to if the I/I is to hold for noncopresent objects. It seems that if we believe in the I/I then we will also be committed to the belief that

A or Not-A must first pass through some stage or process in order for each to have that set of nonrelational properties together with a singular existence (which in itself is not incompatible with the I/I being true). Such a requirement is a necessary condition for the I/I being true. Yet, that requirement does not, in itself, seem very plausible. If A' and Not-A' each could have the T set of properties together with the singular existence, which as I previously pointed out each might have, what good reason, apart from the I/I justifies us in believing that each could be like that only by ending up like that after some previous stage of process?

I have pointed out that if we hold the I/I then certain beliefs that do not, in themselves, seem plausible are beliefs that we cannot deny if we are to avoid inconsistency. I argued that they do not seem defensible, apart from being beliefs that express necessary conditions for the I/I to be true, and their implausibility therefore casts doubt on the plausibility of the I/I. I have evaluated the I/I by examining the consequences and ramifications of that principle. Since the I/I requires that we believe propositions that do not seem to be true, the case against the I/I appears to be better than the case for it. And even after exploring arguments in behalf of that principle, the sound arguments still remain to be given in support of it. I doubted the

truth of the I/I, in part, because it does not seem to be true that if each of two entities might have had a singular existence together with the same set of nonrelational properties, one or both of them had to acquire the properties together with the singular existence together with the same set of nonrelational properties, one or both of them had to acquire the properties together with the singular existence by first passing through some stage or process. Notice also, that in rejecting the I/I for the reasons just mentioned, I also am rejecting the PII with respect to noncopresent particulars. If A' and Not-A' each might have had a T set of properties together with a singular existence without acquiring that combination by having historical differences between them, then the PII is not true. Under those conditions they would have no properties relevant to supporting the PII, e.g., no spatial relationships to anything with respect to which they differ.

The defender of the I/I may attempt to argue that not all objects that have some set of nonrelational properties together with a singular existence must have first passed through some stage or process in order to acquire that combination. We might, he may claim, suppose that A' had never passed through any stages or process in order to acquire its combination of a T set of properties and a singular existence. However, it may be claimed, no other entity could have been

like that without acquiring, by first passing through some stage or process, a combination of T properties and singular existence. Whatever particular might have had the T set of properties together with a singular existence, without acquiring that combination by first passing through some stage or process, would have been identical with A'.

If the defender of the I/I takes this approach, then his position is an arbitrary one. Why say that only A could have been characterized as just described? Why not say that any particular that had those characteristics would have been an entity that was identical with Not-A? Out of the many objects that might share the same T set of nonrelational characteristics, why believe that some one of those objects is the only one that could have had those nonrelational characteristics in combination with a singular existence? Furthermore, why believe such a claim? That claim must be true if the I/I is to be true. But why believe it? It seems that the defender of the I/I who takes this approach must commit himself to an arbitrary view that, in itself, does not appear plausible. This consequence will now be examined in further detail.

(C)

Assume that there are four uniformly colored spheres, A, B, C, and D. A, B, and C are red have have the same set of nonrelational properties called "R₁." Whenever any of

these objects are mentioned, it will be assumed that the object mentioned has that set of nonrelational properties. D has all of the same nonrelational properties as A, B, and C except for color. D is green. Whenever I mention D, it will be assumed to have all of the same nonrelational properties as A, B, and C except for its color which we will assume is green. A, B, C and D all differ in their spatial relationships. Let us suppose the following: (1) that A was ten feet away from D after it was nine feet away from D, and nine feet away from D after it was eight feet away from D, (2) that before A was ten feet away from D, no entity was external to both A and D, and (3) that before A was ten feet away from D nothing occurred to A and D except that the continuous movement of A and D away from each other as described in (1).

If the I/I is true then it is impossible for certain states of affairs to have occurred. A might have been related to D in the ways specified under conditions (1), (2) and (3). Now, we may, without begging the issue against the I/I, suppose that the following condition (1') might have held for B: B was ten feet away from D after it was nine feet away from D, although B was not nine feet away from D after B was eight feet away from D. Under condition (1') B would not be like what A would be like under conditions (1), (2) and (3). Given that each might have existed under

their respective conditions, under those conditions A will differ from B with respect to A having a different spatial history from B. So, we may now also hold, without being inconsistent with the I/I, that B could have existed under conditions (1''), and (2') and (3') which are the conditions that one gets by substituting "(1')" for "(1)", and "B" for "A" throughout the conditions (2) and (3).

In light of what I have said I think that it can be shown that if the I/I is true then certain odd and counter-intuitive results follow. What is not odd and counterintuitive is that B could exist under conditions (1') , (2') and (3'). B, under those conditions, would be ten feet away from D after it was nine feet away from D. This seems possible given the I/I. but let us now modify condition (1') and take it to have been the condition that B was ten feet away from D after it was nine feet away from D, and nine feet away from D after it was eight feet away from D. If we hold the I/I, can we, without inconsistency, also hold both that A might have existed under conditions (1), (2) and (3) and that B might have existed under conditions (1'), (2') and (3')? The answer is no. Under the modified conditions (1') along with (2') and (3'), B would not differ from what A would be like, under conditions (1), (2) and (3) in a way compatible with the I/I. They both would have had the same, with respect to the properties that are relevant on the I/I, spatial and

historical properties. Before each was ten feet away from C, both would have had the position of being eight feet away from D. And so B under conditions ('), (2'), (3') will not differ in a way that supports the I/I, from A under conditions (1), (2), and (3). If we accept the I/I we may, without inconsistency, hold that A could have been ten feet away from D after it was nine feet away from D, and nine feet away from D after it was eight feet away from D. We may also hold, without inconsistency with respect to the I/I, that B could have been ten feet away from D after it was nine feet away from D as well as being like that under conditions (2') and (3') if (2') and (3') incorporate a reference to the *unmodified* condition (1'). However, if we are to be consistent we cannot also hold that (2') and (3') could have held of B if they incorporate a reference to (1') as *modified*. (Under these conditions B would, just like A, have been eight feet away from D.) But, isn't this very odd? Doesn't that claim seem wrong? B might have been external to both B and D. But under those conditions, it seems that if we are to hold the I/I and also to be consistent with what was previously claimed about A, then we must hold that it is impossible for B to have been eight feet away from D before it was nine feet away from D if nothing occurred to B and D except that it moved (continuously) from being eight feet to nine feet away from D. This claim is

simply absurd. If our concept of a physical object is such that it is meaningful and not inconsistent to claim that A might have existed under conditions (1), (2) and (3), then why is it meaningless or inconsistent to say that B might have existed under conditions (1'), (2') and (3') (where (1') is the *modified* condition)? There is no relevant difference between A and B such that it fails to make sense to say, or is contradictory to say, that A could exist under conditions (1), (2), and (3) but B could not exist under the previously mentioned conditions (1'), (2') and (3'). So why believe that that purported impossibility is a real one? There is no nonarbitrary reason to accept such an impossibility. In therefore regard I/I as having unacceptable consequences.

Notice the an analogous argument to the one just given against the I/I can be levelled against the PII (with respect to holding for noncopresent particulars). If was previously mentioned that A' and Not-A' (the bodies of creatures A and Not-A) might have had the same set of nonrelational properties--it was called "T." Whenever A' or Not-A' are mentioned, the creature's body that is mentioned will be assumed to have that set of nonrelational properties. In this argument let "A" refer, not to creature A, but to one part of A' and "D" refer to the rest of A'. And now take condition (1) to be the following condition: A was ten feet

away from D after it was nine feet away from D and nine feet away from D after it was next to and connected to D thereby forming A'. A could exist under condition (1) as well as (2) and (3). The reader should, of course, take "A" and "D" in those conditions as now referring to the creature parts just mentioned and not to the two uniformly colored spheres that "A" and "D" were previously used to refer to. Call this part of the argument "Part-I." Let us now turn to "Part-II" of the argument. In Part-II, "B" will be taken as referring to one part of Not-A' and "D" as referring to the rest of Not-A'. Furthermore, take condition (1') to be the following condition: B was ten feet away from D after it was nine feet away from D, although B was not next to and connected to D thereby forming Not-A'. Given the PII, B could exist under condition (1') as well as (2') and (3')-- which, in Part-II, are the conditions one gets by taking "B" and "D" in (2') and (3') to refer to parts of Not-A'. However, let us modify condition (1') and take it to have been the condition that B was ten feet away from D after it was nine feet away from D and nine feet away from D after it was next to and connected to D thereby forming Not-A'. Given the PII, then A could not, as described in Part-I, exist under conditions (1), (2) and (3), if B, as described in Part-II under the modified version of (1'), could exist under conditions (1'), (2') and (3'). But which object, A or B, can exist

under its respective conditions? The choice is arbitrary. Accepting the PII leads to the same sort of problem--arbitrariness--as I previously discussed. A and B, under their respective conditions, would be parts of wholes that simply do not differ in any way required for the PII to hold of noncopresent particulars. We may correctly reject the claim that the PII is true of noncopresent particulars.

I have presented some of my reasons for not accepting either the PII (with respect to noncopresent particulars) and the I/I. My strategy in arguing against these principles has been to argue both that the major attempts to support these principles have failed and the the limits set by these principles as to what is possible are unacceptable. The I/I and PII, for the sake of consistency, require us to believe in the impossibility of certain states of affairs that, apart from these principles, did not seem problematic. However, I have not yet provided any reason for believing that the PII is not true with respect to copresent particulars. Is it not true that copresent particulars must differ in the objects that each is at a distance from? Even if two spheres, like Black's spheres, had lacked any nonspatial differences that support the PII, wouldn't they still have differed spatially from each other? Each would have had a distance from an object that was not the object that the other was at a distance from. Each could not have the same distance to

the same object. So, how could it be the case that if two particulars, e.g., two red spheres are copresent particulars, then they are not necessarily particulars that differ in their spatial properties? I will now present an argument designed to support this very possibility. I will proceed by relying on the truth of certain claims that I have previously argued for.

III. The PII and Copresent Particulars

Let us assume that two groups of objects are correctly describable in the following way. One group, "group I," consists of four particulars: A, B, C and D. The other group, "group II," consists of four other particulars: E, F, G and H. No object that is a member of one group is also a member of the other group. Both A and E are clocks. The rest of the objects mentioned are cube shaped objects each with a different color. A and E do not have the same spatial properties. A is next to B but E is not next to B. E is next to F but A is not next to F.

So, there are two groups of objects, groups I and II, each of which contains a clock. And no member of either group is a member of the other group. Each group consists only of objects which are each spatially related to all the other members of the group that each is in. The clocks

of groups I and II work in such a way that when the hands of one strike a certain time--when they are positioned in a certain way with respect to the numerals of the clock--the hands of the other also strike some time. In other words, some position is assumed by the hands of one clock neither before nor after some position is assumed by the hands of the other clock, i.e., simultaneously. I have described two groups of copresent objects each of which contains members spatially related to members of the group that each is a member of. Let us now ask a question about both groups. Is it necessary that the objects in each group just described be spatially related to each other? At first we may be inclined to answer in the affirmative. We might say that every object in group I must be either next to or at a distance from every object in group II. If each copresent group contains only spatially related objects, i.e., objects spatially related to some other object, then all of the objects of each group must be spatially related to each other. But why should we believe that this must be so? From a statement of the form "some A are B" it does not follow that all A are B. It does not seem logically inconsistent to deny the claim that if some of the objects among the spatially related copresent objects are themselves spatially related to each other, then all of the spatially related copresent objects are spatially related to each other. If each group, i.e.,

group I and II, contain only spatially related objects, and each is a copresent group of objects, why does it follow that both of those groups must contain objects that are all spatially related to each other?

Anthony Quinton has argued that two groups of copresent objects might exist without their member being spatially related to any of the members of the other group.¹⁵ It is essential to my argument against the PII that I defend Quinton's position. However, it should be noted that a defender of the PII, which Quinton happens to be¹⁶ (although he does not explicitly formulate that principle) may agree with Quinton's position on both matters without being inconsistent. If copresent groups such as I and II did exist without their members being either next to or at a distance from the members of the other group, then each object in each group would differ in its spatial relations from every other object in both groups. Each object in, e.g., group I would not be next to or at a distance from each of the objects that any other object in that group was either next to or at a distance from. For example, object A would be either next to or at a distance from object B, C and D. But it, unlike B, C and D, would not be spatially related to A, i.e., itself. Furthermore, object A would be spatially related to objects that no member of group II would be spatially related to--given that each of the objects in both groups

are neither next to nor at a distance from any object that is a member of the other group. In light of these remarks it should be clear that even if groups I and II could be spatially unrelated copresent groups of objects, it would not follow from that that the PII is false. But, my strategy in arguing against the PII requires that I first defend such a possibility. I will begin by examining Quinton's position and defending it against criticisms that have been raised against it.

(A)

In his article, "Spaces and Times," Quinton concerns himself with constructing a myth in order to reveal the ultimately conventional nature of the belief that space must be unitary,¹⁷ i.e., to reveal the contingent status of the claim that any two copresent groups of objects, each of which contains only objects spatially related to each other, contain objects that are all spatially related to each other.¹⁸ Accordingly, to say that there could be "many spaces." What Quinton does is to describe what he believes to be a possible state of affairs about which, he claims, it is reasonable to believe that two spaces exist. Let us now examine Quinton's example.

We are asked to suppose that our dream life changed in a remarkable way. Suppose that when you fall asleep, you find yourself in a tropical environment instead of in the

familiar one in which you previously fell asleep. You find yourself in a hut at the edge of a lake. You meet a person whom you realize is your spouse. You do several things during the day. The events that you experience proceed in a coherent way and in accordance with physical laws. At the end of the day you fall asleep and subsequently find yourself waking up in your familiar (let's say from now on, modern) environment. At the end of each day in each environment, you fall asleep and find yourself back in the other type of environment. Each day in each environment proceeds coherently and in a lawlike manner. Events of the previous day in each environment have consequences that follow into the next day within the same type of environment. Every time you return to each environment, your life "picks up" in a coherent way from where it left off when you went to sleep. Basically, this is what Quinton asks us to suppose might have happened to us.¹⁹

Quinton is aware that, as it stands, his "myth" (as he calls it) needs to be supplemented by additional arguments and considerations before it would be reasonable to explain the described mythical events as events in which a person alternately inhabits different spaces.

(i)

How can we explain the fact that the tropical life seems to have begun without the person having any memory of

always having lived such a life? We may assume, says Quinton, that that person has amnesia and that he begins to experience what seems to him to be memories of his lakeside past.²⁰

If there are events in each environment that might occur before, after or neither before nor after events in the other environment how do we explain certain odd phenomena that might then arise. Some events may seem to take sixteen hours while the time of sleep seems to take only eight. Surely we cannot hold that sixteen hour events take eight hours! Quinton states the situation is to be explained as follows. The sixteen hours seem to take twice as long but we should regard this in the same way that we do when we say that the events in some dream seemed to take more time than the time taken to have that dream. But, they do not even though it may seem that way.²¹ What Quinton means is that the matter is purely psychological and not logical. The events of one environment do occur before or after events in the other. But just because some event A seems to take twice as long as some event B, it does not follow that relative to the framework appealed to to measure the duration of either A or B, that one will have taken twice as long as the other.

Before I mention further difficulties with Quinton's myth and how Quinton deals with them, I will first comment

on one of the solutions just offered. By supposing that the person undergoing the described environmental shifts, had memories of the lakeside environment, it seems that that person grew up in both environments. But in which environment was he born? Does he have two sets of parents? This difficulty can be easily overcome. We may suppose that that person is born in only one environment, with only one set of parents, and at some later time that person begins to alternate between environments. (Later on I will discuss further problems arising from the view of the self that is presupposed in Quinton's myth.) The alternation may begin while that person is an infant. Each environment might then seem to be no less familiar than the other. So this difficulty can easily be handled. In doing so, Quinton's story would then be slightly modified but not in any way damaging to Quinton's main contention.

(ii)

Quinton discusses problems about the logical possibility of the events he describes in his myth. And he attempts, by answering them, to strengthen his case in behalf of the possibility of multiple spaces. Now, two problems not previously mentioned arise with Quinton's myth. First, Quinton says, it might be that the people experiencing what they believe to be a lakeside existence are just dreaming about a lakeside existence. The objection

is that if such a series of events did happen to us, perhaps we should say that we are only dreaming and not going to any lakeside place at all. Secondly, it does not follow from anything stated so far, that if the lakeside experiences do not occur in a dream then they do not occur somewhere in ordinary physical space, i.e., in one space. With respect to the first problem, his answer is that the events that are claimed to be those of a dream are as coherent and lawlike as those that are not dream events. So, there are simply no good grounds for saying that the one series of events are those of a dream and the other those of reality.²² We may suppose, for example, that each person in each environment undergoes the experiences of living in two environments, one of which is the lakeside environment. People might even make plans with each other in one environment and carry them out in the other. Publicity of experience may be established in this way.²³ Notice that Quinton has *described* the events in his myth by using expressions that are appropriately used to describe events that do not occur in a dream. He asks us to suppose, e.g., that we find ourselves in a hut by a lake.²⁴ But when I dream I do not enter huts by lakes. I dream that I do, but I do not do so. So, Quinton cannot without begging the question say that the explanation for why those events are not events in a dream is simply that they meet the requirements of being events in reality. He

has already given us descriptions of events that are the descriptions of events that are not dreamt events. Nevertheless, this does not show that Quinton's myth is incoherent. The objection that he raises--about the events mentioned occurring in dreams--is answered by responding that the myth is simply one about people not dreaming. That is a presupposition of the myth given in the way in which it was described. However, another approach is the following. The events in the myth may be referred to in a way that does not presuppose that they are not events in a dream. We might suppose that we experience certain events that are coherent and lawlike but are not events consisting of ourselves in a modern environment. What happens to us is that we have experiences that are coherent and lawlike. At first we perhaps think that we are dreaming. We report having experiences of such a nature that we think we are dreaming about a lakeside existence that we live in. But, after some time we begin to doubt that we have merely dreamt of the lakeside existence. And we eventually believe that we are not dreaming at all. We may come to believe that, as Quinton would say, because the experiences that we initially thought were those of a dream do not have any relevant differences from those experiences that we call reality, we are not justified in describing them as dreamt. We may argue that there is simply no good reason not to say that they are dreamt

by us. On the basis of those experiences alone, there is no good reason to deny that we experience a hut, a lake, and other people in a tropical environment. At night we thought we went to sleep and began to dream, but we did not do that.

It may now be asked how we know that those experiences do not occur in ordinary physical space? Quinton asks us to suppose that we instituted the most thorough going geological investigations and did not find the lakeside existence anywhere on earth.²⁵ Now, it may be replied that that place may be on some other planet. Quinton states that we could have no positive reason, other than a loyalty to the Kantian thesis that there can be only one space, "for saying that the lake is located somewhere in ordinary physical space and there are, in the circumstances envisaged, good reasons for denying its location there!"²⁶ But just because we cannot find, under the conditions of Quinton's myth, the lakeside environment on earth we should not conclude that that environment is another space. The simple theory is that it is somewhere in ordinary physical space: why complicate our cosmology by postulating another space to explain the events previously described? I suspect that Quinton did intend that the geographical exploration that he mentioned extend to areas beyond our own planet. He did use, in defending his position, the phrase ". . . failing to find the scene

of my coherent dream in ordinary physical space . . ."²⁷
 And ordinary physical space includes more than our own planet. But even if we have searched our universe, why not just say that we have not yet found the lakeside place? Perhaps what Quinton would say is that if someone, in spite of continuous failures to find the lakeside place, insists that it must be somewhere in ordinary physical space, then that person merely reveals his prejudice in favor of there necessarily being only one space. If the lakeside place is not found after extensive search, that does not show that the multiple-space hypothesis might not be correct. Only by begging the issue against it does that follow. In fact, it might be objected that Quinton's two space myth does not seem to be the simplest hypothesis in terms of which the events described could be explained.

I have two main responses to such a objection. First, it is true that it still remains to be settled which hypothesis--the single space or multiple spaces hypothesis--is to be preferred under the conditions of Quinton's myth, i.e., Quinton's myth as here modified. In *Space and Time* Richard Swinburne has defended Quinton's position against the purported necessity of there being only one space.²⁸ Swinburne suggests that Quinton's myth be modified so that the laws of nature be different in each environment. And as a result, it would not be simpler to suppose that there is

one space rather than two.²⁹ It would not be simpler because we would then have to hold there are two sets of laws of nature in the same physical space. Swinburne suggests that rather than adopt the hypothesis involving a discontinuity of the laws of nature, we might prefer to adopt a two space explanation.³⁰

Swinburne also states that space might turn out to be finite. "So in whatever direction one set off from a given place, one would eventually arrive back at where one started."³¹ He concludes from this that failure to find the lakeside environment anywhere in our finite space "would be very very good evidence indeed for the former not being spatially related to the latter."³²

It is not clear to me why Swinburne believes that if we fail to find the lakeside existence in a finite space, then that failure constitutes "better evidence of its non-existence in that space if the space were a finite one than if the space were an infinite one."³³ Why not say that although the lakeside place is at a distance from the earth because of certain physical laws, whenever we try to reach that place, we fail to do so? It is spatially related to the earth but we cannot travel to it--given those physical laws. However, we may suppose that the people in the lakeside existence do not have a finite space; and that their explorations reveal, no matter how extensive those explorations are, no environment

such as ours. It is not clear that under these conditions the hypothesis that both environments are spatially related to each other, is the best one. Are we to assume that our space consists of at least one group of objects that comprise for their inhabitants a limited area open to exploration by them, and another group of objects (spatially related to the first group) where the inhabitants of that group of objects may leave that place to explore, as far as they can tell, without limitations? If we add to this the supposition that the physical laws of the one space are different from those of the other, and also that no exploration has ever led to anyone finding the lakeside place, then the many space hypothesis may not be the more complex one.

Second, my purpose has not been to argue that the only hypothesis or the simplest hypothesis for the events described in Quinton's myth is that two spaces exist. I have spent several and will spend several other pages discussing the coherence of Quinton's myth as well as defending the possibility of that myth (as modified by me where necessary). Part of my defense consists in examining evidence for the existence of multiple spaces. Although it may seem that the question of evidence for multiple spaces is logically independent of the question of the possibility of there being multiple spaces. It is useful to illustrate a speculative thesis by describing a purportedly possible state of affairs

illustrative of that thesis. In this way hidden assumptions may be explored, and the consequences of the thesis may be made more clear. Inconsistencies that might be seen in a position by producing such descriptions, might not have been noticed without those possible world descriptions. And lastly, such descriptions may help the reader to evaluate the truth of the position without his familiar and habitual ways of thinking about the world prejudicing him. The question is not which hypothesis--the single or multiple space hypothesis--is simpler. The question is whether or not the view that there is or can be only one space is true. And so far I have not uncovered any good reason for thinking that it is necessarily true that there is only one space, or that there could not be several spaces. However, other objections to Quinton's myth remain to be dealt with.

(iii)

There is difficulty with Quinton's myth I have not yet discussed. Are we to suppose that the same person has two bodies--one in each environment? If so, it would seem that Quinton is presupposing a view of the self as an entity that is logically independent of the body. In response to this we may accept such a notion of the self; or we may alter Quinton's myth in the way that Swinburne does, namely, we may suppose the person's body changes its space.³⁴ It remains spatially related to one group of objects until it

ceases to be so related and then acquires spatial relationships to the other group of bodies.³⁵ Richard Gale has commented on Swinburne's modification by stating since "the myth already presupposes a Cartesian view of the self, this concession is not necessary."³⁶ But why is this "concession" not necessary? If endurance of the self depends on the person's body being the same body throughout the time that the person endures, why is this concession unnecessary? If to be Cartesian is to believe that a person is an entity that is logically independent from his body, it is not Cartesian to suppose the since the person's body is the same in both spaces, then the person is the same. Perhaps Gale thinks that a necessary condition for a physical entity to be the same entity as one that previously existed is that it not cease to be spatially related to at least some things that it was previously spatially related to. Gale mentions an individual named "Smith" who is supposed to inhabit each space. Suppose that Smith re-inhabits the space that he last left. There is good evidence, says Gale, for holding that the body of Smith could not be identical with the body of Smith that ceased to inhabit the space that Smith just left. The reason is, according to Gale, that "we reidentify a material object partly in terms of its continuing to have the same spatial relations to certain other objects. Thus Smith's body is not carried over from one realm to the other."³⁷ So, we may conclude, in light of what Gale states, that to

assume that the person is the same in both spaces is to assume that something other than body is identical with the person. And to do that is to take a Cartesian position on the nature of the self. To suppose that the person is the same in both spaces, is already to adopt a Cartesian view.

Interestingly enough, Quinton himself defines a physical continuant, i.e., an enduring physical thing, partly in terms of spatial position.³⁸ First he states that "A at [time] t1 at [place] p1 is identical with B at [time] t2 at [place] p2 provided that there is a continuous spatial path between p1 and p2 on every pair of neighboring points of which there are closely qualitatively similar things at neighboring moments of the interval from t1 to t2."³⁹ A "continuous path" for mobile things is such that ". . . roughly speaking, their position at one time shall be either identical with or very close to their position at closely neighboring times."⁴⁰ Quinton then informs us that the preceding analysis also needs to be supplemented by adding "the condition that A and B and the set of qualitatively similar things that connect them should all be things of the same kind, that they should all fall under the same substantive concept."⁴¹ So, Quinton ends up defining a continuant "in terms of its temporal parts, as a series of events, thing-slices or momentary individuals, related by identity of substantial kind and continuity in qualities and spatial position."⁴²

Quinton therefore regards the identity of a continuant such as a rock or a creature's body, to be logically bound up with its place or location within one space--and that is Gale's position!

If Quinton is correct about spatiotemporal continuity being a necessary condition for physical object continuity (i.e., endurance), Gale is right about Quinton's myth being Cartesian. I do not wish to defend Quinton's myth by defending a Cartesian view of the self. Instead, I will attack the argument that a person cannot alternate between different spaces given that since the body of that person would cease to have any place among the places within the space that it left, that person's body cannot therefore be correctly described as the same body that ceased to be in one space and subsequently inhabited another space. Notice that this position of Quinton and Gale may be used to challenge my arguments already given against the I/I and PII. In order to state those arguments I appealed to the possibility of there being a creature A and a creature Not-A that had a solitary existence, i.e., was spatially related to no other entity. A, if it had a solitary existence, would therefore not have any location, and it might be claimed that having a position relative to other entities is a necessary condition for an extended shaped thing, e.g., a particular, to exist and also to endure. In fact, Quinton does claim this.⁴³

I will now state my reasons for rejecting the position of Quinton and Gale previously mentioned.

(i) I previously described a creature called "A." I described A as being a creature that can eat anything in its surroundings. As it eats it incorporates things in its surroundings into its body. It grows as it eats. I asked the reader to suppose that A eats and eats until everything in its environment has been eaten by A. As a result, A is the only entity left--in addition, of course, to any parts, portions or constituents that may comprise the body of A. I might have added to this story the following information. Before A died A's heart continued to pump even after there was nothing left for A to eat; and that certain other body functions of A continued even though A did not eat any longer. I did suppose that A continued to move its claws even after it ate everything in its environment. The parts of A, e.g., its claws, would then have changing spatial relationships to things, e.g., to the parts of A's body. But, remember, A ended up neither next to nor at a distance from anything else. It ate everything spatially related to its body. If that could occur to A, and A ends up without its body having any spatial relationships to other bodies, then A would cease to have a body with any spatial location with respect to other bodies. A would cease to have a body that had any spatiotemporal continuity with respect to other physical things.

The body of A would exist during its functioning and movements, but it would not be spatially related to any thing else during those occurrences. It would therefore not have the same spatiotemporal relationships, during those occurrences, to other objects. Now this may be the reason why some philosophers would think that my story about a creature that ate everything in its surroundings is not a story about anything that could happen. But let us examine the story in closer detail.

Notice that my story is, in part, a story about physical objects and their physical parts, portions and constituents being arranged in new ways. A has a body. That body is spatially related to other physical things that become part of that body. Certain entities are incorporated into the body of A. Other physical things may be left for A to eat. Parts of A grow by physical entities being incorporated into the bodily tissues of A. A eats and grows, thereby rearranging things that continue to be spatially related to each other while A eats. If A eats everything external to its skin, then the body of A consists of all the matter in the universe arranged, in various ways, into a body of a certain shape, structure and content. The story about A may be viewed as a story about the rearrangement of matter into a creature-like mass whose portions are formed into things such as masses of matter shaped like claws. Some

of the entities in the universe may also be conceived to be arranged into things with the shape and function of various animal tissues and organs. They form the tissues and organs of A. Furthermore, within that creature shaped entity, a substance just like the blood of some type of creatures might be supposed to circulate.

My story may be interpreted to be about all the material things in some universe rearranging themselves in ways that are analogous to the ways in which material things are arranged to form the body and body parts of living creatures. The physical entities that form the body of the creature-like mass, can meet the conditions of spatiotemporal continuity that Gale and Quinton adhere to. So, their view, even if true, does not show that one result of the rearrangement of all the matter in the universe might not be the formation of groups of physical entities arranged into structures resembling in shape and function, parts of living creatures, such as claws, blood, a heart, a brain, and a skin surrounding them. Are we to say that even though all the bodily parts thus formed, and arranged together, could not form the body of a living creature? It seems absurd to say so. Suppose that such a mass was spatially related to other physical entities. It would then meet the requirements of spatiotemporal continuity. It could be continuously spatially related to all of those objects while events, e.g., events

in a brain-like entity, continued to occur. The parts of such a mass could then, under Quinton and Gale's view, be the body parts of a living creature. However, if we adopt their view, then that creature could not exist without any of those external entities existing. Even though those parts were structurally like the body parts of living creatures as well as related to each other in ways that were biologically sufficient for life, no creature could exist. If a creature-like body, biologically not lacking anything necessary for life, could exist why not believe that that body could be the body of a creature? Why not believe that any necessary condition(s) for the existence and/or endurance of physical things that rule out such a possibility is or are wrong? Perhaps my creature example provides one of the cases that any requirement(s) for the existence and/or endurance of a physical thing must be compatible with if they are to be correct. Ruling it out a priori is just begging the question. And the problem with ruling it out is that the claim that a creature shaped entity whose parts are like those of living creatures could exist only if it is spatially related to other entities, is counterintuitive.

Perhaps Gale would not deny that a creature could exist if it was not spatially related to anything else. However, he may claim that creature, as well as its body, could not be the same as either the creature or creature's

body that did exist spatially related to other entities. Imagine that there was nothing left for A to eat except several rocks. Does A cease to exist after some or all of them are eaten? If those rocks are broken down and their constituents rearranged into portions of claw tissue of A, does A cease to exist? If that did happen must A's body cease to exist as well? It certainly seems absurd to say so. And if that creature could exist without being spatially related to anything else, why believe that that creature could not have been identical with one whose body was previously related spatially to other bodies? Well, suppose that we do believe this. If we do, then we would be holding that although spatiotemporal continuity is not a necessary condition for the existence and/or endurance of a creature or a creature's body, it is a necessary condition for that creature or body being the same creature or body that previously existed spatially related to other bodies. But, if a creature or its body can exist and endure without spatial relationships to other things, why believe that either the creature or its body could not exist or endure if it ceased to maintain such a relationship? Is it a question of what it means to be the same living creature or creature's body? If so, perhaps we should not accept that proposed analysis of what it means for such entities

to be the same living creature or creature's body. If the result of the proposed analysis of those expressions is that on that analysis what we thought to be possible is ruled out as possible, we may prefer to reject that analysis rather than accept the limitation that it imposes on what is possible.

However, I think that there are other reasons than the ones that I have previously stated, for doubting that an appeal to what is meant by the "same living creature" or the "same creature's body" can show that a creature and/or its body must cease to exist if it ceased to be spatially related to any entities. I will now argue in behalf of that claim.

(2) Gale thinks that if we suppose that a physical object, such as a person's body changes spaces, then it follows that that body could not continue to have spatial relationships to any of the same objects that it had before it changed spaces. In order to show that this claim is not true, we might try to argue as follows. Suppose that some person who wants to alternate between spaces wears a toupe. The toupe is not part of this body. But if the person alternating between spaces wears a toupe then couldn't that be at least one physical object that that person is related to in both spaces. That person puts on his toupe and when some event in the space he is in happens, that person ceases to be

spatially related to the objects of that space. He was related to them up till that event occurred and during that event. However, when that event is over the person is in another space. No event after that event for a limited range of events occurred before or after some range of events in the other space. And those events in that other space occurred while the person is in that space wearing his toupe. So why not say that he can alternate between spaces and, relative to the events in both spaces, he continuously wears his toupe. He wears the toupe, is spatially related to it in both spaces, and does not cease to wear it while events in both spaces occur.

One obvious reply, in support of Gale's view, is that the requirement of spatial continuity has not been shown to be false because the appeal to the example just cited begs the question. In that example it is assumed that the body and toupe that acquired a place in a space they were not previously in were the *same* body and toupe that ceased to be members of the group of objects of some other space. But if the person's body and the toupe do not continue to be spatially related to any objects besides each *other* and besides any of the parts, portions and constituents of each other as well, then each cannot be identical with some object that began to acquire spatial relations to objects of a space that neither was previously in.

This reply will not do. Let us suppose that the person who both wears the toupe and alternates between spaces wears in both spaces, the same clothes. If that happened then, in both spaces, that person's body will be spatially related to the same clothes, and those clothes will also be spatially related to the same toupe. As a result, there would then be objects besides his body and toupe to which each of those objects in both spaces did not cease to be spatially related.

In reply the following principle (P) may be claimed to be a necessary condition for a particular enduring through time: (P) If any object or group of objects cease to be spatially related to every entity not in that group, then those objects no longer exist. The person's clothes, body and toupe are a group of objects. So, if that group ceased to be spatially related to all the entities that they formerly were spatially related to, then according to P none of the objects in that group would continue to exist. (Let us assume that all of the spatially related entities in the universe are not to be regarded as a "group" of objects.)

According to P, if some particular that is spatially related to some entity is a particular that existed after some event E as well as before E, then that particular must have been spatially related to some entity that was the *same* entity that that particular was spatially related to both

before and after E.

Notice that each of the objects previously mentioned, e.g., a body, toupe and clothing, are given the status of the same object that existed before and after some event, only if that object was spatially related to some entity that was the very *same* entity that that object was spatially related to both before and after that event. Let us consider such a consequence.

We may want to think about or follow the spatial path of some object. The object may have gone along a certain spatial route from one place to another over a certain period of time; or it may have, over a certain period of time, remained in the same place. In considering the spatiotemporal history or path of the object reference will be made to the location or locations of the object over a certain period of time. Now, in light of this let us suppose that only four differently shaped rocks, A, B, C and D existed. (For simplicity no mention of their portions or constituents will be made.) It will be supposed that A circles B, and that C and D are at different distances from B. In considering the spatial path of A, reference to B may be made. A has a location relative to B, C and D. And each of those rocks, i.e., B, C and D, have a location with respect to the other rocks. However, in considering, e.g., A to be revolving around B, B must be considered to be that very same object

that was circled by A several times. Now, A has a certain spatial path with respect to B. A is at a constant distance from B as A revolves around B. Reference to B is made in stating the spatial path of A relative to the object that it revolves around. If A revolves around B at a constant distance from B, then B is the same object that A is at the same distance from as A revolves around B. In order for A to be at the same distance from B throughout some event, the *same* object must exist throughout that event such that with respect to that object A has the same distance from it. That object is B. Now, B may be at the same place or location, with respect to C throughout the circling of B by A. B did not move, thereby being in the same place during some event, only if some object spatially related to B, is the *same* object that B was spatially related to throughout its being circled.

It appears that if the location of, e.g., B is definable in terms of the spatial relationships that B has to other entities, e.g., C, then its spatial path, e.g., that it remained in the same place, is definable in terms of B's location with respect to the *same* objects that B was spatially related to as A circled B, i.e., C. But what is C's location definable in terms of? What object, e.g., A or B, can now be appealed to to define the object that is C as the *same* object that existed throughout some period, e.g., the circling of B by A?

Sameness of place or location is definable only by appealing to some entity regarded as one and the same entity that existed throughout some period of time. For example, if we wanted to define what it is for one rock to be the one rock that existed while it was being circled by A, or what it is for that rock to be the same rock that was circled by A, we may attempt to do so by utilizing the notion of place or same place. But if we mention one of the other rocks, e.g., A, C, or D, to do so, the "same rock" relies on utilizing the notion that we wanted to define. In order to specify the location of the circled rock, we would appeal to one of the other rocks A, C, or D, to do so. And we would regard at least one of the other rocks as the same rock that existed throughout some period of time if we wanted to consider the rock circled as the same rock that was circled throughout that time period. Remember, sameness of place or location is determined by sameness with respect to the entity or entities in terms of which sameness of place or location is to be defined. So we can now see that it does not follow from the very definition of such expressions as "one rock," "one creature's body," "same rock," or "same creature's body" that those continuants remain the same, e.g., rock or creature's body, only if that rock or creature's body occupies only places within the same space that it previously occupied places in. (Notice that my four rock example might have been

a four creature example instead. That is why the results of the four rock example can be generalized to creatures or creatures' bodies.) Our notion of one rock or the same rock is not definable in terms of sortal covered spatial continuity.⁴⁴ The circularity involved in doing so became apparent in my four rock example and in my discussion of principle P. Consequently I do not see any good reason for physical entities either existing or being the same entities that they were both before and after some event. In other words, I reject Gale's claim that a physical object cannot occupy places in different spaces. That claim simply lacks adequate foundation.

Some philosophers may believe that we understand what it is for some physical object, such as a rock, to be a, one, or the same physical object of the sort that it is, partly in terms of the notion of place (or location). And it may be believed that the notion of place so utilized is such that it is *not* analyzable in terms of entities which are all capable of changing their spatial relationships with respect to each other, e.g., A, B, and C. They may think that what it is for something to be a rock or the same rock is analyzable partly in terms of such a notion of place or location, and conclude from that that a physical object such as a rock cannot cease to be in the space that it is in without also ceasing to exist.

I take the notion of place just mentioned to be, at least in part, a view of place adopted on an "absolute" theory of space. That view of place may be appealed to in order to challenge my results. However, I do not see any good reason for believing that we must understand such notions as "one rock" or the "same rock" in terms of that absolute view of place. In order to successfully attack my position by appeal to such a view of space, acceptable arguments must be offered in behalf of the claim that the notion of place given on that view is utilized by us in defining such notions as "one rock" or the "same rock." However, such a claim seems wrong. Suppose that we do reject the notion of place on the absolute view. Then, if the position just cited, namely, that we in fact do define continuants in a way that involves utilizing an absolute view of place, were correct, then we could not even speak about some rock that is one rock if we did not employ any appeal to place as understood on that view. Remember, the claim is being made that that view incorporates such a notion of place in defining what it is for something to be one rock or the same rock. So, if that notion of place is not utilized then, according to that view, we would and could not be speaking about rocks! But why believe such a claim? Notice that on this view one would still have to rely on a notion of an entity, i.e., a place or part of space, that was the same throughout some

period of time. One would do so on that view in order to define the sort of continuant one was considering. So even on that view there is something such that what it is for there to be one thing of that sort or the same thing of that sort is itself not definable in terms of sortal covered spatial continuity. Why bother then with the analysis of continuants in terms of sortal covered spatial continuity if in doing so one has to appeal to continuants not analyzable in terms of sortal covered spatial continuity? The enterprise seems pointless.

It may be replied that I have ignored an important reason for believing in Quinton's view concerning sortal covered spatial continuity. Consider, for example, (so goes this popular approach) a ship; one by one its original planks may be replaced by different planks. Yet, we would not judge the ship to have ceased to exist just because one, some or perhaps even all of its planks was or were replaced. A "material thing retains its identity if *any* of its components is replaced; things have no specially privileged, identity-bearing parts."⁴⁵ How are we to account for our judgments if we reject the sortal covered analysis? On the analysis, even though parts have been replaced there may still be something that is a ship. And throughout all the changes of parts there may still be a ship at particular places at particular times. Hence we can explain why we judge a certain

ship even though some of its parts have been replaced, to be the same ship throughout, by appeal to the covered sortal analysis. As long as there is a ship at various times at the same or various places, and those places form a continuous spatial path, then there is a sortal covered spatially continuous path. Hence, there is the same ship or one ship in virtue of what it is for there to be one and the same ship, i.e., in virtue of the very notion of what one and the same ship is. Furthermore, if you do not adopt this position then certain problems arise. You must search for a compositional explanation of sameness if you reject the sortal covered analysis. And then you face the problem of not being able to account for our notion of the same material object. Once one of the parts has been changed, then you no longer have the very same whole constituted entirely by its parts. We would have to say that if a ship lost one plank then that ship no longer existed! But, we do not believe any such thing. So that analysis fails to capture our notion of one ship. Now, it may be replied that we, as Hume thought, "feign" identity, i.e., that in spite of the fact that there is not the same ship, we ignore certain considerations that would lead us to this conclusion and assert anyway that the same ship still exists even though some or all of its original parts have been changed. However, even if this theory does work out there still remains the problem of stating criteria

for the identity of the parts that constitute the ship. What account of their identity is to be offered? No account seems available once the sortal covered continuity account is rejected.

In reply it should first be noticed that nothing stated so far obviates the fact that the sortal covered account previously considered suffers from circularity. It appears that on that account something must also be appealed to in virtue of which sameness of place is definable. And the identity of that something cannot itself be definable in terms of the previously considered sortal covered analysis if that analysis is to avoid circularity. This only goes to show that we do have a notion of identity not analyzable in terms of, or partly in terms of, the notion of place. Consider the fact that a flat tire on a moving car has some portion of rubber flat against the ground while the tire and car moves. However, even though there is some flat portion of a rubber tire on the ground throughout the movement of the car, it is not the *same* piece or portion of rubber. Yet, there is a continuous spatial path (on the ground) traceable under the sortal--"flat piece of rubber"--throughout the movement of the car from one place to another. Here is an example of a notion of identity not analyzable in terms of the sortal covered continuity analysis. In spite of that analysis we understand that it is not the *same* portion of

rubber of the tire that is flat against the ground throughout the movement of the car. One portion of the tire touches the ground and that *same* portion does not continue to do so through the car's movement. So the sortal analysis, even if true, must be supplemented by a nonsortal analysis of identity.

Secondly, and in total consistency with what I previously claimed, it is not the case that the sortal covered analysis is the only explanation for our judgments of sameness concerning objects that have their parts replaced. I asked several people who are unfamiliar with this problem if they thought that a ship could be the same ship even if it lost some of its parts. The result that I found was that their notion of a ship is the notion of something that can lose or gain parts and still be the same ship. In other words, a ship, according to them, is *not* a whole whose constituents are only its parts. A ship is something more than that. It is something that has parts but is not just identical with those parts arranged in a certain way. Hence, since, a ship is something that can lose or gain its parts, it still can be the same ship after some of its planks are replaced. The point I am making is not that our notion of a ship is the notion of something that does in fact exist or can exist. Perhaps, it may be argued, no entity could be as we judge it to be in the case of the ship. My point is that such a

notion can serve to explain why we make some of the judgments of identity that we do. We do not have to appeal, as the only viable alternative, to the sortal covered analysis. As I have shown, that analysis ultimately relies on a notion of same place, or must be supplemented with a notion of identity, e.g., for the same portion of rubber, that makes that analysis ultimately unnecessarily complex, pointless and perhaps circular.

(3) If a philosopher wants to analyze our notion a, one, or the same rock or creature's body, he will most likely, in that analysis, take into account the fact that physical entities move from place to place. Quinton, as I previously showed, defines a continuant in terms of a spatial path consisting of places occupied by an entity of the same sort at each of the places on the continuous spatial path. For him, a continuous spatial path of that sort is what an enduring entity is. Consequently, for a mobile continuant to move about is for a spatial path of a certain type to be formed.

✓ If a moves from place P_1 to place P_{10} then there is a continuous sortal covered path from P_1 to P_{10} . At P_1 there is, e.g., a rock, and from P_1 to P_{10} there was a continuous spatial path formed such that at each place on that path there was a rock.

But this way of analyzing what it is for there to be the same rock that moved from P_1 to P_{10} fails as an account of what it is for there to be the same rock that moved about.

I will now explain why.

Suppose that rock A revolves around rock B and continuously touches rock B as it does so. Also, suppose that neither rock was formed into a rock before A revolved around B. And lastly, suppose that nothing is external to both rock A and rock B. Under the conditions just stated, rock A has a continuous spatial path with respect to rock B. Now, we can easily imagine that rock A might not have ever revolved around B close enough to continuously touch B. It might have been ten miles away from B at place P'_{10} . But, how are we to make sense of this possibility on Quinton's view. We are not supposing that A *changes* its path so that it no longer touches B. We are supposing that a different path, discontinuous with the original path of A, might have been the path of A. On the position that we have been considering we cannot do what we obviously can do. We cannot on that analysis of what it is for a rock to be one or the same rock, consider the rock A at P_1 to be the same rock that might have been at place P'_{10} simply because the rock at P_1 would have had no continuous spatial path incorporating the spatial path of the rock at P'_{10} . Hence, defining what it is for there to be a rock, one rock, or the same rock in terms of a sortally covered spatiotemporally continuous path, fails to give an adequate analysis of our notion of a rock, one rock, or the same rock. It fails to provide us with an

adequate notion of a rock as a continuant.

The position on identity that we have been discussing limits what we consistently regard as possible just as the I/I and the PII do. In fact, it commits its holders to a version of the I/I. On it, rock A is identical with rock Q only if rock Q has certain properties. There must be, for A to be identical to A, a certain type of sortally covered spatial path that incorporates the sortally covered spatial path of both. So Q is considered a rock that is identical with A only if Q has certain properties, i.e., if a certain type of sortally covered spatiotemporal path that incorporates the spatial path of both A and Q. And because of the requirement of spatiotemporal continuity traceable under a sortal term has been made a necessary condition for a rock A to be identical with a rock Q, we cannot on that view, consistently hold certain counterfactual beliefs that any correct view of object identity must be consistent with. Of course we do appeal to considerations of sortal covered spatiotemporal continuity to tell if one object is the same as another. But to treat that as proving us with an analysis of what it means or is for something A to be identical with something B, is to hold the position that I have just shown to be inadequate. That position incorporates a confusion between the evidence for sameness of a material object with the analysis of what it is to

be that material object. We are back to McTaggart's position as mentioned in Chapter II. In order to identify an entity A we appeal to certain characteristics or properties of A. (For example, the sort of thing that it is and its spatial position.) And therefore (it is thought) those properties serve as defining "A." They serve as the necessary and sufficient conditions for anything being identical with the entity that in fact has or had those properties. Hence the II is thought to follow. And now we see that those properties may be thought to serve in defining what it is for any entity to be identical with A throughout some period of time or movement. A is an entity, e.g., a rock, with certain characteristics and at a certain position. And any rock whose spatiotemporal path is incorporated into any continuous spatiotemporal path is identical with the enduring entity that that path is constitutive of. So, for example, A may be at place P_1 at time T_1 . Before T_1 A never moved. After T_1 it moves continuously to place P_4 . Some rock at place P_1 at T_1 , namely A, is therefore an entity on a continuous spatial path, starting at P_1 at T_1 . And any rock that is on a spatial path that both (i) is a spatially continuous path traceable under the sortal "rock," and (ii) incorporates position P_1 at T_1 , is identical with A. This position, as I have shown, should be rejected. And so, any version of the II that it may be used to support will

not be successfully supported by it. That position therefore does not succeed in its threat against (i) the possibility of there being a creature with a solitary existence as in my story of A and Not-A, (ii) my arguments against the I/I and PII based on that story, and (iii) Quinton's myth (as modified previously) being a story about two spaces that is the story of a possible state of affairs.

(B)

After having described, critically evaluated and modified Quinton's myth I fail to see any reason that successfully justifies my rejecting Quinton's position on the possibility of two spaces as well as his myth (given that we incorporate the modifications that I have previously mentioned). However, as I have pointed out, by itself, the existence of two copresent groups of objects spatially unrelated to each other does not violate the PII. Each particular in each space will differ from every other particular in each space because each particular will not have the very same spatial properties that each of the others have. Each particular will not be at a distance from itself. It will therefore not be at a distance from something that the other particulars of the same space are at a distance from. And it will also be spatially related to particulars that are not spatially related to the particulars of the space that it is not in. Hence, the PII is not violated by the

existence of two groups of objects each of which is in a different space. However, there are still good reasons for thinking that the PII can be violated. I will now present and discuss them.

At this point it appears that the argument that copresent particulars must be spatially related to different entities can still be appealed to to successfully support the PII. I must therefore show how this difference may not arise if I am to be successful in attacking the PII. Let us refer to one of the universes or spaces in Quinton's myth as "I" and the other as "II." The inhabitants of I and II may have a cosmological theory about the origin of the universe (space) which they are inhabiting. Suppose that they believe that all the matter in their space was once formed into a round sphere. They might believe that sphere had once exploded. The result of that explosion is, each of the inhabitants believe, the universe as it is known to its inhabitants. In support of this theory certain observations, e.g., astronomical as well as physical laws, are appealed to. Now, even though the inhabitants of each universe (space) both have the same "big bang" theory of their universe's origin, the PII may still not be violated if that theory is true. If each universe did originate in the way just described, it does not follow from that that the round masses of matter which exploded had the same sort

of origin--each might have been formed in different ways. So, even if each of the two round spheres did not differ in their nonrelational properties, it does not follow that the PII will be violated if each was also neither next to nor at a distance from anything else. We may therefore suppose, without any inconsistency arising with respect to the PII, that the round mass of matter, call it "Castor," that formed universe I and the round mass of matter, call it "Pollux," that formed universe II each were spheres that had the same nonrelational properties as the other even though each never had any spatial relationships to anything else. As long as each could have been formed in a different way, each could have differed from the other in a way compatible with the PII. Castor may not have existed before or after Pollux. If so, each would then have exploded neither before nor after the other exploded. And before each exploded, each might have been formed neither before nor after the other was formed.

At this point it might still seem that the PII can be successfully supported by arguing that distinct copresent particulars must differ spatially (i.e., have a distance from an entity that is not the distance that the other has to that entity) if those particulars do not differ in any way relevant to supporting the PII. Castor and Pollux are spheres that existed before each exploded. Each exploded

neither before nor after the other did. They were copresent entities with the same nonrelational properties as well as not differing from each other spatially. But each may be thought of as differing from the other in the manner in which each was formed. Except for differing in origin these properties of Castor and Pollux might be the properties that the inhabitants of I and II each ascribe to *both* the masses of matter from which each universe was formed as it is known. They might have done so by comparing the evidence factors on the basis on which they constructed their cosmological theory about their own universe. However, why should they believe that either Castor or Pollux or both must have passed through any stage or process in order to be formed into a spherical entity? Given my argument against the I/I and PII, what good reason is there for believing that Castor and Pollux must have been formed in some way? Not every entity that exists has to have been formed before it can exist. So, in light of my previously given arguments, I therefore see no good reason for the inhabitants of each universe or space to hold that both Castor and Pollux or either one must have been formed in some way. As a result, I conclude that Castor and Pollux might not have differed from each other in any way that supports the PII.

One obvious reply to what I have just said is to say that Castor is in a different space (universe) than the

space (universe) that Pollux is in. But this reply will not do to save the PII. What is meant by saying that each is in a "different space?" Not just that each is neither next to nor at a distance from the other. That property is not a property that Castor and Pollux fail to share. And of course--given the conditions under which they were said to exist--it will not do to say that each is spatially related to some object that the other is not spatially related to. Castor and Pollux are not spatially related to different entities. So, they are not in different spaces if by that one means that each is spatially related to some object or objects that the other is not spatially related to. However, they are in different spaces if by that one means that each of the copresent objects is spatially related to no object that the other is spatially related to; or that each copresent object is not spatially related to the other. But, each shares the property of not being spatially related to the other. Each shares the properties "is not spatially related to Castor" and "is not spatially related to Pollux." Castor and Pollux do not differ from each other in any way that supports the truth of the PII, i.e., they do not differ in their nonformal properties. And so, I conclude that the claim that distinct particulars must differ from each other in virtue of having differences in their spatial relationships to things other than themselves, does not provide us with a satisfactory reason for believing the II.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter IV

¹Karel Lambert and Bas C. van Fraassen, *Derivation and Counterexample* (Encino: Dickenson Publishing Co., Inc., 1972), p. 218.

²*Ibid.*, p. 218.

³*Ibid.*, p. 218.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 218.

⁵van Fraassen has a more detailed discussion of the I/I in his book, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Time and Space* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1970). But it does not shed light on the question that I have raised.

⁶Ian Hacking, "The Identity of Indiscernibles," *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LXXII, No. 9, 1975, p. 249.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 251.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵Anthony Quinton, "Spaces and Times," *Philosophy*, 1962, Vol. 37, pp. 130-147.

¹⁶Anthony Quinton, *The Nature of Things* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 24.

¹⁷Quinton, "Spaces and Times," p. 140.

¹⁸This is my own way of expressing or formulating Quinton's position.

- ¹⁹Quinton, "Spaces and Times," pp. 141-144.
- ²⁰Ibid., p. 141.
- ²¹Ibid., pp. 141-142.
- ²²Ibid., pp. 141-144.
- ²³Ibid., pp. 141-142.
- ²⁴Ibid., p. 141.
- ²⁵Ibid., p. 143.
- ²⁶Ibid.
- ²⁷Ibid., p. 144.
- ²⁸Richard Swinburne, *Space and Time* (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1968) pp. 34-48.
- ²⁹Ibid., pp. 44-45.
- ³⁰Ibid.
- ³¹Ibid., pp. 45-46.
- ³²Ibid., p. 45.
- ³³Ibid.
- ³⁴Ibid.
- ³⁵Ibid., p. 34.
- ³⁶Richard Gale, "Richard Swinburne: *Space and Time*," *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LXVII, No. 9, 1970, p. 309.
- ³⁷Ibid., p. 311.
- ³⁸Quinton, *The Nature of Things*, p. 71.
- ³⁹Ibid., p. 67.
- ⁴⁰Ibid.
- ⁴¹Ibid.
- ⁴²Ibid., p. 71.

⁴³Ibid., p. 26. Quinton's argument is extremely confused. He seems to treat physical objects as wholes whose parts are those qualities related together to form a physical object. Qualities related together at a place seem to be what Quinton thinks a physical object is (perhaps also for Quinton those qualities must be manifested at a continuous spatiotemporal path traceable under a sortal, if they are to form a continuant.) But this conception of a thing treats the thing's qualities as if they are entities themselves, and that position as I argued in Chapter III, should be rejected.

⁴⁴Quinton says, on page 71 of *The Nature of Things*, that he is not defining identity, i.e., what it is for say, a rock, to be the same rock. He states that he is only giving us an analysis of what a continuant is. But a continuant is a thing that exists throughout a period of time. To tell us what it is, e.g., for a rock to exist throughout some period of time is to tell us what it is for one rock to exist through that time period. It is to provide an analysis of what it is for a rock to be the same rock, i.e., what it is for it to be the same rock that existed throughout some time period. Quinton is simply confused about what it is that he is giving us an analysis of.

⁴⁵Quinton, *The Nature of Things*, p. 63.

EPILOGUE

I have come to the conclusion that distinct particulars, whether copresent or not, need not differ from each other in their nonrelational, hierarchial and spatial properties. In other words, that it is possible for particulars not to differ from each other in any of their nonformal properties. This is a claim, as I have pointed out earlier, that many philosophers would wish to deny. My justification for that claim incorporated two ways in which I went about that defense that I will now describe.

I have examined various reasons why philosophers have held the versions of the II that I have argued against. I have attacked their justifications for holding those versions. These attacks can be broadly divided into two categories. First I attacked those justifications that did not rely upon the argument that because there can be only one space, distinct (copresent) particulars must be spatially related to each other and therefore must differ in their spatial properties. The arguments in this category are such that if they were sound then particulars would have to differ in some nonformal way, i.e., in their nonformal properties. This is inconsistent with my position. So, in order to establish the latter, I argued against those views in that category. The second way in which I defended my position was by presenting arguments against the claim that there can be only one space. And afterwards, it was from that strategic position that I went

on to argue against the claim that distinct copresent particulars must differ in their spatial properties. This then constituted the completion of my argument against the PII and in favor of my position.

In presenting the defense of my views, I have mentioned two broad ways in which I went about that task. However, in following the steps that I did, I had to concern myself with many different arguments. In my first chapter, I introduced the reader to the main problem--defeating the PII--that I was to concern myself with in this thesis. Here I elaborated upon several of the points mentioned in the prologue. I also informed the reader of my reasons for rejecting the claim that Black's two sphere universe can be successfully appealed to in support of my view that distinct particulars might not differ in their spatial properties. In chapter II, I discussed Ayer's defense of the I/I and criticized his attempt to defend that version of the II on the basis of his analysis of objects into sets, or bundles, of properties. In that chapter I also discussed and evaluated additional arguments raised by other philosophers in defense of various versions of the II. Some of those arguments rested upon considerations having to do with the possibility of correctly counting objects, verifying claims about a multiplicity of objects, and understanding claims about distinct things. Other arguments had to do with the relationship

between an object and its properties. This led me into the third chapter where I extensively analyzed that relationship in order to show that the argument that since objects are nothing but bundles of properties and distinct objects are therefore bundles of different properties, distinct particulars therefore must differ in their nonformal properties.

In my last chapter, I presented my defense of the possibility of a state of affairs in which the I/I does not hold, and one in which both the I/I and the PII do not hold. My justification for those possibilities consisted in showing --partly by work done in my previous chapters--that the reasons offered by philosophers as to why those states of affairs are impossible, are unsound. In order to do this, I had to argue against certain claims to the effect that a physical object's identity is logically bound up with the space it is in and/or its having a position relative to other objects. I argued against such views in order to justify my claim that two copresent particulars might not differ in their spatial properties.

Of course, not every argument that may be raised against my view has appeared in my work. But, I have attempted to provide the reader with well-defended claims, as well as various statements of my views, that together constitute a strong case in my favor and also provide the means to challenge views that I have not considered. And at this point it is

now up to the reader to utilize the strengths of this
work in determining how well I have defended my position.

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