

## INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

**The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.** Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

ProQuest Information and Learning  
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA  
800-521-0600

UMI<sup>®</sup>



A

THE MEANING AND USE  
OF ENGLISH *-SELF* PRONOUNS

by

Nancy Stern

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Linguistics in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2001

UMI Number: 3024839

Copyright 2001 by  
Stern, Nancy

All rights reserved.

UMI<sup>®</sup>

---

UMI Microform 3024839

Copyright 2001 by Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company.

All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against  
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

---

Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company  
300 North Zeeb Road  
P.O. Box 1346  
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

© 2001

NANCY STERN


*All rights reserved*

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Linguistics in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

8-1-01  
Date

  
Chair of Examining Committee

Aug 8, 2001  
Date

  
Executive Officer

Edward H. Bendix

William A. Stewart  
Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

## Abstract

# THE MEANING AND USE OF ENGLISH *-SELF* PRONOUNS

by

Nancy Stern

Advisor: Professor Ricardo Otheguy

This study offers an innovative analysis of the English *-self* pronouns (*myself*, *yourself*, *himself*, *herself*, *ourselves*, etc.), relying on the notion of INSISTENCE as the constant meaning that these forms contribute to the communication of messages. Grammatical formatives in general, and the *-self* forms in particular, are seen not as surface manifestations of underlying syntactic constructions, but as semantic signals deployed by speakers to meet communicative goals. Data are taken from actual instances of use culled from written and spoken texts.

While rejecting the traditional characterization of *-self* as a reflexive pronoun, this study borrows from the tradition by analyzing *-self* as a kind of emphatic pronoun. All *-self* forms are hypothesized to signal the meaning INSISTENCE ON A REFERENT, which can be understood as a forceful pointing, an energetic reference that draws additional attention to an entity or entities.

This semantic approach to the distribution of *-self* pronouns has led to several discoveries. The *-self* forms contribute to the same types of interpretations in both appositive and argument environments, including unexpected messages, contrast, exclusion of others, and the importance of the referent. We have discovered that reflexive uses of *-self* forms are an instantiation of the general tendency to use their meaning for unexpected messages, in which a single referent is playing more than one role at a given point in time. The presence of such a role conflict accounts for all syntactically reflexive uses of *-self*, as well as the appearance of *-self* in picture noun phrases and logophoric contexts. The notion of role conflict is a more reliable predictor of the distribution of pronouns than is the syntactic notion of reflexivity.

Sentence-based and discourse uses of *-self* do not need to be treated as separate categories. The same set of explanatory principles – signals and their meanings – serves to explain the distribution of these forms in all environments. This study contributes to an understanding of grammatical morphemes as meaningful units whose distribution can be explained not as a reflex of syntactic structure, but instead, directly by their meanings.

## Acknowledgments

It is with great pleasure that I express my gratitude to my mentor, Professor Ricardo Otheguy. He has been extraordinarily generous with his time, attention and energy, offering constant support and encouragement through my years of graduate study. I have benefited enormously from his high standards and intellectual integrity, and I am grateful for his enthusiasm for ideas and his demand for clarity and precision in both thinking and writing. I am privileged to work with this dedicated scholar, and honored to call him my teacher and my friend.

The participants at the Columbia seminars have also been a part of this work from its beginnings as a simple research paper. Special thanks to Joseph Davis and Alan Huffman, for their assistance and their ideas, and to Betsy Rodríguez-Bachiller, for collecting so many wonderful examples. Along with Wallis Reid and Radmila Gorup, these supportive colleagues have collected examples and have patiently pored through data. Together, we have brainstormed, debated and discussed this analysis and many theoretical issues. It has been my good fortune to work with these talented linguists who have been patient and caring teachers.

Professor Marcel den Dikken helped me understand some of the generative literature on Binding Theory, and although I'm sure he won't agree with many of my evaluations of it, I gratefully acknowledge his assistance. I am only sorry that I didn't take more advantage of his knowledge and his willingness to entertain a theoretical viewpoint different from his own.

A committee member who deserves special thanks is Professor Ed Bendix, for his careful and critical reading of my work. I appreciate his support, and his continual insistence that I sharpen my definitions and justify my use of terms. I would also like to thank Professor Bill Stewart for serving on my committee in spite of his skeptical view of my data and of the theoretical framework of my analysis.

In writing this dissertation, I have learned that when scholars say there is much more research to be done, this is not just a polite formulation. And that in spite of the hard work and diligent criticisms of those who have generously offered assistance, all errors truly are my own.

Lastly, I want to thank my family and friends, who have listened to more than they ever wanted to know about English pronouns.

## Table of Contents

<b>Chapter 1. Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1. Reflexivity .....	5
2. The meaning of <i>-self</i> : .....	6
3. The signal/meaning hypothesis.....	7
4. Monosemy, meaning and message.....	9
5. Appositives and arguments.....	10
6. Why do speaker use <i>-self</i> ? .....	10
7. Data and methodology.....	11
8. Deixis.....	14
9. Findings .....	14
10. A single-language analysis .....	15
Notes to Chapter 1.....	17
<b>Chapter 2. Reflexives and Emphatics .....</b>	<b>19</b>
1. The lexicographic tradition .....	19
2. Overview of the structural tradition.....	21
3. Reflexives.....	23
4. Emphatics.....	26
5. Other uses.....	27
5.1 Fixed expressions.....	27
5.2 Logophoric uses.....	28
5.3 Picture noun phrases .....	30
5.4 Conjoined expressions.....	30
5.5 Locative prepositional phrases .....	31
5.6 First and second person alternation.....	31
6. Finding the antecedent .....	32
7. Critical discussion.....	33
7.1 Rules and exceptions model .....	34
7.2 The account is not exhaustive.....	38
7.3 The account is not descriptively accurate.....	39
7.4 Is <i>-self</i> a reflexive pronoun? .....	43
Notes to Chapter 2 .....	53

<b>Chapter 3. Review of the Literature .....</b>	<b>54</b>
1. Perspective .....	54
1.1 What kinds of questions have been asked .....	54
1.2 The data .....	56
2. Reflexivity .....	61
2.1 The structural tradition .....	61
2.2 Generative grammar .....	64
2.3 Functionalist approaches .....	73
3. The role of meaning .....	85
3.1 The structural tradition .....	85
3.2 Generative grammar .....	86
3.3 Functionalist approaches .....	100
3.4 The lexicographic tradition .....	114
4. How many <i>himself</i> 's are there? .....	115
Notes to Chapters 3 .....	119
<b>Chapter 4. Finding the Referent .....</b>	<b>122</b>
1. All reference is the result of inference .....	124
1.1 Nominal expressions need not refer to the entity they name .....	125
1.2 Even first person forms must be interpreted .....	126
1.3 Gender information may be inconsistent .....	127
2. Referent-finding is not the key .....	128
2.1 First and second persons .....	128
2.2 Third person uses .....	130
3. The hearer's task: describing the problem in structural terms .....	132
3.1 Appositive uses .....	133
3.2 Argument uses .....	135
4. The hearer's task: the solution .....	144
4.1 Accessibility .....	145
4.2 The syntactic notion of subject vs. the Focus hypothesis .....	147
4.3 Accessibility in appositive uses .....	149
4.4 Accessibility in argument uses .....	150
5. Summary .....	159
Notes to Chapter 4 .....	161
<b>Chapter 5. Appositive Environments .....</b>	<b>163</b>
1. Appositives and arguments .....	164
2. Insistence in appositive uses .....	167
2.1 Differentiating potential referents .....	168
2.2 Intrinsically prominent referents .....	170
2.3 Locally prominent referents .....	173
2.4 Insisting on the referent's role in an event .....	175

2.5	Exclusion of others.....	177
2.6	Unexpected referents.....	180
2.7	Contrast .....	183
2.8	The non-occurrence of other pronouns in apposition .....	187
3.	Summary .....	189
	Notes to Chapter 5 .....	192

## **Chapter 6. Argument Environments: Role Conflicts and Reflexivity ..... 193**

1.	Reflexivity is not part of the meaning of <i>-self</i> .....	195
2.	INSISTENCE and role conflicts .....	197
2.1	First and second person .....	202
2.2	Non-finite verbs .....	203
2.3	<i>I don't recognize me</i> .....	206
2.4	Two mentions of a referent within the same clause.....	209
3.	Advantages of a non-sentence-based analysis.....	210
3.1	Noun phrases .....	211
3.2	Picture noun phrases .....	214
3.3	Non-sentential uses .....	217
3.4	Other types of role conflicts .....	219
4.	Simple pronouns in reflexive environments.....	223
4.1	Prepositional phrases.....	224
4.2	The Control System .....	232
5.	Logophoricity .....	237
6.	Summary .....	243
6.1	A new solution to an unsolved problem.....	243
6.2	Expanded analytical coverage .....	244
	Notes to Chapter 6 .....	246

## **Chapter 7. Argument Environments: Many Uses of *-Self* ..... 248**

1.	Contrast .....	248
2.	Prominent referents.....	254
3.	Exclusion of others and differentiation.....	262
4.	Conjoined expressions .....	266
4.1	Differentiation.....	266
4.2	Unexpectedness and role conflict .....	269
4.3	<i>Between</i> -phrases.....	276
4.4	Prescriptivist pressures .....	282
5.	Confusion among many possible referents .....	285
6.	Summary .....	287
	Notes to Chapter 7 .....	289

<b>Chapter 8. Overview of the Signal and Meaning Hypotheses.....</b>	<b>291</b>
1. The signal .....	291
1.1 Arguments for a two-signal analysis: their weaknesses.....	292
1.2 Our analysis: <i>-self</i> forms are a single signal .....	294
2. The meaning .....	302
2.1 English pronouns .....	305
2.2 Semantic categories.....	306
2.3 Meanings signaled only if there is morphology .....	307
2.4 Focus .....	309
2.5 Person.....	312
2.6 Sex.....	314
2.7 Number.....	315
Notes to Chapter 8 .....	331
<b>Chapter 9. Further Issues.....</b>	<b>334</b>
1. Ungrammatical sentences.....	334
2. Falsifying meaning hypotheses .....	337
2.1 SAME.....	337
2.2 INSISTENCE ON THE SAME .....	341
2.3 Why referent-finding is not part of the meaning of <i>-self</i> .....	346
2.4 Deixis .....	351
2.5 Exclusion of others.....	353
2.6 Unexpectedness .....	354
2.7 Contrast .....	354
2.8 A less informative signal.....	355
2.9 Falsifying the INSISTENCE hypothesis .....	356
3. Crosslinguistic analysis.....	358
3.1 Message-based analysis.....	360
3.2 Similarity of message does not entail similarity of meaning .....	361
3.3 Intriguing similarities .....	361
4. Areas for future research.....	362
5. The status of reflexivity .....	364
Notes to Chapter 9 .....	366
Data Sources Cited .....	368
References.....	379

## List of Figures and Tables

### Chapter 2

Figure 1. The basic schema of the structural view.....	23
Figure 2. Finding the referent of <i>-self</i> according to the structural view.....	33
Figure 3. Distribution of forms predicted by the Reflexive Pronoun Hypothesis .....	45
Figure 4. Distribution of forms predicted by the Reflexive Pronoun Hypothesis (Revised) .....	46
Figure 5. Distribution of forms predicted by the Reflexive Pronoun Hypothesis (Revised) .....	47
Figure 6. Actual distribution of forms.....	51

### Chapter 3

Figure 1. The distribution of <i>se</i> in Latin (Diver 1987) .....	83
---	----

### Chapter 4

Figure 1. The English Focus system.....	148
---	-----

### Chapter 7

Figure 1. Events and roles suggested in non-conjoined example (26).....	271
Figure 2. Events and roles suggested in conjoined example (23).....	272
Figure 3. Events and roles suggested in conjoined example (27).....	273
Figure 4. Summary of <i>between</i> -phrases .....	280
Table 1. Contrast and comparisons with <i>-self</i> .....	254

### Chapter 8

Figure 1. Schematized meaning of <i>-self</i> forms .....	303
Figure 2. The meaning of some <i>-self</i> forms.....	304
Figure 3. Meaning of <i>-self</i> and <i>-self + -s (-selves)</i> .....	304
Figure 4. English pronouns.....	306
Figure 5. Meanings signaled by <i>-self</i> pronouns .....	307
Figure 6. Focus oppositions.....	309
Figure 7. Person meanings of <i>-self</i> forms.....	313
Figure 8. Discourse Role meanings of <i>-self</i> forms.....	313
Figure 9. Sex meanings of <i>-self</i> forms .....	314
Figure 10. Schematized Number meanings of <i>-self</i> forms .....	315
Figure 11. Number meanings of some <i>-self</i> forms.....	316
Figure 12. Hypothesized meanings of <i>ourselves</i> and <i>ourselves</i> .....	317

## Chapter 1

### Introduction

Linguists have generally taken one of two approaches to the analysis of grammatical formatives such as pronouns and inflectional morphemes. One approach assumes that whereas sentences and lexical items are meaningful units, formatives themselves do not carry meaning, but rather are primarily reflexes of syntactic structure. The other approach assumes that formatives are bearers of meaning, and treats them as objects of linguistic explanation.

This dissertation explores the ramifications of the latter view with respect to the English *-self* forms (*myself, yourself, himself, herself, itself, ourselves, yourselves, etc.*). In this analysis, each *-self* pronoun is viewed as a compound form that is a signal of several, interlocked meanings. With respect to any given occurrence of a *-self* pronoun, we want to know what motivates its use, and more specifically on what basis speakers choose between *-self* and simple pronouns (*me, you, him, her, it, us, etc.*). While many scholars have studied these forms, no grammar has succeeded in explaining their distribution. Unlike analyses that have taken a basically syntactic approach to the problem, the present study looks at *-self* forms as signals of meanings that are used by speakers to meet communicative goals.

This dissertation builds on the work of linguists with a variety of theoretical viewpoints who have been concerned with the semantics and pragmatics of these forms, including some who have explicitly addressed the meaning of English *-self* (e.g., Kemmer 1995; Kemmer and Barlow 1996; Cresswell 1997; and Van Hoek 1997). The present study shares with many theoretical frameworks an interest in the semantic properties of grammatical morphemes, a focus on the communicative function of language, and an interest in naturally occurring discourse data. From among these frameworks, we follow most closely the theoretical approach of the Columbia School, a sign-based functionalist theory whose main features derive from a view of grammar as a tool of human communication.<sup>1</sup>

As is well known to students of English *-self* pronouns, and as we will see in Chapter 2, the categories “reflexive” and “emphatic” do not adequately account for the distribution of these forms. Linguists have offered names for some of the other environments in which *-self* forms appear (e.g., *like*-phrase, logophoric uses, conjoined expressions, picture noun phrases), but these uses have generally been treated as distinct and separate categories, exceptions to the reflexive/emphatic schema. By contrast, this dissertation does not treat reflexives as a primitive construct, nor does it give analytical priority to reflexive uses. Instead, the semantic hypothesis that will be presented here explains all these seemingly disparate uses (as well as others) in a unified and theoretically coherent way.

A focus on reflexive uses of *-self* has led analysts to treat sentences like (1), in which the matter of referent-finding seems to be at the heart of the choice

between *-self* and simple pronouns, as exemplifying the key difference between these forms:

- (1) a. Ben saw **himself**.
- b. Ben saw **him**.

However, the minimal pairs in (2) through (5) demonstrate that an understanding of the difference between *-self* and simple pronouns will require much more than a discussion of reference or truth conditions. These examples suggest the variety of contexts in which both pronouns can occur with no change in referent.

- (2) a. Nicole<sub>1</sub> knew that he was like **her**<sub>1</sub>.<sup>2</sup>
- b. Nicole<sub>1</sub> knew that he was like **herself**<sub>1</sub>.
- (3) a. Sometimes Sue<sub>1</sub> would fantasize about having babies, speculating in what ways they would resemble both **her**<sub>1</sub> and her husband.
- b. Sometimes Sue<sub>1</sub> would fantasize about having babies, speculating in what ways they would resemble both **herself**<sub>1</sub> and her husband.
- (4) a. He<sub>1</sub> has to convince people that there are differences between **him**<sub>1</sub> and Bradley.
- b. He<sub>1</sub> has to convince people that there are differences between **himself**<sub>1</sub> and Bradley.
- (5) a. Alyssa<sub>1</sub> sent me this picture of **her**<sub>1</sub>.
- b. Alyssa<sub>1</sub> sent me this picture of **herself**<sub>1</sub>.

The existence and use of *-self* in first and second persons provides further evidence that an understanding of these forms will not depend primarily on their

referent-finding functions, since the referent of the pronoun in these persons does not change whether a *-self* or simple form is used:

- (6) a. I see **myself** / **me**.  
b. You should take good care of **yourself** / **you**.

The use of *-self* forms as appositives also suggests that *-self* forms contribute to communications in ways unrelated to reference, and that *-self* and simple pronouns differ in some other important way:

- (7) a. Harry **himself** washed the car.  
b. Harry washed the car **himself**.

While most researchers have focused on examples like those in (1) and (7), the present research has found that uses like those in (2) through (6) can be equally illuminating, and that the uses described as reflexive and emphatic need not be given analytical priority. The present study aims to discover what accounts for the choices between *-self* and simple pronouns in any environment.

The difference between syntax and discourse has been important in the study of *-self*, with most analysts postulating two distinct sets of principles to account for the distribution of these forms.<sup>3</sup> However, in the present account there will be no need to postulate a separation between sentence grammar and discourse grammar. The same set of explanatory principles, signals and their meanings, will serve to explain the distribution of all *-self* pronouns in both sentential and discourse environments. We have found no analytical or empirical reason to segregate discourse uses of *-self* as a separate category.

## 1. Reflexivity

As we have just noted, *-self* forms are typically described as reflexive pronouns.<sup>4</sup> In Chapter 2, we will see the analytical weakness of that approach, and its inability to account for the distribution of these forms. Both *-self* and simple pronouns occur in reflexive environments, and both types of forms occur in non-reflexive contexts as well. It is clear that what motivates the choice of *-self* in an utterance is not the message category “reflexive,” but something else. We will find that what appears to be a syntactic fact (the appearance of *-self* in reflexive environments) can be explained by a deeper, semantic generalization, one that accounts for the exceptions as well as for what appears to be the rule.

We have discovered that reflexive uses of *-self* are an instantiation of a more general tendency to use the forms’ meaning for unexpected messages in which at a given point in time a single entity is playing more than one part or role.<sup>5</sup> The presence of such a role conflict accounts for all syntactically reflexive uses of *-self*, as well as the use of *-self* in other contexts such as picture noun phrases and logophoric uses. Further, the notion of role conflict is a more reliable predictor of the distribution of *-self* and simple pronouns than is the syntactic notion of reflexivity. We will see evidence that even among reflexive uses of *-self*, speakers appear to make choices based on the meanings of the form, and not, as in the reflexive analysis, in accordance with formal rules in which features are copied from subject to object, or in which pronouns must match the features of their antecedents.

In addition to proposing a different analysis for the types of usages that are traditionally described as reflexives, our study also addresses another phenomenon that has received relatively less attention, namely, the occurrence of simple pronouns in reflexive environments:

- (8) a Jessica looked around **her**.  
b When I read about myself in the newspaper, I don't recognize **me**.  
c Kim saw the snake near **her**.  
d He had a wildness about **him**.

These types of examples, along with many more which will be examined in Chapter 2, show that reflexivity is not the conditioning factor that determines whether *-self* or simple pronouns occur.

## 2. The meaning of *-self*: INSISTENCE

The grammatical difference between *-self* and simple pronouns is postulated to be a semantic one: *-self* forms are hypothesized to signal the meaning INSISTENCE ON AN ENTITY. INSISTENCE can be understood as an energetic reference that draws additional attention to an entity or entities. Thus, while rejecting the traditional characterization of *-self* as a reflexive pronoun, this study does borrow from the tradition by analyzing *-self* as a kind of emphatic pronoun. INSISTENCE is an energetic pointing to an entity, a way of saying to the hearer "Yes, this entity. I do mean this one(s)!"

There are many different reasons why a speaker might choose to INSIST on a referent. Hearers must infer a speaker's communicative intent, and her motivations for choosing to INSIST. Given the view of reference assumed in this analysis, we can more accurately say that the meaning of *-self* is INSISTENCE ON AN ENTITY(S) THAT IS UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE REFERENT OF THIS FORM, as the referential interpretation of any form is not inherent, but rather, ensues only as a result of the interpretation of the form.

The semantic substance of INSISTENCE is to be distinguished from seemingly similar substances that are postulated to be part of the meaning of pronouns in several languages. INSISTENCE is not an instruction to the hearer regarding where or how to find the referent of the pronoun. Unlike Deixis, discussed further in Chapter 9, INSISTENCE does not pertain to the amount of attention required to identify the form's referent. INSISTENCE also differs from the semantic substance Focus, which pertains to the amount of attention concentrated on an entity with respect to a given event. The presence of an event, or an entity's participation in an event, is not part of the meaning of INSISTENCE. An examination of a large number of examples in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will further explicate the term INSISTENCE, and support it as an explanatory hypothesis.

### **3. The signal/meaning hypothesis**

In our proposal, the postulated meaning of INSISTENCE is a hypothesis advanced to account for the distribution of *-self* forms. (In addition, the present analysis largely accepts the traditional account that pronouns are bearers of person, gender

and number.<sup>6</sup>) In proposing a meaning for *-self* forms, we are following a well-established linguistic tradition. Analysts routinely assign meanings to forms, generally relying on a canon of well-established meanings such as “Past,” “Definite,” “Accusative,” “Subject,” “Locative,” etc. INSISTENCE, the meaning proposed in this dissertation, is not one that is sanctioned by familiarity, but it is nevertheless the result of a painstaking analysis of hundreds of examples and rigorous hypothesis testing. The hypothesized meaning is a notional, conceptual construct, not a formal one. But unless we abandon the idea that forms have meanings, we will be forced to deal with conceptual notions, even if they are not strictly formalized. Like other theoretical constructs, our hypothesized meaning is not directly observable or measurable, because it is a hypothesis about an underlying system. Nevertheless, as we will see, its effects in the message are observable and in some cases, measurable.

The identity of the signal is also a hypothesis. We posit that each *-self* pronoun is a single form, and not merely the concatenation of two smaller forms (e.g., *him + self* vs. the single unit *himself*). We have found that *-self* pronouns can profitably be understood as analogous to compound lexical items like *blackbird* and *chalkboard*: single forms, which are composed of smaller, identifiable units.<sup>7</sup> The smaller units have combined to create a new form that is related to, but distinct from, the sum of its parts.<sup>8</sup> In Chapter 8 we will discuss the identity of the signals, and we will analyze the difference between two separate signals and the single fused signal.

#### 4. Monosemy, meaning and message

All observers note that *-self* has several different uses. While some analyses attribute these various uses to homonymy, the present account does not posit homonymous *-self* forms. Instead, it holds that there is only one *myself*, one *yourself*, etc., each one signaling INSISTENCE, and not, as has been suggested elsewhere, homonymous reflexive and emphatic forms, or homonymous anaphoric and non-anaphoric forms.

This monosemy hypothesis<sup>9</sup> rests on a fundamental distinction between the linguistically encoded meaning of a form, and the messages that are communicated. The word “meaning” is used here in the specific, technical sense first proposed by William Diver and now common in Columbia School work: a meaning is that, and only that, which is, by hypothesis, encoded in the lexical items and grammatical formatives of a language.<sup>10</sup> The results of communication, which are infinitely varying and extraordinarily complex, are described as “messages”. Given a finite number of signals, and an infinite number of possible communications, each meaning must be used for a wide variety of reasons.

An additional distinction must be drawn between message, which is what the speaker intends to or does communicate, and what Diver called the “scene,” the objective reality which in many theories determines the truth value of utterances. The analyst must take care not to confuse meaning with message, nor message with scene.

## 5. Appositives and arguments

For presentational purposes we will draw a distinction between *-self* forms used as appositives, such as those in (7), and those used as arguments, as in (1) through (6). Appositives, which largely correspond to traditional grammar's emphatic uses of *-self*, include environments in which other pronouns do not occur (e.g., *Harry washed the car himself* vs. *Harry washed the car  $\emptyset$* ). In appositive uses, the *-self* form is a repetition of another entity named in the same clause, without a distinct role for the additional mention. Argument environments are those in which both *-self* and simple pronouns can occur (e.g., *Ben saw himself* vs. *Ben saw him*). These uses contrast with appositives, as they are non-repetitious mentions of entities with their own role in an interpreted utterance. No conclusions or theoretical findings are based on this presentational distinction between arguments and appositives, a distinction which will be considered in more detail in Chapter 5.

## 6. Why do speakers use *-self*?

*-Self* forms occur where their meaning, INSISTENCE, is useful to the intended communication. One of the discoveries of the present research is that the message effects to which *-self* forms contribute in both appositive and argument environments are very often the same. While the best known and most studied function of *-self* forms is to suggest a reflexive interpretation, we will see that such uses are a subset of a larger pattern found among both appositives and arguments, in which

INSISTENCE is used when there is something unexpected about the referent's role. As many analysts have noted, in argument environments, the use of *-self* sometimes suggests that the referent's role is that of the individual(s) whose point of view is being represented. Other motivations for the use of INSISTENCE in both appositive and argument environments are to suggest the importance of a referent, and/or a contrast or comparison with others. Another effect found in both environments is an exclusion of other, related entities from the intended referent.

There are often multiple motivations for the use of the meaning INSISTENCE, and the choice of *-self* is generally not motivated by just a single message category. The message types we have mentioned, along with others to be discussed in subsequent chapters, organize the diverse communications to which *-self* forms contribute, but they represent only convenient groups into which varying messages may be sorted. They are neither units of linguistic analysis nor a classification of linguistic structure, as the number and kinds of messages that speakers may communicate cannot be enumerated in any list. There is a great deal of overlap between different uses, and new uses are always possible as meanings are deployed to meet new and ever-changing communicative demands.

## **7. Data and methodology**

Since the present analysis assumes the latter of the two approaches described at the outset – that the distribution of grammatical formatives does not have to be accounted for through the mediation of syntactic categories, but can be directly explained by properties of the forms themselves – there will be no attempt to

frame the analysis in terms of syntactic constructs. Neither syntactic relations nor intuitions about the well-formedness of sentences serve as data. Instead, the data for the present analysis are occurrences of forms in sentences and in longer stretches of discourse.<sup>11</sup> The limited usefulness of decontextualized data is apparent when one tries to analyze the difference between the use of *-self* and simple pronouns in examples such as (2) through (6). The forms appear to be largely interchangeable, and there is no evidence in the context to help explain the choice between the two types of forms, or to confirm the analyst's intuitions about the differences between them. Therefore, the present study relies on naturally occurring discourse, in all its complexity and richness, so that we can observe the contextual factors that contribute to the choice between these two types of forms.

Our meaning hypothesis will be validated by an examination of data in texts, where we determine whether the postulated meaning of *-self* forms does in fact account for their occurrence. In Diver's words, "Analytical success will have been achieved when it can be demonstrated that the signal appears just at those points in a text at which its particular meaning is useful for the act of communication" (1987: 127).

Data have been drawn from a variety of sources. The largest source of data are examples drawn from novels, non-fiction books, magazines, newspapers, television, radio and personal communications that have been collected over a period of several years. While this type of collection is unstructured and cannot be used to compare frequency of forms or of specific contexts, it provides relevant tokens

that might not occur in any bounded collection. This kind of data also includes examples that would be difficult to identify within an electronic corpus (for example, a collection of *-self* forms that do not have a sentence-internal antecedent).

In addition, two corpora have been established for the purposes of measuring frequency and for collecting particular types of examples. The first corpus consists of a collection of first page articles from the *New York Times* collected over a 10-month period.<sup>12</sup> The second corpus is from a commercial database, the InfoTrac Reference Center, which is comprised of more than 5 million articles drawn from a wide variety of sources, including general interest and business magazines, technical and professional publications, news weeklies and news services.<sup>13</sup> This electronic corpus has been used for both frequency counts and for the collection of particular environments (e.g., pronouns following specific prepositions, as in Chapter 7).

While the majority of our data will be drawn from written sources, we will consider spoken discourse as well. One advantage of spoken discourse is that it is unplanned and therefore is believed to offer more surprising uses than can be expected from written texts. However, we have found many surprises among written works, even among what appear to be planned and edited texts.<sup>14</sup>

## **8. Deixis**

For readers familiar with other Columbia School analyses, the problem of the distribution of *-self* may appear similar to other problems that have been

explained in terms of the semantic substance of Deixis. But as we will see in Chapter 9, the semantic substance of Deixis, which García (1975: 65) describes as “the force with which the hearer is instructed to seek the referent of the pronoun,” cannot account for the distribution of *-self* forms. In Chapter 9 we will see how the Deixis meaning that has been hypothesized to account for the distribution of the so-called Spanish reflexive pronoun, *se*, cannot explain occurrences of *-self*. (In Chapter 9, we will also describe other possible meanings of *-self* that have been considered but rejected.)

Unlike Deixis meanings, which are typically oppositions of value, INSISTENCE is an opposition of substance (Davis 1995). *-Self* pronouns are the only forms that signal this meaning, contrasting with other forms in the pronominal system which do not.

## 9. Findings

The present analysis has discovered explanations for distributions that had previously been noticed but remained unexplained, and has also uncovered a number of new findings. For instance, our analysis explains an observation made by many analysts that there appears to be more flexibility in the use of *-self* pronouns in first and second persons than in third person in environments like the following (Ross 1970 and others):

- (9) a. Physicists like **myself** were never too happy with the parity principle.
- b. As for **myself**, I won't be invited.

c. This paper was written by Ann and yourself.

In addition, our analysis has led to heretofore unknown facts about these forms, such as the distribution of *-self* and simple pronouns with respect to contrasts and comparisons. We have also discovered that the meaning INSISTENCE can be particularly useful in conjoined expressions and following the word *between* when a speaker wishes to suggest a conceptual distance between the referent of *-self* and other entities (Chapter 7).

#### 10. A single-language analysis

While the occurrence of a small number of morphemes in just one language appears to be a narrow question, and one that may appear less interesting than crosslinguistic analyses or higher level generalizations about linguistic universals, the task of explaining the distribution of *-self* forms has never been completed.

Huffman (1997) observes,

it takes an act of will power to refocus one's attention at this late date on the low-level phenomenon of language-specific distributions of grammatical forms.... Whatever the achievements of modern linguistics, the fact remains that difficulties with some of its most basic assumptions have not been resolved. (p. 3)

Science in general often makes progress by asking very narrow questions. By concentrating on a small study one can arrive at a full understanding that might then be useful for pursuing other questions. The larger issue of how far we can go in our understanding of grammar by assigning meaning to morphemes must be pursued by studying specific forms. Thus, this dissertation takes up what had been an unsolved empirical problem, refocusing on the narrow question of

what motivates the occurrence of *-self* forms in actual usage. It offers a new analysis that accounts for the observed distribution of these forms, as well as support for a meaning-based approach to linguistic analysis.

## Notes to Chapter 1

1. The Columbia School approach is based on the work of William Diver and his followers, including Contini-Morava, Davis, García, Huffman, Otheguy, Reid and others. Descriptions of the theoretical underpinnings of this approach can be found in many Columbia School works, particularly Huffman 1997; Contini-Morava 1995; Reid 1991; and García 1975. The Columbia School of linguistics was also called “Form-Content Analysis” in the 1960s and 1970s. This dissertation is intended as an analysis of a body of data, and not as a case for, or against, any particular theoretical orientation.
2. Subscripts are for identification purposes only; they have no theoretical status.
3. Zribi-Hertz (1989), Pollard and Sag (1992), Reinhart and Reuland (1993) and Dalrymple (1993) are among those who have segregated discourse-based uses into a separate analytical category.
4. *-Self* pronouns are also described as emphatics or intensifiers.
5. As we will see, “role” is intended to refer not only to grammatical or participant roles, but to any part played by an entity or actor.
6. The particular way the traditional categories are interpreted in the present analysis will be described in Chapter 8.
7. The single-form premise sets aside the question of the *-s* ending in forms that contain *-selves*, which is hypothesized to consist of the *-self* form, followed by the plural *-s* marker. The *-s* signal, hypothesized to signal the meaning MORE THAN ONE from the Entity Number System described by Reid (1991), combines with the *-self* pronouns as described in Chapter 8.
8. It would also be possible to pursue an analysis of the lexical item *self*, which might lead to the discovery that it is the same form that occurs in *-self* pronouns; that is, that the meaning that accounts for *self*'s usage as an independent lexical item, might also account for the distribution of *-self* pronouns. However, such a decomposition analysis awaits, minimally, a full analysis of the lexical item *self* and an explanation for the phenomena described in Chapter 8.
9. The semantic contribution of each monosemous *-self* form remains constant, even though each *-self* pronoun signals more than one meaning simultaneously. In Columbia School terms, this is described as “grammatical

interlock,” which is similar to the phenomenon known as “portmanteau morphology”.

10. While most signals are morphological, word order may be a signal of meaning as well.
11. The distribution of forms is itself not observable, but follows only from a preliminary morphemic analysis.
12. In this corpus, one article which appeared as the featured first-page *New York Times* article on the internet service America Online, was collected for 254 days over a 10-month period (5/4/98 through 3/11/99).
13. The InfoTrac database used here is the Magazine Index from the General Reference Center, a database published by the Gale Group that is available through many local libraries. The Magazine Index consists of articles from magazines, reference books, newspapers and news services on current events, popular culture, the arts and sciences, sports, business etc. that have appeared from 1980 to the present.
14. For instance, the following example (discussed in Chapter 7) fits neither the traditional description of emphatic or reflexive uses, but seems quite ordinary in its context, the fourth edition of an academic textbook: *Very young children are highly egocentric. The world revolves around them, and they see all events as focusing on themselves* (BPL). Another surprising example from a written source is the following (discussed in Chapter 4): *Brandon miraculously wakes up in a town which sees her as she sees himself* (SLT).

## Chapter 2

### **Reflexives and emphatics**

English *-self* forms are generally analyzed as having two basic uses: reflexive and emphatic. This description serves as the foundation on which modern analyses of *-self* are built, and it is important to understand its contribution to modern thinking about these forms. Although the reflexive/emphatic account is not the analysis of any modern school of linguistic thought, it underlies most current treatments of these forms. The rich lexicographical tradition best exemplified by the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) offers an account of *-self* forms, and the OED's views will be discussed in Section 1 below. The lexicographic tradition shares with our work an interest in these forms as bearers of meaning. The grammatical account of reflexives and emphatics will be considered in Section 2. This structural account is generally regarded as a theory-neutral description. It is a composite of accounts that have been offered by grammarians such as Sweet (1891), Jespersen (1933), and Quirk et. al. (1985), although it includes observations made by modern linguists as well. The account will be critically assessed and evaluated in Section 7.

#### **1. The lexicographic tradition**

Lexicographical treatments of *-self* are, like our own analysis, focused on the meaning of these forms. The lexicographic tradition shares our view that *-self*

pronouns have semantic content, as opposed to the competing view that these forms appear (at least in reflexive uses) as reflexes of syntactic structure. The OED offers extensive entries for both the word *self* and for each of the *-self* pronouns, and traces the usage of these forms from their historical origins to modern times.

The OED divides entries for each *-self* pronoun into reflexive and emphatic uses, but unlike traditional structural treatments of these forms, the OED appears to treat the emphatic senses as primary, as it presents those uses first. In addition, emphatic uses are not limited to appositive positions, as in the structural account. The following example in the entry for *herself* (p. 177) shows what the OED calls an emphatic use that is not in apposition:

- (1) She was told that it was meant for **herself**.

The lexicographic tradition has some similarities to the type of analysis presented in this dissertation. Not only are the forms treated as bearers of meanings, but they are also described as “emphatic”, which is loosely reminiscent of the meaning we have proposed for these forms (see Chapter 1). However, the positions taken by lexicographers are significantly different from the theoretical perspective taken here. One difference is that while there may be an implicit overarching meaning covering the various senses described in any given entry, the OED itself does not offer one. This is not surprising, as the goal of lexicographers is generally not theoretical rigor or analytical economy, but rather, comprehensive descriptive scope. The OED therefore does not make a distinction, as we do,

between meaning and message, between the constant semantic content of forms and the communications to which the forms contribute. In addition, although the OED offers lengthy historical lists of uses for *-self* pronouns, the analysis we will present here offers a wider coverage of the uses of these forms, and we will see senses of *-self* forms that are not included in the OED entries. Further, the OED addresses uses of *-self* in which the pronoun and the lexical item *self* appear to be two separate words, but does not take a position, as we do in Chapter 8, on the issue of whether *-self* pronouns should be treated synchronically as single forms, or whether they are indeed instances of two distinct signals.

Like the structural account to which we now turn, the OED bases its description of *-self* pronouns on the two primary categories of reflexive and emphatic. We will focus the remainder of our discussion of reflexives and emphatics on the structural account, because it is this description that underlies most modern linguistic treatments of these forms.

## **2. Overview of the structural tradition**

In the traditional grammatical account, the distinction between reflexives and emphatics is primarily a structural one: reflexive uses are in head, or argument, position, while emphatics are adjuncts. Reflexive arguments have an independent role in the utterance, as in *The girl saw herself*. Emphatic adjunct *-self* is the mention of an already mentioned entity without a new role for that entity, as in *The girl herself saw the crime*.

The reflexive use of *-self* forms is the cornerstone of the classification: traditional grammars note that reflexive pronouns are required whenever there is a coreferential noun phrase within the same clause, as in (2).

- (2) Reflexive uses
- a. Ben saw **himself**.
  - b. Brandon washed **himself**.
  - c. Sean believed in **himself**.

In this view, the reflexive uses of *-self* pronouns are in complementary distribution with simple pronouns, which are said to occur in non-reflexive environments. In reflexive environments, such as (2), the pronoun stands in the predicate and refers to the same entity as the subject, while in non-reflexive environments, shown in (3), the pronoun does not refer to the subject:

- (3)
- a. Ben saw **him**.
  - b. Brandon washed **him**.
  - c. Sean believed in **him**.

Emphatics, which are also called intensifiers, form the second major group of uses for *-self* pronouns. In emphatics, *-self* typically occurs in apposition to provide emphasis, as in (4).<sup>1</sup> Sometimes the *-self* form immediately follows its antecedent, as in (a), but at other times, it is simply near it, as in (b) and (c):

(4) Emphatic uses (from Quirk and Greenbaum 1973)

- a. I **myself** wouldn't kiss him.
- b. I wouldn't kiss him **myself**.
- c. **Myself**, I wouldn't kiss him.

In addition to the two primary categories of reflexives and emphatics, many other uses of *-self* pronouns have been noted, as shown in Figure 1. Descriptions and examples of all these categories will be provided in the following sections.

Figure 1. *The basic schema of the structural view*

Reflexives (argument position, refer to the same entity as the subject)
Emphatics (adjunct position, for emphasis)
Other uses: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>Like</i>-phrases and other fixed expressions</li><li>• Logophoric uses</li><li>• Picture noun phrases</li><li>• Conjoined expressions</li><li>• Locative prepositional phrases</li><li>• First and second person alternation</li></ul>

### 3. Reflexives

*-Self* forms earned the appellation “reflexive pronouns” by virtue of the great number of instances in which they occur in argument position and refer to the same entity as the subject. Typically, the antecedent of an argument *-self* is the subject of its clause, whether the clause is matrix or subordinate. The *-self* form

may be either singular or plural, and may be in any person. The examples in (5) and (6) show subjects as the antecedents of *-self* in a variety of environments. In (5), the antecedent is the subject of finite verbs; the *-self* pronoun serves as a direct object in (a) and (b), and as an oblique object in (c) and (d).

- (5) a. **Edward Sapir** continually berated **himself** for idleness, when, in fact, he was continually turning out grammars for complex and difficult languages. (MBW 287)
- b. However, **she** seldom allowed **herself** to enjoy pretty clothes or elaborately dressed hair. (MBW 22)
- c. “**He** is really talking about **himself!**” (MBW 14)
- d. “My, oh my, I said to **myself**. What does this fool think he’s doing ....” (NYTC-9/4/98)

In (6), the antecedent of *-self* is the subject of a non-finite verb:

- (6) The sun was fully up now, the light threading **itself** around the curtains and making a slit of bright color along the left side of the double bed. (SPW 83)

Frequently, *-self* is coreferent with the entity that is understood to be the subject of its clause, even when that subject is not overt. (In the examples here, the subject of the verb is understood to be the same as the subject of the preceding finite verb.) The verb may be in the infinitive form (7a), or a participle (7b):

- (7) a. “Our message is, make sure you aim to get **yourself** a career and not just a first job” (NYTC-6/25/98)
- b. Then he entered test-pilot training at Patuxent River, Md., elevating **himself** into the elite of military aviation. (NYTC-7/23/98)

However, not all *-self* pronouns that serve as syntactic arguments are coreferent with the subject of their clauses. In (8a), the *-self* form is coreferent with an object of a preposition, while in (8b), there is no mention of a coreferential entity in the clause itself.

- (8) a. “A Way in the World” is, he says, “a settling of accounts for **me** with **myself**,” for what he regards as errors of artistic judgment. (GNS)
- b. “The interests of the nation and the people do not require a trial or conflicts among **ourselves**, but national reconciliation.” (NYTC-12/29/98)

Nevertheless, subjects are the prototypical antecedents for *-self* pronouns, as shown by their statistical preponderance. In the corpus of first page articles from the *New York Times*,<sup>2</sup> 65% of *-self* pronouns in argument positions refer to the (overt) subjects of their clauses.

Additional evidence that speakers have a preference for subjects as antecedents of *-self* is provided by the responses of some native speakers in an experiment conducted by White et. al. (1997). In this study of second-language learners, the researchers included some native English speakers as a control group, and found that even some native speakers consistently rejected objects as antecedents for *-self* in (9) and similar sentences.

- (9) a. The nurse asked Susan a question about **herself**.
- b. The researcher gave the subject a test about **himself**.

#### 4. Emphatics

In the second major group of uses, *-self* pronouns are said to be used emphatically. *-Self* pronouns earned the monikers “emphatic” and “intensifier” by virtue of the great number of tokens in which they appear as syntactic adjuncts, immediately following or proximate to their antecedent, and in which they seem to provide emphasis on their referent.

The antecedent of an emphatic *-self* pronoun need not be a subject, as shown in the following examples. In (10a), the antecedent of an adjunct *-self* is a direct object, while in (10b), the antecedent of *-self* is the object of a preposition. Most often, however, the antecedent of a non-argument *-self* pronoun is a subject, as shown in (c) and (d). In the *New York Times* corpus, 30% of *-self* pronouns are used as adjuncts. Of these, 59% are coreferent with their clause’s subject.

- (10) a. Representative John Conyers, Jr., the ranking Democrat, sought to put **Starr himself** on trial, accusing him of crossing the “line into obsession” in his four-year investigation of Clinton. (NYTC-11/20/98)
- b. The annex again raises questions about the future of Richard Butler, the executive chairman of Unscor, whom Iraq wants dismissed, and of **the commission itself**, which Iraq wants to make part of the United Nations system. (NYTC-11/15/98)
- c. **Yeltsin himself** suggested that he did not envision speedy changes. (NYTC-8/31/98)
- d. For all the racial undercurrents in Thursday’s violence, there was no doubting the main target for public rage: **Suharto**, the 76-year-old former army

general, **who himself** rose to power on the crest of a popular revolt. (NYTC-5/15/98)

When the antecedent of emphatic *-self* is a subject, *-self* need not immediately follow, as (11a) and (b) show:

- (11) a. **Shepard** almost did not make it to the moon **himself**.  
(NYTC-7/23/98)
- b. **The commission** had **itself** sought the ruling after its amnesty decision, issued in December by an independent committee within the panel, sparked widespread protests from political opponents...  
(NYTC-5/9/98)

## 5. Other uses

While it is true that the structural categories of reflexive and emphatic do describe the majority of tokens of these forms, they do not exhaust the contexts in which *-self* occurs. Therefore, these two generalizations are supplemented by a list of exceptions to account for the other environments in which these forms are also found.

### 5.1 *Fixed expressions*

Quirk et. al. (1985) note that *-self* pronouns occur in “*like*-phrases” as well as with other terms such as *as*, *but* and *except*, and linguists have noted these phrases as well (e.g., Fiengo and Lasnik 1976; Kuno 1987).

- (12) a. He would be something nondescript, something in the background, **like herself**; perhaps he had become an interpreter. (AMM 31)

- b. I can understand a father wanting his daughter to be **like himself** but I can't understand that ugly brute wanting his daughter to be **like him!** (Cantrall 1974)
  - c. For somebody like **me/myself**, this is a big surprise. (Quirk and Greenbaum 1973)
- (13)
- a. Against her better judgment Joanna persists, "I don't know how to **make** Mark understand that no one is comparing him to Jamie **except himself**" (CGH)
  - b. And in that experience something unexpected was illuminated: how gratifying it was not to have to explain or rationalize or defend her decision to anyone but **herself**. (GIN)
- (14)
- a. **As for myself**, I won't be invited. (both from Kuno 1987: 129)
  - b. John told Mary that **as for himself**, he wouldn't be invited.

## 5.2 Logophoric uses

Another group of exceptions that do not fit into the classic reflexive/emphatic taxonomy are logophoric uses, and these have also been well documented by linguists (e.g. Cantrall 1969, 1974; Kuno 1987; Zribi-Hertz 1989; Baker 1995 and others).<sup>3</sup> In logophoric uses, the referent of the *-self* pronoun is the individual(s) whose point of view is being represented, but there is neither an overt nor an explicit clause-internal antecedent (also known as a "local" antecedent). The passages in (15) and (16) contain examples of logophoric uses of *-self*:

- (15) She<sub>1</sub> [Trudi] felt a sudden rush of power, the power to stay alive. She<sub>1</sub>'d kept others alive with her<sub>1</sub> stories when they'd come close to being found. This time it was for **herself<sub>1</sub>**. (HSR 383)<sup>4</sup>

The form's referent is Trudi, whose viewpoint is expressed in the passage, and there is no potential antecedent within the same clause. Trudi has been arrested and is hoping to win her freedom by recounting stories to her guard. We learn her inner feelings (a sudden rush of power), and what she was thinking (she had told stories before).

Another example of a logophoric use of *-self* with no clause-internal antecedent can be found in (16). In this passage, Morrison is one of two main characters. He is visiting the apartment of the other main character, Louise, a woman with whom he had become friendly and who has just been admitted to a psychiatric hospital.

- (16) As he was about to slip the catch on the inside lock Morrison<sub>1</sub> glanced once more around the room. He<sub>1</sub> could see now where it got its air of pastiche: the bookcase was a copy of the one in Paul's living room, the prints and the table were almost identical with those at the Samisens'. Other details stirred dim images of objects half-noted in the various houses, at the various but nearly identical get-acquainted parties. Poor Louise had been trying to construct herself out of the other people she had met. Only from **himself**<sub>1</sub> had she taken nothing; thinking of his chill interior, embryonic and blighted, he realized it had nothing for her to take. (APO 70)

This passage is a description of Morrison's activities and thoughts. The writer tells us that Morrison glanced around the room, and then she tells us what he sees, as though we were looking through his eyes. When the author writes *other details stirred dim images of objects half-noted in various houses*, we know that these images were stirred within Morrison's own mind.

### 5.3 *Picture noun phrases*

-*Self* and simple pronouns are known to alternate in picture noun phrases. According to Trask (1993: 209), “Picture nouns have the unusual property of permitting reflexive pronouns to occur inside prepositional phrases of which they are the heads.” Picture nouns are generally entities that represent likenesses of other entities, such as *story*, *photograph*, and *portrait*; the list of picture nouns is quite long, and can include words like *image*, *song*, *poem*, *glimpse*, *joke*, *description*, *statue* and *gossip*:

- (17) a. Lisa sent me this picture of **herself**. (Trask 1993)  
b. Lisa sent me this picture of **her**.
- (18) a. The dictator was lying at the foot of that statue of **himself** on horseback.  
b. The dictator was lying at the foot of that statue of **him**. (both from Kuno 1987, p. 165)
- (19) a. **John** heard some strange gossip about **himself** on the radio.  
b. **John** heard some strange gossip about **him** on the radio. (both from Kuno 1987, p.174]

### 5.4 *Conjoined expressions*

-*Self* pronouns also occur in conjoined noun phrases, where they are neither reflexive arguments nor emphatic adjuncts:

- (20) a. **My brother and myself** went sailing yesterday.  
(Quirk and Greenbaum 1973: 104)

- b. He was as forgetful and as careless of material things as he had always been, but as he did not smoke and the furnace had an automatic fire arrangement, the principal hazards were to **himself and not the neighbors** in whose children he was deeply interested and for whose sake he had taken down the fence so that they would have more room to play. (MBW 42)
- c. The day before the gunman-arsonist turned a Harlem clothing store into an inferno that killed **seven employees and himself**, the store's owner, who is Jewish, told a court that demonstrations by black protesters outside his premises had become a menacing caldron of anti-Semitic, anti-white racism and that arson and physical attacks seemed imminent. (NYT)

### 5.5 *Locative prepositional phrases*

-*Self* and simple pronouns are also known to alternate in prepositional phrases that involve spatial relationships:

- (21) a. John saw a snake **near him**.
- b. John saw a snake **near himself**.
- (22) a. But knowing nothing of this, the golden girl turned once to wave to the crowd and closed the door **behind herself**. (DPW)
- b. Rankin locked the door **behind her**, and a guard was posted outside for her protection. (JAH)

### 5.6 *First and second person alternation*

Researchers have noted that there is considerably more alternation between first and second person *-self* and simple pronouns, than between the same forms in the

third person (e.g., Ross 1970, Zribi-Hertz 1989). The following examples illustrate:

- (23) a. In a recent **conversation with me**, India's outgoing prime minister, I.K. Gujral, cited Sino-Indian cordiality as a model for Indo-Pakistani relations. (ANA)
- b. He can entertain foolish ideas like the enterprise zones he was pushing in a debate with Clinton, even though the Mondragon co-op model he invokes in a **conversation with myself** and Andrew Kopkind in this issue suggests a much better way to develop manufacturing. (CNA)
- (24) a. Tell me about **you**. (SWF)
- b. Tell me about **yourself**.
- c. But then I started listening to Dr. Laura and I heard caller after caller try to blame someone else for what had gone wrong in their life and I really recognized myself in them. I realized: 'It's **you**. It's **yourself**.' It's not someone else's fault. It sounds simple, I know, but I didn't get it for a long time." (JTM)

In summary, the structural account of *-self* pronouns is not limited to reflexive and emphatic uses, but is supplemented by a list of additional environments in which *-self* pronouns also occur.

## 6. Finding the antecedent

In the structural account, schematized in Figure 2, the identity of *-self* pronouns is believed to be determined syntactically; the antecedent of reflexive *-self* pronouns will be the subject, while the antecedent of emphatic *-self* pronouns will be a proximately mentioned entity (which may or may not be a subject).

Figure 2. *Finding the referent of -self according to the structural view*

	<b>Reflexive</b>	<b>Emphatic</b>
Antecedent:	Subject	Usually the subject; if antecedent is not the subject, then it is mentioned immediately before <i>-self</i>
Examples:	<b>John saw himself.</b>  My, oh my, I said to <b>myself</b> . <b>You</b> wouldn't recognize <b>yourselves</b> .	<b>The teacher herself</b> didn't know the answer. <b>The girl</b> washed the car <b>herself</b> . The lawyer sought to put <b>the witness himself</b> on trial.

A more detailed analysis of referent-finding according to the traditional structural view of *-self* can be found in Chapter 4.

## 7. Critical discussion

As noted earlier, the traditional structural account of *-self* forms is not the analysis of any modern school of linguistic thought, but the basic reflexive/emphatic dichotomy continues to serve as the foundation of most modern treatments of these forms. For example, in the generative literature, the primacy of the reflexive use of *-self*, and the focus on contexts in which *-self* and simple pronouns are in complementary distribution (reflexive and non-reflexive contexts), are basic principles underlying the Binding Theory. About traditional grammar more generally, Chomsky (1965) has this to say:

Whatever evidence is available today seems to me to show that by and large the traditional views are basically correct, so far as they go. (p. 194)

But it is not only formalists who have built their analyses on the foundation of the reflexive/emphatic distinction. These categories form the basic

schema for describing and analyzing the distribution of *-self* by formalists and functionalists alike. This is not to say that the traditional structural analysis has not been modified, refined or improved upon, only that it serves as the basis of modern analyses. For example, Van Hoek's (1997) cognitive grammar treatment of *-self* describes the reflexive and emphatic uses as prototypes, and other uses as extensions from those prototypes.

But there are some serious flaws in the structural account, and they seriously undermine its suitability as a foundation for linguistic analyses. We will consider these problems in turn:

- The analysis relies on a model of rules and exceptions.
- The description does not exhaust exceptions to the reflexive/emphatic taxonomy.
- The account is not descriptively adequate, as it does not distinguish between contexts for *-self* and simple pronouns.
- The notion that *-self* is a reflexive pronoun is not supported empirically.

### ***7.1 Rules and exceptions model***

The architecture of the structural account is a rules-and-exceptions model; that is, it is based on two generalizations, or rules (reflexive and emphatic), which are supplemented by a list of exceptions. This type of model poses some problems of its own.

### Exceptions to the rules

First, the many exceptions to the initial generalizations throw into doubt the wisdom of the classification itself. In any taxonomy, data that do not fit into the taxons undermine the viability of the classificatory system. The exceptions do not prove the rules; rather, they weaken their descriptive value. Grammarians have long recognized exceptions to the structural account, but rather than concluding that the account is not analytically sound and rejecting it outright, modern linguists have tried to salvage that traditional classification by tacking on additional categories (e.g., logophoric uses, conjoined expressions) and various exceptions (e.g., simple pronouns can occur in locative prepositional phrases in reflexive environments).

### Observations are unrelated to each other

In addition, as they are described in the structural account, the reflexive and emphatic uses of *-self* pronouns are unrelated to each other. No overarching explanation or unifying description is offered, and no motivation is offered for the list of exceptions, which are also unrelated not only to each other, but also to the initial classification of reflexives and emphatics. There is no theoretical unity to these observations.

This is not to say that scholars have not suggested motivations for the generalizations and their exceptions. For example, Van Hoek (1997) offers semantic motivations for the extensions from the prototypes. In that account, the structural account of generalizations and exceptions is recast in terms of

prototypes and extensions, so semantic commonalities between the prototypes and other uses are offered as motivations for the various uses of these forms.<sup>5</sup> Interestingly, Van Hoek (p. 173) notes that there is “broad agreement” that the reflexive is the central construction, and she cites the assertions of other linguists (who are likely to have been influenced by the structural tradition) as support for this claim.

### Inconsistent definitions

Another problem is that both the rules and the exceptions are based on a diverse mixture of syntactic and semantic categories. Because the categories are not defined consistently, and they operate on different domains, the account provides neither an integrated nor an exhaustive description of the phenomena. While reflexive and emphatics are defined structurally (heads and adjuncts), they are also semantic categories (pertaining to coreference and emphasis). The list of exceptions is likewise mixed, with some categories defined syntactically (e.g., conjoined expressions), and others semantically (e.g., logophoric messages). In addition to a mix of semantic and syntactic categories, there is also a list of fixed expressions which have not even been classified. The description appears to be a patchwork of unrelated observations.

### Categories cannot always be distinguished

Another problem with the reflexive/emphatic distinction is that it is not always possible to determine whether a token of *-self* is an instance of a reflexive or

emphatic use. While reflexives are said to have an independent role in an utterance, and emphatic adjuncts are the mention of an entity without a new role for that entity, there are some uses of *-self* which appear to fall into both categories. In each of the following examples, *-self* could be analyzed as either a reflexive or an adjunct (emphatic):

- (25) a. Throughout the investigation of Wrynn, the undercover officer and Dowd suspected that **Wrynn** was **himself** receiving leaks from within Internal Affairs, according to testimony in Tocco's trial. (NYTC-5/4/98)
- b. For all the racial undercurrents in Thursday's violence, there was no doubting the main target for public rage: Suharto, the 76-year-old former army general who **himself** rose to power on the crest of a popular revolt. (NYTC-5/15/98)
- c. When Mr. Leopold assigns Celia to write a film review, she turns for help to her father, **himself** a reviewer (as was the author's father, Anatole Broyard, a book critic for The New York Times), who in a burst of impatience does the work for her. (LHF)

In (25a), *himself* could be analyzed as appositive to *Wrynn*, or as a subject or *receiving*. In (25b), *himself* is appositive to *who*, and yet also the subject of *rose*. In the third example, the phrase *himself a reviewer* is clearly appositive to *her father*, yet *himself* appears to have an argument role in the phrase (which, in some theories, would be analyzed as a "small clause", with *himself* as the subject). These examples show that not all instances of *himself* can be classified according to the reflexive/emphatic taxonomy.

## 7.2 *The account is not exhaustive*

Another serious problem with this account is that the list of exceptions does not exhaust the environments in which *-self* pronouns occur. Further, the nature of the descriptive system provides no constraints on the number of new categories. The next two examples, (26) and (27), show *-self* pronouns without local antecedents that do not fit any of the categories we have seen so far:

- (26) This has been a walking Rorschach test. People are reacting as if it's O.J. when it's really about **themselves**. (NYT 10/8/95)
- (27) But when [young men during the Vietnam War] burned their draft cards, no one died. Their protest affected **themselves** alone as sovereign individuals. (CKD)

Under the rules and exceptions model, each new type of usage could force a new category to be added. Because there is no unity among the exceptions that have been documented, there is no limit to the number of new categories that might be needed.

Many linguistic analyses have confronted this problem. In the face of new kinds of exceptions, some analysts have proposed additional categories, segregating additional uses as outside the system in some way. For example, logophoric uses have been proposed as a category of uses not subject to the Binding Theory. Reinhart and Reuland (1993) also adopt the approach of excluding from their account uses that do not fit the pre-determined categories, that is, by excluding non-reflexive uses of *-self* from their revision of the Binding Principles. Another route that has been considered (other than adding on to the list

of exceptions) is the postulation of homonyms. For example, some usages of non-reflexive *-self* may be analyzed as a distinct lexeme that is homonymous with reflexive *-self* (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of *-self* and homonymy in different frameworks). However, it is the very nature of the rules and exceptions model which precludes an approach wherein a more general, and theoretically unified description might be discovered.

### **7.3 *The account is not descriptively adequate***

Perhaps the most pernicious flaw in the structural account is that it does not effectively describe the distribution of these forms. When both *-self* and simple pronouns may occur with the same referent (e.g., in picture noun phrases, conjoined expressions, locative prepositional phrases), the conditions under which *-self* pronouns will be used are not described. When is the use obligatory? When is it optional? When are the forms not used? What is the difference between using *himself* and *him* in contexts in which both can appear with the same referent? The answers to these questions are not provided by the traditional account.

We have seen that *-self* forms occur in all the following non-reflexive environments :

- Emphatic uses
- *Like*-phrases and other fixed expressions
- Logophoric uses
- Picture noun phrases
- Conjoined expressions
- Locative prepositional phrases
- First and second person alternation

However, this list does not constitute an adequate description of the use of these forms, as its categories describe not only uses of *-self* pronouns, but of simple pronouns as well. We have already seen *-self* pronouns used in all these contexts. However, each one of these categories describes uses of both *-self* and simple pronouns. Thus, this account neither predicts, describes nor explains the conditions under which speakers select *-self* forms; further, it does not describe the communicative effect in the message that results from the choice of pronoun.

The following data, (28) through (35), show both *-self* and simple pronouns in each of the contexts that has been offered as a description for the distribution of *-self* forms. These examples show that by naming such uses, we do not reach an understanding of the basis on which speakers are choosing between *-self* and simple pronouns.

### Emphasis

The name of the category “emphatic” does not describe the particular role that *-self* forms have in expressing emphasis or intensification, as there are many devices that speakers can employ to emphasize or draw additional attention to specific entities. Kemmer and Barlow (1995, 1997) point out that prosodic stress and topicalization are also means of emphasizing referents, and that calling *-self* “emphatic” is therefore an insufficient description. While there is no rule that prevents the use of *-self* in the following contexts (as shown by the paraphrases following each example), (28) shows three examples in which writers have chosen alternate means of emphasizing referents:

- (28) a. When Jordan came up to the court from the basement, the reaction from the people in the seats seemed to startle **even him**. (GPW) [...to startle the star himself; to startle Michael himself.]
- b. and I was confronted by the snobbery and cruelty of the sorority system at its worst, with rules ... to control competition that was so harsh and so unashamed that **the very rules** designed to control it made it even worse. (MBW 92) [...that the rules that were themselves designed to control it made it even worse; that the rules themselves made it even worse.]
- c. “If he had had any compassion for *me*” cried her husband impatiently, “he would not have danced half so much! For God's sake, say no more of his partners. Oh! that he had sprained his ankle in the first dance!” (Italics in the original) (APP 13) [If he had any compassion for me myself]

Like-phrases

Both *-self* and simple forms can occur in *like*-phrases, whether or not they are coreferent with the subject of the clause. In (a) and (b), the pronouns are coreferent with the subjects of their clause (her son), while in (c), (d) and (e), the subject is not the referent of the pronoun.

- (29) a. She listened as her son talked with others **like himself**.
- b. She listened as her son talked with others **like him**.
- c. He would be something nondescript, something in the background, **like herself**; perhaps he had become an interpreter. (AMM 31)
- d. He would be something nondescript, something in the background, **like her**; perhaps he had become an interpreter.

- e. I can understand a father wanting his daughter to be **like himself** but I can't understand that ugly brute wanting his daughter to be **like him!** (Cantrall 1974)

### Logophoric messages

While *-self* pronouns do indeed occur in logophoric contexts, the following examples show simple pronouns used to refer to individuals whose points of view are being described in their respective passages:

- (30) a. The envelope of time, **she thought**, was starting in earnest to swallow **her**. (SPW79)
- b. **He realized** she was looking at **him**.

### Picture noun phrases

- (31) a. I have a painting of Grandma, Priscilla, and **herself**. (MBW)
- b. The model ends her walk in the center of the restaurant, strikes a pose and then an original painting of **her** is created by an artist commissioned by Campari. (KAA)

### Conjoined expressions

- (32) a. The principal hazards were to **himself** and to the neighbors in whose children he was deeply interested ..... (adapted from MBW)
- b. The principal hazards were to **him** and to the neighbors in whose children he was deeply interested.

### Locative prepositional phrases

- (33) a. She woke up and looked all **around her**.
- b. She woke up and looked all **around herself**.

### First and second person alternations

- (34) a. In a recent **conversation with me**, India's outgoing prime minister, I.K. Gujral, cited Sino-Indian cordiality as a model for Indo-Pakistani relations. (ANA)
- b. He can entertain foolish ideas like the enterprise zones he was pushing in a debate with Clinton, even though the Mondragon co-op model he invokes in a **conversation with myself** and Andrew Kopkind in this issue suggests a much better way to develop manufacturing. (CNA)
- (35) a. As for **you**, I have nothing further to say.
- b. As for **yourself**, I have nothing further to say.

#### ***7.4 Is -self a reflexive pronoun?***

Naming *-self* forms as reflexive pronouns is not an analytically neutral practice. It reflects the assumption that the best description of these forms is that they are used reflexively. Diver (1987) treats as a testable hypothesis the proposition that the Latin form *se* is a reflexive pronoun; he calls this the Reflexive Pronoun Hypothesis. (See Chapter 3 for a full discussion of Diver's analysis.) Following Diver, we can evaluate the claim that *-self* is a reflexive pronoun, by asking whether there are empirical grounds to identify the forms in this way. It should be noted that we are testing not the incarnation of any particular syntactic or semantic theory, but rather, the structural reflexive/emphatic framework of *-self* that underlies most modern linguistic treatments of these forms. This test can

help establish whether this structural account does indeed form a sturdy foundation on which to build linguistic analyses.

If the Reflexive Pronoun Hypothesis for *-self* is treated as a rough-and-ready generalization about most uses of these forms, then it can succeed. But then the hypothesis is not an analytical claim; it is just an informal description. An informal description would not appear to serve as a suitable framework upon which to build analyses, as a category of crosslinguistic research, or even as a rule about the distribution of these forms. Now, if we choose to accept the notion of reflexive pronouns *a priori*, then there is no need to test the concept empirically. However, if we treat the notion as a scientific hypothesis, then we should be able to make predictions and test to see whether they can be confirmed by data.

If the hypothesis is to be confirmed for English, we would expect to find *-self*, the English reflexive pronoun, in reflexive environments. Reflexive environments are defined as standing in the predicate, and referring to the same entity as the subject. The hypothesis does not anticipate the use of other forms (simple pronouns) in reflexive environments, nor does it, strictly speaking, anticipate the use of reflexive forms in non-reflexive environments. The predictions are shown in Figure 3:

Figure 3.  
*Distribution of forms predicted by the Reflexive Pronoun Hypothesis*

	<i>-self</i>	simple pronouns
Reflexive environment	+	-
Non-reflexive environments	-	+

We have already discussed many other environments in which *-self* is used, and we have seen that these forms are not limited to reflexive environments. The mere existence of these other uses represents a significant weakening of the Reflexive Pronoun Hypothesis, for once we determine that *-self* is not limited to reflexive environments, we must question the analytical expediency of treating the reflexive as the primary function of *-self*. On what grounds have we determined that its reflexive use is more basic than its emphatic or logophoric uses, for example?<sup>6</sup> Further, the examples shown in (36) are not accounted for by the categories we have seen. The *-self* forms are not used logophorically, yet in each one, *-self* is used as an argument to refer to entities mentioned outside its clause:

- (36) a. They<sub>1</sub> wore bathing suits that protected **themselves**<sub>1</sub> from the harmful rays of the sun. (HBS)
- b. The girls<sub>1</sub> were wearing red satin dresses that had obviously been made by **themselves**<sub>1</sub>. (HG)
- c. He<sub>1</sub> turned his head toward the voice and looked into the half-closed eyes of a boy who seemed not much older than **himself**<sub>1</sub>. (LGI)

*-Self* forms clearly occur in many environments other than reflexive ones.

But let us put those facts aside to look carefully at reflexive environments, and consider, as a testable hypothesis, the notion that *-self* forms are the pronoun of choice in reflexive contexts. We have already seen data that show both *-self* and simple pronouns in reflexive environments. Thus, we see that the actual distribution of forms is not as predicted in Figure 3, but rather, as shown in Figure 4:

Figure 4. *Actual distribution of forms*

	<i>-self</i>	simple pronouns
Reflexive environment	+	+
Non-reflexive environments	+	+

If we were not predisposed to accept the hypothesis, even in the face of contradictory evidence, this data alone might cause us to consider rejecting it. But perhaps we have not characterized reflexive environments carefully enough, and we need more precise definitions. Let us look only at reflexive environments, and see whether there are **any** of these that require or guarantee the use of *-self*. Figure 5 shows a more fine-grained definition of reflexive environments, along with predictions for the forms' distribution. Each type of context will be considered to see whether the predictions are borne out. We will begin with reflexive indirect objects, and leave until last the reflexive as direct object, a characteristic of what Faltz (1985) calls "the archetypal reflexive context".

Figure 5. *Distribution of forms predicted by the Reflexive Pronoun Hypothesis (Revised)*

	<i>-self</i>	other pronouns
Reflexive - object of a preposition	+	-
Reflexive - indirect object	+	-
Reflexive - direct object	+	-

### Object of a preposition

One kind of reflexive environment exists when an entity mentioned in a prepositional phrase is coreferent with the subject of its clause. The following pairs show that with a variety of prepositions, both *-self* and simple pronouns can be used reflexively, that is, to refer to the subject of the clause. As we have seen, the traditional structural account has noted such alternation in locative prepositional phrases, such as (37) and (38). It is important to note that merely labeling and assigning these examples to the category of locatives does not explain them. They are exceptions to the generalization that *-self* forms appear in reflexive environments:

- (37) a. Now he had, in the memories, experienced injustice and cruelty, and he had reacted with rage that welled up so passionately **inside him** that the thought of discussing it calmly at the evening meal was unthinkable. (LGI)

- b. Jonas felt a ripping sensation **inside himself**, the feeling of terrible pain clawing its way forward to emerge in a cry. (LGI 151)
- (38)
- a. But knowing nothing of this, **the golden girl** turned once to wave to the crowd and closed the door **behind herself**. (DPW)
  - b. **Rankin** locked the door **behind her**, and a guard was posted outside for her protection. (JAH)

Further, the examples in (39) and (40) show that alternation in prepositional phrases is not limited to locatives. In all the following examples, the pronouns are coreferent with the subjects of the clauses.

- (39)
- a. Geffen says Katzenberg called him “the day it hit the fan at Disney,” and floated the idea of a partnership **with him** and Spielberg. (CSI)
  - b. So when Jeffrey (Katzenberg) suggested that I go into partnership **with himself** and David Geffen, it wasn't something that I just began thinking about the day Jeffrey left Disney. (REC)
- (40)
- a. The Giver would help Jonas hide in the storage area of the vehicle. He would have **with him** a bundle of food which The Giver would save from his own meals during the next two weeks. (LGI 160)
  - b. Lindros was angry. He was angry **with himself** for missing 42 games because of injuries his first two years in the NHL. He was angry with the Flyers because they were lousy. (FLL)

### Indirect objects

Indirect objects that are coreferent with their subjects may also be either *-self* or simple pronouns. The examples in (41) show this alternation in first person; examples (41a) and (b) contain the simple pronoun *me*, while (c) and (d) contain

the *-self* pronoun “myself”. In all four examples, the indirect objects are coreferent with the subjects of their clauses:

- (41) a. “**I Bought Me** a Cat” (IFS)
- b. “I have no problems with Mississippi. You know why I like Mississippi? Because they still sell those little pickaninny dolls down there. And **I bought me** a few of them, too.” (ENP)
- c. I'm thirty-three years old, and **I've bought myself** a Santa suit. (PES)
- d. When I got back to Waterloo, **I bought myself** a new pen and started writing on the train. (MPW60)

#### Direct objects

If there is one environment in which *-self* will behave as a reflexive pronoun should (that is, as predicted in Figure 3), it is as a direct object, the prototypical context for reflexive pronouns. The following examples all contain direct objects. Contrary to the predictions of the hypothesis, the objects in (42) and (43) are simple pronouns which are coreferent with their subjects:

- (42) a. Says Mitnick: “When I read about myself in the media, even I don't recognize **me**.” (PDH)
- b. I lose control. It's like I'm not **me**. (OPR)
- (43) a. Because **she** didn't have **her** to take care of! (A woman explaining why her own mother will be able to live another 30 years to the age of 120, even though she herself won't live that long.) (RFS)
- b. Speaker A: I don't know, I can't keep up with him.  
Speaker B: I know, I can't keep up with him either. I don't think **he** can keep up with **him**. (HLG)

The examples in (42) show that, at least in the first person, even direct objects that are coreferent with the subject need not be *-self* pronouns; simple pronouns can occur in these contexts as well. The data in (43) show that simple pronouns as reflexive direct objects can occur in third person as well. One might object that these examples are not reflexive; but that is a circular argument that we cannot make in support of the testable notion that *-self* is a reflexive pronoun.

We should note here that not even all *-self* forms that serve as direct objects are coreferent with their subjects, as the examples in (44) show:

- (44) a. But when [young men during the Vietnam War] burned their draft cards, no one died. Their protest affected **themselves** alone as sovereign individuals. (CKD)
- b. “The Marlins have heard a lot about Mariano Rivera, and they're gonna get a chance to see him. His reputation obviously precedes **himself**.” (MSG)

Now, two facts are true about these types of examples, and both require an explanation: (a) they are unusual; and (b) they do occur. Any explanation of the distribution of these forms must account for the skewing in which they are most often coreferent with the subject. However, a satisfactory explanation must also accommodate all the relevant data. The Reflexive Pronoun Hypothesis neither anticipates nor admits these types of examples. A successful analysis must explain not only why examples like these are unusual, but also why they do sometimes occur.

Returning to the predictions of the Reflexive Pronoun Hypothesis, the data show that the actual distribution of forms, then, is not as predicted in Figure 3, but rather, as in Figure 6:

Figure 6. *Actual distribution of forms*

	<i>-self</i>	other pronouns
Reflexive - object of a preposition	+	+
Reflexive - indirect object	+	+
Reflexive - direct object	+	+

These demonstrate that reflexivity is not the conditioning factor that determines whether *-self* or simple pronouns will occur.

### Conclusion

The preceding analysis shows that treating *-self* as a reflexive pronoun obscures more than it illuminates. What motivates the choice of *-self* in an utterance is not the message category “reflexive”, but something else. The category “reflexive” appears to tell us very little about the use of *-self* and simple pronouns in English.

If we accept the reflexive pronoun as an *a priori* category of linguistic analysis, then surely we can find a form that best meets its definition, and *-self* is likely to be the best candidate we can find in English. However, if we treat as a testable hypothesis the claim that *-self* is a reflexive pronoun, the hypothesis fails:

- *-self* is not always used for reflexive messages;
- other pronouns may be used for reflexive messages; and
- *-self* pronouns are used for many other kinds of messages, besides reflexivity.

We have found no empirical support for the notion that the linguistic system includes reflexivity, or reflexive pronouns, as part of its own structure.

## Notes to Chapter 2

1. While this is the traditional definition of emphatic uses of *-self*, some linguists note that *-self* need not be in apposition to be emphatic (Ferro 1992; Kemmer 1995, Kemmer and Barlowe 1996). This observation is similar to the description of emphatic uses in the OED, which may also include argument uses.
2. The corpora used in this study are described in Chapter 1.
3. The concept of logophoricity was developed by Hagège (1974) to describe pronouns in some African languages that refer to an antecedent from whose point of view events are being described. Unlike what are typically called long-distance reflexives, logophoric pronouns are said not to occur with clause-internal antecedents.
4. Subscripts have no theoretical status, but appear only to indicate a coreferential reading in examples in which such reading may not be immediately apparent.
5. Van Hoek (1997) notes that the logophoric use of *-self* shares with the reflexive and emphatic several semantic properties, such as prominence and a “semisubjective” viewing of its referent. In a reflexive phrase like *she saw herself*, the referent of *herself* is acting on herself “semisubjectively”, since the action is taken by the object’s referent, and not by another party. Van Hoek notes that this subjectivity is found in logophoric uses as well, in which the referent of *-self* is also viewed semisubjectively, as the individual whose point of view is represented in a passage.
6. The reflexive does not have historical priority, because diachronically the emphatic function preceded the reflexive. (Faltz 1985; Levinson 1987; Keenan 1994)

## Chapter 3

### Review of the literature

#### 1. Perspective

Many linguists have made contributions to the study of English *-self* pronouns and of what appear to be related forms in other languages. However, most of the linguistic literature does not conceive of the analytical problem in terms of accounting for the distribution of specific forms, and few linguists have viewed the phenomena from this perspective. Researchers have asked questions about, for example, “reflexive pronouns” and “intensification”. This literature review is organized around topics such as reflexivity and the role of meaning in linguistic analysis. Traditional, generative and functionalist explanations will be discussed within each topic.

#### *1.1 What kinds of questions have been asked*

Working within different theoretical frameworks, linguists approach their object of study in widely divergent ways. Because scholars have different assumptions and theoretical goals, they pose many different research questions.

Traditional grammarians aim to provide description, often for use in language teaching (for example Sweet 1891; Quirk et. al. 1972; Quirk and Greenbaum 1973; Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman 1983). In traditional

grammars, exceptions to general rules are not seen as analytical failures, but rather as a matter of descriptive necessity.

Beginning with the categories of traditional grammar, Chomsky (1965) sets the goals of generative grammar, which is to characterize the nature of the language faculty, believed to be a separate component of human cognition. Chomsky seeks the innate endowment (Universal Grammar or UG) that he believes makes possible the acquisition of language. By describing individual languages at ever-increasing levels of generality, Chomsky claims that an understanding of the universal principles common to all languages will emerge. According to this view, once we understand the nature of UG we will have an explanation for the properties we find in language: they are innately determined.

The framework of cognitive grammar (Langacker 1987, 1991; Tuggy 1985; Van Hoek 1992, 1997) shares generative grammar's goal of describing the mental representation of a linguistic system, but differs with respect to the expected characteristics of that grammar. Unlike generative grammar, which views language as an independent mental faculty, cognitive grammar sees language as an integral part of human cognition. The goal of this approach is to describe grammar in terms of general cognitive processing (Langacker 1987). Linguists working within this framework assume that grammar is a conventional representation of meaning, and that syntax and semantics are therefore inseparable.

Typological studies, such as those by Givón (1993), Faltz (1985) and Geniušienė (1987), do not share the goal of characterizing linguistic knowledge. For these linguists, the aim is to describe and classify linguistic phenomena from a wide variety of languages, and in this way to learn about language universals.

Columbia School analysts seek to explain how speakers make linguistic choices. The route they have found most fruitful for answering this question is by trying to account for the distribution of forms. Forms are distributed as they are because their meanings contribute toward the messages that speakers are trying to express. The explanation for the distribution of forms consists in identifying the signals and their meanings, and demonstrating how those hypothesized meanings contribute to the messages being communicated.

## ***1.2 The data***

The selection of data with which to explore grammatical questions cannot be free of assumptions about the nature of language and the goals of research. Especially in a field like linguistics, where data are not readily apparent but must be idealized from the continuous stream of speech in order to lend themselves to analysis, the selection of data is itself determined by one's theoretical perspective and basic assumptions.

As is well known, adherents of the Chomskyan approach believe that the most direct access to a speaker's linguistic knowledge is through grammaticality judgments. Native speaker intuitions about the well-formedness of sentences are believed to be easily accessible, and they form the primary data for generativists

(Chomsky 1986: 36). Chomsky's reliance on grammaticality judgments has been widely accepted, even by linguists who do not share his theoretical views (e.g. Givón, Langacker and others).

In spite of the widespread use of grammaticality judgments, there are some problems with this form of data collection. Labov (1972) warns that there is a serious problem with a scientific endeavor that creates not only theories, but its own data as well. Further, there is frequent disagreement, even among linguists, about grammaticality judgments. In addition, there is little evidence that grammaticality judgments are reliable indicators of speakers' actual competence. Reid (1991) demonstrates that sentences that are judged ungrammatical may be sentences for which an appropriate context has not been imagined, and not, as claimed by some linguists, combinations which are **disallowed** by the language.<sup>1</sup>

Analysis of language as it is actually used provides data different from those resulting from introspection and grammaticality judgments. According to Ruhl (1989: 15), "Invented sentences tend to be simplistic even when complex: well-behaved (and overexemplified) nouns and verbs link in stereotypic ways." Speakers faced with authentic and complex contexts produce language, and it is this data which is of interest to Columbia School linguists, rather than the limited examples we imagine when we try to invent sentences through conscious introspection. Because language is viewed instrumentally, Columbia School linguists look to attested data to discover the ways in which people with genuine communicative needs deploy the resources of their linguistic system. In this

approach, language use is not seen as rule-governed, but rather, as directed by the speaker's communicative goals.

On the other hand, crucial examples are not always found in any corpus, and for some linguists the use of invented data can be quite helpful. However, two important caveats are in order: (a) invented examples should include sufficient context, because context may be necessary in unexpected ways; and (b) we should be very wary of grammaticality judgments regarding invented sentences. What may appear to be an ungrammatical sentence may only be one for which we have not yet imagined an appropriate context, or for which we have imagined an inappropriate context. (Otheguy forthcoming).

The distinction between the use of grammaticality judgments and genuine texts (written or spoken) reflects an underlying difference in theoretical orientation. Chomsky's view is that linguistic competence alone is the proper subject matter of linguistics, and that native speaker intuitions provide the best information about that mental representation. Chomsky's theoretical orientation separates language knowledge from language use, and so attested language data is viewed as contaminated with irrelevant performance factors. Linguists who do not see the line between knowledge and use of language demarcated so boldly need not exclude the rich availability of language data that surrounds us.

Some studies include the analysis of data from just one language, while others rely on data from several languages. Generative analyses generally do incorporate data from more than one language. Because the goal of generative

grammar is to identify the characteristics of UG, it is expected that findings from one language will be applicable to all languages. It follows from this notion that if a grammar of any language is general enough, the principles of UG will emerge.

Cognitive grammar (CG) posits language-specific semantic structure, and so CG analyses may be based on a single language. However, because CG views language as inseparable from the rest of cognition, it is expected that there will be broad similarities between languages, and data from more than one language may be considered (e.g., Tuggy 1985).

Columbia School analyses are almost always based on just one language, but for a different reason. According to the Columbia School view, the analyst should look at individual languages to discover language-specific meanings and categories, rather than imposing the antecedently given categories of traditional grammar, such as “reflexive”.

Typological studies view the task differently. Givón, Faltz and Geniušienė share the point of view that “a grammar may be thought of as providing strategies for carrying out various linguistic functions” (Faltz 1985: i), and that reflexivization is one such function. These researchers rely on data from a variety of related and unrelated languages. In this view, the best way to learn about universal principles of language is by studying a wide range of different languages.

Givón also incorporates diachronic data, because he believes that language change reflects the functional component of grammar. For Givón, the discrete

structures of language (such as the reflexive) are the coding points that exist along a continuum of experience, and he notes that there is often a morphological overlap between forms used to express related points on the continuum. According to Givón, over time, more of these related points (e.g. the middle, passive and reflexive) will be coded similarly (1993: 93):

- (1) a. Reflexive: The argument eventually *resolved itself* in her favor.
- b. Middle: ?The argument *resolved* in her favor.
- c. BE-Passive: The argument *was resolved* in her favor.
- d. GET-Passive: The argument *got resolved* in her favor.

Another difference between schools of thought with regard to their selection of data pertains to figurative and metaphoric uses of language. Generative grammar and Givón's work share the view that "literal" interpretations of linguistic objects are the proper subject area of the field. Cognitive grammar, by contrast, views figurative language and metaphor as central to a psychologically realistic account of language structure. In the Columbia view, sentences do not have inherent, literal meaning. Instead, the message content of **any** utterance must be determined by a hearer not as a mechanical interpretation of its components, but only through inference based on the meanings of the forms, the context and the hearer's understanding of the speaker's communicative intent. Columbia analyses must account for the data of language use, including not only literal uses but metaphoric and figurative uses as well.

## 2. Reflexivity

The earliest writings about *-self* characterize these forms as “reflexive pronouns”, and the term continues to thrive. What have linguists learned by studying reflexivity? Is reflexivity a syntactic property? a semantic property? a morphological category? a category of a different kind? How successful is this category as an analytical tool?

### 2.1 *The structural tradition*

In his 1891 grammar of English, Sweet uses the term “reflexive” in three distinct senses: reflexive pronouns, reflexive messages and reflexive verbs. A reflexive pronoun is defined as “a personal pronoun standing in the object-relation to a verb, or else joined to it by a preposition as in *he thinks too much of himself*, being at the same time a repetition of the logical subject of the verb” (Sweet 1891: 77). Sweet notes that these forms can also be used “emphatically”, as in *I did it myself*. Reflexive messages do not require dedicated reflexive morphology: “we sometimes use the simple personal pronouns in a reflexive sense: *he looked about him*” (p. 78). Reflexive verbs communicate a reflexive message even though no reflexive pronoun is used: the intended message of *to keep quiet* is *to keep oneself quiet*. In summary, the reflexive is a kind of message or interpretation, as well as the name of a particular form. Not all reflexive messages contain reflexive pronouns, and reflexive pronouns are not always needed for reflexive messages.

Sweet and other traditional grammarians describe the distribution of reflexive pronouns and note exceptions. Quirk and Greenbaum say that reflexive

pronouns “replace a co-referential noun phrase, normally within the same finite verb clause: *John has hurt himself*” (1973: 103). This general statement is supplemented with a list of facts predicted by that description: sometimes the use of reflexive pronouns is obligatory (*She was beside herself with rage*); at other times their use is optional (*For somebody like me/myself this is a big surprise*); sometimes reflexive pronouns are used to express emphasis, in which case their position may vary (*I myself have never been there; I’ve never been there myself*) sometimes reflexive pronouns are not used even when they would be coreferential with the subject (*Have you any money on you?*). This is not a satisfying description of the forms’ distribution. When is the use obligatory? When is it optional? When are the forms not used? What is the difference between using *himself* and *him* in contexts in which both can appear with the same referent? No systematic answers are provided.

In their description of English grammar for ESL teachers, Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman (1983) describe the distribution of reflexive pronouns in transformational terms. The generalization they describe is that reflexive pronouns are required of the rightmost noun phrase whenever there are two coreferential noun phrases in the same clause. Their description fails in examples such as Sweet’s *He looked about him*, and Quirk and Greenbaum’s *Have you any money on you?*

According to this account, the example sentence (2a) is ungrammatical, but must be realized as sentence (2b). (An alternative way of approaching this

example is to conclude that speakers use the resources of their language to communicate: the usual way of communicating this message is via example (b); under other communicative conditions, (a) is appropriate.)

- (2) a. John<sub>1</sub> washed **John**<sub>1</sub>.  
b. John<sub>1</sub> washed **himself**<sub>1</sub>.

Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman offer the descriptive note that some verbs may be followed by either reflexive or non-reflexive objects. They ignore the fact that this observation seems to contradict the transformational account they describe.

Because they view language in transformational terms, these authors describe the use of some verbs with just one argument (e.g. *bathe*, *wash*) as instances of deletion of the reflexive pronoun.<sup>2</sup> They search for structural factors to describe the conditions under which such deletion can take place, although they admit that the conditions are not entirely clear. The traditional observation that reflexive pronouns can serve non-reflexive functions is also cloaked in transformational terms: reflexive pronouns can be introduced by other transformations as well. They distinguish two other functions of reflexive pronouns: the emphatic use as in *The owner himself built the house*, while another pattern, *The owner built the house himself* is described as an adverbial function of the reflexive, closely related to *The owner built the house by himself*.

Jespersen (1933) discusses reflexive pronouns and reflexive uses of verbs. He does not create a special category of reflexive verbs, but instead aims for an understanding of language use by considering the communicative purposes for

which the forms are used. He notes that with some verbs, reflexive pronouns may be omitted “whenever no ambiguity is to be feared” (p. 111), as in *I washed, dressed and shaved, and then felt infinitely better.*

These traditional treatments share many characteristics. They all accept the historical category “reflexive”, but they list a variety of uses that do not follow from the basic definition. Perhaps they subscribe to the notion that the exceptions prove the rule. In any event, no explanation is offered for the unexpected facts that sometimes simple pronouns are used reflexively, and that *-self* pronouns are often used non-reflexively.

## **2.2 *Generative grammar***

Chomsky (1965: 5) expresses his support for the essential accuracy of traditional grammar, so the categories of the tradition are categories of generative grammar as well: sentence, subject, direct object, preposition, etc. The reflexive is no exception. Lees and Klima’s (1963) reflexivization transformation is a formalization of traditional grammar’s notion of reflexivity. In this transformation, pronouns are realized as full lexical NPs in deep structure, and identity within the same clause results in the obligatory application of a reflexivization transformation.

Within generative grammar this transformation has been replaced by the Binding Principles (Chomsky 1981; 1982), which capture the same generalization without recourse to transformations or deep structure. However, the exceptions listed by traditional grammar remain problematic. Binding Theory provides

generative grammar's classic account of the distribution of *-self* pronouns, and has served as a springboard for generative research on this topic. We cannot survey all the variations of Binding Theory that have been suggested, but will concentrate instead on Chomsky's original formulation. We will also consider Reinhart and Reuland's (1993) major revision to the original Binding Principles, as well as the treatment of *-self* pronouns in the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1995).

### Chomsky's Classic Formulation

The Binding Principles posit a typology of nominal expressions, in which every noun phrase can be categorized as either an anaphor, a pronoun or a referring expression (R-expression). The members of each category (hence, all NPs) are subject to one of the three principles of Binding Theory given in (3). This typology is held to apply to empty categories as well as to overt NPs, and to apply exhaustively and universally.

- (3) Principle A: An anaphor is bound in its governing category.  
Principle B: A pronominal is free in its governing category.  
Principle C: An R-expression is free.

According to these principles, English *-self* pronouns are classified as anaphors, and are therefore subject to Principle A. Simple pronouns belong to the class of pronominals, and R-expressions include lexical noun phrases and proper names. Together, Principles A, B and C are believed to describe a wide range of facts about the distribution of both *-self* and simple pronouns and lexical NPs, as well as the distribution of hypothesized empty categories (e.g., wh-trace, PRO).

While it is not necessary to delve here into the technical details of the Binding Principles, a few definitions will be needed. A governing category can be defined as the smallest dominating NP or S, and an expression is said to be bound if it is c-commanded by a co-indexed NP, and free otherwise.<sup>3</sup> Co-indexed NPs are syntactically specified for coreference.

To summarize, Principle A states that a *-self* pronoun must be coreferent with another NP that c-commands it within its closest parent NP or S. Principle B states that a simple pronoun may not be coreferent with another NP that c-commands it within the same domain. It follows from these principles that *himself* and *him* will be found in complementary distribution, as the following examples show:

- (4) a. John<sub>1</sub> saw **himself**<sub>1</sub>.  
b. \*John<sub>1</sub> saw **him**<sub>1</sub>.  
c. \*John<sub>1</sub> saw **John**<sub>1</sub>.
- (5) a. Mary<sub>1</sub> said that John<sub>2</sub> saw **himself**<sub>2</sub>.  
b. \*Mary<sub>1</sub> said that John<sub>2</sub> saw **him**<sub>2</sub>.  
c. Mary<sub>1</sub> said that John<sub>2</sub> saw **her**<sub>1</sub>.  
d. \*Mary<sub>1</sub> said that John<sub>2</sub> saw **herself**<sub>1</sub>.

### Problems with the Binding Theory

Chomsky recognized a number of apparent counterexamples to the powerful generalizations captured above, and he considered many minor revisions to his original formulation. For example, Chomsky is unclear at which level of linguistic

representation the Binding Conditions hold, and alternately entertains the possibilities that they apply at S-structure and at the level of Logical Form (see Kuno 1987, 278 n. 15). Zribi-Hertz (1989) notes that syntacticians have been aware of data that present problems for what is now the Binding Theory since 1963.<sup>4</sup>

These are the same facts that troubled traditional grammarians' generalization about the distribution of reflexive pronouns. The generalization that reflexive pronouns replace coreferential noun phrases within the same clause is problematic under any theoretical guise.

One set of problems recognized by generative analysts is that *-self* and simple pronouns alternate in many contexts, such as picture NPs, (NPs that are headed by the noun *picture* or a semantic correlate such as *portrait*, *photograph* or *story*). In these contexts, both forms may refer to the same entity.

- (6) a. They<sub>1</sub> thought that pictures of **them<sub>1</sub>/themselves<sub>1</sub>** would be on sale.
- b. John<sub>1</sub> said that there was a picture of **him<sub>1</sub>/himself<sub>1</sub>** in the post office.
- c. The children<sub>1</sub> heard stories about **them<sub>1</sub>/themselves<sub>1</sub>**.

Sometimes when an object NP is followed by a locative prepositional phrase, *him* and *himself* may both occur with the same referential possibility:

- (7) a. John<sub>1</sub> pulled the blanket over **him<sub>1</sub>/himself<sub>1</sub>**
- b. John<sub>1</sub> hid the book behind **him<sub>1</sub>/himself<sub>1</sub>**.

A third set of exceptions to the complementary distribution predicted by the Binding Theory involves pronouns used in comparative and conjoined constructions like the following (from Ross 1970):<sup>5</sup>

- (8) a. John thinks that Mary is taller than **him/himself**.
- b. John thinks that physicists like **him/himself** are a godsend.
- c. John believes that letter was sent to Mary and **himself**.

### Possible Solutions

The non-complementary distribution of *-self* and simple pronouns in these contexts is not predicted by the Binding Theory, and analysts have pursued several major avenues to provide solutions to these problems. Zribi-Hertz (1989) describes the following four categories of solutions to the problems of Binding Theory. All of these proposals aim to preserve the essential typology of the Binding Theory, along with the assumption that the choice between *-self* and simple pronouns as an autonomous syntactic reflex that is structurally conditioned:

- (9) a. Not all *-self* pronouns are anaphors, and not all simple pronouns are pronominals. We have incorrectly categorized the forms according to their surface appearance. (Bouchard 1982)
- b. There are independent principles that suspend the application of the Binding Principles. For example, Chomsky (1981: 289) considers the notion that emphasis hinders the application of the Binding Principles.

- c. The Binding Principles themselves have been amended. For example, Chomsky (1986: 171) proposes that the governing categories of anaphors and pronominals may sometimes differ. Governing category has been redefined so that only NPs that have a subject can be governing categories.
- d. Despite surface appearances, alternating *-self* and simple pronouns actually occur in underlyingly different syntactic contexts. For example, some picture NPs may contain null subjects, while others contain no subject at all. (cf. Chomsky 1981, 1986)

Another avenue for resolving the problems of the Binding Theory has been proposed by Kuno (1987) and Zribi-Hertz (1989). In these accounts, the output of the syntactic component of the grammar is subjected to further semantic or discourse-based constraints. In this way, these authors try to integrate formalist and functionalist approaches. We will examine these proposals in Section 3 on the role of meaning in linguistic analysis.

#### Reinhart and Reuland (1993)

Reinhart and Reuland contend that the problems with the original Binding Theory justify a revision of the Binding Principles themselves.<sup>6</sup> Unlike the original Binding Theory, Reinhart and Reuland make no reference to structural, hierarchical relations such as c-command. Their revised Conditions A and B are not about anaphors and pronouns, but rather, about reflexive predicates and reflexivity.

What is most striking about this analysis is that non-reflexive uses of *-self* pronouns are simply excluded from the syntactic component of grammar.

Reinhart and Reuland describe two long-distance uses of *-self*: logophoric as in example (10a), and emphatic as in (b). Conditions A and B are defined to exclude these data.

- (10) a. It angered him<sub>i</sub> that she ... tried to attract a man like **himself<sub>i</sub>**.
- b. Max<sub>i</sub> boasted that the queen invited Lucie and **himself<sub>i</sub>** for a drink.

The revised Binding Principles apply only to what Reinhart and Reuland call “grammatical” uses. There appears to be a circularity here – it is through their exclusion of non-reflexive uses from the grammar that the remaining uses can be labeled “grammatical”.

In their analysis, Reinhart and Reuland distinguish between syntactic predicates and semantic predicates. Verbs (with overt subjects) always form syntactic predicates (as well as semantic); prepositions and nouns may form semantic predicates.<sup>7</sup> Reinhart and Reuland define the Binding Principles using two terms, “reflexive” and “reflexive-marking”. The applicability of these terms to English, as well as the revised Binding Principles, are shown in (11):

- (11) Reflexive: A predicate is reflexive if and only if two of its arguments are co-indexed.

Reflexive-marked: A predicate is reflexive-marked if one of the predicate’s arguments is *himself*

Principle A: A reflexive-marked syntactic predicate is reflexive.

Principle B: A reflexive semantic predicate must be reflexive-marked

Reinhart and Reuland propose two different ways their Principles can account for the alternation of *-self* and simple pronouns in picture NPs. In one analysis, the noun forms a syntactic predicate only if it contains a lexical subject. In the other analysis, *-self* pronouns in all picture NPs are excluded from this syntactic explanation.

Example (12a) does not form a syntactic predicate because it does not contain a lexical subject, and is therefore not subject to Principle A. It is not subject to Principle B because it does not have two co-indexed arguments. Thus, the grammar does not rule out example (a).

- (12) a. John<sub>i</sub> liked [(a) picture of **himself**<sub>i</sub>]  
b. \*/? John<sub>i</sub> liked [your picture of **himself**<sub>i</sub>]

The picture NP in (12b) is ruled out by Principle A because the noun does form a syntactic predicate; and it is ruled out by Principle B, because though one of its arguments is *himself*, the picture noun phrase still does not contain two co-indexed arguments. However, (12b) is judged marginally acceptable. Its partial acceptability is credited to its logophoric reading, that is, its representation of point of view. This reading is excluded from the definition of the Binding Principles.

It is this analytical strategy that motivates the possibility that all *-self* pronouns in picture NPs should be excluded from the domain of the Binding Principles. Reinhart and Reuland consider the view that NPs never contain a

subject, in which case “all instances of NP anaphora will turn out to be logophoric, since NPs, in this case, never form a syntactic predicate, so Condition A never applies” (p. 683).

Reinhart and Reuland have simply excluded a large class of problematic examples from the analysis. By limiting the data to which the Binding Principles apply, Reinhart and Reuland make them practically vacuous.

#### Later developments: the Minimalist Program

Following much research and volumes of suggested revisions to the Binding Principles, Chomsky (1995) incorporates the original version of the Binding Theory into his Minimalist Program. In this work, Chomsky proposes that not only is there no deep structure (D-structure), but that there is no S-structure either. The only levels of linguistic representation are the interface levels, Logical Form (LF) and Phonological Form (PF). He concludes that the Binding Conditions hold only at what he now calls the LF-interface.

Chomsky does discuss the fact that many researchers have presented data in which grammaticality intuitions are unclear: “In all but the simplest examples of anaphora, it is unclear whether distinctions are to be understood as tendencies (varying in strength for different speakers) or sharp distinctions obscured by performance factors” (fn., p. 216). Chomsky assumes the latter: the domain of syntax is sharply bounded, with its output distinctly classifiable as either grammatical or ungrammatical. Marginal grammaticality judgments are artifacts of the interference of performance factors.

### 2.3 *Functionalist approaches*

#### Functional/typological studies

Linguists such Givón, Faltz and Geniušienė rely on data from a wide variety of languages in order to classify linguistic phenomena and identify language universals. These three researchers have investigated the manifestations of traditional grammar's "reflexive" category in different languages. Givón (1993) provides a description of the English reflexive and related constructions. Faltz (1985) undertakes a cross-linguistic comparison of reflexivization, and Geniušienė (1987) suggests a typology of reflexive verbs.

For Givón, linguistic categories and rules exist by virtue of their frequency of occurrence (1984: 22). Semantic and grammatical categories are not and need not be absolute, clean, discrete and exceptionless. Rather, Givón's view is that categories are best understood prototypically (cf. Lakoff 1987), that is, with varying degrees of "fit" both within and between categories.

Givón (1993) describes three types of constructions that can be called "reflexive":

- (13) a. Simple reflexive (*Mary saw herself.*)
- b. Emphatic reflexive (*Mary herself has come to recognize this*)
- c. Possessive reflexive (*Mary killed her own mother*)<sup>8</sup>

The property that defines these three constructions is that the same referent is mentioned twice in the same clause. For simple and possessive reflexives, but not emphatic reflexives, the same referent participates in the clause in two different

roles. (See Chapter 6 for the importance of dual roles in the present analysis.) Givón's aim is to describe these categories in terms of their prototypical characteristics. He gives both a semantic and a syntactic definition of the simple reflexive in a simple clause (1993: 89):

- (14) Semantic definition: The subject is coreferent with the object, and thus acts upon itself reflexively.

Syntactic definition: The object in the reflexive clause is represented by a reflexive pronoun.

These are the prototypical reflexive relations, and other reflexive constructions can be understood as less central members of the same category. Exceptions can be viewed as extensions from the prototypes with predictably varying degrees of acceptability.

Faltz (1985) draws on data from more than 30 languages to compare reflexivization cross-linguistically. He begins by trying to establish a language-independent notion of reflexivization, but notes the following caveats: (a) he cannot give a comprehensive definition at the outset, because languages are expected to differ in ways that cannot be predicted before such an investigation takes place; (b) "even within a single language, the range of phenomena to be regarded as cases of reflexivization may be unclear" (p. 1).

Faltz assumes that for any language, we can isolate a class of simple clauses expressing a two-argument predication. If the language has a grammatical device that specifically indicates that the agent/experiencer and the patient are the same

referent, then that grammatical device will be called a “reflexive strategy” of that language.

This two-argument predication need not be realized linguistically. Following traditional grammar’s notion of a reflexive message, Faltz does not limit reflexive strategies to those that are marked morphologically. Faltz observes five such strategies in English:

- (15) a. John washed himself  
(the use of the word *himself*)
- b. John washed up  
(deletion of the object NP and addition of the particle *up*)
- c. John got washed  
(use of *get* and the past participle )
- d. John shaved  
(deletion of the object NP)
- e. John took a bath  
(use of the dummy verb *take* with a noun form of the verb as object)

While all of these are reflexive strategies, Faltz gives the following reasons why

(15a) represents the “primary reflexive strategy”:

- (16) a. the use of devices (b) – (e) is limited to a small set of lexical items (e.g., one cannot say *John saw* to express the proposition that John saw himself).
- b. devices (b) – (e) are pressed into service for many nonreflexive purposes as well.
- c. (b) – (e) are not devices which specifically indicate subject-object coreference.

It is not clear that these reasons directly ensure that (15a) will be selected as the primary reflexive strategy of English. Following the reasoning of (16b), we have seen that the *-self* pronoun is also used for many nonreflexive purposes, as pointed out by Faltz himself (p. 1):

- (17) a. The book was written by John and **myself**.  
b. John cooked supper by **himself**.  
c. John **himself** cooked supper.  
d. John was pleased when a picture of **himself** appeared in the newspaper.<sup>9</sup>

The pre-analytical category of reflexivity shapes and defines not only the analysis presented by Faltz, but also the data he considers. It is clear that there are other ways to indicate subject/object coreferentiality, as shown by Faltz himself in (15), and that the observed device (*-self* forms) are used for other functions as well, as shown among argument uses in (17) (and among appositive uses as well). Faltz admits there are many problems identifying not only reflexive strategies, but also the components of their definition: subjects, objects and even clauses. Nevertheless, he is satisfied with his search for a primary reflexive strategy in English, and proceeds to identify and classify those he finds in other languages.

Faltz identifies two conditions on the basis of which reflexives can be categorized. In some languages, antecedents for reflexives must be the subject of a clause. English reflexives clearly do not meet this condition. Faltz also concludes that languages differ regarding what he calls the “Clause Mate Condition”: whether or not the reflexive must find its antecedent within its own

clause. Faltz says that the English reflexive meets this condition. It is unclear why Faltz does not mention the many uses in which *-self* pronouns do not find their antecedent within the same clause, such as those in (10), repeated here as (18):

- (18) a. It angered him<sub>i</sub> that she tried to attract a man like **himself<sub>i</sub>**.
- b. Max<sub>i</sub> boasted that the queen invited Lucie and **himself<sub>i</sub>** for a drink.

Geniušienė (1987) notes in her preface that her work will be difficult for linguists in the Western tradition to appreciate since it is grounded in a Russian linguistic approach that is very different from that of the West. Her goal is to develop a general, semantic typology of “reflexive verbs”, and to show the applicability of this typology to English. For Geniušienė, a reflexive verb (RV) is any verb marked with a “reflexive marker” (RM). She bases her typological study of Baltic, Slavic and English reflexives on a diathesis model of grammar in which the semantics of every verb is represented at three levels:

- (19) a. Syntactic functions (subject, direct object, etc.)
- b. Semantic roles (Agent, Patient, etc.)
- c. Referents (the entities that the nouns refer to)

In order to identify a verb’s referents, the verb must be in the context of at least a clause. The behavior of a verb with respect to its arguments is believed to shed light on the semantic properties of the verb itself. All reflexive verbs are discussed in relation to their corresponding non-reflexive form.

Geniušienė begins her analysis of English by describing reflexive constructions in terms of a continuum of semantic fusion between the RM and the verb. Some RVs, such as *blame oneself*, have a zero degree of semantic fusion between the RM and the verb, since the verb has the same meaning when used non-reflexively (*John blames himself / John blames Mary*). Some RVs, such as *pull oneself together*, show a maximum degree of semantic fusion since their meaning is not recoverable from the meaning of their parts. Intermediate cases along this continuum include expressions such as *throw oneself (in a chair)*, in which there is no Agent-Patient relationship, but rather, just one Actor. All these types of expressions are treated as RVs, and are classified.

Geniušienė compares English reflexives with the semantic types she has identified in Baltic languages, and notes that English does not use a reflexive marker in many instances in which Baltic languages do. She identifies six categories of Baltic semantic types that are not marked as reflexive in English. We will look at one example, which Geniušienė calls the “absolute” use. It must be recalled that in this framework, a reflexive verb is identified and understood in comparison with its non-reflexive usage:

- (20) a. The boy kicks children.
- b. The boy kicks.
- (21) a. The dog bites people.
- b. The dog bites.

Geniušienė gives the Lithuanian equivalents of the (b) examples to show that the reflexive marker is used in Lithuanian. However, the agents in these examples are not acting reflexively upon themselves, so these sentences do not appear to express semantic reflexivity. It seems that the only reason these have been classified as reflexive is that the Lithuanian morpheme that is used to express reflexive messages is also used to express these messages.

We have seen reflexives identified on the basis of semantic, syntactic and morphological bases. Once a form is identified that meets the semantic criterion, that form is labeled as a “reflexive”. Then, the category “reflexive” is extended to include any structures that contain this form. A disconcerting circularity arises: what is a reflexive pronoun? It is one that is used to code a reflexive structure. What is a reflexive structure? It is (among other things) one that contains a reflexive pronoun!

#### Reflexivity in cognitive grammar

Conceptual accounts are offered by cognitive grammar for many of the categories of traditional grammar. Nouns and verbs, for example, are defined notionally instead of syntactically (Langacker 1987; 1991). All predications are characterized conceptually as well – subjects correspond to “trajectors”, and objects to “landmarks”. Predications are said to “profile” the relation of the trajector to a landmark. Van Hoek describes reflexive pronouns by rephrasing the traditional definition of reflexive pronouns in CG terms:

The reflexive pronoun itself profiles just one nominal entity, but it includes as an unprofiled part of its base the conception of a processual relation in which the landmark corresponds with the trajector. The reflexive pronoun itself profiles the landmark in that relation (1997: 174).

Whereas descriptive grammars list different uses of reflexive pronouns, CG describes those uses as “inventories of constructional schemas” (Van Hoek 1997: 188), and highlights the ways in which different uses (e.g. emphatic and reflexive) are similar to each other. The use of *-self* pronouns that Faltz (1985) calls the primary reflexive strategy (*he washed himself*) is considered the prototypical reflexive construction in English. The well-known emphatic usage is considered another primary constructional schema, which is similar to the prototype (the reflexive) in that the *-self* pronoun in both constructions is “strongly interconnected by virtue of directly elaborating the same profiled relation” and in both cases, “The antecedent is the most prominent nominal in relationship to the reflexive” (Van Hoek 1997: 174). Van Hoek’s analysis overcomes the problem with the traditional account that the various uses of *-self* are not related to each other.

Tuggy (1985) discusses a pattern in many languages in which reflexives are used to “make a passive form of the verb” (p. 44). He analyzes reflexives in English, Spanish and Náhuatl within the framework of cognitive grammar. Tuggy calls the behavior of reflexives “odd” (p. 47) and “deviant” (p. 44) because reflexives behave differently from corresponding non-reflexive verbs. He explains that *see* can be used for many different kinds of messages when it is used non-

reflexively as in (24 a-c), while the same message is not available when the form is used reflexively as in (24d):

- (22) a. I'm going to see my folks in South Carolina.  
b. See you tomorrow.  
c. Have you seen a doctor about that?  
d. ?I'm off to see **myself**.

Another way in which reflexives are different from non-reflexives is that some verbs are never used reflexively – you do not give birth to yourself, or marry yourself, or snub yourself. But is this a characteristic of the reflexive construction? Another alternative is that these facts have nothing to do with the structure of the **language**, but rather that people don't often wish to express these messages. The view taken here is that it is not the linguistic system itself that precludes such expressions, but rather, the nature of reality. There are things one **normally** doesn't do to oneself; but when appropriate needs arise, the linguistic system stands ready to be exploited for novel communicative purposes, as in the following example, in which the writer imagines the mayor of New York City planning to become a victim of his own policies:

- (23) I'll turn up the Puccini on the car radio to 69 decibels, arrest myself for "unreasonable noise," find myself guilty, lock myself up, and complain loudly about my Draconian measures. (DRR)

Tuggy analyzes Spanish and Náhuatl reflexives as expressing internal causation. Whereas English does not code causation with the verb *sit*, Tuggy says Spanish and Náhuatl construe sitting as involving internal causation, as shown by

the fact that these verbs are reflexives (e.g. *sentar-se*).<sup>10</sup> The absence of movement and the change of an emotional state is also construed as internally caused in Spanish (e.g. *quedar-se* ‘to stay still’ and *enojar-se* ‘to get angry’) and in Náhuatl. The verb *grow* is intransitive in both English and Spanish (*crecer*), but in Tuggy’s analysis, speakers of Náhuatl construe growing as internally caused because it is coded as a reflexive.

### The reflexive in Columbia School

The object of study for Diver (1987) is emphatically not a reflexive pronoun. Instead, it is the Latin morphological unit *se*. Diver demonstrates the pitfalls in traditional grammar’s treatment of this form, and provides his own analysis of *se* as a meaningful signal.

As we saw in Chapter 2, Diver treats the characterization of *se* as a reflexive pronoun as a testable notion, which he calls the Reflexive Pronoun hypothesis. If the hypothesis is to be confirmed, reflexive pronouns will be found in reflexive environments, and non-reflexive pronouns in non-reflexive environments. Reflexive environments are defined as standing in the predicate and referring to the subject (p. 119).

Diver analyzes the occurrences of *se* in the text *De Bello Gallico*. Of course, he finds *se* in reflexive contexts and other pronominal forms in non-reflexive contexts. But he also finds *se* in non-reflexive contexts as well as other types of pronouns in reflexive contexts. The Reflexive Pronoun hypothesis is disconfirmed by this data: reflexive environments do not necessarily require the use of *se*, and

*se* is not only used as a reflexive pronoun. Diver provides a summary of the syntactic categorization of the uses of *se* (Figure 1), and concludes that “syntactic categorization does not serve to differentiate the uses of *se* from that of other pronouns” (p. 125). Only the first category corresponds to the Reflexive Pronoun hypothesis. The other categories refute it.

Figure 1. *The distribution of se in Latin* (Diver 1987: 125)

	<i>se</i>	Other pronoun
Direct reflexive	+	-
Indirect reflexive	+	+
Subject of infinitive	+	+
Neither subject nor predicate	+	+
Referent within the same predicate	+	-

Because the Reflexive Hypothesis is not illuminating, Diver abandons it. In place of that unsuccessful syntactic analysis, he proposes the hypothesis that the morphological unit *se* is a signal of a meaning.

Diver explains that there seem to be two types of meanings: meanings that feed information to the message, such as the familiar singular-plural distinction; and meanings that give instructions to the hearer about how to process the information provided by other meanings. *Se* appears to have the latter type of meaning. Its meaning pertains to the amount of attention the hearer is directed to

apply to identify the referent of the form. The meaning of *se* is an instruction to the hearer to apply the **least** amount of attention to identify the referent. Its referent must therefore be the “easiest to find,” which means that the referent is at the center of the hearer’s attention at the moment the pronoun is encountered.

This meaning corresponds to the attested uses of the forms in all the categories listed in Figure 3.1. For direct reflexives, when the previous mention of the referent is the subject of the sentence, it is in the nominative case, a morphological signal meaning that an entity is the center of attention. Under other circumstances, enough attention can be focused on a different entity so that the antecedent of *se* is not necessarily the entity in nominative case. In one of Diver’s examples (shown in 24), there is no competing entity in the nominative case; the referent of *se* (*tigna bina* ‘twin logs’) is at the center of attention by virtue of its place at the beginning, and by a detailed description about the preparation of the logs:

- (24) *Tigna bina<sub>1</sub> sesquipedalia paulum ab imo praeacuta dimensa ad altitudinem fluminis intervallo pedum duorum inter se<sub>1</sub> iungebat.*

Paired logs<sub>1</sub>, a foot and a half in diameter, sharpened a little from the bottom, measured to the depth of the river, with an interval of two feet between **them** (*se*)<sub>1</sub>, he joined.

Diver shows for each of his examples that the referent of *se* is the center of attention, or the only possible candidate that makes sense as the referent. Diver’s hypothesis is that *se* has a grammatical meaning in a system of meanings that all

pertain to CONCENTRATION OF ATTENTION.<sup>11</sup> Speakers (and writers) deploy this meaning when it is useful to communicate a particular message.

### **3. The role of meaning**

Two different approaches to linguistic analysis, formalism and functionalism, characterize the field of linguistics today (Newmeyer 1991). The most well-known and influential formalist theory is Chomsky's generative grammar, whose proponents posit an autonomous syntax, a central portion of language that is mechanical and arbitrary, and best described independently of meaning. By contrast, functionalists share a belief that language is best understood with reference to its role in communicative situations and to meaning.

Within these broad categories of formalists and functionalists lie many different theories and views of the role of meaning in linguistic description. We will consider the role of meaning in traditional and generative grammar, as well as efforts to integrate formalist and functionalist approaches in the study of *-self* pronouns. We will then turn to the role of meaning in a variety of functionalist approaches.

#### **3.1 The structural tradition**

Grammarians such as Sweet (1891) and Quirk and Greenbaum (1972, 1973) describe the distribution of forms with reference to traditional grammatical categories. For example, Quirk et. al. (1972) say "The reflexive pronouns are also used as prepositional complements, where there is a close connection between the

verb and the prepositional phrase...; for example: *Mary could stand for hours looking at herself in the mirror.*” Semantic properties such as “close connection” and “spatial relationship” are included in their description of rules for the use of these forms, although the emphasis is on structural descriptions. An exception to this generalization is Jespersen (1933), who carefully considers the communicative purposes for which different forms are used. He speculates on the difference in meaning between using and omitting a reflexive pronoun. He notes, for example, that *behave oneself* is often used for good manners, while *behave* is used more generally: *the troops behaved gallantly under fire* (p. 112). He compares *We kept ourselves warm*, with *we kept warm*, and observes that there is an element of “exertion” when the *-self* pronoun is used. Jespersen is a grammarian who is not only concerned with describing rules, but also with accounting for the meaningful use of language.

### **3.2 Generative grammar**

Chomsky (1957) argues that structural well-formedness is independent of meaning, and that grammatical description is in fact simplified by excluding meaning. The successes and problems of Binding Theory, generative grammar’s account of *-self* pronouns, have been discussed in Section 2.2. The architecture of grammar proposed by Chomsky includes an autonomous syntactic component that generates sentences. This component provides input to the level of Logical Form (LF), which is an interpretive level of grammar in which syntactically

determined elements of interpretation are represented. These pertain to certain truth-conditional elements of semantics, such as coreference.

Kuno (1987) and Zribi-Hertz (1989) offer an integration of formalist and functionalist approaches by incorporating meaning into primarily structural analyses. According to their accounts, the output of the syntactic component is subjected to constraints that define meaning more broadly, considering notions such as point of view and awareness that may be determined with reference to the discourse context of a sentence.

#### Kuno (1987)

The goal of Kuno (1987) is to demonstrate that syntactic structure alone cannot account for linguistic phenomena, because semantic, pragmatic and discourse-based factors must also be taken into account. Kuno provides his own structural revision to all three Binding Principles,<sup>12</sup> then shows that even with this reformulation, the acceptability of sentences containing *-self* varies according to their semantic and pragmatic content. In Kuno's model, the revised Binding Principles overgenerate acceptable sentences, but then ungrammatical sentences are ruled out by the semantic constraints that apply to the output of the syntactic component.

Kuno presents data to show that the difference between the use of *-self* and simple pronouns is conditioned not only structurally, but also by semantic differences. In the following sentences, the overlapping distribution of *himself* and *him* corresponds to differing interpretations having nothing to do with reference:

- (25) a. John<sub>1</sub> hid the book behind **himself**<sub>1</sub>.  
 b. John<sub>1</sub> hid the book behind **him**<sub>1</sub>.
- (26) a. John<sub>1</sub> pulled the blanket over **himself**<sub>1</sub>.  
 b. John<sub>1</sub> pulled the blanket over **him**<sub>1</sub>.

Kuno describes the difference this way (p. 66):

Example [(25a)] implies that John held the book with his hand and put it behind his back. The book was directly touching him. On the other hand, [(25b)] implies that perhaps the book was on a chair, and he was standing in front of the chair so that the book could not be seen. In other words, it is most likely that there was no physical contact between John and the book. It might be possible to use [(25b)] to describe the first situation, in which John held the book in his hand behind his back, but the sentence would not be asserting this physical contact at all. Example [(26a)] implies that John put the blanket over his head and covered himself with it, perhaps intending to hide under it. On the other hand, [(26b)] does not imply such direct action with the whole body of John as target. If John was in bed under a comforter, and he pulled the blanket and put it over the comforter, only [(26b)] can be used to describe the situation.

The semantic difference Kuno describes is that in the (a) sentences, John is the direct recipient of the action, while in the (b) examples, he is not. This leads him to propose the following constraint (p. 67):

- (27) **Semantic Constraint on Reflexives:** Reflexive pronouns are used in English if and only if they are the direct recipients or targets of the actions represented by the sentences.

Kuno notes that the fact that reflexives are obligatory as direct and indirect objects follows from this constraint because in such contexts *-self* forms are always the direct recipient or target of its verb (*John killed himself; John talked to himself*).

Kuno gives further examples to clarify his notion of direct recipient/target.

- (28) a. John<sub>1</sub> has great passion in **him**<sub>1</sub>.  
b. \*John<sub>1</sub> has great passion in **himself**<sub>1</sub>.
- (29) a. \*John<sub>1</sub> has confidence in **him**<sub>1</sub>.  
b. John<sub>1</sub> has confidence in **himself**<sub>1</sub>.

He says that in (28), the object of *in* is not the target of an action or mental state, and so the use of *himself* is not possible. In (29), however, the object of *in* is the target of a mental state, so the use of *himself* is required. Kuno does not describe what it means to be the target of an action, or especially a mental state. Without an independent understanding of this notion, there appears to be a circularity here: in sentences which contain *himself*, the form's referent is the target (or direct recipient); in other cases, the referent is not necessarily the target.

Van Valin (1990) explicates Kuno's notion of direct target, describing it as "degree of affectedness". He points out that (30a) can have the reading that John has gum stuck directly on him, or the gum can be in his pocket, while (30b) can not be used for a scene in which John has gum in his pocket. The use of *himself* leads unambiguously to the direct target interpretation in which the gum itself is physically in contact with John:

- (30) a. John<sub>1</sub> has gum on **him**<sub>1</sub>.  
b. John<sub>1</sub> has gum on **himself**<sub>1</sub>.

Van Valin notes that the semantic difference between *him* and *himself* cannot be direct target/affectedness alone, because sometimes the contrast occurs

when the only difference in the communicated message is the degree to which the subject has an active role, as in (31). The *-self* form is more appropriate to a description of a situation in which the subject did something to bring about the state of affairs being described, while the simple pronoun is more appropriate if the subject did not take an active role.

- (31) a. Bill<sub>i</sub> has paint all over him<sub>i</sub>.  
b. \*Bill<sub>i</sub> has paint all over himself<sub>i</sub>  
c. \*Bill<sub>i</sub> got paint all over him<sub>i</sub>.  
d. Bill<sub>i</sub> got paint all over himself<sub>i</sub>.

Lathey (1989) also agrees with Kuno that the choice between *himself* and *him* results in different inferences by the hearer, but her examples show that Kuno's direct target hypothesis does not explain all alternating uses of *-self* and simple forms. In these examples, John is not the target of pushing:

- (32) a. John<sub>i</sub> pushed the food away from **himself**<sub>i</sub>.  
b. John<sub>i</sub> pushed the food away from **him**<sub>i</sub>.

Lathey notes that one imagines different contexts for which these two sentences might be appropriate. One imagines John pushing the food away more energetically - more actively - in (32a) than in (32b). It seems plausible that the difference between these interpretations is, as Van Valin suggests, the active role the subject takes.

Kuno, Van Valin and Lathey have shown that while there are contexts in which (third person) *-self* and simple pronouns alternate with the same referential

possibilities, hearers infer different messages depending on which form is chosen. These differences do not appear to correlate with structural differences.

In addition to the Semantic Condition on Reflexives, Kuno proposes nine other semantic conditions that hold for the use of *-self* in different contexts. We will consider just three of these constraints here. Each one represents an important observation regarding the message types *-self* is sometimes used to express.

Kuno identifies “Empathy Perspective” as an area that has helped illuminate what are often regarded as purely syntactic phenomena. Empathy Perspective is the speaker’s ability to place himself at a given distance from the entities he describes, as well as at a specific camera angle with regard to the scene. Kuno proposes the Empathy Constraint on Reflexives, which states that a sentence that contains *-self* must be understood as produced from the camera angle of the referent of *-self*.<sup>13</sup> For each of the following sentences, the use of *-self* is correlated with the speaker’s taking a specific position, or camera angle, with respect to the scene he is describing.

- (33) a. John<sub>1</sub> pulled Mary toward **himself**<sub>1</sub>.  
b. Mary was pulled toward John.  
c. ?Someone<sub>1</sub> pulled Mary toward **himself**<sub>1</sub>.

Kuno says that (33a) is described from John’s point of view; if it were not, the scene might be described as in (33b). The data to be explained include the ungrammaticality of (33c), which Kuno says is only marginally acceptable because it is difficult to take the point of view of a person who is not identified.

But is (33c) really only marginally acceptable? It may be that what Kuno calls the marked status of (33c) stems not from the ungrammaticality of this use of *-self*, but rather from the fact that it is more difficult to imagine a context for this example. Unknown individuals – strangers – don't usually pull people we know. When they do, there is nothing **linguistically** odd about it. The difference lies not in the linguistic system, but in what we know the world to be like, and what we expect to hear about it. An unexpected message is not necessarily an ungrammatical one.

Kuno states that the Empathy Constraint does not seem to apply when the antecedent of *-self* is a generic NP, and he considers the following sentences perfectly *grammatical*:

- (34) a.     Anyone<sub>1</sub> can talk to me about **themselves<sub>1</sub>/themselves<sub>1</sub>**.
- b.     Anybody<sub>1</sub> can talk to anybody else about **themselves<sub>1</sub>/**  
              **themselves<sub>1</sub>**.<sup>14</sup>

It is not clear for what principled linguistic reason Kuno feels we can take the perspective of a generic individual, but not an unidentified one.

Kuno describes the term “logophoric” to mean pertaining to the point of view of the speaker or hearer, and bases many constraints on the concept of logophoricity. For example, Kuno's Semantic Constraint on Emphatic Reflexives, discussed above, holds that a *-self* pronoun in a conjoined or comparative construction is acceptable in a subordinate clause only if the subordinate clause represents the thoughts or feelings of an entity in the matrix clause, and only if the

antecedent of the *-self* pronoun is either the speaker/experiencer or the hearer of that thought or feeling.

Another condition discussed by Kuno is the Awareness Condition for Picture Noun Reflexives. This constraint says that the use of *-self* is obligatory in a picture noun if the referent perceives the picture noun as one that involves him, and ungrammatical otherwise. Kuno's grammaticality judgments are his own.

- (35) a. John<sub>1</sub> knew that there was a picture of **himself**<sub>1</sub> in the post office.
- b. \*Mary didn't hear from John<sub>1</sub> that – you know – that there was a picture of **himself**<sub>1</sub> in the post office. She heard it from BILL.
- c. John<sub>1</sub> knew that there was a picture of **himself**<sub>1</sub> in the morning paper.
- d. \*John<sub>1</sub> never knew that there was a picture of **himself**<sub>1</sub> in the morning paper.

Kuno provides the following sentences and their accompanying interpretations as evidence for this constraint.

- (36) a. The dictator<sub>1</sub> was lying at the foot of that statue of **himself**<sub>1</sub> on horseback. (= the dictator was alive and conscious)
- b. The dictator<sub>1</sub> was lying at the foot of that statue of **him**<sub>1</sub> on horseback. (= the dictator was dead or unconscious)

Kuno's judgments provide interesting observations about the inferences some hearers might make under certain conditions. Many speakers share (or can agree with) these intuitions. However, labeling these correlations as "constraints" overstates the case. As long as we find exceptions and disagreement over

interpretations, we must talk in terms of “tendencies”.<sup>15</sup> Kuno has borrowed the term “constraint” from a theory of formal syntax, a theory that does not include the vagaries of language in context, used meaningfully as a communicative instrument. Nevertheless, Kuno identifies some important correlations between the use of *-self* pronouns and messages they are frequently used to communicate.

What remains unexplained is a unifying explanation for all the constraints, exceptions and different message effects Kuno has identified (empathy, awareness, etc.), as well as an integrated explanation for the fact that in some contexts, the use of *-self* and simple pronouns results in different referential interpretations (*John saw him, John saw himself*).

#### Zribi-Hertz (1989)

To account for data that is problematic for Binding Theory, Zribi-Hertz (1989) proposes a new architecture for grammatical theory in which the generative account of sentence grammar is supplemented with a level of discourse grammar. Under this formulation, the new level includes grammatical constraints bearing on the well-formedness of combinations of sentences within discourse.

Zribi-Hertz relies on an extensive corpus of attested occurrences of pronouns, and shows that the problems for Binding Theory are not limited to picture NPs, locative PPs and emphatic contexts. Rather, *-self* pronouns regularly and productively violate almost all the distributional properties predicted by the Binding Theory.

Zribi-Hertz suggests that we must look beyond sentence boundaries to the domain of discourse to explain many uses of *-self*. She identifies logophoric uses of *-self*, in which the forms may be used to refer to the entity whose thoughts or feelings are being expressed within a part of discourse. Zribi-Hertz calls this entity the “subject of consciousness” (SC), and she defines several terms in order to formalize this notion and associate this essentially semantic concept with a structural description of discourse. A “domain of point of view” (DPV) is a portion of discourse that represents only one narrative point of view, minimally coinciding with a “clausal category” (CC). A CC is any phrase of the form Subject-Predicate, including clauses as traditionally defined, as well as NPs.<sup>16</sup> A *-self* pronoun may refer to an SC as long as there is no DPV which contains a different SC intervening between the reflexive pronoun and its antecedent.

According to Zribi-Hertz’s discourse principles, *-self* is only licensed within the DPV that contains its antecedent. Example (37) represents an apparent violation of the Binding Principles, because *himself* does not find its antecedent within its governing category, the NP that contains it:

- (37) But Rupert<sub>1</sub> was not unduly worried about Peter’s opinion of **himself**<sub>1</sub>. (Zribi-Hertz 1989)

How do Zribi-Hertz’s discourse principles account for the use of the *-self* form in this example? The minimal CC containing *himself* is [*Peter’s opinion of himself*], in which the subject is *Peter* and the predicate is *opinion*. This NP is a CC which does not constitute a new DPV, and so the antecedent of the *-self* pronoun need not be within its boundaries. The claim is that the use of *himself* to

refer to Rupert tells us that we are looking at the scene from Rupert's point of view.

This analysis provides a solution to the problem of the alternation of simple and *-self* pronouns in picture NPs. According to Zribi-Hertz, each picture NP is a CC with either a lexical subject, as in (38a), or a null subject, as in (38b),

- (38) a. They<sub>1</sub> thought that [NP/CC John<sub>2</sub>'s pictures of **them<sub>1</sub>/themselves**] would be on sale.
- b. They<sub>1</sub> thought that [NP/CC e pictures of **them<sub>1</sub>/themselves<sub>1</sub>**] would be on sale.

Under traditional generative treatments, picture NPs which contain simple pronouns and no lexical subject are believed to contain a phonetically null subject; picture NPs which contain *-self* do not include a (null) subject. This assumed structural difference is motivated by the stipulations of the Binding Principles and the desire to accommodate the data to these Principles. Zribi-Hertz's formulation seems preferable because it is a motivated difference: her claim is that the alternation between *-self* and simple pronouns in picture NPs is correlated with a consistent difference in interpretation. Under this analysis, simple forms are used when the picture NP serves as a new, objective DPV, while *-self* is used when the antecedent of the form is to be interpreted as the SC.

Zribi-Hertz offers an interesting explanation of single-sentence grammaticality judgments. Informants judge non-clause bound reflexives as ungrammatical in sentences given in isolation because such sentences are interpreted as complete discourses. *-Self* pronouns require an antecedent which is

either (a) clause-bound, according to the conditions specified in Principle A, or, (b) the Subject of Consciousness (SC) in discourse (with no intervening DPV between the pronoun and its antecedent). An isolated sentence does not provide that SC, and speakers therefore judge the isolated sentence as ungrammatical.

Zribi-Hertz has identified an important line of investigation. However, her analysis requires an independent means to establish the concepts of SC and DPV. In some cases, Zribi-Hertz relies on an understanding of the message elements in the sentence to determine the SC, but in others, she relies on the circular evidence of the occurrence or non-occurrence of *-self* pronouns. This is particularly problematic for “objective” DPVs, defined as a CC that represents facts as part of objective reality, rather than filtered through an SC. An objective DPV has neither its own SC nor does it fall under the scope of an SC earlier in discourse. In the following example, Zribi-Hertz asserts that the CC which contains the pronoun *me* constitutes an independent, objective DPV. But what evidence is there, other than the non-occurrence of the *-self* pronoun, that this CC is not itself filtered through the point of view of the narrator?

- (39) I<sub>1</sub> stared at her and began to think and to read her face. Her manner more than her words frightened me<sub>1</sub> a lot. (Zribi-Hertz 1989)

Sentence (40), also from Zribi-Hertz, provides another example of the lack of empirical basis for the identification of the SC. How do we know that the DPV that contains *herself* expresses Joyce’s point of view? The text that follows, *not*

*where mine are*, seems to indicate that the whole passage expresses the narrator's point of view.

- (40) Joyce<sub>1</sub> is just holding herself<sub>1</sub> together (...) Her<sub>1</sub> defences are well inside **herself**<sub>1</sub>, not where mine are, outside in clothes, hair, etc. (Zribi-Hertz 1989)

Zribi-Hertz notes that *-self* occurs in conjoined and comparative constructions, while simple pronouns may be ungrammatical in the same contexts, and concludes that these constructions have the same SC as previous DPVs, while non-conjoined constructions represent an objective DPV:

- (41) a. I<sub>1</sub> stared at her. Her manner frightened **me**<sub>1</sub>/**\*myself**<sub>1</sub> a lot.  
b. I<sub>1</sub> stared at her. Her manner clearly frightened Mary much more than it did **myself**<sub>1</sub>.  
c. I<sub>1</sub> stared at her. Her manner clearly frightened Mary much more than it did **me**<sub>1</sub>.
- (42) a. He<sub>1</sub> sat staring ahead of **him**<sub>1</sub> with his bright blue eyes. Some thought seemed to have struck **him**<sub>1</sub>/**\*himself**<sub>1</sub>.  
b. He<sub>1</sub> sat staring ahead of **him**<sub>1</sub> with his bright blue eyes. Some thought seemed to have struck both Eleanor and **himself**<sub>1</sub>.  
c. He<sub>1</sub> sat staring ahead of **him**<sub>1</sub> with his bright blue eyes. Some thought seemed to have struck both Eleanor and **him**<sub>1</sub>.

The conclusion that the difference between the (b) and (c) examples pertains to narrative point of view seems to have been reached by a circular argument: *-self* pronouns that are not clause-bound only occur when they refer to the SC. Whenever a non-clause bound *-self* pronoun occurs, we can identify the SC as its

antecedent. Zribi-Hertz acknowledges that she does not have an explanation for the different points of view in conjoined and non-conjoined constructions. However, without an independent way to determine the SC, this analysis is not missing an explanation for the SC effects, but rather, it lacks an explanation for the use of *-self* in these constructions.

In example (43a) from my own corpus, the antecedent for *himself* does not appear to be the SC at all. And Baker (1995: 68) provides several examples from the writing of Jane Austen in which it is clear that the SC is not the antecedent for a *-self* pronoun that has no local antecedent (e.g., 43b and c)

- (43) a. Each week she got another of these letters, more or less identical. In one of them a colour print was enclosed: **himself<sub>1</sub>**, slightly cross-eyed and grinning hilariously, even more spindly than she remembered **him<sub>1</sub>**, against her billowing draperies, flowers exploding around them like firecrackers, one of his hands an equivocal blur in her lap, the other out of sight; on her own face, astonishment and outrage.... (AMM 20)
- b. She acknowledged, therefore, that though she had never been informed by **themselves** of the terms on which they stood with each other, of their mutual affection she had no doubt, and of their correspondence she was not astonished to hear. (Baker 1995)
- c. If Cassandra has filled my bed with fleas, I am sure they must bite **herself**. (Baker 1995)

The logical priority that Zribi-Hertz grants to Chomsky's Binding Theory creates problems for her analysis. Her analysis, like the Binding Theory itself, results in a structural description of discourse that can be either ruled in or out,

according to constraints of well-formedness. This stretches Chomsky's (1957) assertion that language can be viewed as a set of grammatical sentences.

In spite of the fact that all the distributional properties of *-self* predicted by the Binding Principles are productively violated, Zribi-Hertz still retains them as the basis of her account. She explicitly states that the syntactic properties of pronouns follow from their semantic properties. She seems to retreat from this bold assertion, suggesting that syntactic constraints are primary, and that discourse factors only come into play when the structural constraints are not relevant (p. 724). Binding Theory remains the sentence-grammar account of the distribution of *-self*; her discourse principles merely supplement the Binding Principles, in order to account for what she calls "problematic data". On what principled basis have the occurrences which are predicted by the Binding Theory been considered the most important or basic uses of these forms, leaving the exceptions to be treated by a separate component of grammar?

### ***3.3 Functionalist approaches***

A forerunner of much contemporary functionalist thought, Bolinger (1978) treats the question of whether linguistic choices are "forced" by the grammar, as claimed by the Binding Theory for *-self* and simple pronouns. He rejects the notion that the form of a sentence is determined by syntactic constraints that are independent of sentence meaning, and asserts that the nature of language suggests that meaning is likely to be essential. He says that "no claim of automaticity should have been made concerning any fact of syntax before exploring every

avenue that might lead to discovering a meaning for it” (p. 4). While functionalist theories all say that semantic properties are an important part of their approach, the analytic importance of meaning in these accounts varies.

#### Meaning in functional/typological approaches

Within Givón’s approach, there is a relatively large autonomous, arbitrary component of grammar (including the structural notions of subject, relative clause and sentence) along with elements of meaning. For Givón, the structural resources of language exist for the purpose of coding the meanings speakers wish to express from the vast continuum of experience.

Meaning for Hopper and Thompson (1980) is similarly understood. Like Givón and Faltz, they view grammatical devices as discrete methods of coding points on a continuum of experience, or meaning. Transitivity is one meaning that is defined in terms of semantic components such as kinesis, punctuality, volitionality and affectedness. Hopper and Thompson want to “isolate the component parts of the Transitivity notion, and to study the ways in which they are typically encoded by languages” (p. 251). These authors view reflexive clauses on a semantic scale of Transitivity: compared with one-argument clauses, reflexives are more transitive; compared with two-argument clauses, reflexives are less transitive.

Haiman (1995) provides an analysis of the development and use of reflexive pronouns in terms of the conceptual content they represent. He questions the universality not only of the grammatical notion of the reflexive, but even of

the notion of self-awareness itself, a necessary precursor of a grammatical representation of reflexivity. Haiman's central claim is that "the representation of reflexivity by a separate (non-clitic) reflexive pronoun ... originally signaled the recognition of not one but two participants and thus implied some kind of detachment from the self" (p. 224), a notion that he describes as a cultural invention. He observes that the difference between the middle voice, shown in (44a), and the reflexive in (b) is a semantic one: the use of a separate reflexive pronoun indicates the conception of a separate entity – one half of the self observing and acting on another.

- (44) a. I washed.  
b. I washed **myself**.

Haiman notes that in English, simple pronouns were originally used for reflexive as well as non-reflexive messages, and that the use of *-self* pronouns originally indicated remarkable coreference. Now that this use has been grammaticalized, the use of *-self* pronouns indicates routine coreference. Now, when a reflexive pronoun does not occur in contexts where it would be expected, the message that the self is divided into two parts is expressed with the use of a simple pronoun:

- (45) I talked **me** into it.

Thus, Haiman views the use of *-self* pronouns not as a syntactic reflex but as a meaningful element used by speakers to express specific notional content.

Ferro (1992) analyzes the messages that are associated with certain *-self* forms according to Dik's (1989) typology of kinds of Focus.<sup>17</sup> Ferro is concerned with *-self* forms that are in argument position that do not express a reflexive message, but rather, are used to indicate "contrastive focus," such as the following:

- (46) A: Bush thought the voters were angry at Congress.  
B: Well, now he knows they are angry at **himself**, not Congress. (Ferro 1992: 72)

### Meaning in Cognitive Grammar

Meaning is central to the view of language taken within the framework of cognitive grammar. The meaning of an expression is considered to be the conceptions, or cognitive processes, which it evokes in a speaker or hearer's mind. Linguistic meaning is held to be encyclopedic, including specifications and knowledge associated with all other cognitive domains, and it is believed to be inseparable from the rest of general cognition. The conception of meaning within cognitive grammar is based largely on imagery, differing from that of generative grammar in that cognitive grammar does not view semantics in truth-conditional or logic-based terms.

One of the central notions of cognitive grammar is that grammar is inherently symbolic (Langacker 1987). The only linguistic units posited are bipolar symbolic units, in which one pole is phonological and the other pole is semantic. Grammar is viewed as the conventional symbolization of meaning.

In this framework, meaning and use cannot be separated. Cognitive grammar does not differentiate between the linguistically encoded meaning of forms and the uses to which those forms are put. Because *-self* pronouns are used to communicate messages of contrast and logophoricity, these messages become, in the CG view, part of the forms' meaning. "Constant usage to achieve a certain end automatically implies that the achievement of such an end becomes a central part of the meaning of the structures involved" (Tuggy 1985: 54).

### Meaning in Columbia School

As we have noted, Columbia School linguistics distinguishes sharply between the meaning of a linguistic form and the messages it is used to communicate. In research regarding Latin *se* described above, Diver (1987) provides an analysis of *se* as a signal of meaning. In the Columbia view, meanings are properties of forms, and it is only the forms and their meanings which comprise the linguistic system. When we understand utterances, we are aware of messages. The linguistically encoded meanings are not directly observable. Because meaning is defined as a property of formatives, sentences do not have inherent meaning. Like paragraphs in sentence-based theories, sentences are not units of analysis in sign-based theory; sentences (and utterances in general) are the result of the use of the linguistic system.

Columbia linguists reject the compositional view of meaning, holding instead that the notional, propositional and communicative content of utterances cannot be determined mechanistically from the sum of the meanings of its parts.

Language alone cannot produce messages – only people can do that, by actively interpreting the signals chosen by speakers in specific contexts. The Columbia approach holds an “instrumental” view of meaning:

The grammar that emerges from this view of meaning is analogous to a set of tools. Each meaning is a tool available for a speaker to use; the actual uses to which the tools are put depend on immediate need and the users' ingenuity. (Huffman 1997: 17)

Ruhl (1989) argues against the notion of compositionality in his *book On Monosemy*. Ruhl's view of lexical meaning, which closely parallels the view of grammar taken in Columbia School, is that lexical items contribute abstract but invariant meaning to each utterance. Analysts must be careful to distinguish the specific contribution of the linguistic system from the resultant communication. The Columbia School approach generally attributes less specificity and meaning to the linguistic system than other theories, along with a greater role for speaker/hearer inference.

García's (1975, 1977) analysis of the Spanish pronominal system shows the role of meaning in the Columbia School framework. She hypothesizes a single, invariant meaning for the morphological unit *se*, and describes how each of the form's uses can be explained on the basis of that one meaning.

García begins with an overview of the pronominal system. She largely accepts the traditional analysis of pronoun number, and so excludes plural pronouns from her discussion for ease of presentation. According to her analysis, Spanish verb endings express a semantic substance called FOCUS: of the

participants on the scene, the one that the speaker is focusing on is either first, second or third person. (García also treats Person as a semantic substance.<sup>18</sup>) In addition, there are free, emphatic pronominal forms that express FOCUS: *yo*, *tú* and *él*. The clitics *me* and *te* convey NON-FOCUS; that is, they tell us that the first (*me*) or second (*te*) person is OUT OF FOCUS. *Se*, which has the meaning third person, is neutral with respect to the FOCUS opposition. That is, it signals neither FOCUS nor NON-FOCUS. It is, however, in opposition to other third person forms, *él*, *ella*, *ellos* and *ellas*, with respect to the semantic substance DEIXIS.<sup>19</sup>

What is DEIXIS? García explains: “Note that the fundamental problem raised by the Third Person – some one other than the speaker or the addressee – is one of identification: which some one other, since there are innumerable entities in the real world that fit this definition” (1977: 153). The pronouns that are in opposition regarding DEIXIS differ in the degree of attention needed to identify the Third Person referred to. Spanish has two sets of forms in the Third Person. The *l* forms (*él*, *le*, *lo*) all mean HIGH DEIXIS, that is, a high degree of attention is needed to identify the Third Person referent;<sup>20</sup> the *s* form, *se*, means LOW DEIXIS – a low degree of attention is needed to identify its referent. A speaker will choose the Third Person LOW DEIXIS form, *se*, when the task of determining its identity – “the fundamental question raised in the Third Person” – raises no communicative difficulty, either because its identity is obvious or because its identity may be ignored.

Traditional accounts recognize at least two homonyms: “reflexive” *se* and “impersonal” *se*. According to García’s analysis, *se* is one form, signaling third person LOW DEIXIS. One inference that a hearer may make from the speaker’s use of a form whose meaning includes LOW DEIXIS is that the identity of the referent is obvious. Because the referent of the verb ending is IN FOCUS, the most obvious third person referent is that entity. If the referent of *se* is obvious, it is likely to be coreferent with the verb ending. This inference corresponds to the reflexive interpretation:

- (47) *se lavó*  
3 washed-3  
‘he washed himself’ (or ‘she washed herself’)

Among “reflexive” uses, there is a group of less transparently transitive verbs that are also sometimes used with *se*, such as (48b) and (49b).<sup>21</sup> These are not transparently reflexive messages, because the agents are not acting reflexively on themselves. The meaning LOW DEIXIS explains the use of *se* in these contexts. The use of this meaning ensures that no other participant is considered to be involved in the act. In the (a) sentences of (48) and (49), the verb ending signals third person, and the pronoun *lo* (whose meaning is hypothesized to be HIGH DEIXIS) suggests that its referent is not the same as the participant signaled by the verb ending. By contrast, in the (b) examples, the IN-FOCUS participant is mentioned twice, once by the verb ending and once by *se*:

- (48) a. *lo corrió*  
 ‘she chased him, ran after him’
- b. *se corrió*  
 ‘she moved aside’
- (49) a. *lo dormiste*  
 ‘you knocked him out’ lit: you slept him
- b. *se durmió*  
 ‘he fell asleep’

The double mention results in “the concentration of attention on one participant by the exclusion of others” (1977: 158).

Another inference a hearer may make from the use of the form whose meaning is LOW DEIXIS is that the identity of the referent is unimportant or irrelevant. This inference corresponds to the “impersonal” interpretation. Here, *se* is “defocussing, removing from our attention that party we would normally focus on, namely the one doing all these things [the third person IN FOCUS entity pointed to by the verb ending]” (1977: 159):

- (50) a. *En Francia se come un pan muy rico.*  
 ‘In France one eats very tasty bread’
- b. *Se arregló el coche.*  
 ‘The car was repaired’ or ‘One repaired the car’

Thus, the hypothesized meaning of the form accounts for its observed distribution. García and other Columbia School analysts argue that we can expect language, as a system of communication, to be composed of signals and meanings. However, as a system used by human beings, we also expect it to reflect certain human characteristics. It is a human tendency to do things in a

routine way – once we have solved a problem of any kind (such as the communicative problems speakers face) – we are likely to continue to use that same solution rather than look for other ways to do the same thing. Also, we can expect the system of signals and meanings to rely on the intelligence of its users. It is human intelligence that allows us to make inferences about a speaker's intended message.

### Meaning in pragmatic accounts

The gap between what is linguistically encoded and what is communicated is bridged by inference. Most linguistic theories assign this aspect of linguistic analysis to the field of pragmatics. Pragmaticists Levinson (1987, 1991) and Cresswell (1997) insightfully analyze the contributions made by *-self* forms and the inferences that result from their use. Cresswell focuses on appositive uses of *-self*, while Levinson addresses the use of argument *-self*.

Cresswell divides what are typically called emphatic (or intensive) reflexives into two categories: (1) appositive NARs (“non-argument reflexives”) are those that appear immediately after their NP antecedent; and (2) VP-NARs, that appear immediately after an auxiliary verb or copula, or at the end of a VP (while still relating to the subject). Cresswell is interested in elucidating the contributions made by appositive *-self* to the messages that are communicated, even though neither type contributes to the truth-conditional meaning of a sentence. Like the present analysis, Cresswell relies on actually occurring data. She concludes that NARs are used to emphasize the particular relevance of the

NP they follow, while *-self* forms that occur within the predicate (that is, not adjacent to the subject NP they refer to) emphasize the existence in the state or the performance of the action, referred to by the predicate, by the individual referred to by the subject NP. Many of the observations made by Cresswell are repeated in our own analysis of *-self* forms, although we find the message types she describes to be overlapping and manifold in any single instance of use. In addition, the analysis presented here is not limited to appositive uses of these forms, but includes argument uses as well.

Levinson (1987, 1991) provides a pragmatic account of the phenomena described by the Binding Theory. He notes that since most cases of intra-sentential anaphora are widely believed to be governed by pragmatics, it may be possible to account for inter-sentential anaphora in the same way. Because pragmatic accounts describe preferred interpretations and defeasible implicatures rather than inviolable syntactic rules, exceptions to the predicted patterns are expected in a pragmatic account.

Levinson (1987) proposes that while Principle A is grammatically specified, Principles B and C need not be since they can be derived from independent pragmatic principles. These pragmatic principles hinge on the assumption that simple pronouns are less informative than *-self* pronouns which are, in turn, less informative than lexical NPs.<sup>22</sup> Levinson offers the following pragmatic principles which have been independently proposed to account for other phenomena (Atlas and Levinson, 1981; Horn, 1985):

- (51) I-Implicature: Induce maximum informativeness from minimally specified information; assume stereotypical interpretations. Pronouns I-implicate coreference.

Q-Implicature: Induce the negation of a stronger reading from the use of a weaker expression. Non-reflexives implicate disjoint readings where reflexives might have been used.

Q/M-Implicature: Induce from the use of a prolix expression the negation of what would have been induced by the use of a minimally specified form. The use of a reflexive implicates coreference.

When inconsistent implicatures arise, priority is given according to the hierarchy:  $Q > Q/M > I$ . Any tendency to read a pronoun as coreferent according to the I-Principle will be overridden by the Q-implicature to disjoint reference of the non-use of a *-self* pronoun.

Let us look at a small set of data to see how these implicatures account for the use of *-self* and simple pronouns:

- (52) a. John<sub>1</sub> saw **himself**<sub>1</sub>.  
b. John<sub>1</sub> saw **him**<sub>2</sub>.  
c. John<sub>1</sub> pulled the blanket toward **himself**<sub>1</sub>.  
d. John<sub>1</sub> pulled the blanket toward **him**<sub>1</sub>.  
e. Only Felix<sub>1</sub> voted for **himself**<sub>1</sub>.  
f. Only Felix<sub>1</sub> voted for **him**<sub>1</sub>.  
g. Only Felix<sub>1</sub> voted for **Felix**<sub>1</sub>.  
h. John<sub>1</sub> revealed **himself**<sub>1</sub> to be a Mason.

According to Levinson's account, Principle A is grammatically specified in Modern English, so the interpretation of (52a), (c) and (e) is directly predicted by

the syntactic component of the grammar. The use of *him* in (52b) Q-implicates disjoint reference, since *him* is a weaker expression than *himself* (that is, *him* is semantically more general); its use therefore negates the implicature of coreference which would have resulted from the use of *herself*.

An additional explanation is needed for (f) and (g), since there is a Q-inference to disjoint reference in these sentences as well. However, Levinson points out that in these examples, *himself* is not necessarily more informative than *him*. The forms are not only used to point to a referent, since the pairs of sentences (c - d) and (e - f) are distinguished by **different** truth conditions. Example (52f) has the same truth conditions as (g), and not as those of (e). *Himself* in (h) is analyzed as part of the lower clause, and its use there is determined by a rule at the syntactic (not pragmatic) level.

Levinson's implicature-based theory predicts complementary distribution of *-self* and simple pronouns, but predicts exceptions to this pattern when inconsistent background knowledge or other pragmatic conditions arise. The following pair of examples shows that background knowledge can override these pragmatic principles.

- (53) a. John pointed the missile toward **him**.  
b. John pulled the blanket toward **him**.

In (53a), the natural inference of disjoint reference is supported by the context; the context in (53b) makes it unlikely that *John* and *him* are not coreferent. While Levinson describes this situation as background knowledge "overriding"

pragmatic principles, another way of describing these examples is to say that background knowledge contributes to the hearer's inferring the speaker's intended message, along with the hearer's knowledge of the linguistic choices available to the speaker.

In his later work (1991), Levinson notes several problems with his (1987) "A-first" account, primarily, that many languages do not have grammaticalized anaphors.<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, such languages do exhibit a preference for disjoint readings of inter-sentential pronouns, what Levinson calls Principle B-like patterns of pronominal reference. He proposes that there are some languages in which Principle B is basic, albeit pragmatically (not syntactically) determined. The prototypical transitive clause involves two distinct entities, so the use of a pronoun I-implicates this stereotypical condition of disjoint reference. Anaphors, in this view, are pronouns marked in some way to trigger a Q/M-implicature to the complement of this stereotypical interpretation. Levinson suggests that languages with grammaticalized anaphors develop diachronically from languages which are based on Principle B. English provides evidence for this progression from "B-first" (Principle B is basic) to "A-first" (Principle A is grammatically specified), in which the grammaticalized anaphor ("the reflexive") develops from an emphatic pronoun.

Levinson accounts for logophoric uses of *-self* in terms of this diachronic progression, and quotes Faltz (1985: 240): "an emphatic is added to an NP as a warning to the hearer that the intended referent of that NP is unusual or

unexpected.” Once this opposition is in place, speakers and hearers may use it to indicate something else unusual or unexpected – point of view. Since the default interpretation is that a speaker is expressing his own point of view, the use of a marked form can indicate that the point of view expressed is **not** that of the speaker, but rather, of the form’s referent. Levinson (1991: 154) says this analysis provides a plausible account of the “persistent association of logophoricity and long-range reflexives.”

Levinson’s essential insight is that the distribution of both *-self* and simple pronouns need not be specified grammatically, since hearers can be relied on to make inferences about speakers’ intentions by using their knowledge of, among other things, the communicative choices available to the speaker. By combining a diachronic account with a synchronic analysis, Levinson may have illuminated issues which might otherwise remain obscured by the idealization of a synchronic state (cf. Hopper and Traugott 1993).

### ***3.4 The lexicographic tradition***

The Oxford English Dictionary (OED), with extensive entries for both the word *self* and for each of the *-self* pronouns, traces the meaning of these forms from their historical origins to their modern uses. The OED characteristically provides attested usages of these forms throughout the centuries, with the earliest cited example from the year 853. The OED does not draw a distinction between the linguistically encoded meaning of the forms, and the messages which they are used to communicate.

As noted in Chapter 1, entries for each *-self* pronoun are classified into reflexive and emphatic uses, but unlike traditional grammatical treatments of these forms, the OED appears to treat the emphatic senses as primary, as it presents those uses first. In addition, emphatic uses are not limited to appositive positions, as in the traditional account.

#### 4. How many *himself*'s are there?

Homonymy is commonplace in the world's languages, and probably no analysis of language can do without it. In some analyses, authors are careful to enumerate the number of different homonyms of *-self* pronouns they propose. Other analysts do not tackle this question directly, but nevertheless, implicit in their accounts is an assumption about the number of different forms they postulate.

Traditional treatments vary in whether they treat several uses of the reflexive pronoun (e.g., Jespersen 1933), or in fact, whether the same form serves sometimes as a reflexive pronoun and at other times as an emphatic pronoun (e.g., Sweet 1891). Givón (1993) does not specify whether these two uses of *-self* are different lexical items; he refers to them as different "constructions". The OED has just one entry for each *-self* pronoun, but each entry is divided into reflexive and emphatic uses, each of which is further broken down into distinct senses.

Generative analyses do not often treat this question directly. The distribution of specific forms is only tangentially related to generative grammar's goal of identifying properties of mind/brain by elucidating the structure of the sentence. Chomsky's Binding Theory does not address the question of whether there are

homonymous *himself*'s, although one proposal for solving some of the theory's empirical problems is the postulation of homonyms (Bouchard 1982). According to this solution, all instances of the form *himself* are not anaphors. In addition to the anaphor *himself*<sub>1</sub>, there exists *himself*<sub>2</sub> that is a pronominal.

The same kind of explanation is offered by both Kuno and Chomsky for other phenomena. Kuno (1987: 78) suggests that *him* is "ambiguous between [-reflexive] and [+reflexive]." It is the [+reflexive] *him* that is coreferent with *John* in the sentences in (55). In other words, there are two *him* forms. One is a (non-reflexive) pronominal, and the other, in (55b), is an anaphor:

- (55) a. John<sub>1</sub> put a blanket under **him**<sub>2</sub>.  
b. John<sub>1</sub> found a snake near **him**<sub>1</sub>.

Chomsky (1981: 286) considers this solution to account for possessive pronouns in fixed expressions that are coreferent with a clause-internal antecedent. According to this approach, *his* in (56a) is a pronominal, but in (b) it is an anaphor on account of the ungrammaticality of (c):

- (56) a. John<sub>1</sub> lost **his**<sub>1</sub> book.  
b. John<sub>1</sub> lost **his**<sub>1</sub> way.  
c. \*John<sub>1</sub> lost **my**<sub>1</sub> way.

In another generative analysis we have discussed (see Section 2.2), Reinhart and Reuland (1993) specifically exclude some uses of *-self* from their analysis. Possibly, in that analysis the logophoric and emphatic are different lexical items from the reflexive. In this way, homonymy provides an escape hatch for

unexplained (non-reflexive) uses of these forms. In any event, whether the excluded occurrences are considered different uses or different lexical items, they are not included in the domain of the proposed Binding Principles.

Moravcsik (1972) and Edmondson and Plank (1978) analyze *-self* as an intensifier. In her analysis, Moravcsik proposes that there are two different *-self* forms that serve as intensifiers: head-bound intensifiers immediately follow the noun they intensify (57a), while sentence-final intensifiers are always, of course, at the end of the sentence (b).

- (57) a. He **himself** signed the letter, but I didn't.  
b. He signed the letter **himself**, but I didn't.

Moravcsik notes some distributional restrictions on these two types of forms as evidence for their distinctiveness. For example, she observes that head-bound intensifiers do not occur with indefinite nouns (1972: 274):

- (58) a. \*An engineer **himself** should know this.  
b. An engineer should know this **himself**.

Edmondson and Plank (1978) give examples of intensifiers which are neither head-bound nor sentence final, and propose that these constitute a third homonymous form:

- (59) a. How can I give advice when I am **myself** affected?  
b. **Himself** he favors a more step-by-step approach to the theory of understanding.

While neither Moravcsik nor Edmondson and Plank analyze reflexive (or any other) uses of *-self* pronouns, they would surely postulate at least one additional homonym for the reflexive. Thus, Moravcsik considers three distinct forms of *-self*, while Edmondson and Plank postulate at least four.

The cognitive grammar framework proposes constructions and prototypical schemas in place of distinct lexical items. Van Hoek (1977) aims for a unified treatment of *-self*, proposing that there is indeed a “a single superschema which is schematic for all of the conventional reflexive constructions in English” (p. 178). However, she adds “In accordance with general principles of CG, I assume that such a superschema does little if any work in sanctioning the use of a reflexive marker in a particular context.” She proposes two central nodes in a network of hundreds of highly specific schema: the traditional reflexive and the emphatic reflexive.

The working assumption of the Columbia School approach is “one form, one meaning”.<sup>24</sup> We have seen that Diver (1987) proposes a single, invariant meaning for the Latin form *se*. Likewise, García (1975, 1977) identifies a single meaning for Spanish *se*, as opposed to several homonyms posited by traditional and generative grammar, and Davis (forthcoming) posits a single meaning for *sé* in Italian.<sup>25</sup> The forms are hypothesized to contribute the same sparse meaning to all utterances in which they occur.

### Notes to Chapter 3

1. Reid (1991) cites, among many others, the following examples. These sentences are acceptable in their contexts. It is not clear on what basis they would be judged ungrammatical, that is, not **permitted** in the language: *Yes, Virginia, there are a Santa Claus.* (as a caption for a picture of a school for Santa Clauses); and *You read the latest polls every morning... You listen to the latest polls every evening... As a result, you know President Reagan was re-elected next week by a thumping majority* (Russell Baker in the *New York Times*). These sentences are acceptable in their contexts. It is not clear on what basis they would be judged ungrammatical, that is, not **permitted** in the language.
2. Such uses are called “middles” by some analysts.
3. C-command is a structural relationship between two elements, and can be defined as follows: A c-commands B if and only if the first branching node dominating A also dominates B, and A does not itself dominate B. For additional information about the Binding Principles, the reader is referred to the following secondary sources: Sells (1985), Haegemann (1994) and Webelhuth (1995).
4. Zribi-Hertz (1989) cites the following syntacticians’ work as evidence that generativists have been aware of problematic data: Lees & Klima (1963); Warshawsky (1965); Chomsky (1965); Lakoff (1968); Ross (1970); Cantrall (1974); and Kuno (1987).
5. The use of the term “emphatic” by generativists differs from traditional grammar’s “emphatic” use of reflexive pronouns (*John himself wanted to go*).
6. Reinhart and Reuland (1993) propose changes to Principles A and B; Reinhart (Reinhart 1983 and Grodzinsky and Reinhart 1993) has already argued that Principle C belongs outside syntax in a different, inferential module of grammar.
7. In *your picture of me*, *your* is the subject of the noun *picture*, and this forms a syntactic – though not semantic – predicate.
8. There are many interesting similarities between contexts for *himself* and *own*, as pointed out by Cantrall (1973) “Why I would relate *own*, emphatic reflexives and intensive pronouns, *my own self*”.

9. Faltz will later call (d) a reflexive. However, at this stage of the exposition, it is merely another use of *himself* other than the archetypal reflexive use, in which agent/experiencer and patient are coreferential.
10. Tuggy does not address the fact that *sentar* can be used “non-reflexively”, as in *sentar a los niños*.
11. Following the Columbia School formalism, the names of meanings are shown in capital letters.
12. Kuno’s revised Principle A does not define a GC, and it replaces the structural relationship of c-command with the similar but slightly different notion of k-command. The definition of K-command is: A k-commands B iff the first S or NP node that dominates A also dominates B (p. 36). Under Kuno’s formulation, these conditions apply cyclically throughout the derivation, successively reaching into S’s in which clauses may be embedded. Kuno’s reformulated Principle A as it pertains to *himself* is: *Himself* may be co-indexed with a non-reflexive NP that k-commands it. *Himself* must find a sentence-internal antecedent at S-structure, and is then subject to a “semantico-syntactic chain of command”.
13. Kuno notes that the Empathy Constraint requires some modifications, because it does not hold in certain conditions: (a) when *himself* is the direct object of a verb; (b) when the antecedent is a generic NP; and (c) when the sentence is in the past progressive form.
14. Kuno notes that some speakers use *themselves* as a genderless, generic *-self* pronoun.
15. Kuno recognizes this need to consider tendencies in his own discussion of hierarchies.
16. *John cooked Mary’s breakfast* contains two CCs. The first is the clause itself, with the subject *John* and the predicate *cooked*. *Mary’s breakfast* is also a CC. The subject is *Mary* and the predicate is *breakfast*. In *John cooked breakfast*, the NP *breakfast* is still a CC, with a null subject.
17. Ferro (1992) claims that **some** instances of *-self* pronouns consist of two separate morphological elements. This view, though rejected by the present analysis, is discussed in Chapter 8.
18. We will veer from traditional Columbia School and García’s own formalism here, by showing Person terms in lowercase letters, so as not to detract from the Deixis meaning which is at the heart of García’s proposal.

19. García's DEIXIS is the same semantic substance that Diver (1987) calls CONCENTRATION OF ATTENTION.
20. In García's analysis, *le* and *lo* have the meaning THIRD PERSON and HIGH DEIXIS as well, but they also signal meanings related to the degree of activity (commonly referred to as case roles). *Le* signals the meaning LESS ACTIVE and *lo* signals MORE ACTIVE.
21. Tuggy (1985), discussed above, attributes such uses to a conception of internal causation.
22. Simple pronouns are believed to be less informative than *-self* pronouns because in most cases, their referential possibilities are less constrained.
23. Levinson discusses "scattered reports from around the world of languages that do not directly code reflexivity" (p. 133), and discusses the cases of Old English, Biblical Hebrew, Fijian and other Austronesian languages, pidgins and creoles (discussed by Carden and Stewart 1988) and Guugu Yimidhirr and other Australian languages
24. Obviously there are genuine cases of homonymy in language. However, Columbia School analyses need not appeal to homonymy to fit the *a priori* categories of traditional grammar.
25. See Chapter 9 for a discussion of García's analysis of Spanish *se*, and Davis's analysis of Italian *sé*.

## Chapter 4

### Finding the referent

There is a large and growing body of pragmatic and psycholinguistic literature regarding the problem of how hearers determine the reference of pronouns.<sup>1</sup> *-Self* forms are generally left out of these investigations, because it is widely assumed that the reference of *-self* is determined syntactically. However, we will demonstrate that the referential interpretation of *-self* is not given structurally, and that it too depends on pragmatic inference. We will see that there are no linguistic categories or syntactic rules that unambiguously lead the hearer to the referents of these forms.

The nature of reference is a long-standing philosophical problem which will not be considered here. As described in Section 2, the term “reference” in the present study is not understood as a property of linguistic expressions themselves, but rather, as the result of something speakers do through the use of linguistic expressions which must be interpreted by hearers.

In this chapter, we will address the relatively narrow question of how hearers identify the referents of *-self* pronouns. We will consider the forms’ wide range of uses, examining not only cases in which *-self* and simple pronouns designate different entities, as in (1a) and (b), but also those in which *-self* and simple forms can refer to the same entity, as in (c) and (d).

- (1) a. Mary saw **her**.
- b. Mary saw **herself**.
- c. Mary looked around **her**.
- d. Mary looked around **herself**.

According to the traditional account of emphatics and reflexives, hearers identify the referent of *-self* pronouns by looking either to the subject of a clause or to an immediately or proximately mentioned entity (schematized in Figure 2 in Chapter 2.) By contrast, the approach adopted here is to seek a unified account of the referential interpretation of *-self* pronouns in all their uses. There will be no *a priori* distinction drawn between sentential and discourse-based uses, as we have discovered no evidence – other than the weight of linguistic tradition – to do so. On phonological grounds there is no difference between *-self* forms used as appositives and as arguments, nor between *-self* forms used reflexively and for other discourse uses. We have found no reason to assume that the lay hearer (who does not benefit from the intellectual tradition of classical grammar) operates with the metalinguistic categories that linguists rely on. Thus, we will consider not only examples such as those in (1), but also those in (2):

- (2) a. John **himself** washed the car.
- b. John washed the car **himself**.
- c. He would be something nondescript, something in the background, like **herself**; perhaps he had become an interpreter. (AMM 31)

- d. He sat down at the desk and opened the drawers. In the top right-hand one was an envelope addressed to **himself**. (Zribi-Hertz 1989)

We will begin in Section 1 by explicating the view of reference taken in this study; then, in Section 2 we will show that referent-finding is neither the essential function nor the defining characteristic of *-self* pronouns. In Section 3, we will consider structural accounts of referent-finding for *-self*, demonstrating that they do not explain speakers' ability to identify the referents of these forms. Lastly, in Section 4 we will propose the outlines of a pragmatic account of referent-finding for *-self*.

#### **1. All reference is the result of inference**

Every pronoun (and every nominal expression) may be interpreted to point to a referent, a conception of an entity in discourse that is designated by a linguistic form. However, linguistic forms never point directly to referents, but are always mediated by the hearer's active role in interpreting them. One of the tasks facing hearers is to match the name of every entity mentioned in an utterance with its real-world referent. Whether a speaker says *Tom Jefferson, the president, that man with the gray hair, this one, him* or *himself*, the addressee must figure out which entity in the world is being mentioned by the speaker (a point that has been made by many researchers, e.g., Ariel 1988, 1991; Cornish 1996). The process of identifying referents of nominal forms involves information from the immediate

and general context, along with inferential abilities that language users bring to every communicative event.

In the view taken here, hearers do not find “antecedents”, a term that is misleading because it suggests that there is a structural connection between a pronoun and another form with the same referent, and that this link exists independently of the hearer’s efforts to determine the identity of the pronoun. Rather, hearers must make the connection between pronouns (and all other nominal forms), and their mental representations of entities in the world.

### 1.1 *Nominal expressions need not refer to the entity they name*

Well-known examples of metonymy such as the following from Lakoff (1987: 77) illustrate that nominal expressions need not even refer to the entity they name:

- (3) a. Waitress: The **ham sandwich** just spilled beer all over himself. (*Ham sandwich* refers to a customer eating the sandwich.)
- b. Don’t let **El Salvador** become another **Vietnam**. (Place names represent what occurs in those places.)
- c. The **White House** isn’t saying anything. (*White House* stands for the people and the institution located there.)

Jackendoff (1992) points out a problem that these facts pose for traditional theories of anaphora: when a nominal expression is used metonymically, the referent of a linguistic antecedent will not necessarily match the referent of the pronoun:

- (4) At a wax museum, where Ringo Starr falls onto a statue of himself: Ringo fell on **himself**.

In (4), the referent of *himself* cannot be determined on the basis of linguistic information, and in fact, the referent of *himself* does not match the referent of its so-called antecedent, *Ringo*. Rather, hearers' interpretation of referring expressions must rely on background knowledge and an understanding of the context in which the reference is made.

### 1.2 *Even first person forms must be interpreted*

Even first and second person forms, which are meant to designate direct participants in the discourse event, must be interpreted. In the next example, the forms *we* and *us* within the same sentence do not refer to the same entities. The passage is from a children's book, in which two children go back in time to a scene in which they themselves are already participating. They are present in the scene in two versions: their original selves, and their time-traveling selves. (As always, subscripts are for identification and discussion purposes only.)

- (5) “**We<sub>a</sub>** need to keep out of sight of Hagrid's front door, or **we<sub>b</sub>**'ll see **us!**” (RPA 397)

The speaker (one of the referents of *we<sub>a</sub>*) is warning the hearer that the time-traveling children (*we<sub>a</sub>* and *us*) must stay out of sight or they will be seen by their non- time-traveling selves (*we<sub>b</sub>*) in the original scene.

### 1.3 *Gender information may be inconsistent*

It seems intuitively obvious that hearers consider the morphological features of pronouns to narrow down their search for intended referents.<sup>2</sup> Some linguists have incorporated this observation into their grammatical theory, postulating that antecedents and their anaphors must match in person, gender and number. This is not the view taken here. Subsequent references made to the same entity will naturally encode the same information, but this correlation is due not to a feature of grammar, but instead to properties of the real world in which the identity of individuals usually stays constant over time. There is no need to incorporate a rule regarding nominal morphology into the grammar to capture this observation. When continuity of identity is not a feature of the real world, the linguistic system is not constrained by a requirement that an anaphor and its antecedent have matching features. In the following example, from a review of the movie *Boys Don't Cry*, the referent of *himself* is a girl who thinks of herself as a boy:

- (6) Swept out of Lincoln with a rowdy crew of redneck visitors during a boozy blowout, Brandon miraculously wakes up in a town which sees her as **she sees himself**. Among the scrappy, disheveled stragglers clinging to the fringes of farm country, only her good manners attract special notice. (SLT)

The reader may hesitate in processing this utterance, especially here where it is out of context. But it is clear that in (6), *she* and *himself* refer to the same person, Brandon. Thus, not even gender information can **automatically** match referring expressions to their real world referents. When there is a compelling reason to

refer to the same entity with different gender features, then both the linguistic system and its users are flexible enough to do so.

In summary, the language itself does not provide an identity for any pronoun, and hearers must always use intelligence, inference and an active role in the interpretation of utterances to determine the intended referents of forms. Examples like (4), (5) and (6) are certainly rare, but that is because the type of communicative situations they describe is rare in the real world. The linguistic system does not constrain their occurrence.<sup>3</sup>

## **2. Referent-finding is not the key**

Our research reveals that referent-finding is not the primary functional motivation for the choice between *-self* and simple pronouns in any person.

### **2.1 *First and second persons***

In any analysis based on the reflexive account, there is no functional explanation for the existence of both *-self* and simple forms in the inventory of first and second person pronouns. Referent-finding differences between the two types of forms are obviously applicable only in the third person, since first and second person pronouns always designate the same speakers and hearers. After all, the same referent is designated whether a speaker says *I like me* or *I like myself*. Thus, the language offers pairs of forms (*me/myself*; *you/yourself*; *us/ourselves*) that are unrelated to referential differences, hinting at some other reason for the existence of both types of forms.

In the traditional account, the appearance of *-self* forms in reflexive environments is seen as the mark of a construction, the reflexive. In that view, *-self* occurs in reflexive contexts as an arbitrary and autonomous component of the grammar when a pronoun designates a referent that is the same as the subject.

By contrast, in the present analysis the appearance of *-self* – in all persons – is motivated by the **meaning** of these forms. Both types of forms exist because they are meaningful linguistic signals that are useful in the communication of many different types of messages. As we will see in Chapter 6, the appearance of *-self* in reflexive environments is a hint that the referent of *-self* may be participating in an event in more than one role. For now, the key point is that the occurrence of *-self* pronouns in first and second persons is not the result of an autonomous rule of grammar.

#### More flexibility in first and second person

The analysis offered here explains why *-self* pronouns occur more often in first and second person than in third,<sup>4</sup> as in (7) and (8), from Quirk et. al. (1972):

- (7) a. For someone like **me**, this is a big surprise.
- b. For someone like **myself**, this is a big surprise.
- (8) a. This is a great tribute to the Scout movement,  
      and to **you** as its leader.
- b. This is a great tribute to the Scout movement,  
      and to **yourself** as its leader.

A fundamental problem is raised in the third person that does not exist for first and second person forms: the problem of identifying which of the innumerable entities in the real world (neither the speaker nor the hearer), is being referred to (García 1977: 153).<sup>5</sup> The consequence of this important difference is that there appears to be more communicative leeway in the use of *-self* forms in first and second persons, since the task of referent-finding is not as challenging in those persons.

In any communication, there is a hierarchy of communicative problems to solve, and the task of correctly identifying referents and their roles naturally has the highest priority. Such elements are the most conspicuous components of any message; they are also the parts of communication that contribute to the truth conditions of sentences, and as such are given analytical priority by many linguists.

As noted above, one of the most frequent inferences regarding the use of *-self* forms as arguments is that their referents are playing more than a single role at one time. In the third person, messages of dual roles usually do affect the referential identity of *-self* pronouns. Thus, speakers are freer to exploit the meaning difference between *-self* and simple pronouns in first and second persons for other reasons, as there is little communicative risk of identifying the wrong referent.

## 2.2 *Third person uses*

By focusing on reflexive uses, analysts can too easily overlook the wide variety of cases in which both *-self* and simple forms refer to the same entities. The minimal pairs shown below, like (7) and (8) above, are equally revealing about the nature of *-self*, and they demonstrate that a discussion of reference will be insufficient to characterize the difference between *-self* and simple forms even in third person uses. In some cases, both pronouns can refer to the subject of their clause; in others, both forms refer to an entity not mentioned within the clause:

- (9) a. John<sub>1</sub> saw a snake **near him<sub>1</sub>/himself<sub>1</sub>**.
- b. He would be something nondescript, something in the background, like **herself/her**; perhaps he had become an interpreter (*-self*: AMM 31)
- c. I don't know how to make Mark<sub>1</sub> understand that no one is comparing **him<sub>1</sub>** to Jamie except **himself<sub>1</sub>/him<sub>1</sub>**. (*-self*: CGH)
- d. She<sub>1</sub>'d kept others alive with her stories when they'd come close to being found. This time it was for **herself<sub>1</sub>/her<sub>1</sub>**. (*-self*: HSR 383)
- e. The nurse asked Susan<sub>1</sub> a question about **herself<sub>1</sub>/her<sub>1</sub>**. (White et. al. 1997).
- f. Lisa<sub>1</sub> sent me this picture of **herself<sub>1</sub>/her<sub>1</sub>** (Trask 1993)
- g. The dictator<sub>1</sub> was lying at the foot of that statue of **himself<sub>1</sub>/him<sub>1</sub>** on horseback. (Kuno 1987)

- h. He<sub>a</sub> was as forgetful and as careless of material things as he had always been, but as he did not smoke and the furnace had an automatic fire arrangement, the principal hazards were to **himself<sub>1</sub>/him<sub>1</sub>...** (-*self*: MBW 42)
- i. It's also important, I think, for youths<sub>a</sub> while they are in school to volunteer or work for pay in part-time jobs where they<sub>a</sub> can serve people who have serious, unmet needs, then discuss these problems in class so that they<sub>a</sub> won't acquire critical or condescending attitudes toward those different from **themselves<sub>1</sub>/them<sub>1</sub>**. (-*self*: SBC 20)

The point of these representative examples is to illustrate the wide range of contexts in which the choice between *-self* and simple pronouns does not result in a difference in referents.

### 3. The hearer's task: describing the problem in structural terms

In this section, we will look in detail at the identity of *-self* forms in both appositive and argument uses in terms of the structural reflexive/emphatic framework. We will see that the syntactic account does **not** explain how hearers are able to identify the referents of these forms, as the examples we will consider demonstrate that the reference of *-self* pronouns is not fixed syntactically. While the referent of *-self* is usually found within the same sentence, and the referent is most often the subject of that sentence, neither of these tendencies is consistent enough to serve as a rule that hearers can rely on. Gender, number, person and animacy information may be helpful as well, but none of them offers any kind of rule-governed procedure for interpreting the referential identity of a *-self* form.

### 3.1 *Appositive uses*

Even among appositive uses, in which *-self* always refers to an entity that has been mentioned elsewhere in the clause, linguistic information alone does not always allow hearers to identify which entity the *-self* form refers to. We will see many examples that will show that hearers must rely not only on the linguistic information that is signaled, but also on the immediate and background context of an utterance to determine the speaker's intended communication.

Examples such as those in (10) and (11) are deceptively simple, leading analysts to conclude that there is little inference involved in identifying the referents of *-self*. In (10), *-self* forms immediately follow a mention of their referent. When the referent of an appositive *-self* form is the subject of its clause, the *-self* form need not occur adjacent to a previous mention, as in (11):

- (10) a. Yeltsin **himself** suggested that he did not envision speedy changes. (NYTC-8/31/98)
- b. If Cox drops out, Livingston could claim credit for out-organizing and out-gunning his opposition that, for three hours after he announced his candidacy on Friday, included Gingrich **himself**. (NYTC-11/9/98)
- (11) a. The commission had **itself** sought the ruling after its amnesty decision, issued in December by an independent committee within the panel, sparked widespread protests from political opponents... (NYTC-5/9/98)
- b. Hyde said the House was "not bound" by Starr's report, and he added that the Judiciary Committee might decide to obtain evidence **themselves**. (NYTC-7/31/98)

- c. Shepard almost did not make it to the moon **himself**. (NYTC-7/23/98)

Generally, person, gender and number meanings of *-self* forms help hearers determine the intended referent. For instance in (11b), only the subject, *the Judiciary committee*, matches the number meaning of *themselves*, while the entity mentioned immediately before the *-self* pronoun, *the evidence*, does not. In (11c) the immediately mentioned entity, *the moon*, does not match *himself's* meaning of male. In each of the examples in (11), there is only one entity mentioned within the clause that matches the gender and number meanings of the *-self* pronouns, making the identification of their referents unproblematic.<sup>6</sup>

But sometimes both a subject and a proximately mentioned entity match the meanings signaled by the *-self* form. There appears to be no linguistic information that is sufficient to determine the referent of *-self* in examples such as (12). and (13). Neither the syntax nor the person, gender, and number meanings of the forms help the hearer narrow down the identification of the referent. In each example in (12), the referent of *-self* is the same as that of the subject, while in the passages in (13), the referent is the proximately mentioned entity. In neither case is there a linguistic clue that hearers can rely on. (Entities that are subjects and those that are proximately mentioned are underscored.)

- (12) a. Policy-makers fear an overwhelming demand for services from families that are now caring for elderly relatives **themselves** at no cost to the government. (NYTC-6/8/98)

- b. It is hard to convince boys that they can't grow babies inside themselves. (SBC 16)
  - c. Senators will then vote on whether to allow the videotaped depositions to be shown as part of the trial and on whether to call the witnesses themselves. (NYTC-2/2/99).
- (13)
- a. Several cancer experts said Monday that the trials could be especially complicated given that the new drugs work on a principle unlike other treatments, like chemotherapy, which attack the tumors themselves and are often accompanied with side effects. (NYTC-5/5/98)
  - b. The note said nothing about the book itself.
  - c. But Arney quoted the president himself in rebuttal. (NYTC-12/18/98)

The hearer's task in these examples is not different from his task in other cases. He must always consider linguistic information, as well as background knowledge and context to infer the referents of *-self* forms.

### 3.2 *Argument uses*

Like the referents of appositive *-self*, the referents of argument *-self* are usually either subjects or proximately mentioned (or both) within the pronoun's clause. It is this tendency that leads scholars to believe that the referents of *-self* pronouns can be determined syntactically. But such a stereotypical view of the distribution of *-self* forms is incomplete and inaccurate, ignoring as it does the wide range of environments in which *-self* forms actually occur.

### Referring to subjects

The most well-known pattern is for *-self* forms to refer to an entity that is the subject of its clause:

- (14) a. Candidates often found **themselves** giving major speeches or press conferences with only a single television camera in sight. (NYTC-9/16/98)
- b. “My, oh my, I said to **myself**. What does this fool think he’s doing....” (NYTC-9/4/98)

While not all argument *-self* forms refer to subjects, in the *New York Times* corpus, 65% of *-self* pronouns used as arguments refer to the participant that is the overt subject of the clause within which *-self* appears. An additional 31% of *-self* pronouns in argument positions in that corpus refer to a participant that is an implicit subject, bringing the total number of *-self* pronouns that refer to a subject to 95%.<sup>7</sup> According to the traditional account of examples like (15), the referent of each of these *-self* forms is an implicit subject of the clause in which the form appears. The first two examples were presented in Chapter 2 as sentences in which the subject of the (non-finite) verb is not overt. (The implicit subject posited by the traditional account for these examples is indicated with the symbol  $\emptyset$ .)

- (15) a. “Our message is, make sure you aim  $\emptyset$  to get **yourself** a career and not just a first job,” said Ellen F. Hartigan, vice president of student affairs at Polytechnic University in New York.” (NYTC-6/25/98)
- b. Then he entered test-pilot training at Patuxent River, Md.,  $\emptyset$  elevating **himself** into the elite of military aviation. (NYTC-7/23/98)

- c. Some adjusted quickly, finding ways to affirm **themselves** and their skills in a new environment, bridging discontinuity. (BCL 8)
- d. Friends say her work shows her fierce determination to carve out an independent life for **herself** while married to a powerful man who is often out late at dinners, has 11 p.m. meetings.... (BCC)

In addition, experimentally speakers show a preference for subjects as referents of *-self*. In a study of second-language learners, White et. al. (1997) found that even some native speakers consistently rejected the objects in (16) and similar sentences as the referents of *-self*.<sup>8</sup>

- (16) a. The nurse asked Susan a question about **herself**.
- b. The researcher gave the subject a test about **himself**.

However, linguists agree that the tendency for argument *-self* to refer to subjects is not robust enough to be considered a grammatical requirement.

#### Referring to non-subjects

*-Self* may also refer to an entity other than the subject that is mentioned within the clause:

- (17) a. “A Way in the World” is, he says, “a settling of accounts for **me** with **myself**,” for what he regards as errors of artistic judgment. (GNS)
- b. He described it as a desperation effort to save **Japan** from **itself**. (NYTC-6/21/98)

In both these examples, the previous mentions of referents are proximate. The person, gender and number meanings of the *-self* forms do not match those of the subjects. (Hearers must still determine whether the referent of *-self* is another entity mentioned elsewhere within the clause, or if the referent is mentioned only outside the clause.)

In the *New York Times* corpus, almost all tokens of argument *-self* can be accounted for by the generalizations we have considered so far. Yet, it is well-known that there are many exceptions to these generalizations, even if they appear less frequently than the most well-known uses of these forms, especially on the carefully prepared and edited first pages of the *New York Times*. The preponderance of *-self* forms that refer to an entity mentioned elsewhere within its clause makes it is easy to see why linguists have focused on this pattern, and why such examples have been seen as representative of the distribution of *-self* forms. But such a view can lead to a stereotypical assessment of the data, one that does not encompass the wide range of uses of these forms.

#### First and second person referents

As noted above, there is little communicative difficulty in identifying the referents of first and second person pronouns. Consequently, first and second person entities may be referred to by *-self* forms even when they are neither subjects nor proximately mentioned within the clause:

- (18) a. He added: “The interests of the nation and the people do not require a trial or conflicts among **ourselves**, but national reconciliation.” (NYTC-12/29/98)
- b. The scene is the ladies’ room at Time Cafe on Lafayette Street. The cast: a young woman and **myself**. From one of the stalls, I hear her laying out cosmetics, etc. One sigh after another. I emerge. Our eyes meet. (YMD)

A complication: logophoric uses

Logophoric uses present us with the first of several counterexamples to the generalization that *-self* pronouns refer to an entity mentioned within their clause. As described in Chapter 2, logophoric messages are those in which the point of view expressed is that of the pronoun’s referent, even when that referent is not mentioned elsewhere within the clause in which *-self* appears. These phenomena pose a problem for syntactic accounts of *-self*, since hearers must look outside the sentence boundary to find a linguistic antecedent:

- (19) a. She<sub>1</sub> [Christine] could not see him in the army, on either side; he wasn’t the type, and to her<sub>1</sub> knowledge he had not believed in any particular ideology. He would be something nondescript, something in the background, like **herself**<sub>1</sub>; perhaps he had become an interpreter. (AMM 31)
- b. She<sub>1</sub> [Trudi] felt a sudden rush of power, the power to stay alive. She<sub>1</sub>’d kept others alive with her<sub>1</sub> stories when they’d come close to being found. This time it was for **herself**<sub>1</sub>. (HSR 383)
- c. As he was about to slip the catch on the inside lock Morrison<sub>1</sub> glanced once more around the room. He<sub>1</sub> could see now where it got its air of pastiche: the bookcase was a copy of the one in Paul’s living room,

the prints and the table were almost identical with those at the Samisens'. Other details stirred dim images of objects half-noted in the various houses, at the various but nearly identical get-acquainted parties. Poor Louise had been trying to construct herself out of the other people she had met. Only from **himself**<sub>1</sub> had she taken nothing; thinking of his chill interior, embryonic and blighted, he realized it had nothing for her to take. (APO 70)

In the examples in (19), there are some linguistic clues that a previous mention of these referents will not be found within the clause in which the forms appear. In (a), the subject, *he*, does not match the gender of the *-self* pronoun, and so is an unlikely potential referent. In (b) the subject, *it*, does not match the gender meaning of *herself*. And in (c) the subject is *Louise*, which does not match the gender of *himself*, and is therefore an unlikely referent. In example (c), Paul is actually the most recently mentioned entity that matches the morphological features of the *-self* pronoun, but the hearer must rely on his understanding of the discourse to determine that Paul is not the intended referent of *-self*.

In all of these cases, the referents of *-self* are what Zribi-Hertz (1989) calls Subjects of Consciousness (SC's), because even as other characters are mentioned and discussed, they are always seen through the point of view of the SC. The referent of *-self* cannot be determined syntactically in these examples, unless syntactic information is understood to include extra-sentential, discourse-level constructs, such as SC's.<sup>9</sup>

### Further complications

As pointed out by Baker (1995), logophoric uses are not the only cases in which *-self* pronouns do not find clause-internal antecedents.<sup>10</sup> Baker gives the following example from Jane Austen's *Sense and Sensibility* as one in which it is patently clear that the utterance does not represent the point of view of *-self*'s referent:

- (20) Had he married a more amiable woman, he might have been made still more respectable than he was: – he might even have been made amiable himself; for he was very young when he married, and very fond of his wife. But Mrs. John Dashwood was a strong caricature of **himself**; – more narrow-minded and selfish. (Baker 1995)

In (20), the hearer cannot rely on either sentence-internal syntactic information, or on discourse-level logophoricity to identify the referent of *-self*.

The next three examples also show non-logophoric *-self* forms that refer to entities not mentioned within the pronouns' clauses:

- (21) a. Only Elizabeth was an artist to her fingertips, and whichever of her talents she used, she used it differently from all the rest of us. Her perceptions, so different from ours, have nourished me through the years. Her understanding of what has gone on in schools has provided depth and life to my own observations on American education. And her paintings have made every place I have lived in my home. I have the first watercolor she ever painted and a painting of the New York Stock Exchange building she made for Father. I have a painting of Grandma, Priscilla, and **herself**, dressed for church, standing by the gate to our house in Holicong, and another of the view from our windows in Philadelphia. (MBW 69)
- b. He was as forgetful and as careless of material things as he had always been, but as he did not smoke and the furnace had an automatic fire arrangement, the

principal hazards were to **himself** and not the neighbors in whose children he was deeply interested and for whose sake he had taken down the fence so that they would have more room to play. (MBW 42)

- c. Each week, she got another of these letters, more or less identical. In one of them a colour print was enclosed: **himself**, slightly cross-eyed and grinning hilariously, even more spindly than she remembered him against her billowing draperies, flowers exploding around them like firecrackers, one of his hands an equivocal blur in her lap, the other out of sight; on her own face, astonishment and outrage, as though he was sticking her in the behind with his hidden thumb (AMM 20)

In all three examples, readers are able to identify the referents of *-self*, but in no case is there a linguistic rule that can provide such reference. One could pursue a syntactic explanation by positing silent constructs such as a phonologically null subject of *painting* in (21a). But a syntactic solution seems even less feasible for examples (b) and (c), and such an account would still not explain how hearers identify the underlying syntactic configuration.

#### Competing entities

It seems likely that the morphological features of the *-self* pronouns in (21) may be used as a hint to hearers that the form's referent is not mentioned within the clause. However, matching features cannot provide an algorithmic method to make this determination, because even when the subject matches the morphological features of the *-self* form, *-self* may refer to an entity mentioned outside its clause, as the examples in (22) show. Once again, to illustrate the non-mechanical

nature of the task, the subject within each *-self* pronoun's clause is underlined, as are other matching entities mentioned outside that clause:

- (22) a. At the signing ceremony, Mr. Arafat promised Mr. Netanyahu that "your security is our security". But Palestinians doubt that the rules will be applied against Israelis in the way they are applied against **themselves**<sub>1</sub>. (ECO)
- b. The girls were wearing red satin dresses that had obviously been made by **themselves**. (PCH)
- c. They wore bathing suits that protected **themselves** from the harmful rays of the sun. (HBS)
- d. They wore badges identifying **themselves** by name. (NYTC-1/13/99)

In all these examples, the subject of the clause matches the person, gender and number features of the *-self* pronoun. There is no linguistic information that tells hearers that the referent of *-self* is not mentioned within its clause.

It can be noted that in all three examples in (22), the subject of the pronouns' clauses are inanimate, while the subjects of the previous clauses, the referents of *-self*, are animate. But in the next example, the subject of the clause in which *-self* appears not only matches the person and number meanings of the *-self* form, but it also refers to an animate entity and matches its gender meaning:

- (23) He turned his head toward the voice and looked into the half-closed eyes of a boy who seemed not much older than **himself**. (LGI 119)

The subject of the clause in which *himself* appears is *who*, which refers to the entity designated by *a boy*, the object of the preposition *of* in the previous clause.

The word *who* is meant to refer to a single, male, third person, animate entity, so there is no linguistic information whatsoever that can alert the hearer that this is an exceptional use of *-self*, and that the referent of the pronoun is not mentioned within the clause. Common sense – that is, inference about what is a plausible message – allows the hearer to figure out that a boy cannot look, or seem, older than himself. The hearer discards the implausible scenario in his interpretation of the utterance, and concludes that *himself* must not refer to the subject of its clause. This example clearly demonstrates what is suggested by the many others we have examined: the referent of the *-self* pronoun is not fixed syntactically.

#### **4. The hearer's task: the solution**

A complete analysis of how hearers identify the referents of pronouns and other linguistic expressions should be grounded in psychological and psycholinguistic research, and is beyond the scope of the present research. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the observations described below will illuminate the processes involved in the referential interpretation of *-self* forms. Although there are no syntactic rules that can account for hearers' identification of the referents in all the examples seen above, there is a generalization that applies to both appositive and argument uses: *-self* forms are used to refer to highly accessible entities, often (but not always) to suggest that their referent is playing more than a single role. Hearers must rely on linguistic information and their own evaluation of plausible and likely messages to determine the referents of these forms.

#### 4.1 *Accessibility*

Ariel argues that referring expressions are guidelines used to determine the identities of entities in discourse. All pronouns are markers of high accessibility, she says, where accessibility is described as the degree to which an entity is mentally available to an addressee at any stage of discourse. The more accessible information is, the less processing effort is required to access and implement it in the interpretation of any utterance. Ariel proposes an Accessibility Marking Scale, from the lowest accessibility markers (full names and long definite descriptions) to high accessibility markers (including simple and *-self* pronouns). Whether one refers to *Professor Ronald Langacker, the distinguished linguist*, or merely *Langacker*, largely depends on how accessible the referent is to the intended audience. If the audience consists of linguists, they can probably easily access background knowledge that will allow them to determine the identity of *Langacker* (higher accessibility); however, if hearers can be expected to have trouble identifying the referent of just a last name, speakers will normally choose to provide a full name and/or a longer description, which are both markers of lower accessibility.

The referents of *-self* pronouns are always highly accessible, but high accessibility is not in itself sufficient motivation for the use of *-self*. (Motivation for the use of *-self* will be discussed in Chapters 5 through 7.) And the referents of *-self* are not necessarily more highly accessible than the referents of simple forms.

There are many ways that an entity may become highly accessible. The traditional account of reflexives and emphatics covers the most frequent sources of accessibility for third person referents: an entity may be a clausal subject, or it may be immediately mentioned in discourse. First and second person *-self* pronouns also usually refer to either a subject or a proximately mentioned referent, though speakers and hearers also achieve high accessibility by virtue of being immediate participants in a communicative event.

Hearers consider only highly accessible entities as potential referents for *-self* (Ariel 1988, 1990, 1994) and choose among those the referent that leads to the most plausibly intended message. The ways in which an entity may become accessible enough to be referred to by a *-self* form cannot be defined mechanically, as shown by the many uses in which a previous mention of a *-self* pronoun does not appear within the same clause or even the same sentence (e.g., examples 18 - 23 above). The source of high accessibility is not constrained by textual prominence or grammatical rules. Rather, a more general principle of coherence and plausibility, which applies at the level of the individual utterance and cannot be reduced to rule, appears to take precedence. We will look in detail at the source of entities' accessibility in both appositive and argument uses in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.

#### 4.2 *The syntactic notion of subject vs. the Focus hypothesis*

We have seen a tendency for *-self* pronouns to refer to subjects, and it is widely agreed that subjects of sentences refer to entities that are highly accessible. However, the definition of “subject” is problematic.<sup>11</sup> The notion has been stretched to include not only grammatical, but also logical subjects of sentences; and the traditional account of reflexives requires subjects of noun phrases as well, and possibly even of prepositional phrases too. That “subject” is not a successful category of grammatical analysis has been demonstrated by other analysts, and the evidence and arguments presented by them will not be repeated here (e.g., Davis 1992; Diver 1982).

The present study does not rely on the loosely defined syntactic/semantic notion of subject, but instead, replaces it with a semantic hypothesis regarding word order in English, the Focus System. As we will see, In-Focus entities are a specifically defined subset of expressions that are subsumed under the more traditional term “subject”. Nevertheless, the Focus hypothesis is not essential to the present analysis of *-self*. Whether one’s theoretical preference is to trace the high accessibility of certain entities to the Focus hypothesis or to the status of expressions as subjects, the essential point remains the same: the referents of these entities are very highly accessible.

The Focus System, described by Reid (1991) and Huffman (1993), categorizes entities according to the amount of attention concentrated on them with respect to an event, and captures the semantic contribution of the word order in

which subjects most often appear.<sup>12</sup> According to Reid and Huffman, English word order is a signal of meaning, and specifically a signal of two semantic substances, Control and Focus. (The Control System will be discussed in Chapter 6.) Figure 1 shows the Focus meanings signaled by various word orders in English.<sup>13</sup>

Figure 1. *The English Focus System*<sup>14</sup>

Number of Participants	Examples	Schematized word order	Meaning signaled
1-Participant	<i>A hat<sub>P</sub> was in the closet.</i> <i>There was a hat<sub>P</sub> in the closet.</i>	P... Event Event...P	P: MORE FOCUS P: LESS FOCUS
2-Participant	<i>The boy<sub>P1</sub> washed the car<sub>P2</sub>.</i>	P1... Event ... P2	P1: IN-FOCUS P2: NOT-IN-FOCUS
3-Participant	<i>Mary<sub>P1</sub> gave the boy<sub>P2</sub> the keys<sub>P3</sub>.</i>	P1...Event...P2...P3	P1: IN-FOCUS P2: NOT-IN-FOCUS P3: NOT-IN-FOCUS

*Note:* For purposes of the present analysis, the meaning MORE FOCUS will be treated the same as In-Focus, as both meanings describe a participant on which attention is concentrated with respect to an event.

Entities that occur before the verb are hypothesized to be IN-FOCUS, that is, receiving the highest amount of attention concentrated on a participant with respect to an event. Clearly, the entity that is receiving the highest amount of attention is highly salient and therefore highly accessible. For our purposes, we will simplify this system to just two meanings, IN-FOCUS and NON-FOCUS, as shown in the rightmost column. IN-FOCUS will comprise the meanings MORE FOCUS (1-Participant events) and IN-FOCUS (2- and 3-Participant events). Our cover term NON-FOCUS corresponds to NOT-IN-FOCUS.<sup>15</sup>

While the notion of subjecthood is generally assumed as a valid construct and is not subjected to empirical verification, the Focus System has several advantages over the subjecthood account:

- The Focus account is tied to the presence of overtly occurring linguistic signals.
- The Focus account is a hypothesis. It does not rely on an *a priori* category.
- The Focus hypothesis provides a communicatively motivated explanation for the high salience of overt, grammatical, clausal “subjects”.

To see how the notion of accessibility and the Focus hypothesis account for the data seen in Section 3, the examples seen there will be repeated in Section 4.4.

#### 4.3 *Accessibility in appositive uses*

Accessibility is a dynamic property of the hearer’s interpretation processes. As an utterance is rolled out over time and hearers actively try to interpret messages, attention is concentrated on any entity at the point at which it is mentioned. Thus, when an entity is mentioned in discourse, it becomes highly salient, and most appositive uses of *-self* forms immediately follow a mention of their referent, as in (24), which, like the other examples in this section, are repeated from Section 3.<sup>16</sup>

The Focus system pertains to the amount of attention focused on an entity with respect to an event. Entities that are IN-FOCUS, that is, placed before the verb, are highly salient and accessible, as in the second set of examples, (25) below.

- (24) a. Yeltsin **himself** suggested that he did not envision speedy changes. (NYTC 8/31/98)

- b. If Cox drops out, Livingston could claim credit for out-organizing and out-gunning his opposition that, for three hours after he announced his candidacy on Friday, included Gingrich **himself**. (NYTC 11/9/98)
- (25)
- a. The commission had **itself** sought the ruling after its amnesty decision, issued in December by an independent committee within the panel, sparked widespread protests from political opponents... (NYTC-5/9/98)
  - b. Hyde said the House was “not bound” by Starr’s report, and he added that the Judiciary Committee might decide to obtain evidence **themselves**. (NYTC-7/31/98)
  - c. Shepard almost did not make it to the moon **himself**. (NYTC-7/23/98)

#### 4.4 *Accessibility in argument uses*

The referents of *-self* pronouns in argument position achieve high accessibility in many different ways. As noted above, they are usually IN-FOCUS (overt clausal subjects) or proximately mentioned, or both, within the pronoun’s clause. However, accessibility is a dynamic discourse-level property that pertains to the prominence of an entity at any specific time, and cannot be defined sententially.

The Focus hypothesis has less empirical coverage than the notion of subjects does, as the meaning IN-FOCUS cannot apply to entities that are not signaled. Thus, there are no implicit, or phonologically null IN-FOCUS entities, so we must identify another way in which the referents of *-self* forms such as those in (15), repeated here in (26), become highly accessible.

- (26) a. “Our message is, make sure you aim  $\emptyset$  to get **yourself** a career and not just a first job,” said Ellen F. Hartigan, vice president of student affairs at Polytechnic University in New York.” (NYTC-6/25/98)
- b. Then he entered test-pilot training at Patuxent River, Md.,  $\emptyset$  elevating **himself** into the elite of military aviation. (NYTC-7/23/98)
- c. Some adjusted quickly, finding ways to affirm **themselves** and their skills in a new environment, bridging discontinuity. (BCL 8)
- d. Friends say her work shows her fierce determination to carve out an independent life for **herself** while married to a powerful man who is often out late at dinners, has 11 p.m. meetings at Gracie Mansion, reads into the early hours of the morning and begins work at dawn. (BCC)

Finding the referent of the form *yourself* in (26a) does not pose much of a communicative problem because the referent is highly salient as a direct participant in the in the communication. Nevertheless, the referent is also salient as the last signaled In-Focus referent, and in this case, the last signaled entity. In (26b), the referent of *himself* is also the last mentioned In-Focus participant, even though the entity is not In-Focus with respect to the event in which the *-self* pronoun names a participant. In (26c), the referent of *themselves* is the same as the last mentioned In-Focus participant, even though there is an intervening entity (*ways*) that does match the person, gender and number of the *-self* form. Both entities, *some women* and *ways* are highly salient at the moment that the *-self* form is encountered, but only one of them, *women*, makes sense as a plausible referent for the pronoun – it is unlikely that *ways* could affirm themselves. The inanimacy of

ways and the animacy of *women* are surely factors in the interpretation of this utterance, as hearers must determine not only the referent of the pronoun, but also who should be understood to be doing the affirming.<sup>17</sup> In (26d), the referent of *herself*, Donna Hanover, does not appear In-Focus with respect to any of the preceding events in the quoted passage. However, she serves as the main subject of the article from which this passage is taken, and even figures prominently in this passage, in which she is overtly signaled twice (*her work* and *her fierce determination*). It is clear from the context that Hanover is the person carving out an independent life, so she is highly salient in the context. In addition, because *-self* often suggests that its referent is playing more than one role, she is a likely referent.

#### Other referents

As noted above, argument *-self* forms may also refer to another entity that is mentioned within the clause, as shown in (27a) and (b) below. In those examples, the previous mentions of the referents are proximate (and thus highly salient). And once again, the hearer will infer that the meaning of *-self* has been used because its referent has another role at the same time:

- (27) a. “A Way in the World” is, he says, “a settling of accounts for **me** with **myself**,” for what he regards as errors of artistic judgment. (GNS)
- b. He described it as a desperation effort to save **Japan** from **itself**. (NYTC-6/21/98)

### First and second person

As noted above, speakers and hearers are direct participants in any communicative event, and are therefore always highly accessible and may be referred to by *-self* forms even when they are neither IN-FOCUS nor proximately mentioned, as in the passages in (18), repeated here:

- (28) a. He added: “The interests of the nation and the people do not require a trial or conflicts among **ourselves**, but national reconciliation.” (NYTC-12/29/98)
- b. The scene is the ladies’ room at Time Cafe on Lafayette Street. The cast: a young woman and **myself**. From one of the stalls, I hear her laying out cosmetics, etc. One sigh after another. I emerge. Our eyes meet. (YMD)

### Logophoric uses: subjects of consciousness

In logophoric uses, the Subjects of Consciousness (SCs) are indeed highly accessible in the discourse:

- (29) a. She [Christine] could not see him in the army, on either side; he wasn’t the type, and to her knowledge he had not believed in any particular ideology. He would be something nondescript, something in the background, like **herself**; perhaps he had become an interpreter. (AMM 31)
- b. She [Trudi] felt a sudden rush of power, the power to stay alive. She’d kept others alive with her stories when they’d come close to being found. This time it was for **herself**. (HSR 383)
- c. As he was about to slip the catch on the inside lock Morrison glanced once more around the room. He could see now where it got its air of pastiche: the bookcase was a copy of the one in Paul’s living room, the prints and the table were almost identical with

those at the Samisens'. Other details stirred dim images of objects half-noted in the various houses, at the various but nearly identical get-acquainted parties. Poor Louise had been trying to construct herself out of the other people she had met. Only from **himself** had she taken nothing; thinking of his chill interior, embryonic and blighted, he realized it had nothing for her to take. (APO 70)

In (29a), Christine is the SC throughout most of the short story in which this passage appears. The reader understands that it is not the author's thoughts being reported, but rather, they are Christine's thoughts. Christine is also the main character of the story, adding to her accessibility. In addition, the IN-FOCUS entity, *he*, does not match the gender of the *-self* pronoun, and is therefore an unlikely potential referent.

The passage in (29b) is described from Trudi's point of view. Trudi has been arrested, and is hoping to win her freedom by recounting stories to her guard. We learn her inner feelings, and what she was thinking. In addition, the IN-FOCUS participant of the clause, *it*, does not detract from Trudi's high salience prior to the clause in which *-self* appears. Not only does *it* not match the gender of the *-self* form, but *it* also makes only a vague and nebulous reference to a general situation, and is therefore unlikely to attract much processing attention. As we will see, it is not unusual for indefinite uses of *it* to serve as IN-FOCUS entities in clauses for which the previous mention of *-self*'s referent is outside the pronoun's own clause.

The passage in (29c) is a description of Morrison's activities and thoughts. Morrison, the SC for this passage, is highly accessible to the reader, who is aware

that the details being reported represent Morrison's own experience. The IN-FOCUS entity is Louise, who does not match the gender of *himself*, and is therefore an unlikely referent. Morrison is highly accessible in spite of the fact that Paul is actually the most recently mentioned matching entity. While Paul does match the person, gender and number features of the *-self* pronoun, he is neither linguistically prominent (he is mentioned within a prepositional phrase, in the genitive case), nor is he contextually important in the story.

#### Other sources of accessibility

If we were looking for a mechanical procedure to identify the referents of *-self*, we would need to create additional categories and rules to account for non-logophoric uses in which there is no other intraclausal mention of the same referent. But in the present framework, as long as there are other ways in which an entity may become highly accessible, and the meaning of *-self* forms is appropriate to the intended communication, we will expect to find uses in which the referent of *-self* becomes highly accessible in some other way.

In many examples, such as (20) and (21) above, the source of entities' **accessibility** is not easily categorizable, but must be described with reference to its specific context:

- (30) a. Had he married a more amiable woman, he might have been made still more respectable than he was: –he might even have been made amiable himself; for he was very young when he married, and very fond of his wife. But Mrs. John Dashwood was a strong caricature of **himself**; –more narrow-minded and selfish. (Baker 1995).

- b. Only Elizabeth was an artist to her fingertips, and whichever of her talents she used, she used it differently from all the rest of us. Her perceptions, so different from ours, have nourished me through the years. Her understanding of what has gone on in schools has provided depth and life to my own observations on American education. And her paintings have made every place I have lived in my home. I have the first watercolor she ever painted and a painting of the New York Stock Exchange building she made for Father. I have a painting of Grandma, Priscilla, and **herself**, dressed for church, standing by the gate to our house in Holicong, and another of the view from our windows in Philadelphia. (MBW 69)
  
- c. He [Mead's father] was as forgetful and as careless of material things as he had always been, but as he did not smoke and the furnace had an automatic fire arrangement, the principal hazards were to **himself** and not the neighbors in whose children he was deeply interested and for whose sake he had taken down the fence so that they would have more room to play. (MBW 42)
  
- d. Each week, she got another of these letters, more or less identical. In one of them a colour print was enclosed: **himself**, slightly cross-eyed and grinning hilariously, even more spindly than she remembered him against her billowing draperies, flowers exploding around them like firecrackers, one of his hands an equivocal blur in her lap, the other out of sight; on her own face, astonishment and outrage, as though he was sticking her in the behind with his hidden thumb (AMM 20)

In (30a), John Dashwood, the referent of *himself*, is the topic of the paragraph, and in addition to being IN-FOCUS with respect to six events in that paragraph, he is conceptually prominent even within the clause in which the In-Focus entity is *Mrs. John Dashwood*.

In (30b), the referent of *herself* is the author's sister, Elizabeth, who is also the topic of the paragraph in which the *-self* form appears. Elizabeth is mentioned nine times in this paragraph, including as the IN-FOCUS entity prior to the clause in which the *-self* pronoun occurs. In addition, the context makes it clear that Elizabeth is the person who produced the painting in which she appears, so she is indeed accessible in this passage. (She also has more than a single role, as both the painter and the painted.)

The referent of *himself* is especially important and therefore accessible in (30c), which appears in a chapter entitled "My Father and Academia" in Margaret Mead's autobiography. The passage pertains to her father's life after the death of her mother; in the previous paragraph, she writes "The way in which one's parents grow old matters a great deal". While her father is not the IN-FOCUS entity of *-self*'s clause, he is IN-FOCUS with respect to three of the previous events. In addition, the IN-FOCUS entity of the pronoun's clause is *the principal hazards*, which does not match the number of the *-self* form.

In (30d), another mention of the referent of *-self* cannot be found within the form's own clause, or within the same sentence. The referent is neither IN-FOCUS, nor has he been proximately mentioned. Nevertheless, he is highly accessible and easily identifiable, as he is one of the main characters in the story, an entity on whom attention is concentrated in the text, and the one who is known to be sending the letters.

Supporting the reader's ability to correctly identify the intended referents in all these examples are the morphological features of the *-self* forms, which do not match the IN-FOCUS nor proximately mentioned entities. But in other examples we have seen, i.e., those in (31), the IN-FOCUS participant **does** match the person, gender and number features of the *-self* form:

- (31) a. At the signing ceremony, Mr. Arafat promised Mr. Netanyahu that "your security is our security". But Palestinians doubt that the rules will be applied against Israelis in the way they are applied against **themselves**<sub>1</sub>. (ECO)
- b. The girls were wearing red satin dresses that had obviously been made by **themselves**. (HG)
- c. They wore bathing suits that protected **themselves** from the harmful rays of the sun. (HBS)
- d. They wore badges identifying **themselves** by name. (NYTC-1/13/99)
- e. He turned his head toward the voice and looked into the half-closed eyes of a boy who seemed not much older than **himself**. (LGI 119)

These examples further demonstrate that relative accessibility rankings do not determine the referent of *-self*, as these referents are not necessarily **more** accessible than the IN-FOCUS entities. It is only through an active process of message interpretation and inference that hearers are able to identify the referent intended by the speaker. For example, in (31a), it would not make sense if the referent of *-self* were the In-Focus entity, *the rules*. Such an interpretation would lead to a highly implausible message. In (31b), (c) and (d), unless the contexts are magical ones, dresses cannot make themselves, bathing suits don't protect themselves, and

badges don't identify themselves. And we have already seen that in (31e), it does not make sense for a boy to be older than himself, so the hearer discards this implausible interpretation.

## 5. Summary

We have presented evidence that has allowed us to make the following points:

- a. Referent-finding is not the key to an understanding of *-self* pronouns. The many uses of these forms that are unrelated to referential differences (including all first and second person uses) suggest another reason for the existence of *-self* pronouns. An understanding of *-self* must account for such non-referential uses, as well as for the referential differences in the third person.
- b. Because there is little communicative risk of identifying the wrong referent for first and second person pronouns, speakers are freer to exploit the meaning difference between these two types of forms in these persons for other reasons, and there is therefore a greater flexibility in the use of *-self* pronouns in first and second persons.
- c. Hearers must always interpret the linguistic information provided in an utterance to understand the intended reference of any forms. We have seen that there are no syntactic or otherwise consistently applicable categorical rules that can establish the identity of *-self* pronouns in discourse. In addition, the same factors operate both within and between sentences, and

there is therefore no need to separate clause-internal referent-finding from discourse-level referent-finding.

- d. The referents of *-self* forms are always highly accessible, though they are not necessarily the **most** highly accessible entities. We cannot measure accessibility, and therefore cannot establish a cut-off point for minimal accessibility for the referent of a *-self* form. The hearer's evaluation of the plausibility and coherence of the intended message is the overriding factor that guides the inferential processes involved in determining the reference of *-self* forms. This evaluation is on a case-by-case basis, and the factors that enter into the process are too numerous and varied to be reduced to a categorical rule.

## Notes to Chapter 4

1. For example, Gordon and Hendrick (1999); Chambers and Smyth (1998); Oppy (1995); Gordon (1995); Smyth (1994); Greene et. al. (1992, 1994); McKoon et. al. (1993) and others.
2. McDonald and MacWhinney (1995) discuss the role of gender information in pronoun interpretation, concluding that hearers may not begin processing gender information precisely at the moment that the pronoun is encountered, but that “there is abundant evidence to indicate that gender information influences later interpretations and later responses to overt sentence interpretation tasks” (p. 547).
3. See Reid (1991) for the same point regarding verb and noun number in English.
4. Examples from Ross (1970), credited with being the first to make this observation, are shown in Chapter 1.
5. As saw in example (5), the problem is not completely non-existent in first and second persons, but it is considerably lessened.
6. While these meanings may be used as guides by the hearer, it was shown above that they do not provide algorithmic instructions that can be followed mechanically without the mediation of the hearer’s inferential powers.
7. The discrepancy between the sum of 65 and 31, and the total, 95, is due to rounding.
8. The judgments elicited from subjects in these experiments may not be reliable indicators of their actual use of language, as it appears that in context, speakers could readily accept that these *-self* pronouns could refer to non-subjects as well.
9. As discussed in Chapter 3, Zribi-Hertz (1989) proposes a discourse level as a separate component of grammar to handle cases like these. Sentences that are not generated by the sentence-level grammar would be shunted off to a discourse component, where they would have another chance at being licensed.
10. Baker (1995) describes this phenomenon for British English, but it is in fact not limited geographically, as discussed in Chapter 2. Examples (21a) and (b) were produced by an American writer, Margaret Mead, and (21c) was written by a Canadian author, Margaret Atwood.

11. See, for example, Keenan (1976).
12. Although the semantic substance Focus may be reminiscent of the meaning INSISTENCE, which also pertains to the amount of attention concentrated on an entity, Focus concerns only the amount of attention concentrated on an entity with respect to an event. The presence of an event, or a referent's participation in an event, is not part of the meaning insistence.
13. Following other Columbia research and the rejection of the traditional syntactic categories of parts of speech, Reid and Huffman describe entities and events in their analyses (in place of the syntactic categories of nouns and verbs). Unlike nouns and verbs which are defined as syntactic classes, entities and events are types of interpretations of lexical centers.
14. The English Focus system interlocks with the Control System, which categorizes participants as to the degree of control they have in an event. For a full explanation and discussion, see Reid (1991) and Huffman (1993).
15. Pronouns do not generally appear in positions of LESS FOCUS (*There am I; There sat he*).
16. In the New York Times corpus, 74% of appositive uses of *-self* immediately follow a previous mention of the same referent.
17. While the animacy of the participants affects the interpretation of the utterance, it is beyond the scope of this research to specify whether animacy also affects the psychological accessibility of the referents.

## Chapter 5

### **Appositive environments**

In this chapter we will examine *-self* pronouns in apposition. We will look beyond this very general label “emphatics” in order to more precisely describe the message effects that result from the use of these forms. We will demonstrate that *-self* forms occur where their meaning, INSISTENCE, contributes to the intended communication. As noted in Chapter 1, INSISTENCE can be understood as an emphatic reference that draws additional attention to an entity or entities. By INSISTING ON A REFERENT, speakers communicate a variety of message elements, including differentiating one entity from others, expressing the intrinsic or local prominence of a referent, emphasizing a referent’s role in an event, and excluding others from reference. Speakers also INSIST when they realize that a referent’s role in an utterance is unexpected to a hearer, or, to contrast the referent with others. By INSISTING and thereby shining extra attention on a referent, *-self* forms also add to that entity’s importance in discourse.

None of the message effects we will describe are present in every use of appositive *-self*. However, what is common to every use of appositive *-self* (and as we will see, to every use of argument *-self* as well) is the meaning INSISTENCE. The contextual interpretations of these forms are the result of the deployment by speakers and writers of the meaning INSISTENCE.

The rubrics in this and the following chapters organize the diverse communications to which *-self* forms contribute, representing only convenient groups into which varying message types may be sorted. These message types are neither units of linguistic analysis nor a classification of linguistic structure, as the number and kinds of messages that speakers may communicate cannot be enumerated in any list.

There is a great deal of overlap between different uses. The appearance of a grammatical formative in a particular context is not necessarily motivated by, nor is it an instantiation of, a single message category (Davis 1997; Huffman 1997: 84). Rather, any single use of a form may be caused by and may suggest many different message elements simultaneously. The messages which hearers understand depend on the linguistic and extralinguistic contexts which give rise to varying inferences about the speaker's communicative intentions. And novel uses are always possible as meanings are deployed to meet new and ever-changing communicative demands.

### **1. Appositives and arguments**

*-Self* forms contribute the same invariant meanings to the same types of messages in both appositive and argument uses. However, for presentational purposes our examples are grouped into these two categories, loosely defined in terms of whether the referent of the form has a distinct role in the utterance. As we have noted, appositive uses largely correspond to traditional emphatic uses of *-self*, in which the *-self* form is a repetition of another entity named in the clause, without

a distinct role for the additional mention (e.g., *Harry washed the car himself* vs. *Harry washed the car*  $\emptyset$ ). Simple pronouns generally do not appear in these environments. If the *-self* forms were not included, there would be a loss of clarity and nuance, but not a loss of coherency. Appositives can be omitted from utterances without affecting the most conspicuous message elements that pertain to what many linguists give priority as truth-conditional semantics, and to what Diver (1975) called the scene.

Arguments contrast with appositives, as they are non-repetitious mentions of entities with their own role in an interpreted utterance. In argument uses, both *-self* and simple pronouns can occur (e.g., *John saw himself* vs. *John saw him*). Following Kemmer and Barlow (1996) and Cresswell (1997), the term “argument” will be applied here not only to participants selected by the verb (e.g., *Ben saw Mary*), but to **any** entity with its own role (e.g., *Mary was looking at a picture of Ben in the newspaper*).

The distinction between argument and appositives is not theoretically significant, and not all uses can be easily classified as either argument or appositive. For example, in (1), *-self* is part of an appositive phrase, but it also appears to have a distinct role in that phrase:

- (1) When Mr. Leopold assigns Celia to write a film review, she turns for help to her father, **himself** a reviewer (as was the author’s father, Anatole Broyard, a book critic for *The New York Times*), who in a burst of impatience does the work for her. (LHF)

*-Self* in (1) meets most of the informal conditions we have given for both appositives (it could be omitted without a loss of coherency and simple pronouns do not occur) and arguments (it has a distinct role). From our point of view, the classification of this example as an appositive or an argument is not important; the distributional fact to be explained is the occurrence of *-self* in this context, and the nearly complete absence of simple pronouns in such environments.

The status of *-self* as either an argument or an appositive is not a structural property given as part of the linguistic input, but must be determined by the hearer on the basis of his interpretation of the utterance. In (2), the *-self* pronoun appears immediately following the verb, a position in which it could be interpreted as a direct object. However, due to the implausibility of someone *philandering himself*, the hearer understands that the speaker does not intend the *-self* form to be construed as an argument:

- (2) ... President Vaclav Havel was not merely repaying a friend for bringing his country into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A target of accusations of *philandering himself*, he was standing in solidarity with a fellow politician contending with a culture much more judgmental than his own. (KTP)

Example (2) shows that appositiveness is a contingent, contextually-based conclusion, which depends on the hearer's interpretation of the signaled meanings.

A much wider context including extra-clausal information is sometimes needed to determine whether a *-self* pronoun should be interpreted as an argument or as an appositive. Generally, construing *-self* as the direct object of *asked* is quite plausible, as in (3a). But in spite of what might appear to be a canonical

S-V-O word order in (3b), the *-self* pronoun there should be interpreted not as an argument, but as an appositive:

- (3) a. Richard never asked **himself** that question.
- b. Ms. O'Neill booked the trip herself, madly dialing 800 numbers into the night .... Then she brokered a deal with her travel agent that allowed her to finalize the arrangements in exchange for the agent's discount and half the commission. "Even Richard, who would never have asked **himself**, was impressed this time," she said. (BCS)

Identifying whether a token of *-self* should be interpreted to refer to an entity with a distinct role requires the hearer to understand the utterance and to evaluate the likelihood of possible messages.

## 2. INSISTENCE in appositive uses

In this chapter, we will concentrate on the meaning INSISTENCE in appositive uses, in which an entity also receives more attention by virtue of being additionally mentioned in a linguistic context in which the pronoun could have been omitted entirely. In Chapters 6 and 7 we will look at *-self* forms in argument uses. In all these cases, we will demonstrate how the meaning INSISTENCE motivates the forms' distribution, as speakers select it in order to achieve a variety of communicative effects. A complete outline of the signal and meaning hypotheses proposed in this study will be postponed until Chapter 8.

In the following sections, we will look beyond the overly general rubric "emphatic," and try to more carefully analyze the interpretations of *-self* forms in apposition. As we have noted, other analysts, like Cresswell (1997), Kemmer

(1995) and Kemmer and Barlow (1996), have insightfully identified some of the message effects and the contributions made by appositive *-self* to messages. We will see that the meanings they have posited are frequent inferences that result from the use of the meaning INSISTENCE, but none of them is present in every use of *-self*.<sup>1</sup>

### 2.1 *Differentiating potential referents*

The meaning INSISTENCE can alert hearers to pay extra attention to someone or something when there might be difficulty identifying precisely which referent is intended. By INSISTING on a referent, a speaker can steer the hearer away from unintended connections between the actual referent and the possible but unintended ones. In (4), the name *Jerry Seinfeld* does not unambiguously point to a single entity. Readers might think of Jerry Seinfeld, the person, or of his eponymous television show *Seinfeld*:

- (4) a. Jerry Seinfeld is back: not the television show, but the comedian **himself**. He has returned to his hometown to appear on Broadway. (HNY)
- b. Jerry Seinfeld is back: not the television show, but the comedian. He has returned to his hometown to appear on Broadway. (Unattested)

The initial statement *Jerry Seinfeld is back* could refer to either the man or the television show. The meaning INSISTENCE is used to help clarify what the writer means: Jerry Seinfeld the comedian is back, not “Seinfeld” the show. The writer could have omitted the *-self* form as in (4b), and the factual content of the utterance could still be understood. However, the presence of the *-self* form is an

acknowledgment by the writer of the reader's expectations, as the writer **INSISTS** on the referent because she expected some confusion regarding the referent's identity. (The non-occurrence of other types of pronouns in this and other appositive uses will be discussed in Section 2.8.)

In example (5) the meaning **INSISTENCE** is used to distinguish several closely related entities that might not be differentiated from the specifically intended referent. The writer wants to distinguish a book from its packaging and publishing circumstances:

- (5) It is wrong, almost always, to review the blurbs, cover, publicity, contract or circumstances surrounding a book instead of the book **itself**. (PSM)

In this example, the word *book* is used in a particularly narrow sense, referring only to that which the author has written. The writer, a book reviewer, wants to differentiate the content from all other related elements, which are aspects of a book that a reader may consider when thinking of, or evaluating, a book.

Two examples offered in Kemmer (1995: 60) also show this pattern:

- (6) - 'How was the banquet?'  
- 'The dinner **itself** was fine, but after that it was all downhill. I was bored to death.'
- (7) On the way we stopped to have a look at old Miller's place. The gardens were overgrown, but in a picturesque kind of way; the layout was charmingly old-fashioned. The little lake was mostly dried up, and the dock was pretty much rotted away. The house **itself** was in pretty good repair, though ...

The speaker in (6), in answering the query about the banquet, wants to distinguish the dinner from other details of the event. A banquet consists of many parts,

including possibly dinner, dessert, drinks, music, décor, other guests, etc. In (7), *old Miller's place* includes gardens and a lake. The speaker wants to be sure to distinguish the house from these other related entities, and uses *-self* to zero in precisely on that referent.

Kemmer does not characterize the message type in the way it has been described here. Her account of these examples involves a discourse pattern that she calls “first-mention emphatic,” in which an entity has not been previously mentioned, but is naturally prominent in an overall conception that has been invoked by the preceding context. Indeed, the dinner and the house are salient parts in a conceptualization of the banquet and the home being described in these passages. But what is missing from Kemmer’s characterization is that speakers are specifically differentiating the entity referred to by *-self* from distinct but related elements of the scene. In all four examples, *-self* forms could have been omitted by the writers, but were put in for the purpose of INSISTING on their referents to distinguish those referents from other, closely related entities. We will return to the interpretation of these four examples in more detail later in this chapter.

## **2.2 *Intrinsically prominent referents***

One of the results of additionally mentioning and INSISTING on any entity is to confer additional attention on that individual. For this reason, *-self* pronouns can be useful when a speaker wishes to express the notability of a referent, as in (8) -

(10). **INSISTING** on a referent can create a spotlight, corresponding to a magnified conception held of that individual:

- (8) They constantly badgered me to do the “James Brown” for them, a squiggling of the feet made famous by the “Godfather of Soul” **himself**, who back in the sixties was bigger than life. (MCW 104)
- (9) Nell and Lillian stood at the front door and waved goodbye to Tom. Rachel wouldn’t stir herself from a chair to say goodbye to Jesus Christ **himself**. (ABE 194)
- (10) A radio DJ, following a song by the well-known and greatly admired Bette Midler: “That was the Divine Miss M **herself**.”

Like differentiating related entities, conferring importance is another motivation for the use of the meaning **INSISTENCE** on a referent. The message effect seen in (4) through (7) of distinguishing one of several potential referents is not present in (9) and (10) because there are no closely related, competing entities from which these referents must be distinguished. In (8), there is some possible referential confusion, as the designation James Brown is not only the name of a man (nicknamed the Godfather of Soul) but also the name of a dance step that the man is known for.

Not only do these *-self* pronouns refer to prominent entities, but by virtue of **INSISTING** on them, and shining that additional spotlight, the forms confer additional attention and thereby contribute to the message that their referents are important.

### Overlapping message types

It is not always possible to tell apart the two motivations that we have just discussed for the meaning INSISTENCE. In the next example, the referent of *-self* is of singular importance, but she is also closely related to another person from whom she might not easily be distinguished, and both message elements exist simultaneously. The referent of *-self* in (11) is a fictional character, Dame Edna Everage. Dame Edna is a *grand dame*, a member of the British aristocracy who compares herself to personages no less eminent than the Queen of England and Margaret Thatcher. She is described as a “self-possessed megastar,” so the use of *-self* in the next example can be understood to express her celebrity and grandeur:

- (11) Utterly unadorned, Dame Edna is said to look alarmingly like her manager. This is a matter of common hearsay, and it has reached the sensitive ears of the dame **herself**. (HAU)

But INSISTING on the eminence of this referent is not the only intended element of the communication here. The rumor that has reached Dame Edna is that she doesn't exist, that she is just a performance by her manager, Barry Humphries. This rumor is true; Dame Edna is a character conceived and portrayed by Mr. Humphries, and it is indeed tricky to distinguish between Dame Edna and the actor who portrays her. The meaning INSISTENCE on the referent not only helps to highlight the importance of Dame Edna, but also differentiates her (the creation) from Humphries (the creator). Both these message elements are motivations for, and inferences resulting from, the use of the meaning INSISTENCE in (11).

### 2.3 *Locally prominent referents*

This category is similar to the previous one, but here the referent's importance is not an overall illustriousness, but instead prominence or importance in relation to others in the context. It is not felicitous to INSIST, to refer with additional energy, to an entity that is not important. But the source of an entity's importance need not be "intrinsic," as in the previous section; an entity may also be important in the local context. *-Self* forms are used to refer to (relatively) important entities, because they also confer additional importance on them.

In this group of uses, *-self* designates referents that are important in relation to other entities in a set, a use that has been documented by other linguists (e.g., Baker 1995; Kemmer 1995). The following example illustrates. The reference set in (12) is those people who knew or wrote about a well-known Japanese geisha, who has written a memoir:

- (12) But she leaves behind as well a record of herself that is far more complete, more accurate, and more compelling than the lengthy chapter examining her life in the book *Glittering Jewels of Japan*, or in the various magazine articles about her that have appeared over the years. It seems that at least in the case of this one unusual subject, no one knew the memoirist as well as the memoirist **herself**. (GMG 2)

By INSISTING on the memoirist, the writer expresses the importance of this woman in relation to the other memoirists that have been mentioned. The geisha is the most important person in this set, because it is only through knowing her that these people form a group at all. Though there is no difficulty in distinguishing the intended referent from others, *-self* still does separate its referent from other

potential referents, in that the geisha is being differentiated from others who have written about her. Thus, the meaning INSISTENCE simultaneously contributes to more than just one interpretation.

In the next example, the set of entities includes four people to be called to testify before the United States Senate:

- (13) Hutchinson also suggested four other witnesses: Betty Currie, Clinton's private secretary; John Podesta, the White House chief of staff; Sidney Blumenthal, another presidential aide, and Clinton **himself**. (ATP)

Here, the use of *-self* is not primarily motivated by the overall eminence of its referent, Bill Clinton (after all, he is the one on trial), but more by his **relative** importance in relation to the other individuals being considered. He is most important not only because he is the president, but also as the defendant in the proceeding. As in (12), there is no referential confusion in this example; still, the meaning INSISTENCE serves to separate its referent from his close aides, all of whom are identified as potential witnesses. Again here, we see the blend of motivations that characterizes the use of linguistic meanings.

This same pattern can also be seen in examples (6) and (7). As Kemmer points out, the intended referents of *-self* (the house, the dinner) have greater prominence than the related entities from which they are being distinguished.

The meaning INSISTENCE adds to the prominence of any referent. It is not necessary, or even always possible, to determine whether the source of a referent's prominence is inherent or contextual. As an example, commerce may be considered intrinsically prominent by some people, but not by others. But in the

conception evoked by the phrase *Internet commerce* in example (14), commerce in general is surely contextually prominent:

- (14) At stake here, said Richard Blumenthal, attorney general for Connecticut, “is whether Microsoft’s control over gateways could throttle Internet commerce – and indeed, commerce **itself**.” (NYTC-5/19/98)

Whether commerce in general is understood to be intrinsically prominent, or merely prominent in this context, is unimportant. The meaning INSISTENCE confers additional attention, and is therefore only appropriate for entities who merit that attention, entities who have some significance that is worth INSISTING on.

#### 2.4 *INSISTING on the referent’s role in an event*

The meaning INSISTENCE draws extra attention to the referent of *-self*, and it magnifies and amplifies the mention of that entity. INSISTING on a referent may result in emphasis on the role of that referent in an event.<sup>2</sup> In the following passage regarding the solicitation of campaign funds from the White House, *-self* helps express a message like “and I do mean that **he** is the one who performed this action.”

- (15) It’s an indication that the president was deeply involved **himself personally** in the [solicitation of money]. (RTO)

The speaker is INSISTING on the president, INSISTING that it was really he – the president! – who was involved. The use of *-self* in (15) draws extra attention to its referent, like the double mention of the president in the preceding sentence (“he – the president!”), as a way of stressing that it was indeed the president, and not just

other people around him, who were involved in the solicitation of money. The use of the word *personally* also contributes to this message effect, highlighting the fact that it was really the president, and not someone else who may have been acting on his behalf, whose actions are being described.

The familiar overlap of message types can be seen here as well, since (15) exemplifies not only INSISTING on the referent's role, but also the other communicative effects we have considered. Even though the other potential referents are not named, the president is being differentiated from other aides and associates who might have been involved in improper fundraising activities. And, the referent is clearly a prominent individual: he is the President of the United States.

The meaning INSISTENCE in the next example also results in an emphasis on the referent's role in an event; it has an effect that can be paraphrased as "yes, that's right, **he** is the one who goes":

- (16) When some workers are killed at a Bridgestone tire plant in Oklahoma City, he [Robert Reich, U.S. Secretary of Labor] decides to go **himself** to slap on a fine and dramatically seek a court order to fix the unsafe machinery. (TIB)

INSISTING on this referent stresses that he is the one who performed the action, and not any other entities who might have been more likely to do it. Additionally, and following the general multi-motivational pattern we have seen, INSISTING on Reich has the effect of differentiating him from other, closely related individuals to whom the task might have been delegated. Further, Reich is a prominent individual, a high-ranking government official, and the repeated mention of him along with the meaning INSISTENCE confers additional importance on him.

## 2.5 *Exclusion of others*

INSISTING on a referent to emphasize its role in an event can have the effect of removing attention from others who may also have participated, thereby pointing to a specific referent, to the exclusion of other possible referents. In (17), the meaning INSISTENCE concentrates attention on the mother:

- (17) Our society has thought up a dozen ingenious ways to put distance between mothers and their babies. It invented anesthetized childbirth, so a mother misses the dramatic evidence of having carried and borne her baby **herself**. (SBC 7)

In this passage, INSISTING on the mother leads to a focus on her role in the birth, and away from the roles of other parties, thereby excluding the doctors and the medical establishment who might also have participated. But here again, exclusion of others is just part of the message communicated by the *-self* form. The meaning INSISTENCE stresses the mother's role in the activity. And because this passage is about childbirth, the mother is highly prominent in the context; the *-self* form confers additional importance on her.

In the next three examples, advertisers deploy the meaning INSISTENCE to suggest that certain projects can be completed without the participation of others. By INSISTING on their referents, the *-self* forms stress the performance of the actions by these referents, to the exclusion of the professionals who might also perform these tasks:

- (18) You have to do your taxes, but you don't have to do your taxes **yourself!** (HRB)

- (19) Let JC Penney Custom Decorating measure, design, and install custom window treatments for you. [Or,] Measure for window coverings **yourself**... here's how. (JCP)
- (20) A caption under a picture of a woman: "I was going to hire an artist to design my brochure. But then I got PrintMaster... and did it **myself**!"

In (18), a tax preparation company is urging people to get help doing their taxes. Everyone must do their taxes, but saying *you have to do your taxes yourself* suggests that you – and only you, without the help of others – have to do it. The tax preparation company is urging people to rely on their company's services in the preparation of tax returns. In (19), JC Penney offers customers two choices: let someone else measure your windows, or **you** do the measuring, that is, alone, without assistance. The software mentioned in (20) offers the same option. The ad quotes a woman who explains that instead of hiring someone to design a brochure for her company, she herself did it personally, alone, without assistance. By **INSISTING** on the referent's role in an activity, the *-self* forms in these examples direct hearers to note only the referent, and to thereby exclude other possible participants from the event. The referents are thereby differentiated from others who might have participated, and as direct participants in the speech act and agents of the named activities (doing taxes, measuring, and designing), the referents are prominent in the discourse.

The exclusion of others that is present in these examples can also be seen when *-self* forms are used to **INSIST** on a referent of great importance or

eminence. In fact, the phrase *none other than* captures this implication, and one can readily imagine a paraphrase of (10):

(21) That was **none other than** the Divine Miss M (herself).

The following attested example shows both the phrase *none other than*, which points to a referent specifically to the exclusion of all others, and the meaning INSISTENCE, used to highlight the singular importance of the form's referent.

(22) The man died without a penny, yet his children grew up to graduate from college, to become doctors, professors, teachers, and professionals all. It was the work, they said, of **none other than** Jesus Christ **Himself**. (MCW 251)

#### Why exclusion is not the meaning of appositive *-self*

Exclusion is one of the most common messages associated with the use of *-self* pronouns, but this message effect is not part of the meaning of *-self*.<sup>3</sup> Instead, exclusion is an inference that results from the use of the meaning INSISTENCE. Referring always implies the exclusion of all that is not referred to, and INSISTING on a referent implies the exclusion of all that is not INSISTED on. Since any act of referring includes an exclusion of those who are not included in the reference, it follows that because INSISTING implies a stronger act of referring, it implies a concomitantly stronger exclusion. Even the use of proper names suggests an exclusion of those who are not named. For instance, in the act of referring to someone named *Ben*, those who are not named Ben are not designated by that reference and so are necessarily excluded. Just as referring always implies the exclusion of all that is not referred to, INSISTING on a referent always implies the

exclusion of all that is not INSISTED on. In some examples, such as (17) through (22), exclusion of others is quite salient, while in other examples, it is less so. The degree to which exclusion is a salient part of the inferred message depends on the presence of other entities, and the possibility that they might be in the same role. (In examples (8) through (10), and other examples of eminent referents, the message of exclusion derives from an allusion to the impossibility of others being in the same, exalted role as the referent itself.)

## 2.6 *Unexpected referents*

Unexpected situations provide another reason why a speaker chooses to INSIST on a referent. The meaning INSISTENCE can function as a “heads-up” warning to hearers, a notice that they should pay attention because there might be something about the referent that is not anticipated. By INSISTING, a speaker draws additional attention to a referent, so the meaning is well-suited to messages in which the referent’s identity will be surprising to hearers. In the next example, the actions of Mom, the referent of *herself*, are indeed surprising:

- (23) I was very sick as a child, and none of the doctors could figure out what was wrong with me. But Mom was persistent. She did research at a medical school library and found a doctor who cured me. Then, Mom **herself** went to medical school at age thirty-nine. Today she has her own private practice and specializes in treating people with chronic medical problems.  
(BTM)

The message effects are something like this: “Yes, my mother did this. It is unusual for a Mom to go to medical school, but that is indeed what happened.”

But as we have seen, INSISTING on a referent results in a variety of interpretations.

Mom is locally prominent in this passage, both as the mother of the sick child, and because she is mentioned several times; INSISTING accords her additional importance. Further, INSISTING on Mom stresses that she actually performed the action (*went to medical school*), surprising though that may be. There is no need to differentiate Mom from other closely related entities, because none are mentioned or suggested by the text.

Another example of an unexpected message is found in (24), in which the phrases *the second shock, almost incomprehensible news* and *none other than*, also contribute to the message that the facts being described are indeed surprising and unexpected:

- (24) The second shock came when police identified the victims: Nicole Brown Simpson, 35, ex-wife of onetime football star O.J. Simpson, and Ronald Goldman, 25, a waiter and part-time model. Then came the almost incomprehensible news that the prime suspect in the case was none other than Simpson **himself**. (UNK)

However, as we have seen with all the message elements discussed so far, it is not only the unexpectedness of this referent that motivates the use of the meaning INSISTENCE. This referent has both local prominence (he is the ex-husband of one of the victims), and global prominence (he is famous as a professional football star and television celebrity), and the meaning INSISTENCE expresses his importance. The message effect of exclusion is present as well, expressed by the phrase *none other than*, which designates a referent specifically to the exclusion of all others. However, since there are no other potential referents in the context, there is no need to differentiate an entity from other possible referents in this example.

The unexpectedness that we see in the examples in this section is common to many of the examples we have previously considered, and is in general a prevalent motivation for speakers' use of the meaning INSISTENCE. In the example seen earlier about the comedian Jerry Seinfeld, repeated here, the identity of the comedian is actually unexpected:

- (25) Jerry Seinfeld is back: not the television show, but the comedian **himself**. He has returned to his hometown to appear on Broadway. (HNY)

The *Seinfeld* television series had been hugely popular, and the end of its final season a few months earlier had been a highly publicized event. The name *Seinfeld* was associated primarily with the TV series (and not with the man), and many viewers had been longing for the show's return. Thus, to many enthusiastic fans, the implication of the statement *Jerry Seinfeld is back* must have been that the show was coming back. But that was not the case. Instead, the surprising news was that Seinfeld the comedian was performing on Broadway.

Example (16), repeated here, was originally described as exemplifying the message category of INSISTING on a referent's role in an event. In addition, the actions of the form's referent are quite unexpected:

- (26) When some workers are killed at a Bridgestone tire plant in Oklahoma City, he [Robert Reich, U.S. Secretary of Labor] decides to go **himself** to slap on a fine and dramatically seek a court order to fix the unsafe machinery. (TIB)

The Secretary of Labor is a high-ranking official, a member of the president's cabinet whose job is to make decisions, affect policy, and direct the activities of a large government department in which there are many employees whose job

description actually entails imposing fines and filing court papers. The normal procedure is for the Secretary of Labor to delegate such activities, and not to be directly involved in the details. However, in this particular case Reich breaks with the typical pattern, resulting in unusual and therefore unexpected behavior.

Why “unexpectedness” is not the meaning of appositive *-self*

Like exclusion and all the other message effects that have been considered here, unexpectedness is not posited as part of the meaning of *-self*. Unexpectedness is common to many of the examples we have seen, but it is a motivation for the use of the meaning INSISTENCE, and a possible contextual interpretation of it, only in some contexts. Example (6), repeated here, demonstrates that unexpectedness is not always a motivation for the use of these forms:

- (27) - ‘How was the banquet?’  
- ‘The dinner **itself** was fine, but after that it was all downhill. I was bored to death.’

There is no element of unexpectedness here. The most conspicuous element in a dinner banquet is quite expectedly the dinner itself, and the speaker’s evaluation of the dinner is an important part of the anticipated response.

## **2.7 Contrast**

Contrast and comparison are message elements that are closely related to the exclusion effect described above.<sup>4</sup> By INSISTING on a referent, and thereby excluding those who are not included in the reference, the forms may suggest a compari-

son between their referents and those who have been excluded. The next example, involving a discussion about who will make tea, will illustrate:

(28) He handed me a packet wrapped in rice paper, about the size of a fish head. "It's some Chinese herbs," he told me. "Don't listen to Dr. Miura if he tells you they're worthless. Have your sister make tea with them and give the tea to your mother, to ease the pain. They're very precious herbs. Make sure not to waste them."

"I'd better do it **myself** in that case, sir. My sister isn't very good at making tea." (GMG 19)

The meaning INSISTENCE on the referent draws extra attention to the fact that it will be the speaker, and therefore not her sister, who will make the tea, thereby creating a contrast between these two girls. The speaker's offer to make the tea is not only in contrast to her sister's making the tea, but it is also unexpected. The man's statement suggests that the narrator's older sister will be preparing tea, and the girl's response is counter to that expectation. Further, the narrator is a poor girl, and a rich and powerful man has just given her instructions. Surprisingly, the young girl decides not to do as she is told.

The contrast discussed here between the referent of *-self* and other possible entities is also part of most of the examples discussed above. As we have seen, referring to any entity excludes those who are not being referred to; INSISTENCE results in a stronger reference, and therefore a stronger exclusion. If a speaker INSISTS on a particular referent, then it is likely that there exist other referents on whom she is not INSISTING. Thus, there is an implied comparison between the referent of *-self* and some other entities in most of the passages in this section:

- (4): Jerry Seinfeld the comedian / Seinfeld the television show
- (5): a book / blurbs, cover, publicity other circumstances
- (6): dinner / ambiance, company, entertainment
- (7): house / other parts of the property: gardens, lake, dock
- (11) Dame Edna / Barry Humphries
- (12): the memoirist / those who have written about her
- (13) Clinton / Podesta, Blumenthal and another aide
- (15): the president / his aides
- (16): U.S. Secretary of Labor / other government workers
- (17): the mother / doctors, nurses, anesthesiologists, etc.
- (18): you / tax preparation company
- (19): yourself / JC Penney
- (20): myself / a professional artist
- (23): Mom / the doctors who themselves had already gone to medical school

In some of these examples, the comparison is more salient than in others. For example, in (18), (19) and (20), the contrast is obvious between the referent of *-self* and the professionals who might be hired to perform the same tasks. The contrast between the president and his aides in (15) is less evident, because the aides have not even been mentioned and the intended message has nothing to do with them.

Why contrast is not the meaning of appositive *-self*

Because contrast or comparison between the referent of *-self* and some other possible referents is one of the most persistent message effects associated with these forms, one may reasonably wonder if contrast should be posited as part of their meaning. The answer is no. We have seen some examples in which comparison is not part of the message at all. A few such examples are repeated here:

- (29) a. A radio DJ, following a song by the well-known and greatly admired Bette Midler: "That was the Divine Miss M **herself**."

- b. The second shock came when police identified the victims: Nicole Brown Simpson, 35, ex-wife of one-time football star O.J. Simpson, and Ronald Goldman, 25, a waiter and part-time model. Then came the almost incomprehensible news that the prime suspect in the case was none other than Simpson **himself**.
- c. It's an indication that the president was deeply involved **himself** personally in the [solicitation of money]. (RTO)
- d. I was very sick as a child, and none of the doctors could figure out what was wrong with me. But Mom was persistent. She did research at a medical school library and found a doctor who cured me. Then, Mom **herself** went to medical school at age thirty-nine. Today she has her own private practice and specializes in treating people with chronic medical problems. (BTM)

In example (29a), the referent is Bette Midler, who is described in grand and glowing terms. The passage seems to suggest there are no other entities with whom she might be compared, so there is no effect of contrast or comparison. Similarly, contrast is missing from examples (8), (9), and (22), in which the referents (James Brown, Jesus Christ, and again, Jesus Christ) are all personages of great eminence, with whom there can be no comparison.

Likewise, (29b) is another example that does not suggest a comparison between the referent of *-self* and others. The referent of *-self* is O.J. Simpson, who is identified as a suspect in a murder case. The meaning INSISTENCE contributes to highlighting Simpson's prominence, and at the same time, highlighting the unexpectedness of his role as a suspect. But there are no other possible suspects

mentioned in the passage, so a comparison between Simpson and others is not among the interpretations of *-self* in that example.

Other examples in which the contrast between the referent of *-self* and other entities is not a salient element in the communication are (29c and d). Hearers may perceive a contrast between the president and his aides, or between the mother and the medical establishment respectively, but the contrasting referents are not mentioned in the passage, and are only thought of because the referent of *-self* is unexpected, and the contrasting entities are the ones who are more likely to have been in the role.

## 2.8 *The non-occurrence of other pronouns in apposition*

The meanings hypothesized for the forms in the pronominal system explain why *-self*, but not other pronouns, occur in the appositive uses discussed above.<sup>5</sup>

- (30)
- a. Jerry Seinfeld is back: not the television show, but the comedian **himself**. He has returned to his hometown to appear on Broadway. (NYT 8/6/98)
  - b. Jerry Seinfeld is back: not the television show, but the comedian **him**. He has returned to his hometown to appear on Broadway. (Unattested)
  - c. Jerry Seinfeld is back: not the television show, but the comedian **he**. He has returned to his hometown to appear on Broadway. (Unattested)

In each example, the pronoun that follows the word *comedian* refers to a singular, third person male referent,<sup>6</sup> and one might wonder why writers do not choose these other forms (*him*, *he*) to repeat the reference to an entity in order to emphasize or draw further attention to him. (The possible omission of *-self* in this

example is discussed in Section 2 on page 167.) Perhaps, if English didn't have *-self* forms, a repeated mention of an entity by another type of pronoun could serve as a way of emphasizing, or INSISTING, on a notable referent. But English has a form whose meaning is INSISTENCE, so it will naturally be the one used for INSISTING. There is no need for speakers to rely on the non-specialized forms *him* or *he* that do not signal the meaning INSISTENCE. Reid (1991: 93) suggests an analogy between the use of meanings and carpentry tools. If a carpenter wishes to drive a nail into a board but doesn't have a hammer, he might use a block of wood, or he might find some other tool that can be adapted to the task; but if he has a hammer, the tool whose design is dedicated to this purpose, surely he will use the hammer. Likewise, if a speaker has the option of using a form whose meaning is INSISTENCE on a referent, she will use that meaning to INSIST, rather than another form whose meaning is not as well suited to the communicative task. The meaning INSISTENCE is appropriate to the intended communication in (30); the meanings in (b) and (c) are not.

But in fact, saying that simple pronouns never occur in these contexts is an oversimplification. A repeated pointing to a referent by means of a simple pronoun does occur occasionally, and when it does, the occurrence is supportive of our meaning hypothesis:

- (31) Costarring with 73-year-old screen legend Paul Newman in the crime drama *Twilight* triggered “a lot of jealousy” for young actor Liev Schreiber. “Paul was very popular, very goodlooking, and everybody loved him,” says Schreiber, 30. “I figured at the very least the young women on the set would like me because, well, I’m younger. But when Paul’s around, it’s all **him, him, him!**” (STI)

In this example, emphasis on the referent is achieved not through the use of the meaning *INSISTENCE*, but rather through a repeated mention by the simple pronoun *him*. The message effects in (31) are different from those which result from the use of *-self* pronouns, and none of the message effects that we have pointed to in support of our meaning hypothesis occur in this example. In (31) there is a serial effect, a suggestion that it’s one thing after another, always about Paul Newman. There is no need to differentiate closely related referents, and there is no contrast between Paul Newman and the speaker. Nor is the identity of Mr. Newman unexpected; while Schreiber’s initial expectation was that he would receive a lot of attention, by this time in the passage that expectation has been extinguished. And while Paul Newman is indeed a prominent celebrity, described in the passage as popular and good-looking, the speaker is not happy about Newman’s status, and nothing suggests that he wants to confer additional importance by referring to him with the meaning *INSISTENCE*.

### 3. Summary

In this chapter, we have characterized the message effects that result from the use of *-self* in apposition, and have shown how these are interpretations of the meaning *INSISTENCE*. None of the effects described above are present in every use

of appositive *-self*. What is common to every use of appositive *-self* (and as we will see, to every use of argument *-self* as well) is the meaning INSISTENCE. The contextual interpretations of these forms are the result of the deployment by speakers and writers of the meaning INSISTENCE.

A speaker does not select a single message category or use of *-self*, since in each example we have considered, we have found a blend of motivations for the use of INSISTENCE. The message categories we have described are not distinct or mutually exclusive; rather, every use of *-self* is motivated by, and results in, a multiplicity of message elements

The constellation of message effects that results from the use of a *-self* pronoun in any particular utterance depends on hearers' contextual interpretation of speakers' reasons for INSISTING on a referent. For example, the effect of distinguishing an entity from other potential referents occurs only when there are other potential referents on the scene. Sometimes the meaning INSISTENCE serves to stress the referent's role in the performance of an action, although it is a fine-grained distinction between an emphasis on a referent's role and an emphasis on a referent. Exclusion is a message effect that is particularly salient in some cases, but is present at least subtly in all uses, since every act of INSISTING (like every act of referring) entails excluding those referents that are NOT INSISTED on (or referred to).

Simple pronouns rarely occur in apposition because the meaning of *-self* forms is so well-suited to the purpose of repeating a mention of an entity for addi-

tional attention or emphasis. Generally, there is no need for speakers to rely on the non-specialized simple forms that do not signal the meaning INSISTENCE, although we have also seen that when simple forms are repeated, the effects in the message are different from those that result from INSISTENCE.

## Notes to Chapter 5

1. An exception is high accessibility. Kemmer and Barlow (1996) posit high accessibility as a part of the meaning of appositive forms. In our analysis, *-self* forms refer to highly accessible entities as a pragmatic result of their meaning.
2. Cresswell (1997) and Edmondson and Plank (1978) discuss the message effect of stressing a referent's role in an event as a result of word order. The role of word order appears to be a factor in the interpretation of *-self* forms, but is beyond the scope of the present research.
3. Kemmer and Barlow (1996) propose that "exclusion of others", along with unexpectedness, contrast and salience, is part of the meaning of appositive *-self*.
4. Henceforth, "comparison" and "compare" will be used as superordinate terms that encompass the meaning of "contrast". That is, the most general definition of "compare" will be the intended one: "to examine (two or more things, ideas people, etc.) for the purpose of noting similarities **and** differences," and **not** in the more narrow sense of noting only similarities. (Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary 1996)
5. Grammaticality judgments are not part of the data in this analysis, so examples (b) and (c) are not preceded by asterisks as is customary. In the view taken here, the linguistic system does not include constraints regarding acceptable sentences. The utterances are labeled "Unattested" because the meanings in those examples have not (to our knowledge) been chosen by speakers for the purpose of communicating intended messages.
6. The conventional notions of person, gender and number are discussed in Chapter 7.

## Chapter 6

### **Arguments: Role conflicts and reflexivity**

In this chapter, we will demonstrate that the meaning INSISTENCE, which was shown to account for the use of *-self* in appositive positions, also motivates the use of these forms as arguments in both reflexive and non-reflexive uses. We have already seen that INSISTENCE in appositive uses can alert hearers to something unexpected regarding the role of the form's referent. Reflexive uses are a subset of unexpected messages, in which one party plays more than a single role at just one time.<sup>1</sup> There is a discrepancy, or a conflict, between the number of roles and the number of actors, a situation we will describe as a "role conflict".

Unlike reflexivity, role conflict is not a syntactic phenomenon; instead, it is completely notional. It is not only verbs that can lead to the conception of more than one participant in an event, and the conceptualization of a role conflict is not limited to clause boundaries. "Roles" are not limited to grammatical roles, but may include any part played by an entity in an event or in the conception of an event.

As we have noted, argument uses are those which suggest a distinct role for their referents. The next six pairs of examples show pronouns in argument positions:

- (1) a. Kim saw **herself**.  
b. Kim saw **her**.
- (2) a. I bought the present for **myself**  
b. Do you like **yourself**?
- (3) a. Rita looked around **herself**.  
b. Rita looked around **her**.
- (4) a. Mary invited me to her office, which was covered with pictures of **herself**.  
b. Mary invited me to her office, which was covered with pictures of **her**.
- (5) a. Mary stopped. Only from **herself** had he taken nothing.  
b. Mary stopped. Only from **her** had he taken nothing.

We will demonstrate that the INSISTENCE hypothesis explains not only what are traditionally described as reflexive uses, (1) through (3), but many other uses of *-self* as well, such as (4) and (5). In addition, we will also account for a less commonly studied phenomenon, namely the use of simple pronouns in environments like (3b). Thus, we will find that what appears to be a syntactic rule (the use of *-self* in reflexive environments) can be explained by a semantic property of *-self*, which accounts for the many other uses as well.

### 1. Reflexivity is not part of the meaning of *-self*

Reflexivity is not proposed as a part of the meaning of *-self*. As we saw in Chapter 2, the notion of reflexivity does not explain the distribution of *-self* pronouns. What motivates the choice of *-self* in an utterance is not the message category “reflexive” but something else, as both *-self* and simple pronouns occur in both reflexive and non-reflexive environments. While treating *-self* as a reflexive pronoun may describe a large number of tokens of these forms, it serves only as an informal description, but not as an analytical claim.

Reflexivity is not the conditioning factor that accounts for the distribution of these forms, as illustrated by this pair of revealing examples: <sup>2</sup>

- (6) a. She carried an umbrella **with her**.
- b. She bought flowers **for herself**.

Although the lexical items are different, the sentences have the same traditional syntactic structure, in which the pronoun refers to the subject of the sentence – the classic definition of a reflexive environment. These examples suggest that the choice between *-self* and simple forms is based on semantic, not syntactic considerations. *-Self* pronouns appear when their referent is unexpected, while simple pronouns appear elsewhere.<sup>3</sup>

There is a natural inference that the referent of the simple pronoun *her* in (6a) is the same person already mentioned by the word *she*, because people usually do carry their own umbrellas. The inference is correct. By contrast, one usually buys flowers for someone else, such as a lover or a sick person. In (6b)

then, there is an expectation that the flowers were bought for someone else. The *-self* form blocks that inference, by suggesting there is something worth INSISTING on about this referent, specifically, that she has more than one role in the event of buying flowers.

Another line of reasoning that could be proposed to explain the difference between (6a) and (b) is that the prepositions themselves “select” either one or both pronouns; that is, perhaps *with* takes a simple pronoun, while *for* takes a *-self* pronoun. Our analysis shows that this is not the case. In Section 4, we will look in detail at the use of both *-self* and simple pronouns with not only *for* and *with*, but with other prepositions as well.

Levinson (1991) makes a similar point with another illuminating pair of examples, both of which are syntactically reflexive:

- (7) a. John pulled the blanket toward **him**.  
b. John pointed the missile toward **himself**.

Levinson notes that the choice of a simple pronoun results in inferences that hearers are most likely to make. He explains that in (7a) the most likely scenario is that *John* and *him* are coreferential, as John would have to be in an awkward position and performing an unusual action to pull a blanket toward someone else. By contrast, the unexpectedness of John pointing a missile toward himself makes the use of a simple pronoun questionable in (7b) (under a coreferential reading), and a *-self* pronoun in such a context is therefore more likely.

The appearance of simple pronouns in syntactically reflexive environments such as (6a) and (7b) are anomalous only from the point of view of sentence grammar; they are not anomalous in the light of our meaning hypothesis, which is that the meaning INSISTENCE, which is common to all uses of *-self*, can suggest that there is something unexpected about its referent.

In the present analysis, reflexivity is not a property of the linguistic system; it is encoded in neither *-self* pronouns nor in sentences that contain them. Rather, a reflexive interpretation is the result of inferences regarding speakers' motivations for the use of the meanings chosen in any utterance.

## **2. INSISTENCE and role conflicts**

The meaning INSISTENCE may be used to suggest that referents are playing more than a single role at one time. This generalization, which we will call the role conflict hypothesis, accounts for the appearance of *-self* pronouns in reflexive environments, as well as in some environments that are not syntactically reflexive. It also explains the occurrence of simple pronouns in grammatically reflexive environments.

In reflexive messages, *-self* forms suggest an unexpected situation in which a single referent (or group of referents) is playing more than one role simultaneously. The meaning INSISTENCE serves as an alert that there is something unusual about the referent, and the speaker wishes to block an unwanted inference which might result from the use of a simple pronoun.

Let us look at examples. With the pronoun omitted in (8), a hearer's natural inference will be that the referent is someone else, someone other than *women*:

(8) Society insists that **women** be protected from \_\_\_\_\_.

Generally, people need to be protected from others. The use of a simple pronoun in this context, as shown in (9), would lead the hearer to the natural inference that there is someone else being mentioned: dangerous people? wild animals?

(9) Society insists that women be protected from **them**.

In the attested example shown in (10), the writer chose a *-self* form to point readers toward an unexpected referent. Women, those in need of protection, are playing two roles in this utterance, those in need of protection, as well as those from whom protection is required:

(10) Society expects women to be altruistic, not venal. And it insists that women be protected from **themselves**, on the assumption that they are unable to make rational decisions about their bodies. (SLD)

Thus, a single entity (actually, a group) has two distinct roles in this event, two roles which are usually played by different entities.

Similarly, if the pronoun is omitted in the next example, the reader's natural inference will be that the referent is someone else, someone other than *she*:

(11) She suppressed a quick, impossible vision of \_\_\_\_\_.

Due to the nature of sight, visions are most often of other people and other things. Again, the use of a simple pronoun in this context, as shown in (12), would lead the hearer to the natural inference that there is someone else being seen:

(12) She suppressed a quick, impossible vision of **her**.

In (12), the referent of *her* could be almost anyone (that is, any one, female, third person referent), although it would be exceedingly unlikely that it would be the same person referred to by *she*. In the attested example, (13), the writer used *-self* to alert readers that the referent of the form is **not** who they might have expected.

(13) She suppressed a quick, impossible vision of **herself**.  
(AMM 17)

INSISTING on the referent blocks the unwanted inferences in both (10) and (13), and suggests to the hearer that there is something unexpected about the message being communicated.

The meaning of many lexical items suggests that there are two participants in the event they name. For example, the meaning of *find* (when interpreted as an event) suggests two participants, someone who does the finding, and something (or someone) that is found. Further, the typical situation is that these two participants are distinct, as in the first token of *found* in (14), about the skater Oksana Baiul:

(14) Three years ago, when her mother died unexpectedly of cancer, her coach **found** a new life in Canada, and she **found herself** alone. (SSC)

Thus, there is an expectation that when two roles are signaled, they are likely to be played by two different people (or things).<sup>4</sup> Sometimes, however, as in the second token of *found* in (14), one entity plays both roles simultaneously: Baiul found someone, but was herself found as well, a situation we are describing as an unexpected conflict of roles. The meaning INSISTENCE is inferred to be a warning

to the hearer about this conflict, a situation that requires some additional attention. To short-circuit the reader's natural expectation that there is a second participant, the writer uses the meaning INSISTENCE to draw extra attention to the referent and to the unexpected circumstance that she is playing two roles simultaneously.

While *herself* signals only INSISTENCE on a referent (one, female, third person), the reader assumes the writer has a reason for INSISTING, and must determine her intention for doing so. How does the reader infer that the writer's use of INSISTENCE is to alert to a role conflict, rather than because she wishes to express a message of, say, exclusion, or contrast? As we have noted, there is a hierarchy of communicative problems to solve in any communication, and the task of correctly identifying referents and their roles seems to take precedence. Sorting out the identities and roles of entities is the highest communicative priority in the interpretation of utterances. Thus, in argument positions – which we have defined as those which suggest a distinct role for the referent – the most likely inference from the use of the meaning INSISTENCE is related to the referent's participation in that role.

The notion of role conflict is not simply a restatement of reflexivity. The role of the referent is not encoded by the *-self* pronoun, nor by a reflexive construction. Instead, it is the result of speakers' deployment of signals with meanings, and hearers' active interpretation of those meanings as they try to determine speakers' intended messages. As we will see, the domain of role conflict extends beyond the boundaries defined by the traditional concept of reflexiv-

ity. Further, the present analysis accounts not only for the reflexive uses that are so successfully covered by the traditional account, but for the other uses of *-self* as well, those that the traditional account shunts into various piles of exceptions.

The examples we considered in Chapter 2 as exemplars of reflexive uses of *-self* will be repeated here to show how the present proposal accounts for the data that are successfully described by the traditional account. (We should note that in Chapter 2, we also pointed out cases where the traditional analysis, based on reflexivity, is empirically inadequate and leaves many questions unanswered.) We will see that in each case, *-self* forms designate a referent who is involved in a role conflict. The first example from Chapter 2 involves the event *berate*:

- (15) **Edward Sapir** continually berated **himself** for idleness, when, in fact, he was continually turning out grammars for complex and difficult languages. (MBW 287)

The lexical item *berate* has as part of its meaning the suggestion that there are **two** participants involved in any act of *berating*: one who berates, and one who is berated. And generally, these two participants are two **different** people. In this example, however, Edward Sapir berated not someone else (as is the typical expectation in any event of *berating*), but he berated himself. Thus, one individual has two distinct roles in this event, two roles which are usually played by two different people, thereby creating a conflict of roles. Because of this unusual communicative circumstance, the speaker has chosen the *-self* form to **INSIST** on the referent, to forestall the hearer's natural inference that Edward Sapir berated someone else.

The next example from Chapter 2 also involves a conflict of roles for a single entity, one person who has two different roles in the event of *allowing*:

- (16) However, **she** seldom allowed **herself** to enjoy pretty clothes or elaborately dressed hair. (MBW 22)

Generally, one party, with more power in a situation, might allow **someone else** to do something: parents allow children to do things; bosses allow employees. But in (16), one person has both roles. The hearer has chosen the *-self* form to INSIST on the referent because of this unusual communicative circumstance. The meaning INSISTENCE forestalls the hearer's natural inference that she seldom allowed **someone else** to do something.

The next example contains a *-self* form that is not a direct object. Nevertheless, the same conceptual situation still holds: when a person *talks about* another person (or thing), there are two entities with a role in the talking: the one who talks, and the thing talked about:

- (17) "He is really talking about **himself**!" (MBW14)

Here too, the writer has relied on the *-self* form to INSIST on its referent. The hearer can use this meaning to infer that the speaker is INSISTING because there is something unexpected: the form's referent is playing two roles simultaneously.

## 2.1 *First and second person*

The appearance of *-self* forms in reflexive environments is motivated by their usefulness in communicating messages of role conflict, in all persons. In the fol-

lowing examples from Chapter 2, the meaning INSISTENCE is used to indicate that the forms' referents are playing more than a single role at one time:

(18) "My, oh my, I said to **myself**. What does this fool think he's doing ...." (NYTC-9/4/98)

(19) **You** say to **yourself**, "Well, this is good." (PWL)

The same referent is identified by both *me* and *myself*, *you* and *yourself* or *yourselves*, and *us* and *ourselves*, so the choice between these *-self* and simple pronouns is not made for referent-finding.<sup>5</sup> *-Self* forms alert the hearer that there is a conflict of roles for their referents.

## 2.2 *Non-finite verbs*

Non-finite verbs can also suggest multiple participants. This analysis does not posit silent syntactic constructs such as understood subjects, although it does recognize that hearers actively make inferences about the number of roles suggested by the meaning of the verb. In (20), the first participant in the event of *threading* is *the light*, and *the light* is actually playing two roles. This message is contrary to expectations, since typically two different roles are played by two distinct entities, as when, for instance, a seamstress threads a needle.

(20) The sun was fully up now, the light threading **itself** around the curtains and making a slit of bright color along the left side of the double bed. (SPW 83)

Once again, the meaning INSISTENCE is used to help the hearer infer that the form's referent is, contrary to the expectations raised by the verb, playing two roles simultaneously.

The next example was presented in Chapter 2 as a sentence in which the subject of the (non-finite) verb is not overt:

- (21) “Our message is, make sure you aim to get **yourself** a career and not just a first job” (NYTC-6/25/98)

The event can be analyzed as *aim to get*, or just *get*, in which case the event (*get*) is seen as secondary to the event of *aiming*. (A more traditional analysis would be to posit an underlying subject for the verb *to get*.) But no matter what syntactic description we assign to this example, the same conceptual situation still holds. Hearers infer that the person doing the *getting* is the same as the person doing the *aiming*, and the *-self* form is used because its referent is playing two roles: the one who gets something, and who the object is for. The meaning INSISTENCE directs the hearer to pay special attention, that this referent is playing not just one, but two roles in a single event.

#### Role conflict vs. referent-finding

The next example is illuminating because in it the choice between *himself* and *him* does not result in a different referential identity for the pronoun, but the use of *himself* suggests that its referent has two roles, while *him* suggests he had only one:

- (22) Then he entered test-pilot training at Patuxent River, Md., elevating **himself** into the elite of military aviation. (NYTC-7/23/98)

Because the *-self* form is used, the hearer can infer that the referent of *-self* played two roles in the event of *elevating* (here, the agent and the object). The same

passage, with a simple pronoun in place of the *-self* form, is shown in (23a). If the writer had chosen the simple pronoun, a hearer would still correctly identify the form's referent, but might conclude that circumstances had caused him to be elevated to a higher rank, that just being in test-pilot training was itself sufficient for entry into the elite. Without the *-self* form to lead the reader to the inference that it was the referent of *he* who gets credit for this accomplishment (that he played two roles), (23a) could be paraphrased as (23b):

- (23) a. Then he entered test-pilot training at Patuxent River, Md., elevating **him** into the elite of military aviation. (Unattested)
- b. Then he entered test-pilot training at Patuxent River, Md., which elevated **him** into the elite of military aviation. (Unattested paraphrase of (23a))

In fact, the expanded context shown in (24) reveals that the writer did want to distinguish between circumstances that simply unfolded (*his career moved along typically*), and those following the word *then*, which indicates a new phase in which the referent took action and was personally responsible for the path of his career:

- (24) His career moved along typically: flight training in Texas and Florida and service on aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean. Then he entered test-pilot training at Patuxent River, Md., elevating **himself** into the elite of military aviation. When NASA asked 110 test pilots to volunteer to be astronauts, Shepard made the list and was one of the seven chosen ones. (NYTC-7/23/98)

The traditional account of an example such as (24) is that there is an understood subject of the verb, *elevating*, and that *himself* is coreferent with that subject.

However, that account does not explain how hearers know the identity of that phonetically null subject. In the analysis proposed here, the presence of *-self* is one additional piece of information that hearers can use to infer who the participants are in the event of *elevating*.

It is beyond the scope of the present research to investigate how hearers infer which entities are in roles that are not signaled, e.g. the agent of *elevating* in (24), or the agent of *insulting* in the following example. What can be described, however, is the basis on which speakers choose between simple and *-self* pronouns in these examples.

In (25), the meaning INSISTENCE is not used to suggest a role conflict for the referent of the pronoun, nor for any other reason, and so the simple form is used:

(25) The president made it illegal to insult **him**.

The hearer will naturally assume that the agent of *insulting* would not be the president, as presidents don't generally make their own actions illegal, but rather, the possible activities of others. Based on the context, the hearer can infer that the person doing the insulting would not be the president. Thus, there is no role conflict for the referent of *him*, since in the event of *insulting*, the referent of *him* has just one role, that of the person insulted.

### 2.3 *I don't recognize me*

Sometimes the meaning INSISTENCE is deliberately avoided in order to suggest the presence of two distinct participants, even though there is but one entity on the scene. The objective characteristics of the scene do not determine the choices of

forms; rather, it is the speaker's conception of a situation and what she wishes to communicate that determine which meanings will be signaled. The next example shows a contrast between the use of *myself* and *me*. In each case, the pronoun's referent does have two roles, but in the first instance, the meaning INSISTENCE is present, and in the second, it is not.

- (26) Says Mitnick: "When I read about **myself** in the media, even I don't recognize **me**." (PDH)

In this passage, a computer hacker is commenting on unsubstantiated stories that have been written about him in the *New York Times*. He uses *myself* to INSIST on a dual role for himself: he is reading, and he is being read about. However, when the speaker says *I don't recognize me*, he is deliberately evading the meaning INSISTENCE to avoid the suggestion that he is playing two roles. Instead, he is describing a situation in which it seems that there are two **different** entities being mentioned.

Likewise, in the next example the meaning INSISTENCE is deliberately avoided in order to present the scene as if there were two different individuals:

- (27) I lose control. It's like, I'm not **me**. I'm a totally different person. (OPR)

Referentially, the only entity on the scene in *I'm not me* is one person, but the speaker is saying that she feels like someone else. She has chosen meanings to suggest that that there are two different people present.

### First and second person vs. third

Because the crucial information about the identity of the referent generally changes in the third person depending on whether an entity plays a single role or dual role, we find a scarcity of examples such as (26) and (27) with third person pronouns. As we have noted, speakers are less willing to deploy the meanings of third person pronouns to achieve communicative effects other than expressing identities and role conflicts, for fear of misleading their hearers and confusing them about the basic information of who did what. But the language itself does not preclude this possibility.

When speakers are confident that their hearers will have no difficulty identifying their intended referents, even in the third person, they may use – or avoid – the meaning INSISTENCE for other communicative effects. The following examples show third person simple pronouns used in reflexive contexts to refer to a person who has two roles in an event, in order to present the situation as if there were two distinct individuals involved. In (28), the speaker is tired and run down, as she feels burdened by the constant care of her cantankerous elderly mother. A doctor has just told the 92-year old mother that she will live to the age of 150, but the daughter doesn't feel that she herself will be graced with the same healthy longevity:

(28) Doctor to 92-year old patient: You're in excellent health.  
You'll live to be 150.

Patient's daughter: Sure she will. She doesn't have **her** to take care of! (RFS)

The message is that the mother (*she*) will never be in the position the speaker is in, having to take care of a person like the mother. The speaker is describing the situation as if there were two different people involved. The same effect is found in (29):

- (29) Speaker A: I don't know, I can't keep up with him.  
Speaker B: I know, I can't keep up with him either. I don't think **he** can keep up with **him**. (HLG)

#### 2.4 *Two mentions of a referent within the same clause*

The role conflict hypothesis avoids one of the flaws of the reflexive pronoun hypothesis, whose definition was originally phrased in terms of the subject (i.e., reflexive pronouns are used whenever there is “a repetition of the logical subject of the verb” Sweet 1891: 77). Formulating the reflexive hypothesis in terms of subjects does not account for cases in which both mentions of an entity occur in the predicate, as in the following, in which there is neither a grammatical nor logical subject involved:

- (30) “A Way in the World” is, he says, “a settling of accounts for **me** with **myself**,” for what he regards as errors of artistic judgment. (GNS)
- (31) He described it as a desperation effort to save **Japan** from **itself**. (NYTC-6/21/98)

To cover examples such as these, later formulations of the reflexive pronoun account were revised to include two mentions of the same referent within the same clause (e.g., Quirk and Greenbaum 1973: 103).<sup>6</sup> But two mentions of the same referent within a clause do not necessarily lead to the use of a *-self* form, as

shown by the many exceptions to the traditional reflexive/emphatic model we have seen, and by the following examples as well:

- (32) a. John<sub>1</sub>'s mother loves **him**<sub>1</sub>.  
b. John was like his father<sub>1</sub>, very much like **him**<sub>1</sub> in fact.  
c. We had to protect Kuwait<sub>1</sub> from an invasion of **it**<sub>1</sub> by its neighbors.  
d. Most houses<sub>1</sub> had grandmothers in **them**<sub>1</sub>. (HSR 40)  
e. Trudi<sub>1</sub> understood that the love she<sub>1</sub> felt meant far more to **her**<sub>1</sub> than to Eva. (HSR 115)

All the examples in (32) include two mentions of the same entity within a clause, yet *-self* pronouns do not appear.

The generalization that does account for these and all the other examples we have seen in this chapter is that the meaning *INSISTENCE* is useful to refer to an entity when a role conflict exists for that entity. Whenever there are at least two roles suggested, and a single entity is to play both roles, a conflict occurs. There is no role conflict for the referents of the pronouns in (32), and speakers have found no other reasons to deploy the meaning *INSISTENCE*.

### **3. Advantages of a non-sentence-based analysis**

Another flaw in the traditional analysis of reflexives, and modern treatments of *-self* that are based on it, is that it does not account for uses of these forms in noun phrases, headlines, or anywhere that is outside the boundaries of a clause. By

contrast, the role conflict hypothesis is not limited to clause-level phenomena, and applies equally to non-sentence-based role conflicts.

### 3.1 *Noun phrases*

The meaning *INSISTENCE* is useful when a single entity plays two roles in any conceptualized event, even if the event is not suggested by a verb. Sometimes a noun phrase can suggest an event with multiple participants, and *INSISTENCE* can be used to warn the hearer that a given entity has more than one role:

- (33) Rose Espinoza and Alice Callaghan spend much of their lives nurturing the American dreams of poor and working class Latino immigrant children by tutoring them after school in English, math and faith in **themselves** and in their new country. (TBE)

The lexical item *faith* suggests two participants: one person has faith in someone or something else. The referents of *-self*, the students, have two roles: they have faith in themselves.

Similar to *faith* is the word *respect*, another noun that suggests the participation of more than one person, since respect is something that someone has for someone or something else:

- (34) The positive change was obvious to him, even in the younger children of his customers, a respect for **themselves** and their town that hadn't been there before. (HSR 195)

In (34), the children have two roles simultaneously: they are the ones doing the respecting, and they are the object of that respect.<sup>7</sup>

The next example also contains *-self* within a noun phrase:

- (35) His expanded life failed to halt **his** attacks on **himself**.  
(NYTC-10/29/99)

The presence of the word *his* indicates it is one, male individual who is carrying out these attacks. (There are other senses in which the attacks could be *his*, but the inference in this utterance is that this male is the agent of the attacks.) The meaning INSISTENCE warns that there is something unexpected about the referent, and the reader concludes that what is unexpected is that the same entity has more than one role in these attacks, that he is both the agent and the object.

A *-self* pronoun appears in (36) even though there is no additional mention of the referent either within its clause. There is no apparent syntactic explanation for this example. Instead, the meaning of the word *affair* typically suggests not one person, but two, someone who is having an affair with someone else:

- (36) “Let Me Count the Times” is about a man who compiles statistics on his love life, which includes an affair with **himself**. (SHE)

The meaning INSISTENCE is used in (36) because the referent has a highly unusual dual role in this love affair. The use of a simple pronoun might lead the reader to conclude that there was an affair with a different man, someone mentioned previously in the discourse. In (36) the meaning INSISTENCE alerts the hearer that the form’s referent is playing more than a single role, leading to the inference that the man is having an affair alone, that is, with himself. Because role conflict is understood as a notional phenomenon, not as a syntactic one, the role conflict hypothesis applies equally well to this passage, in which the *-self* form is not

coreferent with another entity mentioned within its clause, as it does to those in which the referent of *-self* has been mentioned within the clause.

Linguists have grappled with examples like these before, describing *his* in (35) as the subject of its noun phrase, thereby stretching the notion of subject far beyond its original definition, which was derived from analysis of logical propositions consisting of a clausal subject and a predicate. In addition, some analysts posit underlying, phonetically null subjects of noun phrases to account for the occurrences of *-self* in examples like (33), (34), and (36). In all these cases, the postulation of noun phrase subjects, whether overt or underlying, reflects the sentence-based assumptions on which most linguistic analyses rest. In the traditional view, reflexives refer to a subject. In order to fit the data into the *a priori* categories of reflexives and subjects, noun phrases are analyzed as having subjects as well.

The proposal advanced here does not rely on any syntactic constructs, such as subjects, verbs, or reflexives, to describe the messages that are inferred from the use of the linguistic system, and no underlying structure is posited. Instead, events are understood conceptually.<sup>8</sup> Some lexical items are interpreted to refer to events, but these words need not be verbs, in the syntactic sense. The names of some entities, such as *faith*, *respect* and *affair* evoke a conceptualization of events with participants.

### 3.2 *Picture noun phrases*

As we have noted, picture noun phrases pose difficulties for syntactic accounts of reflexivization (including Chomsky's Binding Theory), since *-self* and simple pronouns may both occur in them to designate the same referents:

- (37) a. John said there was a picture of **him** in the post office.  
b. John said there was a picture of **himself** in the post office.

However, picture noun phrases are another type of noun phrase that suggests multiple participants. Like the words *respect*, *faith*, and *affair* discussed above, picture noun phrases may evoke a conceptualization in which entities have distinct roles.

Picture nouns, like *story*, *photograph*, and *portrait*, all suggest the existence of a viewer, or perceiver, of the likenesses they represent. Thus, there are at least two roles suggested by any picture noun: the entity portrayed, and the entity perceiving. Kuno (1987) captures this observation with the hypothesis he calls the Awareness Condition for Picture Noun Reflexives, which states:

the use of a picture noun reflexive is obligatory if the referent of the reflexive perceived/will perceive the referent of the picture noun has one that involves him. (p. 179)

The Awareness Condition corresponds to our understanding of role conflict, in which the role of the perceiver is one of the distinct roles suggested by the noun. When the conception of a picture noun involves a single entity in more than one role, a *-self* pronoun is likely to be used; otherwise, simple pronouns are suitable. If the referent of the *-self* form is the perceiver of the picture noun, he or she will

be playing two roles simultaneously, and the meaning *INSISTENCE* will be useful. Van Hoek (1997) also notes that the appearance of *-self* forms in picture nouns corresponds to point of view effects. In our analysis, however, this tendency does not represent a condition, or a constraint; instead, it reflects speakers' use of *-self* forms when their meaning contributes to the intended communication.

The observations of Kuno (1987) and Van Hoek (1997) appear to support our proposal, but to validate our hypotheses we want to go beyond such context-free, invented sentences like those in (37). Each of the following examples contain *-self* pronouns with referents that are not mentioned elsewhere within their clauses:

- (38) a. [Regarding the author's late father's close female friend:] I had never met her, nor heard much about her until the last three years of his life. I was visiting one time and he asked me to choose among several **pictures of himself** to send to "an old flame." (SMF)
- b. The 'Enigma Variations' were first conceived humorously as a series of musical **pictures of himself**, his wife and people they knew. Coming home after a grinding round of teaching one Friday evening in 1898, he sat down at the piano and idly played a tune. His wife liked it and asked for it again. (CFP)
- c. "...Donald wants to sit down with me. So I fly up to New York. What the hell, right? And I walk in his office and I just crack up. He's got this huge office, you know, and every square inch is covered with **pictures of himself**. Like a shrine to Donald, you know? He starts telling me how he's thinking about doing Trump.com, 'selling Trump this and Trump that, perfume and other stuff, and then he's going to take it public." (EYB)

The use of a *-self* pronoun in each of these examples supports the meaning hypothesis we have proposed. In (38a), the referent of *-self* has more than one role in the scene being described, as he is directing the selection of the picture (even though he is not personally making the selection, due to his failed eyesight), and the picture is of himself. The referent of *-self* is an important person throughout the article, in which the author writes about her father, his life, his death, and her memories of him.

The text of (38b) tells us that the musical pieces were *conceived* by the referent of *himself*, so in the conceptualization of the *musical picture*, the referent of *-self* is both the conceiver of the piece, and its subject. Like all the other examples we have seen, *-self* forms in picture noun phrases are generally not motivated by a single message element. Not only is this referent the conceiver of the picture noun, but he is also part of a conjoined expression, and as will see in Chapter 7, the meaning INSISTENCE often serves to differentiate its referent from other conjoins.

In (38c), the *-self* pronoun suggests that Donald Trump has more than a single role with respect to the picture noun: Trump owns his office and has his pictures inside that office. Another motivation for the use of *-self* in this example is to express the importance and prominence of its wealthy and powerful referent. Trump has summoned the writer to his office, which is like a shrine, as Trump tells the writer about his grandiose plans.

As further evidence that the occurrence of *-self* forms to refer to perceivers of picture nouns is not a syntactic phenomenon, the following example does not contain a picture noun phrase, in the syntactic sense. Nevertheless, it demonstrates that the meaning INSISTENCE is used when its referent is a portrayal of someone who is perceived by herself:

- (39) ...she shivered and wished she wasn't going to the sea: A picture rose clearly before her mind. Cyril's head, bobbing up and down, swimming to the rock... up and down – up and down... And **herself**, swimming in easy practised strokes after him. (Lattey 1989)

This example demonstrates the overlap between logophoricity and picture noun perception, as the scene is viewed from the point of view of the pronoun's referent. We will discuss logophoric uses of *-self* in Section 5.

### 3.3 *Non-sentential uses*

While the postulation of understood subjects can preserve the syntactic account of reflexivity in some instances, the sentence-based reflexive analysis also requires understood verbs to account for the occurrence of *-self* in the following headlines, which are not in the form of sentences. By contrast, no syntactic machinery is needed to explain these examples in the present analysis, in which the signaled meanings themselves suggest both the existence of an event, and an entity who plays more than one role in that event:

- (40) Diana: In Search of **Herself** (SDI)
- (41) Some magazines are cutting out the reporter altogether, having stars interview themselves, as Sharon Stone did

recently in Harper's Bazaar "Nobody Does it Better: Sharon Stone on **Herself**").... (UNK)

In (40), the word *search* is syntactically a noun, and there is no verb in this book title. Yet, notionally, an event of *searching* is suggested, and Diana is both the agent and the object of that searching. In (41), the headline *Sharon Stone on Herself* suggests that the celebrity will be discussing herself, playing her usual role as a celebrity, but also that of the reporter who is usually a distinct participant in typical interviews.

The next example also contains a *-self* pronoun that does not appear syntactically as part of its clause, providing further evidence that the relevant generalizations are not clause-based:

(42) After 11 years of marriage to an eternal preppy, Susan Squire realizes that there's one thing that doesn't go with khaki: **herself**. (SMH)

The meaning INSISTENCE warns the hearer that there is a role conflict for the referent of this form. There are three entities evoked: X (Susan Squire) realizes that Y (something) doesn't go with Z (khaki), and one expects all three entities to be distinct. However, one person has two of the three roles mentioned: X and Y. In addition, this use reflects not only a role conflict, but an additional source of unexpectedness as well. The headline sets up an expectation that a piece of clothing, or color, or type of cloth will be mentioned; it is clear that the writer is having fun, playing with language by offering *herself* as a sort of punch line, as the unexpected "item" that doesn't go with khaki. Thus, it is the unexpectedness

of this referent, as well as the role conflict, that so strongly favors the use of *-self* in this context.

### 3.4 *Other types of role conflicts*

The hypothesis that the meaning INSISTENCE is chosen to alert hearers to potential role conflicts can explain what may seem to be anomalous uses of *-self*. The traditional account, like analyses derived from it, describes the following usage in the category of conjoined expressions, traditionally listed as an exception to the reflexive and emphatic generalizations. However, the meaning INSISTENCE, and its usefulness for suggesting role conflicts, accounts for this example in a principled and consistent way:

- (43) The day before a gunman-arsonist turned a Harlem clothing store into an inferno that killed seven employees and **himself**, the store's owner, who is Jewish, told a court that ... arson and physical attacks seemed imminent. (MCF)

There are at least two ways in which the role of this arsonist is unexpected. First, arsonists generally set fires that kill other people, not themselves. And second, the arsonist and the seven employees who were killed are linguistically conjoined, suggesting that they play the same role. This is another potential conflict, in that one's expectation is that the victims and the arsonist will not share a similar fate. (See Chapter 7 for a further discussion of this example and the use of *-self* in conjoined phrases, in which the meaning INSISTENCE is used to differentiate its referent from other conjoins.)

The next example might not be described as grammatically reflexive, but a *-self* form is used because its referent has more than a single role in the situation being described:

- (44) Willy's real wares may appear to be inconsequential because **what he sold was himself**. (SLH)

In this review of the play *Death of a Salesman*, the writer notes that the audience never learns what Willy Loman actually sells, and never knows what fills the heavy suitcases he carries. Although the grammatical subject of the sentence is *what he sold*, the conceptualization being described is that Willy Loman sold himself. Thus, the *-self* form is chosen because its referent has more than a single role in the act of selling.

A similar explanation can be offered for (45), in which a strictly syntactic analysis (of the surface elements) in terms of reflexivity also fails to account for the role conflict that is expressed for the referent of *-self*:

- (45) The toughest task, it seems, for the man with the toughest job in American retailing is selling **himself**. (STT)

The grammatical subject of (45) is *the toughest task*, and syntactically, *the man* is just an object within a prepositional phrase. But of course, when one understands the sentence, one understands that the man is the person who is actually doing the selling. The use of the meaning INSISTENCE to refer to him corresponds to the communicated message that he has more than one role in the event.

Of course an analyst could point to syntactic explanations for the use of *-self* in both (44) and (45), that the mention of the referent within the same clause

triggers the use of *-self* later in the same sentence. The reflexive account can also be salvaged in (45) by the postulation of a phonetically null subject for the gerund *selling*. However, in addition to the other limitations we have already noted of a syntactic account, the use of *-self* to suggest a role conflict is not limited to clausal environments.

In the next example the meaning INSISTENCE is used for a role conflict, even though the role conflict is not expressed within the boundaries of a clause:

- (46) Wait, I said. You mean you're planning a one-man show about yourself, starring **yourself**? (BBN)

In a syntactic analysis, the understood subject of the verb *starring* must be the show. After all, a show stars its actors, but actors don't star themselves. But the meaning INSISTENCE is appropriate to this message because the referent of the pronoun is apparently quite surprising to the speaker. The first token of *-self* (*a one-man show about yourself*) is primarily motivated by a role conflict, in which X is planning a show about Y, and X and Y are identical. Syntactically, there would be a new subject for the next verb, *starring*. However, conceptually, the speaker is still surprised at the identity of the referent. He is surprised that not only is the show about the hearer, but is even starring the hearer too. Thus, the meaning INSISTENCE is used because the referent has two roles and is unexpected.

The next example, which unfortunately requires a lengthy explanation that is difficult to understand, provides further evidence that the distribution of *-self* cannot be explained through constructs depending on clausal structure. A defendant

is explaining to a judge on a television show why she does not owe money to her ex-husband:

- (47) Defendant: I was getting child support, but then when our son went to live with his father, I transferred it to him.  
Judge: You were getting child support? From whom?  
Defendant: Yes. From **himself**. (JJ)

The defendant's argument makes little sense, which is one of the reasons why this exchange is difficult to follow. The defendant says that she had been receiving child support when her son lived with her. Then, she says, when her son went to live with his father, she gave the child support to the father. Schematically, the defendant is claiming that she received money from X, but is now giving it to Y, where Y is the boy's father. The judge is confused by this statement, and asks directly where the defendant was getting the child support from, or in our schematic terms, the judge asks the identity of X. The defendant answers that she received money from the boy's father. Thus, the referent of *-self* has two roles in the situation, as it is described by the defendant: X gave money to the defendant, and the defendant is now giving that money to Y. But X and Y are the same person! While this is not a role conflict expressed within a clause, or even a noun phrase or headline as seen above, clearly the boy's father is being described as playing two roles that are in conflict with each other. The woman's defense, regarding why she shouldn't pay her ex-husband any child support, is that she is already paying him child support, in the form of the money that she is no longer receiving from him for the care of their child. Confusing? Yes. And that is another reason for the deployment of the meaning INSISTENCE – the speaker is aware that

the referent is playing more than a single role, and that the hearer (the judge) will have to put some extra attention into sorting out the referents that are mentioned.

#### 4. Simple pronouns in reflexive environments

Simple pronouns that occur in syntactically reflexive environments are problematic for the traditional reflexive account and analyses that are based on it. However, the meaning hypothesis proposed here explains these uses in a straightforward and theoretically consistent way. Simple pronouns are used in argument positions if there is no role conflict, and no other reason to INSIST on the pronoun's referent.<sup>9</sup>

The following examples contain locative prepositional phrases, which are known to be an environment in which simple pronouns may occur even when they are coreferential with the clausal subject:

- (48) a. John saw a snake near \_\_\_\_\_.  
b. John<sub>1</sub> saw a snake near **him**<sub>1</sub>.
- (49) a. Rankin locked the door behind \_\_\_\_\_, and a guard was posted outside for her protection.  
b. Rankin<sub>1</sub> locked the door behind **her**<sub>1</sub>, and a guard was posted outside for her protection. (JAH)

While one may indeed see a snake near someone else, there is no expectation that the referent named in (48) will be someone other than John. One most often sees other people and other things, and generally, what is seen is close to the person

doing the seeing. There is no role conflict, and the identity of the referent is not unexpected, so the simple pronoun is used.

The same is true for (49). One most often locks a door behind oneself, after entering or leaving a room. It is also possible to lock a door behind someone else (say after a visitor leaves a house, and the homeowner stays inside and locks the door after his guest leaves). However, in the attested example, the context makes it clear that Rankin locked the door behind herself and not behind someone else: she was being followed by a large, angry crowd, and was escorted to her office by the police, who posted a guard outside her office for her protection. Again, there is no expectation that there will be a distinct entity mentioned, no role conflict, and no other motivations for the use of the meaning INSISTENCE, so the simple pronoun is used. We will consider locative phrases further in Section 4.1.

Our analysis shows that there is no need to posit underlying structures to account for such data, as the meaning hypothesis proposed here accounts for the appearance of both *-self* and simple pronouns in prepositional phrases, without recourse to underlying syntactic structure or to other additional theoretical constructs.

#### **4.1 *Prepositional phrases***

Grammarians note that *-self* pronouns are optional in certain prepositional phrases, specifically in locative expressions. What is unexplained by this observation is (a) in which cases both *-self* and simple pronouns may be used, and (b) on what basis the choice between the two types of forms is made. Our meaning

hypothesis provides an analytical solution to both questions: when the meaning INSISTENCE is not needed to communicate messages regarding who did what, speakers may use simple pronouns. If the identity of a referent is unexpected, as when that referent is playing more than a single role in an event, the meaning INSISTENCE will be needed. When no role conflict is present, speakers will use simple pronouns, unless the meaning INSISTENCE contributes to other intended messages.

Before turning to locative expressions, let us return to the words *with* and *for*, which were discussed at the beginning of this chapter (*She carried an umbrella with her* and *She bought flowers for herself*). There we considered the possibility that the choice of preposition determines whether it will be followed by a *-self* or a simple pronoun (in a coreferential reading). We will see that the conditioning factor is not the preposition itself, but rather, the intended message that accounts for the choices between *-self* and simple pronouns.

### With

In the passages in (50) and (51), the pronoun is coreferent with another form mentioned within its clause, the subject (underscored in the following examples). However, in (50), a simple pronoun is used, while in (51), a *-self* pronoun appears:

- (50) a. The Giver would help Jonas hide in the storage area of the vehicle. He would have **with him** a bundle of food which The Giver would save from his own meals during the next two weeks. (LGI 160)

- b. She does have to show that Mr. Clinton implicitly or explicitly made sex **with him** a condition of her employment. (NYTC-1/23/98)
- (51)
- a. Regarding the Razzies (the opposite of the Academy Awards) for the worst performance in a strip tease: Demi Moore has emerged in a tie **with herself**. (UNK)
  - b. Lindros was angry. He was angry **with himself** for missing 42 games because of injuries his first two years in the NHL. He was angry with the Flyers because they were lousy. (FLL)

In (50), simple pronouns are used because there is nothing unexpected about the referents of *-self*, and there are no other reasons to INSIST on them. If Jonas has food, as in (50a), he naturally has it with *him*, not with someone else. There is therefore no role conflict, and no expectation that there is someone else with whom Jonas has food. Likewise, in (50b). The claim that Clinton made sex with someone else a condition of employment is highly unlikely, so there is no expectation that the referent of the pronoun will be someone other than Clinton. The noun phrase *sex with him* also suggests another participant, someone other than *him*, so that in the conceptualized event of having sex, the referent of *him* has just one role. There is no need for the meaning INSISTENCE in this example, so the writer chose a simple pronoun.

By contrast, in (51) the other lexical and grammatical forms in the utterances suggest a different entity in the pronoun's role, and the meaning INSISTENCE is deployed to block that inference. A *-self* form appears in (51a) because the nature of prizes like the Academy Awards and the Razzies is that more than one person competes, and the normal circumstance is that one is in a tie

with someone else. Thus, the meaning INSISTENCE is deployed to block the unwanted inference that someone else was involved. The referent of *-self* is someone who is playing more than a single role in this tie. Similarly, the *-self* pronoun in (51b) occurs because one is usually angry with someone else, as Lindros was with his team. But Lindros was also angry with himself, a role conflict in which he is both the person who is angry, and the object of his own anger.

### For

The meaning of the word *for* so strongly suggests a specific role for the entity that follows it that when the same entity is mentioned elsewhere in the clause, a role conflict ensues. (In traditional terms, the grammatical role introduced by *for* is a beneficiary.)

- (52) a. I felt somewhat sorry **for myself**.... (MBW 157)  
b. "India has just dug a big hole **for itself** by doing this test ...." (NYTC-5/12/98)

We need not appeal to a linguistic rule to account for data such as these. When communicative circumstances arise in which an entity should be understood to be playing more than one role at a single time, the meaning INSISTENCE is chosen to block the inference that two distinct entities are in those roles.

### Around

Locative expressions do not usually suggest a distinct role for an entity, but rather, a location in space relative to that entity. Thus, simple pronouns may

appear in such phrases when there is nothing unexpected about the identity of the referent, and no other reason to INSIST. Both of the following examples are grammatically reflexive, as the pronouns are coreferent with the subjects of their clauses. Under the sentence-based reflexive pronoun hypothesis, such examples are anomalous, but our meaning hypothesis predicts the occurrence of examples such as these:

- (53) a. Even as a child I could tell that Mr. Tanaka saw the world **around him** as it really was. (GMG 14)
- b. Maybe the Kaiser had climbed across a wall like this ... when he'd escaped from Germany. But what if countries had even higher walls **around them**? (HSR 33)

In (53a), there is nothing unexpected, as there is no dual role for Mr. Tanaka; when a man sees the world, he typically sees the world around himself, not around someone else. The writer has not used the meaning INSISTENCE, because there is no reason to INSIST on this referent. Likewise for (53b). Countries have walls around themselves; it is hard to imagine a situation in which a country has a wall around someone else. Thus, there is nothing unexpected about the referent of the pronoun, and no need for the meaning INSISTENCE.

In the next two examples, *-self* forms are used following the word *around* because the referent of the pronoun might well be someone other than the intended one:

- (54) a. “Fiona is already being trained ...” The Giver told him. “She’s very efficient at her work, your red-haired friend. Feelings are not part of the life she’s learned.”

Jonas wrapped his arms **around himself** and rocked his own body back and forth. (LGI 153)

- b. After Gorbachev took power in 1985, Raisa quickly came to be viewed as a jet-setting elitist who wielded undue influence over the reformist president. Stung by the criticism, “she built a wall **around herself**,” says Olga Beklemishcheva, a Russian parliamentarian. (PWT)

In (54a), it is surely possible that Jonas would put his arms around his good friend Fiona (especially since he has a crush on her). In this example, there is no expectation that the referent of the pronoun is Jonas, the person who is wrapping his arms around someone. The meaning *INSISTENCE* is therefore useful in alerting the hearer that this referent has two roles. The same is true for (54b). In the event of building a wall, Raisa Gorbachev has two different roles. It is certainly possible that the wife of a Russian president could build a wall around someone or something else, so the speaker chooses the meaning *INSISTENCE* to clarify the message that the form’s referent had both roles.

#### Other prepositions

The following pairs show both *-self* and simple pronouns with several different prepositions: *about*, *against*, and *under*. In each case, a *-self* form is used when its referent has a separate and/or unexpected role, and a simple pronoun is used when the entity has no additional role, and his or her identity is not unexpected:

- (55) a. “With the books, they can forget **about themselves** for awhile...” (HSR 162)
- b. She had a wildness **about her**. (HSR 188)

When X forgets about Y, one expects that X and Y will be distinct; however, it is difficult to imagine X having a wildness about someone other than herself.

- (56) a. Ciba and Union Carbide dispute the allegations against **them**. (CTI)
- b. I'm playing a Pokémon battle against **myself**. (BSK)

When companies dispute allegations, they are most likely disputing allegations against themselves, not allegations against others, so these two roles are not expected to be distinct. By contrast, playing a game against someone implies that there are two distinct participants.

In the next pair of examples, a woman tucks her feet under her, but a colt puts her feet under herself:

- (57) a. In the afternoon she would sit in a very roomy arm-chair, opposite her husband, gazing steadily through a wide opening in the wall which gave an extensive view of the settlement and the river.
- “She invariably tucked up her feet **under her**, but old Doramin sat squarely, sat imposingly as a mountain sits on a plain.” (CLJ 256)
- b. I took the blanket from Strider [a horse] and rubbed the colt vigorously until it made a slight effort to stand. Strider started licking it clean. The colt was now making colossal efforts to get up. Then she put her front feet **under herself**, supporting her front half until she was standing. (AFB)

Whether tucking or putting one's feet under oneself, the physical actions (the scenes) are similar. However, the passages evoke very different sorts of images. It is difficult to tuck one's feet under someone else; in addition, we are told in (57a)

that the woman's actions were invariable (thus, not unexpected), and there is no one else near her under whom she might have put her feet. By contrast, one could more easily **put** one's feet under someone else. More specifically, in this example, a colt has just been born and is therefore very close to her mother and to the writer, both of whom would be possible referents for a simple pronoun. The meaning **INSISTENCE** helps clarify that its referent has two roles.

### To

The word *to* (like *for*, above), almost always suggests a separate and distinct role for its referent, and is therefore almost always followed by a *-self* form when the pronoun's referent is mentioned elsewhere in the same clause:

- (58) a. I said **to myself**  
b. I thought **to myself**  
c. nor did I pretend **to myself** (MBW 97)  
d. I laughed **to myself**

But not always. Our corpus also includes the following examples, in which *to* is followed by a simple pronoun that refers to an entity mentioned as the grammatical subject of its clause. In (59), the simple pronoun *them* is coreferent with the subject (*the church bells*), because the word *to* does not suggest a distinct participant in this example:

- (59) a. The two taverns ... were full again; voices sounded louder and even the church bells had a deeper ring **to them**. (HSR 27)

- b. On Wednesday a third witness, Sidney Blumenthal, a senior White House aide, is to be questioned about the president's remarks to **him** that he had been stalked by Ms. Lewinsky. (NYTC-5/19/98)

In (59a), there are two mentions of the same entity within the same clause, but the entity is not understood to be playing two different roles; hence, there is no need for the speaker to signal the meaning INSISTENCE on this referent. It should be noted that *to* is not used in a locative sense in this example, but that is the point being made here. It is not the preposition itself that determines the type of pronoun that follows it, but rather, the message the hearer infers. In (59b), even though Sidney Blumenthal is the grammatical subject of the sentence, the noun phrase *the president's remarks to him* suggests a conceptualized event in which the president makes remarks to Blumenthal. There is no role conflict or unexpectedness for this referent.

#### 4.2 *The Control System*

We have just seen that in prepositional phrases simple pronouns may be used when the identity of a referent is expected. But the flexibility to use simple pronouns for expected referents does not generally extend to environments in which a direct object is coreferent with the subject of its clause, as the following examples show:

- (60) a. She prided **herself** on tolerance. (MFM 17)  
b. The witness perjured **himself**.

Clearly, the meanings of the lexical items *pride* and *perjure* lead to the expectation that the second participant will indeed be the same as the first. After all, one cannot pride someone else, nor can a witness perjure someone else. Nevertheless, *-self* pronouns occur, and it is difficult to imagine the use of simple pronouns in these contexts.

In cases such as these, the English Control System<sup>10</sup> is a grammatical source of role conflict for these referents. The Control System, which interlocks with the Focus System (described in Chapter 5), refers to the ordered position of words or phrases referring to participants in an event, and is the primary grammatical mechanism for spelling out the roles of referents in English.<sup>11</sup>

The word order signal in the Control System is schematized in (61), signaling that the two participants exert different degrees of Control over an event:

(61) The kitten liked the dog.  
          C1                  C2

C1 = Higher Controller (in position before the verb) = *the kitten*

C2 = Lower Controller (in position after the verb) = *the dog*

By virtue of its position prior to the word *liked*, *the kitten* in example (61) is a signal of Higher Control, and *the dog*, by virtue of its position following the word *liked*, is a signal of Lower Control. Clearly, the kitten exerts more control over the event of *liking* than does the dog, who is just the passive recipient of the kitten's affection. (See Reid 1991 for an explanation of the Control System, and why it is preferable to the more traditional categories of Agent, Patient, Instrument, etc.)

Let us return now to the examples in (60). Typically, if a speaker chooses to signal two levels of Control, it is because there are two different participants involved. There is an inherent conflict of roles when one individual has both a Higher Control and a Lower Control role simultaneously. It is this conflict that motivates the use of *-self* in these examples, in which its meaning warns the hearer that there is something unexpected, a role conflict for its referent. In (60a), *she* is the Higher Controller, and *herself* is the Lower Controller:

(62) She prided herself on tolerance  
C1            C2

C1 = Higher Controller (in position before the verb) = *she*

C2 = Lower Controller (in position after the verb) = *herself*

Control meanings are signaled in (60b) as well. *The witness* is in a position that signals Higher Control, while *himself* is in a position that signals Lower Control; thus there is a role conflict for this referent. The use of *-self* blocks the unwanted inference that the two Control roles are held by two different people. It is beyond the scope of the present research to explain why lexical items like *pride* and *perjure* occur with two participants; however, we can explain why the Lower Controllers are *-self* pronouns rather than simple ones.

In conclusion, the meanings of the Control System suggest the existence of more than a single participant in an event, and therefore account for the overwhelming distribution of *-self* pronouns as Lower Controllers that are coreferent with Higher Controllers. However, the Control System need not be operative for a

conflict of roles to occur, as the meanings of lexical items (such as *find*, *talk to*, *faith* and *affair*) can also suggest the presence of more than a single participant in an event.

### One-participant events

When speakers signal just one participant in an event, Control meanings are not signaled, and the Control System is not invoked.<sup>12</sup> In the next two examples, a *-self* form occurs as a second participant specifically to invoke the Control System, to make clear that the referent of *-self* (who is also the first participant) is in control of the situation:

- (63) a. My big mistake here was that I didn't realize how very, very angry I was.... And I needed support. Certainly, deathbed wills became exceedingly difficult and depressing, as if they weren't in the first place. Sometimes I found myself angry that the client **had gotten himself sick** in the first place, a notion only one step away from the anger I was really feeling – anger at Joe for **getting sick** and for dying and of course for leaving me. (SFC 212-213)
- b. We are brought up to control and manage our bodies' functions, holding back coughs and yawns, fending off sleep in public.... But childbirth cannot be controlled in this sense. Once labor begins, **your baby is going to get himself born** with or without your conscious cooperation. (LYB 27)

In (63a), the writer realizes that it is unreasonable to blame the client's sickness on the client, but he wants to do just that: he wants to impute control to the client who got sick. Then, the writer speaks more rationally about what he is really angry about – his friend's death – and now that he is being realistic, he does not

blame his friend, and does not invoke Control. In (63b), the writer is trying to express the agency of the baby, and his control over the birth situation. His birth will not just happen; rather, he will be an active, controlling participant.

Another reason that *-self* forms occur in events that are typically signaled as one-participant events is when the identity of the referent is in question, or when it is particularly relevant to the intended message. A *-self* form is used for the familiar reason that its referent is playing more than a single role, as both the agent and the object of the action:

- (64) a. In this picture, Keaton finally got to play his adored Saphead character, a pampered, useless playboy surrounded by maids, butlers, and chauffeurs, **a man who can't shave himself** and has yet to light his own cigarette. (MFA)
- b. His shoulders have been strong too. In August, a couple of days after Stefanie bought a pricey wig, a hairdresser came to the house to shave her head. Stefanie wondered where Chris was, because he had promised to be there for the trimming. He arrived late in her shearing with a bald head of his own, nicked and cut. **He had shaved himself**. She cried. (SPI)
- c. Jeff Gordon was always out of the ordinary. As mothers helped their 8- and 9-year-old sons into their uniforms, gloves, and helmets and buckled them into their quarter-midget racers, **young Jeff dressed himself**. (FSS)

In (64a), Saphead does practically nothing for himself. He is pampered and spoiled, and does not even light his own cigarette. The *-self* form is used here because there is an unusual situation that bears specific mention: he can't do anything for himself, and can't even shave himself. In (64b), the text pertains to

the shaving of Stephanie's head. Chris had promised to be present while Stephanie's head was shaved, so the fact that Chris had shaved his own head is not naturally assumed. For this reason, the second participant, the Lower Controller, is signaled. Likewise in (64c). While other little boys were dressed by their parents, the natural inference is not that Jeff dressed himself. Because that is what he did, it is noteworthy that Jeff played two roles in the dressing, so the *-self* form is used.

## 5. Logophoricity

In earlier chapters we saw the following examples in which the referent of *-self* is not mentioned elsewhere in its clause and the point of view expressed is that of the pronoun's referent:

- (65) a. As he was about to slip the catch on the inside lock Morrison glanced once more around the room. He could see now where it got its air of pastiche.... Other details stirred dim images of objects half-noted in the various houses, at the various but nearly identical get-acquainted parties. Poor Louise had been trying to construct herself out of the other people she had met. Only from **himself** had she taken nothing; thinking of his chill interior, embryonic and blighted, he realized it had nothing for her to take. (APO 70)
- b. She [Trudi] felt a sudden rush of power, the power to stay alive. She'd kept others alive with her stories when they'd come close to being found. This time it was for **herself**. (HSR 383)

- c. She could not see him in the army, on either side; he wasn't the type, and to her knowledge he had not believed in any particular ideology. He would be something nondescript, something in the background, **like herself**; perhaps he had become an interpreter. (AMM 31)

Most contemporary analysts treat such logophoric uses as different in kind from other uses of these forms (e.g., Zribi Hertz 1989; Pollard and Sag 1992; Reinhart and Reuland 1993; Dalrymple 1993; and others). But in the present study we have found no analytical or empirical reason to segregate these uses as a separate category. We will explain logophoric messages by the same mechanism that accounts for other uses of *-self* forms: they are both a motivation for and a result of the use of the meaning INSISTENCE. We have seen that speakers INSIST on a referent when (a) the referent is important in context; and (b) there is something about the referent that the speaker wishes to point out to the hearer (e.g., an unexpected role, a contrast, exclusion of others, etc.). Referents whose points of view are represented in a discourse narrated by someone else meet both those criteria. And like other categories we have considered, logophoric uses overlap with other message types; we will find a multiplicity of motivations for the use of INSISTENCE in all these examples.

#### Additional role

By definition, the referent of a pronoun used for a logophoric message plays at least two roles in an utterance: the role for which he is mentioned, and as the cog-

nizer (SC) of the situation. For example, the role of the referent of *himself* in (65a) can be schematized as in (66):

(66) X was thinking that she had taken nothing from X.

Zribi-Hertz's (1989) paraphrase of a logophoric example she provides illustrates this point as well:

- (67) a. He [Zapp] sat down at the desk and opened the drawers. In the top right-hand one was an envelope addressed to **himself**. (Zribi-Hertz 1989)
- b. He sat down at the desk and opened the drawers. He {**saw/realised/registered...**} that in the top right-hand one was an envelope addressed to **himself**. (Paraphrase of 67a, p. 716)

Thus, not only is the referent the individual to whom the envelope was addressed, but the referent is also the one who perceives that fact:

(68) X perceived that the envelope was addressed to X.

We have already seen that the most frequent inference that results from the use of INSISTENCE is that its referent plays more than one role. Logophoric uses of *-self* suggest a role conflict for their referents.

### Unexpectedness

We have seen *-self* forms used when there is something unusual or unexpected about their referents, and in logophoric uses, there are at least two elements that are unusual: the referent of the form has more than single role, and the perspective taken is not that of the speaker. The normal expectation in any discourse is that a speaker offers her own point of view, not the viewpoint of another person. Each

utterance in (65) is assumed to expound its author's point of view – such is the normal expression of ideas in discourse. Even a sentence such as *Zribi-Hertz proposes...* is the present author's interpretation of the work of Zribi-Hertz. And even a potential paraphrase of (65a), *She was thinking he would be something nondescript...* represents the speaker's view of what the character was thinking.<sup>13</sup>

If a speaker wishes to deviate from the typical situation by expressing the point of view of a particular referent, that is surely an unusual and noteworthy situation regarding that referent.

#### Importance in discourse

We have also seen that only entities with a certain measure of importance are referred to by *-self* pronouns, and that the use of *-self* contributes additional importance to them. In (65), the referents of the *-self* pronouns are important as the protagonists of the stories from which these passages are excerpted. They are also the individuals whose points of view are represented throughout, the characters with whom readers identify in these stories, the ones that readers have the most empathy for.

#### Available meanings and oppositions

English has no dedicated grammatical mechanism to indicate point of view, so other resources of the grammar must be tapped to express perspective.<sup>14</sup> The meaning INSISTENCE may be used to suggest an unexpected point of view, that of the form's referent.

Simple pronouns are highly unsuitable for point of view effects, because they pertain **primarily** to person meanings. That is, all simple forms signal person meanings, and no other meaning is signaled by all of these forms. The person system defines and exhaustively categorizes everything in the world from the point of view of the speaker. In the person system, the speaker is always “ego,” as any entity referred to by a (personal) pronoun is either speaker, hearer, or other than speaker/hearer. Because the person meanings of the pronominal system grammatically embody the speaker’s perspective, a speaker who wishes to express a point of view other than that of the speaker must, in some way, subvert the speaker-based perspective of the person meanings.

While *-self* pronouns also signal person meanings, the essential characteristic of *-self* forms is not person, but INSISTENCE. Person is simply a meaning that is interlocked with INSISTENCE, as it is not possible to signal INSISTENCE without simultaneously signaling person. The *raison d’être* for *-self* forms is not person, so a *-self* pronoun in some way skirts the more salient speaker-based perspective of simple pronouns.

#### Analysis of examples

Let us analyze the choice of pronouns in the passages in (65). Throughout the story in which (65a) occurs, the author is addressing the reader, narrating the story from an external perspective. Each use of a third person pronoun suggests that it is from the point of view of the narrator. The otherwise unexpected use of *himself* in (65a) is as close as the speaker can come to subverting the speaker-based third

person perspective of the simple pronoun *him*. *-Self* gives the sense of an indirect quote, that the reader is witnessing Morrison's own thoughts. In addition, as the word *only* also suggests (*only from himself*), the meaning INSISTENCE concentrates attention on this referent to the exclusion of others (a motivation we saw among appositives, and which will be discussed further in Chapter 7).

In (65b), Trudi is the main character of the book in which this passage appears, highly salient and accessible. The use of the *-self* pronoun suggests that there is something unexpected about her: the thought (*this time it was for herself*) is not from the perspective of the objective narrator, but from Trudi's own point of view. The meaning INSISTENCE also contributes to a comparison between her telling stories for others, and for herself. There is also a conceptual role conflict (if not a clausal one), in that her storytelling was for herself. The IN-FOCUS entity *it* refers to Trudi's storytelling, so she has two roles in the utterance: she told stories, this time for herself.

In (65c), the *-self* form not only contributes to a logophoric interpretation, but also to a comparison. We saw in Chapter 5 that INSISTENCE is well-suited to expressing comparisons, because INSISTING suggests the existence and exclusion of other possible entities, and therefore a comparison between those who are included in the reference, and those who are excluded.

## 6. Summary

The claim of the present study is that the same meaning, INSISTENCE, is signaled whenever *-self* pronouns occur. In this chapter we have seen that unexpectedness is not only a motivation for the use of this meaning in appositive positions, but for their use as arguments as well. In contexts that are typically characterized as reflexive, what is unexpected is that an entity is playing two different roles at just one time, creating a conflict between the number of roles and the number of entities filling those roles. By hypothesizing that *-self* forms are signals of the meaning INSISTENCE, and noting that the meaning is used when a single entity is playing more than one role, the distribution of both *-self* and simple pronouns in what have traditionally been called reflexive contexts can be explained. The appearance of *-self* pronouns in picture noun phrases and in logophoric uses is also partially explained by the role conflict hypothesis.

### 6.1 *A new solution to an unsolved problem*

The present proposal offers a solution to an analytical problem that has never before been solved: what motivates the occurrence of *-self* forms in actual usage. The notion of role conflict is not simply a restatement of the reflexive pronoun account, which provides neither an explanation, nor even a description, of the distribution of these forms. Rather, the hypothesis offered here is a novel one that is quite different from the structural notion of reflexivity.

Role conflict is an instantiation of the more general tendency to use the meaning INSISTENCE when the form's referent is unexpected. The same meaning that accounted for the wide variety of message effects seen in Chapter 5 among appositive uses, also explains both the occurrence and non-occurrence of *-self* pronouns in reflexive contexts.

## 6.2 *Expanded analytical coverage*

The reflexive pronoun hypothesis is a syntactically-based account of the distribution of *-self* forms, relying as it does on the notions of subjects and predicates, and on the prior mention of the same referent within a clause.<sup>15</sup> The use of *-self* in noun phrases requires a modification of the original account, such as the postulation of understood subjects of noun phrases. In addition, the use of *-self* outside clausal environments requires the postulation of understood sentence structure, where no such structure is overtly present. The use of *-self* in conjoined phrases is also unexplained by the reflexive pronoun account.

By contrast, our meaning-based analysis is not limited to clause-level phenomena; rather, the meaning INSISTENCE may be used whenever a role conflict is suggested. No amendments or modifications are needed for our meaning-based analysis to account for the appearance of *-self* forms in noun phrases, headlines or conjoined phrases, and our analysis does not require the postulation of underlying structures, homonyms or additional components of grammar to account for phenomena such as these. The meanings of lexical items, including words typically defined as nouns and verbs, as well as the Control System, can all

suggest distinct participants in an event, and the meaning *INSISTENCE* may be useful in all such cases to block that inference.

The notion of role conflict also helps to explain logophoric uses of *-self*. Logophoricity is not unlike other communicative effects we have described. It is neither a condition nor a constraint, but rather, an inference about the intended message. Logophoricity does not simply license the use of *-self*, but rather, like other message elements we have seen, it is a possible interpretation of and motivation for the use of the meaning *INSISTENCE*.

## Notes to Chapter 6

1. Givón (1993b: 89) suggests that part of the definition of the reflexive construction is that “The same referent participates in the clause *in two different roles*” (emphasis added).
2. Thanks to Joseph Davis for suggesting these examples.
3. Analysts who are predisposed to look for syntactic explanations might propose that the similarities are only superficial, and that there are different underlying structures for each sentence.
4. In example (14), the Control System, described on page 232, is another source of role conflict.
5. The *-self* forms in second person also differ from simple forms in that the *-self* forms provide additional number information, in the difference between *yourself* and *yourselves*. Number in *-self* forms will be discussed in Chapter 8.
6. Modern syntactic treatments have also adapted the reflexive account with a formulation that relies on structural notions such as c-command.
7. The *-self* pronouns in the two previous examples are part of conjoined noun phrases, but this fact does not appear to be essential to the choice of *-self* in them. See Chapter 7 for a discussion of *-self* in conjoined expressions.
8. The eschewing of the notion of underlying structure and attention to the conceptual content of utterances are points of agreement between the present analysis and the cognitive grammar framework.
9. In Section 2.3 we saw that one reason simple pronouns may be used is specifically to avoid the inference that one entity is playing two different roles, and to present the scene as if there were two distinct entities.
10. The English Control System has been described by Reid (1991) and Huffman (1993). Only an outline of the essential analysis is provided here.
11. Other examples in which the Control System is operative include (14), (15), (16), (20), (26), (27) and (28). In addition, some analysts propose that a Control meaning is signaled by the entity mentioned after an event, even when there is no signaled Higher Controller, such as (21) and (22).

12. In Reid's words, "the single Participant may play any role implied by the Occurrence itself so long as it is a contextually plausible one." Reid gives the following examples of the range of Control that single participants may exert: *Sterling Moss drives well*; *The car drives well*; *The gasoline drives well*; *The road drives well* (1991: 178).
13. Direct quotations are the only explicit device that a writer can rely on to unambiguously indicate that an utterance represents the thoughts or words of another, as in *She thought, "he is something nondescript..."*.
14. For example, see Kuno (1987), and Fleischman (1992), who considers the role of verb tense in expressing point of view effects.
15. More recent incarnations of the reflexive pronoun account involve the prior mention of the same referent within some other structural domain, e.g., a governing category that may be either a clause or a noun phrase.

## Chapter 7

### **Argument environments: Many uses of *-self***

While most tokens of argument *-self* suggest an unexpected role conflict for their referent, as long as the use of INSISTENCE is not incompatible with the hearer's task of determining the identities and roles of entities, speakers can effectively deploy the meaning for myriad message effects. In this chapter we will demonstrate that INSISTENCE in argument uses contributes to many of the same message effects that are found among appositive uses.

#### **1. Contrast**

We saw in Chapter 5 that INSISTING on one entity suggests the existence and exclusion of other possible entities, making *-self* well suited for comparisons in appositive environments. Expressing contrast is also a motivation for the use of *-self* in many argument environments, as in (1a). The writer could have chosen a simple pronoun, as in (1b), without a change in reference, but instead selected the *-self* pronoun for a comparison between the referents of the form, and those who are different from them:

- (1) a. It's also important, I think, for youths while they are in school to volunteer or work for pay in part-time jobs where they can serve people who have serious, unmet needs, then discuss these problems in class so that they won't acquire critical or condescending attitudes toward those different from **themselves**. (SBC)
- b. It's also important, I think, for youths while they are in school to volunteer or work for pay in part-time jobs where they can serve people who have serious, unmet needs, then discuss these problems in class so that they won't acquire critical or condescending attitudes toward those different from **them**. (Unattested)
- c. It's also important, I think, for youths while they are in school to volunteer or work for pay in part-time jobs where they can serve people who have serious, unmet needs, then discuss these problems in class so that they won't acquire critical or condescending attitudes toward those different from \_\_\_\_\_.

Inferences about role conflicts and referent-finding

The first question we might ask about the passages in (1) is why both *-self* and simple forms can be used in this context without a change in reference. That is, why can both *themselves* and *them* refer to the same students? The answer is that the issue of role conflict does not arise, because the object of a comparison is not typically a distinct referent. It is **expected** that an already mentioned entity will be the one with whom a comparison is being made. That there is no role conflict can be seen in the following schematic representation of the conceptual content of this utterance:

- (2) X should not develop critical attitudes toward those different from \_\_\_\_.

People are most likely to have critical attitudes toward those different from themselves, and not from those who are different from another group of people.

A more detailed schematic representation is shown in (3):

- (3) X should serve Y  
(Y = people who have serious unmet needs),  
so that X won't have critical attitudes toward  
those different from \_\_\_\_\_.

The clear implication is that those with serious unmet needs are different from the students (that is, Y is different from X); the students should not develop critical attitudes toward those people and by extension, others who are also different. By omitting the pronoun altogether, as in (1c), we can see that a hearer's natural inference will be that the referent is the youth; the expectation is that the referent of the pronoun is the youth, and INSISTENCE is not needed to point the hearer toward the correct referent.<sup>1</sup>

#### Contrast and comparison

As we saw in Chapter 2, *-self* forms are prevalent in expressions such as *like Y*, *but Y*, *except Y*, and *(more) than Y*. While grammarians have listed such expressions as an arbitrary set, we are proposing that *-self* forms appear in these contexts as part of a larger pattern in which the meaning INSISTENCE is used to express comparisons.

- (4) a. She could not see him in the army, on either side; he wasn't the type, and to her knowledge he had not believed in any particular ideology. He would be something nondescript, something in the background,

**like herself**; perhaps he had become an interpreter.  
(AMM 31)

- b. And in that experience something unexpected was illuminated: how gratifying it was not to have to explain or rationalize or defend her decision to **any-one but herself**. (GIN)
- c. If a child throws a toy truck at his friend, causing a wound that will leave a scar, a mother might well sue the center for negligent supervision. Of course, if it had happened at home, under her watch, there would be no solace in the courts, and no one to punish **except herself**. (GDW)
- d. Perhaps that was why he had never wanted to touch her: he liked women who were not necessarily more stupid but **lazier than himself**. (APO 51)

Of course, in none of these examples is contrast the only interpretation associated with the use of *-self*, because in argument uses, like appositives, many different communicative effects generally occur simultaneously. In (4a), the *-self* form expresses not only contrast, but logophoricity as well. The thoughts that *he would be something nondescript, something in the background*, and that *he had become an interpreter* belong to Christine, the referent of *-self* and the protagonist of the short story, not to its author. In (4b), INSISTENCE contributes not only to a comparison, but also to a sense of exclusion, which was seen with respect to appositive uses of *-self* as well. The phrase *anyone but herself* expresses a targeted and focused reference, one that clearly does not admit others. The same is true of (4c), in which INSISTENCE contributes to a comparison and a sense of exclusion. *No one to punish except herself* points directly at the referent of *-self*, and highlights the fact that there is no one with whom she can share the blame.

In (4d), there is a logophoric message as well, as the passage describes the thoughts of the referent of *himself*.

In the next example, the phrase *instead of* indicates a contrast:

- (5) Ogburn was such a shy and considerate employer that often he went to extremes to protect my feelings. Once when I had addressed a manuscript to **ourselves** instead of the Rumford Press in Maine, he hid it under a pile of mail so that I would find it without knowing that he had already seen it. (MBW 120)

There is a comparison between those to whom the manuscript was sent (*ourselves*), and those to whom it should have been sent. In addition, the referent of *-self* is unexpected, partly because the intended recipient of the manuscript was someone else, but also because mailing an envelope to oneself is usually counterproductive and unanticipated. And there is a role conflict, in that the sender and the receiver of the manuscript are the same, even though the number meanings of the participant *I* do not match the number meanings of the second participant, *ourselves*.

The writer's wish to express contrast is just one of the factors that motivates the use of INSISTENCE in the next example as well:

- (6) He had already lost his job because of discrimination when it was discovered he had AIDS. He was the man who had called me six months before for help, and I had turned him down, and he had hung up on me.... I should just give up on trying to attract men, I thought. I went home and nursed my cold, struck by the loss of this man, **not only to me but to himself**. (SFC118)

The phrase *not only to me but (also) to himself* indicates a comparison between the referents of *me* and *himself*, suggesting a contrast between what the loss

means to the writer, and what it means to the man himself. There is also a role conflict for this referent: he has suffered the loss of himself. And in addition to the unexpectedness of any person playing two roles simultaneously, another unanticipated situation makes the meaning INSISTENCE on a referent appropriate to this communication. The loss of a person usually refers to death, or departure, so the individual himself does not experience his own loss. In this example, however, he does lose himself. The writer deploys the meaning INSISTENCE to express the contrast, role conflict, and situational unexpectedness which are all part of the overall communication.

#### More robust contrast

The meaning INSISTENCE appears to result in a sharper contrast between the referents of *-self* and others than would the corresponding versions of these passages with simple pronouns. For example, (1b) describes the same scene as (1a), though the comparison seems less robust. As we have noted, while all referring expressions necessarily exclude others, the INSISTENT reference of *-self* leads to a concomitantly stronger exclusion, so *-self* forms are particularly well suited for differentiating their referents from other, related entities, and for highlighting the **differences** between the referents and others. Thus, in a large sample of utterances, we can predict that *-self* pronouns will be used relatively more often for contrasts than for comparisons. This prediction has led us to a newly discovered fact about the distribution of these pronouns: there is a

greater proportion of *-self* pronouns in the environment *different from* \_\_\_\_\_ than in the corresponding environment *like* \_\_\_\_\_, and an even higher proportion of *-self* forms in the phrase *very different from* \_\_\_\_\_.

Table 1. *Contrast and comparisons with -self*

	<i>like</i>		<i>different**</i>		<i>very different</i>	
	N*	%	N	%	N	%
<i>him</i>	4418	78	30	16	0	0
<i>himself</i>	1212	21	148	83	5	100
	5630		178		5	

\* Because the count was performed on an untagged electronic corpus, the number of tokens of *like him* have been adjusted to exclude strings in which *like* is used as a verb.<sup>2</sup>

\*\* Includes tokens of *different from him* and *different than him*.

Table 1 shows that *-self* forms are useful for comparisons, as they appear 21% of the time with the word *like*. However, when there is a contrast between their referent and others (with the word *different*), the percentage jumps dramatically to 83%. And while the number of tokens with *very different* is quite small, it is nevertheless noteworthy that every single one of them includes the *-self* form. These findings support our hypothesis that the meaning INSISTENCE contributes to the expression of contrast between its referent and others. When speakers want to draw attention to differences between a referent and others, the *-self* form is useful in meeting that communicative goal.

## 2. Prominent referents

Because the choice of a *-self* pronoun results in more attention on a referent than would a simple pronoun in the same context (INSISTING draws additional attention), the use of *-self* suggests that its referent is worthy of that additional

attention.<sup>3</sup> One of the factors motivating the choice of a *-self* pronoun in (1) is the importance accorded to the referents. The youth (the referent of *themselves*) derive their importance not only by being IN FOCUS with respect to the most recently named event, but also because they are entities of central importance throughout the book from which this passage is excerpted. The example is from Dr. Spock's well-known *Baby and Child Care*, in which the referents are not only featured in the title, but are also the major topic and the *raison d'être* of the book itself. Clearly, these children are prominent throughout the text. Referring to them with the meaning INSISTENCE reflects their important role in the discourse.

#### Little ol' me

As we have noted, the communicative problem of identifying referents and their roles takes communicative priority, and more of the resources of the linguistic system must be brought to bear on this task for third person than for first and second person referents. Among first and second person uses, the prominence accorded to the referent is an important factor in the choice between these two types of forms. Thus, we have the familiar expression *little ol' me*, but not *little ol' myself*. To illustrate, let us look at pairs of examples in which the speaker's sense of the referent's importance clearly correlates with the choice between *-self* and simple forms:

- (7) a. Why do they call New York the Big Apple? It should be called the Big Heart, for as I ran [in the New York City Marathon], I was cheered on – **me**, a mere Virginian – by thousands of New Yorkers.... (LCA)
- b. [In a letter from the actor Sean Penn to movie studio executives, complaining that he hasn't been supplied with a private jet] ... my schedule is rather hectic. I therefore requested that Mr. Murdoch's gigantic corporation might be so generous (with the money they've earned exploiting the pain and suffering of **myself** and my peers in their tabloids) as to supply me with a private jet to travel to Houston. (PDM)

In (7a), the writer is extolling the virtues of New York City, deliberately belittling his own status by referring to himself as *a mere Virginian*. He chooses the pronoun *me*, rather than *myself*, to minimize his importance. By contrast, in (7b), the writer is a Hollywood celebrity who is having an epistolary temper tantrum, complaining that he is being asked to sit in a commercial airline's first class lounge, with regular first class passengers, when he should have been offered a private jet. The grandiose actor even describes himself in this letter as *less than humble*.<sup>4</sup>

The next pair of examples shows a similar pattern with second person forms, *you* and *yourself*. The simple pronoun *you* in (8a) is used to minimize the importance of its referent, while in (8b), the speaker chooses the *-self* pronoun to give its referent respect and importance.

- (8) a. If you want to tell women that they should have 1950's marriages or 1850's morals, if you want to persuade them that motherhood will drive them crazy and that condoms are for squares, it's best not to look too closely at the variety and complexity of human experience. You might find out that your politics are, after all, **just you**. (PSO)
- b. Mother went on, "I wonder if you would entertain a proposal. If the great Mameha says Chiyo will repay her debts by the age of twenty, how can I doubt it's true? Of course, a girl like Chiyo won't succeed without an older sister **such as yourself**, and yet our little okiya is stretched to its limits just now. I can't possibly offer you the terms you're accustomed to. The best I could offer from Chiyo's future earnings might be only half what you'd ordinarily expect." (GMG 135)

In (8a), a reviewer suggests that a book's author bases her opinions on nothing more than her own limited experience, and not, as the author claims, on universal truths.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the reviewer avoids the meaning INSISTENCE, because she wants to minimize the referent's importance, believing as she does that the author's experience is only a personal one, just a small and unrepresentative part of a big world. By contrast, in (8b), the speaker is asking a favor, and uses the meaning INSISTENCE to express deference and respect to the referent of *-self*, believing that by showing greater respect, the hearer will be more likely to do what the speaker is asking of her.

## Politeness

Because INSISTING can suggest the importance of referents, second person *-self* forms may express politeness or deference toward an addressee, as in (8b). Van Hoek offers the following attested example (1997: 189):

- (9) To illustrate how you are connected to international finance, let's look at how the banking system works. First, people like **yourself** deposit money in banks. The banks put the money in their safes, where the amounts gradually increase thanks to the sound banking practice of never lending money to people like **yourself**. (BBA)

The writer's goal is to be humorous, not insulting. Thus, he simultaneously offends the reader by suggesting that banks don't lend money to people like him, and flatters him by INSISTING.

Likewise, in (10), a speaker refers to his listeners with INSISTENCE as a way of flattering, in an effort to convince them to do something:

- (10) "Now, I don't have to spell things out for people like **yourselves**. Some types one comes across can't seem to cut their way through any problem, and that does make things difficult. But you, I don't have to explain the situation to you. I've got what you want, and you've got what I want." (BTE 74)

Van Hoek notes that "This pragmatic effect of increased politeness is further illustrated by the inappropriateness of [*-self*] when the speaker's intent is to insult the addressee," and she offers the following (invented) examples to support her assertion:

- (11) a. People like you disgust me!
- b. \*People like yourself disgust me!
- c. \*With friends like yourself, who needs enemies?

Testing this premise on attested data is difficult, due to the small numbers of examples such as these, and the difficulty of identifying them in electronic corpora according to specific textual criteria. However, in the InfoTrac corpus, we conducted a search for articles that contained the phrases *stupid ... like you*, and *stupid ... like yourself*, predicting that we would find more of the former (with *you*), because the meaning INSISTENCE is not appropriate when a speaker wishes to insult her addressee. While only two tokens were found, these findings suggest at least preliminary confirmation of the observation that second person *-self* forms may be used to express politeness, while simple forms are more suitable for insults.

- (12) a. He spit at her feet. "Stupid children like you aren't good for much...." (TBH)
- b. "I would be stupid to ride with a stupid driver like you," her mother said. (NGD)

We noted in connection with example (8a) that the meaning of the word *just* is compatible with simple pronouns, as importance and expansiveness suggested by INSISTENCE is contrary to the diminishing contribution of *just*. While people are notoriously egocentric and therefore might be expected to assert their own importance with *just myself*, we generally do not want to **appear** overly ego-

centric or narcissistic; so a more frequent strategy is to use the *-self* form with *just* in the second person, in order to avoid suggesting the **unimportance** of a hearer:

- (13) “Is there anything I can bring?” He shook his great head.  
“**Just yourself.**” (WBE)

In (13), the speaker uses the word *just* to tell his hearer that her presence alone is all he wants. To avoid the minimizing effect of the concatenation *just you*, the speaker says *just yourself*.

In an analysis that is consistent with our own, Cresswell (1997) describes the politeness effect of *-self* forms in apposition as a highlighting of the referent’s importance and relevance. However, she points out that the use of *-self* could have the opposite effect, if a speaker were highlighting the referent’s importance with respect to a negative situation:

For instance, in situations where it is polite to point out the addressee’s or some third party’s relevance/importance, the speaker might refer to *you yourself* or *x himself/herself* (if, for example, the speaker was extolling the addressee for his role in granting her some favor). On the other hand, in a situation where the speaker wishes to refrain from seeming to blame the addressee for an unfavorable state of affairs, it might be impolite to emphasize the addressee’s role by using [appositive *-self*].

Our analysis makes the same prediction, that the use of the meaning **INSISTENCE** could be impolite or insulting, depending on what is being **INSISTED** upon. That is, politeness is not part of the meaning of *-self*, nor a necessary result of the use of these forms. Rather, it is the context of **INSISTING** that determines whether the *-self* form is interpreted to be polite or not. Although we do not have data to confirm

this prediction among appositives, the following three examples appear to be decreasingly polite:

- (14) At a dinner party, a host hears a glass break, and asks what happened:
- a. Did a glass break?
  - b. Did you break a glass?
  - c. Did you yourself break a glass?

In (14a), no agency is imputed to anyone, so (a) is a way of asking if a glass is broken without assigning any responsibility to a guest. In (b), which seems less polite than (a), the speaker names her guest (*you*), and asks if he is responsible for breaking the glass, not sparing the guest the embarrassment that follows from such a blunder. In (c), the host is **INSISTING** on the referent's role in the breaking of the glass, further embarrassing the guest by drawing additional attention to him and his mistake.

#### A third person example

As we have noted, there is generally little flexibility in the use of *-self* forms as participants in an event, as the meaning **INSISTENCE** is typically reserved for suggesting a role conflict. But in the next example, the speaker relies on his hearers' ability to easily identify the referent of *-self* even though it is not used to suggest a role conflict, and he deploys the meaning **INSISTENCE** to confer prominence and prestige on the form's referent. While this single example cannot demonstrate the hypothesis that *-self* forms can have the effect of signifying the importance of

their referents, it is nonetheless illustrative of the strategy, and fully consistent with the hypotheses we have proposed. A broadcaster is giving a play-by-play description of a baseball game, in which the home team is ahead and the game is almost over. The broadcaster announces that a new pitcher is coming in to pitch against the Florida Marlins for the first time:

- (15) “The Marlins have heard a lot about Mariano Rivera, and they're gonna get a chance to see him. His reputation obviously precedes **himself**.” (MSG)

The tone of the home team broadcaster is somewhat condescending toward the visiting Marlins, as the Yankees are leading, and Rivera, a star closing pitcher, is coming into the game to pitch just one inning. The importance and prominence of this referent are so great that he is referred to with a *-self* pronoun, even without being IN FOCUS with respect to the event (*precedes*).

### 3. Exclusion of others and differentiation

Concentrating attention to the exclusion of others is a motivation for the use of *-self* forms not only as appositives, but as arguments as well:

- (16) (Regarding Jack Kevorkian) But when [young men during the Vietnam War] burned their draft cards, no one died. Their protest affected **themselves** alone as sovereign individuals. (CKD)

In her comments comparing different acts of civil disobedience, the writer has also used the words *alone* and *sovereign* to emphasize that the actions of the Vietnam protesters affected only them, and not anyone else. The hearer can infer that the speaker's reason for using the meaning INSISTENCE is to direct the

hearer to note only the referent, and to thereby exclude other possible participants from the event.

In addition, the referents of *themselves* are important individuals in this utterance, and the use of *-self* contributes to the importance accorded them. The writer views the actions of the war protesters as noble (in contrast to her view of Jack Kevorkian), and she does not diminish their worthiness in any way, as she might have chosen to do with the word *just*, or *only*. Instead, she emphasizes the point that the protests affected no one else with the word *alone*, and she expresses the dignity of the referents by describing them as *sovereign individuals*.

Analyzing *-self* as a reflexive pronoun does not account for this example, because the *-self* form occurs as an argument, yet it is not coreferent with the subject of the sentence. However, the INSISTENCE hypothesis accounts for this example in a principled and consistent way. Because the essential task of establishing the identities and roles of entities is not difficult in this example, the writer has chosen to exploit the meaning INSISTENCE to exclude others from the reference. Even though the young men are not IN-FOCUS within the clause, they are highly salient, as they are mentioned as part of the phrase *their protest*, and they are IN-FOCUS with respect to a recently mentioned event, *affected*. In addition, in the conceptualization of the protests they have two roles, as they are the agents of the protests, and those affected by them. The young men are the

most plausible referent of the pronoun, and there are no other matching, or even animate entities who have more prominence at this stage of the discourse.

In the next example, the speaker uses the word *solely*, which helps the hearer infer that the meaning INSISTENCE is used here not because of a role conflict, or an unexpected message, but to INSIST on the referents to the exclusion of others:

- (17) a. “We created an ad campaign solely directed at women for this watch.” The thinking, she said, was that Patek Philippe needed “to be speaking to women in a language solely for **themselves**.” (CAD)
- b. “We created an ad campaign solely directed at women for this watch.” The thinking, she said, was that Patek Philippe needed “to be speaking to women in a language solely for **them**.” (Unattested)

The speaker could have used a simple pronoun, as shown in (17b), which would be the more typical choice. The scene described remains the same in both examples, as both *them* and *themselves* in these examples are understood to refer to women. The attested choice, however, is more effective in expressing the message that the ad campaign is targeted very specifically – exclusively – to women.

The next example provides further evidence that this use of argument *-self* is not exceptional or accidental, as it is excerpted from the fourth edition of an academic textbook:

- (18) Very young children are highly egocentric. The world revolves around them, and they see all events as focusing on **themselves**.<sup>6</sup>  
(BPL)

While *-self* does not refer to the grammatical subject of the verb (which would be *events*), the writer chooses the *-self* form to point very specifically to the pronoun's referent, to *focus* specifically and intently on the form's referents, to the exclusion of others.

The next passage was originally seen as an exemplifying the use of *-self* for comparison. But it also shows *-self* contributing to an exclusion of others, a targeted and specific pointing to its referent, to the exclusion of all others:

- (19) If a child throws a toy truck at his friend, causing a wound that will leave a scar, a mother might well sue the center for negligent supervision. Of course, if it had happened at home, under her watch, there would be no solace in the courts, and no one to punish **except herself**. (GDW)

According to this passage, if her child is injured at home, the blame will fall squarely on the mother, and on the mother alone.

As we have seen, INSISTENCE can exclude other entities that are closely related and that might otherwise not be differentiated from the intended referent. In the following example, the speaker is answering a question about an irreverent book he has written about celebrities called *Naked Pictures of Famous People*:

- (20) I am writing about their iconic basis more than I'm writing about **themselves**. (SNP)

Referentially, both *them* and *themselves* would be equivalent in this example. Nevertheless, the speaker has chosen to INSIST because he wants to differentiate the people themselves from their symbolic value, or what he calls their "iconic basis".

Here again, we see that *-self* simultaneously contributes to several different message effects. There is a contrast between the famous people and their iconic value, and in this comparison, the celebrities themselves are seen as more important. While this is not necessarily the case for all famous people, the book under discussion is not a serious study of true heroes; rather, it is a silly spoof on celebrity. The use of *-self* to refer to the individuals themselves helps express their relative importance.

#### **4. Conjoined expressions**

There are many reasons why one might INSIST on a referent in a conjoined expression, just as there are many reasons why one might INSIST on a referent in any other context. But one of the characteristics of conjoined expressions makes the meaning INSISTENCE especially useful within them: the meaning of the word *and*, which draws things together, creating the notion of a group consisting of the entities named by the two conjoins. *-Self* forms may indicate that their referents are special, noteworthy members of the group formed by the conjoined phrase, or an unexpected role or role conflict for their referents.

##### **4.1 Differentiation**

By INSISTING, *-self* forms suggest that their referents are bounded and distinct from other related entities. Thus, a *-self* form may be used to individuate its referent, to, in a sense, extract its referent from the relationship suggested by the word *and*. To put it another way, the word *and* puts things together, but the

meaning INSISTENCE can pull them apart. In the examples in (21), both from Margaret Mead's autobiography, the meaning INSISTENCE serves to differentiate its referent from others:

- (21) a. He [Mead's father] was as forgetful and as careless of material things as he had always been, but as he did not smoke and the furnace had an automatic fire arrangement, the principal hazards were to **himself** and not the neighbors in whose children he was deeply interested and for whose sake he had taken down the fence so that they would have more room to play. (MBW 42)
- b. I have a painting of Grandma, Priscilla, and **herself**, dressed for church, standing by the gate to our house in Holicong, and another of the view from our windows in Philadelphia. (MBW 69)

In both cases, the writer could have chosen a simple pronoun, but instead relied on the meaning INSISTENCE to differentiate the form's referent from the other conjoin. In (21a), the *-self* form helps differentiate the form's referent from his neighbors. The word *not* demonstrates that the writer wishes to distinguish the referent of *himself* from the other entity in the phrase (*the neighbors*). Mead notes that these two entities do not share the same relationship to *the hazards*, which were to her father, but not to the others.

Like the other examples we have considered, this one is motivated by a multiplicity of message types that may be inferred from the use of the meaning INSISTENCE. There is a comparison between the hazards to the author's father and hazards to the neighbors, and the *-self* form also reflects and confers importance.

The example in (21b) includes the phrase *a painting of Grandma, Priscilla, and herself*, which can be described as both a conjoined expression and a picture noun phrase. The classification is not theoretically significant though, as the same factors motivate the use of the meaning INSISTENCE in both contexts. Here, the meaning is being used to differentiate its referent from the other conjoins. The expanded context of this example, shown in (22), shows that the referent of *herself* has a very different relationship to the painting than the others pictured in it, as she is not only a subject in the painting, but also its creator:

- (22) Only Elizabeth was an artist to her fingertips, and whichever of her talents she used, she used it differently from all the rest of us. Her perceptions, so different from ours, have nourished me through the years. Her understanding of what has gone on in schools has provided depth and life to my own observations on American education. And her paintings have made every place I have lived in my home. I have the first watercolor she ever painted and a painting of the New York Stock Exchange building she made for Father. I have a painting of Grandma, Priscilla, and **herself**, dressed for church, standing by the gate to our house in Holicong, and another of the view from our windows in Philadelphia. (MBW 69)

Here again, the referent's importance is another factor motivating the choice of the meaning INSISTENCE. Not only is she the topic of the paragraph, but the love and respect the author feels for her are expressed here.

#### 4.2 *Unexpectedness and role conflict*

In the next example, the meaning **INSISTENCE** is motivated not only by the unexpectedness of the arsonist's death (as discussed in Chapter 6), but also by the fact that the pronoun is part of a conjoined expression:

- (23) The day before a gunman-arsonist turned a Harlem clothing store into an inferno that killed seven employees and **himself**, the store's owner, who is Jewish, told a court that ... arson and physical attacks seemed imminent. (MCF)

In (23), the arsonist and the seven employees form a group (those who were killed by the fire). But the arsonist is far from an ordinary part of this group, as he is the one responsible for his own death and the deaths of the others. The meaning **INSISTENCE** advises hearers that there is something noteworthy, something worth **INSISTING** about this referent, that is, that his role in this collectivity is unique.

We can only speculate about which form would have been used had there been no conjoined expression, that is, if the arsonist been the only one killed. It seems likely that a simple pronoun would have appeared:

- (24) The day before a gunman-arsonist turned a Harlem clothing store into an inferno that killed **him**, the store's owner, who is Jewish, told a court that ... arson and physical attacks seemed imminent. (Unattested)

The following passage is quite similar to the arsonist example, but here the pronoun is not in a conjoined expression because its referent is the only one killed as a result of the action described:

- (25) Bobby Phills and David Wesley were both racing at speeds of more than 100 mph when Phills lost control of his Porsche in the accident that killed **him**, according to a Charlotte Mecklenburg police report. (AP)

Thus, it appears to be the presence of the word *and* along with another entity in the role of Lower Controller that makes the meaning INSISTENCE useful in example (23). As we have seen, one of the most frequent uses of the meaning of *-self* is to suggest that its referent is playing more than a single role, and in the scene described in (23), the arsonist does play two roles. According to a syntactic analysis of this passage, there is no role conflict. But in a more global view of the scene, the arsonist clearly has two roles: he set the fire and he has perished in it.

Let us explicate this role conflict by considering the same passage without a conjoined expression, containing a simple pronoun:

- (26) The day before a gunman-arsonist turned a Harlem clothing store into an inferno that killed **him**, the store's owner, who is Jewish, told a court that ... arson and physical attacks seemed imminent. (Unattested)


In a syntactic analysis of the passage, there are two roles suggested by the verb *killed* (the killer and the killed), and the arsonist has just one of these roles, as it was the fire (*an inferno*) that killed the victims. In our terms, the meanings of the Control System, when there are two participants in an event, suggest that there will be two distinct participants, one a Higher Controller, the other a Lower Controller.<sup>7</sup> Thus, in (26), in the event *killed*, the Higher Controller is *the inferno*, and the Lower Controller is the *gunman-arsonist*. In the attested version (23), the

Higher Controller is *the inferno*, but there are **two** Lower Controllers, *the gunman-arsonist* and the *seven employees*.<sup>8</sup>

While more research is needed in this area, it appears that the presence of a conjoined expression weakens the signal of the Control system. The signals of the Control System are more readily recognizable in (26) where there is no conjoin, and the status of each of the participants is clear. However, in the attested example, with the word *and*, and the presence of additional participants (*seven employees*), the signals of the Control System are less readily recognizable, and the role of the arsonist and the seven employees as Lower Controllers is less apparent. Consequently, the hearer's interpretation relies more on a global understanding of the message, and less on the specific interpretation of the Control signal. In such a macro-level view, as we have seen, the arsonist is indeed playing two roles, because he has caused his own death.


We can schematize the participants' roles as follows. In Figure 1, the events and roles suggested by the non-conjoined version (26) are shown. In such a neat layout, the meanings of the Control System are apparent, and it is relatively easy to see that for any single event, the gunman-arsonist has just one role:

Figure 1. *Events and roles suggested in non-conjoined example (26)*



In Figure 2, the events and roles described by the original passage in (26) are shown. The visual presentation is more complicated too; the reader's eyes have more work to do, and the relationship between the circles is not as clear as in the previous figure. For this reason, the meaning *INSISTENCE* is useful, as it provides additional information to the reader, suggesting that there is something noteworthy or unusual about this referent, the gunman-arsonist.

Figure 2. *Events and roles suggested in conjoined example (23)*




A global view of a role conflict can result in the use of the meaning *INSISTENCE* even when a conjoined expression is not present:

- (27) Jeff Jinnett, a lawyer who specializes in technology issues, said several states, including Georgia, Virginia and Hawaii, had passed laws to shield **themselves** against lawsuits that might be filed if their computers fail. (NYTC-11/27/98)

Because the Higher Controller of the infinitive verb *to shield* is not signaled, the identity of that Controller is not obvious. It could be that, in traditional terms, the understood subject of *to shield* is *several states*, in which case, the *-self* form is indeed a second mention of the same referent. However, it is laws that are shielding the states against lawsuits. The indeterminacy of the understood subject, the agent of *to shield*, makes the use of a *-self* form more likely, because the meaning INSISTENCE helps the hearer infer that its referent has more than a single role in the scene:

Figure 3. *Events and roles suggested in conjoined example (27)*



As we will see in Section 7, the sheer number of entities present on the scene may also motivate the use of *-self*, as the writer recognizes the possible confusion among all these potential referents.

### Word order

Although a study of word order is beyond the scope of the present research, we must at least consider its effects in conjoined phrases. Whether the pronoun occurs as the first or second conjoin may affect the choice between *-self* and simple pronouns in (23) and in other cases. In the attested example, the pronoun occurs second; had it occurred first, we can surmise that the writer might have chosen **either** a *-self* or a simple pronoun, as in the following:

- (28) a. The day before a gunman-arsonist turned a Harlem clothing store into an inferno that killed **himself and seven employees**, the store's owner, who is Jewish, told a court that ... arson and physical attacks seemed imminent. (Unattested)
- b. The day before a gunman-arsonist turned a Harlem clothing store into an inferno that killed **him and seven employees**, the store's owner, who is Jewish, told a court that ... arson and physical attacks seemed imminent.

Without actual data, we can only hypothesize on the effect of word order on the choice between *-self* and simple pronouns in conjoined phrases. Intuitively it does appear that if the form occurs as the first conjoin, a simple pronoun can be used, whereas in the attested case, in which the pronoun occurs second, the simple pronoun is less appropriate. This may be because the prior mention of other entities makes the identity of the referent even less likely, and more unexpected.

But word order alone does not account for the choice of pronouns. In the first of the following two attested examples, the first conjoin is a simple form, while in the second case, a *-self* form appears:

- (29) a. What the arrest has also done, though, is thrust into the spotlight, once again, a man [Michael Skakel] who has spent much of his life trying to escape the rumors and accusations dogging **him**, his older brother Thomas and by extension, his entire family. (CGO)
- b. As Hedda Nussbaum, in a red coat with faux-fur trim, met the press on the courthouse steps in Manhattan on March 10 to announce a legal victory giving **herself** and other battered women more time to save their abusers, she dabbed her left eye with a tissue. (RHN)

The meaning INSISTENCE is not used in (29a) as there appears to be nothing unexpected about this referent, and there is no need to differentiate him from the other conjoins. While no arrests were made at the time of the crime, 25 years earlier, many residents and investigators have suspected Skakel since the time of the crime. There is nothing surprising then, that Skakel and his brother have been dogged by rumors. In addition, there is no need to differentiate Skakel from the others in the group formed by the conjoined expression. Skakel's brother has also been a suspect, and because of a widespread belief in a cover-up by his wealthy family, the whole family has been under a cloud of suspicion, and is widely believed to share the guilt.

By contrast, in (29b) a *-self* form occurs as the first conjoin. The meaning INSISTENCE is deployed because the role of the referent is unexpected, and also to suggest that she is a special member of the group formed by the conjoined

expression. INSISTENCE separates Nussbaum from the rest of the group, not only because of her unusual notoriety, but also as a newly empowered crusader for the legal rights of those who are unable to assert their rights.<sup>9</sup> Described in the article as “one of the most famous battered women in America,” Hedda Nussbaum is not an ordinary member of the group. She was last seen in public after her daughter had been murdered, and she herself had been severely and brutally beaten over a period of ten years. Not only is Nussbaum being differentiated from the rest of the group, but it is also surprising that she is in this position at all. Her role as a strong, healthy spokesperson is unexpected, given the circumstances under which she was last seen in the public eye. So the meaning INSISTENCE is useful on both counts: to differentiate Nussbaum as a special member of this group, and because her role is rather surprising.

#### **4.3 Between-phrases**

Our meaning-based approach has led to a discovery about a particular type of conjoined expression: in a *between*-phrase, the use of *-self* pronoun may suggest a conceptual difference between the conjoins. This finding supports our meaning hypothesis, as we have seen that INSISTENCE differentiates and individuates its referent, thereby suggesting the separateness of its referent; the absence of INSISTENCE (simple pronouns) can be interpreted to imply greater closeness or intimacy between the referent and other entities.

Each of the following sets shows a near-minimal pair, the first with a *-self* pronoun, the second with a simple pronoun. The choice between *-self* and

simple pronouns in these examples is not contingent on whether the referent has been mentioned elsewhere in the clause. In (30), both *-self* and simple forms occur when their referents have not been mentioned within the clause, while in (31), both types of pronouns refer to the person who is the understood agent of the event (though the referent is not mentioned explicitly within the clause, in traditional terms he is the understood subject of the clause). Thus, the proximate mention of the same referent is not the conditioning factor that determines the choice of forms in these examples:

- (30) a. **Between herself and the door** was a pungent memory, a reprise of another time she'd walked the length of the hall and opened the door to him, a moment when all her life had changed, had altered its course for good. (SPW 286)
- b. Trudi loved quickly, rashly – Sister Mathilde, whose voice would tremble with emotion when she spoke of the martyrs; Eva Rosen...; Herr Pastor Schuler, who would hear Trudi's first confession and tell her not to forget that she was God's child – loved quickly, rashly, as she had once loved George, as though there were no air **between her and the other person**. (HSR 91)
- (31) a. Behind him emerged a woman's face and graceful hands with red-lacquered nails, locked on the boy's shoulders as if in a death grip, holding him **between herself and Trudi**. (HSR 321)
- b. Suspended in the beams of pearl-gray light, he kept Trudi there though his arms began to quiver with her weight, held her there **between him and his wife** for what seemed the span of an entire lifetime, her round infant hands stirring the layers of air like

tropical fish, until his wife scuttled toward them with a sob and snatched the child from him with her smudged hands, enveloping the three of them with the musty smell of earth (HSR 20)

Example (30a) is from a novel in which the main character (Kathleen) learns of her husband's death when a man comes to her front door to deliver the news of a plane crash; her entire world disintegrates as she first learns of her husband's death, then discovers that he had been living a double life, married to another woman, with children in another city (at the same time that he was married to her). In the scene described in (30a), near the end of the novel, she is approaching the door again, remembering that other time she answered. The distance between her life before she answered the door and the utter chaos that ensued afterwards is immense. The meaning *INSISTENCE* helps express the conceptual distance between the referent of *-self* and the door, an entire world away.

By contrast, the *between*-phrase in (30b) contains a simple pronoun. One of the goals of the passage is to express the closeness Trudi felt toward those she loved. The conceptual distance between the referent of *her* (Trudi) and the other conjoin (*the other person*) is quite small, as if *there were no air between [them]*. This conceptual closeness is one of the reasons for the writer's choice of the simple pronoun.

The pair of examples in (31) shows the same contrast. In (31a), the scene is Nazi Germany, where a woman who is hiding while trying to flee the Nazis with her young son unexpectedly encounters a stranger (Trudi). The woman does not

know that Trudi is part of an underground that helps people escape the Nazis. There is no intimacy whatsoever between Trudi and the woman, who is naturally mistrustful and afraid, fearing for her life and for the life of her son, practically using the boy as a shield between herself and Trudi. The meaning INSISTENCE helps express this distance between them.

In (31b), we see the use of the simple pronoun in a *between*-phrase from the beginning of the same book, when Trudi is an infant. Here, the three people on the scene are a family: a father, mother and their new baby. The mother has rejected her child following her birth. This passage describes a scene in which the father, who loves both his baby and his seriously disturbed wife, hopes his wife will embrace them and they can live the close, happy, family life he dreams of. Thus, the use of the simple pronoun suggests the closeness the father longs for, the closeness which is the goal of him holding the baby there between them. The meaning INSISTENCE would be inappropriate in this passage, as it would suggest a conceptual distance between the husband and wife which was not part of the intended message.

We cannot say that every time a *-self* pronoun is used in a *between*-phrase, it is to express distance, and every time a simple pronoun is used it is to express closeness, because as we have seen, the use of its meaning is generally multi-determined. However, the examples above, and in (32) and (33) attest that *-self* pronouns are more likely to be chosen when there is a conceptual distance between the conjoins, and that simple pronouns are more useful when a

conceptual closeness is communicated. Figure 4 shows a summary of contexts in examples (30), (32) and (33).

Figure 4. *Summary of between-phrases*

<i>between + -self</i> (conceptual distance)	<i>between + simple</i> (conceptual closeness)
a pungent memory	as though there were no air
the unnatural relationship	nothing comes between...
emphasized the gap	emotional identification
differences of substance	no separation
obliterating the most visible link	there is no one
he lived with a wall	the bond between [a mother] and her children
I puzzled about the contrasts	One of the most important relationships in your life
one extra step	the intimate connection

- (32) a. Despite the revelations of the last several minutes, despite **the unnatural relationship between herself and the baby** (despite the very fact of the child's existence at all), Kathryn felt an urge, akin to sexual, to hold **the infant** to her breast, to that hollow space that wants always to embrace a small child (SPW 215)
- b. There was too much of everything in the banker's office, the banker's house. It all only **emphasized the gap between Elizabeth and himself**. (Elizabeth is the wife of the referent of *himself*, and the banker is her wealthy father.) (HVE 31)
- c. "Gore is on the offensive because he has to convince people that **there are differences of substance between himself and Bradley**," says Tumulty. (GVB)

- d. Unsatisfied by ham-fisted stereotypes, I went in search of political scientists, historians, legal scholars, biologists and psychologists who might cast more light on why most women make their first public act as mothers an etymological suicide, **obliterating the most visible link between their children and themselves.** (LWS)
  - e. An ad for a computer, headline: Christian Murphy was non-verbal. **He lived with a wall between himself and the rest of the world.** ... Caption: This is Christian. He can see, hear, feel touch, but he cannot speak. He was born with autistic tendencies that cut him off from the world around him. (ADA)
  - f. And I puzzled about **the contrasts between Ruth and myself**, especially when she made what seemed to me contradictory remarks, such as that it was quite impossible to imagine me as a man and that “you’d make a better father than a mother.” (MBW 196)
  - g. Gradually, she recognized more words. During the day she spoke German to the children: it was easier than taking every thought, translating it into English inside her head, and then saying it aloud, a process that always meant **one extra step between herself and the meaning.** (HVE 106-7)
- (33) a. The year 1980 marked a big turning point for Klein's empire. A series of commercials featuring 15-year-old model Brooke Shields saying, **“Nothing comes between me and my Calvins,”** made Klein's new line of tight jeans a nationwide phenomenon, selling 200,000 pairs the first week alone. The provocative commercials marked a revolution in clothing advertising, but prompted criticism from feminist leaders. The negative publicity only fueled sales. (WHW)

- b. Whatever the product, **the goal is always emotional identification between it and the consumer.** (MAL)
- c. “It's much easier to play someone else than to be yourself onscreen,” says Michael Douglas, who transforms himself into a bumbling, out-of-shape English professor in the drama *Wonder Boys*. “And when it's going good, there's an element of feeling that you're living that character. On Wall Street I felt that. **There was no separation between me and Gordon Gekko until the end of the day.**” (ACH)
- d. About a year ago, Ms. Whitman [CEO of eBay] set up a consumer insight and analysis group to find out. In contrast to the situation at traditional retailers, she said, “**there is no one between us and the consumer.**” (HDO)
- e. Some mothers, like Dot Hewitt of Paramus -- can no longer find the gift that best captured **the bond between her and her children**, but it doesn't matter. (AHM)
- f. **The Best Medicine Can Help You Improve One of the Most Important Relationships in Your Life: The One Between You and Your Doctor.** (MAB)
- g. And because she missed the written words that had formed **the intimate connection between her and Stefan** for seventeen years – so much more satisfying to be with him on the page than in person – she began to write to him again, fervent notes in German that she would hide and never show him., letters in which she didn't have to hold back with her love for him or with her anger....(HVE 105)

#### 4.4 *Prescriptivist pressures*

Linguistic behavior is fundamentally a social behavior, and therefore it is, like other social behaviors, subject to normative constraints (Cameron 1995). Unlike

linguists, who strive to ignore prescriptivist tenets in their work as analysts, speakers and writers are quite interested in using language **correctly** and in following the guidelines of stylebooks and other authorities. Thus, one of the factors that affects speakers' choice of pronominal forms is the desire to conform to social norms and prescriptivist pressures.<sup>10</sup> Such pressures are especially evident in the use of pronouns in conjoined expressions, where there is widespread confusion among speakers as to what is considered proper usage.

Speakers are sometimes unsure whether it is correct to use *I* or *me*, and may use *myself* to avoid the conundrum altogether. Many speakers have been taught not to use *me* in a conjoined expression that serves as the subject of a sentence (such as the proscribed *Me and my friends went to the movies*), so they consequently avoid the use of *me* in all conjoined expressions, and replace *me* with *myself* whenever they are unsure which pronoun to use.<sup>11</sup> An entertaining usage guide describes the problem and sets the record straight for readers who struggle with the choice of pronouns in conjoined expressions:

In the contest between *I* and *me*, the booby prize often goes to *myself*. That's why we see sentences like *Jack and myself were married yesterday*. (It's *Jack and I*.) Or like this more common *self*-promotion: *The project made money for Reynaldo and myself*. The speaker isn't sure whether it's *Reynaldo and me* or *Reynaldo and I*, so she goes with *Reynaldo and myself*. Tsk, tsk. (It's for *Reynaldo and me*.) (O'Conner 1996: 13)

While some speakers use *-self* forms in conjoined expressions to avoid the uncertainty between *I* and *me*, others are well aware of the prescriptive rules, and use the forms according to the normative guidelines they know well. In conjoined

expressions as objects, then, some speakers might always rely on *me*, if they are aware of the standard that prescribes *I* to be used as a subject, and *me* to be used as an object. In (34) the writer is discussing a significant age difference between herself and her students, yet she uses the simple pronoun, *me*:

- (34) As a teacher, I am at times most disconcerted by the style that reminds me of the 25-year gap in age **between my students and me** – the one my son calls the Hootchie-With-a-B.A.: smart girls in tight jeans, midriff-baring spandex shirts or body-hugging knit minidresses. (TWC)

At first glance, this writer is discussing a large conceptual gap (a 25-year age gap), so a *-self* pronoun may have been more effective in communicating her intended message. However, it is also possible that this writer used the simple pronoun *me* precisely to achieve the conceptual closeness effect we have been discussing, that is, to ally herself with her students. After all, she tell us that she is **disconcerted** by this age gap (more precisely, by the style that reminds her of it). She may have used *me* to minimize the gap, to suggest a closeness and affinity with her students. But the possible influence of prescriptive pressures in this example should not be ignored. It is likely that the writer, a high school teacher, is well aware of the rules laid down in grammar and style books regarding the use of first person pronouns in conjoined expressions, and she may be devotedly following them. It is generally not possible to determine to what extent prescriptivism is a factor in a writer's choice of pronoun, but it would be naïve to believe that it plays no role. As in the other examples we have seen, there are a multiplicity of motivations for the use of any single form, and we need not –

indeed we cannot – settle on any single motivation as the definitive explanation. Nevertheless, the observation that prescriptivist pressures influence speakers' choice of pronoun suggests a fruitful area for future research, as the importance of this factor cannot be determined without further study.

### 5. Confusion among many possible referents

The processing demands created by a multitude of entities on the scene are another motivation for the use of the meaning INSISTENCE. In the next example, a *-self* form is used because of confusion regarding the identity of its referent:

- (35) Sister 1: Grandma said she was going to ask Mom to pick up her own present.  
Sister 2: You mean for **herself**. (SSM)

The sisters' grandmother often asks her daughter (the sisters' mother) to purchase presents for her to give to others, so in this exchange, Sister 2 isn't sure whether Grandma is asking Mom to pick up presents on Grandma's behalf for other family members, or for Grandma herself. The confusion created by this situation motivates the use of the meaning INSISTENCE, which is used to make clear that its referent (Mom) has two roles in the gift-buying: she is purchasing the gift, and the gift is for her.

A similar motivation can be seen in (36), which describes a study in which scientists are trying to recreate the essence of an optical illusion by positioning two different moons:

- (36) People were asked to position the reference moon so it was halfway between **themselves** and the fixed moon, the Kaufmans said. (BMT)

Although the writer could have chosen a simple pronoun (*them*), she realizes the reader may have some difficulty in identifying the form's referent. *-Self* appears to be useful to help the reader picture this highly unusual arrangement, in which the form's referents have two roles: they are positioning the "reference moon," and along with the fixed moon, serving as a reference point for its placement. The need for clarity appears to motivate the choice of *-self* more than the desire to express conceptual distance, as discussed in Section 4.3.

The next example could simply be classified as a logophoric use, but recognizing the multiplicity of motivations for the use of *-self* allows us to reach a better understanding of it:

- (37) When Jutta turned from the altar after the ceremony to walk up the aisle on the arm of her new husband, there was something skittish about the way she moved, and suddenly Trudi could see why the stable Klaus, who used to be so captivated by Ingrid, would also feel drawn to Jutta, who would balance that settled side of **himself**. (HSR 295)

There are many different people in the scene described in (37) – there's Jutta, Trudi, Klaus, and Ingrid – and it can be a confusing to keep track of everyone. Even though the scene is described from Trudi's point of view (*Trudi could see why...*), what Trudi sees is Klaus's point of view (why he would feel drawn to Jutta).

Several words in the next example match the person and number of the *-self* form: *Palestinians, rules, Israelis* and *they*. The meaning INSISTENCE draws extra

attention to its referent to clarify who the referent is, and to contrast the referent with others (the Israelis):

- (38) At the signing ceremony, Mr. Arafat promised Mr. Netanyahu that “your security is our security”. But Palestinians doubt that the rules will be applied against Israelis in the way they are applied against **themselves**.  
(ECO)

If a simple pronoun had been used, the perplexing result would have been *in the way they are applied against them*. To avoid that confusion, the *-self* form is chosen for these referents, who are highly salient as the most recently signaled IN-FOCUS entities, and the conceptualizers of the situation (it is the Palestinians who doubt that the rules will be applied). In addition, the meaning INSISTENCE is useful in pointing out a contrast between the Israelis and the Palestinians, because what is at issue here is a contrast between the way the rule will be applied to the two different groups.

## 6. Summary

By looking beyond the uses of *-self* in as reflexives, we have seen in this chapter that *-self* forms are used as arguments to communicate the same types of messages for which the forms occur in apposition, such as contrast, prominence, differentiation, exclusion and unexpectedness. These message types are not linguistic categories or discrete effects of the use of these forms. Rather, they are inferences that result from the use of the meaning INSISTENCE.

We have shown why the choice between *-self* and simple pronouns is sometimes related to politeness, and also why *-self* forms frequently appear in

conjoined expressions: *-self* forms appear where their meaning, INSISTENCE, contributes to the desired communication.

## Notes to Chapter 7

1. The alternate interpretation, that the referent of the pronoun is a different group altogether, is more readily available when the simple pronoun is used. See Chapter 9 for further discussion of this observation.
2. To correct for this over-sampling, the first 100 tokens of *like him* were counted, and because 62% of them contained *like* used as an adverb (in 38% *like* was used as a verb), the number of occurrences of adverbial *like him* is estimated to be 62% of the total number of occurrences of *like him* (7126). Likewise for *like himself*. The total number of occurrences of *like himself* (1212) is estimated to be 50% of the total, since 50% of the first 100 tokens contained *like* used as a verb. Each of the examples represented by the other cells in the table have been verified individually.
3. The phonetic shape of *-self* forms iconically reflects this effect, in that they are a longer word than the corresponding simple pronouns.
4. Additional reasons for which *-self* may be used in conjoined expressions are discussed in Section 4 below.
5. One of the contextual clues to the minimized importance of the referent of *you* in (8a) is the word *just*, which Quirk et. al. classify as a “diminisher”, a form that suggests the lessening of strength of the item it modifies (1985: 598). The use of both *-self* and simple pronouns in concatenation with *just* will be discussed below. See Tobin (1995) for an analysis of *just* and *only*.
6. The only difference between this sentence and the version in the third edition is that *highly egocentric* has replaced *totally egocentric*.
7. See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the Control System.
8. Hearers must always infer the presence of any signal.
9. Nussbaum and her lawyer initially fought for this law so that Nussbaum could sue her abuser, Joel Steinberg. However, after it was discovered that Steinberg no longer had assets, the two “agreed to continue the battle anyway, hoping to make the new law for other battered women.”
10. The role of prescriptivist pressures is part of what Diver (1975: 3) calls the Human Factor. As Cameron (1995) describes it, “language-using is a social practice: the human capacity for acquiring and using language is necessarily

actualized within social relationships....” (p. 6). Norms and evaluative views are the essence of such social behaviors.

11. In our earlier discussion of conjoined phrases, we noted that speakers sometimes select *myself* instead of *me* because they believe that *me* is not correct and therefore, not polite. Another source of the belief that *me* is not polite stems from the prescription that one should always mention oneself last, so that *She gave the candy to John and me* is preferred over *She gave the candy to me and John*. What some speakers seem to take away from this injunction (in addition to the rule against using *me* in subject position) is further confusion over when it is acceptable to use the word *me*.

## Chapter 8

### Overview of the signal and meaning hypotheses

In addition to INSISTENCE, the semantic substance that accounts for the difference between *-self* and simple pronouns, there are other meanings signaled by *-self* pronouns. These meanings, which are held in common by both *-self* and simple forms, will be discussed below in Section 2. But first, we turn to the existence and identity of the signals themselves, which are also a hypothesis advanced to account for the distribution of forms. Neither the signal nor meanings are given antecedently in the speech stream, but must be discovered by the analyst. García (1977: 151) explains the problem this way:

The analysis of any language must involve the positing of signals and meanings both...: we do not know beforehand what the right meanings are, unless we have the right signals to join them to, and conversely, we do not know what the signals of the language are, until we can attach them to meanings that work.

#### 1. The signal

As we have seen, the present study treats all tokens of *myself*, *yourself*, *himself*, etc. as instances of the same lexeme. In this analysis, each *-self* pronoun is viewed as a compound form that is a signal of several, interlocked meanings. But it is only through analysis that we can determine whether each *-self* form is an instance of one signal (*himself*, *myself*, etc.) or two (*him + self*, *my + self*, etc.).

Traditional grammar and orthography tell us that *himself* is a single unit, but successful linguistic analysis must rely on more rigorous sources than these. In the present analysis, *-self* pronouns are treated as compound words like *blackbird* and *chalkboard*. That is, each compound is a single lexical item that can profitably be analyzed as a fused, grammaticalized form. In Section 1.2 we will consider the evidence for our single-unit hypothesis. But first, we will consider an argument that has been made, and others that could be made, in support of the two-signal analysis that we discard.

### 1.1 *Arguments for a two-signal analysis: their weaknesses*

Let us first look at a proposal to treat some, though not all, instances of *himself* as tokens of two different morphemes, *him* + *self*.

#### *Him* + *self* as two separate signals

Ferro (1992) proposes that for some uses of *-self*, such as those shown in (1), the form is to be treated as two distinct lexical items: a pronominal form and *self*, which serves as an emphatic marker.

- (1) a. A: Bush thought the voters were angry at Congress.  
B: Well, now he knows they are angry at **himself**, not Congress. (Ferro 1992: 68)
- b. **Marco** thinks that Elena is taller than **himself**. (p. 73)

Ferro's account notes that simple pronouns could occur in these contexts as well, and that the emphatic marker *self* would naturally draw the contrastive stress that the form receives in these examples. However, there are some problems with this

proposal. First, Ferro offers no explanation for the parallel distribution of the *-self* forms in other persons, as in (2). These examples could presumably not be subject to the same analysis, because the pronominal parts of the form, which are possessives in first and second person, could not stand alone (that is, without *-self*) in these contexts:

- (2) a. A president: I thought the voters were angry at Congress, but now I know they are angry not at Congress but at **myself**.
- b. Do you really think that Elena is taller than **yourself**?

Ferro's proposal relies largely on historical evidence, that *self* was indeed a separate morpheme in earlier stages of English.<sup>1</sup> However, it is not unusual for lexical items that are synchronically single words, such as *chairman* and *breakfast*, to be derived from forms that were historically two separate items. (Burling 1992)

It should be noted that there is one strong piece of evidence that suggests that all *-self* pronouns are indeed two separate signals: number meanings, which will be discussed at length in Section 2.7, interact independently with **both** parts of the *-self* pronoun. In spite of this, however, the weight of evidence, presented in Section 1.2, still suggests that *-self* forms should be analyzed as single signals.

The *Oxford English Dictionary* also notes that *-self* is sometimes fused with the pronominal part of the form, and sometimes appears as a separate word, as in expressions like "her very self, her own self, her good, dear sweet self, and the

like” (p. 177), all of which are listed as a separate entry under the fused form *herself*.

## 1.2 *Our analysis: -self forms are a single signal*

There are three important pieces of synchronic evidence that *-self* forms should be treated as single units:

- *Myself* is not the same as *my self*
- *Himself* but *his self*
- Morphological irregularity

### *Myself is not the same as my self*

Writers make a deliberate choice between the use of the fused single form, and two separate morphemes, the pronoun plus *self*. In fact, the orthographic system represents this difference, as the separate morphemes can be written as a single word, or separated by either just a space or by additional words:

- (3) And that book really helped me find **myself, my true self** as a woman. (EJP)

In addition, there is a message difference between, for example, *my self* and *myself*, that supports the claim that they are two different things. When the forms are written as two independent words, there is more attention on the inner identity of the referent, while in the compound forms, the message pertains more to the referential unit. So in (3), *myself* designates the writer as a single entity, a referential unit. However, when the forms are used as separate words (*my true self*),

there is a reference to an inner identity, a person's essence, that is not present in the fused form.

When the forms are written as two separate words, there is present a word order signal from the System of Differentiation, a grammatical system described by Diver (1984). The meanings in this system account for the occurrence of forms, and the resultant messages based on the word orders of what are traditionally known as adjectives and nouns in, for example, *She painted the blue house* vs. *She painted the house blue*; and *Do you like your coffee hot?* vs. *Do you like your hot coffee?* When a separate pronominal form precedes the word *self*, the meaning DIFFERENTIATION FROM OTHER is signaled. In the compound *-self* forms, that signal clearly does not appear, since by definition a word order signal requires the presence of more than a single word. Thus, *my* and *true* differentiate the referent of *self* from other possible *self*'s that might have been referred to. They suggest the existence of possible identities other than *my true self*.

The same effect can be seen in the next example. In (4a) the forms *her* and *self* are separated only by a space, not by an intervening word. The writer has chosen to write two distinct lexical items, suggesting that Ms. Steinem sacrificed her inner life. The unattested (4b) would seem to suggest a different type of message, one in which Ms. Steinem's "*-self*" – her inner essence, her individuality, is less at stake.

- (4) a. Gracious, compassionate, fervently devoted to advancing the status of her sex, sometimes at the expense of **her self**, Gloria Steinem emerges from this reverential biography as an accidental celebrity. (KGS)

- b. Gracious, compassionate, fervently devoted to advancing the status of her sex, sometimes at the expense of **herself**, Gloria Steinem emerges from this reverential biography as an accidental celebrity.

Example (5) shows the use of *my* and *self* as two independent words, again with attention on the inner identity of the referent:

- (5) Schaefer's *Women's Reality* and French's *The Women's Room* were revelations to me when I was beginning to chafe at the unrealistic expectations our culture held of wives and mothers prior to the onset of the women's movement. I felt guilty for wanting to preserve **my self** in the midst of all those impossible expectations of perfectionism, but I thought I was alone and selfish in my feelings. (USC)

In (5), the writer deliberately chose to write *my* and *self* as two distinct words. It is not the referential unit of the writer (her very life) that she felt guilty for wanting to preserve, it is her inner identity, which is distinguished here from cultural expectations of her.

In (6), the fused form *myself* is found alongside the separate morphemes. The intervening words *past* and *future* add support to the writer's wish to separate the forms *my* and *self*:

- (6) Then one evening about 15 years later, I was in a contemplative state, remembering things, and I remembered that experience. And in remembering, I did what I think people often do, which is to remember from the outside, as if viewing a photograph of the event. So I saw **myself** standing there by the road, looking at the sunset, with the countryside spread out all around me. I drew the scene into focus in my mind, pulling it closer into view, moving closer to it. As I did this, I suddenly realized that I was "coming into" the scene exactly at the point in the sky from which I had felt I was being watched 15 years before. I was utterly shocked.

Something like a lightning bolt snapped between me and **my past self**, and I felt **myself** rubber-banding perceptually back and forth from one location to the other – from one body to the other. In a flabbergasted state I realized I had been watched then, and that the watcher was me, **my future self**.  
(CAA)

Each time the writer uses *myself*, there is a reference to a single referential unit. When *my* and *self* are used as two separate words, the writer is talking about an insider viewpoint, where *self* refers to an inner identity not merely to name a referential unit, but also to more strongly evoke the inner life of that individual. However, the second occurrence of *my* and *self* as two words (*my future self*) is not that of an insider viewpoint, since the scene is described from the point of view of the past self. However, *my future self* is chosen from among other possible units (*my future self* implies the possibility of a past or present self). *My future self* is in contrast to *me* in this sentence, in which *me* simply names the referential unit, while *my future self* evokes a sense of the writer's individuality or inner psyche.

The following long list of examples shows that the separate lexical items of a pronoun and *self* are used in **all** persons and numbers. In each case, writers chose the use of separate signals over the use of a single, compound form, implying that the named *-self* is just one of other possible selves:

- (7) a. ***your self***  
Robinson told Moeller: "You've got to be **your own self** because it's your team. It's not somebody else's team. It's yours." (MSN)

- b. *his self*  
In the past I had imagined the words of consecration as representing Jesus' total offering of **his -self** – his entire life--and of course it was. But it was also Jesus' offering of his own physical body – the most intimate, personal part of **himself**, the part that we normally wish to shield from any pain – to a painful crucifixion. What I would have given anything to avoid, he took on willingly, and in doing so gave everything. (MAM)
- c. *its self*  
In July, the Seattle-based company [Muzak] unveiled an extensive *image makeover*. It's all part of a new campaign to take this often ridiculed business into the next millennium as a happier, more creative version of **its former self**. (KMM)
- d. *our self*  
If we take ourselves and our ideas too seriously, we create an illusory and idolatrous image of **our self** which we maintain in existence by holding it up in stern opposition to all that is not **our self**. Hence the dualism of self-vs.-nonself which Zen adroitly transcends. (MAM )
- e. *our selves*  
We need to critique the ways that our social order hurts us by denying us opportunities to give to others. A central aspect of our program for social change must sanction acts of kindness as acts of strength, not weakness. We need to validate **our higher selves** in whatever ways we can, including in political discourse and initiatives. We need to welcome the exchange of gifts of care and kindness, and stop looking them in the mouth. (BTK)
- f. *your selves*  
To Americans, the Japanese might well say, "You Americans so inflate the importance of **your private selves** that you run the risk of destroying the bonds that hold a society together." (BBH)

g. ***their selves***

As they learn how to live in the new context, they evolve new selves. **Their new selves** are creative and responsible responses to the new routines they face. They are able to use the new behaviors to gain access to power and to express who they are among [themselves] and the larger community. (ORM)

Morphological irregularity

The morphological irregularity of the pronouns in different persons also provides support for the notion that these forms are single units. If these were indeed instances of two discrete lexical items, we would expect all persons to pattern the same way. Instead, first and second persons contain the possessive forms of the pronoun (*my, your, our*), while third person forms contain the object forms (*him, them*).<sup>2</sup> (Third person *herself* and *itself* are indistinguishable between possessive and object forms, so provide no evidence either way; we cannot determine whether the pronominal prefixes are possessive or objective.) While it is possible that an explanation for this difference lies in the drastically different communicative task of identifying third person as opposed to first and second person referents, this seems an unlikely explanation for the irregularity, as we have already seen that possessive forms appear in the third person when the writer intends them to be understood as two separate signals, as shown above in (7).

*Himself but his self*

Additional evidence that *-self* pronouns are instances of single forms is that when other words intervene between the pronoun and *-self*, third person pronouns

change their form, occurring with a possessive pronoun. If the compound forms were in fact the same as the usage of two distinct lexical items, we would not expect to see different forms in each case. That is, if *himself* were really *him + self*, then we would expect it, when said or written as two words, to contain the same forms. But neither *him self* nor *them selves* occur; instead, we find the two separate signals *his* and *self*, alongside the single signal *himself*; likewise, we see *their selves* as two words, but *themselves* as one:

- (8) a. In the past I had imagined the words of consecration as representing Jesus' total offering of **his self**--his entire life--and of course it was. But it was also Jesus' offering of his own physical body--the most intimate, personal part of **himself**, the part that we normally wish to shield from any pain--to a painful crucifixion. (repeated from 7b) (MAM)
- b. From teenagers posing as brain surgeons to call girls who are really housewives, cyberspace is crowded with incessant role players, according to MIT psychologist Sherry Turkle, Ph.D. Turkle has vividly described how on-line anonymity lets people exaggerate or hide aspects of **their selves**, or even assume entirely new personas. (PPS)

#### Cognitive grammar and symbolic units

The view of *-self* pronouns as compounds is consonant with the view held within the theory of cognitive grammar, or CG (see Langacker 1987, 1991). In the CG view, the identity of linguistic units is not sharply defined and analytically discrete, so *himself* should be understood as **both** a single unit, **and** as a concatenation of two smaller units. Langacker's explanation of the derived form *stapler* characterizes the CG position on this question:

The meaning of *stapler* is more specific and elaborate than just *staple* + *-er*, and therefore should be considered a symbolic unit. Yet merely listing *stapler* in the lexicon stretches credibility in failing to accord it any relation at all to the lexical items of which it is composed, *V* and *-er*. (1987: 15)

Following this line of thinking, we can say that the meaning of *himself* is more specific and elaborate than just *him* + *self*; yet merely listing *himself* in the lexicon also “stretches credibility in failing to accord it any relation at all to the lexical items of which it is composed.” Thus, *himself* is at once composed of two separately meaningful units, and is itself a single unit. To some scholars, this position is unsatisfying, and suffers from a lack of analytical rigor and logical consistency. However, the size of a signal is an empirical question, one that should not depend on the methodological preferences of the analyst:

Linguistic relationships are not invariably all-or-nothing affairs, nor are linguistic categories always sharply defined and never fuzzy around the edges. This is perhaps unfortunate from the analytical standpoint – discrete entities are easier to manipulate, require simpler descriptive tools, lend themselves to stronger claims, and yield esthetically more pleasing analyses – but it is true nonetheless. Eventually the predilections of the analyst must give way to the actual complexity of the empirical data. Nondiscrete aspects of language structure must be accommodated organically in the basic design of an adequate linguistic theory. (Langacker 1987: 14)

While the findings of the present analysis do not match the CG view that even larger constructions should also be analyzed as meaningful linguistic units, it draws from the CG position in proposing that *himself* is a lexical compound, a single unit that is also a combination of two smaller units.<sup>3</sup>

By accepting the analysis that each *-self* pronoun is a single sign, we do not have to abandon the hypothesis that the meanings of the sign’s recognizable constituents contribute to the meaning of the combined form. There is no reason

to suppose that speakers ignore the meaning of the constituent morphemes, or that the meaning of *-self* forms is synchronically unrelated to the signs of which they are composed.<sup>4</sup>

### Summary

The facts we have reviewed indicate that the meaningful elements (e.g., *him* + *self*) have combined to form a new sign (*himself*), and that *-self* pronouns can profitably be analyzed as single units. We analyze these forms as compound lexical items: single forms, which are composed of smaller, identifiable units. The smaller units have combined to form a lexical item that is related to, but distinct from, the sum of its parts.<sup>5</sup> Each *-self* pronoun is posited to be a single form that signals several invariant meanings, and it is to these meanings that we now turn.

## **2. The meaning**

Like many other grammatical forms, each *-self* pronoun signals more than one meaning simultaneously, a phenomenon generally known as “portmanteau morphology,” and in Columbia School terms as a “grammatical interlock”.<sup>6</sup> Pronouns are traditionally understood to represent more than a single morphological category at one time; for example, *him* expresses third person, masculine, and singular; *we* expresses both first person and plural. The present analysis generally accepts this part of the traditional account, though as will be described below, person, gender and number are interpreted here in strictly semantic terms, as semantic substances: Discourse Referent (or Person), Sex and Number.<sup>7</sup> *-Self*

forms signal linguistically encoded meanings into which these semantic substances may be divided.

The meanings signaled by *-self* forms can be schematized as shown in Figure 1. The short-hand notation shown in this figure is not offered as a description or validation of the meanings, but only as an orienting overview of the proposal. By hypothesis, meanings are present only when they are encoded linguistically, that is, when they are part of the invariant contribution of a form. Meanings signaled by only some *-self* forms are shown in parentheses:

Figure 1. *Schematized meaning of -self forms*

INSISTENCE ON ONE (or MORE THAN ONE) REFERENT: Person (Number) (Sex)
---

The specific meanings of some individual *-self* forms are shown in Figure 2.

Although Number meanings will be discussed at length below, something should be said here about the forms that end in *-selves*. Forms that end in *-selves* consist of the *-self* form, followed by the plural *-s* marker. The *-s* signal, hypothesized to signal the meaning MORE THAN ONE from the Entity Number System described by Reid (1991), combines with the *-self* pronouns as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 2. *The meaning of some -self forms*

<i>myself</i>	INSISTENCE ON ONE REFERENT: ONE, FIRST PERSON
<i>yourself</i>	INSISTENCE ON ONE REFERENT: SECOND PERSON
<i>herself</i>	INSISTENCE ON ONE REFERENT: ONE, THIRD PERSON, FEMALE
<i>himself</i>	INSISTENCE ON ONE REFERENT: ONE, THIRD PERSON, MALE
<i>itself</i>	INSISTENCE ON ONE REFERENT: ONE, THIRD PERSON, UNSEXED
<i>ourselves</i>	INSISTENCE ON ONE REFERENT: MORE THAN ONE, FIRST PERSON
<i>ourselves</i>	INSISTENCE ON MORE THAN ONE REFERENT: MORE THAN ONE, FIRST PERSON
<i>yourselves</i>	INSISTENCE ON MORE THAN ONE REFERENT: SECOND PERSON
<i>themselves</i>	INSISTENCE ON MORE THAN ONE REFERENT: THIRD PERSON

Figure 3. *Meaning of -self and -self + -s (-selves)*

<i>-self</i>	<i>-selves</i>
INSISTENCE ON	INSISTENCE ON
→ ONE REFERENT:	→ MORE THAN ONE REFERENT:
Person	Person
(Number)	(Number)
(Sex)	(Sex)

Thus, every *-self* pronoun signals a Number meaning, because the meaning is either INSISTENCE on ONE referent, or on MORE THAN ONE referent. We will continue to use the term “*-self*” to refer to forms that end in both *-self* and *-selves*. The Number meanings signaled by this opposition, as well as the additional Number meaning signaled by the pronominal part of the *-self* forms, will be discussed below in Section 2.7.

Setting aside the difference between INSISTING on ONE vs. MORE THAN ONE referent, and the meaning INSISTENCE itself, there remain three semantic substances whose meanings may be signaled by *-self* pronouns:

- Person
- Number
- Sex

Each of these semantic substances is responsible for certain oppositions among *-self* pronouns, and these will be discussed in detail below. But first, we will consider the meanings of other forms with which *-self* contrasts.

## 2.1 *English pronouns*

We can present here only the outlines of an analysis of the English pronominal system. A thorough study is beyond the scope of the present research, which is focused on the choice between *-self* and simple forms. For this reason, the meanings held in common by both types of pronouns are not an essential part of the present study. Nevertheless, a tentative analysis of part of the English pronominal system will be described below. These hypotheses are consistent with our analysis of *-self*, and suggest potentially fruitful avenues for future research.

Linguists generally agree that meanings can best be described as systems of contrasts or oppositions (Lyons 1977). In the terms of this study, which is oriented by the fact that it is people who are the users of language, the meanings a speaker selects will depend on the other meanings that are available. Figure 4 schematizes the meanings signaled by part of the English pronominal system.<sup>8</sup> It

bears a strong resemblance to the traditional paradigm of these forms, but it differs in some important ways which will be discussed below.

Figure 4. *English Pronouns*


					+ FOCUS	
						+INSISTENCE
Number	ONE	Person	Sex			
		FIRST		<i>I</i>	<i>me</i>	<i>myself</i>
		THIRD	MALE	<i>he</i>	<i>him</i>	<i>himself</i>
			FEMALE	<i>she</i>	<i>her</i>	<i>herself</i>
	UNSEXED		<i>it</i>		<i>itself</i>	
	MORE THAN ONE	FIRST		<i>we</i>	<i>us</i>	<i>ourselves</i>
		SECOND		<i>you</i>		<i>yourselves</i>
THIRD			<i>they</i>	<i>them</i>	<i>themselves</i>	

Two features characterize the major differences between this view and the traditional account, which will be discussed in the next two sections: (a) only semantic categories are posited; and (b) meanings are signaled only if there is corresponding morphology.

## 2.2 *Semantic categories*

Figure 5 shows the three semantic substances, labeled Person, Sex and Number, and the meanings into which the substances are divided, which are not very different from the categories described within traditional grammar. However, one of the most important differences between the traditional view and the present proposal is that the syntactic categories of person, gender and number are interpreted as strictly semantic domains, or substances, which are subdivided into meanings that are signaled by the forms in question.

Figure 5.  
*Meanings signaled by -self pronouns*



### **2.3 Meanings signaled only if there is morphology**

In the analysis proposed here, there are no meanings posited without a corresponding morphological signal. Person, Sex and Number meanings are properties of forms, and are only present if a form invariantly signals a given meaning. Thus,

whether the word *I* is uttered by a man, a woman, or a parrot, the form itself has no linguistically encoded meaning pertaining to Sex. It may be interpreted to refer to an entity that is male or female, but that interpretation is a product of inference, not part of the linguistic contribution of the form. The meaning/message distinction is operative here, as the word *I* has no **meaning** related to Sex, though in a **message**, it will be interpreted to refer to an individual of a certain gender. Likewise, the form *you* does not signal a Number meaning, though it too may be interpreted to refer to a specific number of referents. *You* does not have a Number **meaning**, though in a **message** the form will be interpreted to refer to either one individual or to more than one.

This approach differs from the view of many other schools of linguistic thought. For example, generative grammar's phi features represent morphological properties of pronouns that are not tied to specific morphology, e.g., a gender feature for the form *I*, and a number feature for the form *you*, which vary according to the context of the utterance. By contrast, in the view taken here, meanings are present only when they are associated with specific morphology.<sup>9</sup> Thus, the form *I* is posited to signal no meaning of Sex; the form *you* has no Number meaning, as it invariantly signals neither the meaning ONE nor MORE THAN ONE. Each form may be interpreted to designate a referent with a specific gender, or a specific number of referents, but these message elements may be determined contextually, and are not in all cases part of the linguistic meaning of the forms.

## 2.4 FOCUS

While FOCUS is not a meaning signaled by *-self* forms, a discussion of this semantic substance is included here in order to elucidate the oppositions between *-self* and the forms that are traditionally labeled subject pronouns but which are called Focus forms in Figure 4. In the present study, the difference between what are typically called subject and object pronouns (e.g., between *he* and *him*), is postulated to be a semantic one. *He* is a signal of FOCUS, while *him* is not. FOCUS is typically signaled by word order in English, and most nominal expressions are not inflected for FOCUS. (See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the Focus System.)

This semantic hypothesis provides an explanation for what is traditionally seen as a syntactic phenomenon, the non-occurrence of subject pronouns in object positions: it would be inconsistent for forms that signal the meaning FOCUS to be used in a word order signal that means NON-FOCUS.

According to the hypothesized meanings, *-self* forms (like simple ones) do not have a Focus meaning. They signal neither FOCUS nor NON-FOCUS, so they are generally less suitable for IN-FOCUS uses than the dedicated FOCUS pronouns. The Focus oppositions are shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6. *Focus oppositions*

FOCUS	(Unspecified)
<i>I</i>	<i>me, myself</i>
<i>she</i>	<i>her, herself</i>
<i>they</i>	<i>them, themselves, themselves</i>

Although FOCUS pronouns are better suited to the task, there is nothing in the meaning of *-self* forms that prevents them from being used for IN-FOCUS participants, and *-self* is used for IN-FOCUS participants as in the following examples:

- (9) a. That's what I keep telling **myself**, but **myself** doesn't listen. (FHR)
- b. From a *Hi and Lois* Comic Strip:  
Mother: I thought I asked you to clean up after yourself!  
Kid: I did!  
Kid: But **myself** messed it up again!

Of the three FIRST PERSON forms *I*, *me* and *myself*, only *I* has a Focus meaning, and it is therefore the pronoun that typically appears IN-FOCUS. But in both these examples, *myself* appears IN-FOCUS, as there is nothing in the meaning of *-self* forms that precludes them from being used in this way.

Because the Focus System is interlocked with the Control System, word order that signals the meaning IN-FOCUS also generally signals Higher Control. (The Control System is described in Chapter 6.) So, in (9a), in the phrase *that's what I keep telling myself*, *I* is a signal of FOCUS and HIGHER CONTROL, and *myself* (by virtue of its position in the word order signal) is a signal of NON-FOCUS and LOWER CONTROL. The speaker then plays on words, using the *-self* pronoun IN FOCUS with respect to the event of *listening*, to suggest that she does not have control over that situation either.

In (9b), the same communicative effect is achieved. The child wants to avoid responsibility for the fact that his room is not clean, even though his mother told him to clean it. By using the *-self* form, which is typically **not** associated with the word order position signaling IN-FOCUS and HIGHER CONTROL, he names himself in a way that removes some of that responsibility from him.<sup>10</sup>

The point being made here is that *-self* and simple pronouns differ from what are traditionally called subject pronouns in that the former do not signal Focus, while the latter do. Neither *-self* nor simple forms signal NON-FOCUS, but instead, are neutral or unmarked with respect to Focus. The hypothesis that there is nothing in the meaning of these forms that prevents them from occurring in FOCUS positions is supported by the following examples as well:

- (10) a. “Tommy and **myself** were talking to Mills Lane [the referee] about stopping the fight at that point,” said Holyfield’s lead trainer, Don Turner. “But Evander said: ‘No, no, no. Put my mouthpiece in; I’m going to knock him out.’” (FAB)
  - b. Hello FUNKNET members: **Myself** and some grad student colleagues who have an informal discussion group here at Cornell have a question or two that we thought could be answered on this list. (Email posting)
- (11) **Myself**, Staff Sergeant Bill Hudon can be contacted at (702) 639-0000 or at [ssghudon@hotmail.com](mailto:ssghudon@hotmail.com) or my partner Staff Sergeant Sarah Chapman can be contacted at (702)639-0000 or at [6abc@usarec.army.mil](mailto:6abc@usarec.army.mil)<sup>11</sup> (Email posting)


The first of these two examples, (10a) and (b), contain *-self* forms in conjoined expressions. While we do not have sufficient context to confirm our analysis here, it appears that these *-self* forms are used here in a form of hypercorrection that

was discussed in Chapter 7. That is, the speakers are either unsure of whether to use *me* or *I*. They may be responding to normative pressures by choosing *-self*, which not only avoids the choice altogether but which may therefore sound more correct or professional. Another motivation for the use of *-self* in these examples could be because, as we have seen, the *-self* form gives greater weight and importance to the speaker.

## 2.5 *Person*

In addition to INSISTENCE, all *-self* forms signal the semantic substance of Person, which gives information about the referent's relation to the speech situation. As in the traditional account of person, the semantic substance of Person is subdivided into meanings which correspond to a referent's role in the speech act: SPEAKER, HEARER and OTHER THAN SPEAKER OR HEARER. Although the term Person is not in itself revealing about the nature of the semantic substance it names, it is used here because the word is well known and familiar. A more descriptive name would be Referent's Role in the Speech Act, but we will continue to use the traditional term for the sake of its familiarity. In the present proposal, Person is intended strictly as a semantic category. Every *-self* pronoun signals a meaning pertaining to Person, divided exhaustively into the meanings shown in Figure 7.<sup>12</sup>

Figure 7. *Person meanings of -self forms*



Thus, in following the traditional paradigm, the meaning of Person contrasts the following forms:

Figure 8. *Discourse Role meanings of -self forms*

1 <sup>ST</sup> PERSON (INCLUDING SPEAKER)	2 <sup>ND</sup> PERSON (INCLUDING HEARER)	3 <sup>RD</sup> PERSON (OTHER)
<i>myself</i>	<i>yourself</i>	<i>himself / herself / itself</i>
<i>ourselves</i>	<i>yourselves</i>	<i>themselves</i>
<i>me</i>	<i>you</i>	<i>him / her / it</i>

While the meaning of these forms is quite transparent, they do not always refer to a participant whose role on the scene matches the form's meaning. For example, in the so-called impersonal uses of *you* and *they*, these forms are selected when either no specific reference or a generic reference to all people is intended. The existence of such uses poses a challenge to the semantic hypothesis we have set forth, but these problems are beyond the scope of the present analysis, as they do not relate to the choice between *-self* and simple pronouns. A thorough examination of Person as a semantic category awaits further analysis.

## 2.6 Sex

Sex is a semantic substance that gives information about the sex of the entity being referred to.<sup>13</sup> Sex is divided into three meanings: MALE, FEMALE and UNSEXED. Only THIRD PERSON singular forms signal the Sex of their referent. Since this analysis posits meanings only when there is linguistic evidence to do so, it posits Sex meanings only for forms which have overt morphological marking related to this semantic substance. Thus, the semantic substance of Sex is responsible for the following oppositions among *-self* pronouns:

Figure 9. *Sex meanings of -self forms*

	MALE	FEMALE	UNSEXED
THIRD PERSON	<i>himself</i>	<i>herself</i>	<i>itself</i>

Unlike Sex, grammatical gender is a morphological category. For this reason, in this analysis as in Columbia School work in general, the term Sex is preferred to distinguish this strictly semantic notion. In this view, English does not have a system of grammatical gender; instead, it has only a limited number of forms whose meanings signal the Sex of their referents.<sup>14</sup>

All three pronouns that signal THIRD PERSON / ONE also signal a meaning pertaining to Sex. Speakers who wish to avoid specifying the Sex of a referent must fashion a solution to this problem with the available meanings in the linguistic system, and they have devised a variety of strategies.<sup>15</sup> One solution, which

will be discussed in Section 2.7, is to use the form *they* (and related forms, *their*, *them*, *themselves* and *themselves*) in such cases.

## 2.7 Number

Number is a semantic substance that gives information about how many entities are being referred to. There are two opportunities to signal Number meanings in *-self* pronouns. The first opportunity is in the pronominal part of the form. So *my-*, *him-*, *her-*, and *it-* signal the meaning ONE, and *our-* signals the meaning MORE THAN ONE. *Your-* does not signal a Number meaning, as it is used for both singular and plural referents. The second Number meaning signaled is by the presence or absence of the *-s* suffix as in, for example, *yourself* vs. *yourselves*.

The schematized version of the meaning of *-self*, as shown in Figure 1, is repeated here with the two Number meanings underlined and subscripted. The Number meaning contributed by the presence or absence of the *-s* signal at the end of the form has been subscripted with a 1, and the Number meaning from the pronominal element has been subscripted with a 2:

Figure 10. Schematized Number meanings of *-self* forms

INSISTENCE ON <u>ONE</u> [ <u>OR MORE THAN ONE</u> ] <sub>2</sub> REFERENT: Person (Number) <sub>1</sub> (Sex)
---

Figure 2 on page 304 shows the most commonly occurring *-self* forms. Figure 11 lists the two Number meanings for each of these forms.

Figure 11. Number meanings of some -self forms

	(1) Pronominal Number	(2) -self/ -selves
<i>myself</i>	ONE	ONE
<i>yourself</i>		ONE
<i>herself</i>	ONE	ONE
<i>himself</i>	ONE	ONE
<i>itself</i>	ONE	ONE
<i>ourselves</i>	MORE THAN ONE	MORE THAN ONE
<i>yourselves</i>		MORE THAN ONE

While the two Number meanings of *-self* pronouns usually co-vary, it is not necessary that they do so. In fact, many different combinations occur. The following examples show the contrast between *ourself* and *ourselves*, and between *themselves* and *themselves*:

- (12) a. It is clear that we will be increasingly called to justify **ourselves** and our practices. (JAMA)
- b. [The book] seeks to understand how human beings function, what drives them in concluding, as he put it, that there is a man in the mirror and that each of us seeks to justify **ourself** to a conscience. (NFO)
- (13) a. So far as actual political activity was concerned, three-quarters of these 635 young people described **themselves** as politically apathetic, and only 2 per cent had ever attended any sort of political meeting. (HNS)
- b. He stipulated in his will that anyone able to prove **themselves** to be his widow or child would be entitled to fifty dollars. (KAH)

Thus, *ourself* and *themselves* are the most common examples of *-self* forms in which different Number meanings are signaled. We will turn first to *ourself*, but before considering the form *themselves*, we will look at the use of *themselves* to refer to

singular referents. Then we will examine other forms in which differing Number meanings are signaled within one *-self* pronoun.

*Ourself*

*Ourself* simultaneously signals two different Number meanings:

Figure 12. *Hypothesized meanings of ourself and ourselves*

<i>ourself</i>	INSISTENCE ON ONE REFERENT that is: FIRST PERSON(SPEAKER) MORE THAN ONE
<i>ourselves</i>	INSISTENCE ON MORE THAN ONE REFERENT that is: FIRST PERSON (SPEAKER) MORE THAN ONE

While it may appear contradictory to INSIST on one referent that is actually more than one entity, this notion is actually quite familiar from what are known as collective nouns. A family, a team, a jury, a forest and a wardrobe may be treated as singular entities, while they actually designate referential pluralities (Cruse 1986). Likewise, *ourself* is a word whose meaning designates a single referential entity that is composed of a plurality of units.

The forms *ourself* and *themself* may seem strange to some readers, particularly to educated speakers who themselves do not use these expressions. However, the data show that the use of these forms is not an aberration, and should not be excluded from the database as nothing more than unenlightening performance errors. If these forms occurred only as performance errors, we would not expect to find them in careful speech or in edited writing, where they certainly

are used deliberately and systematically, in spite of a prescriptive prohibition against them. The following list of attested examples is long, to show that the use of *ourself* is indeed productive and systematic:

(14) **ourself**

- a. “If we go on the next road trip and play like we have, we’ll be throwing dirt on our own grave,” Rockies manager Don Baylor says. “We won’t need anyone to shovel for us. We’ll be shoveling for **ourself**.” (NSN)
- b. In the wake of an ugly battle that has erupted between Pergamon Press Ltd. and the editor of one its journals, there are now two versions of Cellular and Molecular Biology.... Both parties insist that their journal is the legitimate one and the other is an impostor, and lawsuits are in the works... “We own that title,” he [the publishing director of Pergamon Press] says. Nevertheless, he explains, “pending the resolution of the issue we need to find a mechanism to distance **ourself** from his product.” (SCA)
- c. Sue believes in Sue. She is committed to the idea that we are all masters of **ourself**. She knows in her gut that it’s not what happens to us but how we handle it. (NVS)
- d. Gender is one of the first things each of us learns about **ourself** as a young child, and the gender roles that we learn in our families continue to develop as we grow. We begin taking in elements of gender roles from significant others from the time we’re born. These ideas are incorporated into our own individual sense of self and assumptions about how men and women both **ourself** and others ought to believe and behave. (TRG)
- e. There are times, too, when we hate the man we love because he reflects a different image of **ourself** than the one we would like other people to see. (GCW)

In example (14a), the manager of a baseball team is lamenting his team's recent performance. He refers to the team with the plural pronouns *we*, *our* and *us*; the corresponding singular forms *I*, *my* and *me* would not be communicatively successful to refer to the whole group. But in the *-self* pronoun, the speaker is not constrained by a binary choice between the meaning ONE and MORE THAN ONE; *ourself* represents a creative exploitation of the Number meanings available in the *-self* form. The coach is INSISTING on the single unit, that is characterized by the form as FIRST PERSON and MORE THAN ONE. Of course, he could have said *ourselves* (*We'll be shoveling for ourselves*), and this would have been an unremarkable use of the meanings, since all the Number meanings would then match. But the use of *ourself* is actually more effective in this instance, because its meaning, INSISTENCE ON ONE REFERENT, expresses the unity of the team.

Sports figures are known for colorful uses of language; after all, emotions run high in sports coverage, and prominent players and coaches don't always conform to norms regarding standard usage. But example (14b) is from the journal *Science*, in an article about the ownership of the journal name *Cellular and Molecular Biology*. Here too, *ourself* designates a single referential unit, the publishing company that wants to distance itself from what it considers an inferior journal. The publisher is speaking in the FIRST PERSON about a company, a single referential unit that consists of a plurality of individuals and journals. The meaning of *ourself* is ideally suited to this communication; the prescriptively

avored *ourselves* does not capture the notion that the publishing company as a whole is a single entity to be protected in the dispute.

In (14c), a motivational speaker is describing the characteristics of one of her employees. She is saying that people in general are responsible for their own destinies, and she uses the FIRST PERSON pronoun *we* to include herself, along with the audience, in explaining who this observation applies to. Although the speaker uses a plural form, she is not saying that a group of people is responsible for the destiny of the group; she is trying to express the idea that each person in the group (*we*) is responsible for *him- or herself*. The form *ourself*, signaling at once MORE THAN ONE and ONE, is ideally suited to this message. The referential unit being designated is singular – each person is responsible for herself – though the plural form *we* (and *our-*) corresponds to the group of all people that the speaker is addressing and talking about.

*Ourself* performs a similar function in (14d). *Each of us* simultaneously designates a single entity (*each*) and the group that forms the referent of *us*. The meaning of *ourself*, INSISTING on a single entity that is a plurality of entities is well-suited to this message. The second token of *ourself* in this example also captures the writer's intention of speaking generally about an unspecified single entity (*our own individual sense of self*), referring to a single entity but speaking generally.

Example (14e) also shows *ourself* used to point to a single referential unit, but corresponding to the meaning MORE THAN ONE that has been chosen throughout the passage to point to an unspecified, generic individual.

Prescriptive prohibitions against the use of *ourself* surely limit its distribution. Even the descriptivists Quirk and Greenbaum (1985) mention *ourself* only in connection with the “virtually obsolete *royal we*,” but it is clear from these examples that the use of this form is current and productive. The “royal we” is indeed another instance in which a singular entity is referred to as a plurality. The meanings of *ourself* are available to speakers who wish to use not only the “royal we,” but at other times that they wish to refer to a plurality of entities as a single referent.

### *Themselves*

While *themselves* does not appear to be an example of a *-self* form that signals differing Number meanings, it is instructive to look at the use of this form for singular referents. A complete analysis of this topic is not part of the research reported here, but some initial observations and proposals will be presented. The use of *themselves* for singular referents, to avoid specifying the Sex of the referent, or when the identity of the referent is unknown or non-specific, is well-documented (see Lagunoff 1997 for an extensive corpus of singular *they*, *them*, *their*, *themselves* and *themselves*).<sup>16</sup> Despite its prescriptive prohibition, *themselves* is often used to refer to single referents:

- (15) I picture living there with a man, and the whole house is designed around that man. I've imagined his den, bedroom, bathroom – totally for him.... But I'd want a prenuptial agreement, and anyone I would want to marry I'm sure would want one for **themselves**. (quoted by Lagunoff 1997: 172)

It should be pointed out first that in the present proposal the meaning of *them-*, in *themselves* (like in *themselves*) does not include a Number meaning; that is, *them-* is unspecified for Number. While it is true that most uses of *them* are for plural referents, the productive use of these forms to refer to singular referents suggests the possibility that *them* is simply unmarked for Number.

The forms *themselves* and *themselves*, hereafter *themselves(s)*, are in opposition to other THIRD PERSON forms which do signal the Number meaning ONE. We would therefore expect *themselves(s)* to be used for referents for whom the meaning ONE is not appropriate, particularly for referents numbering more than one. But *themselves(s)* will also be used for singular referents, when the meaning ONE is not appropriate, as we will see. The hypothesized meaning of *themselves*, shown in Figure 2, is: INSISTENCE ON MORE THAN ONE THIRD PERSON REFERENT, where MORE THAN ONE REFERENT is signaled by the *-s* at the end of *-self* form.

The meaning of *himself* is avoided in (15) because of its meaning ONE, and the implication that the hearer would be expected to identify its referent, since pronouns are typically used only when a hearer can be expected to identify their referents. *Themselves* is better suited to the intended communication because it still has a THIRD PERSON meaning, but it introduces less precision into the message in two ways. First, unlike *himself*, *themselves* does not signal the gender of the

form's referent; but in addition, *themselves* does not contribute the meaning ONE, with its implication of definiteness. With a plurality, one does not single out or concentrate attention on an individual entity; and with any plurality, one is less likely to know the identity of each individual member.

Some arbiters of writing style actually recommend the use of singular *they*, including *The Chicago Manual of Style* (1993), which cites *The Handbook of Nonsexist Writing* (Miller and Swift), and *Grammar and Gender* (Baron) as authorities who share their view of the singular use of these forms. However, prescriptivists generally do not approve of the use of *they* and related forms for singular referents. The new edition of *The New York Times Manual of Style* (1999) has this to say regarding *their*, *theirs*, *them* and *they*:

These pronouns are plural. Do not apply them to singular antecedents (like anyone or someone) even when the aim is to avoid assuming maleness or femaleness; other solutions exist. (p. 330)

*-Self* forms are not mentioned explicitly in the style guide, though one assumes that the comments apply equally to *themselves*, and even more strongly against the use of *themselves*. Surely many speakers are dissuaded from this use of *they* and related forms by such prescriptive admonitions. Nevertheless, the use is widespread, in written as well as spoken discourse, by speakers in a wide range of educational and professional levels. The following example was produced by a college professor, in a written message distributed to other professors:

- (16) I am chair of the committee that has to decide the best paper in language testing in 1997.... I have been asked to state publicly whether self-nominations are accepted. To

the best of my knowledge there is no reason why a person should not nominate **themselves**. As chair, I would not hesitate to accept a self nomination. A paper is nominated, that's all; who nominates it is not relevant, and I make no effort to keep track of who nominates who. (RBK)

This writer's lack of attention to prescriptive tenets is also shown by his use of *who* in place of *whom*. But the issue is not whether *themselves* is prescriptively acceptable or whether the speaker is adhering to prescriptive standards; rather, this example illustrates a typical exploitation of the resources of the available linguistic meanings.

### *Themselves*

The use of *themselves* for singular referents is also widespread, and it actually provides an effective solution to the communicative problem of referring to a single non-specific or unknown THIRD PERSON referent.<sup>17</sup> The form is denounced by prescriptivists, and descriptive linguists can easily overlook the existence of this form (e.g., Quirk and Greenbaum 1985; and the OED, which states that *themselves* was the "normal form historically, but disappeared c. 1570"). Nevertheless, the use of *themselves* in present-day English is a widespread phenomenon, as the following examples show. Again, the list is long to demonstrate the ordinariness of the form:

- (17) a. Janie, who had suffered much abuse and violence as a child said she "was feeling so much hatred. I was like a walking time bomb. You can't have peace when someone doesn't love **themselves**." (BNC)
- b. There are all these hands in the pot when money or glory is to be made, and all this selfishness stems from

one of the most selfless acts a person can do, which is write a song and give **themselves** to someone else. (RGP)

- c. I look for a level of aggressiveness and a certain way that someone handles **themselves**. (MML)
- d. That's a concept that comes out of communal societies. In those societies, no one can proclaim **themselves** the leader. The group has to say that you're the leader. (SVJ)
- e. Words such as "himself" or "herself" have long been taboo in their world, where sexism is one of the deadliest sins. Now even the plural pronoun "themselves" has fallen victim to Birmingham city council ... Officials ordered that the word "themselves" ... should be used instead for a slogan to promote Care Week ... Thousands of posters around the city centre read: "Do you care for someone who is unable to look after **themselves**?" ... (SGM)

The hypothesized meaning of *themselves*, then, is: INSISTENCE ON THIRD PERSON REFERENT. The form does not signal whether the INSISTENCE is on ONE OR MORE THAN ONE THIRD PERSON, so *themselves* is ideally suited to messages in which the identity of the referent is unknown or unspecified.

Now, in spite of the appropriateness of this form to certain types of communications, it does not appear in all the environments in which one might expect it (e.g., 15 and 16). Many speakers probably do not have this form in their lexicon, rejecting it as a non-existent form, or at least as one that is deemed nonstandard. We do not have the data available to determine whether some speakers produce both *themselves* and *themselves* to refer to singular referents. If a single speaker does

produce both forms, it would be instructive to learn under what conditions each form is produced.

Other *-self* forms with mismatched Number meanings

As we have seen, there are two opportunities to signal Number in *-self* pronouns. The first opportunity is in the Number of the pronoun, which is interlocked with the semantic substance of Person. The second opportunity is whether *-self* is inflected with the *-s* from the Entity Number System. Speakers have two independent opportunities to make these choices. Tokens of forms such as *ourself* and *themself* represent creative exploitations of the Number meanings signaled by these forms, and support the hypotheses proposed in the present analysis. Though they bend the rules in the eyes of prescriptivists, these forms are nevertheless a robust and productive phenomenon in present-day English.

However, these are not the only forms that occur with unexpected pairings of Number meanings. Even *myselfes* and *herselves* occur, as single words, when the mismatched Number meanings are appropriate to the intended messages. Each of the following examples is preceded by a brief comment in square brackets to explain the unusual context in which the passage occurs:

- (18) *myselfes*  
a. [A man who describes himself as “schizoid”:] After my release, I multiplied **myselfes** like the police, and grew as crooked, if not quite as preachy. (TDC)

- b. [A man discussing his identity as a drag queen, Lola Berry:] I felt incapable of living up to Lola Berry. I was now in a bizarre competition with **myselfes**. (SBH)

In each of these cases, uncommon communicative circumstances lead speakers to choose conflicting Number meanings to best express their intended messages. In (18a), the speaker wants to identify himself as both ONE entity (*myselfes*) and as a plurality of entities (*myselfes*), corresponding to a schizophrenic state in which one individual has multiple personalities. In (18b), the speaker has two specific identities, himself, and his drag queen identity. In neither case does the writer deploy two separate signals (*my* + *selves*), but rather, chooses the compound forms with mismatched Number meanings.

The following examples show the creative exploitation of Number meanings in the use of the fused form, *herselves*:

- (19) a. [Also describing a schizophrenic-like state achieved by guests at a party:] Everyone wanted to visit them, to be able to say they'd attended the wacky party where Jeff was discovered [having sex with] Sylvia's brother, the Curate of Montreal, in the woodshed, or, most memorably, the time they dropped hallucinogens together and somehow exchanged personalities, Sylvia furiously arguing among **herselves** about decommo-dification and floating signifiers, while Jeff incessantly sprayed permset on his shining bald pate and optimistically combed the air. It was a complete riot, everyone agreed. (ECP)
- b. [Regarding Shirley MacLaine, an actress known for her belief in reincarnation and past lives:] Though she did not want to be pinned down about the whens and wheres, she said, she has not spent one dime of seminar earnings on any of **herselves** (either past or present). (HSB)

- c. [More about Shirley MacLaine:] This has created the suspicion among her listeners that Shirley MacLaine is readying **herselves** to become to the spirit via audio- and videocassette what Jane Fonda is to the body. (HSB)

Under typical communicative circumstances, speakers will not signal conflicting meanings (i.e., ONE and MORE THAN ONE), but these uses show that the language does not preclude this possibility.<sup>18</sup> The meaning of *herselves* is then INSISTENCE ON MORE THAN ONE REFERENT that is ONE, THIRD PERSON, FEMALE. In (19a), one person is arguing with herself; here again, a schizophrenic state is described as one in which that individual is conceptualized as several different people. A similar situation holds in (19b) and (c), in which there is one individual, Shirley MacLaine, who has been reincarnated several times, so that she is both one, and a plurality, of individuals.

In all these cases, the writers **could** have chosen to use two separate forms, the pronoun plus *-self*, but instead chose to use the single, fused form, whose meaning matches the intended message. These examples constitute evidence that speakers make choices based on their communicative needs, and not in accordance with formal rules in which features are copied from subject to object, or in which pronouns match the number features of their antecedents.

Non-occurrence of *himselves* and the rarity of mismatched Number meanings

The fact that almost all permutations of Number and Person are found provides support for the view that Number meanings are signaled twice in all *-self* forms.

One might argue that the existence of examples such as those shown above are evidence that *-self* pronouns are actually instantiations of two separate morphemes, and that they are not a single form at all. However, the non-occurrence of the nonmatching Number meanings in the form *himselves* suggests that *himself*, and by extension other *-self* forms, are indeed single signals. As we have already noted, the pronominal part of most *-self* forms is a possessive, with only *himself* and *themselves* as exceptions.<sup>19</sup> We have hypothesized that *them* does not signal any Number meaning, so there is no potential Number mismatch with either *themselves* or *themselves*. By contrast, *himself* does signal the meaning ONE, and the internal morphological shape of this form, including an object pronoun, makes the constituent morphemes (*him + self*) less prone to independent manipulation than other forms. In the terms described earlier, in which *-self* forms were described as both single signals and the concatenation of two smaller signals, *himself* appears to be more fully fused than the corresponding forms containing a possessive form of the pronoun. In terms of grammaticalization theory (Heine, Claudi and Hünnemeyer 1991; Hopper and Traugott 1993), it may be that the *-self* forms in all Persons are going through a process of grammaticalization, and the THIRD PERSON forms are further along in the process.

One might also question why these unusual combinations of meanings are not exploited more often. One reason is that the communicative circumstances that give rise to these uses are themselves highly unusual, and there is therefore little need for such uses. Another reason is that language use is a social behavior

that is subject to normative pressures and constraints (see discussion in Chapter 7). Speakers consult style manuals, and not sharing in the linguist's purely descriptive conception of language, aim to associate with different cultural groups and to avoid prescriptive errors. These unusual combinations are not found in dictionaries, and are sanctioned by neither language authorities nor by speakers themselves. Nevertheless, the existence of these unusual meaning combinations reflects the creative exploitation of the resources of the linguistic system.

## Notes to Chapter 8

1. There is wide and general agreement on this point. Ferro cites the *Oxford English Dictionary*, Visser (1993) and Traugott (1972).
2. In some dialects of English, this morphological irregularity does not exist. Third person forms exhibit possessive case of the pronouns just as the other persons do: *hissself* and *theirselves*. No analysis has been done of these dialects.
3. The traditional CG view is to analyze entire constructions containing *-self* pronouns as symbolic units as well (e.g., reflexive and emphatic uses), and here the present analysis diverges from the CG analysis. The theoretical status of the uses of *-self* in the current proposal is discussed in Chapter 3.
4. See Glucksburg (1993) for a similar point about the role of constituent morphemes in phrases such as *perfect stranger* and *spill the beans*. These phrases can be analyzed as single units, since the meaning of the phrases are fixed and probably stored as part of a speaker's lexicon (Swinney and Cutler 1979). Yet speakers are aware of the constituent morphemes, and the phrases are not unrelated synchronically to the signs of which they are composed.
5. It would also be possible to pursue an analysis of the lexical item *self*, which could lead to the discovery that it is in fact the same form that occurs in *-self* pronouns; that is, that the meaning that accounts for *self*'s usage as an independent lexical item, also accounts for the distribution of *-self* pronouns. However, such a decomposition analysis awaits, minimally, a full analysis of the lexical item *self* and an explanation for the phenomena described in Section 1.2.
6. An example of grammatical interlock is the morpheme *-o* in the Spanish word *hablo*, which is typically analyzed as simultaneously signifying: first person, singular, present and indicative.
7. The words Person, Sex and Number will henceforth appear with initial capital letters, because these morphological categories are tentatively hypothesized to represent semantic substances. Hypothesized meanings, such as MALE and THIRD PERSON, will be shown in all capital letters.
8. These oppositions characterize what appear to be related forms in English. Omitted from this description are what are traditionally called possessive pronouns: *my*, *your*, *his*, *her*, *its*, *our* and *their*, which are often discussed along with simple and focus pronouns. Also omitted are the forms *one* and

*oneself*, which do not appear to signal a meaning of Person and have therefore not been included in the present study.

9. As we have noted, word order may be a signal of meaning as well.
10. Another source of this effect in examples (9a) and (b) is related to what Haiman (1995) calls an alienation from self. *-Self* usually occurs as a second participant (as in *that's what I keep telling myself*), in which the meaning of *-self* suggests that there are two roles for the speaker. For a speaker to have two roles requires a consciousness of the self, an awareness that Haiman describes as a cultural invention which creates the ability for individuals to recognize that one part of a self is doing something to another part, and to see part of one's self as something that can be acted on, as opposed to a single, integrated self. This alienated self is the actor in both (9a) and (b).
11. Telephone numbers and email address have been changed to protect the innocent.
12. Other Columbia linguists have preferred the terms System of Referents, or System of Referent's Role in the Speech Act for the same semantic substance (Davis 1992; Reid p.c.).
13. Sex is not to be confused with systems of grammatical gender in other languages. The present discussion is intended only to describe the meaning signaled by the pronominal system of English. Here, the sex of a referent refers to the cultural definition of an individual as male, female, or other.
14. It has been suggested that the pronoun *he* (and therefore the corresponding *-self* form, *himself*) is not specified for gender at all. Our position is that *himself* does signal the meaning MALE, although we need not enter that controversy here, as the conclusion has little bearing on the analysis of *-self* which is the topic of this dissertation. We agree with Lagunoff that these forms are "gender-marked" (in our terms, that they signal a Sex meaning), even though they are sometimes used to refer to female referents. Morris (1991) proposes an analysis of gender in English from the semantic perspective of the sign-based framework of Guillaumean linguistics, and contains a large corpus of data related to gender and sex in English. She reaches conclusions quite different from the hypotheses posited in the present analysis.
15. Quirk et. al. (1985: 343) offer several strategies, quoted from the TESOL Quarterly Style Sheet, Vol 13, to writers who wish to avoid the use of *he*, *him*, etc. as unmarked pronouns when the sex of the referent is unknown.

16. Lagunoff (1997) classifies *they* (and its related forms) as a plural pronoun. However, she omitted from her study “non-anaphoric uses where singular interpretation is possible” (as in, for example *I went to the bank, and they told me I couldn't get the loan*). She notes that one might propose that *they* is the default third person pronoun in English in general, unspecified (or underspecified) for number, making it available in any situation when number, gender or identity of (human) referents is not important or is unknown or conflicting.
17. Lagunoff (1997) discusses singular *they*, along with *themselves* and *themselves*, in present-day English, and offers many examples of these forms. She notes that Abott (1984) and Whitley (1978) also give examples of *themselves*.
18. A similar point was made in Chapter 3, regarding examples like *He saw herself*, in which it was argued that the scarcity of such utterances is due not to constraints of the linguistic system, but rather, to the rarity of the communicative need.
19. As noted above, the pronominal portion of *herself* is indistinguishable between possessive and object *her*.

## Chapter 9

### Further issues

The analysis we have presented demonstrates that the distribution of *-self* pronouns can be explained by hypothesizing that the forms are meaningful signals used for the purpose of communication, and not autonomous reflexes of syntactic structure. In the preceding chapters we have provided evidence to support our proposal that, unlike simple pronouns, *-self* forms signal INSISTENCE ON A REFERENT, a meaning that accounts for the choice between *-self* and simple pronouns in naturally occurring discourse. The INSISTENCE hypothesis provides a unified explanation for the superficially varied uses of *-self* pronouns that have typically been described as discrete and unrelated.

Nevertheless, there are several important questions about these forms that remain to be addressed.

#### 1. Ungrammatical sentences

One of the basic tenets of generative linguistics is that a successful grammar should generate all and only the grammatical sentences of a language, ruling out the ungrammatical ones. While the present analysis accounts for the observed distribution of *-self* forms, linguists who are accustomed to constraint-based grammars might wonder whether the hypothesis proposed here can **rule out**

sentences like the following, in which the first matching subject is coreferent with *-self*:

- (1) Felix<sub>1</sub> said that Jane thought that we reported that I saw **himself**<sub>1</sub>.

We have a two-part answer to this question.

First, as we have defined the problem of linguistic analysis, our task is to account for the observed uses of *-self* forms. The view of grammar adopted here is not that of a generative device that mechanically generates the sentences of a language. Instead, grammar is viewed here as analogous to a set of tools, creatively deployed in ever-novel ways as speakers rely on the meanings of lexical and grammatical forms in their linguistic system to express new and ever-changing messages. Therefore, the domain of data our hypothesis is responsible for does not include isolated or invented grammatical sentences, let alone ungrammatical ones. This study takes language data to consist of the naturally occurring utterances that are observed by the linguist, not the utterances that have not been observed. Just as evolutionary biologists devote little or no attention to explaining why certain types of organisms have **not** evolved, our analysis does not address the question of phenomena that have not occurred. It is only by observing forms in actually occurring contexts that we can determine whether the proposed meaning hypothesis accounts for the use of forms. Our analysis is not intended to account for what is not observed.

Nevertheless, the question of what in other theories is called ungrammaticality does raise an important point. Is the INSISTENCE hypothesis so

imprecise that it could describe any phenomena at all, including the sentence in (1)? The answer is no. Our hypothesis would **not** predict such a use. In an effort to satisfy the interests of linguists for whom ungrammaticality is an important issue, we would offer the following observations. We find at least two problems: the referent of *Felix* is not highly salient, and there appears to be no reason to **INSIST** on this referent.

We have seen that the referent of a *-self* form is generally highly accessible, most often by virtue of linguistic salience such as being IN-FOCUS or proximately mentioned, but also in some cases as the subject of consciousness or a participant in the speech act.<sup>1</sup> But in (1) there is no context that creates any unusual accessibility for Felix, the referent of *he*. While this entity is briefly IN-FOCUS, each intervening IN-FOCUS entity becomes equally salient, and the accessibility of Felix diminishes over the course of the utterance. It is important to note that this is not a mechanical procedure, in which we can algorithmically state the conditions under which an entity will be highly accessible, as accessibility is dynamic, pertaining to the psychological availability of an entity at any point in discourse. Still, it is clear that in this invented sentence with only an imagined context, the referent of *-self* is not particularly salient.

In addition, there does not appear to be any motivation for **INSISTING** on this referent, so the form's meaning would not be appropriate in this context, as far as we imagine it. Because there is no context to suggest that **INSISTENCE** can make a

contribution to what we imagine to be the intended message, there is no reason to expect a *-self* form to appear.

## 2. Falsifying meaning hypotheses

Readers may question not only the correctness of the INSISTENCE hypothesis, but also whether it is ever possible to falsify any meaning hypothesis. It is. We have considered and discarded a number of hypotheses that cannot account for the distribution of *-self* forms.

### 2.1 SAME

The *Oxford English Dictionary* notes that the cognates of *-self* in Gothic and Scandinavian have only the “primary sense” of English *-self*, which is “same” (p. 905). While we cannot consider here the meanings of forms in other languages, we can test the hypothesis that the meaning of English *-self* is SAME. We will conclude that the meaning SAME is inadequate to account for major classes of data that the INSISTENCE hypothesis can account for.

Reflexive uses of these forms could be signaling SAME REFERENT, telling the hearer that the referent of the form is the same as the participant previously mentioned:

- (2) Edward Sapir continually berated **himself** for idleness....  
(MBW 287)

In (2), *himself* might be understood as “him-same,” suggesting that its referent is the SAME as the previously mentioned participant, Sapir.

Referential differences are found even in sentences in which both *-self* and simple pronouns can be used to designate the same referent:

- (3) a. Nicole looked around **her/herself**.
- b. Alyssa knew that her father was like **her/herself**
- c. Jessica sent me this picture of **her/herself**.

In each sentence in (3), the *-self* pronouns are likely to refer only to the IN-FOCUS entity, while the simple pronoun can be interpreted to refer to either the IN-FOCUS entity or to some other person. Hypothesizing that SAME is part of the meaning of *-self* is a way to incorporate this referent-finding difference into the meaning of the form.

However, the meaning SAME REFERENT would not account for all the other message effects we have described for these forms. The first type of problematic data for the SAME hypothesis is appositive uses, such as the following:

- (4) You have to do your taxes, but you don't have to do your taxes **yourself!**" (HRB)

In general, the meaning SAME seems more appropriate to Third Person argument uses than to appositives and First and Second Person uses, in which the referent-finding instruction of "same one" appears to be less useful. And in particular, the specific message effects that we have described for this example are not explained by the meaning SAME. If you have to do your taxes yourself, it means that you – and only you, without the help of others – have to do it. It is not clear how such a message would follow if *-self* had the meaning SAME, which seems intended to aid in the identification of the referent. By contrast, INSISTING

on the referent is a way of zooming in on him or her, and thereby removing attention from others, suggesting that the person who has to do the taxes is the one and only the one who is being INSISTED on.

In Chapter 5 we noted that among appositive uses, an entity receives more attention merely by virtue of being additionally mentioned. One could argue that the effects we have described as the result of the meaning INSISTENCE among appositive uses could result simply from the additional mention of an entity by the form meaning SAME REFERENT. However, this hypothesis would not explain the effects found among argument uses, effects we have found to be the same as those found among appositive uses. For example, the exclusionary effect identified for the appositive in (4) is seen in the following argument uses as well:

- (5) a. (Regarding Jack Kevorkian) But when [young men during the Vietnam War] burned their draft cards, no one died. Their protest affected **themselves** alone as sovereign individuals. (CKD)
- b. “We created an ad campaign solely directed at women for this watch.” The thinking, she said, was that Patek Philippe needed “to be speaking to women in a language solely for **themselves**.” (CAD)

In addition, it is not clear how the meaning SAME would contribute to the persistent effect of contrast, found among both appositive and argument uses:

- (6) a. Jerry Seinfeld is back: not the television show, but the comedian **himself**.
- b. he liked women who were not necessarily more stupid but lazier than **himself** (APO 51)

In (6a), it is possible that simply referring to the comedian a second time invites an interpretation of contrast, but there is no such explanation for the message effect in (6b). On the other hand, the meaning INSISTENCE suggests the existence and exclusion of other possible entities, and therefore a contrast between its referent and others.

Nor would the meaning SAME explain the choice between *-self* and simple pronouns in conjoined expressions. In Chapter 7 we proposed that the meaning INSISTENCE, which may be used to individuate its referent, can extract that referent from the relationship suggested by the word *and*, suggesting that its referent is a special member of the group formed by the two conjoins:

- (7) a. The day before a gunman-arsonist turned a Harlem clothing store into an inferno that killed seven employees and **himself**, the store's owner, who is Jewish, told a court that ... arson and physical attacks seemed imminent. (MCF)
- b. As Hedda Nussbaum, in a red coat with faux-fur trim, met the press on the courthouse steps in Manhattan on March 10 to announce a legal victory giving **herself** and other battered women more time to save their abusers, she dabbed her left eye with a tissue. (RHN)

Further, in *between-phrases*, the meaning INSISTENCE differentiates and individuates its referent, suggesting a conceptual distance between the conjoins.

The meaning SAME would not create that effect:

- (8) a. Between **herself** and the door was a pungent memory.... (SPW 286)
- b. It all only emphasized the gap between Elizabeth and **himself**. (HVE 31)

The meaning SAME would not appear to lead to these interpretations, and would thus not account for all the data that is addressed by the INSISTENCE hypothesis.

## 2.2 *INSISTENCE ON THE SAME*

Another alternative is that the meaning of *-self* forms is INSISTENCE ON THE SAME REFERENT, a proposal that appears to account both for the message effects we have described, as well as the referential effects described in Section 2.1. However, we have rejected this meaning hypothesis, as there appears to be no specific referent-finding instruction as part of the constant semantic contribution made by *-self* forms. The crucial question regarding the meaning INSISTENCE ON SAME must be: SAME as what? The referents of *-self* are not necessarily subjects of clauses, nor are they always the last mentioned matching entity. Accessibility might provide an answer to this question, but we will see that even relative accessibility rankings cannot account for the referential differences between *-self* and simple pronouns.

### Accessibility

Ariel proposes that *-self* forms rank higher on the scale of Accessibility than do simple pronouns, and Kemmer and Barlow (1996) state that high accessibility is part of the meaning of appositive *-self* pronouns, so we will test the notion that part of the meaning of *-self* is MOST HIGHLY ACCESSIBLE. This meaning would appear to account for the referential effects suggested in (3), repeated here as (9):

- (9) a. Nicole looked around **her/herself**.  
b. Alyssa knew that her father was like **her/herself**  
c. Jessica sent me this picture of **her/herself**.

In each case, the referent of *-self* has either the same accessibility as the referent of the simple pronoun (when both refer to the IN-FOCUS entity) or the referent of *-self* has higher accessibility than the referent of the simple pronoun (when the simple pronoun refers to some other entity not mentioned within the sentence).

However, there are crucial examples, originally discussed in Chapter 4, in which the referent of *-self* is not the most highly accessible referent. In the following passages, matching entities that would appear to be **more** salient than the referent of the *-self* forms are underlined. In each case, there are reasons why the referent of *-self* is not the more accessible entity; however, the point is that the referent of *-self* cannot be identified merely by identifying the most accessible entity.

- (10) a. Only Elizabeth was an artist to her fingertips, and whichever of her talents she used, she used it differently from the rest of us. Her perceptions, so different from ours, have nourished me through the years. Her understanding of what has gone on in schools has provided depth and life to my own observations on American education. And her paintings have made every place I have lived in my home. I have the first watercolor she ever painted and a painting of the New York Stock Exchange building she made for Father. I have a painting of Grandma, Priscilla, and **herself**, dressed for church; standing by the gate to our house in Holicong, and another of the view from our windows in Philadelphia. (MBW 69)

- b. At the signing ceremony, Mr. Arafat promised Mr. Netanyahu that "your security is our security". But Palestinians doubt that the rules will be applied against Israelis in the way they are applied against **themselves**. (ECO)
- c. The girls were wearing red satin dresses that had obviously been made by **themselves**. (PCH)
- d. They wore bathing suits that protected **themselves** from the harmful rays of the sun. (HBS)
- e. They wore badges identifying **themselves** by name. (NYTC-1/13/99)

In (10a), the most recently mentioned (matching) entities are Grandma and Priscilla. If *-self* forms signaled that their referents were the MOST HIGHLY ACCESSIBLE entities, then either of these people would serve as the referent of *herself* in this example. However, the word *and* precludes this interpretation, suggesting that the referent of *herself* is someone else. It is not part of the invariant contribution made by *-self* that its referent is the most highly accessible entity. Rather, hearers must choose among all the highly accessible potential referents, and use inference to determine the intended one.

In (10b) the IN-FOCUS *they*, referring to the rules, seems to be more accessible than is the referent of *-self*, but the context of the utterance makes it clear that the intended message is not that the rules apply to themselves. In (c), the red satin dresses appear to be a more salient entity than the girls, yet again, this referential interpretation is blocked by the implausibility of the resulting message. Likewise in (d) and (e), in which the more accessible entities would be the most recently mentioned potential referents within each clause, bathing suits and

badges. In each case, identifying the referent of *-self* as the **most** accessible entity would result in an implausible message.

In (10b) through (e), the intervening matching entities are inanimate, while the referent of *-self* is animate, but the following examples demonstrate that this is not a requirement:

- (11) a. He turned his head toward the voice and looked into the half-closed eyes of a boy who seemed not much older than **himself**. (LGI 119)
- b. he can't stand anyone younger than **himself** horning in on his territory. (HLI 168)
- c. contrasting all this with Emma's careless ways she pointed out how wrong he was to adore his wife to the exclusion of **herself**. (SMB 48)

In (11a), the IN-FOCUS entity (the subject of the clause) not only matches the Person and Number meanings of the *-self* form, but also refers to an animate being and matches the *-self* form's gender meaning. It is common sense – that is, inference about what is a plausible message – that allows the hearer to figure out that a boy cannot look, or seem, older than himself. The referent of *-self* is neither the previously mentioned entity (*a boy*), the subject (*a boy*), nor the most highly accessible entity (again, *a boy*). If the referent of *-self* were linguistically specified as THE MOST ACCESSIBLE ENTITY – then presumably the boy, who is IN-FOCUS **and** most recently mentioned, would be the referent of *-self*. The hearer discards this implausible scenario.

In (11b), *anyone* cannot be the referent of *-self*, because it is not coherent for someone (anyone) to be younger than himself. The hearer cannot identify the referent of *-self* by looking for the most highly accessible entity.<sup>2</sup>

In (11c), *the* subject of the clause is not a likely referent for *-self*, because *he* does not match the gender meanings of *herself*. However, there is a proximately mentioned entity, *his wife*, within the clause. Nevertheless, the reader ignores this linguistic cue (clause-internal mention of a referent) in favor of a less accessible entity: the referent of *she*, the subject of the higher clause.

The next example is an important one, because it suggests that *-self* forms are interpretable even without referent-finding. In (12), the referent of *-self* is not accessible or identifiable at the time the pronoun is encountered:

(12) [Headline:] An Unscripted Life Starring **Herself** (KUL)

There is no previous mention of the referent of *herself*; indeed, there is no context prior to the utterance, as the headline appears on the front page of the *New York Times* Arts and Leisure section. The referent does not have high accessibility. In fact, she's not accessible at all, until the reader glances down at the picture accompanying the article, or begins to read the first paragraph. Nevertheless, the utterance is interpretable. The meaning INSISTENCE suggests that the form's referent has two roles at the same time: she is starring in her life – even though we do not know yet who *herself* is. We are able to interpret the utterance without finding a specific referent for the form, simply by knowing that the referent, whoever she is, is playing more than one role.

Likewise in (13), in which the *-self* form appears in what is traditionally called a cataphoric use. This passage provides another example in which the referent of *-self* is not an accessible entity at the time the pronoun is encountered:

- (13) Further distancing **himself** from an advertisement in which he appeared to criticize the city's campaign finance system, Michael R. Bloomberg said yesterday that .... (CBL)

Even though we cannot identify the referent of *himself* until much further in the utterance, the meaning INSISTENCE, with its suggestion that its referent is playing more than one role at a single time, provides a clue that the agent and object of *distancing* are the same individual, even when we cannot identify that entity.

We conclude that the meaning of *-self* cannot be INSISTENCE ON (THE SAME AS) THE MOST HIGHLY ACCESSIBLE REFERENT. There is no linguistic requirement that the forms refer to the most highly accessible entity. The use of *-self* forms to refer to the most highly accessible referent is not invariant, but is instead, contingent; as such, higher accessibility is not part of the constant semantic contribution made by these forms.

### 2.3 *Why referent-finding is not part of the meaning of -self*

The examples in (9) draw attention to the referent-finding differences between *-self* and simple forms, but that attention may be misleading. The research question posed here is: what accounts for the choice between *-self* and simple pronouns in discourse data? The meaning INSISTENCE sometimes does help hearers identify intended referents, by alerting hearers to role conflicts for Third

Person referents. However, we conclude that no further referent-finding instructions are necessary as part of the linguistically encoded meaning of the forms. As outlined in Chapter 4 and elaborated below, we believe that referent-finding instructions, such as SAME, are not part of the meaning of *-self* forms:

- It is apparent that referent-finding does not account for the distribution of *-self* and simple pronouns in First and Second Person uses, yet the forms pattern similarly in all Persons.
- There appears to be no referent-finding instruction among appositive uses of *-self*.
- The referential possibilities for all pronouns are limited because of the minimal semantic information they signal. All pronouns generally refer to accessible entities.
- The meaning INSISTENCE naturally limits the referential possibilities for *-self* forms.
- The motivation for the choice between *-self* and simple pronouns can be explained in terms other than reference.

#### First and Second Person and appositives do not pose a reference problem

As we have noted, *-self* forms pattern similarly in all Persons. If the difference between *-self* and simple forms pertained primarily to referent-finding, we would expect First and Second Person forms to have a different distribution than Third Person forms, in which referent-finding is a significant issue. The differences between pairs of sentences such as *I see myself* and *I see me*, and *you know yourself* and *you know you*, cannot be explained on the basis of referent finding, as discussed in Chapter 6. Even among Third Person uses, it is the inference of a

role conflict that leads to the identification of a specific referent, not a specific referent-finding instruction encoded in the meaning of the forms.

No referent-finding instructions among appositive uses

No specific referent-finding instructions appear to be necessary for appositive uses of *-self* forms. And yet, as we saw in Chapter 4, hearers determine the intended referent when both the IN-FOCUS and the proximately mentioned entity match the Sex, Person and Number meanings signaled by the *-self* form:

- (12) a. Policy-makers fear an overwhelming demand for services from families that are now caring for elderly relatives themselves at no cost to the government. (NYTC-6/8/98)
- b. Several cancer experts said Monday that the trials could be especially complicated given that the new drugs work on a principle unlike other treatments, like chemotherapy, which attack the tumors themselves and are often accompanied with side effects. (NYTC-5/5/98)

All pronouns refer to highly accessible entities

Both *-self* and simple pronouns generally refer to highly accessible entities. The limited semantic information they signal makes this so: speakers choose these forms only when they are confident that hearers can interpret their utterances. In fact, the meaning SAME could be posited for simple pronouns as well as for *-self*, because simple pronouns also refer to entities that have been previously mentioned.<sup>3</sup>

The meaning INSISTENCE limits the referential possibilities for *-self* forms

It is not surprising that referential possibilities seem to be more restricted for (Third Person) *-self* than for simple pronouns. For instance, in the case of *himself*, hearers must determine not only which ONE, THIRD PERSON, MALE entity is being signaled, but also which of those does the speaker have a reason to INSIST on. He will likely find fewer candidates that are worthy of INSISTENCE than of mere mention.

The statistical fact that *-self* usually refers to something also mentioned elsewhere in its own clause is a consequence, an artifact, of the INSISTENCE meaning. There are two reasons for this. First, the most frequent exploitation of the INSISTENCE meaning in argument uses is to suggest that an entity has more than a single role in an event; it is not surprising that an entity with more than one role will be mentioned more than once. Second, to INSIST on an entity is to do more than mention him or her (or it) briefly, in passing. It is expected that speakers will INSIST on entities that are important and highly accessible, and high accessibility is most often achieved by a previous mention within the same clause.

Motivation for the use of *-self*

There are several ways of describing the scene for each of the sentences shown in (9). For instance, (9a) could be phrased in any of the following ways:

- (13) a. Nicole looked around **herself**.
- b. Nicole looked around **her**.
- c. Nicole looked around.

On what basis has the speaker chosen among these options? In Chapter 6 we discussed genuine examples similar to this one, in which we were able to explain why a *-self* form was or was not chosen. While it is true that in example (13a), the reference of *-self* would effectively be restricted to Nicole, while in (13b) *her* could refer to Nicole or to some other Third Person Singular Female, a speaker who wishes to express (13a) is still free to choose among all three of these sentences. In these invented examples, we do not have access to contextual information that would explain the choice of the *-self* form here, so we may imagine that referent-finding is the basis for the choice.

The extensive data we have reviewed suggest that *-self* is not primarily about referent-finding. *-Self* forms occur for a variety of reasons. The most frequent motivation for their use (traditional reflexives) is to indicate that their referent is playing more than one role at a single point in time. In Third Person uses, the presence of such a role conflict generally does result in a different referential identity. However, the form itself need include no specific referent-finding instructions, as the inference that the referent is playing more than one role leads to an identification of the intended referent. We have claimed that it is role conflict rather than referent-finding that is the relevant motivation for the choice of *-self* forms in traditional reflexive uses.

### Why accessibility is not part of the meaning of *-self*

The remaining question, then, is whether a direction to A HIGHLY ACCESSIBLE REFERENT must be specified as part of the meaning of *-self*, or whether it too may be the inferential product of the meaning INSISTENCE. We are proposing that INSISTENCE alone, combined with the limited additional semantic information signaled by the pronoun, suggest that a referent is highly accessible, and that it is not necessary to encode accessibility as part of the form's meaning. Just as simple pronouns are used felicitously if their referents are highly accessible and speakers believe their hearers can identify the referent, *-self* forms are generally used if their referents are highly accessible and speakers believe that hearers can not only identify the referent, but also determine why the entity is being INSISTED on.

For *-self* and simple pronouns alike, hearers must interpret the meanings of the forms, and evaluate the plausibility and coherence of the message in determining the forms' reference. Hypothesizing that SAME or A HIGHLY ACCESSIBLE ENTITY is part of the invariant meaning of *-self* does not solve the inferential problem that hearers face in interpreting the reference of *-self* forms.

#### **2.4 *Deixis***

As part of a careful study of the Spanish pronominal system, García (1975) has analyzed the meaning of what is traditionally called the Spanish reflexive pronoun, *se*, to be LOW DEIXIS. Deixis is understood as the relative degree of

attention needed to identify a form's referent.<sup>4</sup> We will see that a Deixis meaning cannot account for the distribution of English *-self*.

As we have noted, English *-self* forms are frequently used to create a communicative effect of emphasis, to draw **more** attention to their referents. This effect contradicts the meaning LOW DEIXIS, and it is incoherent to suppose that a form communicates a message that is contradictory to its own meaning.

There is further evidence that LOW DEIXIS is not the meaning of the *-self* pronouns. It seems unlikely that First and Second Person pronouns would have meanings of Deixis, since First and Second Person pronouns refer, respectively, to the speaker and the hearer. A more constant (and presumably lower) degree of attention would be needed to identify the speaker and the hearer, a task which does not appear to pose much of a communicative problem. There may be some concentration of attention needed to identify the precise referent of First and Second Person pronouns in the plural, since the hearer must determine who – in addition to the individual speaker and hearer – is to be included. But the *-self* pronouns appear to pattern similarly for all persons and numbers. By contrast, in García's analysis of Spanish pronouns, only the Third Person pronouns have meanings of Deixis.

In summary, the meaning of the *-self* pronouns is not LOW DEIXIS, because (a) the *-self* pronoun results in **greater** concentration of attention on its referent than the corresponding simple pronoun; and (b), differing amounts of

concentration of attention are not needed to identify the referents of First and Second Person pronouns.

Another possibility that we have rejected is that the meaning of *-self* forms is HIGH DEIXIS, that is, that a high degree of attention is needed to identify the referents of these forms. Even though many of the referents of *-self* are unexpected in some way, and determining their identity may therefore require more attention than identifying an expected referent, *-self* forms are always used to refer to entities that are highly salient. This is particularly clear in appositive uses, in which the *-self* form sometimes immediately follows a previous mention of its referent (*Harry himself washed the car*). The hearer need not look far for the referent of *-self* in such cases, so the meaning of HIGH DEIXIS has also been rejected. In conclusion, the substance of Deixis does not account for the meaning difference between simple and *-self* pronouns, and Deixis must be discarded as the hypothesized meaning of the *-self* pronouns.

## 2.5 EXCLUSION OF OTHERS

As we have noted, *-self* forms are sometimes used to suggest the exclusion of other referents, raising the possibility that EXCLUSION OF OTHERS may be the meaning of *-self*. However, this effect can better be understood as a result of the meaning INSISTENCE. Exclusion is a message element that is present in greater and lesser degrees depending on the context, but which is not always a noticeable part of the communicated message. We have noted that excluding others is an effect of **any** reference, and that an INSISTENT reference therefore suggests a concomitantly

stronger exclusion of others (see Chapter 5). In addition, if EXCLUSION OF OTHERS were the consistent semantic contribution of *-self* forms, there would be no explanation for many of the other message effects we have observed, such as that the identity of the referent of *-self* is often unexpected.

## 2.6 UNEXPECTEDNESS

Like exclusion, unexpectedness is a frequent message motivation for the use of *-self* forms. But not all referents of *-self* are unexpected, as the following example from Kemmer (1995: 60) shows:

(15) How was the banquet?

The dinner **itself** was fine, but after that it was all downhill. I was bored to death.

As we noted in our earlier discussion of this example, there is no element of unexpectedness here. The most conspicuous component of a dinner banquet is dinner, and the speaker's evaluation of the dinner is the **expected** response. Further, if the meaning of *-self* were UNEXPECTEDNESS, there would be no explanation for the occurrence of many of the other message effects that are found among the use of these forms, such as increased prominence, exclusion of others, or contrast.

## 2.7 CONTRAST

Contrast is yet another frequent motivation for the use of *-self* pronouns, and one of the most persistent message effects associated with these forms. Nevertheless, we have seen cases in which contrast is not part of the message:

- (16) a. A radio DJ, following a song by the well known and greatly admired Bette Midler: “That was the Divine Miss M **herself**.”
- b. Edward Sapir continually berated **himself** for idleness, when, in fact, he was continually turning out grammars for complex and difficult languages. (MBW 287)

Contrast is not an element in the interpretation of either of these passages, so a meaning of CONTRAST would not account for the appearance of the *-self* forms in these contexts. However, the message effect of contrast that does occur in other environments is explained by the meaning INSISTENCE, because by INSISTING on a referent, and thereby excluding those who are not included in the reference, *-self* forms may suggest a comparison between their referents and those who have been excluded. Contrast is thus a result of INSISTENCE, and there is no need to posit contrast as part of the meaning of *-self*.

## 2.8 *A less informative signal*

*Sé* is traditionally described as the Italian reflexive pronoun,<sup>5</sup> and according to Davis (1992, forthcoming), its distribution can be explained by hypothesizing that it is a less informative signal than the other pronominal forms in the system, including *ess+*, *loro*, and *luillei*.<sup>6</sup> Davis does not posit a relational meaning of Deixis, where forms in a grammatical system have higher or lower values (e.g., HIGH vs. LOW DEIXIS). Instead, he presents evidence for an opposition of substance between *sé* and the other Italian forms that are also Third Person, disjunctive (stressed) forms that can refer to both humans and inanimates. These forms give **more** information about their referents than does *sé*, making *sé* (like

Spanish *se*) suitable for highly obvious referents, as well as those whose identities are unimportant.

Davis's hypothesis about Italian *sé* cannot account for the distribution of English *-self*. Unlike Italian *sé*, English *-self* forms do signal Sex, Person and Number meanings, and are actually more informative than the corresponding simple forms (simple pronouns signal the same Person, Sex and Number meanings as *-self* pronouns, but *-self* also signals INSISTENCE). Thus, the distribution of *-self* cannot be explained as the result of a system in which the forms contrast with other more informative signals.

Davis's analysis may provide a competing hypothesis to García's account of Spanish, but that is not our concern here. The similarities and differences between the distribution of Spanish *se* and Italian *sé* (and the accuracy of the analyses of these forms) are not the subject of the present research. Our purpose here is limited to showing that the meaning hypotheses that have been proposed for these forms cannot apply to English.

## **2.9 *Falsifying the INSISTENCE hypothesis***

Like the other meaning hypotheses we have considered, the INSISTENCE account is falsifiable as well. While the occurrences of *-self* forms that we have found do support our hypothesized meaning, counterexamples to our hypothesis could be discovered. Therefore, we consider here the following question: what might falsify our meaning hypothesis?

If *-self* forms were used when speakers want to draw less attention to entities, or for less important (rather than more important) individuals, such data would pose a challenge to the INSISTENCE hypothesis. According to our hypothesis, *-self* forms are appropriate for more important, rather than less important, individuals. If we discovered that *-self* forms were being used to refer to entities of lesser importance, that finding would pose a challenge to our hypothesis. For instance, if the phrase *little ol' myself* gained currency over the now more prevalent *little ol' me*, our hypothesis would be in question. While this expression may be regarded as fixed and idiomatic, the meaning we have hypothesized does explain the occurrence of the simple form *me* within it.

Another use of *-self* pronouns that would appear to disconfirm the INSISTENCE hypothesis would be if the forms occurred for messages similar to those of the so-called impersonal uses of Romance reflexives, in which the pronoun occurs IN-FOCUS for referents whose identity is unimportant or unspecified. We do not find *-self* forms in examples like these precisely because their meaning is not appropriate to such messages. If we did find such uses, we might conclude that the meaning of *-self* forms is not INSISTENCE, as the intended message is not to INSIST on these referents, but specifically to avoid drawing attention to them. It is an exercise for the imagination to invent sentences like the following which would disconfirm the INSISTENCE hypothesis:

- (17) a. English is spoken by **ourselves** here.  
(Unattested)  
'English is spoken here' [As a sign in a store window]  
(in the sense of Spanish *Se habla inglés aquí*)

- b. In France, very tasty bread is eaten by **themselves**.  
 Or: In France, they **themselves** eat very tasty bread.  
 Or: Among the French, very tasty bread is eaten by **themselves**.  
 (Unattested)  
 ‘In France, they eat very tasty bread’ (in the sense of Spanish *En Francia, se come un pan muy rico*)
- c. **They themselves** fixed the car.  
 Or: The car was fixed by **themselves**.  
 (Unattested)  
 ‘The car was fixed’ or ‘They fixed the car’  
 (in the sense of Spanish *Se arregló el coche*)

Of course, we do not find such uses of *-self* forms, but that is because *-self* pronouns and Spanish *se* have different meanings (see below, Section 4). The meaning INSISTENCE is not appropriate to these messages; a form that does contribute to these messages would not signal the meaning INSISTENCE.

In addition, one would expect quantitative predictions to go in a certain direction. For example, we would predict that in novels, main characters are referred to more often by *-self* forms than are minor characters. A quantitative analysis of several texts that confirms such a prediction would support our hypothesis; if the prediction were not confirmed, the INSISTENCE hypothesis would be weakened.<sup>7</sup>

### 3. Crosslinguistic analysis

The present study has been limited to one set of forms in one language for a principled reason: our goal has been to reach a thorough understanding of a small part of English grammar, and in so doing, to shed light on the nature of language.

To do this, we have made a deliberate attempt to abandon assumptions and to avoid imposing such antecedently given categories as reflexive and intensifier, choosing instead to allow the linguistic facts themselves to suggest the analytical categories.

Although it is beyond the scope of the present research to carry out a crosslinguistic analysis, one naturally wonders about the generalizability of the account offered here, because there appear to be similarities among languages with respect to the forms we have studied. There are similarities in the messages that are expressed, in that people all over the world talk about events in which a single participant acts on himself.<sup>8</sup> Likewise, speakers of many different languages in many different cultures put emphasis on certain referents, and one may be interested in comparing the linguistic means by which they do so. Another similarity is suggested when we find what appear to be translation equivalents of forms. For example, in the traditional sentence-based account, the following two utterances of English and Spanish are the same:

- (18) a. He washed **himself**.  
b. *Se lavó.*

It is natural to wonder, then, what properties both *-self* and *se* share. But before we turn to that question, we should note that *-self* is not always translated as *se* in Spanish:

- (19) a. He did it **himself**.  
b. *Lo hizo él mismo.*

And the same is true in reverse. Spanish *se* is sometimes translated as *-self*, but not always:

- (20) a. *En Francia, se come un pan muy rico.*  
b. In France, **they** eat very tasty bread. (García 1975)
- (21) a. *Se arregló el coche.*  
b. The car was repaired. (García 1975)

Thus, what *se* and *-self* seem to share is that both forms are used for some of the same messages. At the level of communication then, the distribution of these forms overlaps partially: both *-self* and *se* are used for reflexive messages. This alone does not tell us about similarities within the forms' respective linguistic systems. The one overlapping feature shared by Spanish *se* and English *-self* is that both forms are used for **some** Third Person referents who play more than a single role in some events. Beyond that, the distributions of these forms are quite different. *Se* is used only in the Third Person, while *-self* forms occur in all persons. And each form may be used to express a variety of messages that the other form does not.

### 3.1 *Message-based analysis*

Familiar crosslinguistic studies of, say, reflexivity or intensification are based on similarities at the level of communication. Such studies begin with an analysis of messages, describing **what** speakers talk about, and then comparing the linguistic mechanisms across languages that are used to express those messages. Not

surprisingly, there are similarities the world over regarding what types of messages are communicated.

Such a message-based approach is different from the task set out in the present research, which is narrowly focused on the linguistic forms themselves. We have not begun with an analysis of message types. Instead, we have worked inductively, beginning with data from a single language, and have phrased our research question in terms of linguistic units. A comparable analysis of translation equivalents of *-self* would require a detailed examination of specific forms in those other languages, taking into account not only their reflexive uses, but other uses as well, as we have done here for English *-self*.

### **3.2 *Similarity of message does not entail similarity of meaning***

We have reached a tentative conclusion, based on our analysis of English and on sign-based analyses of other languages, that partial similarity of message (e.g., forms that are used to express reflexivity) is not necessarily based on commonality of meaning. This is not surprising, since reflexivity is just a small part of what each of these forms is doing in its respective language, and in many cases, the differences among the forms' distributions are greater than their similarities.

### **3.3 *Intriguing similarities***

In spite of our caution in comparing languages, there are nevertheless many intriguing crosslinguistic similarities that do seem to call out for an explanation.

For instance, it has been observed that there are semantic similarities in the origins of forms that are used to express reflexivity (e.g., *bone, head, body*) (Moravcsik 1972, König 1999). Another observation that suggests a need for further study is that some of the same forms that are used to express reflexivity may also contribute to messages of logophoricity and/or focus (Thráinsson 1976; Reinhart and Reuland 1991; Ferro 1992). On what basis do these overlapping functions of morphemes occur? From where do these similarities derive? Such questions are neither asked nor answered by the present research.

#### **4. Areas for future research**

Even with so much attention to *-self* forms, there remain many unanswered questions about this small corner of the grammar of one language, and this study points to a great deal of research yet to be done. Obviously, a complete analysis of the English pronominal system would be quite valuable. While we tentatively hypothesized in Chapter 8 that the distribution of pronouns can be explained by postulating that features of gender, person and number are in fact semantic substances, a full study of these forms would be required to substantiate such a claim.

Another area related to the use of *-self* pronouns that we have not considered is the role of word order. Other scholars have noted that the communicative effects of appositive *-self* forms vary depending on whether the forms occur immediately following the mention of their referent in the subject, or in the predicate (Moravcsik 1972; Cresswell 1997; Edmondson and Plank 1978; König

1991; Cohen 1999).<sup>9</sup> Further investigation of these phenomena in terms of the meaning/message distinction we have drawn would be valuable as well.

While the present research is supported by a large quantity of attested data, experimental validation of the hypotheses presented here would provide additional support. One technique that might be used would be to construct a questionnaire in which respondents choose between *-self* and simple pronouns, in order to test some predictions derived from our hypothesis.<sup>10</sup> For instance, our analysis predicts that in comparative contexts, *-self* forms would be chosen more frequently for referents who are important than for those of lesser importance. A questionnaire completed by a group of informants could also test the relative importance of the various factors we have identified.

However, one difficulty to be overcome with questionnaires is the tendency of speakers to choose forms on the basis of what they believe is correct, rather than on the basis of the most effective way to express an intended message. The role of prescriptivist guidelines in the use of pronouns is a potentially fruitful line of research. It would be good to know how strongly normative pressures influence the use of forms, particularly in conjoined expressions where the role of such pressures is most apparent. The role of such prescriptive pressures, and of the interaction between meanings and normative behavior in language use, is an interesting and an open question.

## 5. The status of reflexivity

Although we have talked about reflexivity in several previous chapters, we have not yet explained our view. This study does not address the question of whether reflexivity is an important notion in propositional logic, and we have nothing to say about the status of the concept within such a system. Nor have we considered whether the notion of reflexivity is useful in the analysis of the various communications to which the linguistic system contributes. For researchers interested in classifying messages, reflexivity may be a useful way to do so.<sup>11</sup> Our analysis has focused on the properties of the linguistic forms themselves.

We have seen that there is no morphological correlate that appears consistently with either syntactic reflexivity, or even with reflexive messages (e.g., *She looked around her*), and that reflexivity is not the conditioning factor that determines whether *-self* or simple pronouns will occur. Our analysis has found that reflexivity does not account for the choice between *-self* and simple pronouns, nor does it illuminate the constant semantic contribution made by *-self* forms. In our view, the poor fit between the *a priori* category reflexive and the observed data of English suggests that reflexivity is not a **linguistic** category of English, but instead is a kind of communication and interpretation. This study suggests that syntactic reflexivity in English is an epiphenomenon that results from the deployment of the meaning INSISTENCE for unexpected role conflicts. For analysts whose goal is an understanding of the distribution or properties of *-self*

forms, our findings suggest that the notion of reflexivity obscures more than it illuminates.

Although we have not studied other languages here, and therefore cannot draw the same conclusion with respect to them, other analysts have also found that the notion of reflexivity as a linguistic category is a problematic one. According to Diver (1987), García (1985) and Davis (1992, forthcoming), reflexivity does not tell us about the structure of Latin, Spanish or Italian. Faltz (1995) begins his own typological study of reflexives with the caveats that he cannot give a comprehensive definition of reflexives at the outset, and that “even within a single language, the range of phenomena to be regarded as cases of reflexivization may be unclear” (p. 1). And Chomsky notes that “the cross-linguistic status of reflexives is particularly problematic” (1982: 218-19). These crosslinguistic observations, along with our own findings, lead to some doubt about the wisdom of relying on reflexivity as a foundational category of linguistic analysis.

The construct of reflexivity should not usurp the role of empirical observation and hypothesis testing. We have seen that *-self* differs from what are called reflexive markers in other languages in more ways than it resembles them (cf. discussion of Spanish and Lithuanian in Chapter 3). A great amount of linguistic detail is lost if we gloss over all those differences, and subsume all these forms under the heading “reflexive”.

## Notes to Chapter 9

1. See Chapter 4 for a discussion of referent-finding. As noted there, salience refers to the prominence of an entity in discourse, while accessibility pertains to the overall ease with which a hearer may retrieve a mental representation of an entity. Accessibility may also be affected by encyclopedic world knowledge and/or physical proximity, and is not solely determined by the linguistic prominence of a form.
2. Since *anyone* does not have a specific referent, strictly speaking there may be no clause-internal mention of a more highly accessible entity in this example.
3. See Greene et. al. (1994) for a discussion of the use of simple pronouns for entities who have not been previously mentioned in discourse but who are highly accessible for contextual reasons.
4. See discussion of García (1975) and Diver (1987) in Chapter 2.
5. Davis points out that the form is variously represented as *sé*, *sè*, and *se*.
6. The term *ess+* covers *esse*, *essa*, *esses* and *essas*, forms that are inflected for gender and number.
7. Unusual skewings in particular texts do not necessarily falsify a hypothesis. Such skewings may be due to unusual properties of specific texts, and must be evaluated carefully (Davis 1992).
8. However, see Haiman (1995) for evidence that the notion of an individual acting on himself is not a universal of human cognition, but rather a culturally invented concept.
9. Our preliminary review of the data with respect to word order leads us to the conclusion also reached by Cohen (1999) that some analysts have overstated the correlation between the position of the form and its interpretation. There is a great deal of overlap in the different types of messages that are communicated, and it does not seem possible to identify specific, single messages for most uses of these forms.
10. Questionnaires have been used to validate meaning hypotheses by Reid (1991), and García and Otheguy (1983), among others.
11. However, in his discussion of Italian *sé*, Davis notes that “it is best not to think of *sé* in traditional terms (‘reflexive,’ ‘impersonal’) at all, nor in terms of their equivalent CS ‘strategies’. For one thing, *sé* is not always reflexive (viz. when it is impersonal); too, there are other pronouns that can be

reflexive.... Evidently, then, what motivates the choice of *sé* is not the message categories 'reflexive' and 'impersonal' but ... [rather] the place of *sé* in a system of semantic oppositions. *Sé* is chosen because of what it means and what it does not mean."

## Data Sources Cited

- ABE Kate Atkinson. 1997. *Behind the Scenes at the Museum*. New York: Picador USA.
- ACH Chuck Arnold. "Chatter." *People Weekly*. March 6, 2000 (v53 i9 p168). [InfoTrac]
- ADA Ad for Apple Computers
- AFB Emily Ames. "A Fictional Biography." *Stone Soup*, September 1999 (v28 i1 p36), Alison Innis. [InfoTrac]
- AG Agatha Christie in *Ten Little Niggers*, p. 27, cited by Lattey (1989).
- AHM Mary Amoroso. "Whether hand-made or bought, some Mother's Day presents stand out as extra-special." *The Bergen Record*. May 9, 1999.
- AMM Margaret Atwood. 1985. "Man From Mars." In *Dancing Girls*. New York: Bantam Books.
- ANA Eqbal Ahmad. "Fire on the mountain (nuclear tests in India and Pakistan)." (Editorial), *The Nation*, June 29, 1998 (v266 n23 p6(3)). [InfoTrac]
- AP Associated Press. Story posted on AOL January 18, 2000.
- APO Margaret Atwood. 1985. "Polarities." In *Dancing Girls*. New York: Bantam Books.
- APP Jane Austen. 1813/1996. *Pride and Prejudice*. New York: Penguin Books.
- ASS Jane Austen. 1811/1986. *Sense and Sensibility*, cited by Baker (1995).
- ATP R. W. Apple. "The Trial Of The President: The Overview – The Chamber; Senators Hear First Plea." *The New York Times*, January 15, 1999.
- BBA Dave Barry. *Bad Habits*, p. 83, cited by Van Hoek (1997).
- BBH Dean C. Barnlund. "Public and private self in communicating with Japan." *Business Horizons*, March-April 1989(v32 n2 p32(9)) [InfoTrac]

- BBN Martha Barnette. "A Blackwellian Nightmare." *www.Salon.com*, January 11, 2000.
- BCC Elisabeth Bumiller. "Clash of Careers For First Lady." *The New York Times*, December 1, 1995, p. B10. (about Donna Hanover)
- BCL Mary Catherine Bateson. 1989. *Composing a Life*. New York: Penguin Books.
- BCS Catherine O'Neill quoted by Patricia Leigh Brown. "16 Countries and Still Speaking." *The New York Times*, March 27, 1997, p. C4.
- BMT Sandra Blakeslee. "Mind's Trick Revealed in Case of Fat and Skinny Moon." *The New York Times*, January 11, 2000.
- BNC Tom Boswell. "Church in the Street for Society's Throwaways (Franciscan Peacemakers." *National Catholic Reporter* December 26, 1997 (v34 n9 p3(1)). [InfoTrac]
- BPL H. Douglas Brown. 2000. *Principles of Language Learning and Teaching*, fourth edition. White Plains, NY: Longman, p. 64.
- BSK Benjamin Stern Kirzhner, personal communication August 28, 1999.
- BTE Natalie Babbitt. 1986. *Tuck Everlasting*. Farrar Straus & Giroux.
- BTK Michael Bader. "Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: The Psychological and Social Problems of Altruism." *Tikkun*, Sept-Oct 1998. [InfoTrac]
- BTM Michelle Block. In *To Mother With Love*, compiled by Esther L. Beilenson. White Plains, NY: Peter Pauper Press Inc.
- CAA Frances Colpitt. "Between two worlds, interview with minimalist John cCracken" (sic)" *Art in America*, April 1998. [InfoTrac]
- CAD Dana Canedy. Advertising Column, *The New York Times*, September 7, 1999.
- CBL Diane Cardwell. "Bloomberg Continues Retreat From Campaign Commercial," *The New York Times*, January 17, 2001.

- CFP Richard Cavendish. "First Performance of Elgar's *Enigma Variations*," *History Today*. June 1999 (v49 i6 p51). [InfoTrac]
- CGH Madeleine Costigan. "The Second Son" *Good Housekeeping*, April 1996 (v222 n4 p145(3)). [InfoTrac]
- CGO David W. Chen. "Glare of an Old Horror Intrudes on a Privileged Life," *The New York Times*, January 22, 2000 p. B1.
- CKD Polyxane S. Cobb. "Kevorkian's Disobedience" (letter to the editor), *The New York Times*, April 22, 1999.
- CLJ Joseph Conrad. 1899/1931. *Lord Jim*. New York: Modern Library.
- CNA Alexander Cockburn. "The Jerry Brown hate campaigners." *The Nation*, April 20, 1992 (v254 n15 p511(1)). [InfoTrac]
- CSI Richard Corliss. "A Studio Is Born: A new unit formed by Jeffrey Katzenberg, Steven Spielberg and David Geffen tosses Hollywood into a tizz," *Time Magazine*, October 24, 1994, p. 68.
- CTI Adam Cohen. "Next Case," *Time Magazine*, January 18, 1999, p. 77.
- DIT Amy Dickinson. "Where Were the Parents? Could they not notice their kids' rage? Could you?" *Time Magazine*, May 3, 1999 (v153 i17 p40(1)). [InfoTrac]
- DPW Deirdre Donahue, Jack Kelly and Susan Schindette. "In the golden afterglow 10-acious Mary Lou Retton attacks the rest of her life," *People Weekly*, August 20, 1984 (v22 p32(4)). [InfoTrac]
- DRR Maureen Dowd. "Rudy in Reverse," *The New York Times*, June 16, 1999, p. WK 19.
- ECO "Palestinians: Early warning," *The Economist (US)*, October 31, 1998 (p48(1)). [InfoTrac]
- ECP Brian Eno, "Cosmetic Psychiatry," *Whole Earth Review*. Summer 1993 (n 79 p. 9 (2)). [InfoTrac]
- EJP Bell Hooks and Deborah Gregory. "Jada Pinkett: the thinking woman's actress," *Essence*, March 1998 (v28 n11 p72(6)). [InfoTrac]

- ENP Larry Englemann. "Bonehead quotes of the year (Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas," *Playboy*, January 1993, p. 170. [InfoTrac]
- EYB Mark Cuban. "Yeaahhh baa baaaaabyy!" *Esquire*, April 2000 (v133 i4 p.104). [InfoTrac]
- FAB Tom Friend. "After Biting, Tyson Faces Trouble from All Corners," *The New York Times*, June 30, 1997.
- FHR Frances Hern Remington. Phone conversation August 13, 1998, reported by Betsy Rodríguez-Bachiller.
- FLL Michael Farber. "Looming Large," *Sports Illustrated*, October 9, 1995 (v83 n16 p78(5)). [InfoTrac]
- FSS "Speed Sells: Led by superstar Jeff Gordon, Nascar is going national," *Fortune*, April 12, 1999 (v 139, i7, p. 56+(1)). [InfoTrac]
- GCW Leslie Glass. "Why We Hate the Men We Love," *Cosmopolitan*, December 1993, p78. [InfoTrac]
- GDW Dorothy Wickenden. "Good-bye day care: the insurance crisis hits preschool," *The New Republic*, December 9, 1985 (v193 p14(3)). [InfoTrac]
- GGM Mike Glover. "Gore Makes Lieberman Choice Official," *The Associated Press*, August 8, 2000 posted on AOL.
- GIN George Gendron. "The great achievement of the past few decades is that we now know everything necessary to grow a business," *Inc.* May 18, 1999. [InfoTrac]
- GMG Arthur Golden. 1997. *Memoirs of a Geisha*. New York: Knopf.
- GNS Mel Gussow. "V.S. Naipaul in Search of Himself: A Conversation," *The New York Times Book Review*, April 24, 1994.
- GPW Bob Greene. "The road home: for Michael Jordan, the summer game was a spiritual journey that led back to basketball," *People Weekly*, October 9, 1995 (v44 n15 p89(4)). [InfoTrac]
- GTA Headlines from *US Magazine*. "Nobody Does it Better: Sharon Stone on Herself" and "The Unbelievable Truth About Mel Gibson. By Mel Gibson."

- GVB Tony Karon. "Gore vs. Bradley: Get Ready for a Wonkfest," *Web-only news* October 27, 1999.
- HAU Harry Haun. "There Is Nothin' Like This Dame," *Playbill*, p. 54 October 1999.
- HBS "The History of the Bathing Suit," television documentary, The Learning Channel.
- HDO Laura M. Holson. "Defining the On-Line Chief; Ebay's Meg Whitman Explores Management, Web Style," *The New York Times*, May 10, 1999, p. C8.
- HLG Harry Goldsmith (Speaker B), personal communication with car salesman
- HLI Hoffman, Eva. 1990. *Life in a New Language*. New York: Penguin USA.
- HNS Martyn Harris. "Just like dad: contrary to popular myth, the young are conservative," *New Statesman & Society*, November 13, 1992 (v5 n228 pX(2)), originally published July 14, 1983. [InfoTrac]
- HNY Headline under "Inside," *The New York Times* p. A1, August 6, 1998.
- HRB H&R Block TV Commercial , March and April 2000.
- HSB Marlys Harris. "Shirley's best performance. Shirley MacLaine's seminars," *Money Magazine*, September 1987 (v 16 p. 160 (1)). [InfoTrac]
- HSR Ursula Hegi. 1994. *Stones from the River*. New York: Scribner Paperback Fiction.
- HVE Ursula Hegi. 2000. *The Vision of Emma Blau*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- IFS Song title by Irving Fine, *I Bought Me a Cat*.
- JAH Glen Jeansonne. "The Lone Dissenting Voice," *American History*, April 1999 (v34 i1 p46(6)). [InfoTrac]
- JCP JC Penney Catalog, Spring/Summer, 1990, pp. 1184 and 85. (Comparing two options of buying window treatments.)
- JJ *Judge Judy* TV Show, September 21, 1999.
- JTM Rebecca Johnson. "The Just-Do-It Shrink," *The New York Times Magazine*, p. 45, November 17, 1996.

- KAA David Kratz. "Choosing Sampling As An Advertising Ally: A Live Situation With Aproduct Can Be The Ideal Partner For 2-D Communication," (sic) *Advertising Age*, October 12, 1998, p32. [InfoTrac]
- KAH Michael Klepper, Robert Gunther, Jeanette Baik, Linda Barth, Christine Gibson. "The American heritage 40: a ranking of the forty wealthiest Americans of all time," *American Heritage*, October 1998. [InfoTrac]
- KGS Wendy Kaminer. "A Virtuous Woman," *The New York Times Book Review*, (Review of *The Education of a Woman, The Life of Gloria Steinem*, by Carolyn G. Heilbrun).
- KUL Dana Kennedy. "An Unscripted Life Starring Herself," *The New York Times*, May 6, 2001, Arts & Leisure, p. 1.
- KMM David Kushner. "Modern Muzak: It's Not Your Parents' Elevator Music," *The New York Times*, August 27, 1998.
- KTP Michael Kaufman. "Testing of a President: Reporter's Notebook; Havel, Repaying a Favor, Stands in Solidarity," *The New York Times*, September 17, 1998.
- LCA Liam Callanan. "One Virginian Who's Ready to Do His Part," *The New York Times* Op-Ed, January 25, 1999.
- LCP David Lodge. 1975. *Changing places*. Penguin Books. Cited by Zribi-Hertz 1989.
- LGI Lois Lowry. 1994. *The Giver*. Laurel Leaf.
- LHF Christopher Lehmann-Haupt. "Flawed Fathers, Daughters Who Love and Learn," *The New York Times*, July 29, 1999.
- LIN Message posted to LINGUIST List: Vol-10-594. Mon Apr 26 1999. ISSN: 1068-4875.
- LWS Carol Lloyd. "Why should a baby get the father's last name?" *www.Salon.com*, January 20, 2000.
- LYB Penelope Leach. 1987. *Your Baby and Child*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- MAB Ad appearing in *The New York Times* for a book by Mike Magee, M.D. and Michael D'Antonio, *The Best Medicine*. Saint Martin's Press.
- MAL Douglas Martin. "What's in A Name: The Allure of Labels," *The New York Times* (Week in Review), January 19, 2000.

- MAM Thomas Merton. "Zen: Sense and Sensibility," *America*, April 17, 1999. [InfoTrac]
- MAM James Martin. "Patient Writing: Finding God in the Operating Room," *America*, September 26, 1998 (v179 n8 p15(1)). [InfoTrac]
- MBW Margaret Mead. *Blackberry Winter*. 1972. New York: Touchstone Books.
- MCF Robert D. McFadden. "Harlem Store Owner Had Cited Anti-Semitism Before Fatal Fire," *The New York Times*, December 12, 1995, p. A1.
- MCW James McBride. 1997. *The Color of Water, A Black Man's Tribute to his White Mother*. New York: Riverhead Books
- MFA Buster Keaton Silent Film & Music Premiere Program, Massachusetts Festival of the Arts, May 1999.
- MFH Irish Murodch. 1972. *A fairly honourable defeat*. Penguin Books. Cited by Zribi-Hertz 1989.
- MML "Managing long-distance: Rebecca Mark of Enron Development on getting far-flung staffers to work together," *Working Woman*, September 1994 (v19 n9 p23(2)). [InfoTrac]
- MPM Jenny McPhee. "A Mother's Name," *The New York Times Magazine*, February 2, 1997, p. 68
- MPW Jean Richardson. "Hilary Mantel: The Novelist in Action," *Publishers Weekly*, October 5, 1998, p60. [InfoTrac]
- MSG Madison Square Garden (MSG) Cable TV, June 15, 1997, 5:45 p.m.
- MSN Steve Marantz. "The caretaker," *The Sporting News*, August 24, 1998 (v222 n34 p50(5)). [InfoTrac]
- NFO "Newt's new world," *Forbes*, February 27, 1995 (v155 n5 p92(6)). [InfoTrac]
- NGD Peter Nelson. "The good daughter," *Redbook*, March 1990 (v174 n5 p60(5)). [InfoTrac]
- NSN Bob Nightengale. "The game still needs Lasorda, and vice versa," *The Sporting News*, July 8, 1996 (v220 n28 p16). [InfoTrac]
- NVS Marilyn Carlson Nelson. "Women as players: the time is now," *Vital Speeches*, Speech transcript August 1, 1996. [InfoTrac]

- NYTC *The New York Times* Corpus. (As described in Chapter 1, this corpus consists of the article which appeared as the featured first-page New York Times article on America Online for 254 days over a 10-month period, May 4, 1998 through March 11, 1999.)
- OPR An audience member on the television show, "Oprah." ABC July 1, 2000
- ORM Pashington Obent. "Re-membering through oath: installation of African kings and queens," *Journal of Black Studies*, January 1998 (v28 n3 p334(23)). [InfoTrac]
- PAK Bill Parrillo. "Yankees will win AL East, but Red Sox will garner awards," *Knight-Ridder/Tribune News Service*, August 27, 1998 (p0827K7236). [InfoTrac]
- PCH Personal communication, Helene Goldsmith
- PDH Adam Pennenberg. "The demonizing of a hacker." *Forbes*, April 19, 1999, p. 51
- PDM Sean Penn, quoted by Bernard Weinraub. "Dead Man Whining," *The New York Times*, January 17, 1999.
- PES Michael Paterniti. "On the Road with the Big Red Dirigible of Christmas Love," *Esquire*, December 1998, p82. [InfoTrac]
- PPS Carol Potera. "Trapped in the Web," *Psychology Today*, March-April 1998 (v31 n2 p66(4)). [InfoTrac]
- PSM Michael Pye. "Serial Mom" (Review of Joyce Carol Oates writing as Rosamond Smith, *Starr Bright Will Be With You*), *The New York Times Book Review*, April 11, 1999.
- PSO Katha Politt. "The Solipsisters," *The New York Times Book Review*, April 18, 1999.
- PW Francine Prose, Alec Foege, Kim Hubbard, J.D. Reed, Ralph Novak, David Lehman. "Picks & Pans," *People Weekly*, April 26, 1999 (v51 i15 p47+(1)). [InfoTrac]
- PWL Michael A. Lipton. "More Mary Tyler: With harder times behind them, Mary Tyler Moore and Valerie Harper land back on TV," *People Weekly*, February 7, 2000 (v53 i5 p149+). [InfoTrac]

- PWT "True Devotion: In a Russia swept by change, one constant remained: Raisa Gorbachev's love for her husband, and his for her," *People Weekly*, October 4, 1999 (v52 i13 p85+). [InfoTrac]
- RBK Memo received by B. Rodríguez-Bachiller, from a professor at Kean University.
- REC Kenneth Turan. "Spielberg still has a passion for making movies," *The Recorder*, Greenfield, MA, January 12, 1999, p. 15.
- RFS Rita Stern, personal communication
- RGP James Rotondi. "Crowing pains: despite pot shots & killer weeds, the Black Crowes rule the field," *Guitar Player*, January 1995 (v29 n1 p104(12)). [InfoTrac]
- RHN Francine Russo. "The Faces of Hedda Nussbaum," *The New York Times*, March 30, 1997, p. 26.
- RPA J. K. Rowling. 1999. *Prisoner of Azkaban*. New York: Scholastic Books.
- RTO Tim Russert on *The Today Show*, NBC. February 26, 1997.
- SBC Benjamin Spock and Michael B. Rothenberg. *Dr. Spock's Baby and Child Care, revised and updated edition*. 1985. New York: Pocket Books/Simon & Schuster.
- SBH Robert Serian. "Big Hair and New Makeup. Drag and Gay Identity," *Whole Earth Review*, Fall 1987, p. 2 (6). [InfoTrac]
- SCA Christopher Anderson. "Will the real journal please stand up?" *Science*, January 22, 1993, p453. [InfoTrac]
- SCF Erick Schonfeld. "The customized, digitized, have-it-your-way economy," *Fortune*, September 28, 1998 (v138 n6 p114(7)). [InfoTrac].
- SDI Sally Bedell Smith. 1999. *Diana: In Search of Herself*, Times Books.
- SFC Mark Senak. 1998. *A Fragile Circle*. Los Angeles: Alyson Books.
- SGM Daniel Seligman. "Gréat moments in English grammar," *Fortune* October 3, 1994 (v130 n7 p155) [InfoTrac]
- SHE R. Z. Sheppard. "Bitter Sweets," *Time Magazine*, February 9, 1999, p. 70.

- SLD Lee M. Silver. "Life by design: Fertility for Sale," *The New York Times*, March 4, 1998.
- SLH Richard Sandomir. "Lingerie or Hardware, It's a Heavy Burden," *The New York Times*, March 30, 1999.
- SLT "The Ticket," *The Star Ledger*, October 8, 1999, p. 25. Movie review of "Boys Don't Cry"
- SMB *Madam Bovary*. The Modern Library, Francis Steegmuller Translation. 1957
- SMF Martha Sherrill. "My Father, The Bachelor," *Esquire*, June 1999 (v131 i6 p120). [InfoTrac]
- SMH Susan Squire. "My Husband, I Think I'll Dress Him," *The New York Times Magazine*, September 12, 1999, p. 56.
- SMP Judith Sills. "How to make peace with your siblings," *Redbook*, December 1993 (v182 n2 p110). [InfoTrac]
- SNP Jon Stewart, on *The Today Show*, NBC, October 4, 1999.
- SPF Elizabeth Weitzman. "Sean Patrick Flanery," *Interview Magazine*, April 1998 (v28 n4 p86(9)). [InfoTrac]
- SPI "Doing the Right Thing," *Sports Illustrated*, December 14, 1998 (v89 i24 p8(1)) [InfoTrac]
- SPW Anita Shreve. 1998. *The Pilot's Wife*. Boston, New York and London: Little, Brown and Company.
- SSC Michael Specter. "A Skater's Credo: Only Angels Can Fly," *The New York Times*, April 7, 1994.
- SSM Sue Murray, personal communication, December 8, 1995.
- STI R. Z. Sheppard. *Time Magazine*, February 8, 1999, p. 70
- STI "Take It Or Leave It," *People Weekly*, April 6, 1998 (v49 n13 p164(1)). [InfoTrac]
- STT Jennifer Steinhauer. *The New York Times*, December 26, 1995, p. D1.
- SVJ Kalamu ya Salaam. "Visual Jazz - an interview with and portfolio of paintings by John Scott," *African American Review*, Summer 1993 (v27 n2 p257(20)). [InfoTrac]
- TBE Don Terry. "Bilingual Education Facing Toughest Test," *The New York Times*, March 10, 1998, p. A1.

- TBH Laura Tuson. "From Brilliant Hues to Shady Grays," *Stone Soup*, March 1999 (v27 i4 p35(1)). [InfoTrac]
- TDC Rei Terada. "Dino Campana," *Poetry*, June 1996 (v 168 n 3 p 137 (1)). [InfoTrac]
- TIB Evan Thomas. "Inside the Beltway but Out of the Loop," *The New York Times Book Review*, review of Robert Reich's *Locked in the Cabinet*, April 27, 1997.
- TIK2 Arthur Waskow. "When politics is prayer...," *Tikkun*, September-October 1998 (v13 n5 p49(4)) [InfoTrac]
- TRG Mark B. White and Kirsten J. Tyson-Rawson. "A peace plan for the gender wars. Use a gendergram to find the covert beliefs that fuel the conflict," *Psychology Today*, March-April 1996, p. 50. [InfoTrac]
- TWC Sallie Tisdale. "What Color Is Your Uniform," *The New York Times*, May 24, 1998, Sunday Styles/Section 9, p. 5
- UNK Unknown source
- USA Nina H. Shokraii. "The self-esteem fraud: feel-good education does not lead to academic success," *USA Today*, January 1998 (v126 n2632 p66(3)) [InfoTrac]
- USC Dolores Curran. "Books every couple should read: good reads for every stage of marriage," *U.S. Catholic*, May 1998. [InfoTrac]
- VBT David Van Biema. "Emperor of the Soul," *Time Magazine*, June 24, 1996, p. 65.
- WBE Susan Wilson. "Beauty," *Good Housekeeping*, June 1996 (v222 n6 p149(15)). [InfoTrac]
- WHW Thaddeus Wawro. "Hero Worship," *Entrepreneur*, March 2000 (v28 i3 p114) [InfoTrac]
- YMD "Metropolitan Diary," *The New York Times*, June 21, 1995, submitted by Marian Young, edited by Ron Alexander.
- InfoTrac *The InfoTrac Reference Center*, Magazine Index from the General Reference Center. 2001. The Gale Group Inc. This electronic database consists of articles from magazines, reference books, newspapers and news services on current events, popular culture, the arts and sciences, sports, business etc. that have appeared from 1980 to the present.

## References

- Abbott, G. 1984. Unisex *they*. *English Language Teaching Journal*, 38: 45-48.
- Ariel, Mira. 1988. Referring and accessibility. *Journal of Linguistics* 24(1): 65-87.
- Ariel, Mira. 1990. *Accessing Noun-Phrase Antecedents*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Ariel, Mira. 1991. The function of accessibility in a theory of grammar. *Journal of Pragmatics* 16(5): 443-463.
- Ariel, Mira. 1994. Interpreting anaphoric expressions: a cognitive vs. a pragmatic approach. *Journal of Linguistics* 30(1): 3-42.
- Atlas, J. D. and S. C. Levinson. 1981. It-clefts, informativeness and logical form: radical pragmatics (revised standard version). In P. Cole (ed), *Radical pragmatics*. New York: Academic Press, 1-61.
- Baker, C. L. 1995. Contrast, discourse prominence, and intensification, with special reference to locally free reflexives in British English. *Language* 71(1): 63-101.
- Baron, Dennis E. 1987. *Grammar and Gender*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Beaugrande, Robert de. 1999. Sentence first, verdict afterwards: On the remarkable career of the "sentence". *Word* 50(1): 1-31.
- Bolinger, Dwight. 1965. The atomization of meaning. *Language* 41:555-73.
- Bolinger, Dwight. 1978. Free will and determinism in language: or, who does the choosing, the grammar or the speaker? In M. Suñer (ed), *Contemporary Studies in Romance Linguistics*. Georgetown DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Bouchard, D. 1982. *On the Content of Empty Categories*. Ph.D. dissertation, MIT.
- Burling, Robbins. 1992. *Patterns of Language: Structure, variation, change*. San Diego: Academic Press, Inc.

- Carden, Guy and William A. Stewart. 1988. Binding Theory, bioprogram and creolization: evidence from Haitian Creole. *Journal of Pidgin and Creole Languages* 3(1): 1-67.
- Cameron, Deborah. 1995. *Verbal Hygiene*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Cantrall, William R. 1969. *On the Nature of the Reflexive in English*. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
- Cantrall, William R. 1973. Why I would relate *own*, emphatic reflexives, and intensive pronouns, *my own self*. *Papers from the 9<sup>th</sup> Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistics Society*, 57-67.
- Cantrall, William R. 1974. *Viewpoint, Reflexives, and the Nature of Noun Phrases*. The Hague: Mouton.
- Celce-Murcia, M. and D. Larsen-Freeman. 1983. *The Grammar Book*. Rowley, MA: Newbury House.
- Chambers, Craig R. and Ron Smyth. 1998. Structural parallelism and discourse coherence: A test of centering theory. *Journal of Memory and Language* 39(4): 593-608.
- The Chicago Manual of Style*, 14<sup>th</sup> edition. 1993. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Chomsky, Noam. 1957. *Syntactic structures*. The Hague: Mouton Publishers.
- Chomsky, Noam. 1965. *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.
- Chomsky, Noam. 1981. *Lectures on Government and Binding*. Dordrecht: Foris Publications.
- Chomsky, Noam. 1982. *Some Concepts and Consequences of the Theory of Government and Binding*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Chomsky, Noam. 1986. *Knowledge of Language: Its nature, origin and use*. New York: Prager.
- Chomsky, Noam. 1988. *Language and Problems of Knowledge*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Chomsky, Noam. 1995. *The Minimalist Program*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

- Cohen, Dana. 1999. Towards a unified account of intensive reflexives. *Journal of Pragmatics* 31: 1041-1052.
- Contini-Morava, Ellen. 1995. Introduction: In Ellen Contini-Morava and Barbara Sussman Goldberg (eds), 1-39.
- Contini-Morava, Ellen and Barbara Sussman Goldberg (eds). 1995. *Meaning as Explanation: Advances in linguistic sign theory*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Cornish, Frances. 1996. 'Antecedentless' anaphors: deixis, anaphora, or what? Some evidence from English and French. *Journal of Linguistics* 32(1): 19-41.
- Cresswell, Cassandra. 1997. *Non-argument Reflexives: A pragmatic analysis*. Senior honors thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
- Cruse, D. A. 1986. *Lexical Semantics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dalrymple, Mary. 1993. *The Syntax of Anaphoric Binding*. Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Information.
- Davis, Joseph. 1992. *Italian egli and lui: Grammatical Meaning and Inference*. Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University.
- Davis, Joseph. 1995. Italian pronouns and the virtue of relative meaninglessness. In Ellen Contini-Morava and Barbara Sussman Goldberg (eds), *Meaning as Explanation: Advances in linguistic sign theory*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Davis, Joseph. 1997. *So Just What Is a Strategy, Anyway?* Fifth International Columbia School Conference, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
- Davis, Joseph (forthcoming). A surpassingly simple analysis. In Wallis Reid and Ricardo Otheguy (eds), *Signal, Meaning and Message: Perspectives on sign-based linguistics*. Philadelphia and Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Deane, Paul D. 1992. *Grammar in Mind and Brain: Explorations in cognitive syntax*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Dik, Simon. 1989. *The Theory of Functional Grammar, Part 1: The Structure of the Clause*. Dordrecht: Foris.
- Diver, William. 1975. Introduction. *Columbia University Working Papers in Linguistics* 2:1-20 [corrected reprint 1980].

- Diver, William, ed. 1982. *Columbia Working Papers in Linguistics* 7.
- Diver, William. 1984. *The grammar of English*. Ms.
- Diver, William. 1987. Latin Precursors of the Romance Reflexives. *Columbia University Working Papers in Linguistics* 8:115-141.
- Diver, William. 1995. Theory. In Ellen Contini-Morava and Barbara Sussman Goldbert (eds), 43-114.
- Edmondson, Jerold A. and Frans Plank. 1978. Great expectations: an intensive self analysis. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 2: 373-413.
- Faltz, Leonard. 1985. *Reflexivization: A study in universal syntax*. New York: Garland Publishing Inc.
- Ferro, Lisa. 1992. On *Self* as a Focus Marker. In M. Bernstein (ed), *Proceedings of the Eastern States Conference on Linguistics*, 9: Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 68-79.
- Fiengo, Robert and Howard Lasnik. 1976. Some issues in the theory of transformations. *Linguistic Inquiry* 7: 182-92.
- Fleischman, Suzanne. 1992. Temps verbal et point de vue narratif. *Études littéraires* 25(1-2): 117-35.
- García, Erica. 1965. *The Role of Theory in Linguistic Analysis*. Amsterdam: North Holland.
- García, Erica. 1977. On the practical consequences of theoretical principles. *Lingua* 43: 129-69.
- García, Erica and Ricardo Otheguy. 1983. Being polite in Ecuador. *Lingua* 61: 103-132.
- Geniušienė, Emma. 1987. *The Typology of Reflexives*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Givón, Talmy. 1983. Topic continuity in discourse: An introduction. In T. Givón (ed), *Topic Continuity in Discourse: A quantitative cross-language study*. Philadelphia and Amsterdam: Benjamins. 1-42.
- Givón, Talmy. 1993. *English Grammar: A function-based introduction, Vols. 1 and 2*. Philadelphia and Amsterdam: Benjamins.

- Glucksburg, Sam. 1993. Idiom meanings and allusional content. In C. Cacciari and P. Tabossi (eds), *Idioms: Processing, structure and interpretation*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
- Gordon, Peter C. 1995. Pronominalization and discourse coherence, discourse structure and pronoun interpretation. *Memory and Cognition* 23(3): 313-23.
- Gordon, Peter C. and R. Hendrick. 1999. The representation and processing of coreference in discourse. *Cognitive Sciences* 22(4): 389-424.
- Green, Georgia, M. 1996. *Pragmatics and natural language understanding, second edition*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Greene, Steven B., Richard Gerrig, Gail McKoon and Roger Ratcliff. 1994. Unheralded pronouns and management by common ground. *Journal of Memory and Language* 33(4): 511-26.
- Greene, Steven B., Gail McKoon and Roger Ratcliff. 1992. Pronoun resolution and discourse models. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition* 18(2): 266-83.
- Grodzinsky, Yosef and Tanya Reinhart. 1993. The innateness of binding and coreference. *Linguistic Inquiry* 24: 69-101.
- Haegemann, Liliane. 1994. *Introduction to Government and Binding Theory, second edition*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Hagège, Claude. 1974. Les pronoms logophoriques. *Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris*, 287-310.
- Haiman, John. 1995. Grammatical signs of the divided self: a study of language and culture. In Werner Abraham, Talmy Givón and Sandra A. Thompson (eds), *Papers in Honor of John W. M. Verhaar*. Philadelphia and Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Heine, Bernd, Ulrike Claudi, and Friederike Hünemeyer. 1991. *Grammaticalization: A conceptual framework*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Hopper, Paul and Sandra A. Thompson. 1980. Transitivity in grammar and discourse. *Language* 56: 251-299.
- Hopper, Paul and Elizabeth Traugott. 1993. *Grammaticalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Horn, L. 1985. Metalinguistic negation and pragmatic ambiguity. *Language* 61: 121-174.
- Huffman, Alan. 1993. The Control-Focus interlock. *Part I, Events and Participants. Modern English: A Columbia School Grammar*. Ms.
- Huffman, Alan. 1997. *The Categories of Grammar: French lui and le*. Philadelphia and Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Jackendoff, Ray. 1992. Mme. Tussaud meets the Binding Theory. *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory*. 10: 1-31.
- Jespersen, Otto. 1933 (1983). *Essentials of English Grammar*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Keenan, Edward. 1994. *Creating Anaphors, An Historical Study of the English Reflexive Pronouns*. Ms. UCLA.
- Keenan, Edward. 1996. Toward a universal definition of "subject". In Charles Li (ed), *Subject and Topic*. New York: Academic Press, Inc.
- Kemmer, Suzanne. 1993. *The Middle Voice*. Philadelphia and Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Kemmer, Suzanne. 1995. Emphatic and reflexive *-self*: expectations, viewpoint and subjectivity in Dieter Stein and Susan Wright (eds). *Subjectivity and Subjectivisation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kemmer, Suzanne and Michael Barlow. 1996. Emphatic *-Self* in Discourse in A. E. Goldberg (ed), *Conceptual Structure, Discourse and Language*. Stanford, CA.: Center for the Study of Language and Information.
- König, Ekkerhard. 1991. *The Meaning of Focus Particles: A comparative perspective*. London and New York: Routledge.
- König, Ekkerhard. 1999. From expressions for body parts to reflexive anaphors: Semantic change in the development of intensifiers. In Gerald F. Carr, Wayne Harbert and Lihua Zhang (eds), *Interdigitations: Essays for Irmengard Rauch*. New York: Peter Lang, 503-515.
- Kuno, Susumu. 1987. *Functional Syntax: Anaphora, discourse and empathy*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

- Labov, William. 1972. *Sociolinguistics*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Lagunoff, Rachel. 1997. *Singular They*. Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA.
- Lakoff, George. 1968. *Pronouns and Reference*. Indiana University Linguistics Club. (Reprinted in James D. McCawley (ed), *Notes from the Linguistics Underground, Syntax and Semantics 7*, 1976, New York: Academic Press, 275-336)
- Lakoff, George. 1987. *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What categories reveal about the mind*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Langacker, Ronald W. 1987. *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Volume 1: Theoretical prerequisites*. Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press.
- Langacker, Ronald W. 1991. *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Volume 2: Descriptive application*. Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press.
- Lathey, Elsa. *Reflecting on the "reflexive" or Separation of the -self*. Paper delivered at the First Conference of the Columbia School of Linguistics, New York, NY, August 1989.
- Lees, Robert and Edward Klima. 1963. Rules for English pronominalization. *Language* 39: 17-28.
- Levinson, Stephen C. 1987. Pragmatics and the grammar of anaphora. *Journal of Linguistics* 23: 379-434.
- Levinson, Stephen C. 1989. Relevance. *Journal of Linguistics* 25: 455-472.
- Levinson, Stephen C. 1991. Pragmatic reduction of the Binding Conditions revisited. *Journal of Linguistics* 27: 107-161.
- Lyons, 1977. *Semantics, Volume 1*. Cambridge University Press.
- MacKay, D.G. and D.C. Fulkerson. 1979. On the comprehension and production of pronouns. *Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior* 18: 661-673.
- McDonald, Janet L. and Brian MacWhinney. 1995. The time course of anaphor resolution: effects of implicit verb causality and gender. *Journal of Memory and Language* 34(4): 543-566.

- McKoon, Gail, Gregory Ward and Roger Ratcliff. 1993. Morphosyntactic and pragmatic factors affecting the accessibility of discourse entities. *Journal of Memory and Language* 32(1): 56-75.
- Moravcsik, Edith. 1972. Some cross-linguistic generalizations about intensifier constructions. *Papers from the 8<sup>th</sup> Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society*.
- Morris, Lori. 1991. *Gender in Modern English: The system and its uses*. Ph.D. dissertation, Université Laval, Quebec.
- Newmeyer, Frederick J. 1991. Functional explanation in linguistics and the origins of language. *Language & Communication* 11: 3-28.
- Nichols, Joanna. 1984. Functional Theories of Grammar. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 13: 97-117.
- O'Conner, Patricia T. 1996. *Woe Is I, The Grammarphobe's Guide to Better English in Plain English*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Oppy, Brian James. 1995. *Mechanisms of Referential Access and Analysis*. Ph.D. dissertation, UC Davis.
- Otheguy, Ricardo (forthcoming). Saussurean anti-nomenclaturism in grammatical analysis: A comparative theoretical perspective. In Wallis Reid and Ricardo Otheguy (eds), *Signal, Meaning and Message: Perspectives on sign-based linguistics*. Philadelphia and Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Oxford English Dictionary, second edition*. 1989. Prepared by J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Petrovitz, Walter. 1999. The syntactic representation of understood subjects. *Word* 50(1): 47-56.
- Pollard, Carl and Ivan Sag. 1992. Anaphors in English and the scope of the binding theory. *Linguistic Inquiry* 24: 657-720.
- Quirk, R. and S. Greenbaum. 1973. *A Concise Grammar of Contemporary English*. London: Longman.
- Quirk, R., S. Greenbaum, G. Leech and J. Svartvik. 1972. *A Grammar of Contemporary English*. London: Longman.

- Quirk, R., S. Greenbaum, G. Leech and J. Svartvik. 1985. *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language*. London: Longman.
- Reid, Wallace. 1991. *Verb and Noun Number in English: A functional explanation*. London and New York: Longman.
- Reinhart, Tanya. 1983. *Anaphora and Semantic interpretation*. London: Croom Helm.
- Reinhart, Tanya and Eric Reuland. 1991. Anaphors and logophors: an argument structure perspective. In Jan Koster and Eric Reuland (eds), *Long-distance anaphora*. Cambridge University Press.
- Reinhart, Tanya and Eric Reuland. 1993. Reflexivity. *Linguistic Inquiry* 24(4): 657-720.
- Ross, John R. 1970. On declarative sentences. In Roderick Jacobs and Peter S. Rosenbaum (eds), *Readings in English Transformational Grammar*. Waltham, Mass: Ginn & Co., 222-272.
- Ruhl, Charles. 1989. *On Monosemy*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Safir, Ken. 1996. Semantic atoms of anaphora. *Natural Language & Linguistic Theory* 15: 545-589.
- Saussure, Ferdinand. 1916 *Course in General Linguistics*. Translated by Roy Harris. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Classics, 1972.
- Sells, Peter. 1985. *Lectures on Contemporary Syntactic Theories*. Stanford, CA.: Center for the Study of Language and Information.
- Siegal, Allan M. and William G. Connolly (eds). 1999. *The New York Times Manual of Style and Usage, revised and expanded edition*. New York: Random House, Inc.
- Smyth, Ron. 1994. Grammatical determinants of ambiguous pronoun resolution. *Journal of Psycholinguistic Research* 23(3): 197-229.
- Sweet, Henry. 1891 (1955). *A New English Grammar, Logical and Historical*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Swift, Kate and Casey Miller. 1988. *The Handbook of Nonsexist Writing*. New York: Harper and Row.

- Swinney, D. A. and A. Cutler 1979. The access and processing of idiomatic expressions. *Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior* 18: 523-534.
- Thráinsson, H. 1976. Reflexives and subjunctives in Icelandic. *Proceedings of NELS 6, GLSA*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 225-239.
- Tobin, Yishai. 1995. *Only vs. just*: Semantic integrality revisited. In Ellen Contini-Morava and Barbara Goldberg (eds), 323-359.
- Trask, R. L. 1993. *A Dictionary of Grammatical Terms in Linguistics*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Traugott, E. C. 1972. *The History of English Syntax: A transformational approach to the history of English sentence structure*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc.
- Tuggy, David. 1985. Why the oddness of reflexives isn't odd. *Southwest Journal of Linguistics*, 8(1): 44-59.
- Van Hoek, Karen. 1992. *Paths through Conceptual Structure: Constraints on pronominal anaphora*. Ph.D dissertation, University of California, San Diego.
- Van Hoek, Karen. 1997. *Anaphora and Conceptual Structure*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Van Valin, Robert D., Jr. 1990. Functionalism, anaphora and syntax. *Studies in Language* 14: 169-219.
- Visser, F. Th. 1963. *An Historical Syntax of the English Language, Vol. IV*. The Netherlands: E. J. Brill.
- Warshawsky, Florence. 1965. Reflexivization I & II. Indiana University Linguistics Club. (Reprinted in James D. McCawley (ed), *Notes from the linguistics underground, Syntax and Semantics* 7, 1976, New York: Academic Press, 63-84.)
- Webelhuth, Gert. 1995. *Government and Binding Theory and the Minimalist Program*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language*. 1996. Portland House: NY.

- White, Lydia, Joyce Bruhn-Garavito, Takako Kawasaki, Joe Pater and Philippe Prévost. 1997. The researcher gave the subject a test about himself: problems of ambiguity and preference in the investigation of reflexive binding. *Language Learning* 41(1): 145-172.
- Whitley, M. Stanley. 1978. Person and number in the use of *we*, *you* and *they*. *American Speech*, 5: 18-39.
- Wierzbicka, Anna. 1988. *The Semantics of Grammar*. Philadelphia and Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Zribi-Hertz, Anne. 1989. Anaphor binding and narrative point of view: English reflexive pronouns in sentence and discourse. *Language* 65(4): 695-727.