Why we should not be unhappy about happiness via Aristotle the functionalist account of Aristotle's notion of eudaimonia

Item

Title
Why we should not be unhappy about happiness via Aristotle the functionalist account of Aristotle's notion of eudaimonia
Identifier
d_2009_2013:099fa9d5fe48:10151
identifier
10283
Creator
Caesar, Irene,
Contributor
Peter Simpson
Date
2009
Language
English
Publisher
City University of New York.
Subject
Philosophy | ancient philosophy | Aristotle | Aristotle's ethics | Aristotle's philosophy | ethics | happiness
Abstract
The purpose of my dissertation is to resolve the ongoing argument in the modern Anglo-American interpretation of Aristotelianism regarding the principle of eudaimonia ( 3u ,daim oni&d12;a ; happiness). Exlusivist interpretation argues that the principle of eudaimonia is one dominant or exclusive telos (end) consisting of the arete (excellence or virtue) of theoria (contemplation of the divine). Inclusivist interpretation argues that the principle of eudaimonia is an inclusive or compounded telos containing this and all other Aristotelian virtues in a comprehensive or mixed life ruled by phronesis (practical wisdom). I offer the functionalist interpretation that goes beyond the dichotomy of inclusivism and exclusivism in arguing that (1) contrary to exclusivism, theoria is functionally linked with all the other activities of the soul throughout the entire Aristotelian corpus and that; (2) contrary to inclusivism, theoria is functionally superior to each and all of the other activities of the soul, making a compound model irrelevant in its incapacity to express the hierarchy within the soul.;The soul and polis are both a sustema (systematic whole) organized by the ruler nous (intuitive reason/active intellect) with its activity (energeia) of theoria (contemplation) via formulating metron (measure). Metron in relation to us depends on metron within the object, and the latter is assumed a priori as a major premiss (the universal) in the practical and speculative syllogisms, while the practical reason is incapable of defining the universal. Eudaimonia is a perfect realization of the function of the ruler. Humans are functionally distinct from other animals precisely by this contemplative ability of a priori assuming the universal within the particular. Soul, as any sustema, is identified not with the hierarchy of its parts, but with its ruler, and the final virtue is identified with the virtue of the ruler. The passive intellect and the active intellect are accordingly the practical reason and the contemplative reason. The first principle and end (the cause) of action is leisure spent in the disinterested and useless contemplative activity of the ruler -- the active intellect. The moral action, which does not reach this end, is not ultimately good-in-itself though outright dutiful.
Type
dissertation
Source
2009_2013.csv
degree
Ph.D.
Program
Philosophy