A neo -Humean bundle theory: A reductionist account of personal identity, consciousness and self -concern
Item
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Title
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A neo -Humean bundle theory: A reductionist account of personal identity, consciousness and self -concern
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Identifier
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d_2009_2013:656fb0dd773d:10398
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identifier
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10421
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Creator
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Elkatip, Sinem,
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Contributor
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Michael Levin
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Date
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2009
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Language
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English
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Publisher
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City University of New York.
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Subject
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Philosophy | bundle theory | personal identity | reductionism | self concern | self consciousness | subject
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Abstract
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Although our understanding of mental states ordinarily assumes something that has those mental states, viz. a subject, or a self, it is far from clear what the subject or the self is supposed to be. While philosophers have been critical enough of thinking subjects in a certain way for instance as Cartesian egos, or as brains, they have not been critical enough of the need for subjects. Since there is no well-articulated theory of what subjects are really supposed to be, I contend that it is time to challenge the commitment to subjects in mental lives, and see if we can do without them.;Both Hume's bundle theory and Parfit's reductionism challenge the idea of subjects as separately existing entities, but Hume's atomistic view of perceptions makes it very difficult to further develop an understanding of the unity of mental states in a single bundle. And Parfit at times seems to give in to the idea of persons as subjects of experiences.;I contend that the idea of persons as subjects needs to be made explanatorily redundant, for reducing subjects to experiences and endorsing an eliminative approach towards subjects. There are various phenomena that seem to call for subjects to explain them, which might justify the existence of persons as subjects. Hence, methodologically speaking, only if there were a way to account for phenomena that seem subject-requiring without referring to subjects, would it be reasonable to suggest that there are no such things as selves and that persons reduce to bodies and a series of interrelated mental states.;I call such accounts reductionist and start by arguing for a reductionist account of personal identity and unity of experiences. Then I argue for the possibility of conscious mental states without a conception of oneself as the subject of one's experiences. Finally in order to show that reductionism is compatible with basic human experiences, I argue for an explanation of why there would still be self-related concerns in the absence of selves.
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Type
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dissertation
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Source
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2009_2013.csv
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degree
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Ph.D.
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Program
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Philosophy
