The representational character of imagination
Item
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Title
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The representational character of imagination
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Identifier
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d_2009_2013:d0eba237f6f5:10400
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identifier
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10298
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Creator
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Langland-Hassan, Peter,
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Contributor
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Jonathan E. Adler
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Date
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2009
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Language
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English
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Publisher
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City University of New York.
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Subject
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Philosophy | Imagery | Imagination
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Abstract
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Two dogmas shape most theorizing on sensory imagination (thought involving imagery) and propositional imagination (imagining that thus and such). The first is that imaginers have privileged access to what they are imagining; the second is that imagining involves cognitive mechanisms over and above those underlying belief. I challenge both assumptions, arguing that one can easily be wrong about what one is sensorily imagining, and that propositional imagining requires only ordinary beliefs and desires. The former claim is supported through a distinction between the representational (or 'intentional') content of an imaginative experience and the matter of whether the "success" conditions given by that content are satisfied. The latter is advanced on grounds of parsimony, as more baroque hypotheses are shown not to be borne out by the data. In addition, a novel theory of the cognitive mechanisms underlying the sense of agency had over one's own imaginings is developed, through an analysis of cases (in schizophrenia) when the phenomenology of thought-agency is abnormal.;The cumulative effect is to replace the view of imagination as a sui generis, "off-line" mental phenomenon with one that sees it as an assertoric faculty aimed at representing past experiences and future possibilities.
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Type
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dissertation
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Source
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2009_2013.csv
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degree
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Ph.D.
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Program
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Philosophy
