State structure and economic *development: The political economy of Thailand and the Philippines
Item
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Title
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State structure and economic *development: The political economy of Thailand and the Philippines
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Identifier
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d_2009_2013:ad1816e379a9:10420
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identifier
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10505
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Creator
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Raquiza, Antoinette R.,
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Contributor
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Susan L. Woodward
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Date
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2010
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Language
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English
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Publisher
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City University of New York.
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Subject
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Political science | Economic history | Social structure | economic development | political economy | rent-seekjng | Southeast Asia | State formation | technocracy
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Abstract
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This dissertation investigates the factors that account for different economic performance among late developing countries that are vulnerable to external shocks, crony capitalism, and political instability. The dissertation undertakes an historical, comparative analysis of industrializing Thailand and relatively low-performing Philippines, and argues that differences in economic performance are due to variations in the institutional configuration of state power, defined along two dimensions: the embeddedness of governing elites in state institutions, and the relationship between the political leadership and economic technocracy in the development policy process.;The dissertation adopts the concept of bureaucratic polity, used in Thailand studies, to refer to the series of coalitions between military rulers and senior technocrats that controlled state power for most of that country's modern history. Thai political rulers and technocrat economic managers were deeply embedded, respectively, in the military and civilian bureaucracies; economic technocrats had relative autonomy from the political rulers. For the Philippines, this study introduces the concept of proprietary polity, a form of elite rule in which personalistic politicians gain power because of their personal wealth, connections, and political skills. Philippine political leaders belonged to weak political parties and recruited technocrats from the private sector. Hence, the development bureaucracy was strongly subordinate to political leaders.;These distinct institutional settings produced different economic growth patterns. Thailand's more stable bureaucratic polity proved conducive to long-term capital accumulation, necessary for the rise of a robust industrial sector. Because political contestation proved much more disruptive under the Philippines's proprietary polity, investment flowed more into the commercial sectors, where economic activities promised fast turnovers. Four causal mechanisms link the institutional setting to economic outcomes: (1) political contestation, (2) presence of policy continuity, (3) choice of policy design and tools, and, (4) the consolidation of different policy constituencies.
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Type
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dissertation
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Source
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2009_2013.csv
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degree
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Ph.D.
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Program
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Political Science
