Perception and skill: Theoretical foundations for a science of perception

Title: Perception and skill: Theoretical foundations for a science of perception
Identifier: d_2009_2013:b9552fe9493b:10460
identifier: 10630
Creator: Fridland, Ellen,
Contributor: David M. Rosenthal | Nickolas Pappas
Date: 2010
Language: English
Publisher: City University of New York.
Subject: Philosophy | Cognition | Cognitive Penetration | Enactive Perception | Knowing-How | Philosophy of Perception | Skill
Abstract: I argue in my dissertation that if diachronic cognitive penetration is caused by skill, then such changes in perceptual processing are legitimate instances of cognitive penetration. As such, perceptual processing is not modular. I argue this by (1) presenting a detailed analysis of the definition of cognitive penetration, (2) arguing that propositional knowledge cannot account for practical know-how, and (3) providing a definition of skill that highlights its practical and irreducibly cognitive nature. Taken together, these considerations amount to an argument for the possibility of a genuine instance of cognitive penetration, which results from the regular instantiation of skill.
Type: dissertation
Source: 2009_2013.csv
degree: Ph.D.
Program: Philosophy

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