On the phenomenal character of conscious experiences
Item
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Title
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On the phenomenal character of conscious experiences
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Identifier
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d_2009_2013:c5787b2408d8:10702
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identifier
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10841
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Creator
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Yhan, Hung-Tzu,
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Contributor
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David M. Rosenthal | William Earle
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Date
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2010
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Language
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English
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Publisher
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City University of New York.
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Subject
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Philosophy | appearance properties | consciousness | content of perception | phenomenal character | philosophy of mind | qualia
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Abstract
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It seems intuitive to hold that when one has a conscious experience of seeing red, one's conscious experience has a qualitative property of "red," which is a mental quality. Qualitative properties can only exist in conscious experience and are only accessible introspectively. Therefore, they are subjective, since no one can access the qualitative properties of other peoples' experiences. This is the view held by qualia realists. However, Standard Representationalists hold that there are no mental qualities, since sensory experiences are transparent, and that when one introspects, one's attention ends up on the properties of the external objects. They conclude that the phenomenal character of experiences is determined by their intentional content.;I argue that Standard Representationalism is wrong, since there are mental qualities and the representation thesis---phenomenal character is one and the same as intentional content---is mistaken. Standard Representationalism cannot explain some common phenomena of color perception. I also argue that the qualia realists' arguments for the distinction between intentional and phenomenal content, i.e., the inverted spectrum and the inverted earth arguments, fail. I argue that there is no inverted spectrum, behaviorally detectable or undetectable, inverted partially or entirely, and there is no intentional content inversion.;I also reject Shoemaker's moderate representational theory that appeals to the notion of "appearance property" to explain the phenomenal character of conscious experiences. I argue that there is no "appearance property" described by Shoemaker. I accept the division of labor theory of phenomenal consciousness, however, I argue that Lycan's version of the labor division theory faces the problem of higher-order misrepresentation, which is also known as the problem of mismatching between higher-order and first-order mental contents. I support the higher-order thought theory of phenomenal character, since it not only avoids the problem of higher order misrepresentation, but can also explain most of the phenomena of visual perception that other competing theories cannot.
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Type
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dissertation
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Source
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2009_2013.csv
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degree
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Ph.D.
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Program
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Philosophy
