Essays on Identity: A Defense of Logical Orthodoxy
Item
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Title
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Essays on Identity: A Defense of Logical Orthodoxy
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Identifier
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d_2009_2013:18169c1afc6f:10879
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identifier
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11248
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Creator
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Gallegos, Sergio,
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Contributor
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Richard Mendelsohn
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Date
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2011
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Language
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English
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Publisher
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City University of New York.
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Subject
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Metaphysics | Language | Logic | Determinacy | Identity | Necessity
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Abstract
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My dissertation defends a commonly accepted package involving a certain number of theses that lie at the intersection of metaphysics, philosophy of language and philosophy of logic. The package, which includes (i) the classical thesis that identity is a one-one relation that is absolute, necessary and determinate and (ii) the Kripkean theses that true identity statements involving only rigid designators are necessary and that proper names are rigid designators (along with the consequences of these two theses such as the view that true identity statements involving only proper names are necessary), occupies a central role in many philosophical discussions where it functions both as a sanction of certain avenues of inquiry and as a constraint on the development of others.;In spite of its inner consistency and overwhelming persuasiveness, the package has been criticized from many different angles. For instance, some philosophers claim that there are many different identity relations relativized to different sorts of things rather than an absolute identity relation because the latter view is undermined by paradoxes. Others maintain that, pace Kripke, there are true contingent identity statements involving only proper names because the reference of a proper name in a counterfactual situation is given by a sortal concept associated to it. Furthermore, some hold that identity is indeterminate in certain circumstances because the strongest arguments that aim to show the inconsistency of the view that identity is indeterminate may be blocked successfully.;The first chapter of my dissertation is concerned with answering the challenge raised against the absolute character of identity. After reviewing the traditional considerations put forward by relative identity theorists as well as some novel arguments, I conclude that identity is absolute. In the second chapter, I consider in detail some of the most prominent arguments given to maintain that there are true contingent identity statements involving proper names as well as an argument given to show that the proof of the necessity of identity involves a vicious circularity and I show that all the arguments involve serious flaws, thus clearing of doubts the Kripkean portion of the package. The third chapter vindicates the view that indeterminate identity is inconsistent by providing a defense of Evans' argument for the inconsistency of indeterminate identity against a number of objections that have been addressed to it.
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Type
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dissertation
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Source
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2009_2013.csv
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degree
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Ph.D.
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Program
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Philosophy
