Olfaction: Smelling the Content of Consciousness

Item

Title
Olfaction: Smelling the Content of Consciousness
Identifier
d_2009_2013:580c3be5dec2:10958
identifier
11160
Creator
Young, Benjamin D.,
Contributor
Jesse J. Prinz | David Rosenthal
Date
2011
Language
English
Publisher
City University of New York.
Subject
Philosophy | Neurosciences | Epistemology | Consciousness | Mental Content | Nonconceptual Content | Olfaction | Perceptual Object | Qualitative Consciousness
Abstract
Scientific research on the sense of smell has blossomed over the past two decades, yet a comprehensive philosophical treatment of olfaction is nonexistent. My dissertation remedies this neglect by showing how the anatomical structure, functional circuitry, and sensory states of the olfactory system, call into question the reigning theories of cognition and consciousness. Specifically, olfaction provides new insight about the nature of object perception, the structure of our thoughts, consciousness, and the qualitative character of our experiences.;The object of our olfactory experience and what constitutes its olfactory quality, is the chemical structure of molecular compounds, which are unlike those of the other perceptual modalities. Additionally, the content of olfactory experience is represented in a format that is unlike the system of representations posited by Language of Thought Theorists, thus creating a new game in-town. The olfactory system's implementation of a functionally compositional system of representations allows for a new treatment of nonconceptual content as an issue of the representational format that a system employs. Formative nonconceptual content resuscitates the 'Richness of Experience' argument by showing that our experiential content outruns our conceptual repertoire, since the syntax of these states is not fully compatible. Furthermore, the unique anatomical structure and functional organization of the olfactory system helps clarify, and at times falsifies, the putative necessary conditions of consciousness posited by the leading neurobiological theories of consciousness.;The dissertation concludes by offering an alternative approach to explaining phenomenal consciousness, which builds upon the findings that the olfactory object is the chemical structure of molecular compounds, that olfactory experiences are partially nonconceptual, and the failure of contemporary neurobiological theories of consciousness. My theory is that olfactory phenomenal consciousness arises from sensory states, that these are necessary for awareness, and that our olfactory consciousness occurs in a nonconceptual format.
Type
dissertation
Source
2009_2013.csv
degree
Ph.D.
Program
Philosophy