A critique of contemporary nonnaturalist moral realism
Item
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Title
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A critique of contemporary nonnaturalist moral realism
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Identifier
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d_2009_2013:5c717bfe1e60:11068
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identifier
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11336
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Creator
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Linden, Patrick,
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Contributor
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Jesse Prinz
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Date
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2011
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Language
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English
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Publisher
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City University of New York.
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Subject
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Philosophy | McDowell | meta-ethics | Moore | moral realism | nonnaturalism | Shafer-Landau
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Abstract
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This dissertation defends the claim that nonnaturalist moral realism cannot be successfully formulated in terms of a constitution model similar to that proposed by non-reductive materialists for mental properties. Constitution metaphysics of moral properties fails to be non-reductive in any relevant sense; it is incompatible with the claim that moral properties are non-natural and it fails to provide any substance to the claim that there are objective values. Nonnatural moral properties are still in search of a believable metaphysics. The centerpiece of the dissertation is a detailed discussion of Shafer-Landau's metaphysics of moral properties as expressed in Moral Realism, since it is the most philosophically sophisticated proposal of a constitution model for moral properties. It will also be argued that nonnaturalist realism defended without a commitment to mind-independent moral properties fails to respond to common realist intuitions. In fact, the strongest intuitions about objectivity are not likely to find a comprehensible metaphysics. It is unlikely that this result will have any important social consequences.
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Type
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dissertation
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Source
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2009_2013.csv
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degree
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Ph.D.
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Program
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Philosophy
