The metacausal theory of autonomy.
Item
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Title
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The metacausal theory of autonomy.
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Identifier
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AAI3169971
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identifier
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3169971
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Creator
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Repetti, Riccardo C.
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Contributor
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Adviser: Michael Levin
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Date
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2005
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Language
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English
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Publisher
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City University of New York.
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Subject
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Philosophy
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Abstract
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David Chalmers (1996) distinguishes hard/easy problems of consciousness, identifying hard ones as the puzzling metaphysical issues, and easy problems as involving specific causal/functional relations between consciousness and brain/behavioral states. This shifts metaphysical concerns to the speculative background, and brings neurophilosophical ones to the fore. I distinguish hard/easy problems of autonomy, identifying hard ones as puzzling metaphysical issues, and easy problems as involving specific causal/functional relations between autonomy and brain/behavioral states. To solve the easy autonomy problem, I apply a causal/functional analysis to Frankfurt's (1971) meta-motivational model, yielding a model of autonomy as metacognitive self-regulative or "metacausal" control. Since intrinsically-causal, the account is intrinsically compatible with determinism. It also handles all the nuances in Frankfurt-cases involving counterfactual interveners, grounds a determinism-friendly version of "PAP", the principle of alternate possibilities, and provides an error theory for the inflated intuitions of contracausalists. The metacausal theory has the apparatus to establish easy-style meanings for such disputed notions as 'possibility' and 'ability', breaking traditional stalemates. The "consequence argument" claims determinism entails we have no free will, but I argue that it contains an implicit commitment to "deterministic actualism" that is self-refuting, it commits two modal fallacies, serious fixed/variable and attributive/referential equivocations, and other serious flaws.
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Type
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dissertation
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Source
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PQT Legacy CUNY.xlsx
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degree
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Ph.D.
