Time, unity, and conscious experience
Item
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Title
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Time, unity, and conscious experience
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Identifier
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d_2009_2013:c3a402a49be0:11655
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identifier
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12248
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Creator
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Klincewicz, Michal W.,
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Contributor
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David M. Rosenthal
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Date
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2013
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Language
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English
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Publisher
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City University of New York.
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Subject
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Philosophy | Cognitive psychology | mental qualities | passage of time | temporal experience | temporality | time perception | unity of consciousness
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Abstract
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In my dissertation I critically survey existing theories of time consciousness, and draw on recent work in neuroscience and philosophy to develop an original theory. My view depends on a novel account of temporal perception based on the notion of temporal qualities, which are mental properties that are instantiated whenever we detect change in the environment. When we become aware of these temporal qualities in an appropriate way, our conscious experience will feature the distinct temporal phenomenology that is associated with the passing of time. The temporal qualities model of perception makes two predictions about the mechanisms of time perception; one that time perception is modality specific and the other that it can occur without awareness. My argument for this view partially depends on a number of psychophysical experiments that I designed and implemented myself and which investigate subjective time distortions caused by looming visual stimuli. These results show that the mechanisms of conscious experience of time are distinct from the mechanisms of time perception, as my theory of temporal qualities predicts.
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Type
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dissertation
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Source
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2009_2013.csv
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degree
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Ph.D.
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Program
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Philosophy
