The causal role of state consciousness
Item
-
Title
-
The causal role of state consciousness
-
Identifier
-
d_2009_2013:7329612d0d04:11672
-
identifier
-
12223
-
Creator
-
Seli, George A.,
-
Contributor
-
Barbara G. Montero
-
Date
-
2013
-
Language
-
English
-
Publisher
-
City University of New York.
-
Subject
-
Philosophy | Metaphysics | consciousness | epiphenomenalism | feeling of agency | function | higher-order representation | volition
-
Abstract
-
Mental states often occur consciously. We regularly have conscious perceptions in different modalities, for example. A thought process usually involves several conscious beliefs, perhaps conscious doubts or desires. It is generally assumed that a mental state affects cognition and behavior in virtue of its psychological properties. But is a state's being conscious---what I call the c-property---causally relevant? If so, does the efficacy of that property benefit the creature that is in the conscious state? I argue for an affirmative reply, based on a higher-order theory of consciousness. Such a theory claims that for a mental state to be conscious is for the agent to be aware of being in it, via a suitable mental representation of the first-order state.;In Chapter 1, I develop an account of causally relevant properties of events, since I construe consciousness as a property of a mental event. In Chapter 2, I review traditional problems for mental causation, such as the contention that neural states are causally sufficient for all cognition and behavior. I show how proposed solutions to these problems would also establish that it is possible for the c-property to be efficacious. Even so, the property may happen to be epiphenomenal. Accordingly, in Chapter 3 I give the conditions that an event property must meet in order to count as epiphenomenal. In particular, I argue that such a property's epiphenomenality is consistent with the necessity of its instantiation to the outcome of a causal process.;I devote Chapter 4 to the function of consciousness with regard to the feeling of agency. I argue that the higher-order representation that makes such a feeling conscious can be deployed in reasoning about the feeling at the time it occurs. I extend this account in Chapter 5 to conscious perceptions, volitions, and thoughts, arguing that the utility of these first-order states' being represented is to enable reasoning about whether to be in the states. I conclude by showing how my proposal explains the correlation between consciousness and (i) perceptions and volitions that guide non-routine behavior, and (ii) thinking that intellectually challenges the agent.
-
Type
-
dissertation
-
Source
-
2009_2013.csv
-
degree
-
Ph.D.
-
Program
-
Philosophy
