Aristotle on the common sense and the unity of perception
Item
-
Title
-
Aristotle on the common sense and the unity of perception
-
Identifier
-
d_2009_2013:2a413fb14f86:11761
-
identifier
-
12376
-
Creator
-
Twomey, Rosemary,
-
Contributor
-
Iakovos Vasiliou
-
Date
-
2013
-
Language
-
English
-
Publisher
-
City University of New York.
-
Subject
-
Philosophy | Aristotle | common sense | perception | unity
-
Abstract
-
This dissertation addresses the common sense, which is the name commentators give to the perceptual capacity in Aristotle's psychology through which we are able to engage in sophisticated perceptual activity. The common sense is responsible for all activities of the perceptual faculty that go beyond the reception of the special objects by the special senses, including: the perception of the common objects; joint perception; discrimination; memory; sleep; and self-consciousness. I argue that all of these functions implicate a higher-order perception of the activity of the special senses, i.e. a metaperception. My account explains our ability to engage in these activities, which otherwise appear rather disparate, since each requires a single perceptual state with a complex content.;In Chapter One, I present Plato's theory of perception from Theaetetus. According to the view there espoused, perception is the unstructured uptake of special objects: complex contents are introduced by the mind. I show that Plato's view leaves Aristotle with the dialectical burden of accounting for the possibility of sophisticated psychological activities that are merely perceptual.;Chapter Two provides a novel interpretation of the opening lines of De Anima III.2. According to my reading, which I call the Common Sensing Reading (CSR), the discussion here is meant to discharge the obligation left by Theaetetus. In particular, I contend that the metaperceptual apparatus he invokes ("Since we perceive that we see and hear") is introduced to account for perceptual complexity.;Chapter Three considers Aristotle's account of the perception of the common objects. I consider De Anima III.1 425a30-b3, where he argues that the perceptual faculty as a unity is able to account for in-itself perception of the common objects. My discussion here draws out the consequences that Aristotle's view has on the epistemology and psychology of perception more generally.;The final chapter considers further functions of common sensing. I here expand CSR and show that, by Aristotle's lights, all sophisticated perceptual activity can be accounted for by the metaperceptual apparatus. His empiricism is thus shown to be fully developed and internally consistent, thereby making it a viable alternative to the rationalism we find in Theaetetus.
-
Type
-
dissertation
-
Source
-
2009_2013.csv
-
degree
-
Ph.D.
-
Program
-
Philosophy
