Systematics and the selection of species
Item
-
Title
-
Systematics and the selection of species
-
Identifier
-
d_2009_2013:4b147f5402c1:11885
-
identifier
-
12562
-
Creator
-
Finkelman, Leonard,
-
Contributor
-
Massimo Pigliucci
-
Date
-
2013
-
Language
-
English
-
Publisher
-
City University of New York.
-
Subject
-
Philosophy of science | Philosophy | Systematic biology | Individuality | Levels of selection | Natural kinds | Species | Species selection | Systematics
-
Abstract
-
The last Tasmanian wolf, a male popularly named "Benjamin," died in captivity in 1936. Thylacinus cynocephalus, the species that Benjamin represented, was soon thereafter declared extinct; however, one may advance the argument that the species was already extinct when the last of Benjamin's conspecifics died, leaving him a member of an extinct species. This raises the "species problem": what, if anything, is a species?;Resolution of the species problem is complicated by the fact that species are considered "fundamental units" of biological theories in at least two senses. Species are units of taxonomy: they are the smallest "real" groups into which organisms can be classified. Species are also units of evolution: they are the entities that change over time due to Natural Selection. Following Darwin, philosophers of biology traditionally argue that these units can only be identified if species are nominal entities.;More recently, paleontologists suggest that species may be "fundamental units" in a third sense: as units of selection in a higher-order process of differential speciation and extinction. Species selection would therefore have a place in a hierarchy of selection processes.;At lower levels of selection, units of selection emerge from former units of evolution due to intrinsic functional integration. If species emerge as units of selection in the same way, then the species that participate in species selection would not be coextensive with units of evolution: since functional integration had broken down within T. cynocephalus, Benjamin would be part of the latter unit, but not the former. Nominal entities are defined by extension, and so---contrary to the received view---species meeting these criteria cannot be nominal entities.;I therefore argue that species must be natural kinds if they emerge as units of selection in a hierarchy of selection processes. Given the simultaneous identity of units of selection, units of evolution, and units of taxonomy, I suggest an application of the Kripke/Putnam model of natural kinds that is consistent with the theory of Natural Selection. I also consider a reading of Darwin's work that demonstrates the viability of this model.
-
Type
-
dissertation
-
Source
-
2009_2013.csv
-
degree
-
Ph.D.
-
Program
-
Philosophy
