The nature of agentive awareness
Item
-
Title
-
The nature of agentive awareness
-
Identifier
-
d_2009_2013:cdc2d801a1b5:11934
-
identifier
-
12609
-
Creator
-
Mylopoulos, Myrto,
-
Contributor
-
David Rosenthal
-
Date
-
2013
-
Language
-
English
-
Publisher
-
City University of New York.
-
Subject
-
Philosophy | Philosophy of science | action | agentive awareness | comparator model | consciousness | intention | sense of agency
-
Abstract
-
The way in which we are subjectively aware of our passive movements stands in stark contrast to the way in which we are typically aware of our actions. Following Bayne and Pacherie (2007), I call the latter type of awareness agentive awareness. A robust literature on agentive awareness has recently emerged, but there is as of yet no consensus as to its underlying nature. The goal of this dissertation is to give a complete account of agentive awareness that is sensitive to a range of theoretical and empirical considerations.;There are three main questions that frame theorizing surrounding agentive awareness. The first is the question of what kind of awareness is agentive awareness--in other words, in virtue of what kind of mental state (e.g., sensory, cognitive) is one aware of oneself as acting? In Chapter 2, I argue that no sensory approach to agentive awareness is workable. In particular, I argue that if one is agentively aware in virtue of being in suitable sensory states, then such states must be the outputs of some sensory modality. But there is no sensory modality within which to locate these states.;Second, there is the question of how agentive awareness relates to action control. Is it a function of low-level, sensorimotor control, as some have argued? Or high-level, intentional control, as others maintain? In Chapter 3, I argue against dominant low-level accounts of agentive awareness that are pitched in terms of a popular neurocomputational model of sensorimotor control developed by Chris Frith: the comparator model. I evaluate the empirical case for this approach, and argue that it fails to support it. Moreover, I argue that there are dissociations between sensorimotor control and agentive awareness that raise doubts about the success of any low-level account of agentive awareness.;A third question pertains to the psychological mechanisms underlying agentive awareness. What events must take place at the psychological level in order for agentive awareness to arise? There is a broad consensus among theorists that agentive awareness arises out of a matching process between our intentions and our actions. The most influential version of this view has been championed by Daniel Wegner. In Chapter 4, I argue against Wegner's view, and matching accounts in general, on the grounds that (i) the empirical evidence cited in their favor does not, in fact, hold up, and (ii) they are not sensitive to the reliable character of our intentions, and (iii) there are cases in which agentive awareness arises in the absence of a match between an intention and an action.;These considerations point in the end to an account of agentive awareness on which it is non-sensory, located at the level of intentional control, and does not require a match between an intention and an action to arise. In Chapter 5, I develop a novel account of agentive awareness along these lines, arguing that one is agentively aware in virtue of being in suitable cognitive states, i.e., thoughts, which are formed on the basis of executive intentions, i.e., intentions to do something here and now. This account does justice to pre-theoretical desiderata, as laid out in Chapter 1, avoids the pitfalls by which other accounts are hindered, and enjoys ample empirical support.
-
Type
-
dissertation
-
Source
-
2009_2013.csv
-
degree
-
Ph.D.
-
Program
-
Philosophy
