Truth and moral discourse.
Item
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Title
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Truth and moral discourse.
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Identifier
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AAI3213155
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identifier
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3213155
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Creator
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McDonald, Fritz J.
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Contributor
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Adviser: Paul Horwich
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Date
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2006
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Language
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English
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Publisher
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City University of New York.
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Subject
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Philosophy
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Abstract
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In this dissertation, I will examine the relationship between moral theory, the metaphysics of morality, and the semantics of moral discourse. In particular, I will consider what bearing the question of whether moral utterances are straightforwardly true or false has on meta-ethical positions and moral theories. I will argue that the conflation of semantic, metaphysical, psychological, and moral questions has led to a great deal of unnecessary confusion regarding many of the most critical concerns in these domains. In order to resolve this confusion, I will present an account of the semantics of moral discourse based on our commonsense view of the practice of moral argument, the minimalist theory of truth, and a use theory of meaning. In light of this account, I will consider how semantic issues do and do not bear on certain central metaphysical and moral problems.;My main conclusions are: (1) Minimalism and the use theory have the resources to present an account of the semantics of moral discourse fully consistent with common sense; (2) There are no grounds for holding that moral utterances are not truth-apt, and any theory that denies this critical claim will run into serious difficulties; (3) There is no inconsistency between minimalism and the core principles and motivations behind important meta-ethical theories such as expressivism and constructivism.
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Type
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dissertation
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Source
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PQT Legacy CUNY.xlsx
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degree
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Ph.D.
