The problem of consciousness: Mental appearance and mental reality.
Item
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Title
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The problem of consciousness: Mental appearance and mental reality.
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Identifier
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AAI3245080
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identifier
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3245080
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Creator
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Weisberg, Josh.
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Contributor
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Adviser: David M. Rosenthal
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Date
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2007
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Language
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English
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Publisher
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City University of New York.
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Subject
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Philosophy | Psychology, General
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Abstract
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Consciousness is widely seen as posing a special explanatory problem for science. The problem is rooted in the apparent gulf between consciousness as it appears from the first-person perspective and consciousness as it is characterized in scientific theory. From the first-person perspective it seems that we directly access intrinsic qualities of conscious experience, qualities immediately known, but isolated and indescribable. But scientific theory seems ill-equipped to explain such qualities.;That is how things appear from the first-person perspective. However, in this dissertation I argue that we have no reason to accept that these appearances reflect the underlying nature of the conscious mind. I begin by examining attempts by David Chalmers, Joseph Levine, and Ned Block to characterize the problem of consciousness. I argue that all three fail to establish anything more than the claim that consciousness appears to have intrinsic qualities. If we can explain these appearances without endorsing the reality of intrinsic qualities, the way is open to a satisfying materialist theory of consciousness.;The key, I argue, is to provide a feasible model of first-person access. I consider a popular model of first-person access, the "phenomenal concepts" approach, but I argue that this model either fails to explain the appearances or it posits an undischarged mysterious element, undermining the proposed explanation. I then defend a model of first-person access that avoids these pitfalls. I propose that we access our conscious states by way of an automatically applied nonconscious theory. We are unaware of the theory's application, so the access seems direct. Further, we are unaware of the rich relational descriptions the theory employs. It therefore seems to us that we are accessing intrinsic, indescribable qualities. I then present empirical evidence for my model, including the phenomenon of "expert perception" in chess, music, wine tasting, and the appreciation of beauty; and a range of data suggesting that introspection is not a reliable guide to the underlying nature of the conscious mind. I conclude by countering the knowledge argument with a version of the "ability hypothesis," in order to close off any lingering philosophical worries concerning the problem of consciousness.
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Type
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dissertation
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Source
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PQT Legacy CUNY.xlsx
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degree
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Ph.D.
