Are there moral obligations to oneself?
Item
-
Title
-
Are there moral obligations to oneself?
-
Identifier
-
AAI3283211
-
identifier
-
3283211
-
Creator
-
Shouler, Kenneth.
-
Contributor
-
Adviser: Bernard Baumrin
-
Date
-
2007
-
Language
-
English
-
Publisher
-
City University of New York.
-
Subject
-
Philosophy
-
Abstract
-
After showing that the topic of duties to oneself has been de-emphasized in the history of philosophical ethics, I demonstrate that this is due in large part to philosophers embracing the social view of morality (SVM). SVM argues that all morality is interpersonal and that how an agent treats himself may be a matter of prudence but doesn't rise to the level of morality or allow for moral obligations to oneself. I reply that SVM not only fails to disprove the possibility of duties to oneself, but is logically inconsistent for failing to acknowledge that agents can benefit or mistreat themselves in ways strongly analogous to the ways in which they benefit or mistreat others. There are several ways in which this is so. For one, benefiting oneself is similar to beneficence toward others. Also, there are self-regarding virtues like persistence, courage and self-control which it is our obligation to practice, just as we are obliged to practice other-regarding virtues. Agents have further obligations to be prudent and not harm themselves, just as they are obliged not to harm others. In addition to these obligations, there are obligations to keep promises with oneself and not to engage in self-deception.
-
Type
-
dissertation
-
Source
-
PQT Legacy CUNY.xlsx
-
degree
-
Ph.D.
