The president that never was: Maximino Avila Camacho and the taming of caudillismo in early post-revolutionary Mexico.
Item
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Title
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The president that never was: Maximino Avila Camacho and the taming of caudillismo in early post-revolutionary Mexico.
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Identifier
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AAI3283713
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identifier
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3283713
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Creator
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Quintana, Alejandro.
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Contributor
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Adviser: Margaret E. Crahan
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Date
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2007
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Language
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English
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Publisher
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City University of New York.
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Subject
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History, Latin American
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Abstract
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This study analyzes the effects of the machinations of a unique political boss, the product of Mexican political culture at a particular juncture of a political system in the process of formation. More specifically, it focuses on caudillo1 legacies, their evolution, and their influence on the process by which a state-sponsored (official) party was able to dominate the Mexican state between 1929 and 2000. The official party (today known as Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI) was founded in 1929, in large part to institutionalize a renovated political system that intended to eliminate traditional caudillismo in Mexico. This study argues that such caudillismo did not completely disappear, but rather the official party pragmatically opted for a strategy that incorporated caudillos as part of the machinery of a one-party authoritarian system. The result was a modified form of caudillismo in which leaders still engaged in caudillistic practices such as cronyism, corruption, co-optation and coercion, but who were now dependent on and somewhat submissive to the party. Most of these party caudillos were former caciques 2 who became part of the party elite helping establish the party's domination in their region. While traditional caudillos may have faded, these emerging political leaders used such practices to guarantee the party's domination of the state in exchange for political and economic privileges. This contributed to the consolidation of the stable and authoritarian post-revolutionary Mexican state of the twentieth century.;By focusing on Maximino Avila Camacho (1891-1945), the preeminent cacique of the Mexican state of Puebla in the 1930s and a powerful caudillo in the 1940s, this dissertation analyzes how the official party empowered caciques and utilized their caudillistic attributes in order to stabilize and dominate the Mexican state. Maximino's political career provides an excellent case study because he was one of the first political leaders who built a clientelistic network after the foundation of the official party, thus demonstrating the continuity from cacique to caudillo and the effect of this on the Mexican political system. Maximino's rise began when President Lazaro Cardenas (1934-40) appointed him as military commander of Puebla in 1935. One year later, Maximino used this position to secure the official party's dominance in the state of Puebla. As a reward in 1937 the party helped Maximino become governor of that state. Similarly, after organizing a regional coalition and a number of governors in support of the party's presidential candidate in 1940, Maximino took over the Ministry of Communications and Public Works (1941-45), which was a prime base for the distribution of favors. As minister, Maximino expanded his patriarchal influence and power beyond Puebla's borders. For example, he used the influence of the Ministry of Communications and Public Works (SCOP) to establish a national clientelistic network that helped him become a major political figure at the national level. The party and the presidents were generally tolerant and supportive of caudillos, and even in some cases their abuses, because such relationships helped consolidate a one-party dominated state.;The ambitions and autonomy of caudillos made it necessary for the party to establish mechanisms to control them. One such strategy was rewarding loyalty with political office and access to government resources. Another was making it risky for caudillos to operate without the party. Therefore, many caudillos opted to benefit from the perks available rather than sacrifice anything. The case of Maximino illustrates this. By 1942 Maximino by using the emerging system, in part through distributing contracts via SCOP to his cronies and allies was considered one of the most powerful and wealthiest men in Mexico and he was determined to become president. Yet, he failed to do so. Members of the party elite fearing his personalistic authoritarian tendencies denied him the party's endorsement. Maximino attempted to challenge them, but breaking from the party meant losing access to the resources that sustained his political base. As a consequence, he was forced to remain submissive to the party, while the latter was able to pursue state and party stability. This study allows us to better understand the intricacies of such processes in a formative period of the regime that ruled Mexico for most of the twentieth century.
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Type
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dissertation
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Source
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PQT Legacy CUNY.xlsx
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degree
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Ph.D.
