Between being and not -being: Non -existent objects and the intermediary in Plato, Frege, and Meinong.
Item
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Title
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Between being and not -being: Non -existent objects and the intermediary in Plato, Frege, and Meinong.
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Identifier
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AAI3287136
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identifier
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3287136
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Creator
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Albrecht, Vera.
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Contributor
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Adviser: Richard Mendelsohn
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Date
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2007
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Language
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English
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Publisher
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City University of New York.
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Subject
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Philosophy
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Abstract
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Talk and thought about non-existent objects pose problems of accounting for intentionality and meaning, and for answering the question whether statements about non-existent objects can have truth values. The focus and core of this dissertation is the interpretation of three theories: Plato's account of false statements in the Sophist and his notion of eikon (image) in the Republic, Frege's distinction between sense and reference, and Meinong's theory of objects. The discussion is preceded by an examination of Parmenides' fragments. In this interpretation, Plato's notions of eidolon (image) in the Sophist and eikon (image) in the Republic explain intentionality and meaning for complete statements and singular terms, even if no sensible object is denoted. Though Plato's theory of "interweaving" provides a clue for determining the truth and falsity of statements, it remains unclear if statements about non-existents can be true, and it is impossible to formulate statements equivalent to modern negative existence claims in Plato's terms. Frege's concept of sense as "mode of presentation" fulfills the role of cognitive content and meaning for sentences and singular terms that lack a reference. According to Frege, however, statements containing referenceless singular terms have no truth value. We argue that, contrary to Frege's view, it is desirable to account for true statements about non-existent objects, and we show that it is possible to construe them on the basis of Frege's theory. Meinong's concept of "Aussersein" (out-of-being) and his theory of incomplete objects provide a way to account not only for an intentional object and meaning, but also for truth and falsity when talking about non-existents. If taken in terms of sets of properties, Meinongian objects are less eccentric than they appear prima facie. Plato's notions of eidolon and eikon, Frege's notion of sense, and Meinong's concept of incomplete objects are strikingly similar insofar as each of them constitutes a cognitive and semantic intermediary, which can be understood as presumed object that is determined by a set of properties.
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Type
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dissertation
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Source
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PQT Legacy CUNY.xlsx
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degree
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Ph.D.
