TACIT KNOWLEDGE.

Title

TACIT KNOWLEDGE.

Identifier

AAI8014986

identifier

8014986

Creator

SAMET, JERRY HOWARD.

Contributor

Robert Fiengo | Jerrold Katz

Date

1980

Language

English

Publisher

City University of New York.

Subject

Philosophy

Abstract

One of the central methodological claims of Chomsky's linguistics is that speakers have tacit knowledge of the underlying grammar of their language. It is on the strength of this claim that Chomsky has construed linguistics as part of cognitive psychology. The knowledge in question is said to be 'tacit' because speakers are not only unaware of having such knowledge, but they cannot become aware of it by introspection. The ascription of such knowledge to speakers is doubly controversial. From a general epistemological perspective, it involves the idea that there can be knowledge that is more or less permanently hidden from the awareness of the knower. But apart from its epistemological novelty, the tacit knowledge hypothesis also proposes a mentalist treatment of linguistic functioning as involving unconscious rule application. I defend the notion of tacit knowledge by arguing that both these views are essentially correct. My main interest, however, is in the general epistemological claim; I concentrate on its application to language because most of the relevant discussions of the issues have been made in relation to our knowledge of language. If it can be shown that we have tacit knowledge of linguistic principles, then a fortiori we have tacit knowledge.;In Chapter I, I discuss the locus modernus of the tacit knowledge controversy--viz. Chomsky's Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. I then present a set of conditions of adequacy adapted from Brentano that I suggest should be satisfied by any attempt to legitimize tacit knowledge ascriptions.;In Chapter II, I consider two sorts of theoretical objections to the view that there can be any such thing as knowledge that is tacit. The first sort rests on the view that tacit knowledge fails to meet certain a priori criteria that bona fide knowledge must satisfy. These criteria are claimed to be connected to the Freudean notion(s) of the unconscious. I argue that these objections can be met and are ultimately based on a misunderstanding of Freud's position. The second sort of objection is based on the view that there are insurmountable methodological problems pertaining to issues of extensional equivalence that prevent us from ascribing tacit knowledge. Here I argue that the problem is no worse in this case than in ordinary cases of ascription of knowledge and belief. The chapter concludes with a discussion of Quine's position on tacit knowledge ascriptions.;Chapter III is divided into two parts. In the first, I discuss further arguments against the notion of tacit knowledge. Although in themselves unsuccessful, these arguments point the way to what I take to be a significant objection to the Chomskyan position--specifically, the problem of constraining ascriptions of tacit knowledge. I then take up Fodor's conception of tacit knowledge as a response to this last objection. Fodor's view is that we should ascribe tacit knowledge to an organism on the basis of the internal workings of an optimal simulation of the organism. I argue that Fodor's position leads to implausible results.;Chapter IV has three parts. In the first, I consider another model for tacit knowledge ascriptions proposed by Graves, Katz, et. al.. This conception I argue, meets the objections levelled against the Chomskyan position. The key to this proposal is that we only ascribe tacit knowledge in cases where we have some unexplained explicit knowledge to account for. In the next section I consider and reject a number of arguments against the Graves-Katz approach. Finally, I argue that two proposed alternatives to explanation by ascription of tacit knowledge are unacceptable.

Type

dissertation

Source

PQT Legacy CUNY.xlsx

degree

Ph.D.

Program

Philopsophy

Item