THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

Item

Title
THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.
Identifier
AAI8112350
identifier
8112350
Creator
DUBIN, ELLIOTT JOEL.
Contributor
Harold Hochman
Date
1980
Language
English
Publisher
City University of New York.
Subject
Economics, Finance
Abstract
A substantial portion of the literature on public finance is concerned with the changes in the levels of expenditures and/or taxes of governmental units that receive grants from higher levels of government. Until recently, most authors on this subject were concerned with determining whether these intergovernmental flows of revenues caused recipients to increase expenditures on the aided function, or all functions, from their own revenue sources, to use a portion of these funds to reduce local taxes, or to keep total expenditures constant by using some of these grant funds to increase expenditures on unaided functions. It was generally assumed, usually implicitly, that the recipient governmental units would react in a similar manner, in regard to changes in spending/taxing levels, to the grants.;The position taken in this study is that different jurisdiction will respond in different manners to grants-in-aid. To be more specific, it is assumed that the relatively higher income areas would increase revenues from their own sources more (or decrease these revenues less) than would lower income areas in response to grants from the Federal government. Although the data do not prove the hypothesis conclusively, there are indications that in some instances different areas display different responses to Federal aids.
Type
dissertation
Source
PQT Legacy CUNY.xlsx
degree
Ph.D.
Program
Economics
Item sets
CUNY Legacy ETDs