THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL LEVERAGE IN A PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP: THE CASE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL, 1967-1984 (USSR, PEACE INITIATIVE, ARAB STATES, INDUCEMENT, COERCION).

Item

Title
THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL LEVERAGE IN A PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP: THE CASE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL, 1967-1984 (USSR, PEACE INITIATIVE, ARAB STATES, INDUCEMENT, COERCION).
Identifier
AAI8611369
identifier
8611369
Creator
NACHMIAS, NITZA.
Contributor
Seymour M. Finger
Date
1986
Language
English
Publisher
City University of New York.
Subject
Political Science, General
Abstract
The transfer of arms has become a crucial dimension of U.S. foreign policy and a major instrument for achieving its goals. This research examines the strategies, tactics, and consequences of U.S. arms transfers to Israel since 1967, using the model of patron-client relationship. It examines the purpose and efficacy of military aid as a means to achieve political leverage, and assumes that the withholding or delivery of aid does not necessarily result in political leverage. The thrust of the study is to determine (a) whether or not correlations between military aid and political leverage exist, (b) what are the causes for the existence or absence of such correlations.;We assumed U.S.-Israeli arms relationship to be an excellent case study because since 1967 the U.S. has been the sole external supplier of arms to Israel. Israel is also dependent on the U.S. for credits to buy the arms it vitally needs for its security. Such a situation might be expected to yield a high level of leverage. In this case, however, it clearly did not. We have found no correlation between the variable "dependence" and the variable "aid." Indeed, Israel was very successful in resisting American pressures to conform its foreign policy to U.S. desires.;In order to reach conclusions and generalizations as to the causes of these unexpected results, we examined U.S.-Israeli relations in times of conflict and in the framework of the international and the regional environments. We identified four regional and global dilemmas and found clear correlations between them and the absence of American leverage. These dilemmas are an integral part of the international system and they result from its bipolar structure as well as the power competition between the U.S. and the USSR. Consequently, the client-state can pursue an independent foreign policy and often even enjoys leverage over its patron-state. As long as these dilemmas exist, U.S. leverage will be, at best, very limited.
Type
dissertation
Source
PQT Legacy CUNY.xlsx
degree
Ph.D.
Program
Political Science
Item sets
CUNY Legacy ETDs