Clinical implications of the mind/body question: A critique of mechanism.
Item
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Title
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Clinical implications of the mind/body question: A critique of mechanism.
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Identifier
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AAI9207096
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identifier
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9207096
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Creator
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Lipson, Michael Aaron.
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Contributor
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Adviser: I. H. Paul
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Date
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1991
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Language
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English
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Publisher
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City University of New York.
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Subject
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Psychology, Clinical
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Abstract
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This dissertation proposes that some functions of consciousness (such as understanding itself) must be taken as fundamental to psychological science and incapable of reduction to or derivation from non-conscious processes. Psychotherapeutic practice always presupposes the potential for free action, and a faith in the irreducible reality of consciousness, even if its practitioners dispute these categories in theory. Mechanistic theories of psychology, including biological, behavioral, and drive-theoretical (psychoanalytic) schemas in their totalistic forms, cannot account for their own claims to validity. To assert that all consciousness derives from brain activity, for example, is to forget that this very assertion assumes partial freedom from biology. For if it too were the product of neurochemical processes alone, it would lose all possible claim to "correctness." Topics in the history of mind/body problematization, from Aristotle to psychoneuroimmunology and computer models of mind, are examined with regard to this self-referential theme. Clinical implications include emphasis on the choicefulness of patients' behavior and a focus on psychological capacity rather than performance.
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Type
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dissertation
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Source
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PQT Legacy CUNY.xlsx
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degree
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Ph.D.
