The Continentals: A comparative analysis of a late eighteenth-century standing army, 1775-1783.
Item
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Title
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The Continentals: A comparative analysis of a late eighteenth-century standing army, 1775-1783.
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Identifier
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AAI9325146
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identifier
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9325146
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Creator
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Scudieri, James Domenic.
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Contributor
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Adviser: David Syrett
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Date
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1993
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Language
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English
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Publisher
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City University of New York.
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Subject
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History, United States | History, Modern | History, European
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Abstract
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This study examines the Continental main army within the context of eighteenth-century military history. It evaluates their capabilities and limitations vis-a-vis the other regular forces in the war.;Military structures among the armies in North America were remarkably similar. All participants relied heavily on regimental recruiters who resorted to war-duration or relatively short terms of service. The Continentals' logistical channels actually compared favorably with regard to pay and food, but the supply services had to rely on French imports to meet basic equipment needs. Despite foreign aid, uniforms remained a problem throughout the war.;All soldiers' motivation rested upon little discernible loyalty to a higher cause, relying instead upon unit esprit, leadership, and material incentives. Likewise, Continental Army records revealed little that was different from its allies and enemies in discipline, desertion, and mutinies--except for the highest desertion rate of the war. The ability of patriot military leaders to establish viable standard operating procedures (SOPs) was critical for field effectiveness. Combat effectiveness developed over time.;The role of Baron von Steuben looms large in this study. His unitary system of drill gave the patriot soldiers the requisite tactical articulation to implement the intricacies of linear warfare. As Inspector General, he became Washington's most powerful staff officer, even beyond a de facto chief of staff. He was Washington's agent for institutionalizing military excellence.;Washington's officers generally served him well. The generals had some combat experience from the French and Indian war, but none in high command. Unfortunately, too many company and battalion commanders were novices with a predilection for emphasizing the privileges of rank with insufficient attention to the attendant responsibilities.;By 1778 the Continental Army was little different from other armies of the period and thus mirrored them to a far greater extent than heretofore acknowledged. This success was due not only to the successful establishment of professional military institutions but also to certain limitations of all armies waging a protracted war.
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Type
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dissertation
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Source
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PQT Legacy CUNY.xlsx
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degree
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Ph.D.
