Telecommunications policy and integration processes in the European Union.

Item

Title
Telecommunications policy and integration processes in the European Union.
Identifier
AAI9707133
identifier
9707133
Creator
Natalicchi, Giorgio.
Contributor
Adviser: Howard H. Lentner
Date
1996
Language
English
Publisher
City University of New York.
Subject
Political Science, International Law and Relations | Political Science, Public Administration | Political Science, General | Information Science
Abstract
In the mid-1980's, radical changes in telecoms technologies and in the political economy of telecoms provoked European governments to place telecoms under the supranational regime of the EC. The collapse of the monopoly-based international cartel and the emergence of international competition induced these governments to accept the Commission's proposal for a common market for telecoms.;EC telecoms policy followed the integration and liberalization goals set by the Commission. EC responsibilities gradually expanded, reinforced by policies in related areas. A majority of the interest groups involved in the Commission's consultative process pressed for further liberalization.;Although national preferences influenced EC telecoms policy, they did not determine its outcome. The mediation of the Commission produced mid-point rather than lowest common denominator outcomes. In the 1990's the balance in the Council tilted further in favor of integration and liberalization, permitting the Commission to sponsor further steps towards telecoms integration.;External competition enhanced the power of the Commission, which was charged with closing the technological gap with Japan and the United States and gradually took on the role of advocate for Europe's collective interests. Thus, increased competition in international markets reinforced Europe's pursuit of cooperation and liberalization.;The case of telecoms has important implications for theories of European integration. It shows that sectoral integration follows a two-phase cycle. In the first phase, the sector is included in the EU agenda but national preferences have fundamental importance. In the second phase, supranational institutions set the policy agenda and the expansion of the agenda is driven by spillover mechanisms.;Agenda expansion is not automatic. National and European-wide groups influence the Commission. State preferences continue to influence outcomes. Nevertheless, bargaining outcomes do not follow a logic of the lowest common denominator. The Commission not only mediates between competing national interests, but also asserts its own preferences. Finally, events in the international arena condition both the behavior of member states and neo-functional processes. They can produce either a positive or negative impact on member government's attitudes towards further regional integration, and can also either reinforce or weaken the role of central institutions.
Type
dissertation
Source
PQT Legacy CUNY.xlsx
degree
Ph.D.
Item sets
CUNY Legacy ETDs