Language understanding and compositional semantics.
Item
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Title
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Language understanding and compositional semantics.
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Identifier
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AAI9946216
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identifier
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9946216
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Creator
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Romer, Ligia Maria.
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Contributor
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Adviser: Stephen R. Schiffer
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Date
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1999
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Language
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English
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Publisher
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City University of New York.
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Subject
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Philosophy | Psychology, Cognitive | Language, Linguistics
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Abstract
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In this dissertation I offer arguments in defense of the dominant approach to the relationship between theories of meaning and semantic competence. According to this approach, which I call the Common View (CV), natural languages need a compositional semantics to explain language understanding. CV is modeled after Chomsky's program in linguistics and Davidson's work on what constitutes a correct meaning theory.;Two assumptions lie at the core of CV. Roughly, the first assumption is that (tacit) knowledge of meaning underlies a speaker's language understanding; the second assumption is that this knowledge is of a compositional semantics. Within CV there are Davidsonians who claim the correct semantics is a compositional truth theory, and propositionalists who claim it is a compositional meaning theory.;Critics of CV offer two kinds of challenges. Much criticism is aimed at extensionalist CV accounts. I concur with much of this criticism and I argue that even a recent extensionalist version of CV offered by Larson & Segal (L&S), which reiterates the central tenets of the Davidsonian Chomsky-inspired program, still faces problems due in large part to their extensionalism. Therefore, I consider whether propositionalist interpretations of CV offer support for CV's core assumptions.;Other criticisms leveled at CV pose the challenge whether any knowledge of meaning is needed to explain language understanding, regardless of whether the meaning theory is extensionally or propositionally interpreted. In particular, CV here faces Schiffer's counterexample of Harvey which offers a translational account of language understanding. I address these challenges by presenting arguments in support of CV that are inspired by Peacocke's findings in psychological explanation and by a reinterpretation of what understanding entails based on Lepore's notion of a rationalizing step.;CV's continued centrality in the philosophy of language and the fact that it deals with the dual concerns of explaining language understanding and of formulating a correct semantics warrant a reconsideration of its basic assumptions. I conclude that at this point the criticisms do not offer a foolproof refutation of CV; hence there is no argument to justify an all-out rejection of CV.
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Type
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dissertation
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Source
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PQT Legacy CUNY.xlsx
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degree
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Ph.D.
