Many -valued morality.

Title: Many -valued morality.
Identifier: AAI9986306
identifier: 9986306
Creator: Brodetz, Merav.
Contributor: Adviser: Michael Levin
Date: 2000
Language: English
Publisher: City University of New York.
Subject: Philosophy
Abstract: Punishments and rewards are proportionate to actions' degree of wrongness and rightness, which means that gradation is a datum about morality. In my dissertation I argue that this datum cannot be captured by existing---that is, two- and three-valued---moralities, but can be accommodated by a many-valued system. I then develop a many-valued morality and obtain several important results. Among the latter are (i) a pluralist (multi-standard) ethics: by contrast to both two- and three-valued moralities, a many-valued framework allows one to always weigh more than a single standard when evaluating actions; (ii) a sympathetic reading of Kant's 'lack of moral worth': from a many-valued perspective, this notion (which many deem problematic) is but a third moral value (in addition to 'right' and 'wrong'), and reflects an attempt to capture moral gradation; and (iii) a new outlook on an aspect of the dispute between utilitarianism and deontological justice: whether killing a few to save many is unjust is a matter of degree; whether utilitarianism conflicts with justice over this issue is not.
Type: dissertation
Source: PQT Legacy CUNY.xlsx
degree: Ph.D.