Towards a psychoanalytic theory of will.
Item
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Title
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Towards a psychoanalytic theory of will.
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Identifier
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AAI9029960
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identifier
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9029960
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Creator
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Mausner, Joel Stephan.
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Contributor
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Adviser: I. H. Paul
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Date
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1990
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Language
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English
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Publisher
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City University of New York.
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Subject
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Psychology, Clinical | Psychology, Personality | Psychology, General
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Abstract
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The concept of will has a curious status in psychoanalytic theory. For the most part it has been ignored, or dismissed as an antiquated notion. But psychoanalysis has had to develop concepts which are rough approximations to will, e.g., "ego autonomy". And much of the conceptual upheaval which psychoanalytic metapsychology has undergone in recent years is intimately related to will, although rarely discussed as such. It is therefore proposed that psychoanalytic theory would benefit from a clarification of the concept of will.;Part one is a critical examination of the psychoanalytic literature on will and related topics. It is focused around three themes: ego autonomy, freedom of will, and volitional processes. With regard to ego autonomy (and the related theme of active mastery), the contributions of Freud, Waelder, Hartmann, Hendrick, Rapaport, Miller, Gill/Brenman, Holt, Rubenstein, and George Klein are considered. With regard to freedom of will, the various positions taken in the debate are discussed, including the "hard determinism" of Freud and Knight, the "soft determinism" of Holt and Shapiro, and the "libertarianism" of May and Schafer. There is also a discussion of the few contributions focused on volitional processes per se: Wheelis on will-power, Rangell on decision-making, and Shapiro on the role of volition in neurotic action.;Part two is an original contribution towards a theory of will. The will is defined as a sub-system of the ego system, and its processes, products, principles and boundaries are specified. The nature of decision-making and will-power are then explored in more detail. Free will is described in terms of two levels of freedom: voluntariness and transcendence. And unfree will is analogously conceptualized in terms of two levels: act coercion, which generates symptom compulsion, and will deficit, which leads to repetition compulsion. Various ways in which willed intentions become distorted in psychopathology are also examined, and two main levels of distortion are identified: "akrasia" or weakness of the will versus "aboulia" or diffusion of the will.
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Type
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dissertation
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Source
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PQT Legacy Restricted.xlsx
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degree
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Ph.D.