A critique of Saul Kripke's "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language"
Item
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Title
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A critique of Saul Kripke's "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language"
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Identifier
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d_2009_2013:55184bfa1c05:09968
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identifier
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10004
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Creator
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Gitsoulis, Chrysoula,
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Contributor
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Paul Horwich
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Date
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2009
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Language
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English
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Publisher
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City University of New York.
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Subject
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Philosophy | Kripke | meaning skepticism | normativity | private language | rule following | Wittgenstein
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Abstract
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In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke presents a controversial skeptical argument, which he attributes to Wittgenstein's interlocutor in the Philosophical Investigations [PI]. The argument purports to show that there are no facts that correspond to what we mean by our words. Kripke maintains, moreover, that the conclusion of Wittgenstein's so-called private language argument is a corollary of results Wittgenstein establishes in §§137-202 of PI concerning the topic of following-a-rule, and not the conclusion of an independently developed argument in §§243ff of PI, as most commentators take it to be. In this work, I assess Kripke's skeptical argument both in its own right, and as an interpretation of the rule-following sections of PI. In its own right, I try to show that it is critically flawed. However, as an interpretation of the rule-following sections of PI, I try to show that it is essentially correct. I do this by showing that Kripke's interpretation squares with and supports the metaphilosophical framework developed by Wittgenstein in §§107-136 of PI, which immediately precedes his remarks on following-a-rule.
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Type
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dissertation
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Source
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2009_2013.csv
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degree
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Ph.D.
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Program
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Philosophy
