Dynamic contract model under asymmetric information.

Title: Dynamic contract model under asymmetric information.
Identifier: AAI3205020
identifier: 3205020
Creator: Kusuda, Yasuyuki.
Contributor: Adviser: David J. Gabel
Date: 2006
Language: English
Publisher: City University of New York.
Subject: Economics, Theory | Economics, General | Economics, Labor
Abstract: In this article, I propose a new approach by which incentive-compatible contract models are combined with a matching model to formulate a basic recursive contract model under asymmetric information. This model is expected to contain both incentive problems between principals and agents in "economics of incentive" and intertemporal transitory decision problems in "recursive economics." In this model I provide the traditional contract theory with a new interpretation about reservation utilities prior probability, and describe how the optimal contracts are determined in the recursive context.
Type: dissertation
Source: PQT Legacy CUNY.xlsx
degree: Ph.D.