Cognitive and moral evaluations of lies and deception.
Item
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Title
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Cognitive and moral evaluations of lies and deception.
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Identifier
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AAI3063834
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identifier
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3063834
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Creator
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Greenfield, Phyllis.
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Contributor
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Adviser: Benzion Chanowitz
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Date
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2002
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Language
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English
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Publisher
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City University of New York.
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Subject
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Psychology, Experimental | Psychology, Social
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Abstract
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This research explores how lies and deception are comprehended and evaluated. To that end, the statements and interpretations of 57 male and 54 female Brooklyn College students of diverse cultural and religious backgrounds were analyzed. They read eight short stories and open-ended questions that involved various forms of deceit. Carol Gilligan (1993), in response to the work of Piaget and Kohlberg, has asserted that two modes of moral reasoning exist. These are care, seen as the primary focus for women, and justice seen as the primary focus for men. The variables of care and justice were embedded in the rationales given for the deceit of the protagonists in the stories presented to the participants. Care and justice, as well as gender, were variables of particular interest. Through a series of questionnaires the following variables were addressed: cultural orientation (individualism and collectivism), religion, level of religious observance, high and low Machiavellianism and feminine and masculine orientations. These variables were explored in order to obtain judgments about lies in general as well as judgments of omission versus commission lies. Within the context of the presented vignettes, deception was seen as generally more wrong than right. A significant disparity was found between males and females with males judging deception as more right and females judging deception as more wrong. A main effect was evidenced for omission versus commission. However, when asked specific open-ended questions, most participants reported that it was "OK to lie" and that the truth need not always be told. There was support for distinctive forms of care versus justice reasoning but there was no support for the claim that the justice/care paradigm is gender based or based on the sex roles of masculinity and femininity. The use of either care or justice as a rationale for moral reasoning was equally distributed across gender and across sex-role orientation. Participants were, overall, more care oriented.
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Type
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dissertation
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Source
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PQT Legacy CUNY.xlsx
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degree
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Ph.D.
